Lykken, D. T. (1999).
Happiness: The nature Empirical research reveals that despite
and nurture of joy and contentment. New
York: St. Martin’s Griffin.
McGue, M., Bacon, S., & Lykken, D. T. (1992).
Personality stability and change in early adult-
hood: A behavioral genetic analysis. Develop-
mental Psychology, 29, 96 –109.
Tellegen, A., Lykken, D. T., Bouchard, T. J., Jr.,
Wilcox, K., Segal, N., & Rich, S. (1988).
Personality similarity in twins reared apart
and together. Journal of Personality and So-
cial Psychology, 54, 1031–1039.
Tellegen, A., & Waller, N. (1994). Exploring
personality through test construction: Devel-
opment of the Multidimensional Personality
Questionnaire. In S. R. Briggs & J. M. Cheek
(Eds.), Personality measures: Development
and evaluation (Vol. 1, pp. 133–161). Green-
wich, CT: JAI Press.
Wong, A. H. C., Gottesman, I. I., & Petronis, A.
(2005). Phenotypic differences in genetically
identical organisms: The epigenetic perspec-
tive. Human Molecular Genetics, 14, 11–18.
David T. Lykken died on September 15, 2006,
shortly after submitting this comment. (See the
May–June 2007 American Psychologist, p. 319,
for obituary).
DOI:10.1037/0003-066X62.6.612
On the Importance of
Distinguishing Hedonia and
Eudaimonia When
Contemplating the Hedonic
Treadmill
Alan S. Waterman
The College of New Jersey
Missing from the Diener, Lucas, and Scol-
lon (May–June 2006) revision of the adap-
tation theory of well-being was any consid-
eration of the emerging distinction between
hedonic and eudaimonic well-being (Ryan
& Deci, 2001). Contrasts between hedonia
and eudaimonia, two conceptions of happi-
ness, emerged out of competing philosoph-
ical perspectives regarding the nature of a
“good life.” Within hedonism, happiness in
the form of “hedonia” is the goal to be
sought, and the greater the extent of plea-
sure experienced the better. Within this
context, no consideration is given to the
source of happiness. In contrast, according
to Aristotle, the goal of a good life is ex-
cellence in the pursuit of fulfillment of per-
sonal potentials in ways that further an
individual’s purposes in living. Happiness
in the form of “eudaimonia” is a positive
subjective state that is the product (or per-
haps a by-product) of the pursuit of self-
realization rather than the objective being
sought.
612
The objection could be raised here
a high correlation between measures of he-
donia and eudaimonia, differences between
the two are highly replicable (Waterman,
1993; Waterman, Schwartz, & Conti, in
press). For example, eudaimonia is signif-
icantly more strongly associated with the
extent to which activities are associated
with opportunities to develop one’s best
potentials, with investing a great deal of
effort, with having clear goals, and with
feeling challenged. In contrast, signifi-
cantly stronger correlations with hedonia
are found for such subjective experiences
as feeling relaxed, excited, and content,
losing track of time, and forgetting per-
sonal problems.
A discussion of eudaimonic well-be-
ing is relevant to the analysis of the “he-
donic treadmill” both because the reasons
for the adaptation of eudaimonia are well
understood and because the construct pro-
vides a perspective on what is necessary for
sustaining happiness. Flow experiences
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), which occur
when there is a balance of the challenges
posed by an activity and the skills a person
brings to it, can be interpreted as one indi-
cator of eudaimonia, particularly when the
talents expressed are aspects of a person’s
best potentials (Waterman, 2004). With re-
peated engagement in a challenging activ-
ity, a person’s skill levels are likely to
improve, and there will be a concomitant
reduction in the challenges involved. The
result is that an activity that once gave rise
to flow experiences becomes a source of
boredom (a condition prevailing when
skills are high and challenges are low).
This circumstance could be described as a
“eudaimonic treadmill” because, with time,
activities that once gave rise to pleasure no
longer do so. This could be interpreted as
leading to the same pessimistic conclusion
reached by Brickman and Campbell
(1971), that there is little people can do to
change their long-term levels of happiness.
However, the opposite is actually the case.
The analysis of flow experiences contains
within it the solution regarding what is
necessary for sustained experiences of eu-
daimonia. If flow experiences are to be
restored, it is necessary for a person to
increase the level of challenges undertaken,
thereby striving to further enhance the re-
alization of personal potentials. Since the
opportunities for increasing levels of chal-
lenge in any endeavor are almost limitless,
so too are opportunities for experiences of
eudaimonia. Such circumstances can more
aptly be described as a “eudaimonic stair-
case” than as a treadmill since the person is
striving to attain a higher level of accom-
plishment.
September 2007 ● American Psychologist
that increasing levels of challenges over
time will inevitably lead to frustration on
the basis of some eudaimonic equivalent of
the Peter principle: Over time, a person
tends to rise to his or her level of incom-
petence (Peter, 1969). It is true that increas-
ing challenge may result in a person reach-
ing a point where the skills present, or that
can be developed, are simply not sufficient
for a successful outcome to a particular
endeavor. However, eudaimonia is the
product not of the successful outcome of
some task or project but of striving for
excellence in the development and use of
talents. Challenges are functional in bring-
ing out the best one is able to do, or to be,
and thus are likely to be a source of well-
being, irrespective of the extent of success
achieved in any particular instance.
The existing research on the hedonic
treadmill has generally failed to take into
consideration the nature or source of the
happiness being assessed. Global ratings
for happiness do not distinguish between
hedonia and eudaimonia. Diener et al.
(2006) asked why happiness levels change
more, and why those changes are longer
sustained, for some people than for others.
The answer may be that such differences
depend on whether it is hedonia or eudai-
monia that is being affected. A higher gross
national product or longer life expectancy
may both be nation-level variables predict-
ing happiness, but it is what people do with
the wealth available or with their life spans
that determines their level of well-being
and its sustainability. The winner of a lot-
tery may use the proceeds to support a
lavish, sybaritic lifestyle or may change
careers with the goal of fulfilling personal
potentials. The happiness to be derived
from the latter is far more likely to be
sustainable.
Starting with the premise that the na-
ture and source of happiness do make a
difference, one can advance the hypothesis
that the adaptation theory of well-being is
most relevant to experiences of hedonic
enjoyment unrelated to self-realization
through the fulfillment of personal poten-
tials and purposes in life. In contrast, ex-
periences of eudaimonia are likely to have
greater sustainability, with the understand-
ing that as gains in talents are realized,
there is a concomitant need to increase the
level of challenges taken on. With respect
to interventions directed toward increasing
levels of happiness, this analysis suggests
that those interventions directed toward
promoting self-realization (and therefore
eudaimonia) will have more lasting conse-
quences than those with a focus on hedo-
nia.
REFERENCES
Brickman, P., & Campbell, D. T. (1971). Hedo-
nic relativism and planning the good society.
In M. H. Appley (Ed.), Adaptation level the-
ory: A symposium (pp. 287–302). New York:
Academic Press.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1990). Flow: The psy-
chology of optimal experience. New York:
Harper & Row.
Diener, E., Lucas, R. E., & Scollon, C. N.
(2006). Beyond the hedonic treadmill: Revis-
ing the adaptation theory of well-being. Amer-
ican Psychologist, 61, 305–314.
Peter, L. J. (1969). The Peter principle: Why
things always go wrong. New York: William
Morrow.
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2001). On happiness
and human potentials: A review of research on
hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. Annual
Review of Psychology, 52, 141–166.
Waterman, A. S. (1993). Two conceptions of
happiness: Contrasts of personal expressive-
ness (eudaimonia) and hedonic enjoyment.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
64, 678 – 691.
Waterman, A. S. (2004). Finding someone to be:
Studies on the role of intrinsic motivation in
identity formation. Identity: An International
Journal of Theory and Research, 4, 209 –228.
Waterman, A. S., Schwartz, S. J., & Conti, R. (in
press). The implications of two conceptions of
happiness (hedonic enjoyment and eudaimo-
nia) for the understanding of intrinsic motiva-
tion. Journal of Happiness Studies.
Correspondence concerning this comment
should be addressed to Alan Waterman, Depart-
ment of Psychology, The College of New Jersey,
P.O. Box 7718, Ewing, NJ 08628-0718. E-mail:
water@tcnj.edu
DOI:10.1037/0003-066X62.6.613
Is Evidence-Based Practice
Diverse Enough? Philosophy
of Science Considerations
Dennis C. Wendt Jr. and Brent D. Slife
Brigham Young University
In its policy rationale for evidence-based
practice in psychology (EBPP), the APA
Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based
Practice (May–June 2006) claims to have
constituted itself with “scientists and prac-
titioners from a wide range of perspectives
and traditions, reflecting the diverse per-
spectives within the field” (p. 273). We
applaud this attention to diversity but con-
tend that an entire perspective of the debate
was omitted in the Task Force’s newly
approved policy and its underlying report.
This perspective is a broad philosophy of
science consideration for evidence-based
practice that is held, in varying degrees, by
September 2007 ● American Psychologist
many members of several APA divisions,
including Divisions 24 (Theory and Philos-
ophy) and 32 (Humanism).
The failure to consider a philosophy
of science perspective led the Task Force to
make a number of epistemological assump-
tions that are not based on evidence or
rationale and that thus violate the very
spirit of evidence-based decision making.
In this comment, we reveal a few of these
assumptions and discuss their detrimental
consequences.
The Task Force’s grand assumption,
underlying all the claims of its report, is
that “evidence” equals “empirical.” The re-
port claims, for example, that “the purpose
of EBPP is to promote effective psycholog-
ical practice . . . by applying empirically
supported principles of psychological as-
sessment, case formulation, therapeutic re-
lationship, and intervention” (APA Presi-
dential Task Force on Evidence-Based
Practice, 2006, p. 273). Here, as in several
other places, the Task Force asserted that it
endorsed the application of empirically
supported principles but failed to explain
why.
There is, we suspect, an important rea-
son for this lack of explanation: The Task
Force assumed that an empiricist frame-
work required no justification. The usual
reasoning behind this assumption is a prev-
alent, yet mistaken, notion that “we can
only know, or know best, those aspects of
our experience that are sensory” (Slife,
Wiggins, & Graham, 2005, p. 84). This
mistake is consistent with much of psy-
chology’s recent history (Viney & King,
1998), in which empiricism has been mis-
understood to mean objective or impartial,
“in the sense of exposing what is actual or
real” (Slife et al., 2005, p. 84). In other
words, empiricism is not viewed as a par-
ticular epistemology or philosophy at all
but as a transparent window to the way
things are.
Ironically, this assumption of trans-
parency violates the very spirit of the evi-
dence-based practice movement: If the
framework of a therapeutic method re-
quires justification, then why not the
framework of an investigative method on
which the APA policy is based? The latter
framework cannot be justified empirically
because empiricism is the issue in dispute.
However, an empiricist framework can be
examined and potentially justified through
a reasoned assessment of its assumptions
and implications (Slife, Reber, & Richard-
son, 2004). Unfortunately, this type of ex-
amination is altogether missing from the
Task Force’s report and policy statement.
Without such an examination, deeply
problematic aspects of the Task Force’s
framework are neglected. For example, the
Task Force does not adequately consider
that researchers and clinicians are invested
in nonobservable (nonsensory) meanings
and relationships (Slife et al., 2005, p. 89).
This investment is evident, for example, in
the efforts of Division 29 (Psychotherapy)
to identify and validate empirically sup-
ported therapy relationships, such as ther-
apeutic alliance and group cohesion (APA
Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based
Practice, 2006, p. 272). Although this alli-
ance and coherence are surely experienced
by patients and therapists, they do not fall
on their retinas (Slife et al., 2005, p. 91).
The people of these relationships are ob-
served and registered, in some sense, on
their retinas, but the betweenness of these
people is not experienced through sensory
observation (Slife et al., 2005, pp. 88 – 89).
Both Division 29 and the Task Force
assert the existence and importance of
these relations (APA Presidential Task
Force on Evidence-Based Practice, 2006,
pp. 272, 275), but in order to comply with
the method requirements of empiricism,
they must operationalize or make these re-
lations observable (p. 274). The problem is
that any specified operationalization (e.g.,
questionnaire ratings) can occur without
the nonobservable experience (e.g., thera-
peutic alliance), and any such experience
can occur without the specified operation-
alization. The upshot is that the construct
operationalized may never be studied.
Moreover, one can never empirically know
the relation between the construct and its
operationalization because pivotal aspects
of this relation—the construct and relation
itself—are never observable (Slife et al.,
2005, pp. 89 –92). By ignoring this crucial
problem, APA’s policy runs the risk of
making psychotherapy research a compen-
dium of operationalizations without any
knowledge of how they relate to the origi-
nal object of study.
Problems such as these are the reason
that alternative philosophies of science,
such as qualitative methods, were formu-
lated. Indeed, many qualitative methods
were specifically formulated to investigate
experienced, but not strictly observed, re-
lational meanings of the world (Denzin &
Lincoln, 2000). But this implies another
problem with the unexamined framework
of the Task Force’s report—it tends to as-
sume that all alternative methods are vari-
ations on the same empiricist epistemol-
ogy. For example, the Task Force includes
qualitative research on its list of acceptable
methods (APA Presidential Task Force on
Evidence-Based Practice, 2006, p. 274),
but it fails to understand and value quali-
613