Instances when SC considered factual issues in a R45 petition and

when SC departed from factual findings of RTC

1. Heirs of Antonio Feraren, Jr. et. al. vs. Court of Appeals and Cecilia Tadiar

G.R. No. 159328, October 5, 2011

In the case Heirs of Antonio Feraren, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held
that  a petition for review on certiorari filed with this court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
can analyze again evidence introduced in and considered by the tribunals below when the
findings of facts are conflicting and the CA’s finding are contrary to those by the trial court, to
wit:

At the outset, the Court notes that the issues raised in the present petition are
essentially questions of fact. It is fundamental that a petition for review
on certiorari filed with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court shall, as a
general rule, raise only questions of law and that this Court is not duty-bound to
analyze again and weigh the evidence introduced in and considered by the
tribunals below. However, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, to wit:

(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or

conjectures;

(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or

impossible;

(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;

(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;

(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case,
or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and
the appellee;

(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;

(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific

evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;

(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or

(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not

disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.

In the present case, the findings of the MTC and the RTC are contrary to
those made by the CA. The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC that
the subject house which is presently standing on the disputed parcel of
land was built at the time that the ownership of the said lot was in the
name of petitioners' parents. The CA, on the other hand, ruled that the
abovementioned house was constructed when petitioners' parents
were in possession of the lot in question as lessees. Thus, this Court's
review of such findings is warranted.

A careful review of the records and the evidence presented in the instant
case shows that the CA did not commit error in finding that the house in
question was built at the time petitioners' parents possessed the subject
lot as lessees.

xxxx

As noted by the CA, petitioners did not even bother to file a motion
asking the trial court to admit their position paper which was belatedly
filed. Indeed, the record is barren of any evidence to show that
petitioners, at least, tried to offer any explanation or justification for such
delay. They simply ignored the Rules. This Court has previously held that
technical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to
benefit the deserving. Moreover, rules of procedure do not exist for the
convenience of the litigants. These rules are established to provide order
to and enhance the efficiency of our judicial system. They are not to be
trifled with lightly or overlooked by the mere expedience of invoking
"substantial justice." In a long line of decisions, this Court has repeatedly
held that, while the rules of procedure are liberally construed, the
provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as
they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the
orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. In the instant case,
petitioners' complete disregard of the Rules of Court and of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure only shows that they are not deserving of
 their relaxation. Hence, the MTC erred in admitting petitioners' position
paper and taking the same into consideration in rendering its judgment.

In any case, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that
petitioners' statement in their Answer, that their parents built the subject
residential house as lessees under the authority given to them by private
respondent's father in their contract of lease executed in 1949, is a
judicial admission. Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,
petitioners may not contradict this judicial admission unless they are able
to show that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. In the instant case, petitioners' subsequent claim in
their Position Paper that their house was built during the time that their
parents were the owners of the disputed lot is a direct contradiction of
their judicial admission in their Answer. However, petitioners failed to
prove that such admission was made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was made. Hence, they may not contradict the same.

2. Dr. Jose Tongson and Carmen Tongon vs. Court of Appeals and Leonardo Arellano

G.R. No. 167874, 06 November 1992

Also in the case of Dr. Jose Tongson and Carmen Tongson vs. Court of Appeals et. al,
the Supreme Court held that the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals may not be reviewed by
this court except with the findings of CA are contrary to those of the trial court, to wit:

        Petitioners insist that their petition falls within the recognized exceptions to
the rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals may not be reviewed by Us
on appeal, more particularly: (1) that the finding of the Court of Appeals that
there is evidence to support private respondent's claim is contrary to that of the
trial court; and, (2) that the findings of the Court of Appeals are without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based.
        It has been oft-repeated in a long line of cases that in petitions for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised since
the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are deemed conclusive on the
Supreme Court, subject to certain exceptions, namely: (a) where there is grave
abuse of discretion; (b) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (c) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (d) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based
on misapprehension of facts; (e) when the factual findings are conflicting; (f)
when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (g) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion; and, (h) where the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions
without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the
petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
        We agree that the petition at bar falls under the recognized exceptions to
the general rule. For, considering that the findings of respondent Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, We have to take cognizance of
this petition in order to determine whether respondent appellate court was
justified in deviating from the findings of the trial court.
        Petitioners assert that there is nothing in evidence to support the conclusion
of the Court of Appeals that private respondent is entitled to "the amount of
P16,000.00 as his share in the coconut and fruit harvests in the two areas
tenanted by him (Exhs. 'C-1' and 'C-2') for the years 1965 to 1981, plus legal
interests due thereon up to the time of payment thereof." They claim that there
is no basis for private respondent's computation that P1,000.00 per year would
be his annual share from the coconut harvest from 1965 to 1981 because: (a)
such amount cannot be presumed from respondent's testimony that in 1982
when the price of copra was P1.50 to P1.60 per kilo, the gross income he realized
from copra was about P2,000.00; (b) he has not shown how many kilos of copra
were produced per year; and, (c) he failed to show how he arrived at the net
proceeds of P1,000.00. They contend that in order that private respondent may
recover his alleged share in the produce of the land, it is necessary for him to
prove in a satisfactory manner that he has a right to recover. In other words,
private respondent must prove his own affirmative allegations because mere
allegation is not evidence.
        There is merit in the appeal.
        As mandated by the Rules of Court, each party must prove his own
affirmative allegation,  i.e., one who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the
burden of presenting at the trial such amount of evidence required by law to
obtain a favorable judgment: by preponderance of evidence in civil cases, and by
proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases.
        In the case at bar, We agree with petitioners that the claim of private
respondent has not been established by preponderance of evidence. Except for
his own self-serving declarations, there is nothing in the records to support his
claim. As correctly observed by petitioners, the claim of private respondent is
not based on actual figures showing the number of coconut trees from where
the copra was produced, the price of copra at the time of sale, the cost of labor,
how many times copra was produced per year, the expenses deducted from the
gross proceeds, etc. Under the circumstances, We find that there is no sufficient
 basis in awarding P16,000.00 to private respondent as his share for the years
1965 to 1981.
 In the case before Us, there is no showing that private respondent has ever filed
an administrative complaint to enforce his right arising from alleged deprivation
of his shares of the harvests from 1965. It was only in 1981, or after sixteen (16)
years from the time his cause of action supposedly accrued, that private
respondent instituted a judicial action against petitioners. Clearly, private
respondent is now barred from enforcing his right of action with respect to his
supposed shares.

3. Jherome G. Abundo vs. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation Corporation, Grand Celebration

LDS and/or Marlon Roño
G.R. No. 222348, 20 November 2019
The Supreme Court also reviewed the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and Court of
Appeals when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts, to wit:

The Rules of Court requires that only questions of law should be raised in
petitions filed under Rule 45. As a rule, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze
and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings
below.

Petitions for review on certiorari should cover only questions of law as this Court
is not a trier of facts. However, the rules do admit exceptions such as when the
CA's judgment is based on misapprehension of facts and that it overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.

Although the CA was correct in highlighting that referral to a third doctor is

mandatory, it however, overlooked the fact that there was no final and
categorical assessment and conclusion made by the company-designated
physicians. It likewise misapprehended the fact that the company doctors'
assessment is not yet a final conclusion as to the petitioner's disability, and that,
there is no need to consult a third doctor in order to settle the issue. With the
foregoing, this Court is compelled to revisit the factual circumstances of the
instant case. In other words, the Court will re-evaluate the factual findings of
the labor officials and the CA. It is crystal clear that the exception, rather than
the general rule, applies in the present case.

xxxx
 In this case, the third-doctor-referral provision did not find application because
of the lack of a definitive disability assessment by the company-designated
physician.

Considering the absence of definitive disability assessment made by the

company-designated physician, it was by operation of law that the petitioner
became permanently disabled.

Viewed in this light, the CA erred in upholding the interim assessment of Dr. Lao
over that of Dr. Catapang on the basis of the petitioner's failure to seek medical
opinion from a third doctor as provided under the POEA-SEC. It erroneously
applied the provisions of the POEA-SEC in isolation with other laws such as the
Labor Code and the AREC. The CA should have widened its spectrum in deciding
the case and applied the Labor Cod provisions on disability benefits. Applying the
2010 POEA-SEC, the Labor Code provisions on permanent disability and the
AREC vis-a-vis the several jurisprudence concerning seafarer's disability
compensation, this Court holds that the petitioner is, by operation of law,
permanently disabled to work as a seafarer.

4. Leandro Cruz, Emmanuel Manahan, Alric Jervoso vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 206437, 22 November 2017

In the case of Leandro Cruz et.al. vs. People, the Supreme Court held that it can
review question of facts when the lower court had ignored, overlooked or misconstrued
relevant facts, to wit:

As a rule, only questions of law, not of facts, may be raised in a petition

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This rule, however, admits of
exceptions including such situation where the lower court had ignored,
overlooked, or misconstrued relevant facts, which if taken into
consideration will change the outcome of the case. Considering said
exception, and the fact that the liberty of petitioners is at stake here,
the Court sees it necessary to carefully review the records of this case,
and determine whether the CA properly affirmed the RTC Decision
convicting petitioners of Qualified Theft.

Moreover, no less than our Constitution provides the presumption that

the accused is innocent until proven otherwise by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Such proof requires moral certainty, or that "degree of
proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind." Additionally,
the prosecution has the burden to overcome the presumption of
innocence. And, in the discharge of its burden, the prosecution must rely
on the strength of its evidence, and not on the weakness of the defense.

Here, petitioners with their co-accused Pardilla were charged with Qualified
Theft. Based on the foregoing precepts, they are presumed innocent unless the
prosecution established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that they are guilty
as charged. In order to do so, the prosecution must show that the following
elements of Qualified Theft are present here: (a) there must be taking of
personal property, which belongs to another; (b) such taking was done with
intent to gain, and without the owner's consent; (c) it was made with no violence
or intimidation against persons nor force upon things; and (d) it was done under
any of the circumstances under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, which
circumstances include grave abuse of confidence.

Put in another way, in order for petitioners to be found guilty of Qualified Theft,
the prosecution must prove with moral certainty that Prestige Brands lost its
personal property by petitioners' felonious taking thereof or by their acts of
depriving Prestige Brands of its control and possession without its consent.

However, the prosecution miserably failed to discharge its burden.

First, the RTC confirmed that no one witnessed the actual taking of items belonging to
Prestige Brands. To establish unlawful taking, the RTC merely relied on the assertion
that there were discrepancies in the inventories of Prestige Brands. Such reliance,
however, is misplaced because the inventories for January-April 2003, and October
2003, contained only a list of items purportedly stored in Prestige Brands' warehouse
and nothing more. Similar to our ruling in Manuel Huang Chua v. People, we can neither
speculate on the purpose of these inventories nor surmise on the stories behind them.
While the prosecution insists that the inventories evidenced the discrepancies of the
items stored in the warehouse and those that the company lost, the inventories
themselves did not indicate such fact.

xxxx

Second, contrary to the finding of the RTC and the CA, petitioners and Pardilla did not
have exclusive access to the warehouse of Prestige Brands.

Third, the Court gives no credence to the supposed written confessions made by Cruz,
Jervoso and their co- accused Pardilla.
5. Republic of the Philippines vs. Spouses Dolores and Abe Lasmarias et. al.

G.R. 206168, 26 April 2017

A petition for review filed under Rule 45 may raise only questions of law. The factual findings by
the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantial evidence, are generally conclusive and
binding on the parties and are no longer reviewable unless the case falls under the recognized
exceptions. This Court is not a trier of facts and we are not duty bound to re-examine evidence.
The existence or non-existence of fraud in an application for free patent depends on a finding
of fact insofar as the presence of its requirements.  However, these rules do admit exceptions.
Over time, the exceptions to these rules have expanded and this case falls under one of those
exceptions. At present, there are 10 recognized exceptions that were first listed in Medina v.
Mayor Asistio, Jr.:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the
Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the
evidence on record.

While the RTC and the CA in this case are similar in their factual findings, there appears to be no
substantial evidence to prove that Solijon did not commit fraud or misrepresentation in her
application for free patent. It must be remembered that petitioner was not able to prove the
existence of fraud because the records of Solijon's patent application were damaged by
termites and could no longer be reproduced, as testified to by the Officer-in-Charge of the
CENRO, Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte. This, however, does not mean that no fraud actually
exists. It only means that Solijon's free patent application was not presented before the RTC.
Furthermore, it is also erroneous to conclude that if Solijon's free patent was obtained through
fraud, it necessarily follows that Balatero's free patent was, likewise, obtained through fraud.
Nothing in the records would show that the parties presented Balatero's free patent application
or that any party alleged that he committed fraud or misrepresentation by claiming that the
land he applied for was unoccupied. If at all, the fact that Balatero donated a portion of the
land he applied for to the school could mean that he recognized the existence of an occupant
and a previously constructed school building on the land, or that his application was made
subject to the school's occupation of a portion of the land he applied for. In addition, the RTC
noted that petitioner did not give Solijon a day in court either by filing a third-party complaint
or by including her as defendant-in-intervention. Yet, the RTC made a conclusion against
Balatero's free patent application although he was also not a party to the case.