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MODULE 2. BACKGROUND ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS

• Concept and Origin
1) PBM Employees Org. vs. PBM Co., Inc. [51 SCRA 189 (1973)]
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO,
FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE,
BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
respondents.

FACTS: The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter

referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of
the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc with the officers and members
of the petitioner union.
Petitioners claim that on they decided to stage a mass demonstration
at Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be
participated in by the workers. That company learned of the projected mass. That
a meeting was called by the Company and asked the union panel to confirm or
deny said projected mass demonstration. Petitioners confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled
because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting.
Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration
is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not
unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the
Company warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first
and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company,
particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who
shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed.
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400
proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent
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Company a charge against petitioners with a “violation of the CBA providing

for ‘No Strike and No Lockout.’ After considering the aforementioned stipulation of
facts submitted by the parties, Judge Salvador found herein petitioner PBMEO
guilty of bargaining in bad faith as directly responsible for perpetrating the said
unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their
status as employees of the respondent Company

ISSUE: Whether Civil and Political Rights is treated with the same weight as Property
Rights.

RULING: NO. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or
damage by reason of the absence of its employees is a plea for the
preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or
damage would not spell the difference between the life and death of the firm
or its owners or its management.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of
assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the
employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for
their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the
Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The
condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig,
was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as
that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately
compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and
brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms.
While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of
human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are
“delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society” and the “threat
of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
 Page 3 of 601

sanctions,” they “need breathing space to survive,” permitting government regulation

only “with narrow specificity.”
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human
rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time,
then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases
to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential
and powerful, and of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of
assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such
priority “gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions. The primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of
peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property
rights has to be sustained.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention,
but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers
who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the local police, It was more
expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its
employees in their fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty
tyrannies of local police officers.
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor
unionism such as in the Republic Savings Bank vs CIR, where the complaint assailed the
morality and integrity of the bank president no less, such recognition and protection for
free speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable
and more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against
the company nor any of its officers.

2) People vs. Marti (G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
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FACTS: On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley
Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang
Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them 4 gift-wrapped packages.
Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to
them.
Marti informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a
friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Marti filled up the contract necessary for the
transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment
and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr
II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland."
Anita Reyes did not inspect the packages as Marti refused, who assured
the former that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and
were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of Marti's representation, the 4 packages
were then placed inside a brown corrugated box, with styro-foam placed at the
bottom and on top of the packages, and sealed with masking tape. Before
delivery of Marti's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr.
Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard
operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar
odor emitted therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from
the opening of one of the gloves, and took several grams of the contents
thereof.
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the
NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from
the cellophane wrapper. At the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), the box containing Marti's packages was opened, yielding dried
marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks) dried marijuana leaves.
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of
the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said
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effects. Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail,
inasmuch as the latter's stated address was the Manila Central Post Office.
Thereafter, an Information was filed against Marti for violation of RA
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the Special Criminal
Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) rendered the decision, convicting
Marti of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and
Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti appealed.

ISSUE: Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accused's

constitutional rights, be invoked against the State.

RULING: NO. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties

guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure refers to the
immunity of one’s person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by
government; and the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the
government and its agents, not upon private individuals.
The contraband herein, having come into possession of the
Government without the latter transgressing the accused's rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same
should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable
search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by
the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in
aid thereof, is not search. Where the contraband articles are identified without a
trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by
the constitution.
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The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures

therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked
against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of
power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant
must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality.
However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of
a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at
bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of
private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved.
In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it
within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

For reference:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be

inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
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(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

3) Gamboa vs. Teves (G.R. No. 176579 (June 28, 2011)

WILSON P. GAMBOA, Petitioner, vs. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES,
FINANCE UNDERSECRETARY JOHN P. SEVILLA, AND COMMISSIONER RICARDO
ABCEDE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) IN
THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIR AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE PRIVATIZATION
COUNCIL, et. al, Respondents.

FACTS: In 1969, General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GTE), sold 26

percent of the outstanding common shares of PLDT to Philippine
Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC). In 1977, Prime Holdings,
Inc. (PHI) became the owner of 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC. In 1986, the
111,415 shares of stock of PTIC held by PHI were sequestered by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The 111,415 PTIC
shares, which represent about 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital
stock of PTIC, were later declared by this Court to be owned by the Republic of
the Philippines.
In 1999, First Pacific, a Bermuda-registered acquired the remaining 54
percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC. On 20 November 2006, the
Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC) of the Philippine Government through a
public bidding sold the same shares to Parallax Venture who won with a bid of
P25.6 billion or US$510 million.
Thereafter, First Pacific announced that it would exercise its right of
first refusal as a PTIC stockholder and buy the 111,415 PTIC shares by
matching the bid price of Parallax. On 14 February 2007, First Pacific, through its
subsidiary, MPAH, entered into a Conditional Sale and Purchase Agreement of
the 111,415 PTIC shares, or 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC,
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with the Philippine Government for the price of P25,217,556,000 or

US$510,580,189. The sale was completed on 28 February 2007.
Since PTIC is a stockholder of PLDT, the sale by the Philippine
Government of 46.125 percent of PTIC shares is actually an indirect sale of
12 million shares or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares of
PLDT. With the sale, First Pacific common shareholdings in PLDT increased
from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the common
shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47 percent. This, according to
petitioner, violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more
than 40 percent.
On 28 February 2007, petitioner filed the instant petition for prohibition,
injunction, declaratory relief, and declaration of nullity of sale of the 111,415 PTIC
shares.

ISSUE: Whether the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to
the common shares of PLDT, a public utility

RULING: YES. Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution provides:

Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines
or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such
franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer
period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted
except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or
repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall
encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The
participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility
enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the
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executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be

citizens of the Philippines.
Any citizen or juridical entity desiring to operate a public utility must
therefore meet the minimum nationality requirement prescribed in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution. Hence, for a corporation to be granted
authority to operate a public utility, at least 60 percent of its capital must be
owned by Filipino citizens.
Thus, the 40% foreign ownership limitation should be interpreted to apply to
both the beneficial ownership and the controlling interest.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution in imposing limitations
and restrictions on fully nationalized and partially nationalized activities is
for Filipino nationals to be always in control of the corporation undertaking
said activities. Otherwise, if the Trial Court ruling upholding respondent's arguments
were to be given credence, it would be possible for the ownership structure of a public
utility corporation to be divided into one percent (1%) common stocks and ninety-nine
percent (99%) preferred stocks. Following the Trial Court ruling adopting respondent's
arguments, the common shares can be owned entirely by foreigners thus creating an
absurd situation wherein foreigners, who are supposed to be minority shareholders,
control the public utility corporation.
The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers
only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in
the present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock
comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares.
Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate
in the control or management of the corporation. This is exercised through
his vote in the election of directors because it is the board of directors that
controls or manages the corporation. In the absence of provisions in the articles of
incorporation denying voting rights to preferred shares, preferred shares have the same
voting rights as common shares. However, preferred shareholders are often
excluded from any control, that is, deprived of the right to vote in the
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election of directors and on other matters, on the theory that the preferred
shareholders are merely investors in the corporation for income in the same
manner as bondholders. In fact, under the Corporation Code only preferred or
redeemable shares can be deprived of the right to vote. Common shares cannot be
deprived of the right to vote in any corporate meeting, and any provision in the articles
of incorporation restricting the right of common shareholders to vote is invalid.
Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to
control, as opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights,
the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to
common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in
the election of directors, then the term "capital" shall include such preferred
shares because the right to participate in the control or management of the
corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors.
In short, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to
shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors.
This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and
management of public utilities. Thus, 60 percent of the "capital" assumes, or
should result in, "controlling interest" in the corporation and thus in the present case,
only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock (common and
non-voting preferred shares).

4) West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette (319 US 624, 638)
FACTS: The West Virginia State Board of Education, with the advice of the State
Superintendent of schools, made it compulsory for children in the public schools
to salute the flag and pledge allegiance, the resolution states that all teachers and
pupils "shall be required to participate in the salute honoring the Nation represented by
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the Flag; provided, however, that refusal to salute the Flag be regarded as an act of
insubordination, and shall be dealt with accordingly.”
The children in a family of Jehovah’s witnesses refused to do so were
expelled for non-compliance. They were also threatened with reform schools
for criminally active children, and their parents faced prosecution for juvenile
delinquency. Those who refused the compliance did so on religious grounds.
The citizens of the US and of West Virginia filed a suit asking its
injunction to restrain enforcement of these laws and regulations against
Jehovah’s Witnesses. It was contended that the law and regulations are
unconstitutional denial of religious freedom, freedom of speech, due process,
and equal protection; they also alleged that the compulsion is not a permissible
means of achieving national unity.

ISSUE: Whether the compulsory flag-salute for public schoolchildren violates

constitutional rights.

RULING: YES. The Supreme Court invalidated a compulsory flag salute law in
public schools and established that students possess some level of First Amendment
rights.
It also struck down a West Virginia statute that imposed severe
penalties on children and their parents if the children did not comply. The
children faced expulsion and parents could be fined $50 and sent to jail for 30 days.
The Court held that compelling public schoolchildren to salute the flag
was unconstitutional; and that curtailing or eliminating dissent was an
improper and ineffective way of generating unity.
The Court emphasized that the state had a strong interest in promoting
“national cohesion” as “the basis of national security,” and that a mandatory
flag salute was a constitutionally permissible manner of encouraging this by
developing patriotism. However, compelling flag salute not most effective way
to develop patriotism.
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The compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an
attitude of mind. It is not clear whether the regulation contemplates that pupils forego
any contrary convictions of their own and become unwilling converts to the prescribed
ceremony.
It is now a commonplace that censorship or suppression of expression of
opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only when the expression presents a
clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to
prevent and punish. It would seem that involuntary affirmation could be commanded
only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence. But here, the power
of compulsion is invoked without any allegation that remaining passive
during a flag salute ritual creates a clear and present danger that would justify
an effort even to muffle expression.
The right of West Virginia to utilize the flag salute as part of its
educational process is denied because, so it is argued, it cannot be justified as
a means of meeting a "clear and present danger" to national unity.
The action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and
pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power, and invades the
sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment
to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.

FOR REFERENCE:
The First Amendment provides that Congress make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting its free exercise. It protects freedom of
speech, the press, assembly, and the right to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.

• Classification of Rights
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a) Civil Rights - secures private individuals for the purpose of securing enjoyment of
their means of happiness; these are rights enjoyed to enable individuals to undertake
the everyday business of life
(ARTICLE 3, SECTION 4 -- freedom of speech, right to a free press, freedom
of assembly, right of petition)
Limitations of Article 3, Section 4: Severe calumny, anything lewd or
obscene, anything that provokes violence or disorder, seditious messages,
clear and present danger.

(ARTICLE 3, SECTION 8 – freedom to form associations or right to organize –

SO LONG AS not contrary to law)
(ARTICLE 3, SECTION 9 – right to private property – an explicit limitation to
the power of eminent domain: public use, just compensation, due process of
law)
(ARTICLE 3, SECTION 3 – right to privacy – illegally obtained material as
inadmissible evidence)

(ARTICLE 3, SECTION 5 -- freedom of religion – affirms the separation of

church and State; State has no official religion and religion shall not be a
prerequisite for political rights.)
(ARTICLE 3, SECTION 6 – liberty to abode and the right to travel)
(ARTICLE 3, SECTION 7 – right to access to information; public record
although legal restrictions may apply especially to matters of national security)
(ARTICLE 3, SECTION 10 – Sanctity of contracts and obligations; laws
affecting contracts cannot be applied retroactively.)

b) Political Rights - the power to participate directly or indirectly in the establishment

or administration of the government; an individual's ability to participate in political life
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and processes of the society and state without fear of discrimination or repression, and
is tied closely to citizenship status.

c) Social and Economic Rights - intended to insure the well – being and economic
security of an individual; provides for the dignity, freedom and well-being of individuals
by guaranteeing state-supported entitlements to education, public health care, housing,
a living wage, decent working conditions and other social goods.

• Hierarchy of Rights
5) PBM Employees Org. vs. PBM Co., Inc. [51 SCRA 189 (1973)]

FACTS: The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter

referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of
the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc with the officers and members
of the petitioner union.
Petitioners claim that on they decided to stage a mass demonstration
at Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be
participated in by the workers. That company learned of the projected mass. That
a meeting was called by the Company and asked the union panel to confirm or
deny said projected mass demonstration. Petitioners confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled
because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting.
Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration
is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not
unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the
Company warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first
and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company,
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particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who
shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed.
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400
proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent
Company a charge against petitioners with a “violation of the CBA providing
for ‘No Strike and No Lockout.’ After considering the aforementioned stipulation of
facts submitted by the parties, Judge Salvador found herein petitioner PBMEO
guilty of bargaining in bad faith as directly responsible for perpetrating the said
unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their
status as employees of the respondent Company

ISSUE: Whether Civil and Political Rights is treated with the same weight as Property
Rights.

RULING:
For the hierarchy of ranks.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of
assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such
priority “gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions. The primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of
peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property
rights has to be sustained.
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human
rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of
time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of
government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of
officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs — political,
economic or otherwise.
 Page 16 of 601

While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of
human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are
“delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society” and the “threat
of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions,” they “need breathing space to survive,” permitting government regulation
only “with narrow specificity.”

6) Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City of

Manila (G.R. No. L-24693, July 31, 1967)

FACTS: On 13 June 1963, Ordinance 4760 was issued by the municipal board of
the City of Manila and approved by Vice Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the
time acting Mayor of the City of Manila. The ordinance (1) imposes a P6,000.00
fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels;
(2) requires the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of
a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any
guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons
without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all
times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name,
the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the
length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the
name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his
residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification
that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in
the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with
such registration forms and records kept and bound together; (3) provides that the
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premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be
open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly
authorized representatives.
The ordinance also classified motels into two classes and required the
maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in
each room, a dining room or restaurant and laundry; while second class motels are
required to have a dining room. It prohibited a person less than 18 years old
from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or
common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and made it
unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such
establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24
hours. It provided a penalty of automatic cancellation of the license of the
offended party in case of conviction.
On 5 July 1963, the Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association
(EMHMOA), its member Hotel del Mar, and a certain Go Chiu filed a petition for
prohibition against the mayor of the City of Manila in his capacity as he is
charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila
and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such
ordinances.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final
judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower
court on 6 July 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the Mayor to
refrain from enforcing said Ordinance 4760 from and after 8 July 1963.
After the submission of the memoranda, ruled that the City of Manila
lack authority to regulate motels and rendering Ordinance 4760
unconstitutional and therefore null and void. It made permanent the preliminary
injunction issued by the Mayor and his agents to restrain him from enforcing the
ordinance. The Mayor of Manila appealed to the Supreme Court.
 Page 18 of 601

ISSUE: Whether the regulations imposed on motels and hotels (increasing license fees,
partially restricting the freedom to contract, and restraining the liberty of individuals) is
valid and/or constitutional.

RULING: YES. The ordinance was enacted to minimize certain practices

hurtful to public morals. It was made as there is observed an alarming
increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable
in great part to the existence of motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven for
prostitutes and thrill seekers.
The ordinance proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and
guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a
registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times,
and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the
privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests.
The increase in the license fees was intended to discourage
establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal and
to increase the income of the city government. Further, the restriction on the
freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging
house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof
more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be
charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due
process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or
illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, are being devoted.
Furthermore, the right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable
restraint by general law for the common good.
The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public
health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper
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scope of the police power. State in order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of
the state.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were
freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measure is wider.
Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights
by the operation of statute or ordinance he has no standing, except perhaps
as to the liberty to contract, which is part and parcel of their right to
property.

• Accountability
7) People vs. Marti (G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991)

FACTS: On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley
Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang
Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them 4 gift-wrapped packages.
Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to
them.
Marti informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a
friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Marti filled up the contract necessary for the
transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment
and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr
II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland."
 Page 20 of 601

Anita Reyes did not inspect the packages as Marti refused, who assured
the former that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and
were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of Marti's representation, the 4 packages
were then placed inside a brown corrugated box, with styro-foam placed at the
bottom and on top of the packages, and sealed with masking tape. Before
delivery of Marti's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr.
Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard
operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar
odor emitted therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from
the opening of one of the gloves, and took several grams of the contents
thereof.
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the
NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from
the cellophane wrapper. At the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), the box containing Marti's packages was opened, yielding dried
marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks) dried marijuana leaves.
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of
the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said
effects. Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail,
inasmuch as the latter's stated address was the Manila Central Post Office.
Thereafter, an Information was filed against Marti for violation of RA
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the Special Criminal
Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) rendered the decision, convicting
Marti of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and
Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti appealed.

ISSUE: Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accused's

constitutional rights, be invoked against the State.
 Page 21 of 601

RULING: NO. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed

by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure refers to the immunity of one’s person, whether citizen
or alien, from interference by government; and the search and seizure clauses are
restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals.
The contraband herein, having come into possession of the
Government without the latter transgressing the accused's rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the
same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense
charged.
The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable
search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by
the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is
not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has
been committed in aid thereof, is not search. Where the contraband articles
are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is
not the search that is prohibited by the constitution.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures
therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be
invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must
generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the
search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for
its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked
for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved.
 Page 22 of 601

In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be

extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED.

8) Yrasegui vs. Philippine Airlines (G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008)
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.

FACTS: This case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward
who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards
of the airline company. He is now before this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari claiming that he was illegally dismissed.
Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight of
Philippine Arlines, Inc. He stands at 5’8”. As mandated by the Cabin and Crew
Administration Manual of PAL, the proper weight for a man of this height is
from 147-166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds.
To address his weight concerns, petitioner was advised to go on leave
without pay. But after gaining 43 pounds over his ideal weight, petitioner
was removed from flight duty, as per company policy. He was formally
requested to trim down to his ideal weight and report for weight checks on
several dates. However, instead of losing weight, he gained them instead.
On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to
remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the
weight standards and was directed to report every 2 weeks for weight checks.
After petitioner’s repeated failure to report for weight checks, he was
formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check would be dealt
with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates which
 Page 23 of 601

petitioner ignored. When petitioner finally tipped the scale on July 30, 1990,
he weighed at 212 pounds which is way over his ideal weight of 166 pounds.
From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up his
case requesting for leniency on the latter part of 1992.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of
Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on weight
requirements. Petitioner claimed that PAL discriminated against him because
“the company has not been fair in treating the cabin crew members who are similarly
situated.”
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to
his inability to attain his ideal weight, “and considering the utmost leniency”
extended to him “which spanned a period covering a total of almost 5 years,”
his services were considered terminated “effective immediately.
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s dismissal for obesity is discriminatory and therefore, his
dismissal was illegal.

RULING: NO. In British Columbia Public Service Employee CommissionA (BSPSERC) v.

The British Columbia Government and Service Employee’s Union (BCGSEU), the
Supreme Court of Canada adopted the so-called “Meiorin Test” in
determining whether an employment policy is justified.
Under this test, (1) the employer must show that it adopted the
standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job;
(2) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary to
the accomplishment of that workrelated purpose; and (3) the employer must
establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish
the legitimate work-related purpose.
Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, the SC held that in order to
justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove that (1) the employment
 Page 24 of 601

qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job

involved; and (2) that there is factual basis for believing that all or
substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to
properly perform the duties of the job.
In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is
parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid “provided it reflects an inherent quality
reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.”
A common carrier, from the nature of its business and for reasons of
public policy, is bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers it transports. It is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with due regard for all the circumstances. The law leaves no room for mistake or
oversight on the part of a common carrier. Thus, it is only logical to hold that
the weight standards of PAL show its effort to comply with the exacting
obligations imposed upon it by law by virtue of being a common carrier.
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed
itself to safely transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must
necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew
who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed
as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees.
In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the
weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be gainsaid that cabin
attendants must maintain agility at all times in order to inspire passenger
confidence on their ability to care for the passengers when something goes
wrong.
The most important activity of the cabin crew is to care for the safety
of passengers and the evacuation of the aircraft when an emergency occurs.
Passenger safety goes to the core of the job of a cabin attendant. On board an aircraft,
the body weight and size of a cabin attendant are important factors to consider in case
of emergency. Aircrafts have constricted cabin space, and narrow aisles and exit doors.
 Page 25 of 601

Thus, the arguments of respondent that “whether the airline’s flight

attendants are overweight or not has no direct relation to its mission of
transporting passengers to their destination”; and that the weight standards
“has nothing to do with airworthiness of respondent’s airlines,” must fail.
The biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the
possibility of impeding passengers from evacuating the aircraft, should the
occasion call for it. The job of a cabin attendant during emergencies is to speedily
get the passengers out of the aircraft safely. Being overweight necessarily
impedes mobility. Indeed, in an emergency situation, seconds are what cabin
attendants are dealing with, not minutes.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

9) Zulueta vs. CA (G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996)

CECILIA ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN

FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo

Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a
doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs.
The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for
legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which
petitioner had filed against her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the evidence obtained can be held inadmissible as it violated his right
of privacy of communication.
 Page 26 of 601

RULING: YES. The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any
one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy
as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or
to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the
spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the
other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom
of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication
and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it
is the wife (who thinks... herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the
party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order
[from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,... as
prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

MODULE 2-A. DUE PROCESS

• Art. III, Sec. 1
• Art. III, Sec. 14 (1)
• Definition, Nature, Scope and Evolution
• Purpose of the Guarantee
 Page 27 of 601

• Meaning of Life, Liberty, and Property

• Art. 40, 41, 44, Civil Code

10) Darthmouth College vs. Woodward (4 Wheaton 518)

FACTS: Twelve individuals applied to the King of England for a charter to
incorporate Dartmouth College for the purpose of promoting Christianity and
education. The charter application stated that private donors had promised large
contributions to fund the college and that the funds would be given to the
college once it was incorporated.
The King issued the charter of incorporation in 1769, naming the 12
individuals the Trustees of Dartmouth College (plaintiffs). The trustees were
responsible for governing the college, and the charter granted the trustees
corporate powers and privileges. The donors conveyed their funds to the
college, and the college used the money to fund instructors’ salaries.
In 1816, the New Hampshire state legislature enacted a law that
purported to amend the charter and transfer the ownership and control of
Dartmouth to the state (making it a state university). The legislature also
changed the school’s corporate charter by transferring the control of trustee
appointments to the governor. The trustees brought an action against William
Woodward (defendant), Dartmouth’s secretary and treasurer, to recover the
corporate property. The trustees claimed that the Contract Clause of Article I
of the United States Constitution protected the college from state
impairment of its contractual obligations.
The old trustees filed suit against William H. Woodward, who sided
with the new appointees. The New Hampshire Superior Court issued a judgment in
Woodward’s favor, and the trustees petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
review.

ISSUE: Whether the New Hampshire legislature unconstitutionally interfere with

Dartmouth College's rights under the Contract Clause.
 Page 28 of 601

RULING: The Contract Clause (Art 1, Section 10, Clause 1) prohibits states
from violating contracts with private or public corporations. The Court
concluded that the Contract Clause applies to private as well as public
corporations.
The charter had not created a “civil institution to be employed in the
administration of the government” — which would have permitted continuing
governmental control — but rather “a private eleemosynary [charitable]
institution.”
The Court held that the College's corporate charter qualified as a
contract between private parties, with which the legislature could not
interfere. The fact that the government had commissioned the charter did
not transform the school into a civil institution.
This case established the doctrine, never overruled, that a corporation
charter or the grant by a state of corporate rights to private interests comes
within the protection of the contract clause.
The Court seized an opportunity to broaden the contract clause by
making all private corporations its beneficiaries. The judgment was a
"defense of vested rights against Courts and Sovereignties; and to secure
corporations … from legislative despotism.…"
The court’s decision stated that it threw an impregnable barrier around all
rights and franchises derived from the grant of government; and [gave]
solidity and inviolability to the literary, charitable, religious, and commercial
institutions of our country."
"Contract" referred to transactions involving individual property rights, not to
"the political relations between the government and its citizens."

11) Ynot vs. IAC (G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987)
 Page 29 of 601

RESTITUTO YNOT, PETITIONER, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE

STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO
AND THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO
CITY, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos has given orders prohibiting the
interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not
complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626, effective October
25, 1980.
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump
boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police
station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A.
Ynot argued that EO 626-A is unconstitutional for it violated his right
to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by
EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is
unconstitutional.
Thereafter, a case was filed by the petitioner questioning the
constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After
considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court
declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The lower court ruled against Ynot
ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote
general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it
also upheld the ruling of RTC.

ISSUE: Whether EO 626-A is unconstitutional.

RULING: YES. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out
forthright. Due process was not properly observed.
 Page 30 of 601

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the

police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had
filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of Php 12,000.00. The
measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him
a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain so
conveniently resilient for due process is not an “iron rule.” Flexibility must be the best
virtue of guaranty. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and
hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they
are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness.
It has been consistently declared that every person, faced by the
awesome power of the State, is entitled to “the law of the land,” which
Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous
Dartmouth College Case, as “the law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.”
It is noted that E.O. No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the
slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
question of measure is missing. Even if there was a reasonable relation, the
penalty being an outright confiscation and a supersedeas bond of Php12,000.00.
The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately
imposed punishment, thus denying the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair
play.
To sum up, it was found that the challenged measure is an invalid
exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the
carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and is unduly
oppressive.
The phrase “may see fit” is an extremely generous and dangerous
condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality
and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and
 Page 31 of 601

the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must
observe when they make their distribution.
Due process is violated for the owner was denied the right to hear his
defense and was not seen fit to assert and protect his rights. Executive Order
No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional, and the superseceas bond is cancelled.

12) Ichong vs. Hernandez (G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957)
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME
HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of
Manila, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner, also in behalf of other alien residents’ corporations and

partnerships, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that RA
1180 is unconstitutional.
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security,
the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail
Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others, are:
(1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against
associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly
owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the
retail trade;
(2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in
said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein,
unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or
voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the
approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons;
3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United
States;
 Page 32 of 601

(4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for
violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor
and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry;
(5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged
in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business;
(6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present
for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their
businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets
and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and
(7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business
who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of
liquidation.

Petitioner contends, among others, that said act violates the equal protection
of laws and that it violates the treaty of the Philippines with China. Petitioner
further claims that the act is unconstitutional on the grounds that:
 It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and
deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law.
 The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title
thereof.
 The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Solicitor General and Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that the act
was a valid exercise of the police power of the State which exercise is
authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival,
that the Act has only one subject embraced in the title; that not a single treaty was
infringed by said act.; and that as regards hereditary succession, only the form is
affected but the value of the property is not impaired.
 Page 33 of 601

ISSUE: Whether RA 1180 is unconstitutional on the grounds that its exercise violates
one’s right to due process and equal protection as guaranteed by the Constitution.

RULING: NO. The Court finds the enactment of RA 1180 to clearly fall within
the scope of police power of the State. It is clear that the law in question was
enacted to remedy a real and actual threat and danger to the national
economy posed by alien dominance and control of retail business and free
citizens and country from the said dominance and control.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has
become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the
very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined
in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and
as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the
most essential, insistent and illimitable.
Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of
society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and
scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest
and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human
foresight. However, the Constitution has set forth limitations thereof and the most
important of these are: the due process clause and the equal protection clause.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process
and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power
and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be
said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any
democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that
would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license
and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided
there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups,
provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as
always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on
 Page 34 of 601

public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must
be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
The best evidence to determine the alien dominance in retail business are the
statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and white. Between
the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and
control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and
misgivings, and the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act
(1954), official statistics unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and
control by the alien of the retail trade. Statistical figures reveal that in percentage
distribution of assets and gross sales, alien participation has steadily
increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the edge
in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical
gap through their assets and gross sales which average between six and
seven times those of the very many Filipino retailers.
The Court finds that law does not also violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction
between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the
due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and
recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and
reasonably protects their privilege. The wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out
its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only
appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the
prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department
of the Government may not interfere.
IMPORTANT NOTE: A law may supersede a treaty or a generally
accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the
raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the
law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
 Page 35 of 601

conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that

the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only
to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”

13) Villegas vs. Hiu Chong Tsai Pao Ho (86 SCRA 270)
Complete title: G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978
MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner, vs. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE
FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents.
Facts: The Municipal Board of Manila Passed Ordinance 6537, which
prohibited aliens from being employed or to engage in any occupation or
business, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an
employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying a P50 permit fee.
Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, employed in Manila, filed a petition to declare the
Ordinance null and void for being violative of the rule on uniformity of
taxation, and for being discriminatory and arbitrary as there was no
distinction or criteria among aliens in imposing the permit fee.
The CFI judge declared the subject ordinance null and void.

Issue: Whether or not there a violation of equal protection by virtue Ordinance 6537.

Ruling: YES. The decision of Judge Arca is affirmed. Ordinance No. 6537 does not
lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his
discretion. Hence, an undue delegation of power.
Further, the P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive
but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation
among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal
protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is
 Page 36 of 601

imperative that the classification, should be based on real and substantial

differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular
legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien,
whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly
employee or a highly paid executive.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the
City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to
denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a
means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged
to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be
deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of
livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection
clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

14) South Bell & Co. vs. Natividad (40 Phil. 136)
Complete title: G.R. No. 15574 September 17, 1919
SMITH, BELL & COMPANY (LTD.), petitioner, vs. JOAQUIN NATIVIDAD, Collector of
Customs of the port of Cebu, respondent.

Facts: Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippine Islands. A majority of its stockholders are British
subjects. It is the owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato built for it in
the Philippine Islands in 1916, of more than fifteen tons gross. The Bato was
brought to Cebu in the present year for the purpose of transporting plaintiff's
merchandise between ports in the Islands. Application was made at Cebu, the
home port of the vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a certificate of
Philippine registry.
 Page 37 of 601

The Collector refused to issue the certificate, giving as his reason that
all the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were not citizens either of the
United States or of the Philippine Islands. The instant action is the result.
On February 23, 1918, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2761.
Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 2761 amended sections 1176 and 1202 of the
Administrative Code to read as follows:
SEC. 1176. Investigation into character of vessel. — No application for a
certificate of Philippine register shall be approved until the collector of
customs is satisfied from an inspection of the vessel that it is engaged
or destined to be engaged in legitimate trade and that it is of domestic
ownership as such ownership is defined in section eleven hundred and seventy-
two of this Code.
The collector of customs may at any time inspect a vessel or examine its
owner, master, crew, or passengers in order to ascertain whether the vessel is
engaged in legitimate trade and is entitled to have or retain the certificate
of Philippine register.

SEC. 1202. Limiting number of foreign officers and engineers on board vessels.
— No Philippine vessel operating in the coastwise trade or on the high
seas shall be permitted to have on board more than one master or one
mate and one engineer who are not citizens of the United States or of
the Philippine Islands, even if they hold licenses under section one thousand
one hundred and ninety-nine hereof. No other person who is not a citizen of the
United States or of the Philippine Islands shall be an officer or a member of the
crew of such vessel. Any such vessel which fails to comply with the terms of this
section shall be required to pay an additional tonnage tax of fifty centavos per
net ton per month during the continuance of said failure.

Issues:
1.) Whether Act No 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is valid in whole or in part.
 Page 38 of 601

2.) Whether the Government of the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can
deny the registry of vessel in its coastwise trade to corporations having alien
stockholders.

Ruling:
1.) Valid. This is a valid exercise of police power. The Act of Congress of April 29,
1908, with its specific delegation of authority to the Philippines to
regulate the transportation of merchandise and passengers between
ports or places therein, the liberal construction given to the provisions of the
Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, by the courts, and the grant
by the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, of general legislative power to the
Philippine Legislature, are certainly superabundant authority for such a
law. While the Act of the local legislature may in a way be inconsistent with the
Act of Congress regulating the coasting trade of the Continental United States,
yet the general rule that only such laws of the United States have force in the
Philippines as are expressly extended thereto, and the abnegation of power by
Congress in favor of the Philippine Islands would leave no starting point for
convincing argument.

2.) We are inclined to the view that while Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation
having alien stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded by the due-
process of law and equal protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of
Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in denying to
corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the
Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong to that vicious species of class
legislation which must always be condemned, but does fall within authorized
exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police power, and so does not
offend against the constitutional provision.
One of the exceptions to the general rule, most persistent and far
reaching in influence is, that neither the Fourteenth Amendment to the
 Page 39 of 601

United States Constitution, broad and comprehensive as it is, nor any

other amendment, "was designed to interfere with the power of the
State, sometimes termed its `police power,' to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the
people, and legislate so as to increase the industries of the State,
develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity. From the very
necessities of society, legislation of a special character, having these objects in
view, must often be had in certain districts."

15) Buck vs. Bell (274 US 200)

Complete title: Buck v. Bell - 274 U.S. 200, 47 S. Ct. 584 (1927)
Facts: Carrie Buck was a feeble minded white woman who was committed to
the State Colony in due form. She was the daughter of a feeble minded mother in
the same institution, and the mother of an illegitimate feeble minded child. An Act of
Virginia, approved March 20, 1924, stipulated that the health of the patient
and the welfare of society may be promoted in certain cases by the
sterilization of mental defectives, under careful safeguard, and that the sterilization
may be effected in males by vasectomy and in females by salpingectomy, without
serious pain or substantial danger to life.
Also, the Act stipulated that the Commonwealth was supporting in various
institutions many defective persons who if discharged would become a menace but if
incapable of procreating might be discharged with safety and become self-supporting
with benefit to themselves and to society. In 1924, Bell, the superintendent of the
state institution, sought an order for the sterilization by salpingectomy of
Buck. After a hearing, the state trial court ordered that Buck be sterilized.
The state supreme court affirmed the sterilization order, and Buck sought review,
contending that the operation of salpingectomy, as provided for in the Act,
was illegal in that it violated her constitutional right of bodily integrity and
was therefore repugnant to the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment
 Page 40 of 601

Issue: Whetherthe Act of Virginia, which stipulated that sterilization may be effected
on mental defectives, was violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Ruling:No. The Court affirmed the state supreme court's judgment. The hearing
procedure provided before sterilization of those deemed to be feeble minded satisfied
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the fact that the procedure was
limited to people housed in state institutions did not deny the inmates equal protection.
The Court further held that the state could properly sterilize those
determined to be feeble minded to prevent the birth of feeble minded
children who might lead lives of crime or indigency.
According to the Court, the fact that the sterilization order procedure only
applied to inmates in state facilities and not to the general public did not
deprive the inmates of equal protection.
The public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be
strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the state for
these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent
our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their
kind.
The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover
cutting the fallopian tubes. Three generations of imbeciles are enough.

16) People vs. Fajardo (104 SCRA 443)

Complete title: G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL.,
defendants-appellants.
 Page 41 of 601

Facts: Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camarines Sur when the municipal council
passed the ordinance that prohibits the construction of a building that blocks
the view of the town plaza. Moreover, it redirects the grant of permission to
the mayor.

After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside
the gasoline station near the town plaza. His request was repeatedly denied.
He continued with the construction under the rationale that he needed a
house to stay in because the old one was destroyed by a typhoon.
He was convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the building
due to its obstructing view. He appealed to the CA, which in turn forwarded the
petition due to the question of the ordinance’s constitutionality.

Issue: Whether the ordinance is constitutional.

Ruling: No.The ordinance doesn’t state any standard that limits the grant of power to
the mayor. It is an arbitrary and unlimited conferment.
Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is
purely arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few,
are unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should have established a rule by
which its impartial enforcement could be secured. All the authorities cited above sustain
this conclusion.
The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to
permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence,
it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of
appellants property without just compensation.
An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it cannot be
used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be
recognized as a taking of the property. The only substantial difference, in such case,
between restriction and actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to
 Page 42 of 601

the burden of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of that
burden. (Arverne Bay Constr. Co. vs. Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR. 1110, 1116).
While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare,
and the state may eliminate structures offensive to the sight, the state may
not permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and
practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic
appearance of the community.
Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for urban
purposes. To do this legally, there must be just compensation and they must be given
an opportunity to be heard.

17) Rubi vs. Prov. Board of Mindanao [39 Phil. 660 (1919)]
Complete title: G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919
RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs, vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO,
defendant.
Facts: Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of
Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their
residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a
reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or
be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to
live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain
plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of “very
low culture”.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the
reservation but was later caught and was placed in prison at Calapan, solely
because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus
was made on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging
that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating
the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty.
 Page 43 of 601

In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, which
provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of
any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the
provincial board.

Issue: Whether due process was followed in the restraint of liberty and imprisonment
due to violation of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code.

Ruling: The provision is valid, as an exception to the general rule.

One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without
when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are
restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can
one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition
of due process of law and equal protection of the law, there exists a law ; the
law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
The legislature is permitted to delegate legislative powers to the local
authorities on matters that are of purely local concerns. Action pursuant to
Section 2145 does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of
law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws and
confinement in accordance with the said section does not constitute slavery
and involuntary servitude. Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or
restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

18) Terrace vs. Thompson (263 US 197)

 Page 44 of 601

Complete title: TERRACE et al. v. THOMPSON, Attorney General of Washington,263

U.S. 197 (1923)
Facts: A Washington statute disqualifies aliens who have not in good faith
declared intention to become citizens of the United States from taking or
holding interests in land in the State for farming or other purposes not
excepted, and provides that upon the making of such prohibited conveyance
the land shall be forfeited to the State and the grantors be subject to criminal
punishment, and the alien also, if he fails to disclose the nature and extent of
his interest.
Citizens owning land in Washington and an alien Japanese, desirous of
consummating a lease to the alien for farming, sued to enjoin the state
attorney general from taking criminal and forfeiture proceedings, as he
threatened that if the lease were made, the restriction violated the federal
and state constitutions and conflicted with a treaty with Japan.

Issue: Whether the State legislation transgress the due process or equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Ruling: No. As applied to those alien who, under the naturalization laws of Congress,
are ineligible to citizenship, or as applied to citizens who desire to lease their land to
such aliens. The treaty between the United State and Japan of February 21,
1911, 37 Stat. 1504, in granting liberty to the citizens and subjects of each
party"to enter, travel and reside in the territories of the other, to carry on
trade, . . . to own or lease and occupy houses, manufactories, warehouses and shops, .
. . to lease land for residential and commercial purposes, and generally to do anything
incident to or necessary for trade upon the same terms as native citizens or
subjects,"does not include the right to own, lease, or have any title to or
interest in land for agricultural purposes, and the Washington statute above
cited is not in conflict with it. As determined by the Supreme Court of the State,
 Page 45 of 601

the Washington statute above cited is not in conflict with § 33, Art. II of the
state constitution.

19) Hurtado vs. California [110 U.S. 516 (1884)]

Complete title:Hurtado v. California - 110 U.S. 516, 4 S. Ct. 111 (1884)
Facts: An information was filed against defendant, charging him with
murder. Without any previous investigation of the cause by a grand jury,
defendant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Defendant was found guilty
by a verdict of murder in the first degree and was then sentenced to death.
Defendant appealed the judgment on the ground that he was not legally
indicted by or presented to a grand jury, that the proceedings violated due
process of law, as they were in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution. The lower courts rejected defendant's objections and affirmed the
conviction.

Issue: Whether the defendant’s right to due process of law was violated by the
proceedings from which the defendant was convicted and sentenced to death

Ruling:
No. The Court held that the substitution of an indictment by a grand jury by
an information, which certified the probable guilt of defendant, combined
with his right to the aid of counsel and to cross-examination of the
witnesses, did not violate due process of law. The Court noted that the fact that
the Fifth Amendment provided for indictment by grand jury did not mean
that the states had to provide such a procedure in order to meet the
minimum due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court is unable to say that the substitution for a
presentment or indictment by a grand jury of the proceeding by an
information, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, certifying to the
 Page 46 of 601

probable guilt of the defendant, with the right on his part to the aid of
counsel, and to the cross-examination of the witnesses produced for the
prosecution, is not due process of law.
Justice Matthews stated that the states should be free to construct their
own laws without infringement and that the Fourteenth Amendment was not
intended to guarantee the right of a grand jury because it would then have
been specifically referenced. His opinion also concluded that Hurtado's due
process right was not violated, as an information is "merely a preliminary
proceeding and can result in no final judgment." He further concluded that
Hurtado still received a fair trial.

• Relativity of Due Process

20) Title: Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion (G.R. No. 139466, October 17,
2000)
Complete title: G.R. No. 139465 October 17, 2000
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,vs.HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
Facts: On January 18, 2000, petitioner was ordered to furnish private respondent
copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the
latter reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting
evidence.
Private respondent states that he must be afforded the right to notice and
hearing as required by our Constitution. He likens an extradition proceeding
to a criminal proceeding and the evaluation stage to a preliminary
investigation.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration assailing the
mentioned decision.
 Page 47 of 601

Issue: Whether the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice
and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

Ruling: No. Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which

will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights. The process of extradition does not involve the determination of
the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the
court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional
rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an
accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose
extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation.

As held by the US Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis:

“An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the
constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in this
country do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid
treaty.”

As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an

extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process
safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former.

The procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances “must

begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action.” The concept of due process is flexible for “not all
 Page 48 of 601

situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of
procedure.”

In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it
is not ruling that the private respondent has no right to due process at all
throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings.
Procedural due process requires a determination of what process is due,
when it is due, and the degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior
determination should be made as to whether procedural protections are at all due and
when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an individual will be
“condemned to suffer grievous loss.”

21) Title: Morrissey vs. Brewer (408 US 471)

Complete title:Morrissey v. Brewer - 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972)

Facts: Petitioners Morrissey and Booher had been convicted of crimes based
upon their guilty pleas. After serving some time, both were paroled from the
Iowa State Penitentiary. Subsequently, based upon their respective parole
officer's report, their paroles were revoked by the Iowa Board of Parole.
Both Morrisseey and Booher filed habeas corpus petitions in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, alleging that they
were denied due process because their paroles were revoked without a
hearing. The District Court denied the petitions on the ground that due
process did not require a pre-revocation hearing, which the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari review.

Issue: Whether in order to observe the due process of law, the parolees should be
granted a hearing prior to parole revocation.
 Page 49 of 601

Ruling:
Yes. The United States Supreme Court held that one's freedom was valuable
and, therefore, its termination called for some orderly process.
According to the Court, the minimum requirements of due process in
revoking paroles include
(a) written notice of the claimed parole violations;
(b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him;
(c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary
evidence;
(d) the right to confront and cross- examine adverse witnesses (unless the
hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation);
(e) a neutral and detached hearing body such as a traditional parole board,
members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and
(f) a written statement by the fact finders as to the evidence relied on and
reasons for revoking parole.
As such, the Court reversed the decision of the lower court denying the necessity for
such a hearing and remanded both cases for further adjudication.
The liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the core
values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a "grievous loss" on
the parolee and often on others. The liberty is valuable and must be seen as within
the protection of U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Its termination calls for some orderly process,
however informal.

22) Title:Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union vs. McElroy [367 US 886
(1961)]
Complete title:Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy - 367 U.S. 886, 81 S. Ct.
1743 (1961)
 Page 50 of 601

Facts: The individual petitioner was a cook at a cafeteria operated by a

private concessionaire on the premises of the Naval Gun Factory in
Washington, D. C., which was engaged in the development of secret weapons
and access to which was limited to persons having badges issued by the
Factory's Security Officer.
The contract between the Gun Factory and the concessionaire forbade
the employment on the premises of any person who failed to meet the
security requirements of the Gun Factory, as determined by the Security Officer.
On the ground that the cook had failed to meet the security
requirements of the Gun Factory, the Security Officer required her to turn in
her badge and thereafter she was unable to work at the Gun Factory. After a
request for a hearing before officials of the Gun Factory had been denied, the cook
sued in a Federal District Court for restoration of her badge, so that she
might be permitted to enter the Gun Factory and resume her former
employment. The District Court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment
and dismissed the action.

Issue: Whether the civilian cafeteria employee was entitled to be advised of

the specific grounds for her exclusion on a military base, or to a hearing at which
she might refute the charges, under the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment.

Ruling: No. Affirming, the Supreme Court of the United States held that respondent
commanding officer was authorized to deny civilian petitioner access to the
installation under Article 0734 of the Navy Regulations and in light of the
historically unquestioned power of a commanding officer summarily to
exclude civilian tradesmen from the area of the officer's command. The Court also
held that the Due Process Clause of U.S. Const. amend. V was not violated.
Due process did not require that the civilian petitioner be advised of the
specific grounds for her exclusion and be accorded a hearing, because
 Page 51 of 601

government employment, in the absence of legislation, could be summarily

denied.

The control of access to a military base is within the constitutional powers

granted to both Congress and the President. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 gives Congress
the power to provide and maintain a navy; to make rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces; to exercise exclusive legislation over all places
purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for
the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings; and
to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers. Const. art. I, § 8. Broad power in this same area is also vested in the
President by U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, which makes him the Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.

• Void for Vagueness/Overbreadth Doctrine

23) Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union vs. McElroy [367 US 886
(1961)]
Complete title: Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy - 367 U.S. 886, 81 S. Ct.
1743 (1961)

Facts: The individual petitioner was a cook at a cafeteria operated by a

private concessionaire on the premises of the Naval Gun Factory in
Washington, D. C., which was engaged in the development of secret weapons
and access to which was limited to persons having badges issued by the
Factory's Security Officer. The contract between the Gun Factory and the
concessionaire forbade the employment on the premises of any person who
failed to meet the security requirements of the Gun Factory, as determined
by the Security Officer. On the ground that the cook had failed to meet the
 Page 52 of 601

security requirements of the Gun Factory, the Security Officer required her to
turn in her badge and thereafter she was unable to work at the Gun Factory. After a
request for a hearing before officials of the Gun Factory had been denied, the cook
sued in a Federal District Court for restoration of her badge, so that she
might be permitted to enter the Gun Factory and resume her former
employment. The District Court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment
and dismissed the action.

ssue: Whether the Respondents’ action in denying Brawner access to the Gun Factory
deprive her of any right secured by the Constitution.

Ruling: No. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment was not violated
in this case. Because Brawner had no constitutional right to be there in the
first place, denying her access did not deprive her of liberty or property. A
hearing procedure was not constitutionally required. This was not a case where
government action bestowed a badge of disloyalty or foreclosed other employment
opportunity (Brawner was offered another job). The important government function
was to manage the internal operation of a federal military establishment, which is an
area where the Federal Government has traditionally exercised unfettered control.

24) Title:David vs. Arroyo (G.R. No. 171390, May 3, 2006)

Complete title:G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L.
ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL
REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, Petitioners,vs.GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
 Page 53 of 601

PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL

POLICE, Respondents.

Facts: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the
Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of
national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of
terrorism and lawless violence in the country.The Office of the President
announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th
anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold
rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA.
The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a
professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also
arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,
raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest was made
against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom
suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President
Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has
ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court
and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent
questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the
emergency powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.

Issue: Whether PP1017 and GO No. 5 are constitutional

Ruling: The assailed PP1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President

Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly
 Page 54 of 601

within the province of the Legislature, Section 1, Article VI categorically states that
“the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives”. To be sure, neither martial
law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President
Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. It follows that these
decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced.
With respect to “laws”, she cannot call the military to enforce or
implement certain laws such as customs laws, laws governing family and
property relations, laws on obligations and contracts, and the like. She can
only order the military under PP1017, to enforce laws pertaining to its duty
to suppress lawless violence.

25) Ong vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 126858, September 16, 2005)
JOSE U. ONG and NELLY M. ONG, Petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondent.
DUE PROCESS: Void for Vagueness /O verbreadth

FACTS: In 1992, Congressman Bonifacio H. Gillego executed a Complaint-

Affidavit against then BIR Commission Jose Ong for amassed properties
worth disproportionately more than his lawful income. Upon conduct of a
pre-charge investigation, a recommendation from the Ombudsman that the
Forfeiture Proceedings be instituted against his properties which he
illegitimately acquired in just a span of 2 years as Commissioner.
Ong filed a Counter-Affidavit, submitting his Statement of Assets and Liabilities
for the years 1988-1990, ITR, bank certificate of a loan from Allied Bank, certificate of
retirement benefit from SGV, Acknowledgement of Trust that he acquired an assets
for his brother-in-law, and other documents explaining the sources of funds
with which he acquired the questioned assets.
 Page 55 of 601

In view of Ong’s arguments, the Ombudsman issued another Order,

which results to subpoena issued to Allied Bank, SGV and BIR pertaining to
the production of the documents that Ong claimed. It proved negative since
they could not produce the same that would justify Ong’s claim. Ong, is then directed
to submit the same, but instead of complying, he filed a Motion for its recall, the
voluntary inhibition of the handling investigators, and reassignment of the case. Ong
objected to the proceedings taken thus far, claiming that he was not
notified of the subpoenas issued to 3rd parties to substantiate his claims and
that the order violates his right to due process and to be presumed
innocent because it requires him to produce evidence to exculpate himself.
The Resolution was then issued directing the filing by the Ombudsman, in
collaboration with the OSG, of a petition for recovery of ill-gotten under RA 1379
against Ong. A Petition for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired property was
accordingly filed before the Sandiganbayan against Ong and his wife, Nelly.
In its Order, the Sandiganbayan directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against the properties of petitioners.
Spouses Ong filed an Answer denying the order and alleges that the
Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman intentionally failed to consider the
retirement and separation pay Ong received from SGV and other lawful
sources of funds used in the acquisition of the questioned properties. They
also content that Nelly was denied due process inasmuch as no separate
notices or subpoena were sent to her during the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman. They aver that Nelly Ong is entitled to a
preliminary investigation because a forfeiture proceeding is criminal in
nature.
 Page 56 of 601

QuestionablepropeAmt Explanation ExplainedAmt

rties
Interest
frommoney
marketplaceme
nts(MMP) 2,404,643.00
Partial
1. HouseandlotinAyalaAl 5,500,000.00 liquidationofMMP 5,500,000.00
abang 3,095,357.00
P6.5 M Term
2. LotinAyalaAlabang 5,500,000.00 loanfromAlliedBa 5,500,000.00
nk
BalanceofMMP 4,365,834.00
Interestfrom
MMP 83,981.00
Unusedportionofth
3. LotinAyalaAlabang 4,675,000.00 e P6.5M 5,150,230.00
TermLoan
700,415.00
boughtforOng'sbro
4. LotinAyalaAlabang 5,055,000.00 -in-law 5,055,000.00
Unusedportionofth
5. CondounitatAsianMan 744,585.00 e P6.5M 744,585.00
sion,Makati TermLoan
21,474,585.0 21,949,815.00
0
 Page 57 of 601

ISSUE: Whether they were denied of due process as RA 1379 is

unconstitutional as it is vague and does not sufficiently define ill-gotten wealth and
how it can be determined in violationof the non-delegation of legislative power
provision, and insofar as it disregards the presumptionof innocence by requiring them
to show cause why the properties in question should not be declared property of the
state.

RULING: No. The court dismissed the case reiterating that in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, that the powers of the Ombudsman, as defined by RA 6770
corollary to Section13, Article XI of the1987 Constitution, include, inter alia,
the authority to: (1) investigate and prosecute on its own complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office
oragency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take
over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases; and (2) investigate and initiate the proper action
for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth and/or unexplained wealth amassed
after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved there.
In the same case, the Court declared that the Ombudsman has the correlative
powers to investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or
unexplained wealth which were amassed after February 25, 1986. There is therefore
no merit in petitioners’ contention that the absence of participation of the
OSG taints the petition for forfeiture with nullity. Therefore, the attacks
against the constitutionality of RA 1379 because it is vague, violates the
presumption of innocence and the right against self-incrimination, and
breaches the authority and prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, are
unmeritorious.
The law is not vague as it defines with sufficient particularity
 Page 58 of 601

unlawfully acquired property of a public officer or employee as that "which is

manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his
other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property." It also
provides a definition of what is legitimately acquired property. Based on
these parameters, the public is given fair notice of what acts are
proscribed. The law, therefore, does not offend the basic concept of
fairness and the due process clause of the Constitution. Neither is the
presumption of innocence clause violated by Sec. 2 of RA 1379 which states
that property acquired by a public officer or employee during his
incumbency in an amount which is manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property shall be presumed prima facie to
have been unlawfully acquired. While that is the rule, many of the States have
established a different rule and have provided that certain facts only shall constitute
prima facie evidence, and that then the burden is put upon the defendant to show or
to explain that such facts or acts are not criminal. It has been frequently decided,
in case of statutory crimes, that no constitutional provision is violated by a
statute providing that proof by the State of some material fact or facts shall
constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that then the burden is shifted
to the defendant for the purpose of showing that such act or acts are
innocent and are committed without unlawful intention.
 Page 59 of 601

26) Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001]
G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division)
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS: On April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution in Criminal

Case No. 26558, finding probable cause that petitioner Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, then the President of the Philippines has committed the offense of
plunder, and that he be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder).
The petitioner contended that RA 7080 was unconstitutional, on the grounds
that 1.) it was vague; 2.) it dispenses with the “reasonable doubt” standard in
criminal prosecutions; and 3.) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, thus violating the
fundamental rights of the accused.
The said law allegedly suffers from vagueness on the terms it uses, particularly:
‘combination’, ‘series’, and ‘unwarranted’. Based on this, the petitioner used the facial
challenge to question the validity of RA 7080.

ISSUES:
1. WON the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.
2. WON the fact that the Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the
predicate crimes of plunder leads to its violation of the right of the accused to
due process.
3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether
it is within the power of Congress to classify it as such.

RULE:
 Page 60 of 601

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either

forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law.
The over-breadth doctrine states that a governmental purpose may not
be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of a possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech.
This rationale does NOT apply to penal statutes.

ANALYSIS:
1. NO. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because of the
employment of general terms or the failure to define the terms used therein. The
validity of a law is sustained, so long as that law provides some comprehensible
guide as to what would render those subject to the said law liable to its
penalties. The petitioner cannot rely on the void-for-vagueness doctrine, since
this doctrine does not apply to laws that merely consist of imprecise language.
2. NO. The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of the accused in criminal
prosecutions to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Thus he is entitled
to an acquittal unless the State succeeds in demonstrating the guilt of the
accused with proof beyond reasonable doubt. The contention that Sec. 4 of RA
7080 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime is a
misconception. Rather than proving each and every criminal act done, it is
enough that the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt
or criminal acts indicative of the crime as a whole.
3. NO. Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. The
legislative declaration in RA No. 7659 (which has been declared as
constitutionally valid in a previous ruling) that plunder is a heinous offense
implies that it is a malum in se.
 Page 61 of 601

CONCLUSION:
Premises considered, the Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder
Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Thus, the petition to declare the
law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
 Page 62 of 601

27) Ople vs. Torres [292 SCRA 141 (1998)]

G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998
BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,
HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA
REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF
THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION
ON AUDIT, respondents.

Summary Cases:
Subject: Locus Standi of Senator Ople; Ripeness for adjudication; Legislative Power vs
Executive Power; As head of the executive branch, the President exercises both Control
Power and Supervisory (Administrative) Power; A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is
not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order; Right to Privacy is a
constitutional right; A.O. No. 308 is invalid as it violates the right to privacy also suffers
from vagueness and overbreadth; Reasonable expectation of privacy (Two-part test);
Use of biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the
individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy; A.O. No. 308, being overbroad,
cannot be upheld based on the Rational relationship test ; Right to privacy (Strict
scrutiny standard)

Facts: Senator Blas F. Ople seeks to invalidate Administrative Order No. 308
issued by President Fidel Ramos entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important
constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress
to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected
zone of privacy.
Petitioner Ople filed the instant petition against Executive Secretary Ruben
Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-
Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308.
 Page 63 of 601

Held:
I. Procedural Issues
Locus Standi of Senator Ople
Respondents aver that petitioner Senator Ople has no legal interest to uphold and thus,
does not have the requisite standing to sue.
As a Senator, petitioner Opleis possessed of the requisite standing to
bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of
legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the
misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.

Ripeness for adjudication

The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that
the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople
assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirm on its face. His action is not
premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects.
Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O.
No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social
Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of
the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has
publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the
guidelines for the national identification system.
All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to
implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to
pass judgment on its constitutionality.

II. Substantive Issues

Legislative Power vs Executive Power
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct.
Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter
 Page 64 of 601

and repeal them." The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil
government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily
possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except
as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces
all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes
the laws. The executive power is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance.
As head of the Executive Department, the President has control over the
executive department, bureaus and offices. Corollary to the power of control, the
President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance
of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over
bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and
enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the
President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official
conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and
regulations. A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
administrative order
Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law
and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue.
The Court held that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be
covered by an administrative order.

An administrative order is:

"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular
aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative
head shall be promulgated in administrative orders."
 Page 65 of 601

It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the
Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of
various contending state policies - the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy
interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. As said
administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-
a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the
President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident
that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.
Nor is it correct to argue (as the dissenters do) that A.O. No. 308 is not a law
because it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no
office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government
agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification
card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing
with government. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and
imposes no duty cannot stand.
The dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of administrative legislation and
consequently erodes the plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is contrary to
the established approach defining the traditional limits of administrative legislation. As
well stated by Fisher: "Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here
that administrative legislation must be restricted in its scope and application.
Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that
Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are
entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an
independent source of power to make laws." Right to Privacy is a constitutional right
The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." In the 1965 case of Griswold
v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the right to privacy has a
constitutional foundation. The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which
made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an
 Page 66 of 601

unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons. In the 1968 case of
Morfe v. Mutuc, the Philippines Supreme Court adopted the Griswold ruling that there is
a constitutional right to privacy.
The right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our
Constitution, particularly under the Bill of Rights, i.e., Section 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 8, and 17.
The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution,
hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on
two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility
to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and
other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate,
fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is
debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of
A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the
overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy
in clear and present danger.
A.O. No. 308 is invalid as it violates the right to privacy, also suffers from
vagueness and overbreadth
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it
cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it
violates the right to privacy.
The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308
is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn.
A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens
and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and
social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to
reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by
persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling
enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the
 Page 67 of 601

broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will
put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference
Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among
concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer
application designs."
The term "biometrics" has now evolved into a broad category of technologies
which provide precise confirmation of an individual's identity through the use of the
individual's own physiological and behavioral characteristics. A physiological
characteristic is a relatively stable physical characteristic such as a fingerprint, retinal
scan, hand geometry or facial features. A behavioral characteristic is influenced by the
individual's personality and includes voice print, signature and keystroke. Most biometric
identification systems use a card or personal identification number (PIN) for initial
identification.
It is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific biological
characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify
people who will seek its coverage. Considering the banquet of options available to the
implementors of A.O. No. 308, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our
people is not groundless.
A.O. No. 308 also does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological
information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that
the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of
population data for development planning." This is an admission that the PRN will not
be used solely for identification but for the generation of other data with remote
relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No.
308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for
a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN .
Even the assumption that the computer data file will be limited to the name,
address and other basic personal information about the individual will not save A.O. No.
308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and
 Page 68 of 601

categorical terms how these information gathered shall be handled. It does not provide
who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose.
These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the
information. Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies
access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of
information.

Reasonable expectation of privacy (Two-part test)

We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the National ID and the use of
biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a person's
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test:
whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy;
and whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.
The factual circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness of the
expectation. However, other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and
practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation.
Use of biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the
individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The use of biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does
not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy. The measure
of protection granted by the reasonable expectation diminishes as relevant
technology becomes more widely accepted. The security of the computer
data file depends not only on the physical inaccessibility of the file but also
on the advances in hardware and software computer technology. A.O. No.
308 is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable
expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred
from its provisions.
The rules and regulations to be drawn by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal
defect. Rules and regulations merely implement the policy of the law or order. On its
 Page 69 of 601

face, A.O. No. 308 gives the IACC virtually unfettered discretion to determine the metes
and bounds of the ID System.
Nor do our present laws provide adequate safeguards for a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Commonwealth Act No. 591 penalizes the disclosure by any
person of data furnished by the individual to the NSO with imprisonment and fine.
Republic Act No. 1161 prohibits public disclosure of SSS employment records and
reports. These laws, however, apply to records and data with the NSO and the SSS. It
is not clear whether they may be applied to data with the other government agencies
forming part of the National ID System. The need to clarify the penal aspect of A.O. No.
308 is another reason why its enactment should be given to Congress.
A.O. No. 308, being overbroad, cannot be upheld based on the Rational
relationship test
The Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right
of privacy by using the rational relationship test. He stressed that the purposes of A.O.
No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and speed up the implementation of basic government
services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of services, and (3) generate
population data for development planning. He concludes that these purposes justify the
incursions into the right to privacy for the means are rationally related to the end.
We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, we upheld the
constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police
power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a public officer to make an
annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of income and expenses,
did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote
morality in public administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for
official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service.
The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a
statute, not an administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently detailed.
The law is clear on what practices were prohibited and penalized, and it was narrowly
drawn to avoid abuses. In the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a
worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn.
 Page 70 of 601

And we now hold that when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this court
will give the challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny.
It will not do for the authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties. Nor is it enough for the authorities to prove that their act
is not irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if not defeated, even when the
government does not act irrationally. They must satisfactorily show the presence of
compelling state interests and that the law, rule, or regulation is narrowly drawn to
preclude abuses. This approach is demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire
matrix is designed to protect human rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of
doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the stance that will not put in danger the
rights protected by the Constitution.
The case of Whalen v. Roe cited by the Solicitor General is also off-line. In
Whalen, the United States Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether
the State of New York could keep a centralized computer record of the names and
addresses of all persons who obtained certain drugs pursuant to a doctor's prescription.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that while an individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters is an aspect of the right to privacy, the statute did not pose a grievous
threat to establish a constitutional violation. The patient-identification requirement was
a product of an orderly and rational legislative decision made upon recommendation by
a specially appointed commission which held extensive hearings on the matter.
Moreover, the statute was narrowly drawn and contained numerous safeguards against
indiscriminate disclosure. The statute laid down the procedure and requirements for the
gathering, storage and retrieval of the information. It enumerated who were authorized
to access the data. It also prohibited public disclosure of the data by imposing penalties
for its violation. In view of these safeguards, the infringement of the patients' right to
privacy was justified by a valid exercise of police power. As we discussed above, A.O.
No. 308 lacks these vital safeguards.

Right to privacy (Strict scrutiny test)

 Page 71 of 601

The right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right
is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public
service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and
a compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be
accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent
unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law or order that invades individual
privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny. The reason for this stance was
laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc: “The concept of limited government has always included
the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life
of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited
government...a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which
belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state
can control… “

Art. II, Sec. 11 (respect for human rights)

• Writ of Amparo
28) Sec. of National Defense vs. Manalo (G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008)
G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. RAYMOND MANALO and
REYNALDO MANALO, respondents.

FACTS: On February 14, 2006, respondents were abducted in San Ildefonso,

Bulacan by members of the CAFGU and the Armed Forces on suspicion that
that they were members and supporters of the New People’s Army (NPA).
After eighteen (18) months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on 13
August 2007. They filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order before the Supreme Court to stop the military officers and
agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights.
 Page 72 of 601

In a Resolution dated 24 August 2007, the Supreme Court ordered the Secretary
of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP), their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, and
further enjoined them from causing the arrest of Raymond and Reynaldo.
Forthwith,they filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as
Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo
Reliefs.
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a
Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to
Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs.
They prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo under Sec. 266 of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ
commanding therein respondents to make a verified return within the period
provided by law and containing the specific matter required by law; (3) they
be granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other
reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the
Court, after hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 187 of
the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and equitable reliefs.
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as
a petition under the Amparo Rule. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1) Whether the grant of the privilege of the writ of Amparo is moot and academic
as both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo have escaped from captivity.
2) Whether the Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and
giving full faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously
scripted, rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond
Manalo.
 Page 73 of 601

3) Whether the Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in requiring

petitioners to: (a) furnish to the Manalo brother(s) and to the CA all official and
unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except
those already in file with the court; (b) confirm in writing the present places of official
assignment of M/SGT. HILARIO AKA ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; and (c)
cause to be produced to the court of appeals all medical reports, records and charts,
and reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any,
to the Manalo brothers, to include a list of medical personnel (military and civilian) who
attended to them from February 14, 2006 until august 12, 2007.

HELD:
1) Not moot and academic. Respondents assert that their cause of action consists
in the threat to their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to
security.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right
and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong.
Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear
caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people
react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the
variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience
with the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right
to security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the
"threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a
form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.127
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body cannot be searched or invaded without a
search warrant.128 Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may
constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the
 Page 74 of 601

degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in
criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an
affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of
one's rights by the government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right
is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom
from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III,
Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy
that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of
the 1987 Constitution.133 As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security,
the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is
rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially
when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations,
organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and
bringing offenders to the bar of justice.

2) No serious and grave error committed by C.A. After careful perusal of the
evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents
were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buholna Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped on
August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents
were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His
account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents' harrowing experience
and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his
memory.
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's
statements were not corroborated by other independent and credible pieces
of evidence.102 Raymond's affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit
 Page 75 of 601

of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by

forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries
inflicted on respondents,103 also corroborate respondents' accounts of the torture they
endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo's familiarity with the facilities
in Fort Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt.
Col. Jimenez to be the "Division Training Unit,"104 firms up respondents' story that they
were detained for some time in said military facility.
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture
perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the
information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the
veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written
and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such
as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in
the places where they were detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated,
the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise.
3) With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the
production order sought by respondents partakes of the characteristics of a search
warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must
be complied with prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the application
must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must particularly describe the
place to be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause with
one specific offense; and (4) the probable cause must be personally determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce.152 In the case at bar, however, petitioners point out that other than
the bare, self-serving and vague allegations made by respondent Raymond Manalo in
his unverified declaration and affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be
produced are only mentioned generally by name, with no other supporting details. They
also argue that the relevancy of the documents to be produced must be apparent, but
this is not true in the present case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction
has not been shown.
 Page 76 of 601

Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order under

the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search warrant for law enforcement
under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a
protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a
protection of the government from the demand of the people such as respondents.
Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of
documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides in relevant part, viz:
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an
action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and
copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things,
not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in
the action and which are in his possession, custody or control…
MODULE 2-A-1. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
29) Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs. Anti-Terrorism
Council [G.R. Nos. 178552, 178581, 178890, 179157 & 179461 (October 5,
2010)]
Title: Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism
Council

Petitioners:Thisisaconsolidationof6petitions,thus:
SouthernHemisphereEngagementNetwork,I NGO
GRNo.178552 nc.
Atty.SolimanSantos,Jr. Concerned
citizen,taxpay
er,andlawyer
GRNo.178554 KMU,NAFLU-KMU,CTUHR citizens certiorariandprohi
BAYAN,GABRIELA,KMP,MCCCL,COURAGE,K bition
 Page 77 of 601

GRNo.178581 ADAMAY,SCW,
LFS, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, HEAD, Guingona,
Jr., Lumbera,Constantino, Jr., Sr.
Manansan, OSB, Dean Paz, Atty. Lichauco,
Ret.Col.Cunanan,Siguion-
Reyna,Dr.Pagaduan-Araullo,Reyes,Ramos,
DeJesus,Baua,Casambre
GRNo.178890 SELDA,EMJP,PCPR
GRNo.179157 IBP,CODAL,SenatorMadrigal,
OsmenaIII,andTañada
GR.No.179461 BAYAN-
ST,otherreg’lchaptersandorgsmostlybasedi
nSouthernTagalog

Respondents:
 Anti-TerrorismCouncil,composedof:
o ChairpersonEduardoErmita
o Vice-ChairRaulGonzales
o ActingDefenseSecretaryAlbertoRomulo
o NationalSecurityAdviserNorbertoGonzales
o DILGSecretaryRonaldoPuno
o FinanceSecretaryMargaritoTeves
 AFPChiefofStaffGeneralHermogenesEsperon
 PNPChiefGeneral OscarCalderon
 PGMA
 SupportagenciesoftheAnti-Terrorism Council,namely:
o NationalIntelligenceCoordinatingAgency
o NBI
o BureauofImmigration
 Page 78 of 601

o OfficeofCivilDefense
o IntelligenceServiceoftheAFP
o Anti-MoneyLaunderingCenter
o PhilippineCenteronTransnationalCrime
o PNPintelligenceandinvestigativeelements

FACTS:


Thiscaseconsistsof6petitionschallengingtheconstitutionalityofRA9372,“
AnActtoSecuretheStateandProtectour People from
Terrorism,”akaHuman SecurityActof2007.
 Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected
“communist fronts” by thegovernment, whereas individual petitioners invoke
the “transcendental importance” doctrine and theirstatusas citizens and
taxpayers.
 KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP, and PCR allege they have
been subjected to“close security surveillance by state security forces,” their
members followed by “suspicious persons”
and“vehicleswithdarkwindshields,”andtheirofficesmonitoredby“menwithmilitarybuild
.”Theylikewiseclaimtheyhave been branded as“enemiesof the State.”
 BAYAN,GABRIELA,KMP,
MCCCL,COURAGE,KADAMAY,SCW,LFS,Anakbayan,PAMALAKAYA,ACT,Migrante,
HEAD, and Agham would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents’
alleged action oftagging them as militant organizations fronting for the CPP and
NPA. They claim such tagging istantamounttotheeffectsof
proscriptionwithoutfollowing theprocedureunderthelaw.
 Meanwhile,IBPandCODALbasetheirclaimof
locusstandiontheirsworndutytoupholdtheConstitution.

 Page 79 of 601

PetitionersclaimthatRA9372isvagueandbroad,inthattermslike“widespreadandextraor
dinaryfearandpanic among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to
an unlawful demand” are nebulous,leavinglawenforcementagencieswith
nostandardtomeasure theprohibitedacts.

ISSUES:
1. WONpetitioners’resorttocertiorariisproper? NO.
2. WONpetitionershavelocusstandi àNO.
3. WONtheCourtcantakejudicialnoticeofthealleged“tagging”àNO.
4. WONpetitionerscaninvokethe“transcendentalimportance”doctrineàNO.
5. WONpetitionerscanbeconferredlocusstandiastheyaretaxpayersandcitizensàNO.
6. WONpetitionerswereabletopresentanactualcaseorcontroversyàNO.
7. WONRA9372is vagueandbroadindefiningthecrimeofterrorismàNO.
8. WONapenalstatutemaybeassailedforbeingvagueasappliedtopetitionersàNO.
9. WONthereismeritintheclaim
thatRA9372regulatesspeechsoastopermitafacialanalysisofits validity. NO
 Page 80 of 601

HELDANDRATIO:
1. Petitionforcertiorariis improper.
a. Certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial
or quasi-judicial functions.Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
states that petition for certiorari applies when any
tribunal,board,orofficerexercisingjudicialorquasi-
judicialfunctionshasactedwithoutorinexcessofits
orhisjurisdiction,orwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcess
ofjurisdiction.
b.
Petitionersdonotevenallegewithanymodicumofparticularityhowrespond
entsactedwithoutorin excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess ofjurisdiction.
c. Thepowerofjudicialreviewhas4requisites:
i. Theremustbeanactualcaseorcontroversy.
ii. Petitionersmustpossesslocusstandi.
iii.

Questionofconstitutionalitymustberaisedattheearliestopportunit
y.
iv. The issue of constitutionality must be the
lismotaof the
case.Thepresentcaselacksthe1st2requisites,whichareth
emostessential.
2. Petitionerslack locusstandi.
a. Locusstandiorlegalstandingrequires
apersonalstakeintheoutcomeofthecontroversyas
toassureconcreteadverseness.
b. In Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary, locus
standi has been defined asthatrequiring:
i.
 Page 81 of 601

ThatthepersonassailingmusthaveadirectandpersonalinterestA
ND
ii. Thattheperson
sustainedorisinimmediatedangerofsustainingsomedirectinq
uiryas a result oftheactbeing challenged.
c.
Foraconcernedpartytobeallowedtoraiseaconstitutionalquestion,hemustsh
owthat:
i. Hehaspersonallysufferedsomeactualorthreatenedinjury;
ii. Theinjuryisfairlytraceabletothechallengedaction;AND
iii. Theinjuryis likelytobe redressed byafavorable action.
d. RA 9372 is a penal statute. While Chavez v. PCGG holds that
transcendental public importancedispenses with the requirement that
petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of sufferingdirect and
personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal
legislation belong to
analtogetherdifferentgenusofconstitutionallitigation.Suchnecessitatescl
oserjudicialscrutinyoflocusstandi.
e.
Themereinvocationofthedutytopreservetheruleoflawdoesno,however,s
ufficetoclothetheIBP or any of its members with standing. They failed
to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandateundertheassailedstatute
revoltsagainst its constitutional rightsandduties.
f. Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal who claims to have been
the subject of
“politicalsurveillance”alsolackslocusstandi.ThesameistrueforWigbertoT
añadaandOsmeñaIII,whocite their being a human rights advocate
and an oppositor, respectively. No concrete injury
hasbeenpinpointed,hence,nolocusstandi.
3. Courtcannottakejudicialnoticeofthealleged“tagging.”
 Page 82 of 601

a. Mattersofjudicialnoticehave3materialrequisites:
i. mattermustbeoneofcommonandgeneralknowledge
ii. must be well and authoritatively settled, not doubtful or
uncertain or capable of accurateand readydetermination
iii. knowntobewithinthe limitsofthejurisdictionofthecourt
b. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be
judicially known is that
ofnotoriety.Itcanbesaidthatjudicialnoticeislimitedtofactsevidencedbyp
ublicrecordsandfactsof general notoriety. Hence, it can be said that
judicial notice is limited to: (1) facts evidenced bypublic recordsand
(2) factsofgeneral notoriety.
c. A court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is
dependent on the existence or non-existenceof afactofwhichthe Court
hasnoconstructiveknowledge.
d. Petitioners’ apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea.
That no specific charge orproscription under RA 9371 has been filed
against them, 3 years after its effectivity, belies anyclaim of
imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called
tagging. They fail
toparticularizehowtheimplementationofspecificprovisionsofRA9372wo
uldresultindirectinjurytotheir organizationandmembers.

NotwithstandingthestatementofErmitaandGonzalesthattheArroyoadministrationwilladoptt
heUSandEUclassificationofCPPandNPAas
terroristorganizations,thereisyettobefiledbefore the courts an application to declare
the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist oroutlawedorganizationunder RA
9372.
1.
InKilosbayanv.Guingona,toinvokethetranscendentaldoctrine,thefollowingarethe
determinants:
 Page 83 of 601

a. Thecharacterofthefundsorotherassetsinvolvedinthecase
b.
Thepresenceofaclearcaseofdisregardofaconstitutionalorstatutoryprohi
bitionbythepublicrespondentagencyorinstrumentalityofthe
government;
c.
Thelackofanyotherpartywithamoredirectandspecificinterestinthequestion
sbeingraised
In the case at bar, there are other parties not before the Court with
direct and specific interests in thequestions being raised.
2. Petitionerscannotbeconferreduponthemastaxpayersandcitizens.
a. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the
spending or taxing power
ofCongress,whereascitizenstandingmustrestondirectandpersonalinte
restintheproceeding.
b. RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any
appropriation from Congress for itsimplementation, while none of the
individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and
personalinterestin the implementationof thelaw.
c. Generalized interest, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public
right, do not establish locusstandi.Evidence ofadirectand personal
interestiskey.
3. Petitionersfailtopresentanactualcaseorcontroversy.None
ofthemfacesanychargeunderRA9372.
a. Judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
controversy. An actual case orcontroversy means an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination,
notconjecturaloranticipatory,lestthedecisionofthecourtwouldamounttoa
nadvisoryopinion.
b.
 Page 84 of 601

Courtsdonotsittoadjudicatemereacademicquestionstosatisfyscholarlyint
erest.Thepleadingsmustshow:
i. anactiveantagonisticassertionofalegalrightand
ii. adenialthereof
c. However,areasonablecertaintyoftheoccurrenceofaperceivedthreat
toanyconstitutionalinterest suffices to provide a basis for
mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however,
isqualifiedbythepresence ofsufficientfacts.
d. Prevailing American jurisprudence allows adjudication on the merits
when an anticipatory
petitionclearlyshowsthatthechallengedprohibitionforbidstheconductor
activitythatapetitionerseeksto do, as there would be a justiciable
controversy. However, in the case at bar, the petitioners havefailed to
show that the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally
protected conduct oractivity.Nodemonstrablethreathas
beenestablished,muchless arealandexistingone.
e. Petitioners have yet to show any connection between the purported
“surveillance” and theimplementation of RA 9372. Petitioners obscure
allegations of sporadic “surveillance” andsupposedly being tagged as
“communist fronts” in no way approximate a credible threat
ofprosecution.Fromtheseallegations,theCourtisbeingluredtorenderanad
visoryopinion,whichis not its function. If the case is merely theorized, it
lies beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.Allegationsof
abusemustbeanchoredon realevents.
4. The doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no
application in the present case
sincethesedoctrinesapplyonlytofreespeechcasesandthatRA9372reg
ulatesconduct,notspeech.
a. Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan: The overbreadth and the
vagueness doctrines have
 Page 85 of 601

specialapplicationonlytofreespeechcases,andarenotappropriatefort
estingthevalidityofpenalstatutes.
b. Romualdez v. COMELEC: A facial invalidation of criminal statutes is
not appropriate, but the Courtnonetheless proceeded to conduct a
vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subjectelection
offense under the Voter’s Registration Act of 1996, with which the
therein petitioners werecharged,iscouched inpreciselanguage.
c. The aforementioned cases rely heavily on Justice Mendoza’s Separate
Opinion in the Estradacase: Allegations that a penal statute is vague
and overbroad do not justify a facial review of itsvalidity. A facial
challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one, which
is overbroadbecause of possible chilling effect upon protected
speech. This rationale does not apply topenal statutes. Criminal
statutes have general in terrorem effect. If facial challenge is
allowed,the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. Overbreadthand vagueness doctrines then
have special application only to free speech cases. They are
inaptfortesting the validityof penalstatutes.
5. Sinceapenal statute mayonlybeassailedforbeingvagueasapplied
topetitioners,alimited
vagueness analysis of the definition of “terrorism” in RA 9372 is
legally impossible absent an actualorimminent chargeagainstthem.
i.

Thedoctrineofvaguenessandthedoctrineofoverbreadthdonotoperat
eonthesameplane
Astatuteoractssuffersfromthedefectofvaguenesswhen:
1.

Itlackscomprehensiblestandardsthatmenofcommonintellig
encemustnecessarilyguessatitsmeaninganddifferastoitsap
plication.ItisrepugnanttotheConstitutionin2ways:
 Page 86 of 601

a. Violates
dueprocessforfailuretoaccordfairnoticeofconducttoavoid
b. Leaveslawenforcers
unbridleddiscretionincarryingoutitsprovisions
andbecomesan arbitraryflexing of
theGovernmentmuscle.
ii.

Theoverbreadthdoctrinedecreesthatagovernmentalpurpose
tocontrolorpreventactivitiesconstitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means, which
sweepunnecessarilybroadlyand therebyinvadethe areaof
protectedfreedoms.
b. A“facial”challengeislikewisedifferentfroman“asapplied”challenge.
i.

“Asapplied”challengeconsidersonlyextantfactsaffectingreallitigants
.
ii. “Facial” challenge is an examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only onthe basis of its
actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or
prediction that its
veryexistencemaycauseothersnotbeforethecourttorefrainfromc
onstitutionallyprotectedspeechoractivities.
1. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected
to a facial challenge. If facialchallenge to a penal statute
is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be
hampered. Noprosecutionwould be possible.
6.

ThereisnomeritintheclaimthatRA9372regulatesspeechsoastopermit
afacialanalysisofitsvalidity.
 Page 87 of 601

a. Section3ofRA9372providesthefollowingelementsofthecrimeofterrorism:
i.

OffendercommitsanactpunishableunderRPCandtheenumeratedspe
cialpenallaws;
ii. Commissionofthepredicatecrimesowsandcreates
aconditionofwidespreadandextraordinaryfearandpanicamongth
epopulace;
iii. The offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the
government to give in to an unlawfuldemand.
b. Petitioners contend that the element of “unlawful demand” in the
definition of terrorism
mustnecessarilybetransmittedthroughsomeformofexpressionprotected
bythefreespeechclause.Theargumentdoes
notpersuade.WhatRA9372seeks topenalizeisconduct,notspeech.
c. Petitioners’ notion on the transmission of message is entirely
inaccurate, as it unduly focuses onjust one particle of an element of
the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails somemincing
of words on the part of offender. Utterances not elemental but
inevitably incidental tothe doing of the criminal conduct alter
neither the intent of the law to punish
sociallyharmfulconductnor theessence ofthewhole
actasconduct andnotspeech.
ConcurringopinionofJustice Abad:
d. -Heconcurswiththemajorityopinion,buthesays
heneedstoemphasizethatthegroundsfordismissalinthiscasearemoreprocedu
ral than substantive. Hence, when an actual controversy arises and
when it becomes ripe for adjudication, the specificquestionsraised
heremaybe raised again.
 Page 88 of 601

30) Knights of Rizal vs. DMCI Homes Inc. (G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017)
G.R. No. 213948
KNIGHTS OF RIZAL, Petitioner. vs. DMCI HOMES, INC., DMCI PROJECT
DEVELOPERS, INC., CITY OF MANILA, NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
CULTURE AND THE ARTS, NATIONAL HISTORICAL COMMISSION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Mandamus is the proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect on
the part of a tribunal in the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as
a duty, or there was an unlawful exclusion of a party from the use and enjoyment be a
right to which he is clearly entitled. Only specific legal rights may be enforced by
mandamus if they are clear and certain.

FACTS:
DMCI Project Developers, Inc. (DMCI-PDI) acquired a 7,716.60-square
meter lot in the City of Manila, located near Taft Avenue, Ermita for the
construction of Torre de Manila condominium project. DMCI-PDI secured its
Barangay Clearance, Zoning Permit and Building Permit. The City Council of Manila
issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of the Building Official to temporarily
suspend the Building Permit of DMCI-PDI for the reason that it would dwarf and ruin
the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point.
Manila City Legal Officer Renato G. Dela Cruz stated that there is no legal
justification for the temporary suspension of the Building Permit since the
construction lies outside the Luneta Park and that the area of subject
property has neither been officially declared as an anthropological area or
heritage zone. National Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP) shares the
same view as well.
In a letter to Mayor Joseph Ejercito Estrada, DMCI-PIDI President Alfredo R.
Austria sought clarification on its Zoning Permit. He stated that since the City Planning
 Page 89 of 601

and Development Office (CPDO) granted its Zoning Permit, DMCI-PDI continued with
the application for the Building Permit. Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals
(MZBAA) issued Zoning Board Resolution recommending the approval of DMCI-PDI's
application for variance. The MZBAA noted that the Torre de Manila project exceeds the
prescribed maximum Percentage of Land Occupancy (PLO) and Floor Area Ratio (FAR)
as stipulated in Article V, Section 17 of City Ordinance No. 8119.
Later, the Knights of Rizal (KOR), a "civic, patriotic, cultural, nonpartisan, non-
sectarian and non-profit organization" created under Republic Act No. 646, filed a
Petition for Injunction seeking a temporary restraining order before the Supreme Court,
and later a permanent injunction, against the construction of DMCIPDI's Torre de
Manila condominium project which the court treated as petition for mandamus. KOR
argued that the subject matter is one of transcendental importance and paramount
public interest involving the desecration of the Rizal Monument. The KOR asserts that
Torre de Manila will dwarf all surrounding buildings within a radius of two kilometers
and forever ruin the sightline of the Rizal Monument in Luneta Park. They also claims
that the Torre de Manila project violates the NHCP's Guidelines on Monuments Honoring
National Heroes, Illustrious Filipinos and Other Personages, which state that historic
monuments should assert a visual "dominance" over its surroundings, as well as the
country's commitment under the International Charter for the Conservation and
Restoration of Monuments and Sites, otherwise known as the Venice Charter. Lastly,
the KOR claims that the DMCI-PDI's construction is in violation of the City of Manila's
zoning ordinance.
DMCI-PDI argues that the KOR's petition should be dismissed on the ground that
the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the action following the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts as it has not shown that it suffered an actual or threatened injury as
a result of the alleged illegal conduct of the City of Manila and that KOR has no legal
right.
On the other hand the City of Manila also asserts that the issuance and
revocation of a Building Permit undoubtedly fall under the category of a discretionary
act or duty performed by the proper officer in light of his meticulous appraisal and
 Page 90 of 601

evaluation of the pertinent supporting documents of the application in accordance with

the rules laid out under the National Building Code and Presidential Decree No.
1096, while the remedy of mandamus is available only to compel the performance of a
ministerial duty. The City of Manila maintains that the construction of the Torre de
Manila did not violate any existing law, since the edifice is around 789 meters away
from the line of sight of the Rizal Monument.

ISSUE:
Can the Court issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the City of Manila
to stop the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila project?
RULING:
NO. Mandamus does not lie against the City of Manila.
The stoppage of the construction of a building in one's own property
would violate substantive due process. Under the Rules on Civil Procedure,
mandamus can only be issued when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office
or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the party seeking
mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act. In the present case,
there is no legal duty on the part of the City of Manila to consider the standards set
under Ordinance No. 8119 since it can only be applied the boundaries of Rizal Park
while the area where Torre de Manila is being built is a privately-owned property. Also,
to declare that the City of Manila failed to consider the standards under Ordinance No.
8119 would involve making a finding of fact.
The power of the Court in mandamus petitions does not extend to
direct the exercise of judgment or discretion.During the Oral Arguments, it was
established that the granting of a variance is neither uncommon nor irregular. Current
practice has made granting of a variance the rule rather than the exception. Without
further proof that the MZBAA acted whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarily in issuing
said resolution, the Court must take the approval of the MZBAA, and subsequent
ratification by the City Council of Manila, as the duly authorized exercise of discretion by
the city officials. The Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of said
 Page 91 of 601

officials who are in a better position to consider and weigh the same in the
light of the authority specifically vested in them by law.It is not for this Court
to dictate upon the other branches bf the government how their discretion
must be exercised so long as these branches do not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The violation of the NHCP guidelines and Venice Charter as KOR’s
contention states, do not constitute clear legal bases for the issuance of a
writ of mandamus. These were just mere guidelines. The Venice Charter is
merely a codification of guiding principles for the preservation and restoration of
ancient monuments, sites, and buildings. The Venice Charter is not a treaty and
therefore does not become enforceable as law.
The KOR is also estopped from questioning the construction of the Torre de
Manila project under a basic principle that "one who seeks equity and justice must
come to court with clean hands”. According to the NHCP, the KOR itself even proposed
to build a Rizal Center on the park as recently as 2013. The proposal was disapproved
by the NHCR and the Department of Tourism as it would have dwarfed the Rizal
Monument with its size and proximity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of
equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. The KOR's petition should be
dismissed on this ground alone.
There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila due
to its effect on the background, view, vista, sightline, or setting of the Rizal
Monument.
Articles 1306 and 1409(1) of the Civil Code prescribes that - What is not
expressly or impliedly prohibited by law may be done, except when the act is contrary
to morals, customs and I public order. In this case, there is no allegation or proof that
the Torre de Manila project is "contrary to morals, customs, and public order" or that it
brings harm, danger, or hazard to the community. The City of Manila has determined
that DMCI-PDI complied with the standards set under the pertinent laws and local
ordinances to construct its Torre de Manila project.
 Page 92 of 601

Section 47 of Ordinance No. 8119 specifically regulates the development of

historic sites and facilities. Section 48 regulates large commercial signage and/or
pylon. Nothing in both sections as well as in National Cultural Heritage Act, disallow the
construction of a building outside the boundaries of a historic site or facility, where such
building may affect the background of a historic site. In this case, the Torre de Manila
stands 870 meters outside and to the rear of the Rizal Monument and cannot possibly
obstruct the front view of the Rizal Monument. Likewise, the Torre de Manila is not in
an area that has been declared as a cultural property or national treasure.

31) NASECO Guards Association vs. National Service Corporation (G.R. No.
165442, August 25, 2010)
G.R. No. 165442 August 25, 2010
NASECO GUARDS ASSOCIATION-PEMA (NAGA-PEMA), Petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION (NASECO), Respondent.

FACTS: Respondent National Service Corporation (NASECO) is a wholly-

owned subsidiary of the PNB organized under the Corporation Code in 1975. It
supplies security and manpower services to different clients such as the SEC, PDIC,
Food Terminal Incorporated, Forex Corporation and PNB. Petitioner NASECO Guards
Association-PEMA (NAGA-PEMA) is the collective bargaining representative of the
regular rank and file security guards of respondent. NASECO Employees Union-PEMA
(NEMU-PEMA) is the collective bargaining representative of the regular rank and file
(non-security) employees of respondent such as messengers, janitors, typists, clerks
and radio-telephone operators.
On June 8, 1995, petitioner and respondent agreed to sign a CBA on non-
economic terms. On September 24, 1996, petitioner filed a notice of strike
because of respondent’s refusal to bargain for economic benefits in the
CBA. Following conciliation hearings, the parties again commenced CBA negotiations
 Page 93 of 601

and started to resolve the issues on wage increase, productivity bonus, incentive bonus,
allowances, and other benefits but failed to reach an agreement.
Meanwhile, respondent and NEMU-PEMA entered into a CBA on non-economic
terms. Unfortunately, a dispute among the leaders of NEMU-PEMA arose and at a
certain point, leadership of the organization was unclear. Hence, the negotiations
concerning the economic terms of the CBA were put on hold until the internal dispute
could be resolved.
On April 29, 1997, petitioner filed a notice of strike before the NCMB
against respondent and PNB due to a bargaining deadlock. The following day,
NEMU-PEMA likewise filed a notice of strike against respondent and PNB on the ground
of ULP. Efforts by the NCMB to conciliate failed. DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction
over the strike notices. DOLE Secretary issued a Resolution directing petitioner and
respondent to execute a new CBA incorporating therein his dispositions regarding
benefits of the employees. The charge of ULP against respondent and PNB was
dismissed.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA questioning the
DOLE Secretary’s order. CA partly granted the petition and ruled that a
recomputation and reevaluation of the benefits awarded was in order.
Petitioner was not in favor with the result of the recomputation. Hence this
petition.

ISSUE: WON PNB, being the undisputed owner of and exercising control over
respondent, should be made liable to pay the CBA benefits awarded to the petitioner.
RULING:
1. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in stating that respondent was a company
operating at a loss and therefore cannot be expected to act generously and confer
upon its employees additional benefits exceeding what is mandated by law. It is the
petitioner’s position that based on the “no loss, no profit” policy of respondent with
PNB, respondent in truth has no “pocket” of its own and is, in effect, 1 and the same
with PNB with regard to financial gains and/or liabilities. Thus, petitioners contend
 Page 94 of 601

that the CBA benefits should be shouldered by PNB considering the poor financial
condition of respondent.

What the petitioner is asking this Court to do is to pierce the veil of corporate fiction of
respondent and hold PNB (being the mother company) liable for the CBA benefits.
In Concept Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, we explained the doctrine of piercing the corporate
veil, as follows:

It is a fundamental principle of corporation law that a corporation is an entity

separate and distinct from its stockholders and from other corporations to which it may
be connected. But, this separate and distinct personality of a corporation is merely a
fiction created by law for convenience and to promote justice. So, when the notion of
separate juridical personality is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong,
protect fraud or defend crime, or is used as a device to defeat the labor laws, this
separate personality of the corporation may be disregarded or the veil of corporate
fiction pierced. This is true likewise when the corporation is merely an adjunct, a
business conduit or an alter ego of another corporation.

Also in Pantranco Employees Association (PEA-PTGWO) v. NLRC, this Court ruled:

Whether the separate personality of the corporation should be pierced hinges on
obtaining facts appropriately pleaded or proved. However, any piercing of the corporate
veil has to be done with caution, albeit the Court will not hesitate to disregard the
corporate veil when it is misused or when necessary in the interest of justice. After all,
the concept of corporate entity was not meant to promote unfair objectives.
Applying the doctrine to the case at bar, we find no reason to pierce the
corporate veil of respondent and go beyond its legal personality. Control, by
itself, does not mean that the controlled corporation is a mere instrumentality or a
business conduit of the mother company. Even control over the financial and
operational concerns of a subsidiary company does not by itself call for disregarding its
corporate fiction. There must be a perpetuation of fraud behind the control or at least a
 Page 95 of 601

fraudulent or illegal purpose behind the control in order to justify piercing the veil of
corporate fiction. Such fraudulent intent is lacking in this case.
There is no showing that such “no loss, no profit” scheme between respondent
and PNB was implemented to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or
defend crime, or is used as a device to defeat the labor laws, nor does the scheme
show that respondent is a mere business conduit or alter ego of PNB. Absent proof of
these circumstances, respondent’s corporate personality cannot be pierced.
It is apparent that petitioner wants the Court to disregard the corporate
personality of respondent and directly go after PNB in order for it to collect the CBA
benefits. On the same breath, however, petitioner argues that ultimately it is PNB, by
virtue of the “no loss, no profit” scheme, which shoulders and provides the funds for
financial liabilities of respondent including wages and benefits of employees. If such
scheme was indeed true as the petitioner presents it, then there was absolutely no
need to pierce the veil of corporate fiction of respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.

32) Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. (G.R. No. 167614, March 24,
2009)
G.R. No. 167614 March 24, 2009
ANTONIO M. SERRANO, Petitioner, vs. Gallant MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and
MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC., Respondents.
Facts: Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation
Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA)-approved Contract of Employment with the following terms and
conditions:
1. Duration of contract 12 months
2. Position Chief Officer
3. Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00
4. Hours of work 48.0 hours per week
 Page 96 of 601

5. Overtime US$700.00 per month

6. Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to
accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a
monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents
that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. Respondents did not
deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused
to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26,
1998.
Petitioner’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March
19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26,
1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract,
leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against
respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims
in the total amount of US$26,442.73. The LA rendered a Decision dated July
15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him
monetary benefits, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that
the dismissal of the complainant (petitioner) by the respondents in the above-entitled
case was illegal and the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the
complainant [petitioner], jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, based
on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the amount of
EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS (US $8,770.00),
representing the complainant’s salary for three (3) months of the unexpired
portion of the aforesaid contract of employment.
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA
based his computation on the salary period of three months only — rather
 Page 97 of 601

than the entire unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of petitioner’s
employment contract – applying the subject clause. However, the LA applied
the salary rate of US$2,590.00, consisting of petitioner’s “[b]asic salary,
US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month, fixed overtime pay, +
US$490.00/month, vacation leave pay = US$2,590.00/compensation per
month.”
Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to
question the finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally dismissed.
The NLRC modified the LA Decision and corrected the LA’s computation of the
lump-sum salary awarded to petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate from
US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042 “does not provide for the
award of overtime pay, which should be proven to have been actually
performed, and for vacation leave pay.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he
questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause. The NLRC denied the
motion.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional
challenge against the subject clause. After initially dismissing the petition on a
technicality, the CA eventually gave due course to it, as directed by this Court in its
Resolution which granted the petition for certiorari,filed by petitioner.
The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable
salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by
petitioner.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brings
his cause to this Court on the following grounds:
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a way not
in accord with applicable decision of the Supreme Court involving similar issue of
granting unto the migrant worker back wages equal to the unexpired
portion of his contract of employment instead of limiting it to three (3)
months.
 Page 98 of 601

Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of Republic

Act No. 8042, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in excluding from
petitioner’s award the overtime pay and vacation pay provided in his contract
since under the contract they form part of his salary.
The Court now takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the extreme
importance of the constitutional question raised therein.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Section 10 (par 5) of RA 8042 is unconstitutional
2. Proper computation of the Lump-sum salary to be awarded to
petitioner by reason of his illegal dismissal
3. Whether the overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary
basis in the computation of his monetary award
The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of
petitioner was illegal is not disputed. Likewise not disputed is the salary
differential of US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all three fora.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary
of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months
out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or
a total of US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in
addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to
US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for
the entire nine months and 23 days left of his employment contract,
computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00.31
Arguments of the Petitioner
For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, violates the OFWs’ constitutional
rights in that it impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal protection
and denies them due process.
The Arguments of Respondents
 Page 99 of 601

Respondents contend that the constitutional issue should not be entertained, for
this was belatedly interposed by petitioner in his appeal before the CA, and not at the
earliest opportunity, which was when he filed an appeal before the NLRC.40
The Arguments of the Solicitor General
The Solicitor General (OSG)41 points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect on
July 15, 1995, its provisions could not have impaired petitioner’s 1998 employment
contract. Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded petitioner’s contract, the provisions
thereof are deemed part of the minimum terms of petitioner’s employment, especially
on the matter of money claims, as this was not stipulated upon by the parties.
Issue 1
Does the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on Labor as protected
sector?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the law.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor
sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and
welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions
translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally
enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne
by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is
enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.
Imbued with the same sense of “obligation to afford protection to labor,” the
Court in the present case also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny,
for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to
OFWs.
 Page 100 of 601

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all
OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a
discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on OFWs
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it
is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to
equal protection, but also her right to substantive due process under Section
1, Article III of the Constitution.
Issue 2
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or
the unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their
monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform
rule of computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired
portion of their employment contracts.
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a
differentiated rule of computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed
OFWs based on their employment periods, in the process singling out one
category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of one year or more and
subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited
to their salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but
all the while sparing the other category from such prejudice, simply because the latter’s
unexpired contracts fall short of one year.
Prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary awards of
illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was applicable even to
local workers with fixed-term employment.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it
is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to
equal protection, but also her right to substantive due process under Section
1, Article III of the Constitution.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries
for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his
 Page 101 of 601

employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the

enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
Issue 3
Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis
in the computation of his monetary award, because these are fixed benefits that have
been stipulated into his contract.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For
seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a
Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the
basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas
overtime pay is compensation for all work “performed” in excess of the
regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any work
“performed” on designated rest days and holidays.
In the same vein, the claim for the day’s leave pay for the unexpired portion of the
contract is unwarranted since the same is given during the actual service of the
seamen.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause “or for three
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the December 8, 2004 Decision and April 1, 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner
is AWARDED his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment
contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of
US$1,400.00 per month.

33) Concio vs. DOJ (G.R. No. 175057, January 29, 2008)
G.R. No. 175057 January 29, 2008
MA. ROSARIO SANTOS-CONCIO, MA. SOCORRO V. VIDANES, MARILOU
ALMADEN, CIPRIANO LUSPO, MORLY STEWART NUEVA, HAROLD JAMES
 Page 102 of 601

NUEVA, NORBERT VIDANES, FRANCISCO RIVERA, MEL FELICIANO, and JEAN

OWEN ERCIA, petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HON. RAUL M.
GONZALEZ, as Secretary of the Department of Justice
FACTS: The Wowowee Ultra Stampede claimed 71 lives (69 were women)
and left hundred wounded, which necessitated emergency medical support
and prompted the cancellation of the show’s episode.
The DILG immediately created an inter-agency fact-finding team to
investigate the circumstances. The DoJ Secretary (Raul Gonzalez) constituted an
Evaluating Panel to evaluate the DILG’s Report and determine whether there is
sufficient basis to proceed with a preliminary investigation on the basis of
the documents submitted. The Evaluating Panel then submitted a a Report which
concurred with the DILG’s Report, but concluding that there was no sufficient basis to
proceed with a preliminary investigation (there were no formal complaint/s by an of the
victims/their relatives in pursuance to Rule 110, no documents were submitted to prove
the 74 deaths and 687 injuries, the Fact-Finding Report did not indicate the
persons involved and their participation in the Ultra Stampede, and that most
of the victims did not mention, in their sworn statements, the names of the
persons whom they alleged to be responsible).
The NBI-NCR acting on the Evaluating Panel’s referral to it for further
investigation, submitted to the DoJ an NBI-NCR Report, with supporting documents
recommending the conduct of preliminary investigation (Reckless Imprudence
resulting in Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries) against the
petitioners and seven others as respondents.
The DoJSeretary designated an Investigating Panel to conduct the preliminary
investigation and, if warranted by the evidence, to file the appropriate information and
prosecute the same. The Investigating Panel issued subpoenas direct the respondents
to appear at the preliminary investigation.
The petitioners orally moved for the inhibition, disqualification, or desistance of
the Investigating Panel from conducting the investigation, but the latter did not formally
 Page 103 of 601

resolve the motion. The Investigating Panel found probable cause to indict the
respondents-herein petitioners.
The petitioners assert their right to due process (to have a fair and
impartial preliminary investigation), because they allege, that the
respondents have already prejudged the case, as shown by the public
declarations of Respondent Secretary and the Chief Executive and have, lost
their impartiality to conduct preliminary investigation and that although the
respondents may have the power to conduct criminal investigation or
preliminary investigation, the respondents do not have the power to conduct
both in the same case.
The petitioners concede that the DoJ can conduct both criminal investigations
and preliminary investigations, but not in their case, invoking Cojuangco v PCGG, where
the reshuffling of personnel was not considered by this Court. The Court held that the
entity which conducted the criminal investigation is disqualified from conducting a
preliminary investigation. The DoJ cannot circumvent the prohibition by simply creating
a panel to conduct the first, and another to conduct the second.
The petitioners in the instant case insist on the arbitrariness of the two
Department Orders (which, they claim, paved the way for the DoJ’s dual role). They
allege that the basis for the formation of the five-prosecutor Investigating Panel to the
NBI-NCR Report, which was spawned by the supposed criminal investigation of the
Evaluating Panel (two different prosecutors). The petitioners argue that it did not just
evaluate the DILG Report, but went further and conducted its own criminal investigation
(interviewing witnesses, conducting an ocular inspection, and perusing the evidence).
They allege that absent ant act/omission ascribed to them, it would be unreasonable to
expect them to confirm, deny, or explain their side.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were given a fair and impartial
preliminary investigation in accordance with their right to due process?
 Page 104 of 601

Whether or not the respondents have the power to conduct criminal

investigations and preliminary investigations at the same time?

RATIO: The petitioners’ claim does not stand because Cojuangco was borne
out of different facts.In Cojuangco, the Court prohibited the PCGG from
conducting a preliminary investigation of the complaints for graft and
corruption since it had earlier found a prima facie case (their basis of
sequestration/freeze orders and the filing of an ill-gotten wealth case
involving the same transactions).
It would difficult to imagine how, in the conduct of such preliminary
investigation, the PCGG would even make a turn about and a take a position
contradictory to its earlier findings of a prima facie case. The Court held that the law
enforcer who did the criminal investigation and gathered the evidence and then filed
the complaint for preliminary investigation cannot be allowed to conduct the preliminary
investigation of his own complaint.
The measures taken by the Evaluating Panel do not partake of a criminal
investigation, they having been done in aid of evaluation to relate the incidents to their
proper context. Petitioners’ own video footage of the ocular inspection discloses this
purpose. Evaluation for determining whether there is sufficient basis to proceed with a
preliminary investigation entails not only reading the report or documents in isolation,
but also includes resorting to reasonably necessary means, such as ocular inspection
and physical evidence examination. Any conclusion on such in/sufficiency needs to rest
on some basis or justification.
Had the Evaluating Panel carried out measures partaking of a criminal
investigation, it would have gathered the documents that it enumerated as lacking. The
Evaluating Panel dissolved functus oficio upon rendering its report. The NBI, a
constituent unit of the DoJ, is the one who conducted the criminal investigation. It is
foolhardy to inhibit the entire DOJ from conducting a preliminary investigation merely
becasuse the DoJ’s constituent unit conducted the criminal investigation.
 Page 105 of 601

The Evaluating Panel found no sufficient basis to proceed with a preliminary

investigation, since their report was not adverse to petitioners, prejudgment may not be
attributed vicariously.
A complaint for conducting a preliminary investigation is different from a
complaint for instituting a criminal prosecution. There is confusion because two
complementary procedures adopt “the same word” to refer essentially to a written
charge. There hosuld be no confusion about the objectives since, as intimated during
the hearing before the appellate court, preliminary investigation is conducted precisely
to elecit further facts/evidence. Generally inquisitorial, it is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime to enable the
preparation of a complaint/information.
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the
complaint should have the respondent’s address and be accompanied by the
other affidavits of the complainant and witnesses, as well as other
supporting documents to establish probable cause. It shall be subscribed and
sworn to before any prosecutor/government official (authorized to
administer oath) or, in their absence/unavailability, a notary public (each of
whom must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is
satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits).
The complaint is not entirely the affidavit of the complaint because the affidavit
is treated as a component of the complaint. The phraseology of the above-quoted rule
recognizes that all necessary allegations need not be contained in a single document.
This is unlike a criminal complaint/information, where the averments must be contained
in one document charging only one offense, non-compliance with which renders it
vulnerable to a motion to quash.
The Court is aware of the practice of incorporating all alegations in one
document as a “complaint-affidavit.” It does not pronounce strict adherence to only one
approach, but there are cases where the extent of one’s personal knowledge may not
cover the entire gamut of details material to the alleged offense. The private
 Page 106 of 601

offended/relative may not even have witnessed the fatality, in which case the peace
officer/law enforcer has to rely chiefly of witnesses’ affidavits.
The Rules do not preclude the attachment of a referral/transmittal
letter, similar to that of the NBI-NCR. In Soriano v Casanova, it was held that
leters transmitted by the BSP and PDIC to the DoJ were not intended to be the
complaint envisioned by the Rules, but merely intended to transmit the affidavits of the
bank employees to the DoJ. Nowhere in the transmittal letters is there any averment of
personal knowledge of the events/transactions constitutive of the criminal violations
alleged. The letters stated that what the OSI of the BSP and the LIS of the PDIC did
was to respectfully tansmit to the DoJ, for preliminary investigation, the affidavits and
personal knowledge of the acts ofhte petitioner. These affidavits were subscribed under
oath by the witnesses who executed them before a notary public. Since the affidavits
and not the letters transmitting them were intended to initiate the preliminary
investigation, Section 3a, Rule 112 was substantially complied with.
A complaint for preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not be filed by the
offended. Unless the offense subject thereof is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio,
the same may be filed for preliminary investigation by any competent person.
Thus, a preliminary investigation can validly proceed on the basis of an
affidavit of any competent person, without the referral document, like the
NBI-NCR Report, which was sworn to by the law enforcer as the nominal
complainant. To require otherwise is a needless exercise. Oporto v.
Monserate does not dent this proposition. What is required is to reduce the
evidence into affidavits, for while reports and even raw information may justify the
initiation of an investigation, the preliminary investigation stage can be held only after
sufficient evidence has been gathered and evaluated, which may warrant the eventual
prosecution of the case.
In the present case, there is no doubt about the existence of affidavits. The
appellate court held that certain complaint-affidavits were already filed by some of the
victims. A complaint for preliminary investigation is not required to exhibit the attending
 Page 107 of 601

structure of a complaint/information in Rule 110 (the “People” as a party and an

“accused” rather than a respondent, and a court” that shall pronounce judgment).
The investigating officer is allowed to dismiss outright the complaint only if it is
not sufficient in form and substance or “no ground to continue with the investigation.”
He has the discretion to determine the specificity/adequacy of averments. It is not his
duty to require a more particular statement of the allegations merely upon the
respondents’ motion, and especially where after an analysis of the complaint and its
supporting statements, finds it sufficiently definite to apprise the respondents of the
offense which they are charged.
Petitioners’ claims of vague allegations or insufficient imputations are matters that
can be properly raised In their counter-affidavits to negate/belie the existence of
probable

34) Borlongan vs. Pena (G.R. No. 143591, November 23, 2007)
TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON M. BEJASA, ARTURO E. MANUEL,
JR., ERIC L. LEE, P. SIERVO H. DIZON, BENJAMIN DE LEON, DELFIN C.
GONZALES, JR., and BEN YU LIM, JR., Petitioners, vs. MAGDALENO M. PEÑA
and HON. MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as Judge Designate of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Bago City, Respondents.

FACTS OF THE CASE: Respondent Magdaleno Peña instituted a civil case for
recovery of agent’s compensation against Urban Bank and the petitioners, for
when he allegedly entered into an agreement with the petitioners wherein
Peña undertook to perform acts necessary to prevent any intruders or
squatters from unlawfully occupying Urban Bank’s property.
Petitioners presented documents (letters and memorandums) in an attempt to
show that the respondent (Peña) was appointed as agent by ISCI (former owner of the
banks property) and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners. While, on the other hand,
Peña claimed that said documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not
 Page 108 of 601

actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers
and employees of ISCI.
The City Prosecutor rules in favor of Peña and concluded that the
petitioners were guilty of crime of introducing falsified documents,
subsequently, information were filed with the MTCC of Bago City, Negros,
Occidental. The Judge subsequently issued warrants for the arrest of the
petitioners.
Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Recall Warrants of Arrest and insisted that
they were denied due process because they were not afforded the right to submit their
counter-affidavits. And avers that since they were not afforded to submit their counter-
affidavit, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the
respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, in contravention of the Rules. Petitioners
further prayed that the information be quashed for lack of probable cause.

ISSUE: Whether Petitioners are entitled to submit counter-affidavit before determining

if warrant of arrest shall be issued against them.

RULING: No. The prosecutor may take the appropriate action based on the
affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant. It
means that the prosecutor may either dismiss the complaint if he does not see
sufficient reason to proceed with the case or file the information if he finds probable
cause. The prosecutor is not mandated to require the submission of counteraffidavits.
Probable cause may then be determined on the basis alone of the affidavits, without
infringing on the constitutional rights of the petitioners.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable
 Page 109 of 601

cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal

determination of the existence of probable cause; and (2) if he is not
satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutor’s report
and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
In determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest there is no
provision of law or procedural rule which makes the submission of counter-affidavits
mandatory before the judge can determine whether or not there exists probable cause
to issue the warrant

35) City of Manila vs. Laguio (G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005)
G.R. No. 118127 April 12, 2005
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila,
HON.et al Petitioner,vs.HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge,
RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondents.

Facts: The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a

corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodging
houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel
although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.
March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted
which prohibited certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities
where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the
community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of
the community. The Ordinance prohibited the establishment of sauna parlors, massage
parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, cabarets, motels, inns.
Owners and operators of the enumerated establishments are given three months to
wind up business operations or transfer to any place outside Ermita-Malate or convert
 Page 110 of 601

said businesses to other kinds allowable within the area. The Ordinance also provided
that in case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall
be closed and padlocked permanently.
June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the
Ordinance, insofar as it included motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly
because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it constitutes a denial of equal
protection under the law.
Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the Ordinance is constitutional.

Ratio: SC held that the ordinance is unconstitutional for several reasons.

First, it did not meet the valid exercise of police power. To successfully invoke
the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that (1)the interest of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
an interference with private rights, but (2)the means employed must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive. The object of the ordinance was the promotion and protection of the
social and moral values of the community. The closing down and transfer of businesses
or their conversion into businesses allowed under the ordinance have no reasonable
relation to its purpose. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated
establishments will not per se protect and promote social and moral welfare of the
community. It will not itself eradicate prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest
the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
Second. The modality employed constitutes unlawful taking. The ordinance is
unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the
beneficial use of its property. The ordinance forbids running of the
enumerated businesses in Ermita-Malate area and instructs
owners/operators to wind up their business operations or to transfer outside
 Page 111 of 601

the area or convert said business into allowed business. An ordinance which
permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a
taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of
the private property rights of individuals. There are two types of taking: A “possessory”
taking and a “regulatory” taking. The latter occurs when the government’s regulation
leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property, as in this case.
Third. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause. Equal protection
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
the rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words,
should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some. Legislative bodies
are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation provided the classification is
reasonable. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1)It must be
based on substantial distinction; (2)It must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3)It
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)It must apply equally to all
members of the class. In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinction between
motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By
definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and
other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not
pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The Court
likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the
Ermita-Malate area but not outside this area. A noxious establishment does not become
any less noxious if located outside the area.
Fourth. The ordinance is repugnant to general laws, thus it is ultra vires. The
ordinance is in contravention of the Revised Administrative Code as the Code merely
empowers the local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments
enumerated. Not only that, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. The
P.D. Had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area.
The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial
establishments.
 Page 112 of 601

Ruling: Wherefore, the petition was DENIED and the decision of the RTC was
AFFIRMED.

36) Tanada vs. Tuvera (G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986)
LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive
Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET
AL., respondents.

FACTS: Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a
number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required
by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was
not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that
they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this
case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of
these decrees, declaring in the dispostive portion as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application,
and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect."
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision.[1] Specifically, they ask the following
questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which
are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
 Page 113 of 601

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should
be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that
publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made
forthwith in the Official Gazette.[2]

In the Comment[3] required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the
motion was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and,
on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil
Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that
publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that
in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and
consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply[4] refuting these arguments. Came next
the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a
Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of
Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the internal
administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not have to be
published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette;
and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was
not supported by eight members of this Court.[5]

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This
Code shall take effect one year after such publication."

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both
on the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and
so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
 Page 114 of 601

This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its

discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his
separate concurrence in the original decision,[6] is the Civil Code which did
not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official
Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply
because it was "otherwise provided."

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be
dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process
insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern
it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective
immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of
it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to
comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this
is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-
penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the
persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law,
which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to
have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of
the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, [the
legislative enactments of the government.
 Page 115 of 601

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of
general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example
is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be
said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not
apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest
which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a
proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the
public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest
even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only,
and not to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated
by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,

regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules
 Page 116 of 601

or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their

duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies
to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that
place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a
public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or
requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are
meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which
that body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the

Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for
adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the
assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms.
Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
Government Code.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed
out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the
title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date
of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the
publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner,
incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree
undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
administration.[7] The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information
on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically
 Page 117 of 601

for publication in the Official Gazette[8] and that six others felt that publication could be
made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed.[9] One reserved his
vote[10] and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without
indicating where it should be made.[11] It is therefore necessary for the present
membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down
a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the
Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly,
newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating
the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication
is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as we
know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor
General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it
does, it obviously has not yet been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal
or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to
the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and
approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under
Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen
days from such publication or after a different period provided by the
legislature. [NOTE THAT THIS HAS BEEN CHANGED BY AN EXECUTIVE ORDER
ALLOWING PUBLICATION IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION.]

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon
as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is
 Page 118 of 601

that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties, that a law could be
rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to
cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to
examine at this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for
an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is
once again an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to
public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if
our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people
and all government authority emanating from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to
review the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights,
through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if
the acts of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a
valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the
naked blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately
upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on
another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
 Page 119 of 601

SO ORDERED.
 Page 120 of 601

37) Villegas vs. Hu Chong Tsai Pao Ho [86 SCRA 275 (1978)]
Full Title: G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978
MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner, vs. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE
FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents.

Fact: September 17, 1968 of respondent Judge rendered in favor of the respondent and against the
petitioner, declaring Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila null and void. The Ordinance
No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by the
herein petitioner who prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any position
or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without
first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00
except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the
technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and
those working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect
or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.
Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three (3)
months to six (6) months or fine of not less than P100.00 but not more than P200.00 or both such
fine and imprisonment, upon conviction. Private respondent who was employed in Manila, filed a
petition with the praying for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to
stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance
No. 6537 null and void.

Issue:
Whether the Petitioner’s ordinance is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to
aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

Held: Yes, While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an
employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the
processing and approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits and therefore is
regulatory in character the second part which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee’s fee is
not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00
 Page 121 of 601

from aliens who have been cleared for employment.It is obvious that the purpose of the
ordinance is to raise money under the guise ofregulation. It is unreasonable not only because it
is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation
among individual aliens who are required to pay it.
The Ordinance does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in
the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality
fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor’s action,
expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for
its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary
and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance
is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per
se lawful.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila
who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in
the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is
not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived
of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter
of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons,
both aliens and citizens.

38) Rubi vs. Prov. Board of Mindanao [39 Phil. 660 (1919)]
Full Title: G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919
RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs, vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
MINDORO, defendant.

Facts: This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by
the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the
reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be
held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the
reservation. It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof
 Page 122 of 601

directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, selected by the provincial
governor and approved by the provincial board.
The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code
of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.
This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court is called upon the decide.

Issue: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to the provincial official and a department head.

Ruling: No.That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power
should be zealously protected, the Court agrees.
However, an exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the
central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine
Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised
by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the
province, are better qualified to judge “when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of
law and order?” As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its
inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable
for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department
head.

39) Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila (41 Phil 103)

Full title: KWONG SING, in his own behalf and in behalf of all others having a common or
general interest in the subject- matter of this action, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF
MANILA, Defendant-Appellant.
 Page 123 of 601

Facts: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and the
same interest, filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned
the validity of enforcing Ordinance No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires
that the receipt be in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of
articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments. The permanent injunction
was denied by the trial court.
The appellants claim is that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class legislation; putting in
mind that they are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar
circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also contest
that the enforcement of the legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power. In view of
the foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of police power
(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes property rights.

Ruling:
Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under the police power.
The police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444,
paragraphs and of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744, authorizes the municipal
board of the city of Manila, with the approval of the mayor of the city:
To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following:
To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety,
the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants.

The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes
between laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are
not able to decipher Chinese characters from being defrauded. (Considering that in the
year 1920s, people of Manila are more familiar with Spanish and maybe English.)
 Page 124 of 601

In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance invades no
fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an
attempt is not made to violate personal property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory
nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction,
whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without
exception, and each every one of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The
obvious objection for the implementation of the ordinance is based in sec2444 of the Administrative
Code. Although, an additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affected by the
ordinance such as that of the appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but
mostly Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdens are cast
upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of person or property are subjected to restraint,
and even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is
not sufficient ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The very
foundation of the police power is the control of private interests for the public welfare.

Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a preliminary
injunction is denied, with costs against the appellants.

40) Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad (271 US 500)

Full Title: G.R. No. L-20479 February 6, 1925
YU CONG ENG, ET AL., petitioners,vs.W. TRINIDAD, Collector of Internal Revenue, ET
AL., respondents.

Facts: The petitioner, Yu Cong Eng, was charged by information in the court of first instance of
Manila, with a violation of Act 2972, which provides that (Section 1) it shall be unlawful for any
person, company, or partnership or corporation engaged in commerce, industry or any
other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with
existing law, to keep its account books in any language other than English, Spanish or
any local dialect.
 Page 125 of 601

He was arrested, his books were seized, and the trial was about to proceed, when he and the
other petitioner, Co Liam, on their own behalf, and on behalf of all the other Chinese merchants in
the Philippines, filed the petition against the fiscal, or prosecuting attorney of Manila, and
the collector of internal revenue engaged in the prosecution, and against the judge
presiding.

Issue:
Whether or Not Act 2972 is unconstitutional.

Ruling: Yes. The Philippine government may make every reasonable requirement of its
taxpayers to keep proper records of their business transactions in English or Spanish or
Filipino dialect by which an adequate measure of what is due from them in meeting the
cost of government can be had. But we are clearly of opinion that it is not within the police
power of the Philippine Legislature, because it would be oppressive and arbitrary, to
prohibit all Chinese merchants from maintaining a set of books in the Chinese language, and in the
Chinese characters, and thus prevent them from keeping advised of the status of their business and
directing its conduct.
The law is invalid because it deprives Chinese persons of their liberty and property without due
process of law, and denies them the equal protection of the laws.
Guarantees equivalent to the due process and equal protection clauses of the
14th Amendment were extended to the PH; hence, said guarantees are to be interpreted as meaning
what the provisions meant at the time when Congress made them applicable to the PH. (Serra v.
Mortiga, citing Kepner v. US)
PH government may make every reasonable requirement of its taxpayers to keep records of
their transactions. However, it is NOT within the police power of the legislature to prohibit Chinese
merchants from maintaining a set of books in Chinese.
To justify the state in interposing its authority in behalf of the public, 1) the interests of the
public require such interference and 2) the means are necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not oppressive upon individuals. The determination as to what is a properexercise
of the legislature’s police power is subject to the courts’ supervision. (Lawton v. Steel)
We are likely thus to trespass on the provision of the Bill of Rights that the accused is entitled
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to violate the principle that a
 Page 126 of 601

statute which requires the doing of an act so indefinitely described that men must guess at its
meaning violates due process of law.
Act No. 2972 deprives the Chinese merchants of something indispensable to the
carrying on of their business, and is obviously intended to affect them (as distinguished
from the rest of the community) is a denial of the equal protection of the laws.

41) Binay vs. Domingo (G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991)
Full Title: G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991
HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioners, vs. HON.
EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

Facts: The Municipality of Makati passed a resolution extending financial assistance to a

bereaved family whose gross income does not exceed P2000 a month. The resolution was
referred to respondent COA for its expected allowance in audit. However, COA disapproved the
resolution and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds for the implementation
thereof.

COA's objection is of the position that there is no perceptible connection or relation

between the objective sought to be attained under the resolution and the alleged public
safety, general welfare, etc., of the inhabitants of Makati. COA's also argued that "Resolution
No. 60 is still subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be for a public
purpose, ... should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of the
Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few individuals as in the present case."

Issues:
1. Whether the resolution of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the
general welfare clause.
2. Whether the classification of pauper beneficiaries is violative of the equal protection clause in the
constitution.

Ruling:
 Page 127 of 601

1. Yes. COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not
unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As
correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare
legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services (Section 9, Art. II,
Constitution), the promotion of the general welfare (Section 5, Ibid) social justice (Section 10, Ibid)
as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. The care for the poor is generally
recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise
of police power in the promotion of the common good.

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal
corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the
legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause. Pursuant thereto
they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall
be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace
and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and
the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.

2. No. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of
legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment.
Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers.
Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-
farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.

Alternative answer:
There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different
groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local
councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits
to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban
poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a
 Page 128 of 601

paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance
Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful
experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution
No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life,
should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official
go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for
motives political or otherwise.

42) Villavicencio vs. Lukban [39 Phil 778 (1919)]

Full Title:G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.

The Mayor of City of Manila ordered deportation of 170 women, from Manila to Davao. Some
or most of them were ill refute and/or prostitutes. The petitioners applied for writ of
habeas corpus. In granting the petition for the issuance of the writ, the SC upheld the
right of these women, despite having ill reputation, to liberty of abode and travel.

Facts: The Mayor of Manila, Justo Lukban (Lukban), for the best of all reasons, to exterminate
vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted
for a number of years in Manila, closed. The women were kept confined to their houses in the
district by the police. The city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau
of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers. The police acting from the
chief of police, Anton Hohmann and Lukban descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates
into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival.
The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently
were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an
investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not
been asked if they wished to depart from the region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their
consent to the deportation.
The vessels reached their destination in Davao. The women were receipted for as laborers by
Fransisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao. The attorney for the relatives and friends of a
 Page 129 of 601

considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of
the Supreme Court. The application set forth the salient facts, and alleged that the women
were illegally restrained of their liberty by Lukban, Hohmann, in which they have
admitted.
Lukban and Hohmann prayed that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners were
not proper parties; because the action should have begun in the CFI for Davao; because the
respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control; and because their
jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of Manila.
The court awarded the writ that directed Lukban, Hohmann and Sales to bring (in the first
order of the court) the court the persons named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty. Testimonies
were taken.
The respondents technically presented before the Court the women who had returned to the
city through their own efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the respondents.
Eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could return to
Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn statements; fifty-nine had already
returned to Manila; and twenty-six could not be located. Both counsels of both parties submitted
memoranda.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of
habeas corpus in the final decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.

RULING: NO. The Court finds both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense
offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — “No freeman shall be taken, or
imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed,
or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but
by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will
not deny or defer to any man either justice or right.” (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap.
29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.)
No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban committed a grave abuse of
discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law
 Page 130 of 601

expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not
expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels any person to change his
residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same
rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Their choice of profession should not
be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not
authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the human race.
These women have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without
even being given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without even
consenting to being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukbanetal must be severely
punished.

43) Nebbia vs. State of New York (291 US 502)

Facts: The Legislature of New York established, by Chapter 158 of the Laws of 1933, a Milk
Control Board with power, among other things, to “fix minimum and maximum . . . retail
prices to be charged by . . . stores to consumers for consumption off the premises where
sold.” The Board fixed nine cents as the price to be charged by a store for a quart of milk. Nebbia,
the proprietor of a grocery store in Rochester, sold two quarts and a five cent loaf of bread for
eighteen cents, and was convicted for violating the Board’s order.
At his trial, he asserted the statute and order contravene the equal protection clause and the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and renewed the contention in successive appeals
to the county court and the Court of Appeals. Both overruled his claim and affirmed the
conviction.

Issue: Whether the milk industry is a public utility subject to the fixing of its selling price.

Ruling: YES.Many other decisions show that the private character of a business does not
necessarily remove it from the realm of regulation of charges or prices. In the further
discussion of the principle, it is said that, when one devotes his property to a use “in which the public
has an interest,” he, in effect, “grants to the public an interest in that use,” and must submit
to be controlled for the common good.
 Page 131 of 601

It is clear that there is no closed class or category of businesses affected with a public
interest, and the function of courts in the application of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments is to determine in each case whether circumstances vindicate the
challenged regulation as a reasonable exertion of governmental authority or condemn it
as arbitrary or discriminatory. The phrase “affected with a public interest” can, in the
nature of things, mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason, is subject to
control for the public good.
But there can be no doubt that, upon proper occasion and by appropriate measures, the state
may regulate a business in any of its aspects, including the prices to be charged for the products or
commodities it sells.

44) Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway vs. Minnesotta (134 US 118)

Facts: A Minnesota law made its railroad commission the final judge of the
reasonableness of railroad rates. The railroad maintained that "it is always a judicial question as
to whether a statute is repugnant to provisions of the constitution."
The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that the state of Minnesota, hence all states, have
the legislative power to craft laws regulating rates of transport. However, the manner in
which the state of Minnesota executed their authority via the Railroad and Warehouse
Commission--not allowing the Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Railway Company
representation before the commission rate hearings--breached the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S.Constitution. Thus, while states could legally regulate service rates rate
hearings and decisions had to be conducted in a manner which permitted participation and input by
all affected parties.
In March of 1887, the state of Minnesota established a Railroad and Warehouse
Commission. The duties of this commission were defined in a legislative act of Minnesota (General
Laws of 1887, chapter 10). The first section of this act proclaimed that any common carrier "engaged
in the transportation of passengers or property . . . from one place or station to another, both being
within the State of Minnesota" would be liable to its provisions. Thus, the commission was
authorized to force any common carrier to change its tariffs if it found such charges
"unreasonable" and "unequal." The commission, however, was obliged to notify carriers,
in writing, and explain why such charges were unlawful. If a common carrier overlooked such
 Page 132 of 601

notification and refused to follow or adopt recommended charges it was subject to a writ
of mandamus (a written order to undertake a certain legal procedure; subject to the mandamus are
individuals, public officials, companies, and courts). In essence, the Railroad and Warehouse
Commission had total authority and autonomy in determining what constituted lawful
rate charges.
The commission, joined by the Board of Trade Unions of Farmington, Northfield, Faribault and
Owatonna, petitioned the Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Railway Company (C M & St. P Railway)
complaining that their charge for transport of milk was unjust. The petition stated that the company
charged four cents per gallon of milk for shipment from Owatonna to St. Paul and Minneapolis, but
from Faribault, Dundas, Northfield and Farmington to St. Paul and Minneapolis, the price was three
cents per gallon. The commission requested that charges should be replaced with ones determined
fair by the commission. Officials from C M & St. P Railway refused to change rates arguing that their
charges were even lower than in some parts of the country. In response, the commission and the
Board of Trade Unions met at the office of the commission in St. Paul. They concluded that transport
charges of three cents per gallon of milk was high and that two-and-one-half cents was fair.
The commission reported their findings to C M & St. P Railway. The report protested that
the company overcharged for its service and announced that the sum of two and one-half
cents was just compensation. The Commission ruled that the new, set rate should be charged
regardless of the transport distance in the state. When the Railway Company refused to comply, the
state attorney general applied for a writ of mandamus from the Minnesota Supreme Court.
Consequently, the court issued an "alternative" writ of mandamus. (Although the court's deadline for
the response to be filled and returned was 14 December 1887, C M & St. P Railway responded on 23
of December, 1887.)
The heart of the company's response debated whether the state had a legal ground to
establish a regulatory commission with such vast authority. The brief pointed out that C M & St. P
Railway succeeded all franchises granted by the Congress of the United States in 1857 to the Cedar
Valley Railroad Company and that under the ninth section of the charter, the directors of the
company were granted exclusive right to regulate the rates of transport. The only clause in the
charter was that the company had to "assure a reasonable rate."
C M & St. P Railway applied twice for a peremptory writ of mandamus, but the
Minnesota Supreme Court denied their application both times. The court affirmed the
writ and issued an order that the railroad must obey the decision of the Railroad and
 Page 133 of 601

Warehouse Commission. To counter this decision, the company submitted a writ of error
(written order, usually, from a superior court to a lower one to send a record of the case for review)
to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the Minnesota law violate the due process clause of the 14th Amendment?

Ruling: Yes. The statute did not provide procedural due process: railroads received no
hearing or other chance to defend their rates before the commission. Moreover, a rate's
reasonableness "is eminently a question for judicial investigation, requiring due process of law for its
determination." A company denied the authority to charge a reasonable rate and unable to
turn to a judicial mechanism for review would be deprived of the "lawful use of its
property, and, thus, in substance, and effect, of the property without due process of
law."

45) US vs. Toribio (G.R. No. L-5060, January 26, 1910)

Full title:G.R. No. L-5060 January 26, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUIS TORIBIO, defendant-appellant.

Facts: Toribio was found by the trial court of Bohol violating Sections 30 and 33 of Act No.
1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act
prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft purposes for
human consumption.
Appellant Toribio slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered his carabao without a
permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was
slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that
under such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of
large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure.
Appellant contends that he applied for a permit to slaughter the animal but was
not given one because the carabao was not found to be “unfit for agricultural work” which
resulted to appellant to slaughter said carabao in a place other than the municipal slaughterhouse.
 Page 134 of 601

Appellant then assails the validity of a provision under Act No. 1147 which states that only
carabaos unfit for agricultural work can be slaughtered.
Appellant also contended that the act constitutes a taking of property for public use in
the exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing for the compensation of
owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it
deprives them of the enjoyment of their private property.

Issue(s):
1. Whether the prohibition and the penalty imposed in Act No. 1147 is limited only to the slaughter of
large cattle at the municipal slaughterhouse.
2. Whether Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle, is an
undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.

Ruling:
1. NO. The prohibition and penalty imposed in Act No. 1147 applies generally to the
slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly
secured from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large
cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit.

Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction
should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and
promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which
would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the
legislator sought to attain by its enactment.

Therefore, sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be
slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in
section 30.

2. NO. Act no. 1147 is not a taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of
the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to
 Page 135 of 601

regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with
the rights of the publics. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it
shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public
rights and interests of the community.

The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines like an epidemic that
wiped 70-100% of the population of carabaos.. The Supreme Court also said that these
animals are vested with public interest for they are fundamental use for the production of crops.
These reasons satisfy the requisites of a valid exercise of police power

Finally, SC said that article 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of eminent
domain. The said law does not constitute the taking of caraboes for public purpose; it just serve as
a mere regulation for the consumption of these private properties for the protection of general
welfare and public interest.

MODULE 2-A-2. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

46) Tua vs. Mangrobang (G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014)
Full Title: G.R. No. 170701 January 22, 2014
RALPH P. TUA, Petitioner, vs. HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 22,
Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite; and ROSSANA HONRADO-TUA, Respondents.

Facts: Ralph Tua and Rossana Honrado-Tua were married in 1998. Sometime in 2005, Rossana
filed a verified petition before the Imus RTC for the issuance of a protection order for
herself and her three minor children Ralph. This was pursuant to RA 9262 or the Anti-
Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004.
She alleged that in separate instances, Ralph (a) pointed a gun to her head to convince
her not to proceed with the legal separation case she filed; (b) fed their children with the
fried chicken that their youngest daughter had chewed and spat out in order to stop one
of the children from crying; (c) threatened their children with a belt; (d) threatened her
of withholding his financial support and pushed her to lie flat on the bed; and (e) forcibly
took the children and refused to give them back to her.
 Page 136 of 601

On May 23, 2005, Judge Mangrobang of Imus RTC issued a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO).
Subsequently, Ralph filed a Petition with Urgent Motion to Lift TPO. He denied Rossana's
allegations. As a defense, he stated that it was him who was being abused by Rossana. He added
that Rossana was cohabiting with another man, which rendered her mentally,
psychologically, spiritually and morally unfit to keep the children in her custody.
Without waiting for the resolution of his Comment on the petition and motion to lift TPO,
Ralph filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. He argued that the TPO was issued with grave abuse of discretion
on the part of Judge Mangrobang and that Section 15 of RA 9262 relating to the issuance
of a TPO was violative of his constitutional right to be afforded due process.
CA dismissed Ralph's petition. The CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of Imus RTC in the issuance of the TPO as the same was in complete accord with the
provision of RA 9262. As for the constitutionality of the Anti-VAWC Law, the CA did not issue any
ruling on it because the constitutionality of the law was not the lismota of Ralph's petition.
Hence, the instant petition before the SC.

Issues:
1. Whether the issuance of TPOs under Section 15 of the Anti-VAWC Law is violative of the
constitutional right to due process of the party being complained against.
2. Whether Judge Mangrobang acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed TPO.

Ruling:
Petition denied. CA affirmed. No grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Mangrobang.
Anti-VAWC Law, particularly Section 15 on the issuance of TPO, is not unconstitutional.

1. No. SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. – Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to
the protection order issued by the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte
determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the
reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a
hearing on the issuance of a [Permanent Protection Order] PPO prior to or on the date of the
expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the
 Page 137 of 601

respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the
service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a
PPO.

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women
and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary
reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any
disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of
their life.

The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only
mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.

Before a TPO is issued, several steps need to be taken. The rules require that petitions for protection
order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility,
criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further
violence is to be prevented," the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before
notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable
ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent
danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur.

There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The
victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses'
affidavits to the petition.

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process.
Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the
time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of
his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences
 Page 138 of 601

in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before
such acts could be prevented.

It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that
notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days
from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served
immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30)
days from service on the respondent.

Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and
service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within
five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall
likewise be indicated on the notice.

The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the
affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should
not be issued.

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be
apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side.

2. No.The court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the filing of the application after ex parte
determination that there is basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the respondent need
not be notified or be present in the hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is within the court’s
discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to determine that the violent acts
against women and their children for the issuance of a TPO have been committed.

In this case, the alleged acts of Ralph, while not conclusive, are enough bases for the issuance of a
TPO. Contrary to Ralph's assertion that there must be a judicial determination of the basis of the
issuance of a TPO, the law is designed to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the
remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the
victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household
 Page 139 of 601

member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that
jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary
custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the
perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.

There is grave abuse of discretion when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law. The CA did not err when it found no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the RTC in the issuance of the TPO.

47) Estrada vs. Ombudsman (G.R. No. 212140, January 21, 2015)
Full Title: G.R. Nos. 212140-41 January 21, 2015
SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, Petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, Office of the Ombudsman, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION and ATTY. LEVITO D. BALIGOD, Respondents.

Facts: Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada
two (2) criminal complaints for plunder, among others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-
respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14
March 2014.
On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of
Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other
Filings” (the “Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of a
respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been
furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on
record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).” The
Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the subject of the present certiorari case.
Issue: Whether the quantum of evidence necessary during preliminary investigation?
 Page 140 of 601

Ruling: First, there is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a
respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Sections 3 and 4,
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7,
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman do not provide for the relief sought by Sen.
Estrada in his Request.
Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is
only for the determination of probable cause, and “probable cause merely implies
probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner.A preliminary
investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full
exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his
innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those
granted by procedural law.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of
determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence
now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded
belief” as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt thereof.
A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’
evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief
that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. We are in accord
with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of
petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the
evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.
Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and
control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary
investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for a strict
application of the evidentiary rules.
Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those in
administrative proceedings as laid down in the landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of
evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the evidence needed in a
preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to establish the existence of a prima facie
 Page 141 of 601

case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial evidence,” while
the establishment of probable cause needs “only more than ‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence
which would justify . . . conviction’.” In the United States, from where we borrowed the concept of
probable cause, the prevailing definition of probable cause is this:
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with
probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard
of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a
preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally
adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in administrative cases, where rights and
obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence” which cannot rest
entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as substantial
evidence because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can include
hearsay evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in preliminary
investigations will change the quantum of evidence required in determining probable cause from
evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to substantial evidence of guilt.

48) Diona vs. Balangue (G.R. No. 173559, January 7, 2013)

Full Title: G.R. No. 173559 January 7, 2013
LETICIA DIONA, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, MARCELINA DIONA, Petitioner, vs.
ROMEO A. BALANGUE, SONNY A. BALANGUE, REYNALDO A. BALANGUE, and ESTEBAN A.
BALANGUE, JR., Respondents.

Facts: The grant of a relief neither sought by the party in whose favor it was given nor
supported by the evidence presented violates the opposing party's right to due process
and may be declared void ab initio in a proper proceeding.
 This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Resolution of (CA) issued which granted the
Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by the respondents seeking to nullify that portion of
 Page 142 of 601

the Decision of the (RTC), Valenzuela City awarding petitioner 5% monthly interest rate for
the principal amount of the loan respondents obtained from her.
 On March 2, 1991, respondents obtained a loan of P45K from petitioner payable in 6 months
and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their 202-sqm property located in Valenzuela and
covered by TCT.‚When the debt became due, respondents failed to pay notwithstanding
demand. Thus, petitioner filed with the RTC a Complaint on September 17, 1999.
 Respondents were served with summons thru respondent Sonny A. Balangue. On October 15,
1999, with the assistance of (Atty. Coroza) of the PAO, they filed a Motion to Extend Period to
Answer but respondents failed to file any. RTC declared them in default and allowed petitioner
to present her evidence ex parte. RTC granted petitioner's Complaint.
 Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution alleging that respondents did not interpose a timely
appeal. Before it could be resolved, however, respondents filed a Motion to Set Aside
Judgment dated January 26, 2001, claiming that not all of them were duly served with
summons. They had no knowledge of the case because their co-respondent Sonny did not
inform them.
 But on March 16, 2001, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution to implement its
October 17, 2000 Decision. However, since the writ could not be satisfied, petitioner moved
for the public auction of the mortgaged property, which the RTC granted. In an auction sale
conducted on November 7, 2001, petitioner was the only bidder in the amount of P420k. Thus,
a Certificate of Sale was issued and accordingly annotated.
 Respondents then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale,
claiming that the parties did not agree in writing on any rate of interest and that petitioner
merely sought for a 12% per annum interest in her Complaint. RTC awarded 5% monthly
interest (or 60% per annum). Their indebtedness inclusive of the exorbitant interest ballooned
to P652,000.00. RTC granted respondents' motion and accordingly modified the interest rate
awarded to 12% per annum. Then respondents filed a Motion for Leave To Deposit/Consign
Judgment Obligation in the total amount of P126,650.00.
 Displeased with the RTC's May 7, 2002 Order, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. CA rendered a Decision declaring
that the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding the 5% monthly interest but at the same
time pronouncing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in subsequently reducing the rate
of interest to 12% per annum. In so ruling, the CA ratiocinated: Indeed, We are convinced
 Page 143 of 601

that the Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction when it granted 5% monthly interest instead of
the 12% per annum prayed for in the complaint. However, the proper remedy is not to amend
the judgment but to declare that portion as a nullity.

Issue:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT
GRANTED RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A SUBSTITUTE OR
ALTERNATIVE REMEDY OF A LOST APPEAL.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR AND
MISAPPREHENSION OF LAW AND THE FACTS WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT OF THE DECISION OF THE RTC, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID
DECISION HAS BECOME FINAL AND ALREADY EXECUTED CONTRARY TO THE DOCTRINE OF
IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT.30Ï‚rÎ1⁄2l1

Ruling:
The petition must fail. We agree with respondents that the award of 5% monthly interest
violated their right to due process and, hence, the same may be set
aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

Annulment of judgment under Rule 47; an exception to the final judgment rule; grounds
therefor. A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy
granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to
avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies.
Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to
the party's own neglect in promptly availing of the same. "The underlying reason is traceable to the
notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must
end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of
justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to
rest.
While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes
lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this
 Page 144 of 601

Court declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection
thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due
process of law.

Grant of 5% monthly interest is way beyondthe 12% per annum interest sought in the
Complaint and smacks of violation of due process.

It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess
of what is being sought by the party.

They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence presented in
support thereof. Due process considerations require that judgments must conform to and be
supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in court. In Development Bank of the Philippines
v. Teston, this Court expounded that: Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is
improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice
which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The
fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of
recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.

49. Short Title: Maliksi vs. COMELEC

Complete Title: G.R. No. 203302 April 11, 2013
MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
HOMER T. SAQUILAVAN, Respondents.

Facts: During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Saquilayan the winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate
who garnered the second highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the
RTC in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered
precincts.
Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the
revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease
 Page 145 of 601

and desist from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the
meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then
installed as Mayor.
In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the
parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot
images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to
deposit the amount necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot
images. Later, it issued another order dated April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan to augment his cash
deposit.
On August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a resolution nullifying the RTC’s
decision and declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor.
Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to
due process because he had not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He argued
that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had been
unwarranted because there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not been
preserved.
On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny Maliksi’s motion for
reconsideration.
Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari, reiterating his objections to the
decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images without prior notice to him, and to the use
of the printouts of the ballot images in the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division.
In the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013, the Court dismissed Maliksi’s petition for
certiorari. The Court concluded that Maliksi had not been denied due process because: (a) he had
received notices of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the First Division
— referring to the orders of the First Division directing Saquilayan to post and augment the cash
deposits for the decryption and printing of the ballot images; and (b) he had been able to raise his
objections to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration. The Court then pronounced that the
First Division did not abuse its discretion.
Maliksi insists: (a) that he had the right to be notified of every incident of the proceedings and
to be present at every stage thereof; (b) that he was deprived of such rights when he was not
informed of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the First Division; (c)
that the March 28, 2012 and April 17, 2012 orders of the First Division did not sufficiently give him
 Page 146 of 601

notice inasmuch as the orders did not state the date, time, and venue of the decryption and printing
of the ballot images; and (d) that he was thus completely deprived of the opportunity to participate
in the decryption proceedings.
Maliksi submits that the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013 is null and void for having
been promulgated despite the absence from the deliberations and lack of signature of Justice Jose
Portugal Perez.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Supreme Court En Banc gravely erred in dismissing the instant petition despite a
clear violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to due process of law.
2. Whether the Supreme Court En Banc gravely erred in upholding the comelec first division’s
ruling to dispense with the physical ballots and resort to their digital images notwithstanding
the fact that the ballots are the best and most conclusive evidence of the voters’ will

RULING:
1.Yes. The Court grants Maliksi’s Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and reverses the
decision promulgated the ground that the First Division of the COMELEC denied to him the right to
due process by failing to give due notice on the decryption and printing of the ballot images.
Consequently, the Court annuls the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division with the use
of the printouts of the ballot images.
It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have conducted the assailed
recount proceedings because it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to which no existing rule
of procedure allowed it to conduct a recount in the first instance. The recount proceedings authorized
under Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended, are to be conducted by the
COMELEC Divisions only in the exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction over all election protests
involving elective regional (the autonomous regions), provincial and city officials.
As we see it, the First Division arbitrarily arrogated unto itself the conduct of the recount
proceedings, contrary to the regular procedure of remanding the protest to the RTC and directing the
reconstitution of the Revision Committee for the decryption and printing of the picture images and
the revision of the ballots on the basis thereof.
Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) v. Commission on
Elections, the power of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution of
 Page 147 of 601

its cases should still be exercised only after giving to all the parties the opportunity to be heard on
their opposing claims. The parties’ right to be heard upon adversarial issues and matters is
never to be waived or sacrificed, or to be treated so lightly because of the possibility of
the substantial prejudice to be thereby caused to the parties, or to any of them. Thus, the
COMELEC En Banc should not have upheld the First Division’s deviation from the regular
procedure in the guise of speedily resolving the election protest, in view of its failure to
provide the parties with notice of its proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, the
most basic requirements of due process.
Moreover, due process of law does not only require notice of the decryption,
printing, and recount proceedings to the parties, but also demands an opportunity to be
present at such proceedings or to be represented therein. Maliksi correctly contends that
the orders of the First Division simply required Saquilayan to post and augment his cash
deposit. The orders did not state the time, date, and venue of the decryption and recount
proceedings. Clearly, the First Division had no intention of giving the parties the
opportunity to witness its proceedings.
2.Yes. The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the
equivalents of the original official ballots themselves. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional
equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of
revision of votes in an electoral protest.
But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the
Electoral Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture
images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them without notice to the parties.
Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the official ballots and the printouts of
their picture images, the rules for the revision of ballots adopted for their respective
proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the primary or best evidence of the
voters’ will. In that regard, the picture images of the ballots are to be used only when it
is first shown that the official ballots are lost or their integrity has been compromised.
For instance, the aforesaid Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended
by COMELEC Resolution No. 9164, itself requires that "the Recount Committee determines that the
integrity of the ballots has been violated or has not been preserved, or are wet and otherwise in such
a condition that (the ballots) cannot be recounted" before the printing of the image of the ballots
should be made. Also, the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal’s Guidelines on the Revision of
 Page 148 of 601

Ballots requires a preliminary hearing to be held for the purpose of determining whether the integrity
of the ballots and ballot boxes used in the May 10, 2010 elections was not preserved, as when there
is proof of tampering or substitutions.All the foregoing rules on revision of ballots stipulate that the
printing of the picture images of the ballots may be resorted to only after the proper
Revision/Recount Committee has first determined that the integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes
was not preserved.
The foregoing rules further require that the decryption of the images stored in the CF cards
and the printing of the decrypted images take place during the revision or recount proceedings.
There is a good reason for thus fixing where and by whom the decryption and the printing should be
conducted. It is during the revision or recount conducted by the Revision/Recount Committee when
the parties are allowed to be represented, with their representatives witnessing the proceedings and
timely raising their objections in the course of the proceedings.
When, as in the present case, it was not the Revision/Recount Committee or the RTC
exercising original jurisdiction over the protest that made the finding that the ballots had been
tampered, but the First Division in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the parties should have
been given a formal notice thereof.
The disregard of Maliksi’s right to be informed of the decision to print the picture images of
the ballots and to conduct the recount proceedings during the appellate stage cannot be brushed
aside by the invocation of the fact that Maliksi was able to file, after all, a motion for reconsideration.
Notably, the First Division did not issue any order directing the recount. Without the written order,
Maliksi was deprived of the chance to seek any reconsideration or even to assail the irregularly-held
recount through a seasonable petition for certiorari in this Court. In that context, he had no real
opportunity to assail the conduct of the recount proceedings.

50. Short Title: Rodriguez and Tulali vs. Judge Blancaflor

Full Title: G.R. No. 190171 March 14, 2011
ALEN ROSS RODRIGUEZ and REGIDOR TULALI, Petitioners, vs.
The Hon. BIENVENIDO BLANCAFLOR, in his capacity as the Acting Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 52, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
 Page 149 of 601

FACTS: Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was Criminal Case No. 22240 for
arson, entitled People of the Philippines v. Teksan Ami, in which Tulali was the trial
prosecutor.During the pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a controversy
involving an alleged bribery initiated by Randy Awayan, the driver assigned to Judge Blancaflor
under the payroll of the Office of the Governor of Palawan, and one Ernesto Fernandez, to assure the
acquittal of the accused, Rolly Ami, and the dismissal of the arson case.
A day before the scheduled promulgation of the decision in the arson case, Tulali
filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation withdrawing his appearance in the said case to prevent
any suspicion of misdemeanor and collusion. He attached to the said manifestation a copy of
the administrative complaint against Awayan filed (but eventually withdrawn) by his superior,
Rodriguez, before the Office of the Governor of Palawan.On June 30, 2009, Judge Blancaflor
rendered his decision acquitting Ami of the crime of arson.
Purportedly on the basis of the administrative complaint filed against Awayan and Rodriguez,
Judge Blancaflor summoned several witnesses including Tulali and heard their testimonies. On July
30, 2009, he issued an order summoning Rodriguez to appear before him for the purpose
of holding an inquiry on matters pertaining to his possible involvement in Tulali’s filing of
the ex-parte manifestation and the administrative complaint against Awayan.
Rodriguez filed his Motion for Clarification as to the purpose of Judge Blancaflor’s
continued inquiries. Judge Blancaflor informed the petitioners that he was proceeding
against them for direct contempt and violation of their oath of office on the basis of
Tulali’s Ex-Parte Manifestation.
Judge Blancaflor issued the assailed October 13, 2009 Decision finding petitioners guilty of
direct contempt. The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and a fine of
100,000.00 each were imposed upon them.The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision but it was denied.
Hence, the petitioners interpose the present special civil action before this Court
anchored on the grounds that: (A) Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed decision and order
considering that petitioners were denied their right to due process; (B) Respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
decision and order considering that he grossly violated the rules on contempt; and (C) Since the
assailed decision and order are void, a writ of prohibition must be issued against respondent.
 Page 150 of 601

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated that Judge Blancaflor committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding petitioners guilty of direct
contempt as the judgment was not based on law and evidence.

ISSUE: Whether respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed decision and order considering that petitioners were denied their
right to due process.

RULING: Yes. The petition is impressed with merit. The power to punish a person in contempt of
court is inherent in all courts to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the orderly
administration of justice. However, judges are enjoined to exercise the power judiciously and
sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and
preservation of the dignity of the court, and not for retaliation or vindictiveness. In this case, the
Court cannot sustain Judge Blancaflor’s order penalizing petitioners for direct contempt on the basis
of Tulali’s Ex-Parte Manifestation.
The act of Tulali in filing the Ex-Parte Manifestation cannot be construed as contumacious
within the purview of direct contempt. It must be recalled that the subject manifestation bore Tulali’s
voluntary withdrawal from the arson case to dispel any suspicion of collusion between him and the
accused. Its filing on the day before the promulgation of the decision in the pending criminal case,
did not in any way disrupt the proceedings before the court. Accordingly, he should not be held
accountable for his act which was done in good faith and without malice. Neither should Rodriguez
be liable for direct contempt as he had no knowledge of, or participation in, the preparation and filing
of the subject manifestation.
Judge Blancaflor’s conclusion, that the subject manifestation containing derogatory matters
was purposely filed to discredit the administration of justice in court, is unfounded and without basis.
There being no factual or legal basis for the charge of direct contempt, it is clear that Judge
Blancaflor gravely abused his discretion in finding petitioners guilty as charged.
Petitioners also fault Judge Blancaflor for non-observance of due process in conducting the contempt
proceedings. It must be emphasized that direct contempt is adjudged and punished
summarily pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules. Hence, hearings and opportunity
to confront witnesses are absolutely unnecessary.
 Page 151 of 601

In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the elementary procedure
which requires written charge and due hearing. There was no order issued to petitioners.
Neither was there any written or formal charge filed against them. In fact, Rodriguez
only learned of the contempt proceedings upon his receipt of the July 30, 2009 Order,
requiring him to appear before the Court in order to clarify certain matters contained in
the said order. Tulali, on the other hand, only learned of the proceedings when he was
ordered to submit his compliance to explain how he came in possession of the
administrative complaint against Awayan.
The fact that petitioners were afforded the opportunity to file their appropriate pleadings is not
sufficient as the proceedings ex-parte to hear the witnesses’ testimonies had already been
completed.
This Court is not unmindful of a judge’s power to suspend an attorney from practice for just
cause pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Judge Blancaflor, however,
must be reminded that the requirements of due process must be complied with, as mandated under
Section 30, Rule 138 of the same Rules.
In the case at bench, there was no prior and separate notice issued to petitioners
setting forth the facts constituting the misconduct and requiring them, within a specified
period from receipt thereof, to show cause why they should not be suspended from the
practice of their profession. Neither were they given full opportunity to defend
themselves, to produce evidence on their behalf and to be heard by themselves and
counsel. Undoubtedly, the suspension proceedings against petitioners are null and void,
having violated their right to due process.

51. Short Title: PITC vs. Angeles

Complete Title: G.R. No. 108461 October 21, 1996
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. HON. PRESIDING JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, BRANCH 58, RTC, MAKATI;
REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION; AND FIRESTONE CERAMIC,
INC., respondents.
 Page 152 of 601

FACTS: The controversy springs from the issuance by the PITC of Administrative Order No. SOCPEC
89-08-01, under which, applications to the PITC for importation from the People's Republic of China
(PROC, for brevity) must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine
Products to PROC carried out by the improper himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer
in an amount equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC being applied for, or, simply, at
one is to one ratio.
Desiring to make importations from PROC, private respondents Remington and
Firestone, both domestic corporations, organized and existing under Philippine laws,
individually applied for authority to import from PROC with the petitioner. They were
granted such authority after satisfying the requirements, and after they executed
respective undertakings to balance their importations.Private respondent Remington was
allowed to import tools, machineries and other similar goods. Firestone, on the other hand,
imported Calcine Vauxite, which it used for the manufacture of fire bricks, one of its products.
Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit export
credits equivalent to the value of their importations, further import applications were
withheld by petitioner PITC from private respondents, such that the latter were both
barred from importing goods from PROC.
Consequently, Remington filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus, with
prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction on January 20, 1992, against PITC in the RTC Makati Branch 58. The court
issued a Temporary Restraining Order on January 21, 1992, ordering PITC to cease from exercising
any power to process applications of goods from PROC. Hearing on the application for writ of
preliminary injunction ensued.
Private respondent Firstone was allowed to intervene in the petition on July 2, 1992, thus
joining Remington in the latter's charges against PITC. It specifically asserts that the questioned
Administrative Order is an undue restriction of trade, and hence, unconstitutional.
The court ruled that PITC's authority to process and approve applications for
imports from SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 444 and P.D.
No. 1071, has already been repealed by EO No. 133, issued by President Aquino.
Moreover, the court continued, none of the Trade protocols of 1989, 1990 or 1991, has
empowered the PITC, expressly or impliedly to formulate or promulgate the assailed Administrative
Order. This fact, makes the continued exercise by PITC of the regulatory powers in question
 Page 153 of 601

unworthy of judicial approval. Otherwise, it would be sanctioning an undue exercise of legislative

power vested solely in the Congress of the Philippines by Section, 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
The lower court stated that the subject Administrative Order and other similar issuances by
PITC suffer from serious constitutional infirmity, having been promulgated in pursuance of an
international agreement (the Memorandum of Agreement between the Philippines and PROC), which
has not been concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Philippine Senate as required by
Article VII, Section 21, of the 1987 Constitution, and therefore, null and void.
Furthermore, the subject Administrative Order was issued in restraint of trade, in violation of
Sections 1 and 19, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Lastly, the court declared the
Administrative Order to be null and void, since the same was not published, contrary to
Article 2 of the New Civil Code.
Petitioner now comes to use on a Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning the court's
decision particularly on the propriety of the lower court's declarations on the validity of Administrative
Order No. 89-08-01.

ISSUE: Whether Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 is constitutional.

RULING: NO. The PITC was legally empowered to issue Administrative Orders, as a valid
exercise of a power ancillary to legislation.We do not agree,with the trial court's ruling
PITC's authority to issue rules and regulations pursuant to the Special Provision of LOI
444 and P.D. No. 1071, have already been repealed by EO 133.
This does not imply however, that the subject Administrative Order is a valid exercise of
such quasi-legislative power.The original Administrative Order issued on August 30,
1989, under which the respondents filed their applications for importation, was not
published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.The questioned
Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within the context of Article 2
of Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette (or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it is
otherwise provided. . . .
 Page 154 of 601

The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were filed with,
and published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does not cure the
defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative Order.

This court, in Tanada vs. Tuvera stated, thus:

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless
a different effectivity is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
Administrative Rules and Regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.The Administrative Order
under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its
effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a
valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133.
Thus, even before the trade balancing measures issued by the petitioner were lifted by
President Fidel V. Ramos, the same were never legally effective, and private respondents, therefore,
cannot be made subject to them, because Administrative Order 89-08-01 embodying the same was
never published, as mandated by law, for its effectivity. It was only on March 30, 1992 when the
amendments to the said Administrative Order were filed in the UP Law Center, and published in the
National Administrative Register as required by the Administrative Code of 1987.

52. Short Title: Equitable PCI Banking Corporation vs. RCBC Capital
Complete Title: G.R. NO. 182248 December 18, 2008
 Page 155 of 601

EQUITABLE PCI BANKING CORPORATION,1 GEORGE L. GO, PATRICK D. GO, GENEVIEVE

W.J. GO, FERDINAND MARTIN G. ROMUALDEZ, OSCAR P. LOPEZ-DEE, RENE J.
BUENAVENTURA, GLORIA L. TAN-CLIMACO, ROGELIO S. CHUA, FEDERICO C. PASCUAL,
LEOPOLDO S. VEROY, WILFRIDO V. VERGARA, EDILBERTO V. JAVIER, ANTHONY F.
CONWAY, ROMULAD U. DY TANG, WALTER C. WESSMER, and ANTONIO N.
COTOCO, Petitioners, v. RCBC CAPITAL CORPORATION, Respondent.

FACTS: On May 24, 2000, petitioners Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. (EPCIB) and the individual
shareholders of Bankard, Inc., as sellers, and respondent RCBC Capital Corporation
(RCBC), as buyer, executed a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) for the purchase of
petitioners' interests in Bankard. To expedite the purchase, RCBC agreed to dispense with the
conduct of a due diligence audit on the financial status of Bankard.
Under the SPA, RCBC undertakes, on the date of contract execution, to deposit, as
downpayment, 20% of the purchase price in an escrow account. The escrowed amount, the SPA
stated, should be released to petitioners on an agreed-upon release date and the balance of the
purchase price shall be delivered to the share buyers upon the fulfillment of certain conditions agreed
upon, in the form of a manager's check.
Sometime in September 2000, RCBC had Bankard's accounts audited, creating for the purpose
an audit team led by a certain Rubio, the Vice-President for Finance of RCBC at the time. Rubio's
conclusion was that the warranty, as contained in Section 5(h) of the SPA was correct.
On December 28, 2000, RCBC paid the balance of the contract price. The corresponding deeds
of sale for the shares in question were executed in January 2001.
RCBC informed petitioners of its having overpaid the purchase price of the subject
shares, claiming that there was an overstatement of valuation of accounts amounting to
PhP 478 million, resulting in the overpayment of over PhP 616 million. Thus, RCBC
claimed that petitioners violated their warranty, as sellers, embodied in Sec. 5(g) of the
SPA.
Following unsuccessful attempts at settlement, RCBC, in accordance with Sec. 10
of the SPA, filed a Request for Arbitration dated May 12, 2004 with the ICC-ICA. In the
request, RCBC charged Bankard with deviating from, contravening and not following generally
accepted accounting principles and practices in maintaining their books. Due to these improper
accounting practices, RCBC alleged that both the audited and unaudited financial statements of
 Page 156 of 601

Bankard prior to the stock purchase were far from fair and accurate and, hence, violated the
representations and warranties of petitioners in the SPA. Per RCBC, its overpayment amounted to
PhP 556 million. It thus prayed for the rescission of the SPA, restitution of the purchase price,
payment of actual damages in the amount of PhP 573,132,110, legal interest on the purchase price
until actual restitution, moral damages, and litigation and attorney's fees. As alternative to rescission
and restitution, RCBC prayed for damages in the amount of at least PhP 809,796,092 plus legal
interest.
To the Request for Arbitration, petitioners filed an Answer dated July 28, 2004, denying
RCBC's inculpatory averments and setting up the following affirmative allegations: the period for filing
of the asserted claim had already lapsed by force of Sec. 7 of the SPA; RCBC is not entitled to
rescission having had ample opportunity and reasonable time to file a claim against petitioners; RCBC
is not entitled to its alternative prayer of damages, being guilty of laches and failing to set out the
details of the breach as required under Sec. 7.
After drawn out proceedings with each party alleging deviation and non-compliance by the
other with arbitration rules, the tribunal, with Justice Kapunan dissenting, rendered a Partial Award
dated September 27, 2007,10 the dispositive portion of which states:
On the matter of prescription, the tribunal held that RCBC's claim is not time-
barred, the claim properly falling under the contemplation of Sec. 5(g) and not Sec. 5(h).
The tribunal also exonerated RCBC from laches, the latter having sought relief within the three
(3)-year period prescribed in the SPA.
Notably, the tribunal considered the rescission of the SPA and ASPA as impracticable and
"totally out of the question.
On October 26, 2007, RCBC filed with the RTC a Motion to Confirm Partial Award.
On the same day, petitioners countered with a Motion to Vacate the Partial Award. On
November 9, 2007, petitioners again filed a Motion to Suspend and Inhibit Barker and Kaplan.
On January 8, 2008, the RTC issued the first assailed order confirming the Partial
Award and denying the adverted separate motions to vacate and to suspend and inhibit.
From this order, petitioners sought reconsideration, but their motion was denied.
From the assailed orders, petitioners came directly to this Court through this Petition for Review.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court acted contrary to law and judicial authority in refusing to vacate and
in confirming the arbitral award, notwithstanding that the arbitrators had plainly and admittedly failed
 Page 157 of 601

to accord petitioners' due process by denying them a hearing on the basic factual matter upon which
their liability is predicated.

RULING: No. To petitioners, the ICC-ICA's use of such summaries but without presenting the source
documents violates their right to due process. Petitioners allege that they were effectively denied the
right to cross-examine RCBC's witnesses when the ICC-ICA admitted the summaries of RCBC as
evidence. Petitioners' position is bereft of merit.
In a catena of cases, we have ruled that "[t]he essence of due process is the
opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but
the absolute absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard."
We also explained in Lastimoso v. Asayo that "[d]ue process in an administrative context does not
require trial type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where an opportunity to be heard
either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process."
Were petitioners afforded the opportunity to refute the summaries and pieces of
evidence submitted by RCBC which became the bases of the experts' opinion? The
answer is in the affirmative.
The foregoing events unequivocally demonstrate ample opportunity for petitioners
to verify and examine RCBC's summaries, accounting records, and reports. The pleadings
reveal that RCBC granted petitioners' requests for production of documents and
accounting records. More so, they had more than three (3) years to prepare for their
defense after RCBC's submission of its brief of evidence. Finally, it must be emphasized
that petitioners had the opportunity to appeal the Partial Award to the RTC, which they
in fact did. Later, petitioners even moved for the reconsideration of the denial of their
appeal. Having been able to appeal and move for a reconsideration of the assailed
rulings, petitioners cannot claim a denial of due process.
As regards petitioners' claim that its right to due process was violated when they
were allegedly denied the right to cross-examine RCBC's witnesses, their claim is also
bereft of merit.
While administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers, like the NLRC and Labor
Arbiters, are free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, they are nonetheless bound by
law and practice to observe the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. The
 Page 158 of 601

standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of
latitude as long as fairness is not ignored.

Of the same tenor is our holding in Quiambao v. Court of Appeals:

In resolving administrative cases, conduct of full-blown trial is not indispensable to dispense
justice to the parties. The requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full adversarial
proceedings. Submission of position papers may be sufficient for as long as the parties thereto
are given the opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, the essence of
due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain
one's side or opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. This constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is
granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of an action or a ruling. It does not
require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. Where opportunity to be
heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process.
Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with "judicial process" for a trial in
court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial
proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles.
The due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements are not
technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right to a notice or hearing
[is] not essential to due process of law. The constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair
hearing before a regularly established administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that
hearings be had before the making of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and
tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised
and considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires. What is required for "hearing"
may differ as the functions of the administrative bodies differ.
The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process.

53. Short Title: Republic vs. Extelcom

Complete Title:G.R. No. 147096 January 15, 2002
 Page 159 of 601

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION, petitioner,vs.EXPRESS TELECOMMUNICATION CO., INC. and BAYAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CO., INC., respondents.

FACTS: International Communications Corporation (now Bayan Telecommunications, Inc.

or Bayantel) filed an application with the National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC) for a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN) to install, operate and
maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a
Provisional Authority (PA).
Shortly thereafter, the NTC issued Memorandum Circular No. 4-1-93 directing all interested
applicants for nationwide or regional CMTS to file their respective applications before the Commission
on or before February 15, 1993, and deferring the acceptance of any application filed after said date
until further orders.
On May 6, 1993, and prior to the issuance of any notice of hearing by the NTC with respect to
Bayantel's original application, Bayantel filed an urgent ex-parte motion to admit an amended
application. On May 17, 1993, the notice of hearing issued by the NTC with respect to this amended
application was published in the Manila Chronicle. Copies of the application as well as the notice of
hearing were mailed to all affected parties. Subsequently, hearings were conducted on the amended
application. But before Bayantel could complete the presentation of its evidence, the NTC
grant of two (2) separate Provisional which resulted in the closing out of all available
frequencies for the service being applied for by herein applicant, and in order that this
case may not remain pending for an indefinite period of time, ordered ARCHIVED without
prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency becomes available.
On May 17, 1999, Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case, citing the
availability of new frequency bands for CMTS operators. The NTC granted BayanTel's
motion to revive the latter's application and set the case for hearings.
Respondent Express Telecommunication Co., Inc. (Extelcom) filed in NTC Case No. 92-
486 an Opposition (With Motion to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of Bayantel's
application.Extelcom argued that Bayantel's motion sought the revival of an archived application
filed almost eight (8) years ago. Thus, the documentary evidence and the allegations of respondent
Bayantel in this application are all outdated and should no longer be used as basis of the necessity
for the proposed CMTS service. Moreover, Extelcom alleged that there was no public need for the
 Page 160 of 601

service applied for by Bayantel as the present five CMTS operators more than adequately addressed
the market demand.
Bayantel filed a Consolidated Reply/Comment, stating that the opposition was
actually a motion seeking a reconsideration of the NTC Order reviving the instant
application, and thus cannot dwell on the material allegations or the merits of the case.
Furthermore, Extelcom cannot claim that frequencies were not available inasmuch as the allocation
and assignment thereof rest solely on the discretion of the NTC.
On May 3, 2000, the NTC issued an Order granting in favor of Bayantel a
provisional authority to operate CMTS service. To ensure effective competition in the CMTS
market considering the operational merger of some of the CMTS operators, new CMTS operators
must be allowed to provide the service.
Extelcom filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition
seeking the annulment of the Order reviving the application of Bayantel, the Order granting
Bayantel a provisional authority to construct, install, operate and maintain a nationwide CMTS, and
Memorandum Circular No. 9-3-2000 allocating frequency bands to new public telecommunication
entities which are authorized to install, operate and maintain CMTS.
The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision granting the writs of certiorari
and prohibition prayed for. Orders of public respondent are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and
the Amended Application of respondent Bayantel is DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a
new CMTS application. The Motion for Reconsideration of respondent Bayantel dated August 28,
2000 is denied for lack of merit.
Bayantel filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision. The NTC,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), also filed its own motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, Extelcom filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, praying that NTC
Memorandum Circular No. 9-3-2000 be also declared null and void.
On February 9, 2001, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Resolution denying all
of the motions for reconsideration of the parties for lack of merit. Hence, the NTC filed
the instant petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the Order of the petitioner which revived the application of respondent Bayantel in
NTC Case No. 92-486 violated respondent Extelcom's right to procedural due process of law
 Page 161 of 601

RULING: NO. In granting Bayantel the provisional authority to operate a CMTS, the NTC applied
Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure. Respondent Extelcom, however,
contends that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which were filed with the Office of the
National Administrative Register on February 3, 1993. The NTC issued a certification to the effect that
inasmuch as the 1993 Revised Rules have not been published in a newspaper of general circulation,
the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules. The absence of publication, coupled with the certification
by the Commissioner of the NTC stating that the NTC was still governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly
indicate that the 1993 Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time of the grant of the provisional
authority to Bayantel. Thus, publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is
a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. This is explicit from
Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Article 2 of the Civil Code.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there was a violation of the fundamental right of
Extelcom to due process when it was not afforded the opportunity to question the
motion for the revival of the application. However, it must be noted that said Order
referred to a simple revival of the archived application of Bayantel in NTC Case No. 92-
426. At this stage, it cannot be said that Extelcom's right to procedural due process was
prejudiced. It will still have the opportunity to be heard during the full-blown adversarial
hearings that will follow. In fact, the records show that the NTC has scheduled several
hearing dates for this purpose, at which all interested parties shall be allowed to register
their opposition. We have ruled that there is no denial of due process where full-blown
adversarial proceedings are conducted before an administrative body. With Extelcom
having fully participated in the proceedings, and indeed, given the opportunity to file its
opposition to the application, there was clearly no denial of its right to due process.
In Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan (166 SCRA 316 [1988]), we held that the right to be heard does
not only refer to the right to present verbal arguments in court. A party may also be heard
through his pleadings. where opportunity to be heard is accorded either through oral
arguments or pleadings, there is no denial of procedural due process. As reiterated in National
Semiconductor (HK) Distribution, Ltd. vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 123520, June 26, 1998), the essence
of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side. Hence, in Navarro III vs. Damaso (246
SCRA 260 [1995]), we held that a formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and not in all
instances essential. Plainly, petitioner was not denied due process.35
 Page 162 of 601

Extelcom had already entered its appearance as a party and filed its opposition to the
application. It was neither precluded nor barred from participating in the hearings thereon. Indeed,
nothing, not even the Order reviving the application, bars or prevents Extelcom and the other
oppositorsfrom participating in the hearings and adducing evidence in support of their respective
oppositions. The motion to revive could not have possibly caused prejudice to Extelcom since the
motion only sought the revival of the application.
In fact, Extelcom was able to raise its arguments on this matter in the Opposition (With Motion to
Dismiss) anent the re-opening and re-instatement of the application of Bayantel. Extelcom was thus
heard on this particular point.
Likewise, the requirements of notice and publication of the application is no longer
necessary inasmuch as the application is a mere revival of an application which has
already been published earlier. At any rate, the records show that all of the five (5) CMTS
operators in the country were duly notified and were allowed to raise their respective
oppositions to Bayantel's application through the NTC's Order dated February 1, 2000.

54. Short Title: Lobete vs. Sundiam

Complete Title: G.R. No. L-38278. June 28, 1983.
GREGORIO LOBETE, Petitioner, v. HON. CARLOS SUNDIAM, Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XXVIII, THE CHAIRMAN AND BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINE
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, Respondents.

FACTS: Gregorio Lobete, a bona fide USAFFE Veteran of World War II filed a complaint
with the former Court of First Instance of Manila seeking the payment to him by the
Philippine Veterans Administration, of salary differential pursuant to Republic Act No. 65. On
June 30, 1972, the respondent court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.
Upon a motion for reconsideration filed by private respondents, respondent court
reconsidered and reversed its decision and dismissed the case.It held that the cause of
action over the claim of the petitioner for his monthly pension and the additional monthly
pension at the rate of P10.00 for each of his seven unmarried minor children had legally and
factually accrued as of the approval of the last amendment of RA 65 on July 22, 1957;
and that it appearing that this instant action was filed before this Court on December 24,
 Page 163 of 601

1971, the ten (10) year period within which to file an action upon an obligation claimed
under the law, pursuant to Article 144 of the New Civil Code has long prescribed.
On March 29, 1973 petitioner filed a notice of appeal and a record on appeal. Private
respondents filed an opposition to the record on appeal on grounds that it was not afforded at least
five (5) days from receipt within which to oppose the same in accordance with Section 7, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court, and that said record on appeal failed to include material parts of a pleading and
orders of the court.
On March 31, 1973 respondent court issued an order approving the record on appeal
prompting private respondents to file a motion for reconsideration. On May 5, 1973 respondent court
reconsidered and set aside its previous order of March 31, 1973 and set the case for hearing. After
hearing, the lower court issued an order dated May 26, 1973 requiring petitioner to amend the record
on appeal and to incorporate therein certain pleadings and orders.
On November 14, 1973, petitioner filed a supplemental record on appeal to which
private respondents filed an opposition. On December 14, 1973, respondent court, after
hearing, disapproved the record on appeal as well as the supplemental record on appeal
for having been filed out of time and for non-compliance with the court’s order.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied, the present case was instituted.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in disapproving plaintiff-
appellant’s record on appeal on ground of sheer form and technicality at the expense of substantive
justice.

RULING: NO. At the outset, it should be underscored that petitioner failed seasonably to
perfect his appeal. In an order dated May 26, 1973, the court a quo required petitioner to
amend the record on appeal which order was received by petitioner on May 30, 1973. No
period was set by the lower court for the submission of an amended record on appeal.
However, Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is explicit on the period within which
a party should submit an amended record on appeal. Thus, said section provides:
". . . If the trial judge orders the amendment of the record, the appellant, within
the time limited in the order, or such extension thereof as may be granted, or if no time
is fixed by the order within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, shall redraft the record by
including therein, in their proper chronological sequence, such additional matters as the
 Page 164 of 601

court may have directed him to incorporate, and shall thereupon submits the redraft
record for approval, upon notice to the appellee, in like manner as the original draft."
Pursuant to the above provision, petitioner had only ten (10) days, or until June 9, 1973, to
file an amended record on appeal. However, he filed a supplemental record on appeal only on
November 4, 1973 or five and a half (5 1/2) months thereafter, Hence, the lower court properly
disapproved the same in its order dated December 14, 1973, because petitioner’s failure to take the
necessary steps for the amendment of the record on appeal within the time prescribed by the rules is
one of the grounds for the dismissal of an appeal.
In the present petition, petitioner has dwelt at length into the merits of the case which is not
in issue as this is a petition for certiorari and not an appeal, for which reason the same cannot be
entertained. Settled is the rule that the writ of certiorari may not be availed of to make up for the
loss, through omission or oversight, of the right to appeal. 2 Petitioner was not denied or deprived of
the right to appeal as he was ordered by the court a quo to file an amended record on appeal.
However, he complied with said order after a lapse of five and one half (5 1/2) months, hence he lost
his right to appeal due to his own fault for which he alone is to blame.

55. Short Title: People vs. Beriales

Complete Title: G.R. No. L-39962 April 7, 1976
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
RICARDO BERIALES, BENEDICTO CUSTODIO and PABLITO CUSTODIO, accused-appellants.

FACTS: It appears that in Criminal Case No. 562-0 the herein appellants were charged
with the crime of murder in an information filed by the City Fiscal of Ormoc City on
November 22, 1974. At the hearing of November 26, 1974, appellants' counsel moved for
a reinvestigation of said ease, along with two other related cases which the court a
quo granted.
At the hearing appellants counsel manifested to the court that pursuant to its
approval of his motion for reinvestigation, the City Fiscal had set the reinvestigation for
December 12, 1974 and had already issued the corresponding subpoena to secure the attendance of
the witnesses. Nevertheless, the court a quo, issued an order setting the hearing of the
case to the next day, December 11, 1974, at which hearing, appellants' counsel
reiterated his manifestation that since the City Fiscal had already ordered the
 Page 165 of 601

reinvestigation on December 12, 1974, the said reinvestigation should first be finished
and the corresponding resolution rendered thereon and submitted to the court before any trial of the
case should take place.
When the case was called for hearing on December 13, 1974, counsel for the
appellant asked the court to wait for the City Fiscal to appear. The trial court, however,
insisted in arraigning the appellants. When arraigned, the three appellants declined to
plead, saying: "I am not going to answer the question because the Fiscal is not yet
around." Thereupon, the trial court entered a plea of "Not Guilty" for each of them.
Thereafter, appellants' counsel again manifested that the City Fiscal was absent and that they
could not go to trial without the fiscal and his report on the reinvestigation conducted by
him. Nonetheless, the trial court, ordered the presentation of evidence by the private prosecutor
since he had been previously authorized by the City Fiscal to handle the case.
Again, appellants' counsel manifested that the appellants were not agreeing to the
trial of the case unless they first received the result of the reinvestigation conducted by
the City Fiscal. Whereupon, the court considered the case submitted for decision and
announced the promulgation of the decision on December 17, 1974.
When the case was called on December 17, 1974, appellants' counsel manifested that the
accused were not in conformity with the promulgation of the decision on the ground that they did not
agree to the trial of the case. Nonetheless, the trial court promulgated its judgment on the same
day.
Hence, the appellants interpose this appeal, upon the principal ground that they
were denied due process of law. The Solicitor General agrees with such contention and
recommends that the judgment under review be set aside and the case remanded to the lower court
for another arraignment and trial.

ISSUE: Whether the appellants were denied due process of law.

RULING: Yes. We sustain the appellants. After the trial court granted the appellants' motion for
reinvestigation, it became incumbent upon the court to hold in abeyance the arraignment and trial of
the case until the City Fiscal shall have conducted and made his report on the result of such
reinvestigation. That was a matter of duty on its part, not only to be consistent with its own order but
also to do justice aid at the same time to avoid a possible miscarriage of justice. It should be borne in
 Page 166 of 601

mind, that the appellants herein were charged with the serious crime of murder, and considering that
their motion for reinvestigation is based upon the ground that it was Felipe Porcadilla (husband and
father, respectively, of the two deceased, Saturnina Porcadilla and QuirinoPorcadilla) who was the
aggressor for having attacked and seriously wounded appellant PablitoCustodio it was entirely
possible for the City Fiscal to modify or change his conclusion after conducting the reinvestigation.
When the trial court, therefore, ignored the appellants' manifestations objecting to
the arraignment and the trial of the case, until after the City Fiscal shall have rendered a
resolution on his reinvestigation, but instead considered such manifestations on their
part as a plea of riot guilty and proceeded to try the case, received the evidence for the
prosecution, and then rendered judgment against them on the basis thereof, it
committed a serious irregularity which nullifies the proceedings below because such a
procedure is repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution.
Besides, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "what is more deplorable and which
renders patently irregular all the proceedings taken in this case, was the total absence of the City
Fiscal and/or any of his assistants or special counsel on December 13, 1974, when the appellants
were arraigned and when the private prosecutor presented evidence and rested the case supposedly
for the People.
Under the Rules of Court, "All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or
by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal." In the
trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor to appeal for the
government. As stated by this Court, "once a public prosecutor has been entrusted with the
investigation of a case and has acted thereon by filing the necessary information in court he is b law
in duty bound to take charge thereof until its finally termination, for under the law he assumes full
responsibility for his failure or success since he is the one more adequately prepared to pursue it to
its termination." While there is nothing in the rule of practice and procedure in criminal cases which
denies the right of the fiscal, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to turn over the active conduct of
the trial to a private prosecutor, nevertheless, his duty to direct and control the prosecution of
criminal cases requires that he must be present during the proceedings. Thus, in the case of People
vs. Munar this Court upheld the right of the private prosecutor therein to conduct the examination of
the witnesses because the government prosecutors were present at the hearing; hence, the
prosecution of the case remained under their direct supervision and control.
 Page 167 of 601

Moreover, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General, "to permit such prosecution of a criminal
case by the private prosecutor with the fiscal in absentia can set an obnoxious precedent that can be
taken advantage of by some indolent members of the prosecuting arm of the government as well as
those who are oblivious of their bounden duty to see to it not only that the guilty should be
convicted, but that the innocent should be acquitted — a duty that can only be effectively and
sincerely performed if they actively participate in the conduct of the case, especially in the
examination of the witnesses and the presentation of documentary evidence for both parties."

56. Short Title: Serrano vs. NLRC

Complete Title: G.R. No. 117040 January 27, 2000
RUBEN SERRANO, petitioner,vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ISETANN
DEPARTMENT STORE, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner was hired by private respondent Isetann Department Store as a

security checker to apprehend shoplifters and prevent pilferage of merchandise. Initially
hired on October 4, 1984 on contractual basis, petitioner eventually became a regular employee on
April 4, 1985. In 1988, he became head of the Security Checkers Section of private respondent.
Sometime in 1991, as a cost-cutting measure, private respondent decided to phase
out its entire security section and engage the services of an independent security agency.
For this reason, it wrote petitioner a memorandum.
The loss of his employment prompted petitioner to file a complaint on December 3, 1991
for illegal dismissal, illegal layoff, unfair labor practice, underpayment of wages, and nonpayment
of salary and overtime pay.
On April 30, 1993, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding petitioner to have
been illegally dismissed.
Private respondent appealed to the NLRC whichreversed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and ordered petitioner to be given separation pay equivalent to one month pay for every
year of service, unpaid salary, and proportionate 13th month pay. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but his motion was denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner have been illegally dismissed.

 Page 168 of 601

RULING: NO. Petitioner's contention has no merit. Art. 283 provides:

Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. — The employer may also terminate the
employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operations of the establishment or
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by
serving a written notice on the, workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one
(1) month before the intended date thereof. ….
Indeed, that the phase-out of the security section constituted a "legitimate
business decision" is a factual finding of an administrative agency which must be
accorded respect and even finality by this Court since nothing can be found in the record
which fairly detracts from such finding. Accordingly, we hold that the termination of
petitioner's services was for an authorized cause, i.e., redundancy.
The decision followed the ruling in several cases involving dismissals which, although based on
any of the just causes under Art. 282, were effected without notice and hearing to the employee as
required by the implementing rules As this Court said: "It is now settled that where the dismissal of
one employee is in fact for a just and valid cause and is so proven to be but he is not accorded his
right to due process, i.e., he was not furnished the twin requirements of notice and opportunity to be
heard, the dismissal shall be upheld but the employer must be sanctioned for non-compliance with
the requirements of, or for failure to observe, due process."
The rule reversed a long standing policy theretofore followed that even though the dismissal is
based on a just cause or the termination of employment is for an authorized cause, the dismissal or
termination is illegal if effected without notice to the employee. The shift in doctrine took place in
1989 in Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC.
We agree with our esteemed colleagues, Justices Puno and Panganiban, that we should
rethink the sanction of fine for an employer's disregard of the notice requirement. We do not agree,
however, that disregard of this requirement by an employer renders the dismissal or termination of
employment null and void. Such a stance is actually a reversion to the discredited pre-Wenphil rule of
ordering an employee to be reinstated and paid backwages when it is shown that he has not been
given notice and hearing although his dismissal or layoff is later found to be for a just or authorized
cause. Such rule was abandoned in Wenphil because it is really unjust to require an employer to keep
 Page 169 of 601

in his service one who is guilty, for example, of an attempt on the life of the employer or the latter's
family, or when the employer is precisely retrenching in order to prevent losses.
For the same reason, if an employee is laid off for any of the causes in Arts. 283-284, i.e.,
installation of a labor-saving device, but the employer did not give him and the DOLE a 30-day
written notice of termination in advance, then the termination of his employment should be
considered ineffectual and he should be paid backwages. However, the termination of his
employment should not be considered void but he should simply be paid separation pay as provided
in Art. 283 in addition to backwages.
Not all notice requirements are requirements of due process. Some are simply part
of a procedure to be followed before a right granted to a party can be exercised. Others
are simply an application of the Justinian precept, embodied in the Civil Code,33 to act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith toward one's
fellowmen. Such is the notice requirement in Arts. 282-283. The consequence of the
failure either of the employer or the employee to live up to this precept is to make him
liable in damages, not to render his act (dismissal or resignation, as the case may be)
void. The measure of damages is the amount of wages the employee should have
received were it not for the termination of his employment without prior notice.
We hold, therefore, that, with respect to Art. 283 of the Labor Code, the employer's
failure to comply with the notice requirement does not constitute a denial of due process
but a mere failure to observe a procedure for the termination of employment which
makes the termination of employment merely ineffectual.

 JURISDICTION, NOTICE AND HEARING

57. Short Title: Jose Atienza vs. COMELEC
Complete Title: G.R. No. 188920 February 16, 2010
JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MATIAS V. DEFENSOR, JR., RODOLFO G. VALENCIA, DANILO E.
SUAREZ, SOLOMON R. CHUNGALAO, SALVACION ZALDIVAR-PEREZ, HARLIN CAST-
ABAYON, MELVIN G. MACUSI and ELEAZAR P. QUINTO, Petitioners,vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MANUEL A. ROXAS II, FRANKLIN M. DRILON and J.R.
NEREUS O. ACOSTA, Respondents.
 Page 170 of 601

FACTS: For a better understanding of the controversy, a brief recall of the preceding events is in
order. On July 5, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president of the
Liberal Party (LP), announced his party’s withdrawal of support for the administration of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. But petitioner Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman,
and a number of party members denounced Drilon’s move, claiming that he made the announcement
without consulting his party.
Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local autonomy and party
matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all positions in the LP’s
ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president.Respondent
Drilon immediately filed a petition with the COMELEC to nullify the elections. He claimed
that it was illegal considering that the party’s electing bodies, the National Executive Council (NECO)
and the National Political Council (NAPOLCO), were not properly convened. Drilon also claimed that
under the amended LP Constitution, party officers were elected to a fixed three-year term that was
yet to end on November 30, 2007.
On October 13, 2006, the COMELEC issued a resolution, partially granting respondent
Drilon’s petition. It annulled the March 2, 2006 elections and ordered the holding of a new election
under COMELEC supervision. It held that the election of petitioner Atienza and the others
with him was invalid since the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with the
Salonga Constitution. But, since the amendments to the Salonga Constitution had not been
properly ratified, Drilon’s term may be deemed to have ended. Thus, he held the position of LP
president in a holdover capacity until new officers were elected.
Both sides of the dispute came to this Court to challenge the COMELEC rulings. On
April 17, 2007 a divided Court issued a resolution, granting respondent Drilon’s petition
and denying that of petitioner Atienza. The Court held, through the majority, that the COMELEC
had jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership dispute; that the Salonga Constitution had been
validly amended; and that, as a consequence, respondent Drilon’s term as LP president was to end
only on November 30, 2007.
Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before
respondent Drilon’s term expired. Fifty-nine NECO members out of the 87 who were
supposedly qualified to vote attended. Eventually, that meeting installed respondent
Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the new LP president.
 Page 171 of 601

On January 11, 2008 petitioners Atienza et al., filed a petition for mandatory and prohibitory
injunction before the COMELEC against respondents Roxas, Drilon and J.R. Nereus O. Acosta, the
party secretary general. Atienza, et al. sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the presidency of the
LP, claiming that the NECO assembly which elected him was invalidly convened. They questioned the
existence of a quorum and claimed that the NECO composition ought to have been based on a list
appearing in the party’s 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. Both Atienza and Drilon adopted that list
as common exhibit in the earlier cases and it showed that the NECO had 103 members.
Petitioners Atienza, et al. also complained that Atienza, the incumbent party chairman, was not
invited to the NECO meeting. On the other hand, respondents Roxas, et al. claimed that Roxas’
election as LP president faithfully complied with the provisions of the amended LP Constitution.
On June 18, 2009 the COMELEC issued the assailed resolution denying petitioners
Atienza, et al.’s petition. Petitioners failed to prove that the NECO which elected Roxas as
LP president was not properly convened.
As for the validity of petitioners Atienza, et al.’s expulsion as LP members, the
COMELEC observed that this was a membership issue that related to disciplinary action
within the political party. The COMELEC treated it as an internal party matter that was
beyond its jurisdiction to resolve.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution, petitioners Atienza, et
al. filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUE: Whether respondents Roxas, et al. violated petitioners Atienza, et al.’s constitutional right to
due process by the latter’s expulsion from the party.

RULING: NO. The requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal
affairs of political parties. The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only
administrative bodies created by the state and through which certain governmental acts
or functions are performed. An administrative agency or instrumentality "contemplates
an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the performance of a
state function."22 The constitutional limitations that generally apply to the exercise of the
state’s powers thus, apply too, to administrative bodies.
The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the state’s powers are found in Article III of
the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against the taking of life,
 Page 172 of 601

property, or liberty without due process under Section 1 is generally a limitation on the state’s
powers in relation to the rights of its citizens. The right to due process is meant to protect
ordinary citizens against arbitrary government action, but not from acts committed by
private individuals or entities. In the latter case, the specific statutes that provide reliefs
from such private acts apply. The right to due process guards against unwarranted
encroachment by the state into the fundamental rights of its citizens and cannot be
invoked in private controversies involving private parties.
Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an
intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a
state instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right
to life, liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has
no vested right, as against the state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a
political party. The only rights, if any, that party members may have, in relation to other party
members, correspond to those that may have been freely agreed upon among themselves through
their charter, which is a contract among the party members. Members whose rights under their
charter may have been violated have recourse to courts of law for the enforcement of those rights,
but not as a due process issue against the government or any of its agencies.
But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not
interfere in membership and disciplinary matters within a political party. A political party
is free to conduct its internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to
free association.

58. Short Title: Susie Chan-Tan vs. Jesse Tan

Complete Title: G.R. No. 167139 February 25, 2010
SUSIE CHAN-TAN, PETITIONER, VS. JESSE C. TAN, RESPONDENT.

FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were married in June of 1989 at Manila Cathedral in
Intramuros, Manila. They were blessed with two sons.In 2001, twelve years into the marriage,
petitioner filed a case for the annulment of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The parties submitted to the court a compromise agreement.
 Page 173 of 601

On 31 July 2003, the trial court issued a partial judgment approving the compromise agreement. On
30 March 2004, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage void under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity of the
parties. The trial court incorporated in its decision the compromise agreement of the
parties on the issues of support, custody, visitation of the children, and property
relations.
Meanwhile, petitioner cancelled the offer to purchase the Corinthian Hills Subdivision Lot No.
12, Block 2. She authorized Megaworld Corp. to allocate the amount of P11,992,968.32 so far paid on
the said lot.Petitioner authorized Megaworld Corp. to offer Lot 12, Block 2 of Corinthian Hills to other
interested buyers. It appears from the records that petitioner left the country bringing the
children with her.
Respondent filed an omnibus motion seeking in the main custody of the children.
The evidence presented by respondent established that petitioner brought the children out of the
country without his knowledge and without prior authority of the trial court. Thus, the trial court,
in its 17 May 2004 resolution, awarded to respondent custody of the children, ordered
petitioner to turn over to respondent documents and titles in the latter's name, and allowed
respondent to stay in the family dwelling in Mariposa, Quezon City.
Petitioner filed on 28 June 2004 a motion for reconsideration alleging denial of due
process on account of accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. She alleged she was
not able to present evidence because of the negligence of her counsel and her own fear
for her life and the future of the children. She claimed she was forced to leave the country,
together with her children, due to the alleged beating she received from respondent and the
pernicious effects of the latter's supposed gambling and womanizing ways.
Unconvinced, the trial court, in its 12 October 2004 Resolution,denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, which was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
On 4 November 2004, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for reconsideration of
the 12 October 2004 Resolution. She claimed she was no longer interested in the suit.
In its 28 December 2004 Resolution,the trial court denied both the motion to dismiss and the motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner. It held that the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004
resolution had become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period.
Undeterred, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 28 December 2004
resolution, which the trial court denied in its 15 February 2005 resolution.
 Page 174 of 601

ISSUE: Whether the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court have
attained finality despite the alleged denial of due process.

RULING: No. Thepetition has no merit.In the present case, the 30 March 2004 decision and the
17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court had become final and executory upon the lapse of the
reglementary period to appeal. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution,
which the trial court received on 28 June 2004, was clearly filed out of time. Applying the doctrine
laid down in Tuason, the alleged negligence of counsel resulting in petitioner's loss of the right to
appeal is not a ground for vacating the trial court's judgments.
Further, petitioner cannot claim that she was denied due process. While she may
have lost her right to present evidence due to the supposed negligence of her counsel,
she cannot say she was denied her day in court. Records show petitioner, through
counsel, actively participated in the proceedings below, filing motion after motion.
Contrary to petitioner's allegation of negligence of her counsel, we have reason to
believe the negligence in pursuing the case was on petitioner's end, as may be gleaned
from her counsel's manifestation dated 3 May 2004.
Undersigned Counsel, who appeared for petitioner, in the nullity proceedings, respectfully
informs the Honorable Court that she has not heard from petitioner since Holy Week. Attempts to call
petitioner have failed.Undersigned counsel regrets therefore that she is unable to respond in an
intelligent manner to the Motion (Omnibus Motion) filed by respondent.
Clearly, despite her counsel's efforts to reach her, petitioner showed utter disinterest in
the hearings on respondent's omnibus motion seeking, among others, custody of the
children. The trial judge was left with no other recourse but to proceed with the hearings
and rule on the motion based on the evidence presented by respondent. Petitioner
cannot now come to this Court crying denial of due process.

59. Short Title: Summary Dismissal Board vs. Torcita

Complete Title: G.R. No. 130442. April 6, 2000.
THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD AND THE REGIONAL APPELLATE BOARD, PNP,
REGION VI, ILOILO CITY, Petitioners, v. C/INSP. LAZARO TORCITA, Respondent.
 Page 175 of 601

FACTS: On July 6, 1994, twelve administrative complaints were filed against C/Insp.
Lazaro Torcita, herein respondent, by Manuel Puey, Jesus Puey, Alex Edwin del Rosario.
The twelve administrative complaints were the subject of administrative hearings before the
Summary Dismissal Board of the PNP. At the pre-trial, the parties and their respective counsels
agreed that the twelve cases shall be consolidated into one "major complaint" for "conduct
unbecoming of a police officer" under Par. e, Sec. 3, Rule II, Memorandum Circular No. 92-006
pursuant to RA 6975 2. The statement of the case by the Summary Dismissal Board is as follows:
"That sometime last April 26, 1994, after attending the birthday party of Miss
Jessie Vasquez, Alex Edwin del Rosario, together with Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza
and CristitaDawa boarded Mazda pick up driven by Reynaldo Consejo, proceeded
towards the direction of Cadiz City.
While nearing Crossing Cadiz in the vicinity of Sitio PutingTubig, the Mazda pick-up
overtook a red Cortina Ford driven by Major Lazaro Torcita; That on board the motor vehicle
driven by Torcita were three females sitted at the back;Torcita signaled the passengers of the
Mazda pick-up to stop, however, the driver of the Mazda pick-up refused to abide by the
signal and instead accelerated and proceeded to Hda. Aimee without stopping.
Upon reaching Hda. Aimee Major Lazaro Torcita, entered the compound and was approached
by two persons in civilian clothes which prevented him from further proceeding; Moments after,
the patrol car of Cadiz PNP arrived and together with Major Torcita, approached Jesus H.
Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario, inquiring as to the identity of the persons who accosted
him. The complainants alleged that Major Torcita approached and entered the compound
of Hda. Aimee, very drunk, with back-up vehicle full of armed policemen, confronted
Jesus H. Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario as who stopped him at the gate, shouting in a
very, very loud voice, invectives and remarks. That such act of Major Lazaro
Torcitaconstitute Conduct Unbecoming of an Officer not worth of respect.
The Board did not find sufficient evidence to establish that Torcita threatened
anybody with a gun, nor that a serious confrontation took place between the parties. The
Board also found that there was no sufficient evidence that the urinating incident took place, and
held that the charges of violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven. The Board found
that Lazaro Torcita was "in the performance of his official duties" when the incident
 Page 176 of 601

happened; however, he committed a breach of internal discipline by taking alcoholic

drinks while in the performance of same.virtua1aw
Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the PNP, Region
VI, Iloilo City, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Whereupon, C/Insp.
Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the regional trial court of Iloilo City, Branch 31,
questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for which he was not charged, "which
conviction is a nullity because of the lack of procedural due process of law." virtua1aw library
Public respondent filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. The regional trial
court granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive portion of the
questioned decision insofar as it found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the
performance of duty.
Public respondent appealed from the above-mentioned decision of the regional trial court, by
petition of review to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the same for the reason that the
respondent could not have been guilty of irregularity considering that "the twelve (12) cases treated
as Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer were eventually dismissed." library

ISSUE: Whether Torcita’sright to due process of law was "corrosively abridged and impaired".

RULING: It is a requirement of due process that the parties be informed of how the litigation was
decided with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the Court
(ABD Overseas Manpower Corp. v. NLRC, 286 SCRA 454). Memorandum Circular No. 92-006
specifically prescribes that the decision shall contain "a brief statement of the material facts and the
findings of the summary dismissal authority as well as the disposition thereof" (Sec. 6). The cursory
conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of internal discipline by taking
drinks while in the performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual findings referring
to this particular offense.
As it turned out, the dismissal Board believed his allegation that he was not drunk and found
that he was in full command of his senses where he tried to apprehend the driver of the maroon
Mazda pick-up. Although Torcita did not deny that he had taken a shot of alcoholic drink at the party
which he attended before the incident, the records show that he was then off-duty and the party was
at the Municipality of Victorias, which was outside of his area of police jurisdiction.
 Page 177 of 601

On the other hand, the hot pursuit incident occurred while he was on in his way home to Cadiz
City with the members of his family. As observed by the Dismissal Board itself, the hot pursuit was
motivated by the duty "inherent to the position as Chief of Police of Cadiz City and as Deputy of the
Land Transportation Office to enforce traffic rules and regulations, to prevent chaos and accidents in
roads and highways" (Decision, p. 76). The Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that even if he was
prosecuted for irregular performance of duty, he could not have been found to have the odor or
smell of alcohol while in the performance of duty because he was not on duty at the time that he had
a taste of liquor; he was on a private trip fetching his wife.
Premises considered, we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the
decision of the petitioners Board was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, as
respondent Torcita was found guilty of an offense for which he was not properly charged.
A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the
opportunity of being heard (Palu-ay v. CA, 293 SCRA 358). A void judgment never
acquires finality (Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez v. CA 255 SCRA 672; Fortich v. Corona,
298 SCRA 678). Hence, aforementioned decision cannot be deemed to have become final and
executory.

60. Short Title: Banco Espanol vs. Palanca

Complete Title: G.R. No. L-11390 March 26, 1918
EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant,vs.
VICENTE PALANCA, administrator of the estate of
EngracioPalancaTanquinyeng, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: EngracioPalancaTanquinyeng secured a debt with various parcels of real property
in Manila. The debt amounted to P218,294.10 at 8% per annum, payable quarterly. Property's
estimated value was about P292,558. After the instrument's execution, mortgagor returned
to Amoy, China and died on January 29, 1810. The foreclosure proceeding needed
publication pursuant to section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Publication was
made in a newspaper of Manila and an order of the court deposited in the post office
in a stamped envelope of the summons and complaint directed to defendant. The
clerk, however, failed to comply with the mail publication requirement.
 Page 178 of 601

The bank was able to foreclose the property without the defendant.After seven
years, the administrator of the estate, Vicente Palanca, appeared and requested the
court to set aside the order of default of July 2, 1908, and the judgment rendered upon
July 3, 1908, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this
application, as set forth in the motion itself, was that the order of default and the judgment
rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant
or over the subject of the action. His appeal was denied by the lower court, hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the procedural aspect of the right to due process has been prejudiced.

RULING: The SC ruled against Palanca. In dealing with questions involving the application of the
constitutional provisions relating to due process of law the Supreme Court of the United States has
refrained from attempting to define with precision the meaning of that expression, the reason being
that the idea expressed therein is applicable under so many diverse conditions as to make any
attempt ay precise definition hazardous and unprofitable. As applied to a judicial proceeding,
however, it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due process is
satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or
tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2)
jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the
property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an
opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we
observe that in a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner,
prescribing the time within which appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as essential.
To answer this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in addition
thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is known. Though commonly
called constructive, or substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely a means provided
by law whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of judicial proceedings
and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect it.
It is observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the
absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the publication may never
in fact come to his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be very
 Page 179 of 601

slight. Even where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though much increased, is
dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it is forwarded as well as upon the regularity
and security of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the provision of our law relative to
the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every
event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is known. In the light of all these facts, it
is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be
considered absolutely necessary.
It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a difference
whether it be viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due process of
law. In the matter of jurisdiction there can be no distinction between the much and the little. The
court either has jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as to the mailing of notice should be
considered as a step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no escape from the
conclusion that the failure to take that step was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the
application of the idea of due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so
rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter requires is an
opportunity for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it
would seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was fatal.
We think that in applying the requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to
reflect upon the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have been violated and
the principle underlying the exercise of judicial power in these proceedings. Judge in the
light of these conceptions, we think that the provision of Act of Congress declaring that
no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law has not been
infringed.
In the progress of this discussion we have stated the two conclusions; (1) that the
failure of the clerk to send the notice to the defendant by mail did not destroy the
jurisdiction of the court and (2) that such irregularity did not infringe the requirement of
due process of law.

61) Short Title: Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion (G.R. No. 139466, October 17, 2000)
Full Title:
 Page 180 of 601

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge,

Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.

Facts: On February 3, 2000, the petitioner timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. He
assails the decision on the following grounds:
"The majority decision failed to appreciate the following facts and points of substance
and of value which, if considered, would alter the result of the case, thus:
I. There is a substantial difference between an evaluation process antecedent to the filing of
an extradition petition in court and a preliminary investigation.
II. Absence of notice and hearing during the evaluation process will not result in a denial of
fundamental fairness.
III. In the evaluation process, instituting a notice and hearing requirement satisfies no higher
objective.
IV. The deliberate omission of the notice and hearing requirement in the Philippine Extradition
Law is intended to prevent flight.
V. There is a need to balance the interest between the discretionary powers of government
and the rights of an individual.
VI. The instances cited in the assailed majority decision when the twin rights of notice and
hearing may be dispensed with in this case results in a non sequitur conclusion.
VII. Jimenez is not placed in imminent danger of arrest by the Executive Branch necessitating
notice and hearing.
VIII. By instituting a 'proceeding' not contemplated by PD No. 1069, the Supreme Court has
encroached upon the constitutional boundaries separating it from the other two co-equal
branches of government.
IX. Bail is not a matter of right in proceedings leading to extradition or in extradition
proceedings."2
A Comment was filed by the private respondent Mark B. Jimenez, opposing
petitioner’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Allow
Continuation and Maintenance of Action and Filing of Reply. Thereafter, petitioner filed a
Manifestation with the attached Note 327/00 from the Embassy of Canada and Note No.
34 from the Security Bureau of the Hongkong SAR Government Secretariat. On August
15, 2000, private respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion for Leave to File Rejoinder
 Page 181 of 601

in the event that petitioner's Motion would be granted. Private respondent also filed a
Motion to Expunge from the records petitioner's June 7, 2000 Manifestation with its
attached note verbales. Except for the Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance of
Action, the Court denies these pending motions and hereby resolves petitioner's Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

Ruling: NO. There is no provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069
which gives an extradite the right to demand from the petitioner Secretary of Justice
copies of the extradition request from the US government and its supporting documents
and to comment thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation. We cannot
write a provision in the treaty giving private respondent that right where there is none.
It is well-settled that a "court cannot alter, amend, or add to a treaty by the insertion of
any clause, small or great, or dispense with any of its conditions and requirements or
take away any qualification, or integral part of any stipulation, upon any motion of
equity, or general convenience, or substantial justice.
All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted in light of their
intent. Nothing less than the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to which the Philippines is a
signatory provides that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.
An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. "An extradition proceeding
is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in this
country do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty."
Private respondent’s plea for due process deserves serious consideration involving as it does
his primordial right to liberty. His plea to due process, however, collides with important state interests
which cannot also be ignored for they serve the interest of the greater majority. The clash of rights
demands a delicate balancing of interests approach which is a "fundamental postulate of
constitutional law."25 The approach requires that we "take conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation."26 These interests usually
 Page 182 of 601

consist in the exercise by an individual of his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the government’s
promotion of fundamental public interest or policy objectives on the other.
Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding is only at its
evaluation stage, the nature of the right being claimed by the private respondent is
nebulous and the degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak, we accord greater
weight to the interests espoused by the government thru the petitioner Secretary of
Justice. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, we held that the "Constitution has blocked
out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the
legislative and the judicial departments of the government."
In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it is not
ruling that the private respondent has no right to due process at all throughout the
length and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process requires a
determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due.
Stated otherwise, a prior determination should be made as to whether procedural
protections are at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to
which an individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss."

62) Short Title: People vs. Estrada (G.R. No. 130487, June 19, 2000)
Full Title: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO
ESTRADA, accused-appellant.

Facts: Roberto Estrada entered St John’s Cathedral and sat on the Bishop’s chair while
the Bishop is giving the sacrament of confirmation. The assistant requested Estrada to
vacate the chair but the latter declined. Someone called Rogelio Mararac the security
guard. Upon approaching and tapping Estrada to vacate the chair he was then stabbed to
death by the same. counsel for accused-appellant filed a “Motion to Confine Accused for
Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination.”
Appellant’s counsel informed the court that accused-appellant had been exhibiting abnormal
behavior for the past weeks. This was denied and during hearing did not take the witness stand. His
counsel presented instead testimony of Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan, a resident physician in the
Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio General Hospital. She confirmed that appellant had been
 Page 183 of 601

confined at the BGH and that he suffered from “Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid
Type—schizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type. Court found Estrada guilty of the crime
murder.

Issue: Whether or not the hearing / proceeding is null on the ground of violating the requirements
of due process?

Ruling: The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is
not conclusive evidence that he was competent enough to stand trial and assist in his defense.
The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-
appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert
equipped with the specialized knowledge of determining the state of a person's mental
health. To determine the accused-appellants competency to stand trial, the court, in the
instant case, should have at least ordered the examination of accused-appellant,
especially in the light of the latter's history of mental illness.
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. His counsel manifested that accused-
appellant was waiving the right to testify in his own behalf because he was "suffering from mental
illness." This manifestation was made in open court more than two (2) years after the crime, and
still, the claim of mental illness was ignored by the trial court. And despite all the overwhelming
indications of accused-appellant's state of mind, the judge persisted in his personal
assessment and never even considered subjecting accused-appellant to a medical
examination. To top it all, the judge found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death!
If the mental examination on accused-appellant had been promptly and properly made, it may
have served a dual purpose by determining both his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the
time of the offense. In some Philippine cases, the medical and clinical findings of insanity made
immediately after the commission of the crime served as one of the bases for the acquittal of the
accused.
By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived
appellant of a fair trial.1awphil The trial court's negligence was a violation of the basic
requirements of due process; and for this reason, the proceedings before the said court
must be nullified.
 Page 184 of 601

63) Short Title: Samartino vs. Raon (G.R. No. 131482, July 3, 2002)
Full title:
REGALADO P. SAMARTINO, Petitioner,
v. LEONOR B. RAON, AGUSTIN G. CRISOSTOMO, THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF
NOVELETA, CAVITE, HON. MANUEL A. MAYO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 16,
CAVITE CITY, HON. ROLANDO D. DIAZ, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 17, CAVITE
CITY, SHERIFF DANILO G. LAPUZ, CAVITE CITY and THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.

Facts: Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving
sister and spouse, respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, who passed
away on May 17, 1994. Among the properties left by the deceased was her one-half
share in a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite, registered under in the name of co-owners
Lido Beach Corporation and Filomena Bernardo. Respondents instituted a complaint for
ejectment against petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for ejectment alleging
that during the lifetime of Filomena, she leased her share to petitioner for a period of five years
counted from 1986; that the said lease expired and was not extended thereafter; and that petitioner
refused to vacate the property despite demands therefor.
Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of petitioner. At the time of
service, he was not at home as he was then confined at the NBI rehab center since
January 19, 1996, where he was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for drug
dependency. Thus, on February 2, 1996, a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before the trial
court with a certification that petitioner will be unable to comply with the directive to answer the
complaint within the reglementary period, inasmuch as it will take six months for him to complete the
rehabilitation program and before he can be recommended for discharge by the Rehabilitation
Committee.
The trial court, despite the written certification from NBI-TRC, declared petitioner
in default and ordered them to present evidence ex-parte. On March 21, 1996, the trial
court rendered judgment in favor of respondents. Counsel of respondent filed a motion
to set aside judgement at the RTC, RTC affirmed lower court decision.
 Page 185 of 601

This decision became final, the property was sold in an auction to the respondents, Petitioner
filed petition for relief from judgement alleging that the parcel of land from which he was being
evicted had been sold to him by Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, as evidenced by the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated December 13, 1988. Petition was dismissed by RTC. Petitioner filed petition for
certiorari before CA which was also dismissed, including his MR, hence this petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not the court (MTC & RTC) acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner

Ruling: NO. There being no valid substituted service of summons, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. It should be emphasized that the
service of summons is not only required to give the court jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant, but also to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim made
against him. Thus, compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as
much an issue of due process as of jurisdiction. The essence of due process is to be found
in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of his defense. It is elementary that before a person can be deprived of his
property, he should first be informed of the claim against him and the theory on which
such claim is premised.
By reason of the ineffective service of summons, petitioner was not duly apprised of the action
against him. Consequently, he was prevented from answering the claims against him. He was not
given a chance to be heard on his defenses. What made matters worse was that the trial court had
actual knowledge that petitioner was then indisposed and unable to file his answer to the complaint,
as he was then confined at the NBI-TRC. The trial court’s failure to give petitioner a reasonable
opportunity to file his answer violated his right to due process. Perforce, the judgment rendered
against petitioner is nugatory and without effect.
The trial court should not have been too rash in declaring petitioner in default, considering it
had actual notice of valid reasons that prevented him from answering. Well-settled is the rule that
courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default for default judgments are frowned upon,
unless in cases where it clearly appears that the reopening of the case is intended for delay. The
issuance of orders of default should be the exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only in clear
cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court.
 Page 186 of 601

All told, the Municipal Trial Court of Noveleta and the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City did
not have jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Hence, all proceedings had as regards petitioner
were null and void. Necessarily, the enforcement of the writ of execution as well as the sale at public
auction of petitioner’s real property to satisfy the void judgment must also be declared of no legal
effect.
There is a real need to resolve the issue of ownership over the premises in order to determine
who, as between petitioner and respondents, has a better right to possess the property in dispute.
This can only be done in the proper proceeding before the trial court wherein petitioner will be
afforded every right to present evidence in his behalf.

64) Short Title: Lim vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. 111397, August 12, 2002)
Full Title:
HON. ALFREDO LIM and RAFAELITO GARAYBLAS, Petitioners,
v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO REYES and BISTRO PIGALLE,
INC., Respondents.

Facts: On Dec. 7, 1992, Bistro Pigale, Inc. filed before the trial court a petition for
mandamus and prohibition against Mayor Lim of Manila because the policemen under his
instructions inspected and investigated its license as well as the work permits and health
certificates of its staff. This resulted to the stoppage of work in Bistro’s night club (New
Bangkok Club) and restaurant (Exotic Garden Restaurant) operations.
Mayor Lim also refused to accept its application for a business license as well as
the work permit applications of the staff members for the year 1993. Acting on Bistro’s
application for injunctive relief, the trial court issued a TRO on Dec. 29, 1992 ordering
Lim and/or his agents to refrain from inspecting or interfering in Bistro’s operations.
However, despite the trial court’s order, Lim still issued a closure order and sent
policemen to carry this out. Lim filed a motion to dissolve the injunctive order and to
dismiss the case contending that the power of the mayor to inspect and investigate
commercial establishments as well as its staff members is inherent in the statutory
power of the city mayor to issue, suspend or revoke business permits and licenses as
 Page 187 of 601

expressly provided in Sec. 11 (I), Art. II of the revised Charter of the City of Manila and
in Sec. 455 par. 3 (iv) of the LGC of 1991.
The trial court denied Lim’s motion. Lim filed with CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus against Bistro and Judge Reyes claiming that the judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction in
favor of Bistro. CA sustained the trial court orders and denied Lim’s motion for reconsideration.
Subsequently, Manila City Ordinance No. 7783 took effect. Lim ordered the WPD command to
permanently close down Bistro’s operation. Hence; this petition for review on certiorari filed before
the SC.

Issue: Whether or not Lim violated due process on the ground of failing to give Bistro the
opportunity to be heard

Ruling: Lim has no authority to close down Bistro’s business or any business
establishment in Manila without due process of law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila and the Local Government Code. There is no provision in these laws
expressly or impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down private commercial establishments
without notice and hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be void. The due process
clause of the Constitution requires that Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the
allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses and permits.
The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be exercised
in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due
process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically,
arbitrarily or despotically. In the instant case, we find that Lim’s exercise of this power
violated Bistro’s property rights that are protected under the due process clause of the
Constitution.
Lim did not charge Bistro with any specific violation of the conditions of its business license or
permits. Still, Lim closed down Bistro’s operations even before the expiration of its business license
on December 31, 1992. Lim also refused to accept Bistro’s license application for 1993, in effect
denying the application without examining whether it complies with legal prerequisites.
Lim’s zeal in his campaign against prostitution is commendable. The presumption is that he
acted in good faith and was motivated by his concern for his constituents when he implemented his
 Page 188 of 601

campaign against prostitution in the Ermita-Malate area. However, there is no excusing Lim for
arbitrarily closing down, without due process of law, the business operations of Bistro. For this
reason, the trial court properly restrained the acts of Lim.

65) Short Title:Asilo vs. People (G.R. No. 159017-18, March 9, 2011)
Full Title:
PAULINO S. ASILO, JR., Petitioner, vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Spouses VISITACION AND CESAR C.
BOMBASI, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 159059
VICTORIA BUETA VDA. DE COMENDADOR, IN REPRESENTATION OF DEMETRIO T.
COMENDADOR, Petitioner,
vs.
VISITACION C. BOMBASI AND CESAR C. BOMBASI, Respondents.

FACTS: On 15 March 1978, Private Respondent Visitacion’s late mother MarcianaVda. De

Coronado (Vda. De Coronado) and the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna (represented by
the then Municipal Mayor Crisostomo P. Manalang) entered into a lease contract whereby
the Municipality allowed the use and enjoyment of property comprising of a lot and a
store located at the corner of Coronado and E. Fernandez Sts. at Poblacion, Nagcarlan,
Laguna, in favor of the respondent’s mother for a period of twenty (20) years beginning
on 15 March 1978 until 15 March 1998, extendible for another 20 years.
The lease contract provided that the late Vda. De Coronado could build a firewall
on her rented property which must be at least as high as the store; and in case of
modification of the public market, she or her heir/s would be given preferential rights.
Visitacion took over the store when her mother died sometime in 1984. From then on up to January
1993, Visitacion secured the yearly Mayor’s permits. Sometime in 1986, a fire razed the public market
of Nagcarlan. Upon Visitacion’s request for inspection on 15 May 1986, District Engineer Marcelino B.
Gorospe (Engineer Gorospe) of the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways, Regional Office No.
IV-A, found that the store of Visitacion remained intact and stood strong.
 Page 189 of 601

This finding of Engineer Gorospe was contested by the Municipality of Nagcarlan. The
Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna issuedResolution No. 183 authorizing Mayor Comendador
to demolish the store being occupied by Visitacion using legalmeans. Mayor Comendador relying on
the strength of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution Nos. 183and 156 authorized the demolition of the
store with Asilo and Angeles supervising the work.Visitacion, filed with a case for damages before the
R T C . Spouses Bombasi, there after fileda criminal complaint against Mayor Comendador, for
violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and
CorruptPractices Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman.Sandiganbayan rendered decision finding
the accused Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Sec.3(e) of Republic Act. No. 3019
The counsel for the late Mayor also filed its Motion for Reconsideration alleging
that the death of the late Mayor had totally extinguished both his criminal and civil
liability. The Sandiganbayan granted the extinction of the criminal liability is concerned and denied
the extinction of the civil liability holding that the civilaction is an independent civil action. Hence,
these Petitions for Review on Certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the actual damages prayed for is unconscionable

Ruling: We sustain the Sandiganbayan in its finding of criminal and civil liabilities against petitioner
Asilo and petitioner Mayor Comendador as here represented by his widow Victoria Bueta.
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that it is undisputable that the first two requisites of the
criminal offense were present at the time of the commission of the complained acts and that, as to
the remaining elements, there is sufficient amount of evidence to establish that there was an undue
injury suffered on the part of the Spouses Bombasi and that the public officials concerned acted with
evident bad faith when they performed the demolition of the market stall.
In jurisprudence, "undue injury" is consistently interpreted as "actual." Undue has been
defined as "more than necessary, not proper, [or] illegal;" and injury as "any wrong or
damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or property [that is, the]
invasion of any legally protected interest of another." Actual damage, in the context of
these definitions, is akin to that in civil law.
 Page 190 of 601

It is evident from the records, as correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, that Asilo and
Mayor Comendador as accused below did not deny that there was indeed damage caused the
Spouses Bombasi on account of the demolition. We affirm the finding that:
Clearly, the demolition of plaintiff’s store was carried out without a court order, and
notwithstanding a restraining order which the plaintiff was able to obtain. The demolition was done in
the exercise of official duties which apparently was attended by evident bad faith, manifest partiality
or gross inexcusable negligence as there is nothing in the two (2) resolutions which gave the herein
accused the authority to demolish plaintiff’s store
"Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent
and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill
will. [It] contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive
or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. It is quite evident in the case at bar that the accused
public officials committed bad faith in performing the demolition.
There can be no merit in the contention that respondents’ structure is a public nuisance. The
abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible if it is nuisance per se. Nuisance per
se is that which is nuisance at all times and under any circumstance, regardless of location and
surroundings. In this case, the market stall cannot be considered as a nuisance per se because as
found out by the Court, the buildings had not been affected by the 1986 fire.
To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable.
In this case, the Court finds that the only evidence presented to prove the actual damages incurred
was the itemized list of damaged and lost items prepared by Engineer Cabrega, an engineer
commissioned by the Spouses Bombasi to estimate the costs. The amount claimed by the
respondent-claimant’s witness as to the actual amount of DAMAGES” should be admitted with
extreme caution considering that, because it was a bare assertion, it should be supported by
independent evidence.
"Whatever claim the respondent witness would allege must be appreciated in consideration of
his particular self-interest. There must still be a need for the examination of the documentary
evidence presented by the claimants to support its claim with regard to the actual amount of
damages. The price quotation made by Engineer Cabrega presented as an exhibit partakes of the
nature of hearsay evidence considering that the person who issued them was not presented as a
WITNESS.
 Page 191 of 601

66) Short Title: Parayno vs. Jovellanos (495 SCRA 85)

Full Title:
CONCEPCION PARAYNO, petitioner, vs. JOSE JOVELLANOS and the MUNICIPALITY OF
CALASIAO, PANGASINAN,* respondents.

Facts: Respondent Parayno was an owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao,

Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB)
of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to another location. The
matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer
and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advice, the Sangguniang
Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioner's
gasoline station. Resolution 50 stipulated the alleged violations of the gasoline station in
question.
Petitioner sought for reconsideration, which was then denied. She then filed a
special civil action for prohibition and mandamus in the RTC, contending that her
gasoline station was not covered by Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code of Calasiao,
which prohibits gasoline service stations which are within 100meters away from any
public or private school, public library, playground, church, and hospital based on the
straight line method measured from the nearest side of the building nearest the lot if
there are no intervening buildings to the nearest pump of the gasoline station. Petitioner
contended that hers was not a "gasoline service station" but a "gasoline filling station"
governed by Section 21 thereof.
Moreover, the decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in a previous
case filed by the same respondent Jovellanos against her predecessor (Dennis Parayno) should bar
the grounds invoked by respondent municipality in Resolution No. 50. The RTC ruled against
petitioner by applying the virtue of ejusdem generis, saying that a “gasoline filling station” fell within
the ambit of Section 44. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was, again, only denied by the RTC.
The same fate was met by the petition in the CA. Hence this appeal.
 Page 192 of 601

Issue: Whether or not the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent municipality
was an invalid exercise of the latter’s police powers

Ruling: Respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the closure/transfer of
petitioner's gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160, the power to take actions and enact
measures to promote the health and general welfare of its constituents, it should have given due
deference to the law and the rights of petitioner.
A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only
when the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object
sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the
equal protection clause and the second, to the due process clause of the Constitution.
Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it
passed Resolution No. 50. While it maintained that the gasoline filling station of
petitioner was less than 100 meters from the nearest public school and church, the
records do not show that it even attempted to measure the distance, notwithstanding
that such distance was crucial in determining whether there was an actual violation of
Section 44. The different local offices that respondent municipality tapped to conduct an
investigation never conducted such measurement either.
Moreover, petitioner's business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent
municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a
nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a
nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property, hence, it cannot be
closed down or transferred summarily to another location.
As a rule, this Court does not pass upon evidence submitted by the parties in the lower courts.
We deem it necessary, however, to recall the findings of the HLURB which petitioner submitted as
evidence during the proceedings before the trial court, if only to underscore petitioner's compliance
with the requirements of law before she put up her gasoline station.
Another factor that should not be left unnoticed is the diligence exercised by [petitioner] in
complying with the requirements of the several laws prior to the actual implementation of the
project as can be attested by the fact that [petitioner] has secured the necessary building
 Page 193 of 601

permit and approval of [her] application for authority to relocate as per the letter of the
Energy Regulatory Board xxx.
On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives and properties of the
people of Calasiao, we again note:
Relative to the allegations that the project (gasoline station) is hazardous to life and property,
the Board takes cognizance of the respondent's contention that the project "is not a fire
hazard since petroleum products shall be safely stored in underground tanks and that the
installation and construction of the underground tanks shall be in accordance with the Caltex
Engineering Procedures which is true to all gasoline stations in the country. xxx
Hence, the Board is inclined to believe that the project being hazardous to life and property is
more perceived than factual. For, after all, even the Fire Station Commander, after studying
the plans and specifications of the subject proposed construction, recommended on 20
January 1989, "to build such buildings after conform (sic) all the requirements of PP 1185." It
is further alleged by the complainants that the proposed location is "in the heart of the thickly
populated residential area of Calasiao." Again, findings of the [HLURB] staff negate the
allegations as the same is within a designated Business/Commercial Zone per the Zoning
Ordinance. xxx (emphasis supplied)

67) Short Title :Lawton vs. Steele (152 US 133)

Facts: The nets were the property of the plaintiffs, and were taken away by the defendant
Steele, and destroyed. At the time of the taking, most of the nets were in the waters of
the Black River bay, being used for fishing purposes, and the residue were upon the
shore of that bay, having recently been used for the same purpose. The plaintiffs were
fishermen, and the defendant Steele was a state game and fish protector.
The taking and destruction of the nets were claimed to have been justifiable under
the statutes of the state relating to the protection of game and fish. Plaintiffs claimed
there was no justification under the statutes, and, if they constituted such justification
upon their face, they were unconstitutional. Defendant Sherman was a state fish
commissioner. Defendant Sargent was president of the Jefferson County Fish & Game
Association. Plaintiffs claimed these defendants to be liable upon the ground that they
instigated, incited, or directed the taking and destruction of the nets.
 Page 194 of 601

Upon trial before a jury a verdict was rendered, subject to the opinion of the court,
in favor of the plaintiffs against defendant Steele for the sum of $216, and in favor of
defendants Sargent and Sherman. A motion for a new trial was denied, and judgment
entered upon the verdict for $216 damages and $166.09 costs. On appeal to the general
term this judgment was reversed, and a new trial ordered, and a further appeal allowed to the court
of appeals. On appeal to the court of appeals the order of the general term granting a new trial was
affirmed, and judgment absolute ordered for the defendant.

Issue: Whether or not An act for the appointment of game and fish protectors.' Is constitutional

Ruling: It is within the power of a State to preserve from extinction fisheries in waters
within its jurisdiction by prohibiting exhaustive methods of fishing, or the use of such
destructive instruments as are likely to result in the extermination of the young as well
as the mature fish.
The provision in the statutes of New York. c. 591 of the Laws of 1880, as amended
by c. 317 of the Laws of 1883, that nets set or maintained upon waters of the state or on
the shores of or islands in such waters in violation of the statutes of the state enacted for
the protection of fish, may be summarily destroyed by any person, and that it shall be the
duty of certain officers to abate, remove, and forthwith destroy them, and that no action
for damages shall lie or be maintained against any person for or on account of such
seizure or destruction, is a lawful exercise of the police power of the state, and does not
deprive the citizen of his property without due process of law in violation of the provision
of the Constitution of the United States.
The extent and limits of what is known as the 'police power' have been a fruitful subject of
discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every state in the Union. It is universally conceded to
include everything essential to the public safety, health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or
abatement, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. Under this
power it has been held that the state may order the destruction of a house falling to decay, or
otherwise endangering the lives of passers-by; the demolition of such as are in the path of a
conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome food; the
prohibition of wooden buildings in cities; the regulation of railways and other means of public
conveyance, and of interments in burial grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to certain
 Page 195 of 601

localities; the compulsory vaccination of children; the confinement of the insane or those afflicted
with contagious diseases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards; the suppression
of obscene publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling houses and places
where intoxicating liquors are sold.
Beyond this, however, the state may interfere whereover the public interests demand it, and in
this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what
the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such
interests.
To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear-First, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not,
under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose
unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations; in other words, its determination as to
what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the
supervision of the courts.
Thus, an act requiring the master of a vessel arriving from a foreign port to report the name,
birthplace, and occupation of every passenger, and the owner of such vessel to give a bond for every
passenger so reported, conditioned to indemnify the state against any expense for the support of the
persons named for four years thereafter, was held by this court to be indefensible as an exercise of
the police power, and to be void as interfering with the right of congress to regulate commerce with
foreign nations

• Exceptions to Notice and Hearing Requirements

68) Short Title: Philcomsat vs. Alcuaz [180 SCRA 218 (1989)]
Full Title:
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, respondents.
 Page 196 of 601

Facts: The petition seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose
Luis Alcuaz of the NTC which directs the provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged by
petitioner for certain specified lines of its services by fifteen percent (15%) with the reservation to
make further reductions later, for being violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative power and a denial of procedural, as well as substantive, due process of law.
Petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission,
now respondent NTC.
However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 placed under the jurisdiction,
control and regulation of respondent NTC, including all its facilities and services and the
fixing of rates. Implementing said Executive Order No. 196, respondents required
petitioner to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity
covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority
to charge rates therefor. petitioner filed with respondent NTC an application for authority
to continue operating and maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously
operating and maintaining since 1967, to continue providing the international satellite
communications services it has likewise been providing since 1967, and to charge the
current rates applied for in rendering such services.
Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to
operate and maintain the above-mentioned facilities, provide the services and charge
therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for. petitioner was granted a provisional
authority which was valid for six (6) months which was extended 3 times, but the last
extension directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction
of fifteen percent (15%) on the present authorized rates. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether the Respondent violates procedural due process for having been issued without prior
notice and hearing in exercising its power to fix the rate of the Petitioner \

Ruling: Yes. While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of
the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not
exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the
requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise
the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature
 Page 197 of 601

does not perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would
otherwise be applied to any other order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by the
applicable law. In the case at bar, the applicable statutory provision is Section 16(c) of the Public
Service Act which provides:
Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing the Commission
shall have power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and
provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving
provisions to the contrary:
xxx xxxxxx
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, ... which shall be imposed, observed
and followed thereafter by any public service; ...
There is no reason to assume that the aforesaid provision does not apply to respondent NTC,
there being no limiting, excepting, or saving provisions to the contrary in Executive Orders Nos. 546
and 196.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order
without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is
immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the
commission's own motion as in the present case. That such a hearing is required is evident in
respondents' order of September 16, 1987 in NTC Case No. 87-94 which granted PHILCOMSAT a
provisional authority "to continue operating its existing facilities, to render the services it presently
offers, and to charge the rates as reduced by them "under the condition that "(s)ubject to hearing
and the final consideration of the merit of this application, the Commission may modify, revise or
amend the rates ..."
While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing respondents may have other sources of
information or data, still, since a hearing is essential, respondent NTC should act solely on the basis
of the evidence before it and not on knowledge or information otherwise acquired by it but which is
not offered in evidence or, even if so adduced, petitioner was given no opportunity to controvert.
Again, the order requires the new reduced rates to be made effective on a specified
date. It becomes a final legislative act as to the period during which it has to remain in
force pending the final determination of the case.An order of respondent NTC prescribing
reduced rates, even for a temporary period, could be unjust, unreasonable or even confiscatory,
especially if the rates are unreasonably low, since the utility permanently loses its just revenue during
 Page 198 of 601

the prescribed period. In fact, such order is in effect final insofar as the revenue during the period
covered by the order is concerned.
Upon a showing, therefore, that the order requiring a reduced rate is confiscatory, and will
unduly deprive petitioner of a reasonable return upon its property, a declaration of its nullity becomes
inductible, which brings us to the issue on substantive due process.

69) Short Title: Suntay vs. People [101 Phil. 833 (1957)]
Full Title:
EMILIO SUNTAY Y AGUINALDO, Petitioner,
v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HONORABLE NICASIO YATCO, as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch V, and THE HONORABLE CARLOS P.
GARCIA, as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Respondents.

Facts: On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years,
filed a verified complaint against Emilio Suntay who took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul’s
Colleges in Quezon City with lewd design and took her to somewhere near the U.P.
compound in Diliman, Quezon City and was then able to have carnal knowledge of her.
Alicia Nubla is a minor of 16 years. after an investigation, an Assistant City Attorney
recommended to the City Attorney of Quezon City that the complaint be dismissed for
lack of merit.
On 23 December 1954 attorney for the complainant addressed a letter to the City Attorney of
Quezon City wherein he took exception to the recommendation of the Assistant City Attorney referred
to and urged that a complaint for seduction be filed against the herein petitioner. the petitioner
applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs and left the
Philippines for San Francisco, California, U.S.A., where he is at present enrolled in school.
The offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the petitioner with
seduction which was filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City after preliminary
investigation had been conducted. the private prosecutor filed a motion praying the
Court to issue an order “directing such government agencies as may be concerned,
particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs,
 Page 199 of 601

for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be
dealt with in accordance with law.
The respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing him to order
the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him
to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him. The counsel for the petitioner
wrote to the respondent Secretary requesting that the action taken by him be reconsidered, and filed
in the criminal case a motion praying that the respondent Court reconsider its order which the
respondent Secretary denied. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether petitioner should have been granted a quasi-judicial hearing by the respondent
Secretary before withdrawing or cancelling the passport issued to him?a

Ruling: NO The petitioner’s contention cannot be sustained. The petitioner is charged

with seduction. And the order of the respondent Court directing the Department of
Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order that the accused . . . may be brought back
to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law," is not beyond or
in excess of its jurisdiction.

When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs,
processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such
court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not
specifically pointed out by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted
which appears most conformable to the spirit of said rules. (Section 6, Rule 124.)

Moreover, the respondent Court did not specify what step the respondent Secretary must take to
compel the petitioner to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charge preferred against
him.

Section 25, Executive Order No. 1, series of 1946, 42 Off. Gaz. 1400, prescribing rules and
regulations for the grant and issuance of passports, provides that —

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs as well as any diplomatic or consular officer duly authorized by him,
 Page 200 of 601

is authorized, in his discretion, to refuse to issue a passport, to restrict a passport for use only in
certain countries, to restrict it against use in certain countries, to withdraw or cancel a passport
already issued, and to withdraw a passport for the purpose of restricting its validity or use in certain
countries.

Counsel for the petitioner insists that his client should have been granted a "quasi-judicial hearing" by
the respondent Secretary before withdrawing or cancelling the passport issued to him. Hearing would
have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were
not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts
and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of
his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or
capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily
mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon
an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport
holder, hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the
cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law
clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be
deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing
should always be held in order to comply with the due process of law clause of the
Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of
the said clause.

70) Short Title: De Bishop vs. Galang [8 SCRA 244 (1963)]

Full Title:
GEORGE DE BISSCHOP, petitioner-appellee, vs. EMILIO L. GALANG, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Immigration, respondent-appellant

Facts: Petitioner-appellee, an American citizen, was allowed to stay in this country for
three years, expiring he applied for extension of stay with the Bureau of Immigration. In
view, however, of confidential and damaging reports of the Commissioner of
Immigration, in a communication of Customs of Iloilo demanded from petitioner, advised
 Page 201 of 601

him that his application for extension of stay as a prearranged employee has been denied
by the Board of Commissioners, and that he should depart within 5 days.
Thereafter, counsel of de Bisschop requested for a copy of the adverse decision said Board,
but the legal officer of the Bureau of Immigration replied that, pursuant to immigration practice and
procedure and as is usual in such cases where the result is a vote for denial, for reason of
practicability and expediency, no formal decision, order resolution is promulgated by the Board.
Thereafter, Mr. Bisschop was simply advised of said denial.
No request for reinvestigation was made with the Bureau of Immigration. Instead,
to forestall his arrest and the filing of the corresponding deportation proceedings, de
Bisschop filed the present case on 18 September 1959.

Issue: Whether the Commissioners of Immigration are required by law to conduct formal hearings
on all applications for extension of stay of aliens, and in ruling that said Commissioners are enjoined
to promulgate written decisions in such cases?

Ruling: The administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive

responsibility of the Executive branch of the government. Extension of stay of aliens is
purely discretionary on the part of the immigration authorities. Since Commonwealth Act No.
613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, is silent as to the procedure to be
followed in these cases, we are inclined to uphold the argument that courts have no jurisdiction to
review the purely administrative practice of immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings in
certain cases as the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency. This
would not violate the due process clause if we take into account that, in this particular case, the
letter of appellant-commissioner advising de Bisschop to depart in 5 days is a mere formality, a
preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in paragraph 7 of appellant's
answer to the complaint, the "requirement to leave before the start of the deportation proceedings is
only an advice to the party that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled to take
steps for his expulsion". It is already a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a day in court is not a
matter of right in administrative proceedings.
With respect to the contention that the decision of the Board of Commissioners on matters of
petition for extension of stay of aliens should be promulgated in writing, appellee relies on Section 8
 Page 202 of 601

of the Immigration Act, which provides that in "any case coming before the Board of Commissioners,
the decision of any two members shall prevail".
However, we agree with the Solicitor General that the word "decision", as employed in this
section, obviously refers to the number of "votes" necessary to constitute the decision of the said
Board. The Sampaguita Shoe case (G. R. No. L-10285, 14 Jan. 1958), which was considered by the
lower court, is not applicable to the case at bar; it applies to judicial decisions, as provided in Section
1, Rule 35, of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, as pointed out in appellant's brief, where the
intention of the lawmaker is otherwise, the immigration laws specifically enumerate when the
decisions of the Board of Commissioners shall be in writing, to wit: (1) in cases of appeal from a
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry as to matters of admission or exclusion of aliens, as provided
in Section 27 (c) of the Immigration Act; and (2) the decision of the Board of Commissioners in cases
of deportation under Section 37, paragraphs (a) and (c). But there is nothing in the immigration law
which provides that the Board of Commissioners must render decisions on petitioners for extension of
stay
Finally, though not brought out in appellant's brief there is another reason why prohibition will
not lie herein. Prohibition is not favored by the Courts. The writ should issue with caution, and only in
cases of extreme necessity — which condition does not obtain in this case. Moreover, it will issue only
if there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy (Section 2, Rule 67, Rules of Court). This
Court has already ruled that "the use of habeas corpus to test the legality of aliens' confinement and
proposed expulsion from the Philippines is now a settled practice"
Petition dismissed.

71) Short Title: Var Orient Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Achacoso [161 SCRA 232 (1988)]
Full Title: VAR-ORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC. and COMNINOS BROS., petitioners,
vs. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), EDGAR T. BUNYOG, VEDASTO NAVARRO, EUGENIO
CAPALAD, RAUL T IS, ANTONIO TANIOAN, CELESTINO CASON, DANILO MANELA &
ROBERTO GENESIS, respondents.

Facts: The petitioners filed a complaint with the Workers’ Assistance and Adjudication
Office, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against the private
 Page 203 of 601

respondents, crew members of the MPV “Silver Reefer,” for having allegedly violated
their Contracts of Employment with the petitioners which supposedly resulted in
damages arising from the interdiction of the vessel by the International Transport
Workers’ Federation (ITF) at Kiel Canal, Germany, in March 1986.
After joinder of the issues, the case was heard on March 4, 1987 where the parties agreed to
submit their respective position papers and thereafter the case would be submitted for decision. Only
the private respondents submitted a position paper. On the basis of the pleadings and memoranda
the public respondent rendered a decision on September 9,1987 the dispositive part of which Dismiss
of the instant case. A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail and delivered by the postman
to the petitioners’ counsel through the receptionist but According to Attorney Figura, he did not
receive the envelope containing the decision. Petitioners allegedly learned about the decision only
when the writ of execution was served on them by NLRC Deputy Sheriff.
Petitioners, through new counsel, filed an ‘urgent Motion to Recall Writ of
Execution’ on the ground that the decision had not been received by the petitioners,
hence, it was not yet final and executory. The public respondent denied the motion.

Issue: Whether the Petitioner were denied due process of law because the respondent POEA
Administrator resolved the case without any formal hearing?

Ruling: NO. The petitioners' allegation that the issuance of the writ of execution was premature
because the decision had not been received by their counsel is unconvincing, Atty. Figura's affidavit
on the matter is self-serving. Petitioners failed to submit an affidavit of the receptionist Marlyn Aquino
explaining what she did with the decision which she received for Atty. Figura. Under the
circumstances, the respondent Administrator's ruling that the decision had been properly served on
petitioners' counsel and that it is now final and unappealable, should be sustained.
Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners 'allegation that they were denied due process because
the decision was rendered without a formal hearing. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side.
The fact is that at the hearing of the case on March 4,1987, it was agreed by the parties that
they would file their respective memoranda and thereafter consider the case submitted for decision
(Annex 7 of Bunyog's Comment). This procedure is authorized by law to expedite the settlement of
 Page 204 of 601

labor disputes. However, only the private respondents submitted memoranda. The petitioners did
not. On June 10, 1987, the respondents filed a motion to resolve (Annex 7, Bunyog's Comment). The
petitioners' counsel did not oppose either the "Motion to Resolve" or the respondents "Motion for
Execution of Decision" dated October 19, 1987 (Annex 10), both of which were furnished them
through counsel. If it were true, as they now contend, that they had been denied due process in the
form of a formal hearing, they should have opposed both motions.
Furthermore, the petition for review does not allege that the petitioners are in possession of
evidence, other than those which they had attached to their pleadings, which if produced would have
altered the outcome of the case.
The Administrator did not abuse his discretion in ordering the petitioners to pay respondent
Edgar Bunyog's salaries for the unserved portion of his contract plus attorney's fees, in view of the
Administrator's finding that Bunyog did not sign the letter of the other defendants to ITF, hence, 'he
is deemed not to have committed any offense or act to warrant his dismissal."

• Opportunity to be Heard
72) Short Title: Budiongan vs. De la Cruz (G.R. No. 170288, September 22, 2006)
PEDRO E. BUDIONGAN, JR., Municipal Mayor; JOSIL E. TRABAJO, Municipal Vice Mayor
and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan; FULGENCIO V. PAÑA, Municipal
Treasurer; TACIANA B. ESPEJO, Municipal Budget Officer; and SB Members: RUFINO G.
ADLAON, TITO R. MONTAJES, MARIO M. SORIA, ALFONSO L. UNAJAN, CARLITO B.
TORREFRANCA, VICENTE A. TORREFRANCA, JR., petitioners, vs.
HON. JACINTO M. DELA CRUZ, JR., Asst. Special Prosecutor I; HON. CORNELIO L.
SONIDO, Acting Director, Prosecution Bureau IV; HON. ROBERT E. KALLOS, Deputy
Special Prosecutor; HON. DENNIS M. VILLA IGNACIO, The Special Prosecutor; HON.
WENDELL E. BARRERAS-SULIT, Acting Director, Case Assessment, Review and Re-
investigation Bureau; and OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, public respondents.
VALERIANO U. NADALA, ARLENE PAINAGAN-PALGAN, private respondents.

Facts: By virtue of Municipal Ordinance, the Municipality of Carmen, Bohol appropriated an amount
for the purchase of a road roller for the municipality. However, the Municipal Development Council
recommended that the amount be realigned and used for the asphalt laying of a portion of a Street.
 Page 205 of 601

Thereafter, it was discovered that there was yet no ordinance approving the realignment of the
funds.
Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Ordinance, approving the realignment of the fund.
Malmis was paid the contract price. private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioners
before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas alleging illegality in the conduct of the
bidding, award and notice to commence work since there was no fund appropriated for the purpose.
the Office of the Deputy found probable cause and recommended the filing of an information for
violation of Article 2207 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioners.
Upon review, the Case Assessment, Review and Reinvestigation Bureau of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, issued the assailed Memorandum modifying the charge against petitioners for
allegedly giving unwarranted benefit to Malmis and violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019 against
petitioner Budiongan for allegedly “directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in a
contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity.”
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Office of the Special Prosecutor which was
denied for lack of merit in the Resolution dated October 19, 2005.

Issue: Whether the refusal or failure to conduct a re-investigation has violated petitioners’ right to
due process?

Ruling: NO. The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is
merely a right conferred by statute. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not
impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render the same defective. It does not
affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the
Information. If absence of a preliminary investigation does not render the Information
invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case, then the denial of a motion
for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the Information or oust the court of its
jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners were not deprived of due process because they were afforded the
opportunity to refute the charges by filing their counter-affidavits. The modification of the
offense charged did not come as a surprise to the petitioners because it was based on the same set
of facts and the same alleged illegal acts. Moreover, petitioners failed to aver newly discovered
evidence nor impute commission of grave errors or serious irregularities prejudicial to their interest to
 Page 206 of 601

warrant a reconsideration or reinvestigation of the case as required under Section 8, Rule III of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the modification of the offense charged,
even without affording the petitioners a new preliminary investigation, did not amount to a violation
of their rights.
Furthermore, the right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to
invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the person accused of the crime is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the
suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt."
The Office of the Special Prosecutor is an integral component of the Ombudsman and is under
the latter's supervision and control. Thus, whatever course of action that the Ombudsman may take,
whether to approve or to disapprove the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor, is but an
exercise of his discretionary powers based upon constitutional mandate. Generally, courts should not
interfere in such exercise. It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of
the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it, save in cases where there is
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the Ombudsman. Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any other
officer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, as in the instant case, courts as a rule must
defer to said officer's finding and determination of probable cause, since the determination of the
existence of probable cause is the function of the prosecutor.

73) Almendras, Jr. vs. Almendras (G.R. No. 179491, January 14, 2015)
G.R. No. 179491, January 14, 2015
ALEJANDRO C. ALMENDRAS, JR., Petitioner, v.ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS, Respondent.

FACTS: Alejando C. Almendras sent letters to House Speaker Jose Dde Venecia, Jr. And
Dr. Nemesio Prudente, President of Oil Carriers, Inc. These letters were allegedly printed,
distributed, circulated and published by Alejandro Almendras Jr. In Davao Del Sur and
 Page 207 of 601

Quezon City, with evident bad faith and manifest malice to destroy Alexis C. Almendras’
good name. Hence, the latter filed an action for damages arising from libel and
defamation against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Digos City.
In the course of trial at the lower court, petitioner failed to present any evidence,
except his answer, despite several rescheduling of hearings at his instance. RTC thus
submitted it for decision and eventually ruled that respondent was libeled and defamed
thus awarding Alexis P5M as moral damages, P100 thousand as exemplary damages, P10 thousand
for litigation expenses and attorney’s fees in the amount of 25% of whatever amounts actually
received by plaintiff for his judgement. After denial of motion for reconsideration and/or new trial, the
case was elevated to the CA.
The petitioner maintains that his own counsel Atty. Leonardo D. Suario
categorically admitted that he did not know of petitioner’s ailment and thus did not make
the proper manifestations in Court. His failure to attend the hearing was not of his own
volition, but because of his doctor’s strict advice since he earlier underwent a quadruple
coronary artery bypass at the St. Luke’s Medical Center-Heart Institute in Quezon City on 16 July
2001, just a day before the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial was filed. While
his counsel represents him, the latter’s mistakes should not deprive him of his day in
court to present his side
On intermediate appellate review, the CA ruled that petitioner was not denied due
process.It noted that petitioner was given full opportunity to present his evidence, but
he vehemently disregarded the proceedings by merely absenting himself from trials
without valid excuses.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner was deprived of dues process

RULING: NO. The court ruled that the petitioner was given several opportunities to
present his evidence.Settled is the rule that a client is bound by the mistakes of his
counsel. The only exception is when the negligence of the counsel is so gross, reckless
and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. In such instance, the
remedy is to reopen the case and allow the party who was denied his day in court to
adduce evidence. However, perusing the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from
the general rule.
 Page 208 of 601

The Court cannot allow petitioner the exception to the general rule just because
his counsel admitted having no knowledge of his medical condition. To do so will set a
dangerous precedent of never-ending suits, so long as lawyers could allege their own
fault or negligence to support the client’s case and obtain remedies and reliefs already
lost by the operation of law.

74) Uyboco vs. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 211703, December 10, 2014)
EDELBERT C. UYBOCO, Petitioner,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS: A petition for review on certiorari was filed by petitioner assailing the
Sandiganbayan’s decision dated January 9, 2014 ND Resolution dated March 14, 2014, finding
petitioner and his co-accused Rodolfo G. Valencia guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
Petitioner asserts that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the existence of a conspiracy and
in convicting him in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt of such conspiracy.More
importantly, the petitioner finds fault in the Sandiganbayan’s denial of his Motion for
Reconsideration the decision of the honorable court with a plea to reopen the
proceedings dated January 22, 2014. In his motion, petitioner prayed for the reopening of
the proceedings on the ground that his constitutional rights to due process and to
competent counsel were violated when his former counsel, due to blatant error, abuse of
discretion and gross incompetence, did not present any evidence in his defense, causing
serious prejudice to him.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s right to due process was violated.

RULING: NO. The Office of the Special Prosecutor correctly pointed out that petitioner
was given an opportunity to be heard during trial. This opportunity to be heard is the
essence of due process. While petitioner claims that he was incorrectly advised by his
former counsel that the presentation of evidence is no longer necessary, this unfortunate
 Page 209 of 601

mistake cannot qualify as gross negligence or incompetence that would necessitate a

reopening of the proceedings. In fact, not once did petitioner refute, or at the very least,
address the Sandiganbayan’s finding that he had expressly consented to the waiver of
the presentation of evidence by affixing his signature as conformity to the manifestation
submitted by his former counsel.
Petitioner also erroneously claims that his former counsel "failed to prepare and file a
memorandum for him" since the records show that petitioner’s former counsel had belatedly filed a
memorandum on his behalf, which the Sandiganbayan had admitted in the interest of justice. Based
on the foregoing, this Court finds that the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

75) Roxas vs. Vasquez (G.R. 114944, June 19, 2001)

MANUEL C. ROXAS and AHMED S. NACPIL, Petitioners, v. HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ,
Ombudsman and JOSE DE FERRER, Deputy Special Prosecutor, and the HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

FACTS: Manuel C. Roxas was the Chairman, while Ahmed S. Nacpil was a member, of the Bids and
Awards Committee of the PC-INP who invited bids for the supply of sixty-five units of fire trucks. The
COA subsequently discovered that while the disbursement voucher indicated the bid price has
discrepancy. DILG Secretary filed a complaint with the Ombudsman for violation of Section
3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against the accused. On review, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner.
However, the Special Prosecutor made a sudden turnabout as regards to the petitioner
and ordered their inclusion as accused in a Criminal Case. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Review Committee of the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended that
the Motion for Reconsideration be granted and that the charge against the movants be
dismissed. However, Deputy Special Prosecutor disapproved the recommendation. Thus,
Petitioner filed with this Court the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking
to annul the orders of the Ombudsman directing their inclusion as accused in Criminal
Case.
 Page 210 of 601

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners were deprived of due process when the Special Prosecutor
reinstated the complaint against them without their knowledge?

HELD:Yes, the court find that the case at falls under one of the recognized exceptions to
this rule, more specifically, the constitutional rights of the accused are impaired and the
charges are manifestly false. In cases where the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor
were unable to agree on whether or not probable cause exists, we may interfere with the
findings and conclusions.The petitioners were deprived of due process when the Special
Prosecutor reinstated the complaint against them without their knowledge. Due process
of law requires that every litigant must be given an opportunity to be heard. He has the
right to be present and defend himself in person at every stage of the proceedings.
For all intents and purposes, therefore, petitioners were no longer parties in the
criminal action. Evidently, the Office of the Special Prosecutor thought so too. It did not give
petitioners notice of the reinvestigation, which would have enabled them to participate
in the proceedings. But when it later found probable cause against petitioners, it should
have first given them notice and afforded them an opportunity to be heard before
ordering their inclusion in Criminal Case.

76) Marohombsar vs. Judge Adiong (A.M. RTJ-02-1674, January 22, 2004)
BAILINANG P. MAROHOMBSAR, complainant,
vs. JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG, respondent.

FACTS: Complainant Marohombsar was the defendant in Civil Case for “injunction with
prayer for preliminary injunction.” The case was filed by Yasmira Pangadapun, daughter of
Judge YusophPangadapun of RTC Branch 10, Marawi City. In the said complaint, Pangadapun
questioned the legality of Marohombsar’s appointment by DSWD Regional Secretary
Salic-Malna as provincial social welfare officer V of the DSWD-ARMM. Upon the filing of
the said complaint, respondent judge issued a TRO and set the hearing on the application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
 Page 211 of 601

Summons, together with a copy of the complaint and a notice indicating that a
preliminary conference would be held was also served on both parties.Marohombsar filed
an ex parte urgent motion to dissolve the TRO. Pangadapun was asked to comment and,
pending the filing of the same, the TRO was extended.Respondent issued an order stating
that a preliminary conference had been held and that both parties had waived the raffle
of the case. He reset the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.Respondent extended the TRO to let Pangadapun submit her
comment. During the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, none of the lawyers appeared. Hence, respondent considered it submitted for
resolution and issued the preliminary injunction the following day.
In his partial Comment respondent denied that: (1) he issued the TRO in favor of
Pangadapun without benefit of a hearing; (2) in his order dated March 22, 1999, he made it
appear that a preliminary conference was held where the parties agreed to waive the raffle of the
case, when in fact there was none; (3) he falsified the records of the case and (4) he granted the
preliminary injunction without a hearing. He alleged that the complaint was purely a
harassment case filed by a disgruntled party because of the latter’s failure to obtain a favorable
resolution from him. Although respondent judge admitted that Judge YusophPangadapun and Judge
Abdulhakim Ibrahim were his distant relatives and townmates, he stressed that “never in our careers
in the judiciary have we interfered nor influenced one another on any pending case before our
courts.”

ISSUE: Whether the complainant was denied due process because the preliminary injunction was
issued without hearing.

HELD: No, In applications for preliminary injunction, the dual requirement of prior notice
and hearing before injunction may issue has been relaxed to the point that not all
petitions for preliminary injunction need undergo a trial-type hearing, it being doctrinal
that a formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due
process. The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity
to be heard and to present any evidence he may have in support of his defense. In the
present case, complainant was able to move for a reconsideration of the order in
question; hence her right to due process was not in anyway transgressed. The court
 Page 212 of 601

ruled that a party cannot claim that he has been denied due process when he has availed
of the opportunity to present his position.Even assuming for the sake of argument that
respondent judge erred in ordering the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, in Equatorial
Realty vs. Anunciacion, Jr. that, as a matter of public policy, the acts of a judge in his official
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous, provided he acts
in good faith and without malice. Respondent judge, or any other member of the bench for that
matter, is presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner that preserves the ideal of the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge implicit in the guarantee of due process.

77) Alba vs. Nitorreda (G.R. No. 120223, March 13, 1996)
DR. RAMON Y. ALBA, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, CESAR Y.
NITORREDA, ET. AL., Respondent.
Eduardo C . de Vera and Francis Arnold D. de Vera for Petitioner.
Graciano C .Arafol, Jr. for JesielaAntiporta and Aida Salmeo.
The Solicitor General for public Respondent.
Francisco P. dela Peña, Jr., for and in behalf of respondent Dr. Susana
FACTS: Dr. Ramon Y. Alba, in his capacity as Director III of the Department of Education,
Culture and Spots (DECS) was charged with violating certain provisions of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers and Employees (R.A 6713). For such
gross misconduct, petitioner was meted a suspension of 30 days without pay, after he
was given all opportunity to be heard. When petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of
the foregoing resolution was denied by the Ombudsman, he filed an appeal petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether Section 27 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act) and Section 7 Rule III of Administrative
Order No. 7 is unconstitutional for their failure to provide for the right appeal in certain cases from
the decision of the Ombudsman and is tantamount to deprivation of property without due process of
law.

RULING: NO. Petitioner was afforded ample opportunity to present his side at the
scheduled preliminary conference. His non-appearance thereat is attributable to no one else but
 Page 213 of 601

himself and he cannot be allowed to now pass the buck to the Graft Investigation Officer who have
complied strictly with the abovequoted procedure in the conduct of administrative investigations.
Furthermore, undisputed is the fact that not only did the Office of the Ombudsman give
due course and consideration to petitioner’s counter-affidavit, but it also entertained and
resolved his motion for reconsideration which is not ordinarily allowed in the
adjudication of administrative cases where penalty imposed is suspension of not more
that one month. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s claim, he was in fact given all opportunity
to be heard, albeit through pleadings.

78) Bautista vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 157219, May 28, 2004)
NATIVIDAD E. BAUTISTA, CLEMENTE E. BAUTISTA and SOCORRO L. ANGELES, petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA PAPERMILLS, INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC. and SPOUSES RODOLFO JAVELLANA and NELLY JAVELLANA,
respondents.

FACTS: On August 12, 1999, petitioners Natividad E. Bautista, Clemente E. Bautista and
Socorro L. Angeles filed a complaint against respondent Manila Papermills, International,
Inc. for quieting of title. This complaint was later amended to implead respondents
Adelfa Properties, Inc. and the spouses Rodolfo and Nelly Javellana. After several delays
spanning more than two years, the case was finally set for trial.
However, on May 2, 2002, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Postponement to
cancel the hearing on the ground that Atty. Michael Macaraeg, the lawyer assigned to the
case was in the United States attending to an important matter. The trial court denied
petitioners motion for postponement and considered them as having waived the
presentation of their evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation to due process.

RULING: No, due process is not violated. Petitioners’ contention that they were denied
due process is not well- taken. Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate
in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process.
 Page 214 of 601

Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it

is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional
guarantee.

• Impartial Court or Tribunal

79) Tanada vs. PAEC [141 SCRA 307 (1986)]
NUCLEAR FREE PHILIPPINE COALITION, ET AL., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, ET AL., respondents.

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ET AL., petitioners, Vs. PHILIPPINE ATOMIC ENERGY

COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS
 Petitioner(s) charge respondent Philippine Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)
with bias and prejudgement, particulary the certain annexes in its PAEC
pamphlets– which clearly indicates prejudgement that the Philippine Nuclear
Power Plant-1 is safe.
 Exhibit “JJ” was published in 1985, when respondent Commissioners had already
been appointed to their present positions. Exhibits “KK” and “LL” were issued
earlier, but the majority of respondent Commissioners even then were already
occupying positions of responsibility in the PAEC.
 Commissioner Manuel Eugenio was Acting Chief of the PAEC Department on Nuclear
Technology and Engineering from June, 1980 to July, 1984; Commissioner Quirino Navarro
was PAEC Chief Science Research Specialist from May, 1980 to September, 1984-, and
Commissioner Alejandro Ver Albano was PAEC Deputy Commissioner from March, 1980 to
September, 1984.
 Additionally, the stubborn fact remains unrebutted that Exhibits “J.J.” “KK” and “LL”
continued to be distributed by PAEC as late as March, 1985.
 In other wordstheir official distribution continued after the filing of NPC’s motion for
conversion on June 27, 1984 and even after PAEC had issued its order dated
February 26, 1985 formally admitting the said motion for conversion.
 Page 215 of 601

ISSUE: Whether or not the commissioners of PAEC may sit in judgement to determine the safety of
PNPP-1

HELD:
 No. Having thus prejudged the safety of the PNPP-1 respondent PAEC
Commissioners would be acting with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction were they to sit in judgment upon the safety of the plant, absent the
requisite objectivity that must characterize such an important inquiry.
 Respondent PAEC Commissioners cannot escape responsibility for these official
pamphlets.
 Their official distribution continued after the filing of NPC’s motion for conversion
on June 27, 1984 and even after PAEC had issued its order dated February 26, 1985
formally admitting the said motion for conversion.

80) Anzaldo vs. Clave [119 SCRA 353 (1982)]

G.R. No. L-54597 December 15, 1982
FELICIDAD ANZALDO, petitioner, vs. JACOBO C. CLAVE as Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission and as Presidential Executive Assistant; JOSE A. R. MELO, as Commissioner
of the Civil Service Commission, and EULALIA L. VENZON, respondents.

FACTS: The Science Research Supervisor II position was vacant and both Dr Felicidad
Anzaldo and Dr Eulalia Venzon were next-in-rank for the said position. Venzon was
recommended for the position to w/c Anzaldo protested. The position was not filled up
until NIST OIC appointed Anzaldo to that position. The same was approved by Civil
Service Commission. Venzon contested this and appealed to the Office of the President.
This protest was sent to Civil Service Commission and was decided in favour of
Venzon by Chairman Jacobo Clave. Anzaldo’s motion for reconsideration was denied and
she appealed to Office of the President to w/c Clave is concurrently Presidential
Executive Assistant. Appeal was revoked and ruled as “as recommended by the Civil
Service Commission.”
 Page 216 of 601

ISSUE: Whether or not Clave denied due process to Anzaldo on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion?

RULING: Yes. Decision of respondent set aside and Anzaldo’s appointment declared valid.Due
process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Anzaldo that Presidential
Executive Assistant Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman
of the Civil Service Commission, as to w/c doctor should be appointed for the position,
should be adopted by the President of the Philippines.
Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the Civil Service
Commission, who should be consulted by the Office of the President, should be a person
different from the person in the Office of the President who would decide the appeal of
the protestant in a contested appointment.

81) Tejano v. Ombudsman [G.R. No. 159190, June 30, 2005]

CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HON. OMBUDSMAN and the HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.

FACTS: The report of Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan implicated petitioner as persons
involved in the irregular withdrawal of P2.2 million of PNB funds. The Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas ordered petitioner to file their respective counter-
affidavits.
Graft Investigation Officer Edgardo G. Canton recommended the filing of the
proper information against petitioner and was thereafter referred for review to the Office
of the Special Prosecutor who affirmed the resolution of Graft Investigation
Officer,Deputy Special Prosecutor recommended the approval of the memorandum of
Special Prosecution Officer.Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor, concurred in
the approval. Ombudsman concurred thereto. Subsequently, on 24 November 1994, an
Information for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, was filed
before the Sandiganbayan. petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for
a Period of Time to File Motion for Reinvestigation.
 Page 217 of 601

The Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reinvestigation. Petitioner filed his
motion for reinvestigation in the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The Sandiganbayan
ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation. The
reinvestigation was assigned to Special Prosecution Officer. Convinced that no probable
cause existed to indict petitioner Special Prosecutor Micael recommended the dismissal
of the case.
The recommendation was approved by Deputy Special Prosecutor Kallos and concurred in by
Special Prosecutor Tamayo. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier participated in the
initial preliminary investigation as Special Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation
for the dismissal of the case with the marginal note “assign the case to another prosecutor to
prosecute the case aggressively.”Special Prosecutor Micael filed a Manifestation, to which was
attached a copy of his memorandum, informing the Sandiganbayan of the disapproval by
Ombudsman Desierto of his recommendation to dismiss the case.
On 10 February 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the disapproval
by Ombudsman Desierto of the recommendation of Micael. Apparently, petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was not resolved on the merits because on 27 June 2000, Special
Prosecution Officer III Joselito R. Ferrer filed a Motion to Set the Case for Arraignment alleging
therein that the prosecution did not give due course to the motion for reconsideration on
the ground that it was the second motion which is prohibited under the Ombudsman Act
of 1989. He added that the results of the reinvestigation were already submitted to the respondent
court before receiving the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner manifested before the
Sandiganbayan the Office of the Special Prosecutor’s failure to resolve his motion for reconsideration.
Thus, in a resolution13 dated 24 March 2003, the respondent court directed the Office of the
Ombudsman to resolve the said motion.
In a memorandum14 dated 09 June 2003, Special Prosecutor Joselito R. Ferrer
recommended the denial of the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. Deputy
Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos changed his previous position and recommended that
the memorandum for the dismissal of the motion for reconsideration be approved, with
Special Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio concurring in the denial. Ombudsman Simeon V.
Marcelo, who succeeded Ombudsman Desierto when he retired, approved Joselito
Ferrer’s memorandum recommending the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner thus filed the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
 Page 218 of 601

restraining order to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from taking further action in Criminal
Case.
The First Division of this Court issued the temporary restraining order prayed for. The instant
petition was transferred to the Second Division of this Court.

ISSUE: Whether Ombudsman Desierto committed grave abuse of discretion?

RULING: Yes, attributes partiality on the part of Ombudsman Desierto for having
participated in the reinvestigation of the instant case despite the fact that he earlier
participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same when he was a Special
Prosecutor by concurring in the recommendation for the filing of the information before
the Sandiganbayan.
Having participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the instant case and
having recommended the filing of appropriate information, it behooved Ombudsman
Desierto to recuse himself from participating in the review of the same during the
reinvestigation. He should have delegated the review to his Deputies

82) Tumey vs. Ohio [273 U.S. 510 (1997)]

FACTS:Plaintiff Tumey was arrested and brought before Mayor Pugh, of the Village of
North College Hill, charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor. He moved for
his dismissal because of the disqualification of the Mayor to try him, under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Mayor denied the motion, proceeded to the trial, and
convicted plaintiff.The conviction was reversed by the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton
County.
On appeal by the State, the Court of Appeals of the first appellate district of Ohio
affirmed the judgment of the Mayor. The State Supreme Court denied plaintiff’s petition.
In this current petition for certiorari, plaintiff contended that he was denied due process
of law when he was convicted of violating the state's Prohibition Act because the mayor
who convicted him had a direct, pecuniary interest in his conviction.
 Page 219 of 601

Specifically, the mayor could only be paid for his services as a judge if he convicted those who
were brought before him, and the mayor had an interest in generating revenue for his village by
convicting and fining those before him.

ISSUE: Whether the plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment violated?

RULING: Yes. The Court held that the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights and due
process rights were violated when his liberty or property was subjected to the judgment
of a court the judge of which had a direct, personal, substantial, and pecuniary interest in
reaching a conclusion against him in his case. According to the court, plaintiff had a due
process right to be tried by an impartial judge.

RULE:
All questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus
matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest, would seem
generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion. But it certainly violates the
Fourteenth Amendment and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of
law, to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court the judge of which has a
direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in
his case.

83) People vs. Court of Appeals [262 SCRA 452 (1996)]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PEDRO S. ESPINA, CRISTETA REYES, JOHNY SANTOS,
ANTONIO ALEGRO, ROGELIO MENGUIN, PETE ALVERIO, ROGEN DOCTORA and JANE GO,
respondents.

FACTS: Jane Go was being sued criminally for the death of her husband. The case was
lodged before the sala of Judge Pedro Espina of the Tacloban RTC. The Prosecution
however moved for Judge Espina to inhibit himself from hearing the case. The
 Page 220 of 601

Prosecution averred that Judge Espina earlier ordered the Prosecution not to proceed
against Jane Go’s preliminary investigation. Judge Espina refused to inhibit himself. The
matter reached the Court of Appeals and the CA ruled that Espina does not have to
inhibit himself from hearing the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process of the state has been violated.

HELD: Yes. In the case at bar, Judge Pedro Espina cannot be considered to adequately
possess the cold neutrality of an impartial judge as to fairly assess both the evidence to
be adduced by the prosecution and the defense in view of his previous decision in Special
Civil Action No. 92-11-219 wherein he enjoined the preliminary investigation at the Regional State
Prosecutor’s Office level against Jane Go, the principal accused in the killing of her husband
Dominador Go.

Judge Espina’s decision in favor of Jane Go serves as sufficient and reasonable basis for
the prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality in handling the criminal cases. Verily,
it would have been more prudent for Judge Espina to have voluntarily inhibited himself
from hearing the criminal cases.

In view of the foregoing, the Honorable Pedro Espina, Presiding Judge of Branch 7 of the Regional
Trial Court of the 8th Judicial Region stationed in Tacloban is hereby declared disqualified from taking
cognizance of Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 and 93-01-39. It is further ordered that these criminal
cases be re-raffled to another branch of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City.

84) Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan [268 SCRA 332 (1997)]

G.R. Nos. 103501-03 February 17, 1997
LUIS A. TABUENA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. 103507 February 17, 1997

ADOLFO M. PERALTA, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.
 Page 221 of 601

FACTS:Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to
the president’s office and in cash what the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)
owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7 January
1985 memorandum of then Minister Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin. Tabuena
agreed.
About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private
secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated 8 January 1986 reiterating in black
and white such verbal instruction. In obedience to President Marcos’ verbal instruction and
memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused the
release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3) withdrawals.
On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal was made for P25 Million, following a letter
of even date signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting the PNB extension office at the MIAA the
depository branch of MIAA funds, to issue a manager’s check for said amount payable to Tabuena.
The check was encashed. however, at the PNB Villamor Branch, Dabao and the cashier of the PNB
Villamor branch counted the money after which, Tabuena took delivery thereof. The P25
Million in cash was delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez. Mrs.
Gimenez did not issue any receipt for the money received. Similar circumstances surrounded
the second withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another P25 Million, made on 16
January 1986.
The third and last withdrawal was made on 31 January 1986 for P5 Million. Peralta
was Tabuena’s co-signatory to the letter- request for a manager’s check for this amount. Peralta
accompanied Tabuena to the PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena requested him to do the counting of
the P5 Million. After the counting, the money was loaded in the trunk of Tabuena’s car. Peralta did
not go with Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs. Gimenez’ office. It was only upon delivery of the
P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts she received from Tabuena. The
receipt was dated January 30,1986.
Tabuena and Peralta were charged for malversation of funds, while Dabao
remained at large. One of the justices of the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the
questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves; the volume of the
questions asked were more the combined questions of the counsels. On 12 October 1990,
they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Tabuena and Peralta filed separate
 Page 222 of 601

petitions for review, appealing the Sandiganbayan decision dated 12 October 19990 and
the Resolution of 20 December 1991.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime of malversation.

HELD: Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of malversation.
Tabuena acted in strict compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum. The order emanated
from the Office of the President and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official
of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the
memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact,
coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without question.
Records show that the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense
witness and of the accused themselves. The questions of the court were in the nature of
cross examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation. Tabuena and
Peralta may not have raised the issue as an error, there is nevertheless no impediment for the
court to consider such matter as additional basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine
is that an appeal throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the duty of the
appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from
whether they are made the subject of assignments of error or not.
Time and again this Court has declared that due process requires no less than the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Bolstering this requirement, we have added that the
judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial, to give added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The parties are entitled to no less
than this, as a minimum guarantee of due process.

85) Short Title: Sheppard v. Maxwell [384 U.S. 333 (1966)]

Full Title:Samuel H. SHEPPARD, Petitioner, v. E. L. MAXWELL, Warden.
Facts: An individual was accused of killing his pregnant wife. The media coverage during the trial
was overwhelming, to the point of being prejudicial to the defendant.
On July 4th, 1954, Marilyn Sheppard, the pregnant wife of Dr. Sam Sheppard, a well-known
osteopath, was murdered. According to Sheppard, he and his wife had entertained friends and
 Page 223 of 601

watched television in their lakefront Cleveland, Ohio, home the night before. He fell asleep on the
couch, and Marilyn went upstairs to bed. In the early morning, he awoke to her screams. He ran
upstairs, where he struggled with a “form” and was knocked unconscious.
Returning to consciousness, he heard noises outside, ran to the lake’s edge and unsuccessfully
wrestled with this “form” on the beach. Then he went back into the house, found his wife dead, and
called his neighbor, the village mayor. These events touched off a monthlong investigation, coupled
with an avalanche of negative publicity, that culminated in Sheppard’s arrest.
The negative publicity began on July 7th, the day of Marilyn’s funeral, when a newspaper story
criticized the Sheppard family for refusing to cooperate with the investigation. it continued for the
rest of the month. Accusations against Sheppard and demands that he be prosecuted for the murder
appeared in the local press almost daily. The coroner’s inquest became a media circus, swarming
with print and and broadcast journalists. Sheppard was denied access to his attorney at various
critical stages of the process.
He was arrested on the night of July 30th, the same day a front-page editorial asked, “Why
Isn’t Sam Sheppard in Jail?” and portrayed him as a liar and an unfaithful husband. The arrest did
not quiet the press; instead, the publicity onslaught continued.Sheppard’s trial began on October
18th. Both the judge and the chief prosecutor were running for public office, and the election was
just two weeks later. All three Cleveland newspapers published the names and addresses of people
called for jury service.
As a result, prospective jurors received numerous messages from people wanting to express
their views on the case. During jury selection, a Cleveland newspaper ran a two-inch-high, front-page
headline: “But Who Will Speak for Marilyn?”Hundreds of reporters were in Cleveland to cover the
trial. The courtroom, filled with journalists from all media and the equipment they needed to report
on the trial, was so noisy that much of the testimony could not be heard despite a newly installed
loud-speaker system. Photographs of the jury appeared more than forty times in Cleveland
newspapers. Local officials failed to monitor the jurors, who made numerous telephone calls during
deliberations, with no records kept regarding whom they called or what was said. After five days of
deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of guilty.
Later, represented by defense attorney F. Lee Bailey, Sheppard filed for federal habeas corpus
relief, claiming he was denied a fair trial due to the excessive activity by the news media.
Unsuccessful in the lower courts, Sheppard appealed to the Supreme Court.
 Page 224 of 601

Issues: WON the news media sufficiently sway jurors insomuch that it instills prejudice and unfair
trial of the accused?

Ruling: YES. The majority recognized that “[l]egal trials are not like elections, to be won through the
use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper.” Also, “the [Supreme] Court has insisted that
no one be punished for a crime without ‘a charge fairly made and fairly tried in a public tribunal free
of prejudice, passion, excitement, and tyrannical power.’ Moreover, “[f]reedom of discussion should
be given the widest range compatible with the essential requirement of the fair and orderly
administration of justice.” However, “it must not be allowed to divert the trial from the ‘very
purpose of a court system . . . to adjudicate controversies, both criminal and civil, in the
calmness and solemnity of the courtroom according to legal procedures.’” One of the
requirements is that “the jury’s verdict be based on evidence received in open court, not
from outside sources.”

86) Short Title:Webb v. De Leon [247 SCRA 652 (1995)]

Full Title: G.R. No. 121234 August 23, 1995
HUBERT J. P. WEBB, petitioner,vs.HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch

Facts: Hubert Webb was one of the accused in the high-profile case Vizconde massacre. Preliminary
investigation was provided by NBI and the case was raffled to Judge ZosimoEscano who inhibited
himself from the case for being employed with NBI before. His pair Judge Escano issued warrant of
arrest to defendants. The case was re-raffled to Branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino
who issued new warrants of arrest. Webb and the others voluntarily surrendered.
They files before the court petition of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. They contend that
(1) respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to
conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them: (2) the DOJ Panel
likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the
crime of rape with homicide; (3) the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process
during their preliminary investigation; and (4) the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial
prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an accused.
 Page 225 of 601

Issue:
Whether or not the attendant publicity deprived Webb and the others of their right to fair trial?

Ruling: Petition dismissed. to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and
proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content,
of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and
impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the
sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be
sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors.
Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in
determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed,
their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that
they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the
parties. The length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary nature
and the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners
speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the
disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from
their bombardment of prejudicial publicity.

87) Short Title:People v. Sanchez (G.R. No. 121039, October 18, 2001)
Full Title:G.R. Nos. 121039-45, October 18, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MAYOR ANTONIO L.
SANCHEZ, GEORGE MEDIALDEA, ZOILO AMA, BALDWIN BRION, LUIS CORCOLON,
ROGELIO CORCOLON, AND PEPITO KAWIT, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

Facts: Accused-appellant Antonio Sanchez and others were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape with homicide. In his motion for reconsideration, he avers that he is a victim of trial
and conviction by publicity.(The Sarmenta-Gomez rape-slay)
 Page 226 of 601

On 28 June 1993, Luis and Rogelio "Boy" Corcolon approached Eileen Sarmenta and Allan
Gomez, forcibly took the two and loaded them at the back of the latter's van, which was parked in
front of Café Amalia, Agrix Complex, Los Banos, Laguna. George Medialdea, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion
and Pepito Kawit also boarded the van while Aurelio Centeno and VicencioMalabanan, who were also
with the group, stayed in the ambulance. Both vehicles then headed for Erais Farm situated in
Barangay Curba, which was owned by Mayor Antonio Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna.
The two youngsters were then brought inside the resthouse where Eileen was taken to the
Mayor’s room. Allan was badly beaten up by Luis, Boy, Ama and Medialdea and thereafter thrown out
of the resthouse. At around 1:00 a.m. of the next day, a crying Eileen was dragged out of the
resthouse by Luis and Medialdea – her hair disheveled, mouth covered by a handkerchief, hands still
tied and stripped of her shorts. Eileen and Allan were then loaded in the Tamaraw van by Medialdea,
et. al. and headed for Calauan, followed closely by the ambulance. En route to Calauan, gunfire was
heard from the van. The van pulled over whereupon Kawit dragged Allan, whose head was already
drenched in blood, out of the vehicle onto the road and finished him off with a single gunshot from
his armalite. The ambulance and van then sped away.
Upon reaching a sugarcane field in Sitio Paputok, Kilometro 74 of Barangay Mabacan, Eileen
was gang-raped by Luis Corcolon, Medialdea, Rogelio Corcolon, Ama, Brion and Kawit. After Kawit’s
turn, Luis Corcolon shot Eileen with his baby armalite. Moments later, all 8 men boarded the
ambulance and proceeded to Calauan, leaving the Tamaraw van with Eileen’s remains behind.
Initially, the crime was attributed to one Kit Alqueza, a son of a feared general (DictadorAlqueza).
Luis and Rogelio Corcolon were also implicated therein. However, further investigation, and forensic
findings, pointed to the group of Mayor Sanchez. Centeno and Malabanan bolstered the prosecution's
theory.
On 11 March 1995, Judge Harriet O. Demetriou of the Regional Trial Court (Pasig City, Branch
70) found Mayor Sanchez, Medialdea, Ama, Brion, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon and Kawit guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, ordering them to pay Eileen Sarmenta
the amount of P50,000 and additionally, the amount of P700,000.00 to the heirs of Eileen Sarmenta
and Allan Gomez as additional indemnity.
On 25 January 1999, the Supreme Court, through Justice Martinez, affirmed in toto the
judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court. Antonio Sanchez, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and
Pepito Kawit seasonably filed their respective motions for reconsideration. The Office of the Solicitor
General filed its Comment on 6 December 1999. Sanchez avers that he is a victim of trial and
 Page 227 of 601

conviction by publicity, besides claims that principal witness Centeno and Malabanan lack credibility,
that the testimony of his 13- year old daughter should have been given full faith and credit, and that
the gargantuan damages awarded have no factual and legal bases.
Ama, Brion and Kawit maintain that Centeno and Malabanan were sufficiently impeached by
their inconsistent statements pertain to material and crucial points of the events at issue, besides
that independent and disinterested witnesses have destroyed the prosecution’s version of events. On
2 February 1999, Justice Martinez retired in accordance with AM 99-8-09. The motions for
reconsideration was assigned to Justice Melo for study and preparation of the appropriate action on
18 September 2001

Issue: Whether the publicity of the case impaired the impartiality of the judge handling the case.
Ruling: Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial.
The mere fact that the trial of Mayor Sanchez, et. al., was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-
gavel coverage does not by itself prove that publicity so permeated the mind of the trial
judge and impaired his impartiality. The right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to
a free press. Responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial. The press does not
simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the
police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Our judges are
learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on camera performances of parties
to a litigation.
Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their
impartiality. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the
judges have been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity.
Records herein do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against Mayor Sanchez,
et. al., as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The
totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed position as a
result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the
trial. Mayor Sanchez, et. al., has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the
burden.

• Administrative Due Process

 Page 228 of 601

88) Short Title:Ang Tibay vs. CIR (G.R. No. L-46496, February 27, 1940)
Full Title:G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC.,
respondents.

Facts:Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the
Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his
employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it
averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor
union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated
union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR,
filed a motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.

Ruling: Yes. In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al, the Supreme
Court had occasion to point out that the although the Court of Industrial Relations may
be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, it does not mean
that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the
following:
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
 Page 229 of 601

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must
be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for
the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.

In this case the records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by
NLU, which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the
time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have
obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached
documents and exhibits are of such farreaching importance and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained
records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously
accessible but already existing), hence, the NLU should be granted new trial to comply with due
process.

89) Short Title:Meralco vs. Public Service Commission (G.R. No. L-13638-40, June 30,
1964)
 Page 230 of 601

Full Title:G.R. No. L-26762 August 29, 1975

MANILAELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION, respondent.

Facts:Manila Electric Company (Meralco) filed several applications with the Public Service
Commission (PSC), for:
a. for revision and reduction of its rates for commercial and other nonresidential customers
for general lighting, heating and/or power purposes; and
b. for revision and reduction of its residential meter rate.
These applications were approved by the PSC in a decision rendered on 24 September 1955.
On 9 June 1954, upon petition of Dr. Pedro Gil, the Commission requested the Auditor General to
cause an audit and examination of Meralco's books of accounts.
The General Auditing Office (GAO) examined and audited the books. It presented a report
which was submitted to the Commission on 28 May 1956. The PSC, thru Commissioner Feliciano
Ocampo, reset the hearing of the cases for June 22, 1956 "for the purpose of considering such
further revision of applicant's rates as may be found reasonable." On the said date, the parties
appeared and Atty. Venancio L. de Peralta, Technical Assistant and Chief of the Finance and Rate
Division of the PSC, who was duly authorized to receive the evidence of the parties, announced that
the hearing was an "informal hearing", and its purpose was to hear any remarks or statements of the
parties and to define the issues "so that at the hearing we know exactly what are disputed at this
informal hearing".
Dr. Pedro Gil submitted the 3 cases on the report of the GAO and sent to the Commission, in
which he asked the Commission, inter alia, to allow the Meralco "a rate of return of only 8% on its
invested capital." The Solicitor General submitted the case on the same report and letter of Dr. Gil
and on a letter-report addressed by the Deputy Auditor General to the Commission. Other parties
made common cause with Dr. Gil.
Meralco filed its answer to the GAO's report, specifying its objection, and prayed that the cases
be reset for hearing to enable the parties to present their proofs. Without having (1) first reset the
said 3 cases for hearing; (2) Without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by it, to
cross-examine the officers of the GAO who prepared the report, on which report the Commission
based its decision; and (3) Without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by it, to
 Page 231 of 601

present evidence in support of its answer to refute the facts alleged in said report and controverted
by Meralco, the PSC handed down a decision, granting the petition for the reduction of rates.
The motion for reconsideration and to set aside decision filed on by Meralco was denied by the
Commission on a 2 to 1 vote. Meralco filed the petition for review with preliminary injunction before
the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the informal hearing serves the purpose of “proper notice and hearing” in
administrative cases.

Ruling:
No.The record shows that no hearing was held. On 22 June 1956, parties appeared before "Attorney
Vivencio L. Peralta, Technical Assistant, and Chief, Finance and Rate Division, Public Service
Commission, who was duly authorized to receive the evidence of the parties", and the record shows
that the hearing held before the said Commissioner was merely an informal hearing because, using
his own words, "I said at the beginning that this is only preliminary because I want that the parties
could come to some kind of understanding."
Meralco has not been given its day in court. The decision of 27 December 1957 was
not promulgated "upon proper notice and hearing", as required by law, and that
therefore it can not serve as a legal basis for requiring the Meralco to put in effect the
reductions ordered in the decision. It is the cardinal right of a party in trials and
administrative proceedings to be heard, which includes the right of the party interested
or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof and to have
such evidence presented considered by the tribunal. Even if the Commission is not bound
by the rules of judicial proceedings, it must how its head to the constitutional mandate
that no person shall be deprived of right without due process of law, which binds not
only the government of the Republic, but also each and everyone of its branches,
agencies, etc.
WHEREFORE, We set aside the decision of the respondent Public Service
Commission of December 27, 1957 and the order of March 3, 1958, and remand the
records of the above entitled cases to the Commission for further proceedings, and to
render judgment accordingly. No costs.
 Page 232 of 601

90) Short Title: Lumiqued vs. Exevea (G.R. No. 117565, November 18, 1997)

Full Title:G.R. No. 117565 November 18, 1997

Facts:Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of The Department of Agrarian Reform –
Cordillera Autonomous Region.
On Nov. 16, 1989 Jeannette Ober Zamudio charged Lumiqued with Malversation through falsification
of public documents. He allegedly falsified gasoline receipts amounting to Php 44,172.46 and made
unliquidated cash advances amounting to Php 116,000.00. Zamudio also charged him with
oppression and harassment after being relieved without just cause after filing the 2 cases against
Lumiqued.
May 20, 1992 Acting Justice Secretary Eduardo Montenegro issued Department Order No. 145,
creating a committee to investigate complaints against Lumiqued. June 23, 1992; Lumiqued
submitted his affidavit alleging that the reason the cases were filed against him was to extort money
from him. He also admitted that his average daily consumption was 108.45Li which is an aggregate
consumption of the 5 service vehicle issued to him and that the receipts were turned over to him by
drivers for reimbursement.
July 3 and 10 Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted and Lumiqued was not
assisted by a counsel since he was confident that he can defend himself.July 17, 1992 he was unable
to attend the third hearing since he suffered a stroke on July 10.
July 31, 1992 Investigating Committee issued a report finding Lumiqued liable for all charges
against him. December 17, 1992 Lumiqued filed a motion for reconsideration.
April 1, 1993 The Committee informed Lumiqued that the report was already forwarded to the
President.
May 12, 1993 President Ramos issued AO No 52 finding Lumiqued administratively liable for
dishonesty in the alteration of 15 gas receipts and he was dismissed from service.
August 31, 1993Lumiqued filed a Petition for appeal which was denied. He then file a second
motion for reconsideration, alleging that he was denied constitutional right to counsel during the
hearing.
September 28, 1993 The second motion was denied. May 19, 1994Lumiqued passed away.
 Page 233 of 601

Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to
counsel during the hearing. They maintained that his right to counsel could not be waived unless the
waiver was in writing and in the presence of a counsel.

Issue: WON the right to have a counsel during an administrative hearing is necessary.

Ruling: NO. Lumiqued, a Regional Director of a major department in the executive branch of the
government, graduated from the University of the Philippines (Los Baos) with the degree of Bachelor
of Science major in Agriculture, was a recipient of various scholarships and grants, and underwent
training seminars both here and abroad. Hence, he could have defended himself if need be, without
the help of counsel, if the truth were on his side. This, apparently, was the thought he entertained
during the hearings he was able to attend.
The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the
Constitution or the law. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain one's side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and
perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings.
An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. As long as a party was given
the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due
process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process.
Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity
to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Lumiqueds appeal and his subsequent
filing of motions for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted
by the committee.

• Academic Disciplinary Proceedings

91) Short Title:Non vs. Hon. Dames (G.R. No. 89317, May 30, 1990)
Full Title:G.R. No. 89317. May 20, 1990
ARIEL NON ET.AL., petitioners. vs. HON. SANCHO DAMES II, in his capacity as the
Presiding Judge of the
5th Regional Trail Court, Br. 38, and
MABINI COLLEGES, INC., respondents
 Page 234 of 601

Facts: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. were not allowed to re-enroll
by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions
against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protests is not, however, made clear
in the pleadings.
The trial court dismissed the petition referring to the ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA stating, that
being a mere privilege and not a legal right for a student to be enrolled or re-enrolled, respondent
Mabini College is free to admit or not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic
freedom enjoyed by the school.
The respondents, in justifying their action, stated that 8 of the petitioners have incurred failing
grades. In response, the petitioners stated that: (a) three of them were graduating. (b) Their
academic deficiencies do not warrant non-readmission. (c) The improper conduct attributed to them
was during the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly. (d) There was
no due investigation that could serve as basis for disciplinary action. (e) Respondent school is their
choice institution near their places of residence, which they can afford to pay for tertiary education.

Issue: Whether or not the school has the right not to re-admit the petitioners.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court cannot anchor the “Termination of Contract”
theory the contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with
public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to
the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions. It is intended merely
to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on installment basis. It cannot be
construed to mean that a student shall be enrolled for only one semester.
The right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be
utilized to discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to
speech and assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal
protection. It provides that every student has the right to enroll in any school college or university
upon meeting its specific requirements and reasonable regulations; . . . and that “the student is
presumed to be qualified for enrollment for the entire period he is expected to complete the course,
without prejudice to his right to transfer.”
 Page 235 of 601

92)Short Title: Montemayor vs. Araneta University Foundation (G.R. NO. L-44251, May
31, 1977)
Full Title:
Facts: Felix Montemayor was a faculty of Araneta University Foundation serving as Head of
Humanities and Psychology Department. The Chaplain filed a complaint of immorality against him. A
committee was created to investigate the allegation. With the assistance of counsel, he filed a motion
to dismiss or to hold the hearing in abeyance.
The committee found him responsible of the act complained of and recommended for his
demotion by one degree. The President adopted such recommendation and thereafter referred the
same to the Board of Trustees of private respondent for appropriate action. Subsequently new
charges was filed by different faculty members against him and a new committee was formed to
investigate the allegations.
Montemayor asked for postponement of the hearing and was denied. The hearing proceeded
without him and found him guilty of the same charges and recommended for the discontinuance of
his service. He then filed a complaint with NLRC. NLRC decided in favour of the Foundation. Hence
the present petition.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the proceeding relating to Montemayor’s dismissal was done in violation of due
process?
2.Does academic freedom include the right of schools to dismiss teachers?

Ruling:
1. Petition dismissed. In Montemayor’s absence the matter was heard and was sufficiently found by
the committee to be guilty of his conduct unbecoming and recommended his removal. Such
deficiency was remedied when Montemayor was able to present his case with the Labour
Commission. Records will show that after all efforts on conciliation had failed parties agreed to
submit their dispute for compulsory arbitration.
Several hearings were conducted. he legal aspect as to the procedural due process having
been satisfied was then summarized by the Solicitor General thus: “All the foregoing clearly shows
that petitioner was afforded his day in court. Finally, and more significant, is the fact that petitioner
claims denial of due process in the proceeding had before the investigating committees and not in
 Page 236 of 601

the proceedings before the NLRC wherein, as shown heretofore, he was given the fullest
opportunity to present his case.

2. Yes. Institutional academic freedom was vindicated in this case, where, against the plea of
academic freedom and security of tenure of a professor, the school was allowed to separate a
professor who after due process had been found guilty of violating behavioral standards.

93) Short Title:Ateneo vs. CA (G.R. No. L-56180, October 16, 1986)
Full Title:G.R. No. L-56180 October 16, 1986
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES
ROMEO G. GUANZON and TERESITA REGALADO, respondents.

Facts: Juan Ramon Guanzon was a student-boarder at Cervini hall who hurled abuses and laid hand
to the cafeteria server. This was witnessed by several boarders. The university investigated the
slapping incident and decided to expel Guanzon.
He opted instead to apply for honourable dismissal which was granted. Upon learning of the
incident, his parents lodged a complaint for damages with CFI on the ground of unfair trial.
The university denied this and justified that such behaviour of the student is subject to be
sanctioned by the school and that the university has the sole prerogative and authority at any time to
drop from the school a student found to be undesirable in order to preserve and maintain its integrity
and discipline.
Lower court decided in favour of the Guanzon. CA initially reversed the LC decision. Upon
motion for reconsideration of the Guanzons, CA reversed it’s own decision. Ateneo was compelled to
ask for review of the said decision.

Issue: Whether or not Guanzon was denied due process on the ground of unfair trial?

Ruling: No, the respondent was accorded administrative due process in his dismissal cases
according to the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of procedural due
process are:
 Page 237 of 601

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them;
(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Juan Ramon himself appeared before the Board of Discipline. He admitted the slapping
incident. He was given notice of the proceedings; he actually appeared to present his side; the
investigating board acted fairly and objectively; and all requisites of administrative due process were
met.
The court does not share the view that there was no due process because the
parents of Guanzon was not given any notice of the proceedings. He, who at the time
was 18 years of age, was already a college student, intelligent and mature enough to
know his responsibilities. He is assumed to have reported this serious matter to his
parents. The fact that he chose to remain silent and did not inform them about his case,
not even when he went home to Bacolod City for his Christmas vacation, was not the
fault of the petitioner university.

94) Short Title:Alcuaz vs. PSBA (G.R. No. 76353 May 2, 1988)
Full Title:G.R. No. 76353 May 2, 1988
SOPHIA ALCUAZ, MA. CECILIA ALINDAYU BERNADETTE ANG, IRNA ANONAS, MA,
REMEDIOS BALTAZAR, CORAZON BUNDOC JOHN CARMONA, ANNA SHIELA DIÑOSO,
RAFAEL ENCARNACION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Quezon City Branch (PSBA), DR.
JUAN D. LIM, in his capacity as President and Chairman of Board of Trustees of PSBA,
ATTY. P. PAULINO, etc., et al., respondents.
 Page 238 of 601

Facts: Petitioners are all bona fide students of the Respondents, while respondents, are the
Philippine School of Business Administration (hereinafter referred to as PSBA) Quezon City. As early
as March 22, 1986, the students of the respondent school and the respondent PSBA, Q.C. had
already agreed on certain matters which would govern their activities within the school. In spite of
the above-stated agreement, petitioners felt the need to hold dialogues.
Among others they demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was turned
down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of school entrances. “Subsequently
dialogues proved futile.”
Finally, petitioners received uniform letters from respondents giving them 3 days to explain
why the school should not take / mete out any administrative sanction on their direct participation
and/or conspiring with others in the commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts which was
answered by the counsel for the students in a reply letter. During the regular enrollment period,
petitioners and other students similarly situated were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for
the second semester.
President of the Student Council filed a complaint with the Director of the MECS against the
PSBA for barring the enrollment of the Student Council Officers and student leaders. Simultaneously
on the same date, the student council wrote the President, Board of Trustees, requesting for a
written statement of the school’s decision regarding their enrollment. Another demand letter was
made by Counsel for the students Atty. Alan Romulo Yap, also to the President, Board of Trustees, to
enroll his clients within forty-eight (48) hours.
All these notwithstanding, no relief appeared to be forthcoming, hence this petition.
Respondents filed their manifestation and motion stating that pursuant to this court’s order the
school authorities created a special investigating committee to conduct an investigation, which
submitted a report with recommendations. Respondents adopted the recommendations of the
Committee and prayed that the case be dismissed for having become moot. In the resolution the
motion of petitioners to compel respondents to readmit or re-enroll herein petitioners was denied
except in the case of three (3) student petitioners cleared by the investigating committee and who
had been recommended to be readmitted or re-enrolled.
The Court further resolved to require respondent school to show cause why it should not be
adjudged in contempt for refusing to reinstate the intervenors-faculty members in the interim which
the Respondents filed the manifestation informing this Court that they did not refuse to reinstate the
 Page 239 of 601

intervenors/faculty members; that they were in fact actually reinstated in compliance with the Court’s
temporary mandatory order. Hence, the motion for contempt should be dismissed.

Issue: Whether there has been deprivation of due process for petitioners who have been barred
from re-enrollment and for intervenors teachers whose services have been terminated as faculty
members, on account of their participation in the demonstration or protest charged by respondents
as “anarchic” rallies, and a violation of their constitutional rights of expression and assembly.

Ruling:
No, According to the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of
procedural due process are:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the
assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

First, both students and teachers were given three (3) days from receipts of letter to explain in
writing why the school should not take / mete out any administrative sanction on them in view of
their participation in the commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts on the dates stated.
Second, The records show that a letter was sent by Atty. Alan Rollo Yap, in behalf of all PSBA
students to the President of the School Mr. Juan D. Lim, explaining why said students are not guilty
of the charges filed against them. Similarly, a faculty member of the PSBA filed as answer in a letter
to the same President of the school, where he denied the charges against him.
Third to fifth was conducted in the investigation conducted by the committee. which after
careful scrutiny of the Report and Recommendation of the Special Investigating Committee shows it
does not fall under any of the above exceptions. On the contrary, it is readily apparent that the
investigation conducted was fair, open, exhaustive and adequate. Accordingly, there appears to be
 Page 240 of 601

no cogent reason to disturb the finding of said committee and as manifested by the respondents, the
report of said committee has virtually rendered this petition moot and academic.

• Criminal Proceedings
This will be discussed in the Module on the Rights of the Accused.

MODULE 2-A-3. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY DUE PROCESS

95) Short Title:Agabon vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004)
Full Title:G.R. No. 158693 November 17, 2004
JENNY M. AGABON and VIRGILIO C. AGABON, petitioners,
vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), RIVIERA HOME
IMPROVEMENTS, INC. and VICENTE ANGELES, respondents.

Facts: Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. (RHI Inc.) is engaged in the business of selling and
installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed Virgilio and Jenny Agabon as gypsum
board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed
for abandonment of work.
Virgilio and Jenny then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on December 28, 1999 declaring the dismissals illegal and it
ordered RHI Inc. to pay the monetary claims.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter because it found that the petitioners had
abandoned their work, and were not entitled to backwages and separation pay. The other money
claims awarded by the Labor Arbiter were also denied for lack of evidence.
The NLRC denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Agabon’s thus they filed a
petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners
was not illegal because they had abandoned their employment but it ordered the payment of money
claims.

Issue: Whether or Not the Riviera Home Improvements Inc. should be held liable for non-
compliance with the procedural requirements of due process?
 Page 241 of 601

Ruling:
YES, Rivera Home Improvements Inc. should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural
requirements of due process. Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due
process, has two aspects: substantive, i.e., the valid and authorized causes of
employment termination under the Labor Code; and procedural, i.e., the manner of
dismissal. Procedural due process requirements for dismissal are found in the
Implementing Rules of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines in Book VI, Rule I, Sec. 2, as amended by Department Order Nos. 9 and 10.
Breaches of these due process requirements violate the Labor Code. Therefore, statutory
due process should be differentiated from failure to comply with constitutional due
process.
Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and assures him of his
rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; while statutory due process found in the Labor
Code and Implementing Rules protects employees from being unjustly terminated without just cause
after notice and hearing. Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282,
the employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if
requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for
which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to
be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes
under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor and
Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation.
From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just
cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, for an authorized cause under Article 283, or for health
reasons under Article 284, and due process was observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or
authorized cause but due process was observed; (3) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause
and there was no due process; and (4) the dismissal is for just or authorized cause but due process
was not observed.Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead
argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because they did
not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because
the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee's last known address. Thus, it should
be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.
 Page 242 of 601

As enunciated by this Court in Viernes v. National Labor Relations Commissions, an employer

is liable to pay indemnity in the form of nominal damages to an employee who has been dismissed if,
in effecting such dismissal, the employer fails to comply with the requirements of due process.
The violation of the petitioners' right to statutory due process by the private respondent
warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances.
Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it proper to fix it at P30,000.00.
We believe this form of damages would serve to deter employers from future violations of the
statutory due process rights of employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or recognition
of this fundamental right granted to the latter under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.

MODULE 2-A-4. JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW (TESTS)

• Strict Scrutiny Test
• Intermediate Scrutiny
• Rational Basis Test

96) White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila (G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009)
Full Title:G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.

Facts: Manila Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed an Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels,
motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
The City claims that it is a legitimate exercise of police power.
Herein petitioners, assails the validity and constitutionality of the ordinance arguing that it
violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power;
and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
The RTC declared the ordinance null and void, thus, the City of Manila elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals. The CA reversed the RTC ruling.
 Page 243 of 601

Issue:Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

Ruling:
The court ruled in the negative.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has
held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate
admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability
of these ends does not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align
with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people.

97) Williamson vs. Lee Optical of Oklahoma [348 US 483 (1955)]

Brief Fact Summary. An Oklahoma law prohibited any person that is not a licensed optometrist or
ophthalmologist from fitting lenses to a face or to duplicate or replace into frames lenses or other
optical appliances.

Facts: Opticians are artisans who are trained to make lenses, fill prescriptions, and fit frames for
eyeglasses. Oklahoma prohibited anyone from fitting or duplicating lenses for eyeglasses
who was not a licensed ophthalmologist or optometrist, or who did not have a
prescription from a licensed ophthalmologist or optometrist. As a result, opticians were
unable to put old glasses in new frames or duplicate lenses that had been lost or broken
 Page 244 of 601

without a new prescription. Oklahoma also did not allow opticians to advertise the sale of optical
appliances, such as frames and mountings, or rent space in a retail store to someone who purported
to conduct eye examinations.

Issue: Whether the Oklahoma law violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
arbitrarily interfering with the opticians right to do business?

Ruling: NO. While the law may have been "needless" and "wasteful," it was the duty of
the legislature, not the courts, "to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new
requirement." That is, Courts should not be able to invalidate state economic regulations on the
grounds that they disagree with the theories supporting them. Even if the state law imposes burdens
or waste, the legislature has the sole authority over weighing its benefits against its costs. In sum,
the opticians could not prove that the law had no rational relationship to legitimate state objectives.

For the protection against abuses by legislatures, the people must resort to the polls and not to the
courts. This law may not be the least restrictive means to achieve the state’s purpose, but the law
need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional.

The district court also held unconstitutional the provision in the act, which stated a person operating
a retail store that serves the general public, could not rent, or lease space in that store to a person
purporting to do eye examination or visual care. This is a violation of due process.

MODULE 2-A-5. DOCTRINES AND CHALLENGES

• Void for Vagueness Doctrine
• Overbreadth Doctrine
• As-applied Challenge
• Facial Challenge

98) Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council [G.R.
Nos. 178552, 178581, 178890, 179157 & 179461 (October 5, 2010)]
 Page 245 of 601

FACTS: The case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, An Actto Secure
the State and Protect our People from Terrorism, aka Human Security Actof 2007. Petitioner-
organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspectedcommunist fronts by the
government, whereas individual petitioners invoke thetranscendental importance doctrine and their
status as citizens and taxpayers.

Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like widespreadand
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace and coerce the governmentto give in to
an unlawful demand are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencieswith no standard to
measure the prohibited acts.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should prosper

RULING: NO.

POLITICAL LAW- Requisites of power of judicial review. In constitutional litigations, the power
of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential,
renders the discussion of the last two superfluous. Locus standi or legal standing requires a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.

For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that
(1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injuryas a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
 Page 246 of 601

Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected "communist fronts" by
the government, especially the military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the
"transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 178890 allege that they have been subjected to "close security surveillance by
state security forces," their members followed by "suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark
windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with military build." They likewise claim that they
have been branded as "enemies of the State. Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have yet to show any connection
between the purported"surveillance" and the implementation of RA 9372.

POLITICAL LAW- A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein
certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of
terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law
enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct
to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The overbreadth doctrine,
meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals
will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though
some of it is protected.
 Page 247 of 601

Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real
litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects,
not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction
that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or activities.

Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his concurring opinion that the vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines,as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws.
A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either
vagueness or overbreadth grounds. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as
applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is
legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them.

In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend
that the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted
through some form of expression protected by the free speech clause.

Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime
actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the
crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the
presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative
component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.

Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just
one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of
words on the part of the offender like in declaring to launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in
haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction.

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of
prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism"
is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates
 Page 248 of 601

speculative counseling on a statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to
be used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.

Petitions Dismissed

99) Disini vs. Secretary of Justice (G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014)
G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL
and ERNESTO SONIDO, JR., Petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY
OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.

Facts: The Philippine Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 10175 or known as the
cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 which seeks to protect individuals from crimes or
unlawful acts that can be committed through the internet. While it is admitted that the use of
the internet or cyberspace gives access to research, advertisements, business, inquiries and
connection with a greater number of audience, it is also an instrument to commit crimes that the law
itself is trying to prevent and regulate.
Petitioners in these consolidated cases, contended that this law violated certain
constitutional rights thus praying that it be declared void and unconstitutional. The
Temporary Restraining Order issued on October 9, 2012 is extended for 120 days,pending resolution
of the case.

Issue: Whether or not several provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 violated freedom
of expression and privacy.

Ruling: YES. Out of the 21 sections in the Cybercrime Law challenged by the petitioners,
the Supreme Court declared three (3) provisions void for being unconstitutional, to wit
Sections 4(c)(3), Section 12, and Section 19.
 Page 249 of 601

Rationale: The Court in Section 4(c)(3) placed great weight in the protection of
commercial speech, it is ruled that unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression. It ruled that there is no basis to the claim that the presence of unsolicited commercial
communications or spam tend to slow down the efficiency of computers, as well as its storage and is
considered as a nuisance to the users. Commercial speech is afforded protection in this case, further
stating that people have the right to read one’s email, and the denial of such constitutes violation of
freedom of expression.

It is noted that these messages forms part of the freedom of speech, and were never considered as
nuisance, some people may even be interested in the ads, as long as the people have the right of
option whether to open the mail or not.
As to Section 12, the court found that it failed to provide safeguards to the right to
privacy of every individual, as it authority is given to law enforcement authorities to gather
electronic traffic data referred as the date, time, size, origin etc. of a certain communication. It is
declared as unconstitutional, as it must be specific and definite to ensure that the rights of every
individual are protected.
The court ruled that the authority given under this Section is without restraint, although the
law states that the collection of data is limited to those associated with specified communications, it
is still the law enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications.
It is noted that every single information when collected and gathered may create profilesof
persons, including their political views, associations and activities which is protectedby the right to
privacy.
The section likewise failed to define what is meant by “due cause” which will empowerand
authorize law enforces to collect traffic data, as it did not relate the use of saidcollection of traffic
data to the probable commission of a particular crime. There is noguarantee or limitations imposed
that law enforcers will not take advantage and abusethe authority given to have access to
information.
Lastly, the court declares Section 19 as unconstitutional as it violates the
constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression and against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
 Page 250 of 601

This section gives power to the DOJ to block access to a computer data which is found to be
prima facie a violation of the Cybercrime Law without the need of a search warrant. It is guaranteed
by the 1987 Constitution in Sec.2, Article III that every person has the right to be secured against
any unreasonable searches and seizures, the power granted under section 19 of the Cybercrime law
clearly contradicts the constitutional right of every individual against searches and seizures without a
warrant.

It is also ruled that computer data, constitutes speech and the curtailment of such bythe DOJ through
blocking any access to it restricts freedom of expression.

The Court in upholding the validity of several provisions, ensured that the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution will not be violated or restricted.

100) Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001)
G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs.SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS: Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under RA
7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.
On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions of pesos
through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or
means thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the
damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:
1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness
2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code.
Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations against
petitioner.
 Page 251 of 601

Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary investigation,

reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but was
denied.
Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a
probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of
the accused.
Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the ground that the
facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based
was unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more
than one offense. Same was denied.
The questioned provisions of the petitioners are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 of the Plunder Law
which states that:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material
possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the
public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any
other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other
form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines.
 Page 252 of 601

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the
crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated
with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and
the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code
shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their
interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the
deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
ISSUE: Whether the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?
HELD: NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would
inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its
penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the
language of the law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the
petitioner is alleged to have committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his
defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms
“combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being
impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used
herein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them.
 Page 253 of 601

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects –
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances
as in the area of free speech.

MODULE 2-B. EQUAL PROTECTION

• Political, Economic and Social Equality

a) Art. II, Sec. 11 (free access to the courts)

b) Art. II, Sec. 14 (equality of women and men)
c) Art. II, Sec. 26 (public service)
d) Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) (legal aid to poor)
e) Art. IX-C, Sec. 10 (protection of candidates)
f) Art. XII, Sec. 2, par. 2 (reservation of marine resources)
g) Art. XII, Sec. 10 (nationalization of business)
h) Art. XIII, Sec. 1 and 2 (social justice)
i) Art. XIII, Sec. 3 (protection to labor)

101) Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (G.R. Nos. 192935 and 193036,
December 2, 2010)
 Page 254 of 601

FACTS: After a month in office, President Benigno Aquino III issued Executive Order No.
1 (E.O. 1) on July 30, 2010 creating the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC). The PTC was
tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and
corruption involving third level public officers during the administration of Aquino's
predecessor Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. All it can do is gather, collect, and assess evidence
of graft and corruption and thereafter submit its findings and make recommendations to
the Office of the President, Congress, and the Ombudsman. It cannot impose criminal,
civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.

Private citizen Louis Biraogo and a group of congressmen led by Lakas Kampi CMD chairman Rep.
Edcel Lagman filed in the Supreme Court separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
constitutionality of E.O. 1 based on their belief that the creation of the PTC constitutes usurpation of
the legislative power to create public office, threatens the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman, and violates the equal protection clause of the Philippine Constitution for specifically
targeting certain officials of the Arroyo administration.

Biraogo, the petitioner, asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an
adjunct body of the Office of the President. Thus, in order that the President may create a public
office he must be empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law
and such power cannot be presumed.

The petitioner adds that the President is only authorized by law (Section 31 of the Administrative
Code of 1987) to reorganize his office, thus, his cannot serve as the basis for the creation of the PTC.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the president can create public office such as the PTC without usurping the powers of
Congress;

2. Whether the purpose of the PTC transgresses the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws.
 Page 255 of 601

HELD:

1. The President has the authority to create the PTC, not a public office. Majority of the members of
the Supreme Court rejected the justification of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the creation of the
PTC finds basis on the president’s power of control over all executive offices. The Decision stressed
that “control” is essentially the power to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of
the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices.
The majority also rejected the OSG’s claim that the E.O. finds basis under sec. 31 of the
Administrative Code, which authorizes the president to restructure the Office of the President.
Clearly, “restructure” under the said provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation or
abolition of offices by reason of economy or redundancy. This presupposes an already existing office.
The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision.

2. The majority members of the Supreme Court held that E.O. 1 should be struck down as violative of
the equal protection clause. Laying down a long line of precedents, the ponencia reiterated that equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is
to secure every person against intentional and arbitrary discrimination.

The Decision stressed that the clear mandate of the PTC is to investigate and find out the truth
“concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration” only. The
intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been
made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. The Arroyo administration,
according to the ponencia, is just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation gave the majority an impression that the PTC is just being used “as a
vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution” and that E.O. 1 is only an “adventure in partisan
hostility.” While the Court recognized that the creation of the PTC was inspired with noble intentions,
the ponencia nonetheless reminded the government of the ethical principle that “the end does not
 Page 256 of 601

justify the means.” It emphatically closed by stressing that the search for the truth must
be within constitutional bounds, for “ours is still a government of laws and not of men.”

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

102) People of the Philippines vs. Jumauan (722 SCRA 108)

G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-
Appellant.
FACTS: Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children.
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her
husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their
residence in Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant
boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.
As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital
problems between her and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He
treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm. However, in 1997,
he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay,
insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so
she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.
One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed
but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near
the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: “Why are you lying on the cot?”, and to
instantaneously order: “You transfer here to our bed.”
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due
to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from
the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK
stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.
 Page 257 of 601

The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to
copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and
reiterating that she was not feeling well.
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by
holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed
defiant by refusing to bend her legs.
The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his own
legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her.
As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: “Don ‘t
do that to me because I’m not feeling well.”
Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the
rape charges as her revenge because he took over the control and management of their
businesses, and to cover up her extra-marital affairs.

ISSUE: Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

HELD: YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over their wives’
bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.
Violation of equal protection clause
The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape
cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof,
infringes on the equal protection clause.
The Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and
non-marital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in defense of the exemption are
either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights incident to marriage or are
simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny.
The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be
unconstitutional.
Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution
for the rape of his wife. The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital
right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her.
 Page 258 of 601

Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist’s legal
relationship with his victim.

Implied consent theory untenable

The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory which was raised by
the accused. The accused argued that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting
husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.
According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists
within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits
sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying
Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.

103) Remman Enterprises, Inc. vs. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service
(G.R. No. 197676, February 4, 2014)

FACTS: This case involves a petition for review under Rule 45 on the subject of the Real Estate
Service Act of the Philippines. R.A. 9646 (Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines) was
passed. Its purpose is to professionalize the real estate service sector under regulatory
scheme of licensing, registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners. The
supervision was likewise lodged under the authority of the Professional Regulatory
Commission (PRC). The law required that companies providing real estate services must
transact with the employ of duly licensed real estate brokers. Petitioner assails the
constitutionality of the law, alleging that it violates the due process clause and infringes the
ownership rights of real estate developers enshrined in Art. 428 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, they
claim that it violates the equal protection clause as owners of private properties are allowed to sell
their properties without the need of a licensed real estate broker. The provisions in question are – o
Section 29. Prohibition Against the Unauthorized Practice of Real Estate Service. o Section 32.
Corporate Practice of the Real Estate Service. The RTC denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
 Page 259 of 601

ISSUE: Whether the assailed provisions are in violation of the due process clause, particularly
substantive due process.

RULING: NO. The requirements for substantive due process are – 1. Lawful government
purpose; and 2. Reasonable means necessary for the accomplishment of the lawful
purpose. The lawful purpose of R.A. 9646 is to professionalize the real estate service and increase
its standards. The law recognizes the role of real estate practitioners in spearheading the continuous
flow of capital, in boosting investor confidence, and in promoting national progress. The
requirement of employing a duly licensed real estate broker for transactions is
reasonable as it merely regulates the conduct of business, and does not curtail the
exercise of petitioners’ ownership rights.

Lastly, there is a substantial distinction between real estate developers and owners of private who
want to sell their private property. Unlike individuals or entities having isolated transactions over their
own property, real estate developers sell lots, houses and condominium units in the ordinary course
of business, a business which is highly regulated by the State to ensure the health and safety of
home and lot buyers.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. RTC decision AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

104) Villanueva vs. Judicial and Bar Council (G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)

FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN,

COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL,
Respondent.

RECIT READY: Petitioner applied for a position as a judge in a second level court but JBC
did not include his name in the list of applicants since he failed to qualify. This is
because the JBC put priority to incumbent judges who served their position for at least
five years and petitioner here only served as judged for more than a year. The petitioner
assailed, inter alia, the authority of the JBC to add another qualification (5-year-qualitification)
 Page 260 of 601

because the said qualification was already prescribed The Supreme Court ruled that the internal
process of choosing people who would qualify done by the JBC was valid since under Sect. 8 (5), Art.
VIII of the Constitution gave the JBC principal function of recommending appointees to the judiciary.

FACTS: Herein petitioner, Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva was a presiding judge of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Compostela-New Bataas, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI,
which is a first-level court. He applied on second-level courts suchas Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch
13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Adusan Del Sur.

The Judicial and Bar Council’s (JBC) Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed the
petitioner through aletter that we failed to qualify for the said position he applied on. On the same
day, petitioner sent a letter (electronic mail). He seeks reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list
of the considered applicants. He also protested the inclusion of applicants who failedthe prejudicature
examination.

Through a letter, the JBC Executive officer informed him that his protest and reconsideration was
duly noted by the JBC enbanc. Still the non-inclusion of his name in the list of applicants was upheld.
The reason was, the JBS’s long standing policy of givingpriority to incumbent judges that served their
current position for at least five years. Since the petitioner only served as a judged formore than a
year only, his name was not included in the list.

Petitioner argues that: 1.) Qualifications was already prescribed so the JBC could add no more, 2.)
The five-year-requirement violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the constitution,
3.) The same requirement violates theconstitutional provision on Social Justice and Human Rights for
Equal Opportunity of employment, and 4.) The requirement ofpassing the prejudicature exam should
be mandatory.

Respondents argue that 1.) The writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC
from performing itsprincipal function under the constitution to recommend appointees to the judiciary
because the JBC is not a tribunalexercising judicial or quasi-judicial function, 2.) Remedy of
mandamus and declaratory relief will not lie because petitioner doesnot have any legal right that
need to be protected, 3.) Legal protection clause is not violated because the 5-year-requirement
 Page 261 of 601

isperformance and experience based, and 4.) No violation of due process since the policy is merely
internal in nature.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before
they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional – YES
(2) Whether the JBC's five-year requirement violates the equal protection and
due process clauses ofthe Constitution – NO

RULING:
(1) YES. The said added 5-year-qualification being assailed by the petitioner is constitutional since as
stated in the Sect. 8 (5), Art.VIII, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the judiciary.
Consequently, it was also stated in the said provision thatonly the persons nominated by the JBC is
transmitted to the president that will choose whom to nominate as judge in thejudiciary.

(2) NO. The equal protection clause, does not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not
arbitrary. o Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended appointees
does not constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. The JBC does not discriminate
when it employs the 5 year requirement since the number of years of service provides a
relevant basis to determine proven competence which may be measured by experience,
among other factors.

Ratio: Competence is tested based on, among other qualifications, experience and
performance and based on the JBC's collective judgment, those who have been judges of
first-level courts for five (5) years are better qualified for promotion to second-level
courts. A five-year stint can also provide evidence of the integrity, probity,and
independence of judges seeking promotion.

105) Tolentino vs. Board of Accountancy [90 Phil 83, 90(1951)]

 Page 262 of 601

HILARION C. TOLENTINO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY,

ROBERT ORR FERGUSON and HANS HAUSAMANN, defendants-appellees.

Facts: Commonwealth Act No. 3105 was enacted. Section 16-A thereof, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 342, authorized accountants to practice their profession under a
trade name. Assailing the constitutionality of the aforementioned provision, plaintiff, an accountant,
filed an action for declaratory relief in the CFI of Manila on the ground advanced that the assailed
provision is a class legislation since by its terms it excludes persons engaged in other callings or
professions from adopting, acquiring or using a trade name in connection with the practice of such
callings or professions. Included as defendants are Robert Orr Ferguson, and Hans Hausamann,
foreign accountants practicing their profession in the Philippines under the trade name “Fleming and
Williamson.”

Issue: Whether plaintiff has sufficient cause of action to question the constitutionality of
Commonwealth Act No. 342?

Held: NO, plaintiff has no sufficient cause of action. Plaintiff’s main objection centers on the
exclusive character of the law which extends its benefits only to those engaged in the profession of
accountancy. It is obvious that he seeks the declaratory relief not for his own personal benefit, or
because his rights or prerogatives as an accountant, or as an individual, are adversely affected, but
rather for the benefit of persons belonging to other professions or callings, who are not parties to this
case. He does not claim having suffered any prejudice or damage to him or to his rights or
prerogatives as an accountant by the use of the disputed name by the defendants. His complaint is
rather addressed against the propriety of the use of said trade name by the defendants because it is
misleading and is liable to defraud the public. Plaintiff, therefore, has no actual justiciable controversy
against the herein defendants which may give him the right to secure relief by asserting the
unconstitutionality of the law in question. In order that an action for declaratory relief may be
entertained, it must be predicated on the following requisite facts or conditions: (1)
there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons
whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial
 Page 263 of 601

determination. These requisite facts are wanting and, therefore, the complaint must fail for lack of
sufficient cause of action.

106) People vs. Cayat [68 Phil 12, 18 (1939)]

G.R. No. L-45987 May 5, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CAYAT, defendant-appellant.

Facts: On or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of the
Philippine, Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and illegally receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or
custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and
liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make.
Accused Cayat was prosecuted in violation of of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), and was
sentenced by the justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos (P5) or suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:
(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;
(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and.
(3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state.

Issue: Whether or not the Act is in violation of the equal protection clause.

Ruling: NO. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2)must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and(4) must apply equally to all members of the same
class. (Borgnis vs. Falk Co., 133 N.W., 209;Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61; 55
Law. ed., Rubi vs. Provincial Board ofMindoro, 39 Phil., 660; People and Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation vs. Vera and CuUnjieng, 37 Off. Gaz ., 187.)
 Page 264 of 601

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and
substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon
"accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree
of civilization and culture.
"The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the
geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial
Board of Mindoro, supra.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to
meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain
members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian
brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established. That it is germane to
the purposes of law cannot be doubted.
The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer,
wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the
members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act.,"
is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has
been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use
of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and
crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and
civilization.
Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal
thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of
their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.
Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so
as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their
equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be
noother than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines.

107) Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado (227 SCRA 703)

 Page 265 of 601

FACTS: This is a petition raised by the members of the lower courts who assails the
constitutionality of Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 implemented by the Philippine
Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28.
It is alleged that the said law is discriminatory per se to withdraw the franking
privilege of the Judiciary but not on other offices of the government, such as: the President
of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives; the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National
Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices
and officers.
However, the respondents contend that there is no discrimination since the law is
based on the valid classification in accordance of the equal protection clause. In addition,
not only the Judiciary department will be affected with it but also other offices like Office of Adult
Education, the Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation; the National Historical Commission; etc.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 violates the equal protection clause.

HELD: YES. The Court held Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 unconstitutional, thus violates the equal
protection clause.

In Ichong vs. Hernandez, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike. What the clause requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same
particulars.

The Court finds its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the
Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly
situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the
franking privilege.
108) Ichong vs. Hernandez (G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957)
 Page 266 of 601

G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME
HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of
Manila, respondents.

FACTS: A law, RA No. 1180 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business" was enacted
with an effect of nationalizing the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are:
(1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of
the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade;
(2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business
on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are
forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural
persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case
of juridical persons;

(3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States;

(4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation
of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating
to trade, commerce and industry;

(5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail
business of additional stores or branches of retail business;

(6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for
registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses,
giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their
offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and
 Page 267 of 601

(7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to
continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

Petitioner Inchong, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien resident corporations
and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action
to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance
and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its
provisions. Inchong attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to
alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due
process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3)
the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the
provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to
engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of
Article XIV of the Constitution.

In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that:
(1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is
authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one
subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards
hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and the
institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.

ISSUE: Whether RA 1180 is unconstitutional since its exercise violates one’s right to due process and
equal protection as guaranteed by the Constitution

RULING: NO. The Court finds the enactment of RA 1180 to clearly fall within the scope of
police power of the State. It is clear that the law in question was enacted to remedy a
real and actual threat and danger to the national economy posed by alien dominance and
control of retail business and free citizens and country from the said dominance and
control.
 Page 268 of 601

It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it
does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-
protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes,
the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework
where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the
field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and
public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. However,
the Constitution has set forth limitations thereof and the most important of these are: the due
process clause and the equal protection clause.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are
supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the
attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power,
whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that
would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property,
provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided
everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The
police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable
relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made,
there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

The best evidence to determine the alien dominance in retail business are the statistics on the
retail trade, which put down the figures in black and white. Between the constitutional convention
year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and control of the retail trade already filled the minds
of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the
retail trade act (1954), official statistics unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and
control by the alien of the retail trade. Statistical figures reveal that in percentage distribution of
assets and gross sales, alien participation has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of
course, that Filipinos have the edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the
 Page 269 of 601

numerical gap through their assets and gross sales which average between six and seven times those
of the very many Filipino retailers.

The Court finds that law does not also violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and
citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause,
because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. The wisdom and efficacy
of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems
not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the
prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the
Government may not interfere.

109)Short Title: Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad (40 Phil. 136)
Long Title: G.R. No. 15574 September 17, 1919
SMITH, BELL & COMPANY (LTD.), petitioner,
vs.
JOAQUIN NATIVIDAD, Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu, respondent
Facts: Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippine Islands. A majority of its stockholders are British subjects. It is the owner of a motor vessel
known as the Bato built for it in the Philippine Islands in 1916, of more than fifteen tons gross The
Bato was brought to Cebu in the present year for the purpose of transporting plaintiff's merchandise
between ports in the Islands. Application was made at Cebu, the home port of the vessel, to the
Collector of Customs for a certificate of Philippine registry. The Collector refused to issue the
certificate, giving as his reason that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were not citizens
either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. The instant action is the result.
The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, still in force, provides in
section 3, (first paragraph, first sentence), 6, 7, 8, 10, and 31, as follows.
SEC. 3. That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal
protection of the laws. . . .
 Page 270 of 601

On February 23, 1918, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2761. The first section of this law
amended section 1172 of the Administrative Code to read as follows:
SEC. 1172. Certificate of Philippine register. — Upon registration of a vessel of domestic
ownership, and of more than fifteen tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall be
issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic ownership and of fifteen tons gross or less, the taking
of the certificate of Philippine register shall be optional with the owner.
"Domestic ownership," as used in this section, means ownership vested in some one or more
of the following classes of persons: (a) Citizens or native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands;
(b) citizens of the United States residing in the Philippine Islands; (c) any corporation or
company composed wholly of citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States or of
both, created under the laws of the United States, or of any State thereof, or of thereof, or the
managing agent or master of the vessel resides in the Philippine Islands
Any vessel of more than fifteen gross tons which on February eighth, nineteen hundred and
eighteen, had a certificate of Philippine register under existing law, shall likewise be deemed a
vessel of domestic ownership so long as there shall not be any change in the ownership
thereof nor any transfer of stock of the companies or corporations owning such vessel to
person not included under the last preceding paragraph.
Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 2761 amended sections 1176 and 1202 of the Administrative Code to
read as follows:
SEC. 1176. Investigation into character of vessel. — No application for a certificate of
Philippine register shall be approved until the collector of customs is satisfied from an
inspection of the vessel that it is engaged or destined to be engaged in legitimate trade
and that it is of domestic ownership as such ownership is defined in section eleven hundred
and seventy-two of this Code.
The collector of customs may at any time inspect a vessel or examine its owner, master, crew,
or passengers in order to ascertain whether the vessel is engaged in legitimate trade and is
entitled to have or retain the certificate of Philippine register.
SEC. 1202. Limiting number of foreign officers and engineers on board vessels. — No
Philippine vessel operating in the coastwise trade or on the high seas shall be permitted to
have on board more than one master or one mate and one engineer who are not citizens of
the United States or of the Philippine Islands, even if they hold licenses under section one
thousand one hundred and ninety-nine hereof. No other person who is not a citizen of the
 Page 271 of 601

United States or of the Philippine Islands shall be an officer or a member of the crew of such
vessel. Any such vessel which fails to comply with the terms of this section shall be required to
pay an additional tonnage tax of fifty centavos per net ton per month during the continuance
of said failure.

Issue: Whether Act no. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is valid in whole or in part.
Ruling:We nevertheless are clearly of the opinion that the limitation of domestic ownership for
purposes of obtaining a certificate of Philippine registry in the coastwise trade to citizens of the
Philippine Islands, and to citizens of the United States, does not violate the provisions of
paragraph 1 of section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916.No treaty right relied
upon Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is held valid and constitutional.
A literal application of general principles to the facts before us would, of course, cause the inevitable
deduction that Act No. 2761 is unconstitutional by reason of its denial to a corporation, some of
whose members are foreigners, of the equal protection of the laws.
One of the exceptions to the general rule, most persistent and far reaching in influence is, that
neither the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, broad and comprehensive as it
is, nor any other amendment, "was designed to interfere with the power of the State, sometimes
termed its `police power,' to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education,
and good order of the people, and legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its
resources and add to its wealth and prosperity. From the very necessities of society, legislation of a
special character, having these objects in view, must often be had in certain districts."
This is the same police power which the United States Supreme Court say "extends to so dealing with
the conditions which exist in the state as to bring out of them the greatest welfare in of its people.
For quite similar reasons, none of the provision of the Philippine Organic Law could have had the
effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right
to exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the
promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. Another notable exception permits of
the regulation or distribution of the public domain or the common property or resources
of the people of the State, so that use may be limited to its citizens. Still another exception
permits of the limitation of employment in the construction of public works by, or for, the
State or a municipality to citizens of the United States or of the State. Even as to
 Page 272 of 601

classification, it is admitted that a State may classify with reference to the evil to be prevented; the
question is a practical one, dependent upon experience.
To justify that portion of Act no. 2761 which permits corporations or companies to obtain a certificate
of Philippine registry only on condition that they be composed wholly of citizens of the Philippine
Islands or of the United States or both, as not infringing Philippine Organic Law, it must be done
under some one of the exceptions here mentioned. This must be done, moreover, having
particularly in mind what is so often of controlling effect in this jurisdiction — our local experience
and our peculiar local conditions.
We are inclined to the view that while Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation having alien
stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded by the due-process of law and equal
protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761
of the Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co. Ltd.,
the right to register vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong to that
vicious species of class legislation which must always be condemned, but does fall within
authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police power, and so does not
offend against the constitutional provision.
Provisions such as those in Act No. 2761, which deny to foreigners the right to a certificate of
Philippine registry, are thus found not to be as radical as a first reading would make them appear.
Without any subterfuge, the apparent purpose of the Philippine Legislature is seen to be to enact an
anti-alien shipping act. The ultimate purpose of the Legislature is to encourage Philippine ship-
building. This, without doubt, has, likewise, been the intention of the United States Congress in
passing navigation or tariff laws on different occasions. The object of such a law, the United States
Supreme Court once said, was to encourage American trade, navigation, and ship-building by giving
American ship-owners exclusive privileges.
The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

110-111)Short Title:Bache and Company vs. Ruiz (L-32409, Feb. 27, 1971)
Long Title:[G.R. No. L-32409. February 27, 1971.]
 Page 273 of 601

BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. and FREDERICK E. SEGGERMAN, Petitioners, v. HON. JUDGE VIVENCIO
M. RUIZ, MISAEL P. VERA, in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, ARTURO
LOGRONIO, RODOLFO DE LEON, GAVINO VELASQUEZ, MIMIR DELLOSA, NICANOR ALCORDO, JOHN
DOE, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, and JOHN DOE, Respondents.
Facts:On February 24, 1970, respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a
letter addressed to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant
against petitioners for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to
all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing
Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon, one of herein respondents, to make and file the application for
search warrant which was attached to the letter.
At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his
Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of respondents De Leon and Logronio. After the session
had adjourned, respondent Judge was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The
stenographer, upon request of respondent Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and
thereafter, respondent Judge asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his
deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury.
Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leon’s application for search warrant and
respondent Logronio’s deposition, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then sign by
respondent Judge and accordingly issued.
Three days later, or on February 28, 1970, which was a Saturday, the BIR agents served the search
warrant petitioners at the offices of petitioner corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal.
Petitioners’ lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or
transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded
with their search which yielded six boxes of documents.
On March 3, 1970, petitioners filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal
praying that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the search warrant be declared null and
void, and that the respondents be ordered to pay petitioners, jointly and severally, damages and
attorney’s fees. On March 18, 1970, the respondents, thru the Solicitor General, filed an answer to
the petition. After hearing, the court, presided over by respondent Judge, issued on July
29, 1970, an order dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search warrant. In the
 Page 274 of 601

meantime, or on April 16, 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on petitioner
corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the documents thus
seized. Petitioners came to this Court.
Issue:
1. Whether respondent Judge failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.
2. Whether the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
3. Whether the search warrant does to particularly describe the things to be seized.
Ruling:
1. No. The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, required by Art.
III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and by Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court, should be conducted by the judge himself and not by others. The phrase "which shall
be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce," appearing in the said constitutional provision, was
introduced by Delegate Francisco as an amendment to the draft submitted by the Sub-
Committee of Seven.

Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable
him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause, pursuant to Art. III, Sec.
1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, both of
which prohibit the issuance of warrants except "upon probable cause." The determination of
whether or not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial
appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the
contrary.

While it is true that the complainant’s application for search warrant and the witness’ printed-
form deposition were subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge, the latter did not ask
either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining
whether or not there was probable cause against herein petitioners. Indeed, the participants
seem to have attached so little significance to the matter that notes of the proceedings before
respondent Judge were not even taken.
 Page 275 of 601

The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search
Warrant No. 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes,
to a few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to
the complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a personal examination. If there was
an examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by the
Deputy Clerk of Court. But, as stated, the Constitution and the rules require a personal
examination by the judge.
2. Yes. The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the
Tax Code. The first is the violation of Sec. 46(a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax
returns), which are interrelated. The second is the violation of Sec. 53 (withholding of income
taxes at source). The third is the violation of Sec. 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or
occupation); and the fourth is the violation of Sec. 209 (failure to make a return of receipts,
sales, business or gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even
in their classification the six above-mentioned provisions are embraced in two different titles:
Secs. 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Secs. 208 and 209 are under
Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation).
3. Yes. The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and
of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe
the things to be seized.
While the term "all business transactions" does not appear in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70, the
said warrant nevertheless tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the
elimination of general warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as to include
all conceivable records of petitioner corporation, which, if seized, could possibly render its
business inoperative.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio; 57
Phil. 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the
warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad
Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court).
 Page 276 of 601

112) Short Title:Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Drilon [163 SCRA 386 (1988)]
Long Title:G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D.
ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, respondents.
 Page 277 of 601

Facts:The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm
"engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of
1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING
THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for
"discrimination against males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to
domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is
held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and
not executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the
Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." 4 Department Order No. 1, it
is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation
of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI
members face should the Order be further enforced.
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the
Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states
of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and
Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes
the police power of the Philippine State.
It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure.

Issue:Whether it is valid under the Constitution.

Ruling: Petition must be dismissed. As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed
vahdity. 13
In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically
stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified.
There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," 14
but it
does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality
before the law" under the Constitution 15
does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men
 Page 278 of 601

and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing
conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. 16

As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our
female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked
by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by
migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of
returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker
of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that
duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence that,
except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical
predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should act similarly with
respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that
men are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that
women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some
fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is evidence capable indeed of
unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the
same thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no evidence to justify such an
inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this
Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is
justified.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure.
Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for
Filipino female overseas workers" 17
this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible
mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good
and welfare.
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas
workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" 20
is not an argument for unconstitutionality.
Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable
and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced. What the
Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing
 Page 279 of 601

class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another
person or group of persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but not to
those recruited by B, would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the Charter.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of
legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean
that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself
vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement
whereof. 28

The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits" 29
is not well-taken. The right granted
by this provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities of the State's power of
regulation.
The Constitution declares that:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities
for all. 30

"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the
Constitution more paramountlyis that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and
humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands
because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the
Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally
and economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an evidence
the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its
duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
 Page 280 of 601

113) Short Title:Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies vs. POEA

Long Title:G.R. No. 114714 April 21, 1995
THE CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES, INC., ALSTER INTERNATIONAL
SHIPPING, INC., CREAMSHIP MANAGEMENT INC., EL GRANDE SHIPPING CORP.,
EASTGATE (INT'L.) MARITIME AGENCIES, INC., FILIPINAS KALAYAAN OVERSEAS
SHIPPING CORP., INTERWORLD SHIPPING CORP., JZEL COMPANY, INC. , LAINE
SHIPPING AGENCY CORP., MARINERS SERVICES, CORP., MARITIME SERVICES & MGT.,
INC., MID OCEAN (PHILS.) MARINE AGENCY, OCEAN EAST AGENCY CORP., PASIA-PHIL.
GROUP, INC., PHIL. MARINE CONSULTANT INC., SEASTAR MARINE SERVICES, INC., TSM
SHIPPING (PHILS.) INC., TRANS-MED (MANILA) CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, HON. NIEVES CONFESSOR
AND THE HON. FELICISIMO JOSON, respondent.

Facts:Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporated association of

licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies which hire
and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their respective foreign shipowner-principals, urge us
to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board" of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05,
series of 1994, on the grounds that:
(1) The POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting
death and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels; only
Congress can.
(2) Even granting that the POEA has that power, it, nevertheless, violated the standards for its
exercise.
 Page 281 of 601

(3) The resolution and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional because they violate the
equal protection and non-impairment of obligation of contracts clauses of the Constitution.
(4) The resolution and the memorandum circular are not, valid acts of the Governing Board
because the private sector representative mandated by law has not been appointed by the
President since the creation of the POEA.
Governing Board Resolution No. 01, issued on 14 January 1994,1 read as follows:
GOVERNING RESOLUTION NO. 01 SERIES OF 1994.
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the Administration to afford protection to Filipino overseas
contract workers, including seafarers and their families, promote their interest and
safeguard their welfare;
WHEREAS, the Administration under its mandate has the power and function to secure
the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers land ensure
compliance therewith;
WHEREAS, the minimum compensation and other benefits in cases of death, disability
and loss or damage to crew's effects provided under the POEA Standard Employment
Contract for seafarers which was revised in 1989 are now becoming very much lesser
than the prevailing international standards and those given to unionized seafarers as
provided by their collective bargaining agreements;
WHEREAS, the Tripartite Technical Working Group convened for the purpose of
deliberating the compensation and benefits provided under the POEA Standard
Employment Contract for seafarers has recommended for the upgrading of the said
compensation and benefits;
WHEREAS, for the interest of Filipino seafarers and their families, there is an urgent
need to improve and realign the minimum compensation and other benefits provided
under the POEA Standard Employment Contract for seafarers in order to keep them at
par with prevailing international standards and those provided under collective
bargaining agreements.
Memorandum Circular No. 05, issued on 19 January 19942 by POEA Administrator FelicisimoJoson and
addressed to all Filipino seafarers, manning agencies, shipownersl managers and principals hiring
Filipino seafarers, informed them .that Governing Board Resolution No. 01 adjusted the rates of
compensation and other benefits in Part II, Section C. paragraph 1; Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2;
 Page 282 of 601

and Appendix 1-A of the POEA Standard Employment Contracts for Seafarers, which adjustments
took effect on 20 March 1994
In their, comment. the public respondents contend that the petition is without merit and should de
dismissed because (a) the issuance of the challenged resolution and memorandum circular was a
valid exercise of the POEA's rule-making authority or power of subordinate legislation which this
Court had sustained in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA;4 (b) the "non-appointment" of the third
member of the Governing Board bees not necessarily invalidate the acts of the Board, for it has been
functioning "under the advisement of t the Tripartite Technical Working Group which group is
incidentally constituted by the private sector, i.e., seafarer employers and/or associations of manning
agencies including herein petitioner," for which reason "the third member complement . . . has been
substantially represented by said technical working group";5 and(d) the consensus on the increase in
the rates of compensation and other benefits was arrived at after appropriate consultations with the
shipowners and the private sector; the Board therefore soundly exercised its discretion.
Issue:Whether Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration and Memorandum Circular No. 05 violate the equal protection and
contract clauses of the Constitution.
Ruling: There is, as well, no merit to the claim that the assailed resolution and
memorandum circular violate the equal protection and contract clauses of the
Constitution. To support its contention of in equality, the petitioners claim discrimination against
foreign shipowners and principals employing Filipino seamen and in favor of foreign employers
employing overseas Filipinos who are not seamen. It is an established principle of constitutional law
that the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on reasonable
classification. And for the classification to be reasonable, it (1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same
class. 14
There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities between land-based and sea-based Filipino
overseas workers in terms of, among other things, work environment, safety, dangers and risks to
life and limb, and accessibility to social, civic, and spiritual activities.
Nor is there-merit; in the claim that the resolution and memorandum circular violate the contract
clause of the Bill of Rights.
The executive order creating the POEA was enacted to further implement the social justice provisions
of the 1973. Constitution, which have been greatly enhanced and expanded in the 1987 Constitution
 Page 283 of 601

by placing them under a separate Article. 15

The Article on Social Justice was aptly described as the
"heart of the new Charter" by the President of the 1986 Constitution Commission, retired Justice-
Cecilia Muñoz-Palma. 16
Social justice is identified with the broad scope of the police power of the
state and requires the extensive use of such power.
The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not absolute
and is not to be read with literal exactness . It is restricted to contracts with respect to property
or some object of value and which confer rights that maybe asserted in a court of justice; it has no
application to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers
of the State and involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it.
It does not prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police power by enacting regulations
reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals; comfort, or general welfare of the
community, even though contracts may thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be placed by
contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and control them.
The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid implementations of E.O. No. 797,
which was enacted under the police power of the State, they cannot be struck down on the ground
that they violate the contract clause. To hold otherwise is to alter long-established constitutional
doctrine and to subordinate the police power to the contract clause.

114) Short Title:Lacson vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999)
Long Title:G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA
ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.
Facts:In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the
KuratongBaleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate
of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by
elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff
Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of
 Page 284 of 601

police officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior
Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission — Task Force Habagat
(PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District
Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation
Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually
transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out
between the KuratongBaleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman AnianoDesierto formed
a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, BienvenidoBlancaflor,
to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and
personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident was a
legitimate police operation.1
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the Blancaflor
panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six
(26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. The recommendation was
approved by the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de
Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner PanfiloLacson was among those charged as principal
in eleven (11) information for murder2 before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while
intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same
informations as accessories after-in-the-fact.
Sandiganbayan
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No.
7975.7 They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where
one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher,
or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest
ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and
none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
 Page 285 of 601

The Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as
none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the
issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1,
1996, House Bill No. 229910 and No. 109411 (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C.
Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No.
84412 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining
expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. These bills were consolidated and later
approved into law as R.A. No. 824913 by the President of the Philippines on February 5,
1997.
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7
thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial
has not begun as to the approval hereof."
Issue:Whether Section 4 and 7 of RA 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law because
its enactment was particularly directed only to the KuratongBaleleng cases.
Ruling:A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense
committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b)
R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code (the law on bribery),30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986
(sequestration cases),31 or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes; (2) the offender comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or
employee32 holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense
committed is in relation to the office.
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws
is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and
not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class,35
 Page 286 of 601

all of which are present in this case.

The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality
and reasonables of the questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases
involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commence and whose cases could
have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as
against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial
distinction that makes real differences.36 In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet
presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined
witnesses and presented documents.
Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the
constitutional limitations,37 it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction
would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to privide for a remedy in the form of a
transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed
them under a different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of
Section 4 provides that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public officials and, under the
transitory provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and
intervenors' argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the KuratongBaleleng cases. The
transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any
court." It just happened that KuratongBaleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover,
those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section
7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
 Page 287 of 601

115) Short Title: COMELEC vs. Cruz (G.R. No. 186616, November 20, 2009)
Long Title:G.R. No. 186616 November 20, 2009
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Petitioner,
vs.
CONRADO CRUZ, SANTIAGO P. GO, RENATO F. BORBON, LEVVINO CHING, CARLOS C.
FLORENTINO, RUBEN G. BALLEGA, LOIDA ALCEDO, MARIO M. CAJUCOM, EMMANUEL M.
CALMA, MANUEL A. RAYOS, WILMA L. CHUA, EUFEMIO S. ALFONSO, JESUS M.
LACANILAO, BONIFACIO N. ALCAPA, JOSE H. SILVERIO, RODRIGO DEVELLES, NIDA R.
PAUNAN, MARIANO B. ESTUYE, JR., RAFAEL C. AREVALO, ARTURO T. MANABAT,
RICARDO O. LIZARONDO, LETICIA C. MATURAN, RODRIGO A. ALAYAN, LEONILO N.
MIRANDA, DESEDERIO O. MONREAL, FRANCISCO M. BAHIA, NESTOR R. FORONDA,
VICENTE B. QUE, JR., AURELIO A. BILUAN, DANILO R. GATCHALIAN, LOURDES R. DEL
MUNDO, EMMA O. CALZADO, FELIMON DE LEON, TANY V. CATACUTAN, AND
CONCEPCION P. JAO, Respondents.
Facts:We resolve in this Decision the constitutional challenge, originally filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 128 (RTC), against the following highlighted portion of Section 2
of Republic Act (RA) No. 9164 (entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and
SangguniangKabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991"):
Sec. 2. Term of Office. – The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials
after the effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years.
No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position: Provided, however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from the
1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official was elected.
The RTC granted the petition and declared the challenged proviso constitutionally infirm.
The present petition, filed by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeks a review of the RTC
decision.
 Page 288 of 601

Before the October 29, 2007 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections,
some of the then incumbent officials of several barangays of Caloocan City2 filed with the RTC a
petition for declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of the above-highlighted proviso,
based on the following arguments:
I. The term limit of Barangay officials should be applied prospectively and not retroactively.
II. Implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164 would be a violation of the equal
protection of the law.
III. Barangay officials have always been apolitical.
The COMELEC takes the position that the assailed law is valid and constitutional. RA No. 9164 is an
amendatory law to RA No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991 or LGC) and is not a penal law;
hence, it cannot be considered an ex post facto law. The three-term limit, according to the COMELEC,
has been specifically provided in RA No. 7160, and RA No. 9164 merely restated the three-term
limitation. It further asserts that laws which are not penal in character may be applied retroactively
when expressly so provided and when it does not impair vested rights. As there is no vested right to
public office, much less to an elective post, there can be no valid objection to the alleged retroactive
application of RA No. 9164.
The COMELEC also argues that the RTC’s invalidation of RA No. 9164 essentially involves the wisdom
of the law – the aspect of the law that the RTC has no right to inquire into under the constitutional
separation of powers principle. The COMELEC lastly argues that there is no violation of the one
subject-one title rule, as the matters covered by RA No. 9164 are related; the assailed provision is
actually embraced within the title of the law.
Issue:Whether the challenged proviso is unconstitutional.
Ruling: Yes. The constitutional challenge must fail for a more fundamental reason – the
respondents’ retroactivity objection does not involve a violation of any constitutional standard. In the
present case, the respondents never raised due process as an issue. But even assuming that they
did, the respondents themselves concede that there is no vested right to public office.17 As the
COMELEC correctly pointed out, too, there is no vested right to an elective post in view of the
uncertainty inherent in electoral exercises.
Aware of this legal reality, the respondents theorized instead that they had a right to be voted upon
by the electorate without being burdened by a law that effectively rendered them ineligible to run for
their incumbent positions. Again, the RTC agreed with this contention.
 Page 289 of 601

We do not agree with the RTC, as we find no such right under the Constitution; if at all, this claimed
right is merely a restatement of a claim of vested right to a public office. What the Constitution
clearly provides is the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications for elective local posts;18 thus,
the question of eligibility for an elective local post is a matter for Congress, not for the courts, to
decide. We dealt with a strikingly similar issue in Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections19 where we
ruled that SK membership – which was claimed as a property right within the meaning of the
Constitution – is a mere statutory right conferred by law. Montesclaros instructively tells us:
A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a "[P]ublic office is a
public trust." No one has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested right to an
expectancy of holding a public office. In Cornejo v. Gabriel, decided in 1920, the Court already ruled:
Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to
consider an office a "property." It is, however, well settled x xx that a public office is not
property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is a
public trust or agency. x xx The basic idea of the government x xx is that of a popular representative
government, the officers being mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or
set of men has a proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts office
pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people he represents.
The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution is found under its Section 2,
Article III, which provides: "Nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws." Essentially, the equality guaranteed under this clause is equality under the same
conditions and among persons similarly situated. It is equality among equals, not
similarity of treatment of persons who are different from one another on the basis of
substantial distinctions related to the objective of the law; when things or persons are
different in facts or circumstances, they may be treated differently in law.20
Appreciation of how the constitutional equality provision applies inevitably leads to the
conclusion that no basis exists in the present case for an equal protection challenge. The
law can treat barangay officials differently from other local elective officials because the
Constitution itself provides a significant distinction between these elective officials with
respect to length of term and term limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the
Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution provides for a three-year term and
three-term limit for local elective officials, it left the length of term and the application of
the three-term limit or any form of term limitation for determination by Congress
 Page 290 of 601

through legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment recognize substantial
distinctions, it recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform
treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under these conditions.
From another perspective, we see no reason to apply the equal protection clause as a
standard because the challenged proviso did not result in any differential treatment
between barangay officials and all other elective officials. This conclusion proceeds from
our ruling on the retroactivity issue that the challenged proviso does not involve any
retroactive application.

116) Short Title:Yrasegui vs. Philippine Airlines (G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008)
Long Title:G.R. No. 168081 October 17, 2008
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
Facts:Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of Philippine
Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He stands five feet and eight inches (5’8") with a large body frame. The proper
weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being
166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual1 of PAL.
The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised him to go on an
extended vacation leave from December 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to address his weight concerns.
Apparently, petitioner failed to meet the company’s weight standards, prompting another leave
without pay from March 5, 1985 to November 1985.
After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to return to work. But petitioner’s weight
problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal weight. In line with
company policy, he was removed from flight duty effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was
formally requested to trim down to his ideal weight and report for weight checks on several dates. He
was also told that he may avail of the services of the company physician should he wish to do so. He
was advised that his case will be evaluated on July 3, 1989.2On February 25, 1989, petitioner
underwent weight check. It was discovered that he gained, instead of losing, weight. He was
overweight at 215 pounds, which is 49 pounds beyond the limit. Consequently, his off-duty status
 Page 291 of 601

was retained.On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon personally visited petitioner
at his residence to check on the progress of his effort to lose weight. Petitioner weighed 217 pounds,
gaining 2 pounds from his previous weight.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of
company standards on weight requirements. He was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge
within which to file his answer and submit controverting evidence.8
On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer.9 Notably, he did not deny being overweight.
What he claimed, instead, is that his violation, if any, had already been condoned by PAL
since "no action has been taken by the company" regarding his case "since 1988." He
also claimed that PAL discriminated against him because "the company has not been fair
in treating the cabin crew members who are similarly situated."
On December 8, 1992, a clarificatory hearing was held where petitioner manifested that he was
undergoing a weight reduction program to lose at least two (2) pounds per week so as to attain his
ideal weight.10
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal
weight, "and considering the utmost leniency" extended to him "which spanned a period covering a
total of almost five (5) years," his services were considered terminated "effective immediately.
LA
Petitioner was illegally dismissed. Respondent must reinstate him to his former position or
substantially equivalent one, and to pay him backwages and attorney’s fees. The Labor Arbiter held
that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of
petitioner.15 However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since
his weight did not hamper the performance of his duties.16 Assuming that it did, petitioner could be
transferred to other positions where his weight would not be a negative factor.
NLRC
Affirmed LA decision. According to the NLRC, "obesity, or the tendency to gain weight uncontrollably
regardless of the amount of food intake, is a disease in itself."26 As a consequence, there can be no
intentional defiance or serious misconduct by petitioner to the lawful order of PAL for him to lose
weight.
CA
The CA opined that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC because it "looked at
wrong and irrelevant considerations"33 in evaluating the evidence of the parties. Contrary to the NLRC
 Page 292 of 601

ruling, the weight standards of PAL are meant to be a continuing qualification for an employee’s
position.34 The failure to adhere to the weight standards is an analogous cause for the dismissal of an
employee under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code in relation to Article 282(a).
Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA held that the weight standards of PAL are
reasonable.38 Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the
prescribed weight standards.39 It is obvious that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by
petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.40
Issue:Whether the obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) of the Labor
Code.
Ruling:In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims that obesity is
a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible
for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during
the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that "[t]he issue is could I
bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now."49
True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing him "a lot of expenses."50 However, petitioner
has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company physician, per
the advice of PAL.51 He chose to ignore the suggestion. In fact, he repeatedly failed to report when
required to undergo weight checks, without offering a valid explanation. Thus, his fluctuating weight
indicates absence of willpower rather than an illness.
To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause
guaranty86 of the Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental interference,
the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked.87 Put differently, the Bill
of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals.88 Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment,89 which is the
source of our equal protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal
protection erects no shield against private conduct, however discriminatory or
wrongful.90 Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection
guarantee.91
We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative agencies, like the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC, are accorded respect, even finality.83 The reason is simple: administrative agencies are experts
in matters within their specific and specialized jurisdiction.84 But the principle is not a hard and fast
rule. It only applies if the findings of facts are duly supported by substantial evidence. If it can be
 Page 293 of 601

shown that administrative bodies grossly misappreciated evidence of such nature so as to compel a
conclusion to the contrary, their findings of facts must necessarily be reversed. Factual findings of
administrative agencies do not have infallibility and must be set aside when they fail the test of
arbitrariness.85
Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably misappreciated evidence. We thus annul their
findings.

117) Short Title:Gobenciong vs. CA (G.R. No. 159883, March 31, 2008)
Long Title:G.R. No. 159883 March 31, 2008
DR. PEDRO F. GOBENCIONG, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), REGIONAL DIRECTOR of
the Department of Health, Region VIII, and FLORA DELA PEÑA, Respondents.
Facts:Gobenciong held the position of Administrative Officer IV in Eastern Visayas Regional Medical
Center (EVRMC). EVRMC issued a Requisition and Issue Voucher for one unit hemoanalyzer with a
unit price quotation of PhP 1,195,998.

After public bidding where Alvez Commercial, Inc. (Alvez) emerged as the best bidder, a Purchase
Order was issued. As hospital documents would show, the equipment appeared to have been
delivered and accepted by Engr. Jose M. Jocano, Jr. and Supply Officer III Crisologo R. Babula, per
Certification of Acceptance that they signed. It was also made to appear in a COA Inspection Report
 Page 294 of 601

that Jocano and Gobenciong had certified as correct the finding/recommendation that the two
nebulizers and the hemoanalyzer had been inspected as to quality and quantity as per Sales Invoice.

A Disbursement Voucher for PhP 1,161,817.35 was prepared. Gobenciong, among others, signed the
voucher to attest that the expense covered thereby was necessary, lawful, and incurred under his
direct supervision. Appended to it were documents adverted to earlier, such as the Sales Invoice,
Certification of Acceptance, COA Inspection Report, the Purchase Order, and Requisition and Issue
Voucher. A check was then issued in favor of Alvez.

The instant case started when Dr. Flora dela Peña, Head of the EVRMC Laboratory Unit, filed an
administrative complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, charging Gobenciong, Jocano,
Babula and three others with Falsification of Public Documents and Misconduct. She also filed a
complaint with the DOH which formed a committee to look into the alleged anomalous purchase of
the expensive hemoanalyzer. The investigation culminated in the filing by the DOH Secretary of a
Formal Charge for Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service against Gobenciong and three others.

The Deputy Ombudsman placed Gobenciong under preventive suspension and directed the proper
DOH officer to immediately implement the Order.

Gobenciong wrote Dr. Lilia O. Arteche, DOH Regional Director for Region VIII, requesting the
deferment of the implementation of the preventive suspension until after his to-be-filed motion for
reconsideration shall have been resolved. However, Arteche informed him through a memorandum
that his six-month preventive suspension shall take effect immediately upon the receipt of said
memorandum.

Gobenciong sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension but due to the virtual denial of his
plea for the deferment of his preventive suspension, Gobenciong, without awaiting the Ombudsman’s
action on his motion for reconsideration, went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a plea for
the issuance of a TRO.
 Page 295 of 601

CA issued a TRO enjoining then Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas Arturo Mojica and Arteche from
implementing the order of preventive suspension.

The TRO, while duly served, evidently went unheeded, for Gobenciong failed to get back to his work
or get his salary until after the lapse of the suspension period. This turn of events impelled
Gobenciong to move that Arteche and Mojica be cited in contempt. The CA, however, did not act on
the motion.

Ruling of the Ombudsman

The Ombudsman found Gobenciong et al guilty, mainly predicated on the finding that the
Certification of Acceptance and the COA Inspection Report, among other documents, were falsified,
there being no actual delivery on of the covered hemoanalyzer. There was thus no legal basis for the
issuance of the Disbursement Voucher.

The Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas directed the DOH Regional Office No. VIII to immediately
implement its Decision and impose the penalties decreed therein, which, in the case of Gobenciong,
was one-year suspension from office without pay.

Ruling of the CA

1st case: The CA denied Gobenciong’s petition for certiorari assailing the directive, and the
implementation thereof, for the immediate execution of his preventive suspension. This was on the
strength of Section 24 in relation to Sec. 27 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989. The interplay of both sections expressly empowers the Ombudsman, under
defined conditions, to preventively suspend, for a maximum period of six months, all but three
categories of public officials and employees under investigation by his office and to direct the
immediate implementation of the corresponding suspension order.

2nd case: On the postulate that the disciplinary authority of the Office of the Ombudsman is merely
recommendatory, the CA rendered a decision partially granting Gobenciong’s appeal. Invoked
was Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, which the appellate court viewed as declaring that the
 Page 296 of 601

disciplinary power of the Ombudsman in administrative cases is limited only to recommending to the
disciplining authority the appropriate penalty to be meted out. This means that the Ombudsman
cannot compel the DOH to impose the penalty recommended in its decision.

Issue:Whether the equal protection clause has been violated.

Ruling: We are not persuaded. Gobenciong parlays the theory that the application of RA 6770,
which authorizes the Ombudsman to impose a six-month preventive suspension, instead of the civil
service provisions of the Administrative Code, which limits the disciplining authority’s prerogative to
only imposing a prevention suspension for a period not exceeding 90 days, violates the equal
protection guarantee.
We are not persuaded. At its most basic, the equal protection clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination; it does not demand absolute equality.
The fundamental guarantee is not breached by a law which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class and provided further that
there is a substantial distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
not.27 In Miranda v. Sandiganbayan, where the issue of equal protection was raised, albeit the 60-day
preventive suspension limit under the Local Government Code was involved, we ruled against any
violation of the constitutional proscription against the equal protection of the law, thus:
In essence, [the dissenting opinion] avers that there is no substantial distinction between preventive
suspensions handed down by the Ombudsman and those imposed by executive officials. On the
contrary, there is a world of difference between them. The Constitution has endowed the
Ombudsman with unique safeguards to ensure immunity from political pressure. Among these
statutory protections are fiscal autonomy, fixed term of office and classification as an impeachable
officer. This much was recognized by this Court in the earlier cited case of Garcia v. Mojica.
Moreover, there are stricter safeguards for imposition of preventive suspension by the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman Act of 1989 requires that the Ombudsman determine: (1) that the evidence of guilt
is strong; and (2) that any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the charge against such
officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
 Page 297 of 601

118) Short Title:Quinto vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009 and February 22, 2010)
Long Title:G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
Facts:The assailed Decision granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Eleazar P.
Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. and declared as unconstitutional the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369,2 Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code3 and
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678,4 mainly on the ground that they violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution and suffer from overbreadth. The assailed Decision thus paved
the way for public appointive officials to continue discharging the powers, prerogatives and functions
of their office notwithstanding their entry into the political arena.
The assailed Decision struck down Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act (RA) 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, on
the following grounds:
(1) They violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because of the differential
treatment of persons holding appointive offices and those holding elective positions;
(2) They are overbroad insofar as they prohibit the candidacy of all civil servants holding
appointive posts: (a) without distinction as to whether or not they occupy high/influential
positions in the government, and (b) they limit these civil servants’ activity regardless of
whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or whether they be in the national,
municipal or barangay level; and
(3) Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right of
these public appointive officials.
 Page 298 of 601

Issue: Whether Section 4(a) of Resoution 8678 and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code violate
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Ruling: We grant the motions for reconsideration. We now rule that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678,
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13
of RA 9369 are not unconstitutional, and accordingly reverse our December 1, 2009 Decision.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended
to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that
all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within
such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.
Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8,
Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly
prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any election except to
vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are
obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators
deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their
tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those
occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom
of this classification.
 Page 299 of 601

Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-à-vis
appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons
belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is, thus, not infringed.26
The case at bar is a crass attempt to resurrect a dead issue. The miracle is that our assailed Decision
gave it new life. We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quietamovere. This
doctrine, which is really "adherence to precedents," mandates that once a case has been decided one
way, then another case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same
manner.

Short Title:International School Alliance of Educators vs. Quisumbing [G.R. No. 128845, 333 SCRA
13 (2000)]
119) Long Title:G.R. No. 128845 June 1, 2000
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and
Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of
Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the Superintendent of
International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.
 Page 300 of 601

Facts:Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private
respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more
than their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees
should be given equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long honored in this
jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on fundamental notions of justice. That is the principle we
uphold today.1âwphi1.nêt
Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree
732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic
personnel and other temporary residents.1 To enable the School to continue carrying out its
educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree
authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either
locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise
applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be
enacted for the protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the
same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine
whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire:
a. What is one's domicile?
b. Where is one's home economy?
c. To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d. Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School
responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines?2
Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is classified as
a local hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire.The School grants foreign-hires certain
benefits not accorded local-hires.1avvphi1 These include housing, transportation, shipping costs,
taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent
(25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic
disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited
tenure.
When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner
International School Alliance of Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining
representative of all faculty members"4 of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between
 Page 301 of 601

foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be
included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.
On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting
Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in
favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this
Court.
Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to
Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
Issue:Whether the union can invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim.
Ruling:The Acting Secretary upheld the point of hire classification for the distinction in the salary
rates.It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the
laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A
classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the
same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former
enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be
given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of the
School.7
We cannot agree.
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and
laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution8 in the Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities."
The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.
International law, which springs from general principles of law,9 likewise proscribes discrimination.
General principles of law include principles of equity, 10
i.e., the general principles of fairness and
justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. 11
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 12
the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 13
the International Convention on
 Page 302 of 601

the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 14

the Convention against Discrimination in
Education, 15
the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation 16
— all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness
and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its
national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital,
inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution 17
specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These
conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace — the factory, the office or the field — but
include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
The Constitution 18
also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all."
Similarly, the Labor Code 19
provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless
of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the
State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities,
closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. 20

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code.

While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an
enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires
and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation
factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in
salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately
compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.
The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," 25
"to
afford labor full protection." 26
The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations
between labor and capital. 27
These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with
public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the
common good. 28
Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts
will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.
 Page 303 of 601

120) Short Title:Almonte vs. Vasquez (G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995)
Long Title:[G.R. No. 95367. May 23, 1995.]

COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE, VILLAMOR C. PEREZ, NERIO ROGADO, and ELISA

RIVERA, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and CONCERNED
CITIZENS, Respondents.
Facts:This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena ducestecum
and orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring petitioners NerioRogado and Elisa Rivera, as
chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988" and
all evidence such as vouchers from enforcing his orders.

Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of
the EIIB’s Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena ducestecum was issued by the
Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds
representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter,
purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed
to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government offices, including the Office of
the Ombudsman.chanro
The Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman’s office, Jose F. Saño, found the comments
unsatisfactory, being "unverified and plying only on generalizations without meeting specifically the
points raised by complainant as constitutive of the alleged anomalies." 3 He, therefore, asked for
authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. Anticipating the grant of his request, he issued a
subpoena 4 to petitioners Almonte and Perez, requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits and
the affidavits of their witnesses, as well as a subpoena ducestecum 5 to the Chief of the EIIB’s
Accounting Division ordering him to bring "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the
year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988."
Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved to quash the subpoena and the subpoena ducestecum. In his
Order dated June 15, 1990, 6 respondent Ombudsman granted the motion to quash the subpoena in
view of the fact that there were no affidavits filed against petitioners. But he denied their motion to
quash the subpoena ducestecum. He ruled that petitioners were not being forced to produce
 Page 304 of 601

evidence against themselves, since the subpoena ducestecum was directed to the Chief Accountant,
petitioner NerioRogado. In addition the Ombudsman ordered the Chief of the Records Section of the
EIIB, petitioner Elisa Rivera, to produce before the investigator "all documents relating to Personnel
Service Funds, for the year 1988, and all documents, salary vouchers for the whole plantilla of the
EIIB for 1988, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof."

Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved for a reconsideration, arguing that Rogado and Rivera were
EIIB employees under their supervision and that the Ombudsman was doing indirectly what he could
not do directly, i.e., compelling them (petitioners Almonte and Perez) to produce evidence against
themselves.
Petitioners’ motion was denied in respondent Ombudsman’s order dated, August 6, 1990. hence, this
petition which questions the orders of June 15, 1990 and August 6, 1990 of respondent Ombudsman.

To put this case in perspective it should be stated at the outset that it does not concern a
demand by a citizen for information under the freedom of information guarantee of the
Constitution. 7 Rather it concerns the power of the Office of the Ombudsman to obtain
evidence in connection with an investigation conducted by it vis-a-vis the claim of
privilege of an agency of the Government.
Issue:Whether there was a violation of petitioners’ right to the equal protection of the laws.
Ruling:No. . Petitioners complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can
only hale respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully
disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to
start an investigation. In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is
provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of
complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-
known reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As
this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other
investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction
are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss
investigations held against them. 31 On the other hand complainants are more often than not poor
and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers.
 Page 305 of 601

MODULE 2-B. EQUAL PROTECTION

 Applicability, Substantial Distinctions, Discrimination and Classification of Persons Protected

121) Short Title:Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 132922,
April 21, 1998)

Full Title:TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES,

INC. and GMA NETWORK, INC., petitioners,vs.THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.

Facts:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an
organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be
without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show
that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law.
Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the
constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in
the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.

Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:
“Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the
“Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the
area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio
broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time,
free of charge, during the period of campaign.”

Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure
print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air
time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles
out radio and television stations to provide free air time.
 Page 306 of 601

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing
COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial
election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this
year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television
stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free
air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it
lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this year’s elections, it
stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes
of prime time daily for such.

Issue/s:
(1) Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the
equal protection of the laws.

(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of
law and without just compensation.

Rulings:
(1) No.
Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is
licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals
who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting
companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through
which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary
privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate
broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public
funds in licensing and supervising them.
In addition, The basic flaw in petitioner's argument is that it assumes that the provision for
COMELEC Time constitutes the use and operation of the stations of the GMA Network,
Inc., This is not so. Under sec. 92 of B.P. Blg. 881, the COMELEC does not take over the
 Page 307 of 601

operation of radio and television stations but only the allocation of air time to the
candidates for the purpose of ensuring, among other things, equal opportunity, time, and
the right to reply as mandated by the Constitution.
Because, the COMELEC Time and COMELEC Space are about the only means through
which candidates can advertise their qualifications and programs of government. More
than merely depriving their qualifications and programs of government. More than merely depriving
candidates of time for their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time unless
paid by the government would clearly deprive the people of their right to know. Art III,
§7 of the Constitution provides that "the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized," while Art. XII, §6 states that "the use of property
bears a social function [and] the right to own, establish, and operate economic
enterprises [is] subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to
intervene when the common good so demands."

Therefore, Petitioners' assertion that sec. 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 denies them the equal protection of the
law has no basis. In addition, their plea that sec. 92 (free air time) and sec. 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646
(ban on paid political ads) should be invalidated would pave the way for a return to the old regime
where moneyed candidates could monopolize media advertising to the disadvantage of candidates
with less resources. That is what Congress tried to reform in 1987 with the enactment of R.A. No.
6646. We are not free to set aside the judgment of Congress, especially in light of the recent failure
of interested parties to have the law repealed or at least modified.

(2) No.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as
against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space
they may provide is likewise without merit. This is because, the government spends public
funds for the allocation and regulation of the broadcast industry, which it does not do in
the case of the print media. Thus, to require the radio and television broadcast industry
to provide free air time for the COMELEC Time is a fair exchange for what the industry
gets.
 Page 308 of 601

And, as radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, as the air lanes
themselves 'are not property because they cannot be appropriated for the benefit of any
individual,’ that means neither the State nor the stations own the air lanes. Therefore, no
private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

122) Short Title:Dumlao vs. COMELEC (95 SCRA 392)

Full Title:PATRICIO DUMLAO,ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Facts:
Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retiredfrom his
office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. In 1980, he filed for
reelection to the same office. Meanwhile,Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law
provides, among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run
for office.Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation hence
unconstitutional.In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.

His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two however have
different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other
provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign,
and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from running for public office as well as the
provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation
would already disqualify them from office.

Issue:
Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.

Ruling: No
The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case should have never been merged.
Dumlao’s issue is different from Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet
 Page 309 of 601

all the requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be
followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely:
(1) the existence of an appropriate case;
(2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the
case.

In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.

The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public
office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already
disqualify them from office as null and void. The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of
equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the
laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and
real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another
class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly
classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject
to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that
candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if
applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the
Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the
emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it
might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.

Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective
local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below
65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a
good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree. But, in the case of a 65-year old
elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is
reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for
in the challenged provision.
 Page 310 of 601

123) Short Title:De Guzman vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 129118, July 19, 2000)
Full Title:AGRIPINO A. DE GUZMAN, JR., et al., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of
Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voters Registration Act
of 1996".

SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular
city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the
approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or
municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the
original congressional district.

Petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, were reassigned to
different stations by the COMELEC.

Petitioners then contend that the said law is unconstitutional because it violates the equal
protection clause guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution because it singles out the City
and Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the
same city or municipality for more than four (4) years. They maintain that there is no
substantial distinction between them and other COMELEC officials, and therefore, there
is no valid classification to justify the objective of the provision of law under attack.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 44 of RA 8189 violates the equal protection clause.

Ruling: No.
 Page 311 of 601

The "equal protection clause" of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification
under the following conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.

After a careful study, the ineluctable conclusion is that the classification under Section
44 of RA 8189 satisfies the aforestated requirements.

The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election officials by
preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of
assignment"does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

In Lutz vs. Araneta, it was held that "the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to
a policy of ‘all or none’". This is so for underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid
classification.It may be true that all the other officers of COMELEC referred to by
petitioners are exposed to the same evils sought to be addressed by the statute.
However, in this case, it can be discerned that the legislature thought the noble purpose
of the law would be sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of
corruption than by breaking up each and every link thereof. Verily, under Section 3(n) of RA
8189, election officers are the highest officials or authorized representatives of the COMELEC in a city
or municipality. It is safe to say that without the complicity of such officials, large scale anomalies in
the registration of voters can hardly be carried out.

Moreover, to require the COMELEC to reassign all employees (connected with the registration of
voters) who have served at least four years in a given city or municipality would entail a lot of
administrative burden on the part of the COMELEC.Neither does Section 44 of RA 8189 infringe the
security of tenure of petitioners nor unduly deprive them of due process of law.
The petition is dismissed and upheld the constitutionality of Section 44 of RA 8189.

124) Short Title: Ceniza vs. COMELEC (96 SCRA 763)

 Page 312 of 601

Full Title:RAMON B. CENIZA, FEDERICO C. CABILAO, JR., NELSON J. ROSAL and

ALEJANDRO R. ALINSUG, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, and NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.

Facts:
The Interim Batasang Pambansa enacted Batas Blg. 51 providing for local elections on
January 30, 1980. The said legislation classified the chartered cities based on the annual
income of each city. The highly urbanized city (with an annual regular derived from
infrastructure and general funds of not less than forty million pesos (P40,000,000.00)) and
component city. In addition, “the registered voter of a component city may be entitled to
vote in the election of the officials of a province of which the city is a component, if its
charter provides” while “voters registered in a highurbanized city shall not participate
nor vote in the election of the officials of the province in which the highly urbanized city
is geographically located.”
To implement this ACT, the COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which included a list of cities
whose registered voters were not allowed to vote for provincial officials.
The City of Mandaue, not having an annual regular income of not less than 40 million, is
classified as a component city and its registered voters cannot participate in the election
of the provincial officials of the Province of Cebu, except to be a candidate, as expressly
provided in the city's charter (RA 5519).
Sec. 96. of R.A. 5519: Participation of voters in provincial election. The qualified voters
of the city shall not be entitled to vote in any election for the offices of the Provincial
Governor, Vice-Governor, and Members of the Provincial Board of the Province of Cebu, but
any of such qualified voters can be a candidate for any provincial office.

Issue:
Whether or not the assailed legislation violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Ruling: No
The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the
same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates
neither the Constitution nor the voter's right of suffrage.
 Page 313 of 601

The equal protection of the law contemplates equality in the enjoyment of similar rights
and privileges granted by law. It would have been discriminatory and a denial of the
equal protection of the law if the statute prohibited an individual or group of voters in
the city from voting for provincial officials while granting it to another individual or
groups of voters in the same city.
Neither can it be considered an infringement upon the petitioners' rights of suffrage
since the Constitution confers no right to a voter in a city to vote for the provincial
officials of the province where the city is located. Their right is limited to the right to vote
for elective city officials in local elections which the questioned statues neither withdraw
nor restrict.

Additional note:
 the regular annual income of a given city is substantial distinction for classification. The revenue
of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively
independent economic, social and political unit. Thus, the equal protection of the laws in not
violated.
 The city of Mandaue came into existence. In 1969, the constitutional requirement that the
creation, alteration, etc. of a city, province, etc. is subject to a plebiscite only came into being
when the 1973 Constitution was enacted and therefore cannot be applied retroactively.

125) Short Title:League of Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 176951, April 12, 2011)
Full Title:LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), (represented by LCP National
President Jerry P. Treñas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry
P. Treñas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer), Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
(Municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte; Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu; Municipality of
Catbalogan, Province of Western Samar; Municipality of Tandag, Province of Surigao del Sur;
Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar; and Municipality of Tayabas, Province of
Quezon), Respondents.

Facts:
 Page 314 of 601

During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities intocities.
However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.

During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 which took effecton June
30, 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasingthe annual
income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 millionto P100 million. After
the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12thCongress adopted Joint Resolution
No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 millionincome requirements in RA 9009 the 24
municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approvedin the 11th Congress. However, the 12th
Congress ended without the Senate approvingJointResolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the
House of Representatives re-adopted JointResolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded
it to the Senate for approval.
However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution.

Following the advice ofSenator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective
sponsors,individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting
allthe 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009. On December22,
2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approvedthe
cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on June 7,2007. The
cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July2007 without the
President's signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to holdplebiscites to determine
whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of theconversion of their municipality
into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declarethe Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, aswell as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesaleconversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share
of existing cities in the InternalRevenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of
internal revenue setaside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
 Page 315 of 601

Ruling:
1. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.

2. Yes. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills inthe
11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of acityhood bill
in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipalityfrom another for the
purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill inthe 11th Congress does not
affect or determine the level of income of a municipality.

Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annualincome
than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classificationcriterion −
mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related tothe purpose of the
law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from convertinginto cities.

During the 11th Congress, 57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into componentcities were
filed before the House of Representatives. However, Congress acted only on 33 bills.
It did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress,R.A. No.
9009 became effective revising Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Itincreasedthe income
requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from P20 million annual incometo P100 million
locally-generated income. In the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalitiesfiled, through their
respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Each of the cityhood billscontained a common provision
exempting the particular municipality from the 100 millionincome requirement imposed by R.A. No.
9009.

Are the cityhood laws converting 16municipalities into cities constitutional?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

November 18, 2008 Ruling

 Page 316 of 601

No. The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the City Laws is unconstitutional becausesec.
10, Art. X of the Constitution requires that such exemption must be written into the LGCand not into
any other laws. “The Cityhood Laws violate sec. 6, Art. X of the Constitutionbecause they prevent a
fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local governmentunits.” “The criteria, as prescribed
in sec. 450 of the LGC, must be strictly followed becausesuch criteria prescribed by law, are material
in determining the “just share” of localgovernment units (LGUs) in national taxes.” (League of Cities
of the Philippines v. Comelec GRNo. 176951, November 18, 2008)

March 31, 2009 Ruling

No. The SC denied the first Motion for Reconsideration. 7-5 vote.

April 28, 2009 Ruling

No. The SC En Banc, by a split vote (6-6), denied a second motion for reconsideration.

December 21, 2009 Ruling

Yes. The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008 decision and declared asconstitutional the
Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities intocities. It said that based on
Congress’ deliberations and clear legislative intent was that thethen pending cityhood bills would be
outside the pale of the minimum income requirement ofPhP100 million that Senate Bill No. 2159
proposes; and RA 9009 would not have anyretroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are
concerned. The conversion of a municipalityinto a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but
not its property as such, it added.
The Court held that the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen municipalities by thecityhood laws
rests on substantial distinction.
The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were qualified cityhood applicants before theenactment of
RA 9009. To impose on them the much higher income requirement after whatthey have gone
through would appear to be indeed unfair. “Thus, the imperatives of fairnessdictate that they should
be given a legal remedy by which they should be allowed to prove that
they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under theLGC of
1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009. (GR No. 176951, League of Cities of thePhilippines v.
COMELEC; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GRNo. 178056, League of
Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, December 21, 2009)
 Page 317 of 601

NOTE: TheNovember 18, 2008 ruling already became final and executory and was recorded in the
SC’sBook of Entries of Judgments on May 21, 2009.)

August 24, 2010 Ruling

No. The SC (voting 7-6) granted the motions for reconsideration of the League of Cities of
thePhilippines (LCP), et al. and reinstated its November 18, 2008 decision declaringunconstitutional
the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities intocities. “Undeniably, the 6-6
vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of 18November 2008, as well as the prior
majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denyingreconsideration. The tie-vote on the second
motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the main decision where there is no prior
decision,” the Court said. In the latestresolution, the Court reiterated its November 18, 2008 ruling
that the Cityhood Laws violatesec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which expressly provides that “no
city…shall be created…except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code.” It stressedthat while all the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in
the LocalGovernment Code, the assailed Cityhood Laws provided an exemption from the
increasedincome requirement for the creation of cities under sec. 450 of the LGC. “The
unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an exemption contrary
to the express language of the Constitution….Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power,
rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution,” the Court held.

The Court further held that “limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the
requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same
income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent
municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it
were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause.” (GR No. 176951, League of Cities of the Philippines v.
Comelec; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 178056, League of
Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec, August 24, 2010)

February 15, 2011 Ruling

Yes, the laws are constitutional. The February 15, 2011 resolution is the fourth ruling since the
 Page 318 of 601

High Court first resolved the Cityhood case in 2008.

April 12, 2011 Ruling

Yes! The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. “We should not ever lose sight of the fact
that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending
during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the [Local
Government Code] LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress
undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded.
Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and
unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of
Congress,” the SC said.
The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government units
covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009, which
imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million for the creation of cities.

“The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was
well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those
covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001,
when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt
the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the
House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to
Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001
from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the
said Joint Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded the same for approval to the
Senate, which again failed to prove it.

Eventually, the conversion bills of respondents were individually filed in the Lower House
and were all unanimously and favorably voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the
bills were also unanimously approved. The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that
the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express
articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception,
 Page 319 of 601

from the coverage of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by necessity, the LCG, were
amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the
exemption clauses.”

The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local
sources under RA 9009 was arbitrary. “While the Constitution mandates that the creation
of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot
be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the
LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original
thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and
the concomitant national growth.” (GR No. 176951, League of City of the Philippines v.
COMELEC; GR No. 177499, League of City of the Philippines v. COMELEC: GR No. 178056, League of
City of the Philippines v. COMELEC, April 12, 2011)

126) Short Title: Ichong vs. Hernandez (101 Phil 1155)

Full Title:LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer
of Manila, respondents

Facts:
A law, RA No. 1180 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business" was enacted with an
effect of nationalizing the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are:
(1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against
associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly
owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the
retail trade;
(2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said
business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their
licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in
case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration
of term in case of juridical persons;
 Page 320 of 601

(3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States;
(4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for
violationof the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws
relating to trade, commerce and industry;
(5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the
retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business;
(6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for
registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses,
giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their
offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and
(7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die,
to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

Petitioner Inchong, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien resident
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No.
1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional,
and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and
municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions.
Inchong attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
(1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law;
(2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof;
(3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines;
(4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru
hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity
to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and
Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.

In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that:
(1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is
authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival;
(2) the Act has only one subject embraced in the title;
 Page 321 of 601

(3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed;

(4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not
impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 1180 is unconstitutional because it denies alien residents the equal protection of
the laws.

Ruling: No.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation,
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It
does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.

And the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are
treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and
unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate
prerogative and it can not declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection
established by the Constitution. Because the main objective of the legislature in passing
the law was to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by
alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from
dominance and control.
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and
white. Between the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and
control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and the
year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official statistics
 Page 322 of 601

unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of the
retail trade.

And the mere fact that alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien
and the national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth
or his adopted country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the
lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor
immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this
country wherein he is only temporarily staying to makes his living.

127) Short Title:Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City (22 SCRA 603)
Full Title:ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE TREASURER OF
ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as
Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, defendants-appellees.

Facts:
The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing “on
any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in
Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to 1% per export sale to the United States of
America and other foreign countries.”
Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964
for P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of P12,087.50.
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its
Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for
being violative of the equal protection clause.
On the other hand, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city’s power
to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited
constitutional limitations.

Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance is unconstitutional and violate the equal protection clause.
 Page 323 of 601

Ruling: Yes
The ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and
does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification
is reasonable where:
(1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
(2) these are germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future
conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present;
(4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.

The questioned ordinance does not meet the requisites for a reasonable classification, as
the ordinance taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. and none other. But then, at the time of the taxing ordinance’s enactment, Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc., was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc.
To be reasonable, it should be applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing
ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it
is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because
the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to
be levied upon.

 Administration of Justice

128) Short Title:People vs. Hernandez [99 Phil. 515 (1956)]

Full Title:THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AMADO V.
HERNANDEZ, ET AL., accused, AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Facts:
Amado V. Hernandez and several others were accused of the crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, arsons and robberies. The prosecution maintained that Hernandez is
charged with rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and robberies, for which the
 Page 324 of 601

capital punishment may be imposed. The defense contends, among other things, that
rebellion can not be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.
The lower court sentenced Hernandez merely to life imprisonment.
A petition for bail was filed by Amado Hernandez on 28 December 1953, which was denied
by a resolution of the Supreme Court dated 2 February 1954.
A similar petition for bail was filed by Hernandez on June 26, 1954 and renewed on 22
December 1955.

Issue:
Whether or not equal protection was observed in the administration of justice.

Ruling: Yes
Inasmuch as the acts specified in Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code constitute one single crime, it
follows necessarily that said acts offer no occasion for the application of Article 48, which requires
therefor the commission of, at least, two crimes. Hence, the Supreme court has never in the
past convicted any person of the “complex crime of rebellion with murder”. What is more,
it appears that in every one of the cases of rebellion published in the Philippine Reports (US vs.
Lagnason, 3 Phil. 472; US vs. Baldello, 3 Phil. 509, US vs. Ayala, 6 Phil. 151; League vs. People, 73
Phil. 155), the defendants therein were convicted of simple rebellion, although they had killed several
persons, sometimes peace officers.
The law punishing rebellion (Article 135, Revised Penal Code) specifically mentions the act of
engaging in war and committing serious violence among its essential elements, thus clearly indicating
that everything done in the prosecution of said war, as a means necessary therefor, is embraced
therein.

National, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the

proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are
divested of their character as “common” offenses and assume the political complexion of
the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be
punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify
the imposition of a graver penalty. The policy of our statutes on rebellion is to consider
 Page 325 of 601

all acts committed in furtherance thereof as constituting only one crime, punishable with
one single penalty.

Further, the settled policy of our laws on rebellion, since the beginning of the century,
has been one of decided leniency, in comparison with the laws enforce during the
Spanish regime.Although the Government has, for the past 5 or 6 years, adopted a more vigorous
course of action in the apprehension of violators of said law and in their prosecution the established
policy of the State, as regards the punishment of the culprits has remained unchanged since 1932.
Furthermore, to deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of guilt is strong; it must
also appear that in case of conviction the defendant’s criminal liability would probably
call for capital punishment.
Thus, in conclusion, under the allegations of the amended information against Hernandez,
the murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of
rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means “necessary” for the
perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the amended
information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such
charge cannot exceed 12 years of prision mayor and a fine of P20,000; and that, in
conformity with the policy of the Supreme Court in dealing with accused persons
amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail.

The ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and, hence, are absorbed by the
same and cannot be punished either separately there from.Indeed,if one act constitutes
two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that
prescribed for each one of said offenses put together.

The reason for this benevolent spirit of Article 48 is readily discernible. When two or
more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than
when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him
for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty
for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the
separate penalties for each offense.
 Page 326 of 601

129) Short Title:People vs. Isinain [85 Phil. 648 (1950)]

Full Title:THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MORO ISNAIN, defendant-
appellant.

Facts:
In the morning of March 7, 1947, Urbano Cruz the encargado of the coconut grove of
Arturo Eustaquio in Zamboanga was informed by the guard that there were 3 persons
stealing coconuts in the plantation.
Upon arriving on the plantation, the group of Cruz saw the 3 persons chopping coconuts
and upon seeing them, the trespassers started to run away.
Cruz fired shots in the air and defendant Isnain stopped and was apprehended.
Before the justice of peace he pleaded guilty of the charge however in the CFI, he
changed his mind.
He admitted to his arrest during the raid but submitted a flimsy excuse that he had merely
gone to the place because he was thirsty and confessed that he had joined the other 2
thieves in order to drink coconut water.
Isnain’s attorney de oficio raised the constitutionality of Art. 310 of the RPC classifying
as qualified theft, the stealing of coconut, as it allegedly punishes the larceny of such
product more heavily than the taking away of similar produce (rice and sugar), and
thereby denies Isnain the equal protection of the laws.

Issue:
Whether or not the harsher penalties in the theft of coconuts (over other objects of theft) renders the
penal law contrary to the constitutional guaranty on equal protection of the law.

Ruling: No.
Although the constitutional guaranty requires the treatment alike of all persons subject
to state legislation in the same place and under the same circumstances and conditions;
the state, as a part of its police power, may exercise a large measure of discretion,
without violating the equal protection guaranty, in creating and defining criminal
offenses, and may make classifications as to persons amenable to punishment, so long as
 Page 327 of 601

the classifications are reasonable and the legislation bears equally on all in the same
class, and, where a reasonable classification is made between persons or corporations,
the persons or corporation in each class may be dealt with in a manner different from
that employed with regard to the persons or corporations in other classes.

In the matter of theft of coconuts, the purpose of the heavier penalty is to encourage and
protect the development of the coconut industry as one of the sources of our national
economy.
Unlike rice and sugarcane farms, coconut groves cannot be efficiently watched because
of the nature of its growth; and without a special measure to protect this kind of
property, it will be, the favourite resort of thieves.
There is therefore, some reason for the special treatment accorded in the industry; and as it cannot
be said that the classification is entirely without basis.

130) Short Title:Chavez vs. PCGG (G.R. 130716, December 9, 1998)

Full Title:FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG) and MAGTANGGOL GUNIGUNDO (in his capacity as chairman of
the PCGG), respondents, GLORIA A. JOPSON, CELNAN A. JOPSON, SCARLET A. JOPSON,
and TERESA A. JOPSON, petitioners-in-intervention.

Facts:
Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated the
prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public
treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's economy," alleges that what impelled him to
bring the action were several news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in
September 1997 referring to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited
in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between
the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.
Chavez, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to
disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) make public any and all negotiations and agreements
pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth.
 Page 328 of 601

He claimed that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of
"paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would
be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. PCGG claimed Chavez’s action is
premature as he has not asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and agreements and that the
proposed terms of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.

Issue:
Whether or not PCGG should disclose public information regarding the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.

Ruling: Yes
The PCGG should disclose public information regarding the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.
The Court held that the "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject provisions of
the Constitution (Sec. 7 [Article III]) have as yet no defined scope and extent. There are no specific
laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state
duty may be obliged. However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions:
(1) national security matters and intelligence information,
(2) trade secrets and banking transactions,
(3) criminal matters, and
(4) other confidential information.

Limitations to the Right:

(1) National Security Matters

At the very least, this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a governmental
privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and
other national security matters. But where there is no need to protect such state secrets, the
privilege may not be invoked to withhold documents and other information, provided that they are
examined "in strict confidence" and given "scrupulous protection." Likewise, information on inter-
government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject
to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.

(2) Trade Secrets and Banking Transactions

 Page 329 of 601

The drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national security matters
and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property
Code and other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Act) are also exempted from compulsory disclosure.

(3) Criminal Matters

Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the
prosecution and the detention of criminals, which courts may nor inquire into prior to such arrest,
detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective law enforcement would be seriously jeopardized by
free public access to, for example, police information regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts
of fugitives, or leads on covert criminal activities.

(4) Other Confidential Information

The Ethical Standards Act further prohibits public officials and employees from using or divulging
"confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made
available to the public."
Other acknowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic correspondence, closed door
Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court.

Furthermore, the Court used the following case:

In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., the Court emphasized that the information sought must be "matters of
public concern," access to which may be limited by law. Similarly, the state policy of full public
disclosure extends only to "transactions involving public interest" and may also be "subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law."

The Court also addressed the following of Executive Orders of then President Cory Aquino:
Executive Order No. 1, promulgated on February 28, 1986, only two (2) days after the Marcoses fled
the country, created the PCGG which was primarily tasked to assist the President in the recovery of
vast government resources allegedly amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives and close associates both here and abroad.
 Page 330 of 601

Under Executive Order No. 2, issued twelve (12) days later, all persons and entities who had
knowledge or possession of ill-gotten assets and properties were warned and, under pain of penalties
prescribed by law, prohibited from concealing, transferring or dissipating them or from otherwise
frustrating or obstructing the recovery efforts of the government.
On May 7, 1986, another directive (EO No. 14) was issued giving additional powers to the PCGG
which, taking into account the overriding considerations of national interest and national survival,
required it to achieve expeditiously and effectively its vital task of recovering ill-gotten wealth.

In the instant case, there is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a
matter of public concern and imbued with public interest. The Court also add that "ill-gotten wealth,"
by its very nature, assumes a public character. Based on the aforementioned Executive Orders, "ill-
gotten wealth" refers to assets and properties purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former
President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates through or as a result of their
improper or illegal use of government funds or properties; or their having taken undue advantage of
their public office; or their use of powers, influences or relationships, "resulting in their unjust
enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines." The assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the government itself.
To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people.

131) Short Title:Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan [111 SCRA 433 (1982)]

Full Title:RUFINO V. NUÑEZ petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:
Information were filed against Rufino V. Nunez before Sandiganbayan on 21 February and 26 March
1979 for the crime of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in
connivance with his co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. Thereafter, on 15 May, upon
being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on constitutional and juridical grounds. A week later, the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration was filed a day later, and was
likewise denied. Nunez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court, claiming
that Presidential Decree 1486, which created the Sandiganbayan, is violative of the due process,
equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution.
 Page 331 of 601

Issue:
Whether or not the trial of the accused, a public official, by the Sandiganbayan unduly discriminates
against the accused, in light of the difference of the procedures (especially appellate) in the
Sandiganbayan vis-a-vis regular courts.

Ruling:No
The Constitution provided for but did not create a special Court, the Sandiganbayan, with
"jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such
other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be
determined by law." It came into existence with the issuance in 1978 of a Presidential Decree.
Classification must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it
must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions
only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.

The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the
Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, i.e. dishonesty in the public service,
the urgency of which cannot be denied. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried
by such court ought to have been aware as far back as 17 January 1973,when the present
Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether petitioner is
a private citizen or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

Further, the omission of the Court of Appeals as intermediate tribunal does not deprive protection of
liberty. The innocence or guilt of an accused in the Sandiganbayan is passed upon by 3-judge court
of its division. Moreover, a unanimous vote is required, failing which "the Presiding Justice shall
designate two other justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them,
forming a division of five justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be
necessary for rendering judgment." If convicted, the Sandiganbayan en banc has the duty if he seeks
a review to see whether any error of law was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment.
 Page 332 of 601

132) Short Title:Gallardo vs. People (G.R. 142030, April 21, 2005)
Full Title:ARTURO GALLARDO, PETER MELCHOR J. ARCHES, ALLAN B. AMPOLOQUIO,
CIRILO N. BACQUIANO, JOSUE M. RODAJE, BENJAMIN R. MACASAET, JR., VICTORINA
DELOS CIENTOS-MIRAL, RODOLFO M. CARTIN, QUIRINA T. SARTE, NORBERTO E.
GOMEZ, GENEFREDO P. ESPINA, NOEL GUINITA, AND OFELIA NACIONAL, Petitioners, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SANDIGANBAYAN, HONORABLE ANIANO DESIERTO in his
official capacity as OMBUDSMAN, AND OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, Respondents.

Facts:
Public Health Workers (PHWs) of Davao del Sur filed letter-complaint for alleged refusal to
appropriate in the municipal budget the amount representing payment of their salaries by the
Municipality of Bansalan headed by Mayor Arturo Gallardo, among others, with the Ombudsman.
Probable cause was found and information was filed stating that Gallardo caused undue injury to
PHW workers. Gallardo requested for reinvestigation. This was granted by Sandiganbayan, However
Ombudsman Desierto recommended his disapproval writing a note “[l]et the court determine if
indeed the evidence cannot stand the judicial scrutiny”.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ground that they were not accorded equal protection of the
law. They contend that similar cases were dismissed by Desierto previously and should be accorded
the same to the case at bar.

Issue:
Whether or not Ombudsman Desierto violated the equal protection rights of the petitioners on the
ground of not uniformly deciding similar cases.

Ruling: No
The equal protection clause requires that the law operates uniformly on all persons
under similar circumstances or that all persons are treated in the same manner, the
conditions not being different, both in privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. It
allows reasonable classification. If the classification is characterized by real and
substantial differences, one class may be treated differently from another.
 Page 333 of 601

The Ombudsman, contrary to the investigating prosecutor’s conclusion, was of the conviction that
petitioners are probably guilty of the offense charged, and for this, he is not required to conduct an
investigation anew. He is merely determining the propriety and correctness of the recommendation
by the investigating prosecutor, i.e., whether probable cause actually exists or not, on the basis of
the findings of fact of the latter. He may agree, fully or partly, or disagree completely with the
investigating prosecutor. Whatever course of action that the Ombudsman may take, whether to
approve or to disapprove the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor, is but an exercise of
his discretionary powers based upon constitutional mandate. Generally, courts should not
interfere in such exercise. It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of
discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it,
save in cases where there is clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Ombudsman which is absent in the case at
hand. Such initiative and independence are inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one,
acts as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of the public service.

In asseverating that petitioners were deprived the equal protection of law since the Ombudsman, in
sixteen (16) previous cases which were similar to the case at bar, dismissed the same. The
Ombudsman dismissed those cases because he believed there were no sufficient grounds for the
accused therein to undergo trial. On the other hand, he recommended the filing of appropriate
information against petitioners because there are ample grounds to hold them for trial. He was only
exercising his power and discharging his duty based upon the constitutional mandate of his office.

These arguments are specious. Petitioners’ submission that they were deprived of due process hinges
on the erroneous assumption that respondent Ombudsman failed to assess and consider the
evidence presented by petitioners when he disapproved the recommendation by the investigating
prosecutor to dismiss the case, and that his ruling was not supported by evidence on record.

 Public Policy

133) Short Title: Quinto vs.COMELEC (G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010)
Full Title: ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
 Page 334 of 601

Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and
Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the
May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No.
8678provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—
a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.

Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they
file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold
appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections,
filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the
afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend
that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two
conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at
a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.
The SC in its 2009 decision penned by Justice Nachura ruled that the said resolution is not violative of
the equal protection clause. Hence this motion for reconsideration.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the provision on the deemed resigned is violative of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not the provision suffers from Overbreadth

Ruling:
 Page 335 of 601

1. No.
The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the participation
of civil service officers and employees in partisan political activities is too plain to be
mistaken. But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes
apply only to civil servants holding apolitical offices. Stated differently, the constitutional ban does
not cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that [t]he civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned 8or
controlled corporations with original charters.] This is because elected public officials, by the very
nature of their office, engage in partisan political activities almost all year round, even outside of the
campaign period. Political partisanship is the inevitable essence of a political office, elective positions
included.

The law does not violate the equal protection clause. Farias ruling on the equal protection
implications of the deemed-resigned provisions cannot be minimalized as mere obiter
dictum.

The legal dichotomy created by the Legislature is a reasonable classification, as there are
material and significant distinctions between the two classes of officials. Substantial
distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials.
The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate.
They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only
upon stringent conditions.On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue
of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their
office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at
the pleasure of the appointing authority.

The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to

the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity,
efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the
rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally
compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
 Page 336 of 601

2. No.
According to the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law are overly broad because they
apply indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive posts, without due regard for the type of
position being held by the employee running for elective office and the degree of influence that may
be attendant thereto.

Such a myopic view obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the
government posed by the partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy: the danger of
systematic abuse perpetuated by a powerful political machine that has amassed the scattered powers
of government workers so as to give itself and its incumbent workers an unbreakable grasp on the
reins of power.
The restriction is valid regardless of the position sought, even for baranggay elections. it is well to
note that from as far back as the enactment of the Omnibus Election Code in 1985, Congress has
intended that these nonpartisan barangay elections be governed by special rules, including a
separate rule on deemed resignations which is found in Section 39 of the Omnibus Election Code. In
any event, even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and the corresponding provision in Section 13 of RA 9369 are general rules that apply
also to elections for nonpartisan public offices, the overbreadth challenge would still be futile.

134.) Short Title: Gutierrez vs. DBM

Full Title: G.R. No. 153266 March 18, 2010
VICTORIA C. GUTIERREZ, JOEL R. PEREZ, ARACELI L. YAMBOT, CORAZON F. SORIANO,
LORNA P. TAMOR, ROMEO S. CONSIGNADO, DIVINA R. SULIT, ESTRELITA F. IRESARE,
ROSALINDA L. ALPAY, AUREA L. ILAGAN AND ALL THE OTHER CONCERNED EMPLOYEES
OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, Petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT, HONORABLE SECRETARY EMILIA T. BONCODIN AND DIRECTOR LUZ
M. CANTOR, Respondents
Facts: These consolidated cases question the inclusion of certain allowances and fringe benefits into
the standardized salary rates for offices in the national government, state universities and colleges,
and local government units as required by the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
and implemented through the challenged National Compensation Circular 59 (NCC 59).
 Page 337 of 601

Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758, called the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 to rationalize the compensation of government
employees. Its Section 12 directed the consolidation of allowances and additional
compensation already being enjoyed by employees into their standardized salary rates.
But it exempted certain additional compensations that the employees may be receiving
from such consolidation. Thus:
Section 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. -- All allowances,
except for representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry
allowances; subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board
government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign
service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation not
otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed
included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional
compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of
July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be
authorized.
Pursuant to the above, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued NCC 59, covering
the offices of the national government, state universities and colleges, and local government units.
NCC 59 enumerated the specific allowances and additional compensations which were deemed
integrated in the basic salaries and these included the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) and Inflation
Connected Allowance (ICA). The DBM re-issued and published NCC 59 on May 3, 2004.
The DBM also issued Corporate Compensation Circular (CCC) 10 dated October 2, 1989, covering all
government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions. The DBM re-
issued this circular and published it. Accordingly, the Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed the
payments of honoraria and other allowances which were deemed integrated into the standardized
salary rates. Employees of government-owned or controlled corporations questioned the validity of
CCC 10 due to its non-publication. In De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, this Court declared CCC 10
ineffective because of such non-publication. Until then, it ordered the COA to pass on audit the
employees’ honoraria which they were receiving prior to the effectivity of R.A. 6758.
Meanwhile, the DBM also issued Budget Circular 2001-03 dated November 12, 2001, clarifying that
only the exempt allowances under Section 12 of R.A. 6758 may continue to be granted the
employees; all others were deemed integrated in the standardized salary rates. Thus, the payment of
 Page 338 of 601

allowances and compensation such as COLA, amelioration allowance, and ICA, among others, which
were already deemed integrated in the basic salary were unauthorized. The Court’s ruling in
subsequent cases involving government-owned or controlled corporations followed the De
Jesus ruling.
On May 16, 2002 employees of the Office of the Solicitor General filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. 153266, questioning the propriety of integrating
their COLA into their standardized salary rates. Employees of other offices of the national
government followed suit. In addition, petitioners in G.R. 159007 questioned the
disallowance of the allowances and fringe benefits that the COA auditing personnel
assigned to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) used to get. Petitioners in
G.R. 173119 questioned the disallowance of the ICA that used to be paid to the officials
and employees of the Insurance Commission. The Court caused the consolidation of the
petitions and treated them as a class suit for all government employees, excluding the
employees of government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial
institutions.
On October 26, 2005 the DBM issued National Budget Circular 2005-502 which provided that all
Supreme Court rulings on the integration of allowances, including COLA, of government employees
under R.A. 6758 applied only to specific government-owned or controlled corporations since the
consolidated cases covering the national government employees are still pending with this Court.
Consequently, the payment of allowances and other benefits to them, such as COLA and ICA,
remained prohibited until otherwise provided by law or ruled by this Court. The circular further said
that all agency heads and other responsible officials and employees found to have authorized the
grant of COLA and other allowances and benefits already integrated in the basic salary shall be
personally held liable for such payment.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the COLA should be deemed integrated into the standardized salary rates of
the concerned government employees by virtue of Section 12 of R.A. 6758;
2. Whether or not the ICA may still be paid to officials and employees of the Insurance
Commission;
3. Whether or not the non-publication of NCC 59 dated September 30, 1989 in the Official
Gazette or newspaper of general circulation nullifies the integration of the COLA into the
standardized salary rates; and
 Page 339 of 601

4. Whether or not the grant of COLA to military and police personnel to the
exclusion of other government employees violates the equal protection clause.
Ruling:
1. YES. At the heart of the present controversy is Section 12 of R.A. 6758. As will be noted from
the first sentence above, "all allowances" were deemed integrated into the standardized
salary rates except the following: (1) representation and transportation allowances; (2)
clothing and laundry allowances; (3) subsistence allowances of marine officers and crew on
board government vessels; (4) subsistence allowances of hospital personnel; (5) hazard pay;
(6) allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and (7) such other additional
compensation not otherwise specified in Section 12 as may be determined by the DBM. But,
while the provision enumerated certain exclusions, it also authorized the DBM to identify such
other additional compensation that may be granted over and above the standardized salary
rates. Delegated rule-making is a practical necessity in modern governance because of the
increasing complexity and variety of public functions. Congress has endowed administrative
agencies like respondent DBM with the power to make rules and regulations to implement a
given legislation and effectuate its policies. Such power is, however, necessarily limited to
what the law provides. Implementing rules and regulations cannot extend the law or expand
its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute belongs to the legislature.
Administrative agencies implement the broad policies laid down in a law by "filling in" only its
details. The regulations must be germane to the objectives and purposes of the law and must
conform to the standards prescribed by law.
In this case, the DBM promulgated NCC 59 [and CCC 10]. But, instead of identifying some of
the additional exclusions that Section 12 of R.A. 6758 permits it to make, the DBM made a list
of what allowances and benefits are deemed integrated into the standardized salary rates.
The drawing of the list is consistent with Section 12 above. R.A. 6758 did not
prohibit the DBM from identifying for the purpose of implementation what fell into
the class of "all allowances." With respect to what employees’ benefits fell outside
the term apart from those that the law specified, the DBM, said this Court in a case,
needed to promulgate rules and regulations identifying those excluded benefits.
This leads to the inevitable conclusion that until and unless the DBM issues such
rules and regulations, the enumerated exclusions in items (1) to (6) remain
exclusive. Thus so, not being an enumerated exclusion, COLA is deemed already
 Page 340 of 601

incorporated in the standardized salary rates of government employees under the

general rule of integration.
In any event, the Court finds the inclusion of COLA in the standardized salary rates
proper. Clearly, COLA is not in the nature of an allowance intended to reimburse expenses
incurred by officials and employees of the government in the performance of their official
functions. It is not payment in consideration of the fulfillment of official duty. As defined, cost
of living refers to "the level of prices relating to a range of everyday items"or "the cost of
purchasing those goods and services which are included in an accepted standard level of
consumption." Based on this premise, COLA is a benefit intended to cover increases in the cost
of living. Thus, it is and should be integrated into the standardized salary rates.
2. YES. ICA, like COLA, falls under the general rule of integration. The DBM specifically identified
it as an allowance or additional compensation integrated into the standardized salary rates. By
its very nature, ICA is granted due to inflation and upon determination that the current salary
of officials and employees of the Insurance Commission is insufficient to address the problem.
The DBM determines whether a need for ICA exists and the fund from which it will be taken.
The Insurance Commission cannot, on its own, determine what allowances are necessary and
then grant them to its officials and employees without the approval of the DBM. Moreover, ICA
does not qualify under the second sentence of Section 12 of R.A. 6758 since the employees
failed to show that they were actually receiving it as of June 30, 1989 or immediately prior to
the implementation of R.A. 6758. The Commissioner of the Insurance Commission requested
for authority to grant ICA from the DBM for the years 1981 and 1984 only. There is no
evidence that the ICA were paid in subsequent years. In the absence of a subsequent
authorization granting or restoring ICA to the officials and employees of the Insurance
Commission, there can be no valid legal basis for its continued grant from July 1, 1986.
As aptly pointed out by the COA, Section 18 of R.A. 6758 was complete in itself and was
operative without the aid of any supplementary or enabling legislation.2 The implementing
rules and regulations were necessary only for those provisions, such as item (7) of Section 12,
which requires further clarification and interpretation. Thus, notwithstanding the initial non-
publication of CCC 10, the disallowance of petitioners’ allowances and fringe benefits as COA
auditing personnel assigned to the GSIS was valid upon the effectivity of R.A. 6758. Rightly
so, the disallowance in this case is valid.
 Page 341 of 601

3. NO. It is a settled rule that publication is required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of
a law to inform the public of its contents before their rights and interests are affected by the
same. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Nonetheless, as
previously discussed, the integration of COLA into the standardized salary rates is not
dependent on the publication of CCC 10 and NCC 59. This benefit is deemed included in the
standardized salary rates of government employees since it falls under the general rule of
integration—"all allowances." More importantly, the integration was not by mere legal fiction
since it was factually integrated into the employees’ salaries. Records show that the
government employees were informed by their respective offices of their new position titles
and their corresponding salary grades when they were furnished with the Notices of Position
Allocation and Salary Adjustment (NPASA). The NPASA provided the breakdown of the
employee’s gross monthly salary as of June 30, 1989 and the composition of his standardized
pay under R.A. 6758. Notably, the COLA was considered part of the employee’s monthly
income.
In truth, petitioners never really suffered any diminution in pay as a consequence of the
consolidation of COLA into their standardized salary rates. There is thus nothing in these cases
which can be the subject of a back pay since the amount corresponding to COLA was never
withheld from petitioners in the first place. Consequently, the non-publication of CCC 10
and NCC 59 in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation does not
nullify the integration of COLA into the standardized salary rates upon the
effectivity of R.A. 6758. As the Court has said in Philippine International Trading
Corporation v. Commission on Audit, the validity of R.A. 6758 should not be made to depend
on the validity of its implementing rules.
4. (MAIN ISSUE) NO. Petitioners contend that the continued grant of COLA to military and
police personnel under CCC 10 and NCC 59 to the exclusion of other government employees
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. But as respondents pointed out, while
it may appear that petitioners are questioning the constitutionality of these issuances, they are
in fact attacking the very constitutionality of Section 11 of R.A. 6758. It is actually this
provision which allows the uniformed personnel to continue receiving their COLA over and
above their basic pay, thus:
 Page 342 of 601

Section 11. Military and Police Personnel. - The base pay of uniformed personnel of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Integrated National Police shall be as prescribed in
the salary schedule for these personnel in R.A. 6638 and R.A. 6648. The longevity pay of these
personnel shall be as prescribed under R.A. 6638, and R.A. 1134 as amended by R.A. 3725
and R.A. 6648: Provided, however, That the longevity pay of uniformed personnel of the
Integrated National Police shall include those services rendered as uniformed members of the
police, jail and fire departments of the local government units prior to the police integration.
All existing types of allowances authorized for uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and Integrated National Police such as cost of living allowance, longevity pay,
quarters allowance, subsistence allowance, clothing allowance, hazard pay and other
allowances shall continue to be authorized.
Nothing is more settled than that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked
collaterally because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally. In
any event, the Court is not persuaded that the continued grant of COLA to the
uniformed personnel to the exclusion of other national government officials run
afoul the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The fundamental right of
equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and
must apply to all those belonging to the same class.
To be valid and reasonable, the classification must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane
to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
It is clear from the first paragraph of Section 11 that Congress intended the uniformed
personnel to be continually governed by their respective compensation laws. Thus, the military
is governed by R.A. 6638, as amended by R.A. 9166 while the police is governed by R.A. 6648,
as amended by R.A. 6975. Certainly, there are valid reasons to treat the uniformed
personnel differently from other national government officials. Being in charged of
the actual defense of the State and the maintenance of internal peace and order, they are
expected to be stationed virtually anywhere in the country. They are likely to be assigned to a
 Page 343 of 601

variety of low, moderate, and high-cost areas. Since their basic pay does not vary based on
location, the continued grant of COLA is intended to help them offset the effects of living in
higher cost areas.

135) Short Title: Central Bank Employees Assoc. vs. BSP

Full Title: G.R. No. 148208; December 15, 2004
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
INC., petitioner, vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, respondents.
Facts: On July 3, 1993, RA 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the
old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP. Almost 8 years after the
effectivity of RA 7653, the Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a
petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the
President, to restrain the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Executive Secretary from
further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of RA 7653, on the
ground that it is unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of RA 7653 (Exercise of Authority) provides that: "In the
exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall ... (c) establish a human resource
management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer,
promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism
and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of
management. A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys
and subject to the Board’s approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the
Bangko Sentral’s human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board
shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for
under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided, however, That
compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary
grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under
Republic Act No. 6758."
The Association alleges that the proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of
employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and
 Page 344 of 601

below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended
that this classification is “a classic case of class legislation,” allegedly not based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP
personnel’s position.
In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and
capricious, and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner also
stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the proviso in question without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the
urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees have been
prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the
inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents' implementation of such amounts to
lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition, which this Court should take cognizance
of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue involved.
Issue: Whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the
constitutional mandate that "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Ruling: YES. Under the present standards of equal protection, section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No.
7653 is valid. HOWEVER, the enactment, of subsequent laws- exempting all other rank-
and-file employees of GFIs from the SSL - renders the continued application of the
challenged provision a violation of the equal protection clause.
It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature
from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate - so long
as the classification is not unreasonable. Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions
that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The
classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging
to the same class. The exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to
address the BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It
was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a
disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the
 Page 345 of 601

discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in
the legislative sense.
However, while RA 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature’s power,
the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other
Government Financial Institutions (GFIs) leeched all validity out of the last proviso of
Section 15(c), Article II of RA 7653. The concept of relative constitutionality- The
constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its
provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally
valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another. A statute valid at one time
may become void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical
operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former
adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions.
After the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993, Congress also undertook the amendment of the
charters of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP, with RA 7907 [1995]), Social Security System (SSS,
with RA 8282 [1997]), Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation (SBGFC, with RA 8289
[1997]), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS, with RA 8291 [1997]), Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP, with RA 8523 [1998]), Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC, with RA 8763
[2000]), and Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC, with RA 9302 [2004]). Thus, 11 years
after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rank-and-file of 7 other GFIs were granted the
exemption that was specifically denied to the rank-and-file of the BSP. Even the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) was granted the same blanket exemption from the SSL in 2000. The
prior view on the constitutionality of RA 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its classification
between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because there were
substantial distinctions that made real differences between the two classes.
The subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance
that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of
Section 15(c), Article II of RA 7653, thereby exposing the proviso to more serious
scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the classification -
albeit made indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight other laws - between the
rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classification must not only be
reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of the class.
 Page 346 of 601

The proviso may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly
discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between
persons who are without differences. The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and
file and the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable
badge of invidious discrimination - no one can, with candor and fairness, deny the
discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total exemption of the seven
other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated
as unalikes without any rational basis.

The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not identical, are
analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should
be treated in the same fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is equally binding on
the rest.
In light of the lack of real and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment
between the rank-and-file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the enactment of the
seven subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of the challenged proviso
anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be declared as an outlaw. The
two-tier analysis made in the case, and its conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent operation,
are in cadence and in consonance with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in
international law. There should be no hesitation in using the equal protection clause as a major
cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social
justice imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the special status and protection afforded to
labor, compel this approach.
Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and international law, it has
been held in International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing that “public policy abhors
inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the
policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights exhorts Congress to ‘give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
 Page 347 of 601

and political inequalities.’ The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every
person, ‘in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.’"
International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination.
General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and
justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education,
the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation - all
embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The
Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws. The
BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from the Supreme Court. They
represent the more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike
employees in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective
bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment, nor the
power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they impotent as a
labor unit, but their efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil as RA 7653 effectively
isolated them from the other GFI rank-and-file in compensation. These BSP rank-and-file employees
represent the politically powerless and they should not be compelled to seek a political solution to
their unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature
to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting time.
Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court’s duty to
save them from reasonless discrimination. Thus, the continued operation and implementation
of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act 7653 was declared
unconstitutional.

136) Short Title: PNB vs. Palma

Full Title: G.R. NO. 157279: August 9, 2005
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioners, v. GIOVANNI PALMA ET AL., Respondent.
Facts: Republic Act No. 6758 (R.A. 6758), otherwise known as ‘An Act Prescribing a
Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For
Other Purposes,’ took effect on 1 July 1989. Section 12 thereof provides for the
 Page 348 of 601

consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates,

but certain additional compensation were exempted from consolidation.
Section 12 of R.A. 6758 provides that: ‘Section 12. – Consolidation of Allowance and
Compensation. All allowances, except for representation and transportation allowances[;] clothing
and laundry allowances[;] subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government
vessels and hospital personnel stationed abroad[;] and such other additional compensation not
otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the
standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or
in kind, being received by incumbents as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary
rates shall continue to be authorized.’
The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10
(DBM-CCC No. 10) to implement R.A. 6758. Section 5.5 of DBM-CCC No. 10 enumerated the other
allowances/fringe benefits which are not likewise integrated into the basic salary rates prescribed
under R.A. 6758, but were allowed to be continued only for incumbents as of 30 June 1989.
Sec. 5.5 of DBM-CCC No. 10 states:
‘5.5 Other allowances/fringe benefits not likewise integrated into the basic salary and allowed
to be continued only for incumbents as of June 30, 1989 subject to the condition that the
grant of the same is with appropriate authorization either from the DBM, Office of the
President or legislative issuances are as follows: Rice Subsidy;Sugar Subsidy; Death Benefits
other than those granted by the GSIS; Medical/Dental/Optical allowances/ Benefits; Children’s
Allowances; Special Duty Pay/Allowance; Meal Subsidy; Longevity Pay; and Teller’s
allowances.’
Paragraph 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 provides:
‘Payment of other allowances/fringe benefits and all other forms of compensation granted on
top of basic salary, whether in cash or in kind … shall be discontinued effective November 1,
1989. Payment made for such allowances/fringe benefits after said date shall be considered as
illegal disbursement of public funds.’
On 12 August 1998, the Supreme Court held that DBM-CCC No. 10 was ineffective due to its non-
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, in violation of r Art. 2 of
the New Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended by E.O. 200.
In view of the declaration made by the Supreme Court, a petition for mandamus was
filed by respondents on 20 December 1999. Respondents alleged, among other things, that
 Page 349 of 601

they are employees hired by PNB on various dates after 30 June 1989; that from the
dates of their respective appointments until 1 January 1997 they were unjustly deprived
and denied of the following allowances being enjoyed by other employees of the PNB: 1.
Meal Allowance; 2. Rice Subsidy; 3. Sugar Subsidy; 4. Children’s Allowance; 5.
Dental/Optical/Outpatient Benefits; 6. Consolidated Medical Plan for Dependents; 7. Commutation of
Basic Hospitalization Benefit; 8. Benefits under the revised PNB Medical and Hospitalization Plan; and
9. Death Benefits.
According to respondents, the declaration that DBM-CCC No. 10 was ineffective paved
the way to their entitlement to the foregoing allowances/fringe benefits. The
withholding of their entitlement to the same benefits is an unfair discrimination and a
violation of respondents’ rights to [the] equal protection clause of the Constitution since
incumbents or employees of PNB who were already in the service as of 1 July 1989
received the above-enumerated benefits and allowances. PNB erroneously interpreted Sec.
12 of R.A. No. 6758 to mean that employees appointed after 30 June 1989 are not entitled to the
above-enumerated allowances and fringe benefits, whereas those who were already in the service as
of 1 July 1989 and were receiving the same continue to be entitled thereto. [Respondents] contend
that the word ‘only’ under Sec.12 of R.A. [No.] 6758 which states that ‘[s]uch additional
compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not
integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized’ does not refer to
incumbents, but refers to the additional compensation that an employee can continue to receive.
To rectify the injustice against [respondents], PNB passed Board Resolution No. 79 dated
19 June 1996, and issued General Circular No. 1-312/97 dated 14 March 1997, extending
the above-enumerated benefits to respondents. Respondents contend that extending to
them the allowances/fringe benefits meant that they are entitled to the payment of the
same and, hence, they should be given their allowances and benefits reckoned not only
from 1 January 1997 but from the date of respondents’ respective appointment or from
30 June 1989.
PNB denied the material allegations of respondents’ complaint. PNB admitted that it was
formerly a government owned and controlled corporation but on 26 May 1996, it was already
privatized and incorporated as a private commercial bank and registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. PNB, however, contends that respondents were never entitled to the
said benefits and allowances under R.A. 6758. Under Sec. 12 of [R.A. No.] 6758, the DBM
 Page 350 of 601

was expressly empowered to determine what other additional compensation, ‘being

received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989’, shall not be integrated into the
standardized salary rates and shall continue to be authorized. Petitioner alleged that in
the case of Philippine Ports Authority vs. Commission on Audit and MIAA vs. Commission
on Audit, the Supreme Court construed Sec. 12 of R.A. 6758 to mean that for purposes of
determining who shall be entitled to such additional compensation, ‘the date July 1, 1989
becomes crucial only to determine that as of said date, the officer was an incumbent and
was receiving the RATA, for purposes of entitling him to its continued grant.’ Following
the jurisprudence on the matter, [respondents] not being incumbents as of 1 July 1989,
were clearly not entitled to such other additional compensation provided under Section
5.5 of DBM-CCC No. 10.
The trial court rendered its decision; to wit: ‘Respondent PNB, its President and Board of
Directors are hereby directed to immediately settle the claims of petitioners whose names were listed
on pages one (1) to four (4) of the Petition filed on December 22, 1999, including the other
[claimants] who belong to the different offices and branches of respondent bank (PNB) nationwide
and whose names were also listed in the Manifestation of Petitioners, through their counsel, dated 18
April 2000 and filed in court on April 27, 2000. The aforesaid lists are appended to this Decision
forming as an integral part hereof.
‘Accordingly, respondent bank is hereby ordered as follows:
1. To pay (respondents) and other employees similarly situated and whose names are listed in
the Petition and Manifestation referred to above, the fringe benefits and allowances mentioned
above.
2. To pay directly to petitioner’s (sic) counsel attorney’s fees equivalent to twenty (20%) percent
of the total amount of the differentials due and payable to petitioners and the other employees
similarly situated whose names are in the lists referred to above.’"6
Subsequently, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals: Denying the appeal, the appellate court ruled that respondents
were entitled to the questioned benefits. The phrase "only as of July 1, 1989" in the last sentence of
Section 12 of RA 6758 was interpreted by the CA as a reference to "other additional compensation,"
not to "incumbents." Thus, even employees hired after that date were deemed entitled to the same
allowances or fringe benefits.
 Page 351 of 601

In denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner, the CA ruled that PNB was estopped
from raising the issue of the lower court’s lack of jurisdiction, because the argument was being raised
for the first time in that Motion. A writ of mandamus was held to be the proper remedy of
respondents to direct petitioner to pay their claims. The PNB’s other allegations, which had already
been discussed in the main Decision, were all debunked by the appellate court.
Hence, this Petition.
Issue/s:
1. Whether respondents are legally entitled to the questioned fringe benefits.
2. Whether there is a violation of equal protection if the non-integration of additional
compensation into the standardized salary rates, or the continuous enjoyment
thereof, pertains exclusively to incumbents as of July 1, 1989.
Ruling:
1. No. Petitioner invokes the doctrine of stare decisis, arguing that the proper interpretation of
Section 12 of RA 6758 was already settled with finality in previous cases similarly situated. It
further argues that the CA improvidently applied Cruz v. COA to the present case. Petitioner
adds that by extending the assailed benefits to respondents on January 1, 1997, it was not
thereby admitting that the latter were priorly entitled to them. It contends that its privatization
on May 27, 1996 enabled it to grant benefits as it deemed fit. It could not have granted them
while it was still a government agency, because RA 6758 barred such grant as an illegal
disbursement of public funds. It allegedly accorded them those benefits, not because it had
finally acceded to their interpretation of the law, but because it was only then that -- as a
private entity -- it could legally do so.
The doctrine "Stare decisis et non quieta movere (Stand by the decisions and disturb not what
is settled)" is firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence. Once this Court has laid down a principle
of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it would adhere to that principle and apply it to
all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same as in the earlier controversy. The
precise interpretation and application of the assailed provisions of RA 6758, namely those in
Section 12, have long been established in Philippine Ports Authority v. COA. The essential
pronouncements in that case have further been fortified by Manila International Airport
Authority v. COA, Philippine International Trading Corporation v. COA, and Social Security
System v. COA.
 Page 352 of 601

This Court has consistently held in those cases that allowances or fringe benefits,
whether or not integrated into the standardized salaries prescribed by RA 6758,
should continue to be enjoyed by employees who (1) were incumbents and (2)
were receiving those benefits as of July 1, 1989.
In Philippine Ports Authority v. COA, the petitioner (PPA), a government-owned and -controlled
corporation, extended representation and transportation allowance (RATA) to some of its
employees. Upon the enactment of RA 6758, the Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed
further payment of RATA and the resulting RATA differentials. The Court ruled that, pursuant
to Section 12 of RA 6758, the incumbent PPA officials enjoying RATA as of July 1, 1989 should
continue receiving it. The Court said that the intention of the framers of that law was to phase
out certain allowances and privileges gradually, without upsetting the principle of non-
diminution of pay. The intention of Section 12 to protect incumbents who were
already receiving those allowances on July 1, 1989, when RA 6758 took effect was emphasized
thus: "An incumbent is a person who is in present possession of an office. The
consequential outcome, under sections 12 and 17, is that if the incumbent resigns
or is promoted to a higher position, his successor is no longer entitled to his
predecessor’s RATA privilege x x x or to the transition allowance."
The Court stressed that in reserving the benefits to incumbents alone, the
legislature’s intention was not only to adhere to the policy of non-diminution of
pay, but also to be consistent with the prospective application of laws and the
spirit of fairness and justice.
The reliance of the court a quo on Cruz v. COA is misplaced. It was held in that case
that the specific date of hiring, October 31, 1989, had been not only arbitrarily determined by
the COA, but also used as an unreasonable and unsubstantial basis for awarding allowances to
employees. The basis for the Court’s ruling was not primarily the resulting disparity in salaries
received for the same work rendered but, more important, the absence of a distinction in the
law that allowed the grant of such benefits -- between those hired before and those after the
said date. Thus, setting a particular date as a distinction was nullified, not because it was
constitutionally infirm or was against the "equal pay for equal work" policy of RA 6758. Rather,
the reason was that the COA had acted without or in excess of its authority in arbitrarily
choosing October 31, 1989, as the cutoff date for according the allowances. It was explained
 Page 353 of 601

that "when the law does not distinguish, neither should the court." And for that matter, neither
should the COA.
In consonance with stare decisis, there should be no more misgivings about the
proper application of Section 12. In the present case, the payment of benefits to
employees hired after July 1, 1989, was properly withheld, because the law clearly mandated
that those benefits should be reserved only to incumbents who were already enjoying them
before its enactment. Withholding them from the others ensured that the
compensation of the incumbents would not be diminished in the course of the
latter’s continued employment with the government agency.
2. No. Respondents argue that upholding the distinction among the employees on the basis of
the date of their hiring is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Elsewise
stated, the constitutionality of RA 6758 is collaterally challenged by respondents, based on the
constitutional precept of equal protection. For reasons of public policy, however, the
constitutionality of a law cannot be attacked in a collateral way.
A law is deemed valid unless declared null and void by a competent court; more so when the
issue has not been duly pleaded in the trial court. The question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity. Respondents not only failed to challenge the constitutionality
of RA 6758; worse, they used it in seeking compensation from petitioner. The settled rule is
that courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it. Furthermore, as previously discussed, a valid classification was made by the law in
segregating other employees from the incumbents who were already receiving the benefits on
July 1, 1989.
In sum, we rule thus:
1. Under Section 12 of RA 6758, additional compensation already being received by the
employees of petitioner, but not integrated into the standardized salary rates -- enumerated in
Section 5.5 of DBM-CC No. 10, like "rice subsidy, sugar subsidy, death benefits other than
those granted by the GSIS," and so on -- shall continue to be given.
2. However, the continuation of the grant shall be available only to those "incumbents" already
receiving it on July 1, 1989.
3. Thus, in PPA v. COA, this Court held that PPA employees already receiving the RATA
granted by LOI No. 97 should continue to receive them, provided they were already
"incumbents" on or before July 1, 1989.
 Page 354 of 601

4. PITC v. COA held that in enacting RA 6758, Congress was adhering to the policy of non-
diminution of existing pay. Hence, if a benefit was not yet existing when the law took effect on
July 1, 1989, there was nothing to continue and no basis for applying the policy.
5. Neither would Cruz v. COA be applicable. In those cases, the COA arbitrarily set a specific
date, October 31, 1989; RA 6758 had not made a distinction between those hired before and
those after that date. In the present case, the law itself set July 1, 1989, as the date when
employees should be "incumbents," because that was when RA 6758 took effect. It was not
an arbitrarily chosen date; there was sufficient reason for setting it as the cutoff point.1âwphi1
6. The collateral attack on the constitutionality of RA 6758 due to alleged violation
of the equal protection clause cannot prosper, because constitutionality issues
must be pleaded directly -- not collaterally. Furthermore, the constitutional issue
was not raised in the trial court; hence, it cannot now be availed of on appeal to
this Court. Besides, the arguments of respondents rest upon the validity of Section
12 of RA 6758. How then can they now challenge the very basis of their
arguments?
7. Neither will estoppel help respondents. In granting the benefits effective January 1, 1997,
petitioner did not "make any false representation or concealment of material facts" indicating
that it was in a position to give the additional benefits prior to that date. On the contrary, it
consistently opined that, as a government entity, it was bound by RA 6758. Only after its
privatization on May 27, 1996, was it released from the Salary Standardization Law.
8. Since respondents have not shown any law requiring petitioner to grant the subject benefits
to employees hired after July 1, 1989, the Writ of Mandamus was improvidently issued by the
lower courts. Basic is the rule that mandamus is issued to command the performance of a
ministerial, not a discretionary duty, much less one prohibited by law.
This Court sympathizes with the plight of respondents. In these tough economic times, it understands
their difficult situation. But as a court, even as the highest one, it can only apply the letter and the
spirit of the law; it cannot reinvent or modify it. Unfortunately, law and jurisprudence are ranged
against their stance. The Supreme Court has no choice but to apply them accordingly, if it must be
true to its mission under the rule of law. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The challenged
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as those of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, are SET ASIDE.
 Page 355 of 601

137) Short Title: Unido vs. COMELEC [104 SCRA 17 (1981)]

Full Title: G.R. No. 56515 April 3, 1981
UNITED DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION (UNIDO), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(COMELEC), respondent.
Facts: In 1981, the Batasang Pambansa proposed amendments to the 1973 Constitution.
The amendments were to be voted upon in a plebiscite for the people’s
approval/disapproval. The YES vote was being advanced by Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan –
President Marcos’ political party. On the other hand, the NO vote was being advanced by
the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO).
To ensure parity and equality, COMELEC issued Resolutions 1467-1469 which basically
provided that there be equal opportunity, equal time and equal space on media use for
campaigns for both sides.
On 12 March 1981, Marcos campaigned for the YES vote via TV and radio from 9:30pm to
11:30pm. The same was broadcasted live by 26 TV stations and 248 radio stations
nationwide. UNIDO petitioned before the COMELEC that they be granted the same
opportunity as Marcos had pursuant to Resolutions 1467-1469. COMELEC denied the
demand. UNIDO assailed the denial as a denial of the equal protection clause.
Issue/s: Whether or not UNIDO was denied equal protection by virtue of COMELEC’s denial of their
request.
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that UNIDO was not denied due process. They were also not
denied equal protection.
It is the considered view of the Court that when Marcos conducted his ‘pulong-pulong’ or consultation
with the people on March 12, 1981, he did so in his capacity as President/Prime Minister of the
Philippines and not as the head of any political party. Under the Constitution, the ‘Prime Minister and
the Cabinet shall be responsible . . . for the program of government and shall determine the
guidelines of national policy’.
In instances where the head of state is at the same time the president of the political party that is in
power, it does not necessarily follow that he speaks with two voices when he dialogues with the
governed. The president is accorded certain privileges that the opposition may not have. Further, the
Court cannot compel TV stations and radio stations to give UNIDO free air time as they are not party
 Page 356 of 601

to this case. UNIDO must sought contract with these TV stations and radio stations at their own
expense.

138) Short Title: PJA vs. Prado [227 SCRA 703 (1993)]
Full Title: G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P.
ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig,
Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee
on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the
NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its
President. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE
MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G.
TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a
Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the
Country, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the
PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.
Overview: The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted
by the petitioners that this hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular they are
here challenging. The Supreme Court is itself affected by these measures and is thus an interested
party that should ordinarily not also be a judge at the same time. Under our system of government,
however, it cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge, because no other office has the
authority to do so. We shall therefore act upon this matter not with officiousness but in the discharge
of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness.
Facts: The main target of this petition is Section 35 as implemented by the Philippine
Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. These measures withdraw the franking
privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the
 Page 357 of 601

Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration
Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as
judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land Registration
Authority has taken common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as
sending of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its
motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces
more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in
both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among
the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the
independence of the Judiciary.
It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege
from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the
Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections;
former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public
in the filing of complaints against public offices and officers.10
The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid
classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been
withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National
Language; the Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National
Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Ladies Steering Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special
Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the Provincial and
City Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory and that there has been a violation of
equal protection before the law.

Ruling: Yes. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every
unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been
embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a more, specific
guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in
 Page 358 of 601

general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed,
Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some
and unjustly discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or
things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for
example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals
of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same
particulars.
There is no question that if there is any major branch of the government that needs the
privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents themselves point out.
Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely of this
need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while extending it to
others less deserving. The judiciary needs the franking privilege as badly as it is vital to
its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to the
judiciary’s franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the
removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is
untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing
the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed
the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem of the
respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to
withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government, including those who do not
need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from
others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which
may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is
not solved by violating the Constitution.
 Page 359 of 601

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all
persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in
unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all
persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty
of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to
a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar
to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same
particulars.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn,
Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the
need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege,
there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the
Judiciary for such privilege.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege
from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts,
and the National Land Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of which offices the said
privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made
permanent.

139) Short Title: Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan [248 SCRA 700 (1995)]
Full Title: G.R. No. 118533 October 4, 1995
MAYOR PABLO R. OLIVAREZ, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and
the HON. OMBUDSMAN, Special Prosecutor ANIANO DESIERTO and Deputy Special
Prosecutor JOSE DE G. FERRER, respondents.
Fact: On December 15, 1992, Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI), through its board
member Roger de Leon, charged petitioner Parañaque Mayor Dr. Pablo R. Olivarez with
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for unreasonably refusing to issue a
mayor's permit despite request and follow-ups to implement Parañaque Sangguniang
Bayan Resolution No. 744, Series of 1992 which petitioner himself approved on October
 Page 360 of 601

6, 1992. The resolution authorized BCCI to set up a night manufacturer’s fair during the
Christmas fiesta celebration of and at Baclaran for 60 days for which they will use a
portion of the service road of Roxas Boulevard from the corner of Opena to Rivera
Streets.
Attached to the affidavit-complaint were: (ii) four letters all dated November 13, 1992 of BCCI
General Manager Mr. Steve Espina to petitioner, Arch. Vita, Municipal Health Officer Dr.
Oscar de Leon and Municipal Treasurer Silvestre de Leon requesting assistance for the
issuance of a mayor's permit; (iii) Letter dated November 24, 1992 of BCCI counsel Atty.
Renato Dilag to petitioner formally demanding implementation of Res. 744; (iv)
petitioner's reply letter dated November 27, 1992 to Atty. Dilag stating among others
that the non-implementation of Res. 744 was due to BCCI's failure to apply for
appropriate permit and license to operate the Night Manufacturer's Fair which was one
of the conditions in the authorization.
Petitioner filed his counter-affidavit stating that the charge of violation of Sec. 3(f) of RA 3019 has no
legal and factual basis because (a) HCCI, which actually started operation, never applied for a
mayor's permit. Moreover, the four letters of Mr. Steve Espina requesting assistance in the issuance
of mayor's permit were not filed with the municipal office concerned.
In his Reply Affidavit dated April 1, 1993, complainant BCCI denied conducting actual
operations but only commenced soliciting participants and would-be sponsors to the fair.
Allegedly, BCCI exerted all possible efforts to secure the necessary permit but petitioner
simply refused to issue the same unless it gives money to petitioner. Graft Investigation
Officer (GIO) Ringpis conducted a preliminary investigation and issued a resolution recommending
the prosecution of petitioner for violation of Sec. 3(f) of R.A. No. 3019 as amended. On December
22, 1993, Special Prosecutor (SP) II, upon review of the Ringpis resolution, recommended the filing
of information against petitioner for violation of Sec. 3(e) instead of Sec. 3(f) of R.A. 3019. The
recommendation was approved by Deputy Special Prosecutor (DSP) Jose De G. Ferrer and SP
Desierto. On January 11, 1994, Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez approved the report and
recommendation and directed the government prosecutors to file the necessary
information against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan.
The Information for Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 filed on February 16, 1994 and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 20226, reads as follows:
 Page 361 of 601

That in or about the month of November, 1992 or for sometime prior thereto, in the
Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer being then the duly elected
Municipal Mayor of Parañaque, Metro Manila, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in
the exercise of his administrative and official functions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and criminally, without valid reason, refuse to issue a mayor's permit and/or refuse to act
favorably on the application of the Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI) to operate a "night
fair" along the service road of Roxas Boulevard (Baclaran) for a period of sixty (60) days in
accordance with Resolution No. 744 series of 1992 of the Municipal Council of Parañaque, and
that instead the accused issued and signed an executive order on November 23, 1992 granting
an unknown or unidentified group of Baclaran-based organizations/associations of vendors the
privilege to operate a "night fair" at certain portions of the national and local roads/streets in
Baclaran, thus, causing undue injury to the Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc.
On January 17, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation allegedly to
rectify error of law and on ground of newly discovered evidence (Annex "O"). Although opposed by
the prosecution on January 24, 1994, the same was granted. On February 18, 1994, petitioner
voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bail bond with the Sandiganbayan for his temporary
release. On February 21, 1994, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for a re-examination and re-
assessment of the prosecution's report and documentary evidence with a view to set aside the
determination of the existence of probable cause and ultimately the dismissal of the case. On March
3, 1994, the Sandiganbayan, after finding that sufficient probable cause exist(s) against petitioner,
denied for lack of merit petitioner's Omnibus Motion in open court and proceeded to arraign him as
scheduled that day. But in view of petitioner's refusal to enter any plea, the court ordered a plea of
"not guilty" entered into his record.
On March 8, 1994, the prosecution filed a Motion to suspend Accused Pendente Lite. On March 9, 14
and 15, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Plea and To Reduce Denial Order Into Writing
(With Entry of Appearance) (Annex "R"), Supplemental Motion to Set Aside Plea and Opposition to
Motion to Suspend Accused and Supplemental Pleading with Additional Opposition to Motion to
Suspend Accused (Annex "S"), respectively. Petitioner sought the following relief, to wit:
a) to set aside plea of "not guilty" entered for him by the court during the arraignment on March 3,
1994; b) to dismiss the case after a re-study of probable cause; c) to order preliminary investigation
for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019;. d) to deny the motion for suspension.
 Page 362 of 601

The prosecution opposed the supplemental motions and prayed that the denial of petitioner's
Omnibus Motion be maintained. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion but in the interest of
justice and to avoid further delay in the prompt adjudication of the case due to technicalities, it set
aside the proceedings conducted on March 3, 1994 including petitioner's arraignment thus revoking
the plea of "not guilty" entered in his record. The arraignment was set to April 7, 1994 but further
action on the prosecution's motion to suspend petitioner pendente lite was deferred, without
prejudice to the reiteration or revival thereof at the proper time and upon notice (Annex "T"). On
September 23, 1994, SPO III Roger Berbano, Sr. issued a memorandum recommending
the withdrawal of the Information on the ground that no probable cause exist(s) to
indict petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. (3019). He alleged that to grant an
exclusive mayor's permit demanded by BCCI will subject petitioner to liability for
violation of R.A. 3019 for giving unwarranted benefit to BCCI. Moreover, BCCI failed to
show compliance with the requirements of Res. 744, hence petitioner had all the reasons
to refuse issuance of mayor's permit. Also,
the issuance of Executive Order dated November 23, 1992 allowing Baclaran-based vendors
associations to hold a night fair did not in any manner cause injury to BCCI as the authority given to
them under Res. 744 was not exclusive. Petitioner merely considered the best interest of the
municipality. On October 3, 1994, complainant Manuel A. Vizcarra, formally requested the
Ombudsman to disqualify SP(O) Berbano on the ground of lack of confidence, bias and undue delay
in the reinvestigation of the case.
The reinvestigation was reassigned to SPO III Angel C. Mayoralgo who on November 3, 1994
recommended the dismissal of the case stating that petitioner "cannot be held liable for violation of
either Section 3(f), the original charge, or Section 3(e), R.A. 3019, the pending charge against Mayor
Olivarez, because he neither neglect[ed]/refuse[d] to act without sufficient justification on the letter
request addressed to him, nor acted through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence causing undue injury to BCCI. If ever the latter sustained injury for the non-
implementation of Council Resolution No. 744, S-92, the same is due to the fault and indiscretion of
its officers. On December 9, 1994, DSP de G. Ferrer reversed the recommendation with the following
observation: Even discounting evident bad faith on the part of respondent for the sake of argument,
he is liable under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 by giving unwarranted benefit THRU MANIFEST PARTIALITY,
to another group on the flimsy reason that complainant failed to apply for a business permit. The
merits of respondent's justification (insufficient as it is) should be passed upon by the court.
 Page 363 of 601

On January 13, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad
Testificandum to DSP Jose de G. Ferrer, SPO III Roger Berbano, Sr., and SPO III Angel Mayoralgo,
Jr. On January 16, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Strike Out and/or Review Result of
Reinvestigation. On January 16, 1995, the motion was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the petitioner disregarded right to the Equal Protection of BCCI.
Ruling: YES. The alleged shift in theory from "evident bad faith" to "manifest partiality" fails to
present a sufficient indicium that respondent prosecutors gravely abused their discretion. Manifest
partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence are but elements of the
offense defined in and punishable under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for which
petitioner stands charged. The presence or absence of the elements of the crime are
evidentiary in nature and are matters of defense, the truth of which can be best passed
upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. Thus, the issue of whether there was bad faith or
manifest partiality on the part of petitioner should best be determined, not in the preliminary
investigation, but during the trial proper.
It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial, and it is often the
only means of discovering the persons who may be seasonably charged with a crime, to enable the
prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has
no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the persons against
whom it is taken in jeopardy. It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties'
evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief
that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. 8

Consequently, petitioner's asseveration that the reinvestigation is null and void because the
respondent prosecutors failed to consider all the evidence presented in his defense has no leg to
stand on. A perusal of the records will show that all the documentary evidence, as well as the
additional documents submitted by petitioner during the reinvestigation, were thoroughly examined
and fully evaluated in the determination of probable cause.
We have meticulously analyzed the arguments raised by the parties in the various pleadings and
motions, together with their documentary evidence, which all formed the basis for the issuance of the
questioned resolutions, and we are convinced that there exists probable cause as to warrant the filing
of charges against herein petitioner for a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
 Page 364 of 601

Petitioner's main defense is that BCCI was not issued a mayor's permit by reason of its failure to
apply therefor and to comply with the conditions set forth in Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 744.
There are several flaws to this argument.
First. The purported absence of an application for the issuance of a permit is actually more apparent
than real. Initially, petitioner claims that he could not grant a permit to BCCI, which was allegedly
demanding an exclusive authority to operate, on the pretext that he can be held liable for a violation
of Republic Act No. 3019 for giving unwarranted benefits to BCCI to the detriment of other Baclaran-
based vendors' associations. Subsequently, but in the same vein, petitioner tries to justify the
issuance of an executive order granting a permit to the unidentified Baclaran-based vendors'
associations, in that the same did not cause injury to BCCI since the authority to operate given to the
latter is not exclusive.
It would appear, therefore, that petitioner had taken it upon himself to categorize and determine the
exclusivity or non-exclusivity of the authority to operate granted to BCCI, depending on whether or
not it would suit his purpose or predilection. The inconsistent stand taken by petitioner with regard to
the true character of BCCI's authority to operate is indeed quite perplexing and suffices to cast
sufficient doubt on the real motive behind the non-issuance of the required permit.
Second. It is asserted that the executive order granting a permit to the Baclaran-based vendors'
associations was issued by petitioner supposedly in the best interest of the municipality as evidenced
by its earnings from the night fair in the total amount of P13,512,948.00. While the avowed purpose
may prove noble, still it miserably pales in contrast to what appears to be bad faith or manifest
partiality on the part of petitioner in refusing to grant a permit to BCCI. Petitioner could not plausibly
demonstrate how the issuance of a permit to BCCI would so adversely affect public interest as to
warrant its denial. On the contrary, the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque had even passed a
resolution, which notably was approved by herein petitioner, expressly allowing BCCI to hold the
night fair. This is concrete proof that the grant of authority to operate in favor of BCCI was not at all
contrary to law and public policy, nor was it prejudicial to public interest.
Petitioner's suspected partiality may be gleaned from the fact that he issued a permit in
favor of the unidentified Baclaran-based vendors' associations by the mere expedient of
an executive order, whereas so many requirements were imposed on BCCI before it
could be granted the same permit. Worse, petitioner failed to show, in apparent
disregard of BCCI's right to equal protection, that BCCI and the unidentified Baclaran-
based vendors' associations were not similarly situated as to give at least a semblance of
 Page 365 of 601

legality to the apparent haste with which said executive order was issued. It would seem
that if there was any interest served by such executive order, it was that of herein
petitioner.
Petitioner likewise submits that no permit could be issued because BCCI never filed an application
therefor with the proper office, that is, the Business Permit and Licensing Office. This is actually
begging the question. It is not denied that on November 13, 1992, BCCI, through its general
manager, wrote petitioner requesting for a permit to operate, but this was rejected outright by him
on the theory that the application should be made with the proper municipal official. The indifference
shown by petitioner to BCCI's application taints his actuations with dubiety.
As the mayor of the municipality, the officials referred to were definitely under his
authority and he was not without recourse to take appropriate action on the letter-
application of BCCI although the same was not strictly in accordance with normal
procedure. There was nothing to prevent him from referring said letter-application to the
licensing department, but which paradoxically he refused to do. Whether petitioner was
impelled by any material interest or ulterior motive may be beyond us for the moment
since this is a matter of evidence, but the environmental facts and circumstances are
sufficient to create a belief in the mind of a reasonable man that this would not be
completely improbable, absent countervailing clarification.
Lastly, it may not be amiss to add that petitioner, as a municipal mayor, is expressly authorized and
has the power to issue permits and licenses for the holding of activities for any charitable or welfare
purpose, pursuant to Section 444 (b) (3) (iv and v) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic
Act No. 7160). Hence, he cannot really feign total lack of authority to act on the letter-application of
BCCI..
On the basis of the foregoing, we are reasonably convinced that there is enough evidence
to warrant the filing of a formal charge in court against herein petitioner for a violation
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

140) Short Title: Tiu v. Court of Appeals

Full Title: G.R. No. 127410. January 20, 1999
CONRADO L. TIU, JUAN T. MONTELIBANO JR. and ISAGANI M. JUNGCO, Petitioners, v.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA JR., BASES CONVERSION AND
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, BUREAU OF
 Page 366 of 601

INTERNAL REVENUE, CITY TREASURER OF OLONGAPO and MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF

SUBIC, ZAMBALES, Respondents.
Fact: The petitioners challenged before this Court the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being
violative of their right to equal protection of the laws. Petitioners petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals. The challenged Decision upheld the
constitutionality and validity of Executive Order No. 97-A (EO 97-A), according to which the grant and
enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives authorized under Republic Act No. 7227 (RA 7227) were
limited to the business enterprises and residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic Special
Economic Zone (SSEZ).
Issue: Whether the EO 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution in confining the
application of R.A. 7227 within the secured area.
Ruling: No, said Order is not violative of the equal protection clause; neither is it discriminatory.
Rather, than we find real and substantive distinctions between the circumstances obtaining inside
and those outside the Subic Naval Base, thereby justifying a valid and reasonable classification.
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences,
one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be
germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class. The
equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is
limited either by the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. It
does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable. grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not.
Classification, to be valid, must:
1. rest on substantial distinctions,
2. be germane to the purpose of the law,
3. not be limited to existing conditions only, and
4. apply equally to all members of the same class.
 Page 367 of 601

It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As
long as there are actual and material differences between territories, there is no violation of the
constitutional clause. And of course, anyone, including the petitioners, possessing the requisite
investment capital can always avail of the same benefits by channeling his or her resources or
business operations into the fenced-off free port zone. That the classification set forth by the
executive issuance does not apply merely to existing conditions. As laid down in RA 7227, the
objective is to establish a “self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center” in
the area. There will, therefore, be a long-term difference between such investment center and the
areas outside it.
Lastly, the classification applies equally to all the resident individuals and businesses within the
“secured area.” The residents, being in like circumstances or contributing directly to the achievement
of the end purpose of the law, are not categorized further. Instead, they are all similarly treated,
both in privileges granted and in obligations required. The Court holds that no undue favor or
privilege was extended. The classification occasioned by EO 97-A was not unreasonable, capricious or
unfounded. To repeat, it was based, rather, on fair and substantive considerations that were
germane to the legislative purpose.
141) Short Title: Coconut Oil Refiners v. Torres
Full Title: G.R. No. 132527; July 29, 2005
COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. represented by its President, JESUS L.
ARRANZA, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF MEAT PROCESSORS, INC. (PAMPI),
represented by its Secretary, ROMEO G. HIDALGO, FEDERATION OF FREE FARMERS
(FFF), represented by its President, JEREMIAS U. MONTEMAYOR, and BUKLURAN NG
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (BMP), represented by its Chairperson, FELIMON C.
LAGMAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. RUBEN TORRES, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; BASES CONVERSION AND
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, CLARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, 88 MART DUTY FREE, FREEPORT TRADERS, PX CLUB,
AMERICAN HARDWARE, ROYAL DUTY FREE SHOPS, INC., DFS SPORTS, ASIA PACIFIC,
MCI DUTY FREE DISTRIBUTOR CORP. (formerly MCI RESOURCES, CORP.), PARK & SHOP,
DUTY FREE COMMODITIES, L. FURNISHING, SHAMBURGH, SUBIC DFS, ARGAN TRADING
CORP., ASIPINE CORP., BEST BUY, INC., PX CLUB, CLARK TRADING, DEMAGUS TRADING
 Page 368 of 601

CORP., D.F.S. SPORTS UNLIMITED, INC., DUTY FREE FIRST SUPERSTORE, INC.,
FREEPORT, JC MALL DUTY FREE INC. (formerly 88 Mart [Clark] Duty Free Corp.), LILLY
HILL CORP., MARSHALL, PUREGOLD DUTY FREE, INC., ROYAL DFS and ZAXXON
PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents.

Facts: This is a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction seeking to enjoin and prohibit the
Executive Branch, through the public respondents Ruben Torres in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), the Clark
Development Corporation (CDC) and the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), from
allowing, and the private respondents from continuing with, the operation of tax and
duty-free shops located at the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the Clark Special
Economic Zone (CSEZ), and to declare the following issuances as unconstitutional,
illegal, and void:

1. Section 5 of Executive Order No. 80,[1] dated April 3, 1993, regarding the CSEZ.
2. Executive Order No. 97-A, dated June 19, 1993, pertaining to the SSEZ.
3. Section 4 of BCDA Board Resolution No. 93-05-034,[2] dated May 18, 1993,
pertaining to the CSEZ.

Petitioners contend that the aforecited issuances are unconstitutional and void as they constitute
executive lawmaking, and that they are contrary to Republic Act No. 7227[3] and in violation of the
Constitution, particularly Section 1, Article III (equal protection clause), Section 19, Article
XII (prohibition of unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade), and Section 12, Article
XII (preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods).

Issue: Whether the issuances are unconstitutional for supposedly violating the equal protection
clause

Ruling: No. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the
equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable
classification. Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinction, (2) be
 Page 369 of 601

germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4)
apply equally to all members of the same class.

Applying the foregoing test to the present case, this Court finds no violation of the right
to equal protection of the laws. First, contrary to petitioners’ claim, substantial
distinctions lie between the establishments inside and outside the zone, justifying the
difference in their treatment. In Tiu v. Court of Appeals, the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 97-A was challenged for being violative of the equal protection clause. In that
case, petitioners claimed that Executive Order No. 97-A was discriminatory in confining
the application of Republic Act No. 7227 within a secured area of the SSEZ, to the
exclusion of those outside but are, nevertheless, still within the economic zone.

Upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A, this Court therein found substantial
differences between the retailers inside and outside the secured area, thereby justifying a valid and
reasonable classification:
Certainly, there are substantial differences between the big investors who are being lured to establish
and operate their industries in the so-called “secured area” and the present business operators
outside the area. On the one hand, we are talking of billion-peso investments and thousands
of new jobs. On the other hand, definitely none of such magnitude. In the first, the economic impact
will be national; in the second, only local. Even more important, at this time the business activities
outside the “secured area” are not likely to have any impact in achieving the purpose of the law,
which is to turn the former military base to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy.
There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits and incentives accorded in
R.A. 7227. Additionally, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, it will be easier to manage and monitor
the activities within the “secured area,” which is already fenced off, to prevent “fraudulent
importation of merchandise” or smuggling.
It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As
long as there are actual and material differences between territories, there is no violation of the
constitutional clause. And of course, anyone, including the petitioners, possessing the requisite
investment capital can always avail of the same benefits by channeling his or her resources or
business operations into the fenced-off free port zone.
 Page 370 of 601

The Court in Tiu found real and substantial distinctions between residents within the secured area
and those living within the economic zone but outside the fenced-off area. Similarly, real and
substantial differences exist between the establishments herein involved. A significant distinction
between the two groups is that enterprises outside the zones maintain their businesses within
Philippine customs territory, while private respondents and the other duly-registered zone enterprises
operate within the so-called “separate customs territory.” To grant the same tax incentives given to
enterprises within the zones to businesses operating outside the zones, as petitioners insist, would
clearly defeat the statute’s intent to carve a territory out of the military reservations in Subic Bay
where free flow of goods and capital is maintained.

The classification is germane to the purpose of Republic Act No. 7227. As held in Tiu, the
real concern of Republic Act No. 7227 is to convert the lands formerly occupied by the US
military bases into economic or industrial areas. In furtherance of such objective,
Congress deemed it necessary to extend economic incentives to the establishments
within the zone to attract and encourage foreign and local investors. This is the very
rationale behind Republic Act No. 7227 and other similar special economic zone laws
which grant a complete package of tax incentives and other benefits. The classification,
moreover, is not limited to the existing conditions when the law was promulgated, but to
future conditions as well, inasmuch as the law envisioned the former military reservation
to ultimately develop into a self-sustaining investment center.

And, lastly, the classification applies equally to all retailers found within the “secured area.” As ruled
in Tiu, the individuals and businesses within the “secured area,” being in like circumstances or
contributing directly to the achievement of the end purpose of the law, are not categorized further.
They are all similarly treated, both in privileges granted and in obligations required. With all the four
requisites for a reasonable classification present, there is no ground to invalidate Executive Order No.
97-A for being violative of the equal protection clause.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Section 5 of Executive Order No. 80 and Section 4
of BCDA Board Resolution No. 93-05-034 are hereby declared NULL and VOID and are accordingly
declared of no legal force and effect. Respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing the
aforesaid void provisions. All portions of Executive Order No. 97-A are valid and effective, except the
 Page 371 of 601

second sentences in paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of said Executive Order, which are hereby declared
INVALID.

142) Short Title: ISAE vs. Quisumbing

Full Title: G.R. No. 128845; June 1, 2000
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment;
HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and
Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the Superintendent of
International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.
Facts: Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential
Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign
diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. To enable the School to continue carrying out its
educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree
authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either
locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise
applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be
enacted for the protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty,
classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs
four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire
or a local hire:
a. What is one's domicile?
b. Where is one's home economy?
c. To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d. Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the
School responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines?2
Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is
classified as a local hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-
hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The
 Page 372 of 601

School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires

have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The School
explains:
A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his home country, leave his
family and friends, and take the risk of deviating from a promising career path — all for the
purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator, but this time in a foreign land. The new
foreign hire is faced with economic realities: decent abode for oneself and/or for one's family,
effective means of transportation, allowance for the education of one's children, adequate
insurance against illness and death, and of course the primary benefit of a basic
salary/retirement compensation.
Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted again with the same economic
reality after his term: that he will eventually and inevitably return to his home country where
he will have to confront the uncertainty of obtaining suitable employment after along period in
a foreign land.
The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on
an international level in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international
education.
When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995,
petitioner International School Alliance of Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the
collective bargaining representative of all faculty members" of the School, contested the
difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the
question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit,
eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.
On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting
Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in
favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this
Court.
Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to
Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination. The
 Page 373 of 601

School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38 in all, with
nationalities other than Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as local hires.
The Acting Secretary of Labor found that these non-Filipino local-hires received the same benefits as
the Filipino local-hires. The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to
all, regardless of race. There are foreigners who have been hired locally and who are paid equally as
Filipino local hires. The Acting secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in
salary rates:
The Principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find applications in the present case. The
international character of the School requires the hiring of foreign personnel to deal with
different nationalities and different cultures, among the student population.
We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and benefits accorded to
foreign hired personnel which system is universally recognized. We agree that certain
amenities have to be provided to these people in order to entice them to render their services
in the Philippines and in the process remain competitive in the international market.
Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of employment
unlike the local hires who enjoy security of tenure. To apply parity therefore, in wages and
other benefits would also require parity in other terms and conditions of employment which
include the employment which include the employment contract.
A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the conditions and provisions for salary
and professional compensation wherein the parties agree as follows:
All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in accordance with
Appendix C hereof provided that the Superintendent of the School has the discretion to
recruit and hire expatriate teachers from abroad, under terms and conditions that are
consistent with accepted international practice.
Appendix C of said CBA further provides:
The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited Staff (OSRS)
salary schedule. The 25% differential is reflective of the agreed value of system
displacement and contracted status of the OSRS as differentiated from the tenured
status of Locally Recruited Staff (LRS).
To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties' recognition of the difference in the
status of two types of employees, hence, the difference in their salaries.
 Page 374 of 601

The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an
established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is
not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A
classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of
the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires,
the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines
and have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the
teaching faculty of the School.
Hence, this petition.
Issue/s: Whether Foreign-hires being paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-
hires is an invalid and unreasonable classification; and violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Ruling: Yes. That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our
Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social
Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith. International law, which springs from general principles of
law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., the
general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1the
Convention against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination
in Respect of Employment and Occupation — all embody the general principle against discrimination,
the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated
this principle as part of its national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital,
inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible. The
Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These
conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace — the factory, the office or the field — but
include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees. The Constitution also directs
the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor
 Page 375 of 601

Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed."
It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its
primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to
unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. Discrimination, particularly in
terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits
and penalizes the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as against a
male employee for work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, in Article 7
thereof, provides:, The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction
of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior
to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long
honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially
equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be
paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its "international character"
notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to
that of foreign-hires. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords
employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work.
This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less
than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive
more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee;
it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly. The employer in this case has
failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25%
more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions
and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.
 Page 376 of 601

The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the
distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.
While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be
used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same
services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For
the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also
cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and
limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them
which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home
leave travel allowances. The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare," 25
"to afford labor full protection." The State, therefore, has the right and
duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual
but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements
included, must yield to the common good. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are
contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to
justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid
classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires
and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes
public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.
We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires. A
bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the
entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best suited to
serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the
law." 29
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the
employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial
Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment
status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights. It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped
together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the
 Page 377 of 601

School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited
tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under
the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not
granted to local-hires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and
home leave travel allowance, are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the
exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires
would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The
Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of
according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.

143) Short Title: PHILRECA vs. DILG (G.R. No. 143076, June 10, 2003)
Full Title: G.R. No. 143076; June 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC. (PHILRECA); AGUSAN
DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (ANECO); ILOILO I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE,
INC. (ILECO I); and ISABELA I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (ISELCO I), Petitioners, vs.
THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, and THE
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, Respondents.
Facts: On May 23, 2000, a class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in
behalf of other electric cooperatives organized and existing under P.D. No. 269 who are
members of petitioner Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc.
(PHILRECA). Petitioner PHILRECA is an association of 119 electric cooperatives throughout the
country. Petitioners Agusan del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ANECO), Iloilo I Electric Cooperative,
Inc. (ILECO I) and Isabela I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ISELCO I) are non-stock, non-profit electric
cooperatives organized and existing under P.D. No. 269, as amended, and registered with the
National Electrification Administration (NEA).
Under P.D. No. 269, as amended, or the National Electrification Administration Decree, it is the
declared policy of the State to provide "the total electrification of the Philippines on an area coverage
basis" the same "being vital to the people and the sound development of the nation." Pursuant to this
policy, P.D. No. 269 aims to "promote, encourage and assist all public service entities engaged in
supplying electric service, particularly electric cooperatives" by "giving every tenable support and
 Page 378 of 601

assistance" to the electric cooperatives coming within the purview of the law. Accordingly, Section 39
of P.D. No. 269 provides for the following tax incentives to electric cooperatives:
SECTION 39. Assistance to Cooperatives; Exemption from Taxes, Imposts, Duties, Fees; Assistance
from the National Power Corporation. — Pursuant to the national policy declared in Section 2, the
Congress hereby finds and declares that the following assistance to cooperative is necessary and
appropriate:
(a) Provided that it operates in conformity with the purposes and provisions of this
Decree, cooperatives (1) shall be permanently exempt from paying income taxes, and (2)
for a period ending on December 31 of the thirtieth full calendar year after the date of a
cooperative's organization or conversion hereunder, or until it shall become completely free of
indebtedness incurred by borrowing, whichever event first occurs, shall be exempt from the
payment (a) of all National Government, local government and municipal taxes and fees,
including franchise, filing, recordation, license or permit fees or taxes and any fees,
charges, or costs involved in any court or administrative proceeding in which it may be a
party, and (b) of all duties or imposts on foreign goods acquired for its operations, the
period of such exemption for a new cooperative formed by consolidation, as provided for in Section
29, to begin from as of the date of the beginning of such period for the constituent consolidating
cooperative which was most recently organized or converted under this Decree: Provided, That the
Board of Administrators shall, after consultation with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, promulgate
rules and regulations for the proper implementation of the tax exemptions provided for in this
Decree.
From 1971 to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects envisioned by P.D. No. 269, as
amended, the Philippine Government, acting through the National Economic Council (now National
Economic Development Authority) and the NEA, entered into six (6) loan agreements with the
government of the United States of America through the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) with electric cooperatives, including petitioners ANECO, ILECO I and ISELCO I,
as beneficiaries. The six (6) loan agreements involved a total amount of approximately
US$86,000,000.00. These loan agreements are existing until today.
The loan agreements contain similarly worded provisions on the tax application of the loan and any
property or commodity acquired through the proceeds of the loan. Thus, Section 6.5 of A.I.D. Loan
No. 492-H-027 dated November 15, 1971 provides:
 Page 379 of 601

Section 6.5. Taxes and Duties. The Borrower covenants and agrees that this Loan Agreement
and the Loan provided for herein shall be free from, and the Principal and interest shall be
paid to A.I.D. without deduction for and free from, any taxation or fees imposed under any
laws or decrees in effect within the Republic of the Philippines or any such taxes or fees so
imposed or payable shall be reimbursed by the Borrower with funds other than those provided
under the Loan. To the extent that (a) any contractor, including any consulting firm, any
personnel of such contractor financed hereunder, and any property or transactions relating to
such contracts and (b) any commodity procurement transactions financed hereunder, are not
exempt from identifiable taxes, tariffs, duties and other levies imposed under laws in effect in
the country of the Borrower, the Borrower and/or Beneficiary shall pay or reimburse the same
with funds other than those provided under the Loan.
Petitioners contend that pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 269, as amended, and the
above-mentioned provision in the loan agreements, they are exempt from payment of
local taxes, including payment of real property tax. With the passage of the Local
Government Code, however, they allege that their tax exemptions have been invalidly
withdrawn. In particular, petitioners assail Sections 193 and 234 of the Local
Government Code on the ground that the said provisions discriminate against them, in
violation of the equal protection clause. Further, they submit that the said provisions are
unconstitutional because they impair the obligation of contracts between the Philippine Government
and the United States Government.
Issue: Whether there is a violation of the equal protection clause in the assailed sections of the Local
Government Code.
Ruling: NO. There is No Violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The pertinent parts of
Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code provide:
Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges.—Unless otherwise provided in this Code,
tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural
or juridical, including government-owned and controlled corporations, except local water
districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit
hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
Section 234. Exemptions from real property tax.—The following are exempted from payment
of the real property tax:
 Page 380 of 601

(d) All real property owned by duly registered cooperatives as provided for under
R.A. No. 6938; and
Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously
granted to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons whether natural or juridical, including all
government-owned and controlled corporations are hereby withdrawn upon effectivity of this
Code.
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that "no person or class of
persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other
persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances." Thus, the guaranty
of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a law based on reasonable
classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. We hold that there is reasonable
classification under the Local Government Code to justify the different tax treatment between electric
cooperatives covered by P.D. No. 269, as amended, and electric cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938.
First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under P.D. No. 269, as
amended, and cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938. These distinctions are manifest in at least
two material respects which go into the nature of cooperatives envisioned by R.A. No. 6938 and
which characteristics are not present in the type of cooperative associations created under P.D. No.
269, as amended.
A cooperative under R.A. No. 6938 is defined as: A duly registered association of persons with a
common bond of interest, who have voluntarily joined together to achieve a lawful common or social
economic end, making equitable contributions to the capital required and accepting a fair share of
the risks and benefits of the undertaking in accordance with universally accepted cooperative
principles. The definition provides for the following elements of a cooperative: a) association of
persons; b) common bond of interest; c) voluntary association; d) lawful common social or economic
end; e) capital contributions; f) fair share of risks and benefits; g) adherence to cooperative values;
and g) registration with the appropriate government authority.
The importance of capital contributions by members of a cooperative under R.A. No. 6938 was
emphasized during the Senate deliberations as one of the key factors which distinguished electric
cooperatives under P.D. No. 269, as amended, from electric cooperatives under the Cooperative Code
 Page 381 of 601

Nowhere in P.D. No. 269, as amended, does it require cooperatives to make equitable contributions
to capital. Petitioners themselves admit that to qualify as a member of an electric cooperative under
P.D. No. 269, only the payment of a 5.00 membership fee is required which is even refundable the
moment the member is no longer interested in getting electric service from the cooperative or will
transfer to another place outside the area covered by the cooperative. However, under the
Cooperative Code, the articles of cooperation of a cooperative applying for registration must be
accompanied with the bonds of the accountable officers and a sworn statement of the treasurer
elected by the subscribers showing that at least twenty-five per cent (25%) of the authorized share
capital has been subscribed and at least twenty-five per cent (25%) of the total subscription has
been paid and in no case shall the paid-up share capital be less than Two thousand pesos
(P2,000.00).
Another principle adhered to by the Cooperative Code is the principle of subsidiarity. Pursuant to this
principle, the government may only engage in development activities where cooperatives do not
posses the capability nor the resources to do so and only upon the request of such cooperatives.
Accordingly, under the charter of the CDA, or the primary government agency tasked to promote and
regulate the institutional development of cooperatives, it is the declared policy of the State that:
government assistance to cooperatives shall be free from any restriction and
conditionality that may in any manner infringe upon the objectives and character of cooperatives
as provided in this Act. The State shall, except as provided in this Act, maintain the policy of
noninterference in the management and operation of cooperatives.
In contrast, P.D. No. 269, as amended by P.D. No. 1645, is replete with provisions which grant the
NEA, upon the happening of certain events, the power to control and take over the management and
operations of cooperatives registered under it.
The extent of government control over electric cooperatives covered by P.D. No. 269, as amended, is
largely a function of the role of the NEA as a primary source of funds of these electric cooperatives. It
is crystal clear that NEA incurred loans from various sources to finance the development and
operations of the electric cooperatives. Consequently, amendments to P.D. No. 269 were primarily
geared to expand the powers of the NEA over the electric cooperatives to ensure that loans granted
to them would be repaid to the government. In contrast, cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938 are
envisioned to be self-sufficient and independent organizations with minimal government intervention
or regulation. To be sure, the transitory provisions of R.A. No. 6938 are indicative of the
recognition by Congress of the fundamental distinctions between electric cooperatives
 Page 382 of 601

organized under P.D No. 269, as amended, and cooperatives under the new Cooperative
Code. Article 128 of the Cooperative Code provides that all cooperatives registered under previous
laws shall be deemed registered with the CDA upon submission of certain requirements within one
year. However, cooperatives created under P.D. No. 269, as amended, are given three years within
which to qualify and register with the CDA, after which, provisions of P.D. No. 1645 which expand the
powers of the NEA over electric cooperatives, would no longer apply.22
Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is
germane to the purpose of the law. The Constitutional mandate that every local
government unit shall enjoy local autonomy, does not mean that the exercise of power
by local governments is beyond regulation by Congress. Thus, while each government unit is
granted the power to create its own sources of revenue, Congress, in light of its broad power to tax,
has the discretion to determine the extent of the taxing powers of local government units consistent
with the policy of local autonomy.
Section 193 of the Local Government Code is indicative of the legislative intent to vest broad taxing
powers upon local government units and to limit exemptions from local taxation to entities specifically
provided therein. Section 193 provides:
Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges.—Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax
exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical,
including government-owned and controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives
duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational
institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.24
The above provision effectively withdraws exemptions from local taxation enjoyed by various entities
and organizations upon effectivity of the Local Government Code except for a) local water
districts; b) cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938; and c) non-stock and non-
profit hospitals and educational institutions. Further, with respect to real property taxes, the
Local Government Code again specifically enumerates entities which are exempt therefrom and
withdraws exemptions enjoyed by all other entities upon the effectivity of the code. Thus, Section
234 provides:
SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. — The following are exempted from payment of the
real property tax:
 Page 383 of 601

(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions
except when the beneficial use thereof had been granted for consideration or otherwise, to a
taxable person;
(b) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques,
nonprofit or religious cemeteries and all lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly,
and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes;
(c) All machineries and equipment that are actually, directly and exclusively used by local
water districts and government-owned or controlled corporations engaged in the supply and
distribution of water and/or generation and transmission of electric power;
(d) All real property owned by duly registered cooperatives as provided for under
R.A. No. 6938; and
(e) Machinery and equipment used for pollution control and environmental protection.
Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously granted to,
or presently enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or juridical, including all government-owned or
controlled corporations are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.25
While we understand petitioners’ predicament brought about by the withdrawal of their local tax
exemption privileges under the Local Government Code, it is not the province of this Court to go into
the wisdom of legislative enactments. Courts can only interpret laws. The principle of separation of
powers prevents them from re-inventing the laws.
Finally, Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code permit reasonable
classification as these exemptions are not limited to existing conditions and apply
equally to all members of the same class. Exemptions from local taxation, including real
property tax, are granted to all cooperatives covered by R.A. No. 6938 and such
exemptions exist for as long as the Local Government Code and the provisions therein on
local taxation remain good law.
The Court understands the plight of the petitioners. Their remedy, however, is not judicial. Striking
down Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional or declaring them
inapplicable to petitioners is not the proper course of action for them to obtain their previous tax
exemptions. The language of the law and the intention of its framers are clear and unequivocal and
courts have no other duty except to uphold the law. The task to re-examine the rules and guidelines
on the conversion of electric cooperatives to cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938 and provide every
assistance available to them should be addressed by the proper authorities of government. This is
 Page 384 of 601

necessary to encourage the growth and viability of cooperatives as instruments of social justice and
economic development.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the temporary restraining order heretofore issued is
LIFTED.

144) Short Title: Beltran vs. Secretary of Health

Full Title: G.R. No. 133640; November 25, 2005
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing business under the name and style, OUR LADY OF FATIMA
BLOOD BANK, FELY G. MOSALE, doing business under the name and style, MOTHER
SEATON BLOOD BANK; PEOPLE’S BLOOD BANK, INC.; MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO, M.D.,
doing business under the name and style, AVENUE BLOOD BANK; JESUS M. GARCIA,
M.D., doing business under the name and style, HOLY REDEEMER BLOOD BANK, ALBERT
L. LAPITAN, doing business under the name and style, BLUE CROSS BLOOD
TRANSFUSION SERVICES; EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D., doing business under the name
and style, RECORD BLOOD BANK, in their individual capacities and for and in behalf of
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, Respondent.
Facts: Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into
law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by
promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It
took effect on August 23, 1994.
On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent
Secretary of the Department of Health. Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides the Phasing-out
of Commercial Blood Banks over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act,
extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary. ” Section 23 of AO 9
states the Process of Phasing Out.
The Act was passed after studies showed that blood transfusions could lead to transmission of
diseases, and that blood sold by persons to commercial blood banks are three times more likely to
have blood transfusion transmissible diseases than those donated to the Philippine National Red
Cross.
 Page 385 of 601

Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already been
operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled “An Act Regulating the
Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks
and Blood Processing Laboratories.”
On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed
a petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing
the constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations on the ground among others that it is an improper and unwarranted
delegation of legislative power and for discriminating against freestanding blood banks
in a manner, which is not germane to the purpose of the law.
Issues:
1. Whether or not section 7 of R.A. 7719 and its implementing rules and regulations violate the
equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes a valid exercise of police power.
Ruling:
1. NO. What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not
always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class
legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but classification on a
reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The classification,
however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and, (d) must apply equally to each member of the class.
Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act of 1994, was enacted for the
promotion of public health and welfare. In the aforementioned study conducted by the New
Tropical Medicine Foundation, it was revealed that the Philippine blood banking system is
disturbingly primitive and unsafe, and with its current condition, the spread of infectious
diseases such as malaria, AIDS, Hepatitis B and syphilis chiefly from blood transfusion is
unavoidable. The situation becomes more distressing as the study showed that almost 70% of
the blood supply in the country is sourced from paid blood donors who are three times riskier
than voluntary blood donors because they are unlikely to disclose their medical or social
history during the blood screening.
 Page 386 of 601

The above study led to the passage of Republic Act No. 7719, to instill public consciousness of
the importance and benefits of voluntary blood donation, safe blood supply and proper blood
collection from healthy donors. To do this, the Legislature decided to order the phase out of
commercial blood banks to improve the Philippine blood banking system, to regulate the
supply and proper collection of safe blood, and so as not to derail the implementation of the
voluntary blood donation program of the government. In lieu of commercial blood banks, non-
profit blood banks or blood centers, in strict adherence to professional and scientific standards
to be established by the DOH, shall be set in place.
Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the law to create a situation in
which unjustifiable discrimination and inequality shall be allowed. To effectuate its policy, a
classification was made between nonprofit blood banks/centers and commercial blood banks.
We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons: One, it was
based on substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian
reasons and as a medical service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while
the former wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter treats blood as a
sale of commodity.
Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is
germane to the purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate
supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood
transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. This
necessarily involves the phase out of commercial blood banks based on the fact
that they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their blood supply from
paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors
as shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine blood banking system.
Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its
enactment was not solely to address the peculiar circumstances of the situation
nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions. Lastly, the law applies
equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.
2. YES. The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of
the people is a primordial governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act
was enacted in the exercise of the State’s police power in order to promote and preserve
public health and safety. Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the
 Page 387 of 601

public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the interference of
the State; and, (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the
objective sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In the earlier
discussion, the Court has mentioned of the avowed policy of the law for the protection of
public health by ensuring an adequate supply of safe blood in the country through voluntary
blood donation. Attaining this objective requires the interference of the State given the
disturbing condition of the Philippine blood banking system.
In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the law, the
Legislature deemed it necessary to phase out commercial blood banks. This action may
seriously affect the owners and operators, as well as the employees, of commercial blood
banks but their interests must give way to serve a higher end for the interest of the public.
The Court finds that the National Blood Services Act is a valid exercise of the State’s police
power. Therefore, the Legislature, under the circumstances, adopted a course of action that is
both necessary and reasonable for the common good. Police power is the State authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare.
It is in this regard that the Court finds the related grounds and/or issues raised by petitioners,
namely, deprivation of personal liberty and property, and violation of the non-impairment
clause, to be unmeritorious. Petitioners are of the opinion that the Act is unconstitutional and
void because it infringes on the freedom of choice of an individual in connection to what he
wants to do with his blood which should be outside the domain of State intervention.
Additionally, and in relation to the issue of classification, petitioners asseverate that, indeed,
under the Civil Code, the human body and its organs like the heart, the kidney and the liver
are outside the commerce of man but this cannot be made to apply to human blood because
the latter can be replenished by the body. To treat human blood equally as the human organs
would constitute invalid classification. Petitioners likewise claim that the phase out of the
commercial blood banks will be disadvantageous to them as it will affect their businesses and
existing contracts with hospitals and other health institutions, hence Section 7 of the Act
should be struck down because it violates the non-impairment clause provided by the
Constitution. As stated above, the State, in order to promote the general welfare, may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Thus,
persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
 Page 388 of 601

general welfare of the State and to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of the
individual may be subordinated.

145) Short Title: People vs. Vera (65 Phil 56)

Full Title: G.R. No. L-45685; November 16, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.
Facts: Respondent Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case entitled “The People of the
Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", in which herein petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation is the offended party and acted as the private prosecutor. Respondent
Unjieng filed an application for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221 otherwise
known as the “Probation Law” in the Court of First Instance in Manila where Respondent
Vera is the Judge ad interim.
The Fiscal City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation of respondent,
stating that Act No. 4221 is violative of equal protection under Sec 1 (1), Article 3 of the
Constitution because its applicability is not uniform among the provinces in the
Philippines, particularly, the Section 11 of the Act gives the power among the provinces
to determine whether to implement the said law in their province or not. Petitioner
corporation filed a supplementary opposition arguing that the Act is a undue delegation
of legislative power.
Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of Act
No. 4221 and alleging that respondent judge has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of his
jurisdiction in granting the probation. On the other hand, the respondents contend that: the act is
constitutional, that the private may not intervene in probation proceedings, that the City Fiscal and
the Solicitor General are estopped form questioning the validity of the Act, that its validity cannot be
questioned for the first time before the Supreme court, and that the section in question of the act is
inseparable from the entire Act.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in these
proceedings.
2. Whether or not the said Act is unconstitutional.
 Page 389 of 601

Ruling:
1. Yes. Although the general rule is that only those who are parties to a suit may question the
constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the
decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where the jurisdiction of the court
depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of the constitutionality will be
considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the
effect to be given the statute.
In the case at bar, the trial court in granting the probation derived its jurisdiction in the
assailed Act therefore the petitioner have standing in the raising the issue. With regard to the
Solicitor General acting as a representing the People of the Philippines, if indeed the Act is
violative of the constitution, then the People has substantial interest on the issue. The well-
settled rule is, the State can challenge its own laws. In raising constitutionality questions, it
must be raised at the earliest possible time. However, this rule has exception, wherein courts
has jurisdiction to determine the time when question of constitutionality of a statute may be
presented. It can be raised even for the first time, if its resolution is necessary for the decision
of a case, which is the situation of the present case.
2. YES. The constitutionality of the act is questioned on three grounds, namely:
a) That said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive Pardon and
probation are vested on different branches, the former to the executive and the
latter to the judiciary. The two are distinct acts, pardon removes the penalties, disabilities
and restores civil rights of the accused, on the other hand, probation, is a suspension of
sentence temporarily or indefinitely but the conviction, liability and civil disabilities remains and
become operative after the suspension of when the judgement is rendered. Thus, the court
ruled that there is no encroachment in the pardoning power of the President since the two are
very different acts.
b) That it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power:
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall
apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the
salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals.
Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the
direction of the Probation Office.
 Page 390 of 601

The court rules that the section above constitute an improper and unlawful delegation of the
legislative power to the provincial board because of its insufficiency. It does not does not lay
down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided
in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. It does specify facts or conditions
which therefore gives the provincial board unlimited absolute power in implementing the Act.
c) That it denies the equal protection of the laws:
To implement the Act, the condition specified is the provision of the provincial
boards for the salary of a probation officer. Therefore, if a province do not comply
with it, the Act will not be enforceable in that province which means not all
provinces will be able to enforce it. These different situations is clearly a
manifestation of discrimination and inequality. Considering that the Act
particularly Section 11 is an undue delegation of legislative authority that denies
equal protection of laws, the court ruled it unconstitutional. And since the said
section is inseparable with the entire Act that its elimination will render the law
ineffective, the court further ruled Act No. 4221 as unconstitutional and void and
the writ of prohibition is granted.

MODULE 2-B-1. JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW (TESTS)

146) Short Title: Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.
Full Title: G.R. No. 167614; March 24, 2009
ANTONIO M. SERRANO, Petitioner, vs. Gallant MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW
NAVIGATION CO., INC., Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services,
Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc. under a POEA-approved Contract of Employment.
On the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract for the position of Second Officer upon the assurance and
representation of respondents that he would eventually be made Chief Officer.
However, respondents failed to deliver on their promise to petitioner. Petitioner refused to stay on as
Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines. Petitioner’s employment contract was for a
period of 12 months, but at the time of his repatriation, he had served only 2 months and 7 days of
his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of 9 months and 23 days. Petitioner filed a complaint with
 Page 391 of 601

the Labor Arbiter against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money
claims.

Labor Arbiter – rendered a Decision declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him
monetary benefits (petitioner’s salary for three months of the unexpired portion of the employment
contract)
o Basis: RA 8042, Sec. 10
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without
just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled
to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per
annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

NLRC – Modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision but lowered the money claim of petitioner because
overtime pay was removed (still based on the three months unexpired portion of the contract. CA –
affirmed NLRC’s decision

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act
No. 8042 violates the OFWs’ constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their
contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them due process. Said provision
exacerbates the hardships borne by OFWs by unduly limiting their entitlement in case of
illegal dismissal to their lump sum salary either for the unexpired portion of their
employment contract or for the 3 months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less.

RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTION: The constitutional issue should not be entertained for it was belatedly
interposed by petitioner in his appeal before the CA, and not at the earliest opportunity, which was
when he filed an appeal before the NLRC.

ARGUMENTS OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: R.A. No. 8042 took effect on July 15, 1995; its
provisions could not have impaired petitioner’s 1998 employment contract. Rather, R.A.
No. 8042 having preceded petitioner’s contract, the provisions thereof are deemed part
 Page 392 of 601

of the minimum terms of petitioner’s employment, especially on the matter of money

claims, as this was not stipulated upon by the parties.

NLRC – The NLRC corrected the LA’s computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to petitioner by
reducing the applicable salary rate. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time
he questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause. Motion was denied. Petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause.

CA- Dismissed petitioner’s motion due to technicality. CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction
of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
Petitioner raised that the CA erred to not acknowledge the constitutional issues raised by the
petitioner on the constitutionality of said law, which unreasonably, unfairly and arbitrarily limits
payment of the award for back wages of overseas workers to three (3) months. The law in question
is Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 – Migrant Workers Act, to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. – x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid
or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

Petitioner contends that the subject clause is unconstitutional because (1) it unduly impairs the
freedom of OFWs to negotiate for and stipulate in their overseas employment contracts a
determinate employment period and a fixed salary package and; (2) It also impinges on the
equal protection clause, for it treats OFWs differently from local Filipino workers (local
workers) by putting a cap on the amount of lump-sum salary to which OFWs are entitled
in case of illegal dismissal, while setting no limit to the same monetary award for local
workers when their dismissal is declared illegal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-
impairment of contracts?
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section
18,Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.
 Page 393 of 601

RULING:
1. NO. Petitioner’s claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his
contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is not
tenable. Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides: “No law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed.”

The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a
prospective operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected. As to laws
already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof. Thus,
the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws about to
be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging,
abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.

2. YES. The subject clause violates Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on Labor as protected sector. Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution guarantees that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law” and Section
18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without
distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions
translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by
workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal
degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the
burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.

Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate,
when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the
classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions;
2) it is germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and
4) it applies equally to all members of the class.
 Page 394 of 601

There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality
of a classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in
which the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to
serving a legitimate state interest; b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in
which the government must show that the challenged classification serves an
important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related
to serving that interest; and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative
classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is
the least restrictive means to protect such interest.

Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of
constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative
power. But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a
fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by
the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict.
Imbued with the same sense of “obligation to afford protection to labor,” the Court in the
present case also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject
clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs. Upon cursory reading, the subject clause
appears facially neutral for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that
the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs. As
the foregoing matrix readily shows, the subject clause classifies OFWs into two categories. The
first category includes OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of less than one year; in
case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion of
their contract. The second category consists of OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts
of one year or more; in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to monetary award
equivalent to only three months of the unexpired portion of their contracts. The disparity
becomes more aggravating with the fact that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of
contract periods or the unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the
computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected
 Page 395 of 601

to a uniform rule of computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired portion
of their employment contracts.

The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of
computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment
periods, in the process singling out one category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of
one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary
awards limited to their salaries for three months or for the unexpired portion thereof,
whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other category from such prejudice, simply
because the latter's unexpired contracts fall short of one year. There being a suspect
classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution, the Court now
subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a
compelling state interest through the least restrictive means. In the present case, the Court
dug deep into the records but found no discernible state interest, let alone a compelling one,
that is sought to be protected or advanced by the adoption of the subject clause. The subject
clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that precise
reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her right
to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.

The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for
the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment
contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No.
8042. The 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
 Page 396 of 601

MODULE 3. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE

Art. III, Sec. 3(1)
Concept, Basis and Aspect
147) Whalen vs. Roe [429 US 589 (1977]
Robert P. WHALEN, as Commissioner of Health of New York, Appellant, v. Richard ROE

Facts: In 1972, the state legislature enacted the New York State Controlled Substances
Act. The Act required doctors to fill out forms for potentially harmful prescription drugs.
The prescribing doctor kept one copy, while another copy was sent to the dispensing
pharmacy and a third copy was sent to the state department of health.
The forms included personal information such as the patient's name, address, and
age, which is filed with the State Health Department, where pertinent data are recorded on tapes for
 Page 397 of 601

computer processing. All forms are retained for a five-year period under a system to
safeguard their security, and are thereafter destroyed. Public disclosure of the patient's
identity is prohibited, and access to the files is confined to a limited number of health department
and investigatory personnel.

Issue: Whether the reporting and record-keeping requirements violate the constitutional right to
privacy embraced by the concept of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment?

Ruling: NO. The Court held that the requirements of the Act did not on its face violate a
"constitutionally protected 'zone of privacy.'" The Court found that the statutory scheme
evidenced "a proper concern with, and protection of, the individual's interest in privacy"
and that the "remote possibility" of potential abuses of data accumulation and disclosure
were not sufficient to establish an invasion of any rights or liberties protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The patient identification requirement is a reasonable exercise of the State's broad police
powers, and the District Court's finding that the necessity for the requirement had not been proved
is not a sufficient reason for holding the statute unconstitutional.

148) Morfe vs. Mutuc (G.R. No. L-20387, January 31,1968)

G.R. No. L-20387 January 31, 1968
JESUS P. MORFE, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
AMELITO R. MUTUC, as Executive Secretary, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Facts: One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is
that every public officer, either within thirty (30) days after its approval or after his
assumption of office “and within the month of January of every other year thereafter”, as well as
upon the termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to
which he belongs, “a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities,
including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his
personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding calendar: . . .”
 Page 398 of 601

In relation to Morfe’s alleged accumulation of assets grossly disproportionate to his reported

incomes after his assumption to office, plaintiff Morfe alleged that the periodical submission
of such sworn statement of assets is violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of
police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in
the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-
incrimination.
On the otherhand, the defendants Secretary of Justice and Executive Secretary
contended that it was a legitimate exercise of police power, and that Morfe, having
accepted a public position, voluntarily assumed the obligation to give information about
his personal affair, not only at the time of his assumption of office but during the time he
continues to discharge public trust.
Lower court: Law is unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether or not the required periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities
is unconstitutional on the grounds of it being an unlawful invasion of right to privacy, and an insult to
the personal integrity and official dignity of public officials.

Held: No. SC said that such provision of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is constitutional. It is
within the State’s police power, and is not violative of due process and liberty. It is also
not a violation of guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure, and is not against the non-
incrimination clause. Furthermore, it is not an insult to the personal integrity and official dignity of
public officials.

The Anti-Graft Act of 1960 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the
opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public
service. It is intended to further promote morality in public administration. A public
office must indeed be a public trust.

The State’s inherent police power enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society. However, if the police power extends to regulatory action affecting
persons in public or private life, then anyone with an alleged grievance can invoke the protection of
due process which permits deprivation of property or liberty as long as such requirement is observed.
 Page 399 of 601

If due process mandate is not disregarded, even a public official, to protect the security of tenure
which is analogous to property, can protect himself from an infringement of his liberty. However,
liberty, in the interest of public health, public order, or safety, of general welfare, in other words
through the proper exercise of the police power, may be regulated.

In here, the reasonableness of the law makes the prohibition valid and within the ambit
of police power.

It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of
public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as
arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that imposed upon public officials and employees to file
such sworn statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having done so upon assuming
office. There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power.

A periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities after assumption of

office is within the power of the government to impose, even if it will affect the public
officer’s liberty, for as long as due process is observed. In subjecting the public officer to such
a further compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the statement of the amounts
and sources of income, the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of income
taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what
otherwise would be a private sphere.

149) Disini vs. Secretary of Justice (G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014)
G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL
and ERNESTO SONIDO, JR., Petitioners, vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Respondents.
 Page 400 of 601

Facts: The main point of contention in this case was RA 10175, also known as the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of2012. Said law sought to regulate the use of the Internet,
however, a number of its provisions were subject to numerous petitions. These petitions
prayed for said provisions to be declared unconstitutional.
With regard to the right to privacy enunciated in Section 3, Article III of the Constitution, the
following were subjected to scrutiny by the Court:
Sec. 4(b) 3 (Identity Theft) – intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession,
alteration, or deletion of identifying information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical,
without right (petitioners’ stance: violates constitutional right to privacy, among others)
Sec. 12 (Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data) – law enforcement authorities with due
cause shall be authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time
associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system
(Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or
record traffic data in real time as tending to curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities
for official abuse. They claim that data showing where digital messages come from, what
kind they are, and where they are destined need not be incriminating to their senders or
recipients before they are to be protected. Petitioners invoke the right of every individual
to privacy and to be protected from government snooping into the messages or
information that they send to one another.)

Issue: W/N the said provisions violate the constitutional guaranty of the right to privacy

Held: NO and YES. Sec. 4(b) 3 (Identity Theft) is found to be valid and constitutional by the
Court. However, the Court found Sec. 12 (Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data) unconstitutional
for being in violation of one’s right to privacy.

Zones of Privacy
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form
of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary
legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction
that the right to privacy is a “constitutional right” and “the right most valued by civilized men,” but
 Page 401 of 601

also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, “no one
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy” and “every has the right to the protection
of the law against such interference or attacks.”

Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and
(b) the right to privacy of communication and correspondence. In assessing the challenge
that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine
whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.

No showing how the provision violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as
the right to due process of the law.

The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship,
his residence address, his contact number, his place and date of birth, the name of his
spouse if any, his occupation, and similar data. The law punishes those who acquire or
use such identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners
simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft
violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of the
law.

However, the Court found Sec. 12 (Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data) unconstitutional for
being in violation of one’s right to privacy. This is because the gathering of a user’straffic data
can easily reveal such person’s patterns when using the Internet. Such is particularly
true especially when it involves the storage and review of collected data, which is a clear
invasion of privacy. It is notable that the collectionof traffic data is similar to the concept of
‘cookies,’ which is used by online advertising companies like Google in theirproliferation of ads, but
such is only limited to commercial uses, and requires the user’s consent beforehand.

Two categories of right to privacy

 Page 402 of 601

In Whalen v. Roe, the United States Supreme Court classified privacy in two categories:
decisional privacy and informational privacy.

Decisional privacy involves the right to independence in making certain important decisions, while
informational privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. It is the
latter right – the right to informational privacy – that those who oppose government collection or
recording of traffic data in real-time seek to protect.

Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the
messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient.

Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those “associated with specified
communications.” But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the law
enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications. The power is virtually
limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in “fishing expedition,”
choosing whatever specified communication they want. This evidently threatens the
right of individuals to privacy.

Zones of Privacy
150. In the Matter of the petition for Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio vs.
Senator Gordon (Gr. No. 174340, October 17, 2006)
G.R. No. 174340 October 17, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF
CAMILO L. SABIO, petitioner, J. ERMIN ERNEST LOUIE R. MIGUEL, petitioner-relator, vs.
HONORABLE SENATOR RICHARD GORDON, in his capacity as Chairman, and the HONORABLE
MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES and
THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES of the Senate, HONORABLE SENATOR JUAN PONCE-ENRILE,
in his official capacity as Member, HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, Senate President, SENATE
SERGEANT-AT-ARMS, and the SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS: Then Pres. Corazon Aquino, through EO No. 1, created the PCGG whose task is to
recover the ill-gotten wealth accumulated by deposed Pres. Marcos, his family, relatives,
 Page 403 of 601

subordinates and close associates. Sec. 4-b, EO 1 provides that: “[n]o member or staff of
the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.”
The constitutionality of said provision is being questioned in this case on the
ground that it tramples upon the Senate’s power to conduct legislative inquiry under Art.
VI, Sec. 21 of the 1987 Constitution.
Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 was introduced by then Sen. Defensor Santiago,
“directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective
Board of Directors.”
Pursuant to this resolution, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and
his Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted
by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on
Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the
same time invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1..

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all
PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.

RULING: No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry
not only to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their
respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the
committees and it means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in order to
effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to the committees.

It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita,
where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of
 Page 404 of 601

the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation
of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.”

Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article
VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’
power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any
provision granting such exemption. The Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad,
encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as
proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends “to government agencies created
by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or
even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class.

A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power
to enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; or its purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles.

Moreover, Sec. 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is
inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on the Congress’ power of inquiry (Art. VI,
Sec. 21), the principle of public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II,
Sec. 28), and the right of access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).

Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of
Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.

Exclusionary Rule
• Art. III, Sec. 3(2)
151) Silverthorne Lumber vs. US [251 US 385 (1920)
Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)

FACTS: An indictment was brought against Frederick Silverthorne and his father, the owners
of Silverthorne Lumber Company (Lumber), on a single charge. After the Silverthornes were
 Page 405 of 601

arrested at their homes, the government held them in custody. Meanwhile, federal law
enforcement officials, without any legal authority, went to Lumber's office and obtained
books, papers, and documents.
An application was made for a return of what had been taken. The United States
made photographs and copies of material papers and framed a new indictment based
upon the knowledge they obtained. The district court ordered return of the originals but
impounded the photographs and copies.
The subpoenas to produce the originals were served. Although the district court
found that all the papers were seized in violation of the Silverthornes' constitutional
rights, it ordered them to comply with the subpoenas. The Silverthornes sought review of
the judgment.

ISSUE: Whether evidence illegally seized from a company by government agents could be used
against the defendant

RULING: No. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court overturned the district court's
judgment. Because the government had obtained the company papers by illegal means,
the government could not use the knowledge gained from its wrong to frame a new indictment and
use the evidence in a prosecution. The Court noted that such use of the knowledge gained
from unlawful means would reduce the Fourth Amendment to a mere "form of words."

The Court agreed that “[I]f knowledge of them (the evidence) is gained from an
independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by
the Government’s own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed.” In other words,
if the government can show it could have obtained the needed information from another
source, it may be permitted to keep the evidence, but absent that proof, the evidence will
be inadmissible.

EXCLUSIONARY RULE: prohibits a prosecutor from admitting evidence in court that was
illegally obtained. In this case, the exclusionary rule did not apply. There are a number of
ways that evidence can be obtained illegally by the police. Most are due to a violation of
the defendant’s 4th Amendment rights which state that the people shall be secure in their
 Page 406 of 601

persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. It also
requires probable cause to be the basis of the warrant.

152. Short Title: People vs. Aruta (G.R. No. 120915, April 3, 1998)
Full Title: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSA ARUTA y
MENGUIN, accused-appellant.

Facts: On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as Benjie,
that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the following day, December 14, 1988,
with a large volume of marijuana.
A Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters BGO printed on its front and back
bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the evening of the same day from
where two females and a male got off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to the
team "Aling Rosa" who was then carrying a traveling bag.
Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag
marked "Cash Katutak." The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to
which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office
for investigation where a Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana
leaves.
Despite challenging the legality of the search and arrest, Aruta was convicted by the RTC for
transporting prohibited drugs in violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972 and sentenced to life
imprisonment. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of accused-appellant violated the
latter’s constitutional rights.

Ruling: YES. A search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant
validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. However, this
constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates
only against "unreasonable" searches and seizures.
 Page 407 of 601

The plain import of the language of the Constitution, which in one sentence prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures and at the same time prescribes the requisites for a valid warrant, is that
searches and seizures are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant
or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is
that between person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with
power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.

Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as
evidence. This exclusionary rule was later enshrined in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution,
thus:

Sec. 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.

From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply intrude indiscriminately into
the houses, papers, effects, and most importantly, on the person of an individual. The
constitutional provision guaranteed an impenetrable shield against unreasonable
searches and seizures. As such, it protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself
against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint. While generally, a warrant must be
issued first by a judge based on probable cause, the following cases of warrantless searches are
allowed by law:
1. Search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view;
3. Search of moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances;

The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers
to trample upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons against
unreasonable search and seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied
 Page 408 of 601

before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. In searches and seizures effected
without a warrant, it is necessary for probable cause to be present. Absent any probable cause, the
article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as evidence against the person arrested. Probable
cause, in these cases, must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime
has been committed or is about to be committed.

In this case, accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about
to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street
and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents
to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to
accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was
singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant
were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on
record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing
a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. The Court could neither sanction nor
tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid
requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests.

Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of
accused-appellant's bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been
lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the
subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-
appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for
these are "fruits of a poisoned tree" and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec.
3(2) of the Constitution. Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be
incidental to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal.
Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his
belongings.
 Page 409 of 601

In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest, the search and
seizure of accused-appellant's bag would also not be justified as seizure of evidence in "plain view"
under the second exception. The marijuana was obviously not immediately apparent as shown by the
fact that the NARCOM agents still had to request accused-appellant to open the bag to ascertain its
contents. Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellant's bag be justified as a search of
a moving vehicle. There was no moving vehicle to speak of in the instant case as accused-appellant
was apprehended several minutes after alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In fact, she was
accosted in the middle of the street and not while inside the vehicle.

Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to be seized to those and only
those, particularly described in the warrant so as to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they shall seize to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not
be made.

Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have secured one without too
much difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor General. The person intended to be
searched has been particularized and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also sufficiently
ascertained to be in the afternoon of December 14, 1988. "Aling Rosa" turned out to be accused-
appellant and the thing to be seized was marijuana. The vehicle was identified to be a Victory Liner
bus. In fact, the NARCOM agents purposely positioned themselves near the spot where Victory Liner
buses normally unload their passengers. Assuming that the NARCOM agents failed to particularize the
vehicle, this would not in any way hinder them from securing a search warrant. The above particulars
would have already sufficed. In any case, this Court has held that the police should particularly
describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is
feasible.

In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search
warrant considering that they had more than twenty-four hours to do so. Obviously, this
is again an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence illegal and
inadmissible subsequently in evidence. The exclusion of such evidence is the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
 Page 410 of 601

and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.

153. Short Title: People vs. Rondero (G.R. No.125687, December 9, 1999)
Full Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DELFIN
RONDERO, accused-appellant.

Facts: Mardy Doria came home late from a barrio fiesta when he noticed that his 9-year old sister,
Mylene, was not around. Realizing that Mylene was missing, their father, Maximo Doria, sought the
help of a neighbor, Barangay Kagawad Andong Rondero to search for Mylene.

The group began searching for Mylene at around 1:00 a.m. They scoured the campus of Pugaro
Elementary School and the seashore in vain. They even returned to the school and inspected every
classroom but to no avail. Tired and distraught, Maximo started on his way home. When he was
about 5 meters away from his house, Maximo, who was then carrying a flashlight, saw Delfin
Rondero pumping the artesian well about 1 meter away. Rondero had an ice pick
clenched in his mouth and was washing his bloodied hands.

Maximo hastily returned to the school and told Kagawad Andong what he saw without, however,
revealing that the person he saw was the latter's own son. Maximo and Andong continued their
search for Mylene but after failing to find her, the two men decided to go home. After some time, a
restless Maximo began to search anew for her daughter. He again sought the help of
Andong and the barangay secretary. The group returned to Pugaro Elementary School
where they found Mylene's lifeless body lying on a cemented pavement near the canteen.
Her right hand was raised above her head, which was severely bashed, and her fractured
left hand was behind her back. She was naked from the waist down and had several
contusions and abrasions on different parts of her body. Tightly gripped in her right hand
were some hair strands. A blue rubber slipper with a tiny leaf painted in red was found beside her
body while the other slipper was found behind her back. 5 policemen arrived at the scene and
conducted a spot investigation. They found a pair of shorts under Mylene's buttocks, which Maximo
identified as hers.
 Page 411 of 601

Thereafter, Maximo led the policemen to the artesian well where he had seen Rondero
earlier washing his hands. The policemen found that the artesian well was spattered with
blood. After the investigation, the policemen, together with Maximo, went back to their headquarters
in Dagupan City. There, Maximo disclosed that before they found Mylene's body, he saw
Rondero washing his bloodstained hands at the artesian well. Acting on this lead, the
policemen returned to Pugaro and arrested Rondero. Some policemen took the newly
washed undershirt and short pants of Rondero from the clothesline. The policemen
brought Rondero's wife, Christine, with them to the police headquarters for questioning.
When asked about the blood on her husband's clothes, Christine told them about their
quarrel the night before.

On 28 March 1994, the hair strands which were found on the victim's right hand and at the
scene of the crime, together with hair specimens taken from the victim and Rondero,
were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for laboratory examination.
Meanwhile, Rondero was formally charged with the special complex crime of rape with
homicide. Rondero pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. As to the hair specimen sent to
the NBI, comparative micro-physical examination on the specimens showed that the hair
strands found on the right hand of the victim had similar characteristics to those of
accused-appellant's, while the hair specimen taken from the crime scene showed similar
characteristics to those of the victim's.

The trial court rendered judgment convicting Rondero of the crime of murder and
sentencing him to death. Rondero moved for reconsideration. The trial court issued an order
modifying its earlier decision, convicting Rondero of the crime of homicide and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead, on the ground that under Section 10 of Republic Act
7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act," the penalty for homicide is reclusion perpetua when the victim is under 12 years
of age. Rondero appealed.

Issue: Whether the evidence gathered, particularly accused-appellant’s hair strands can be admitted
as evidence against him.
 Page 412 of 601

Ruling: Yes. Under Section 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution, what is actually proscribed is
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from Rondero and not the inclusion
of his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from the body of
the accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine
forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him. Consequently,
although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to
the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him,
for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature
acquired from the accused under duress.

On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from the accused are
inadmissible in evidence. They were taken without the proper search warrant from the police officers.
Accused-appellant’s wife testified that the police officers, after arresting her husband in their house,
took the garments from the clothesline without proper authority. This was never rebutted by the
prosecution. Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the “fruit of the poisonous tree,”
evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other evidence because the
illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. Simply put, accused-appellant’s
garments, having been seized in violation of his constitutional right against illegal searches and
seizure, are inadmissible in court as evidence.

Art. III, Sec. 2

154) Short Title: Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board (G.R. No. 157870,
November 3, 2008)

Full Title: SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD
and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), respondents.

Facts: This is a consolidated case of Pimentel, SJS and Laserna.

 Page 413 of 601

In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was
implemented. Section 36 (g) (c) (d) and (f) thereof requires mandatory drug testing of (g) candidates
for public office, (c) students of secondary and tertiary schools, (d) officers and employees of public
and private offices, and (f) persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses.

In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, sought to implement said RA 9165 in
connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a
senator and a candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a
qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987
Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486. According to
him, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications (see notes) for one to be a
candidate or to be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by
requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an
additional qualification that all candidates for senator. He adds that there is no provision in the
Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of
candidates for senator.

Other parties in this petition are:

The Social Justice Society (SJS), registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs
Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing all four paragraphs
(c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165. They contend the unconstitutionality of the provisions
because: a) it constitutes undue delegation of legislative power when they give discretion to schools
and employers to determine the manner of drug testing; b) the provisions trench in the equal
protection clause; and c) constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached Atty.
Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for
infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure,
and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal
protection guarantees.
 Page 414 of 601

Issue/s:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an
additional qualification for candidates for senator, and can Congress enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution
(2) Whether or not paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 are
unconstitutional

Ruling:

(1) YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator. NO, Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution,
effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be
certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of
candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if
proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the
proviso that “no person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office
until he has undergone mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer
to what the 1987 Constitution requires for membership in the Senate. Congress’ inherent
legislative powers are subject to certain limitations. In Government v. Springer, the Court has
defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power: “In constitutional governments, as well
as governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x
x are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter xxx” Thus,
legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and
constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the
allowable subjects of legislation. The constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of
Rights and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the
qualifications of candidates for senators.
 Page 415 of 601

In the same vein, if Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the
democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement
not otherwise specified in the Constitution.

(2) The Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of Sec. 36 (c) requiring
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional.
Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for
admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. A random
drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable, but may
even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate
concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected.

In the case for Sec. 36 (d), officers and employees of public and private offices is
justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason of the students. SJS has failed to show
how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165
violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs.
1 and 2 of the Constitution. The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. Authorities
are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the
public and defers to the state’s exercise of police power. As the warrantless clause of
Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held, “reasonableness” is
the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. While every officer
and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or
she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for
drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when
and who is to be tested. It is to be noted the very reason RA 9165 was enacted is to safeguard
the well-being of the citizens from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The operative concepts
in the mandatory drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.”

In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory
drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being
 Page 416 of 601

suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not
randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime
are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. To impose mandatory drug
testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for
criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this
case would violate a persons’ right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

In sum, Section 36(c) and (d) are constitutional, but 36(f) is not.

155) Short Title: Nacague vs. Sulpicio Lines (G.R. No. 172589, August 8, 2010)
Full Title: G.R. No. 172589 August 8, 2010
JEFFREY NACAGUE, Petitioner,
vs.
SULPICIO LINES, INC., Respondent
Facts: Respondent Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (Sulpicio Lines) hired Nacague as "hepe de viaje"
or the representative of Sulpicio Lines on board its vessel M/V Princess of the World (the
ship).
Sulpicio Lines received an anonymous letter reporting the use of illegal drugs on board the
ship. On Ceasar T. Chico, a housekeeper on the ship, submitted a report regarding the
drug paraphernalia found inside the Mopalla Suite Room and the threat on his life made by
Nacague and Chief Mate Reynaldo Doroon after he found the drug paraphernalia. Sulpicio Lines sent
a notice of investigation to Nacague informing him of the charges against him for use of illegal drugs
and threatening a co-employee.
When the ship docked in the port of Manila on 18 February 2003, some crew members of the ship,
together with Nacague, were subjected to a random drug test. They were taken to S.M. Lazo
Medical Clinic (S.M. Lazo Clinic) and were required to submit urine samples. The result of the random
drug test revealed that Nacague was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Sulpicio Lines subjected Nacague to a formal investigation. Nacague denied using illegal
drugs. Nacague went to Chong Hua Hospital in Cebu City to undergo a voluntary drug test. The drug
test with Chong Hua Hospital yielded a negative result. Nacague submitted this test result to Sulpicio
 Page 417 of 601

Lines. However, Sulpicio Lines sent a memorandum to Nacague terminating him from the
service. The memorandum reads:
After a careful consideration of your case with the evidence available, including your explanation, and
with the positive drug test result, management finds you culpable of grave misconduct and loss of
trust and confidence. In view thereof, the company is constrained to terminate your employment
effective today, March 7, 2003. Feeling aggrieved, Nacague filed a complaint for illegal suspension,
illegal dismissal and for reinstatement with backwages.
On 12 November 2003, Labor Arbiter Ernesto F. Carreon rendered a decision in favor of Nacague and
declared that Sulpicio Lines illegally dismissed Nacague.
Issue: Whether or not there was just cause to terminate Nacague’s employment
Ruling: YES. Nacague maintains that the S.M. Lazo Clinic drug test was not credible
because Sulpicio Lines failed to show that S.M. Lazo Clinic is an authorized drug testing
center. Nacague also alleges that the urine samples were gathered carelessly without proper labels
to identify their owners and that S.M. Lazo Clinic did not ask Nacague if he was taking any
medication that might alter the results of the drug test. Nacague adds that Republic Act No.
9165 (R.A. No. 9165) and the Department of Labor and Employment Order No. 53-03
(Department Order No. 53-03) require two drug tests — a screening test and a
confirmatory test. Nacague maintains that, since only a screening test was conducted, he
was illegally dismissed based on an incomplete drug test. Nacague argues that Sulpicio
Lines failed to discharge its burden of proving that the termination of his employment
was legal.
The NLRC and the Court of Appeals ruled that Sulpicio Lines validly terminated Nacague’s
employment because he was found guilty of using illegal drugs which constitutes serious misconduct
and loss of trust and confidence. However, we find that Sulpicio Lines failed to clearly show that
Nacague was guilty of using illegal drugs. We agree with the Labor Arbiter that the lack of
accreditation of S.M. Lazo Clinic made its drug test results doubtful.
As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two
testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as
much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important
consideration lies in the fact that the tests shall be conducted by trained professionals in
access-controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to
safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.
 Page 418 of 601

The law is clear that drug tests shall be performed only by authorized drug testing
centers.1avvphi1 In this case, Sulpicio Lines failed to prove that S.M. Lazo Clinic is an
accredited drug testing center. Sulpicio Lines did not even deny Nacague’s allegation that S.M.
Lazo Clinic was not accredited. Also, only a screening test was conducted to determine if Nacague
was guilty of using illegal drugs. Sulpicio Lines did not confirm the positive result of the screening test
with a confirmatory test. Sulpicio Lines failed to indubitably prove that Nacague was guilty of using
illegal drugs amounting to serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence. Sulpicio Lines failed
to clearly show that it had a valid and legal cause for terminating Nacague’s employment. When the
alleged valid cause for the termination of employment is not clearly proven, as in this case, the law
considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.

Art. III, Sec. 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 17 (Penumbra)

156) Short Title: Griswold vs. Connecticut [381 US 479 (1965)]
Full Title: Estelle T. GRISWOLD et al. Appellants,
v.
STATE OF CONNECTICUT.
Facts: In 1879, Connecticut passed a law that banned the use of any drug, medical
device, or other instrument in furthering contraception. A gynecologist at the Yale School of
Medicine, C. Lee Buxton, opened a birth control clinic in New Haven in conjunction with Estelle
Griswold, who was the head of Planned Parenthood in Connecticut. They were arrested and
convicted of violating the law, and their convictions were affirmed by higher state courts.
Their plan was to use the clinic to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under the Fourteenth
Amendment before the Supreme Court.
(Appellant Griswold is Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of
Connecticut. Appellant Buxton is a licensed physician and a professor at the Yale Medical School
who served as Medical Director for the League at its Center in New Haven—a center open and
operating from November 1 to November 10, 1961, when appellants were arrested.
They gave information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the
means of preventing conception. They examined the wife and prescribed the best contraceptive
device or material for her use. Fees were usually charged, although some couples were serviced
free.)
 Page 419 of 601

Issue: Whether the Constitution protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a
couple's ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives?
Ruling: The statutes whose constitutionality is involved in this appeal are §§ 53—32 and
54—196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.). The former provides:
'Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of
preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less
than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned.'
Section 54—196 provides:
'Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit
any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.'
The appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each, against the claim
that the accessory statute as so applied violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
A right to privacy can be inferred from several amendments in the Bill of Rights, and this right
prevents states from making the use of contraception by married couples illegal.
In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Douglas, the Court ruled that the Constitution did in fact protect
the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on contraception. While the Court explained that
the Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the various guarantees within
the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to privacy. Together, the First,
Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments create the right to privacy in marital relations. The Connecticut
statute conflicted with the exercise of this right and was therefore held null and void.
157) Short Title: Ople vs. Torres (G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998)
Full Title: G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998
BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner,
vs.
RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO,
ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS
P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
 Page 420 of 601

We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers
against further erosion.
Petitioner contends that the establishment of a national computerized identification reference system
requires a legislative act. The issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the president of the republic of the
Philippines is, therefore, an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the congress of
the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue: Whether the implementation of AO No. 308 violates the Rights to Privacy enshrined in the
constitution?

Ruling: YES. Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil
Code provides that "[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts
several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds
a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation
of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and
other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets
by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of
privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits
Act and the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise
recognize the privacy of certain information.
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society.
The threats emanate from various sources — governments, journalists, employers, social
scientists, etc. In th case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of
government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their
privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate
delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent
fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a
devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-worded warning
of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an unerasable record
of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping, the society
will have lost its benign capacity to forget." Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should
 Page 421 of 601

not be too quick in labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement
that the right to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy.

158) Ople vs Torres
BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR
VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR
SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER
CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
Summary Cases:
Subject: Locus Standi of Senator Ople; Ripeness for adjudication; Legislative Power vs Executive
Power; As head of the executive branch, the President exercises both Control Power and Supervisory
(Administrative) Power; A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be
covered by an administrative order; Right to Privacy is a constitutional right; A.O. No.
308 is invalid as it violates the right to privacy also suffers from vagueness and
overbreadth; Reasonable expectation of privacy (Two-part test); Use of biometrics and
computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable
expectation of privacy; A.O. No. 308, being overbroad, cannot be upheld based on the
Rational relationship test ; Right to privacy (Strict scrutiny standard)

Facts: Senator Blas F. Ople seeks to invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 issued by
President Fidel Ramos entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of
the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's
protected zone of privacy.

Petitioner Ople filed the instant petition against Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of
the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are
charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308.

The petitioner contends that the implementation of the said A.O. will violate the rights of
the citizens of privacy as guaranteed by the Constitution.
 Page 422 of 601

ISSUE: Whether or not A.O. No. 308 violates the right of privacy.

Held: YES. A.O. No. 308 cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because
facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the “right to be let alone.” The
right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with
liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be
underplayed. The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a
mass society. The threats emanate from various sources — governments, journalists, employers,
social scientists, etc.

In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by
issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving
information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic
services.

They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent. The right to
privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of
government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest
interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations:

(1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently
transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities and

(2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these
interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. Ople vs. Torres
[Rights of Privacy]
 Page 423 of 601

But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No.
308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present
danger.

The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology
are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be
read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded.

They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.

Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that
A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against
unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., “the
disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an unerasable record of his
past and his limitations.

159) Pollo vs Constantino – David

G.R. No. 181881 October 18, 2011
BRICCIO "Ricky" A. POLLO, Petitioner, vs. CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-
DAVID, DIRECTOR IV RACQUEL DE GUZMAN BUENSALIDA, DIRECTOR IV LYDIA A.
CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III ENGELBERT ANTHONY D. UNITE AND THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, Respondents.
Facts: An anonymous letter-complaint was received by the respondent Civil Service Commission
Chairperson alleging that an officer of the CSC has been lawyering for public officials with pending
cases in the CSC. Chairperson David immediately formed a team with background in information
technology and issued a memorandum directing them “to back up all the files in the computers found
in the [CSC-ROIV] Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”
The team proceeded at once to the office and backed up all files in the hard disk of computers at the
PALD and the Legal Services Division. Within the same day, the investigating team finished the task.
It was found that most of the files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the
petitioner were draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other
 Page 424 of 601

tribunals. Chairperson David thus issued a Show-Cause Order requiring the petitioner to submit his
explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
Petitioner denied that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint. He asserted
that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave, and that the
files in his computer were his personal files and those of his relatives and associates, and that he is
not authorize the activities as they are in violation of his constitutional right to privacy and protection
against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. Also, the files/documents copied from
his computer without his consent are inadmissible as evidence, being “fruits of a poisonous tree.”
The CSC found prima facie case against the petitioner and charged him with Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713
(Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). On 24 July 2007, the
CSC issued a Resolution finding petitioner GUILTY of the same merits and meted the penalty of
DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with all its accessory penalties. This Resolution was also brought to
the CA by herein petitioner.
By a Decision dated 11 October 2007, the CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition for certiorari after
finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondents CSC officials. His motion for
reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brought this appeal before the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether the search conducted and the copying of petitioner’s files without his
knowledge and consent lawful?
Held: Yes. The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the
right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution. The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures
but only of “unreasonable” searches and seizures.
Applying the analysis and principles announced in O’Connor and Simons for warrantless searches
involving public employees for work related reasons to the case at bar, we now address the following
questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer
files? (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair reasonable in its inception and scope?
The petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files for he failed
to prove that he had an actual expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued
computer which contained his personal files. He did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office
which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other
 Page 425 of 601

employees or visitors. He did not use passwords nor adopted any means to prevent access by others
of his computer files. The CSC also implemented a policy which implies on-the-spot inspections may
be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such legitimate business
purposes.
The search authorized by the respondent CSC Chair was reasonable since it was conducted in
connection with investigation of work-related misconduct. A search by a government employer of an
employee’s office is justified when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in the
mind of the Commission that the search of Pollo’s computer has successfully passed the test of
reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace. It bears emphasis that the Commission
pursued the search in its capacity as a government employer and that it was undertaken in
connection with an investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of the circumstances
exempted from the warrant requirement. The nature of the imputation was serious, as it was
grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in the practice
of “lawyering” for parties with pending cases before the Commission would be a highly repugnant
scenario, then such a case would have shattering repercussions. It is settled that a court or an
administrative tribunal must not only be actually impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the
general public would not have any trust and confidence in it. Considering the damaging nature of the
accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any possible adverse
consequence or fall-out.
Thus, petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. His
other argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain
legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under the aforecited
authorities. We likewise find no merit in his contention that O’Connor and Simons are not relevant
because the present case does not involve a criminal offense like child pornography. As already
mentioned, the search of petitioner’s computer was justified there being reasonable ground for
suspecting that the files stored therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the
investigation being conducted by CSC as government employer of such misconduct subject of the
anonymous complaint. This situation clearly falls under the exception to the warrantless requirement
in administrative searches defined in O’Connor.
 Page 426 of 601

160) Ayer Production vs Judge Capulong

G.R. No. 82380 April 29, 1988
AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. and McELROY & McELROY FILM
PRODUCTIONS, petitioners, vs. HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, respondents.
DOCTRINE: The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four
Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon
private respondent's "right of privacy."
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE – those words are used in such a circumstance and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantial evils
that a lawmaker has a right to prevent.
BALANCING OF INTERESTS TEST- the courts should balance the public interest served by
legislation on one hand and the freedom of speech (or any other constitutional right) on the other.
The courts will then decide where the greater weight should be placed.
FACTS: Petitioner McElroy, an Australian Film maker, and AYER PRODUCTIONS, his movie
production company envisioned, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and International Release,
the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA.
The proposed Motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB and
other government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film
production. It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-
drama" style, creating four fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual
documentary footage as background.
David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New South
Wales) is an American historian have developed a script. Private Respondent Ponce Enrile declared
that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or
picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other
medium for advertising or commercial exploitation.
Petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and
petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile
invoking his right to privacy is unlawfully intruded. Petitioner contended that:
a. the freedom to produce and film includes in the freedom of speech and expression; and
 Page 427 of 601

b. the subject matter of the motion picture is one of public interest and concern and not on
the individual private life of respondent Senator. RTC Judge Ignacio Capulong ordered for
the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or his
family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is
based on or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.
ISSUES:
a. Whether or not the Freedom of Speech/ Expression includes freedom to film and produce
motion pictures.
b. Whether or not the Right to Privacy of Respondent Enrile is violated by the Motion Picture
of “Four Day Revolution”
RULING:
A. Yes. Freedom of Speech includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to
exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. Along with
press, radio and television, motion pictures constitute a principal medium of mass
communication for information, education and entertainment. This freedom of Speech is
available in our country both to locally-owned and to foreign-owned motion picture companies.
B. No. The projected motion picture “The Four Day Revolution” does not constitute an unlawful
intrusion upon private respondent’s right of privacy.
In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the
right of freedom of expression invoked by petitioner taking into account the interplay of those
interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations
assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will
have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when
expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern." Whether the “balancing of interest
test” or the “clear and present danger test” be applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court
believes that a different conclusion must here be reached.
Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would
precisely look like. There was, in other words, no “clear and present danger” of any violation of any
right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert.
The subject matter of “The Four Day Revolution” relates to the non-bloody change of government
which took place at EDSA. Clearly such subject matter is one of public interest and concern or even
international interest. The subject matter relates to a highly critical state in the history of this country
 Page 428 of 601

and thus passed into the public domain and as an appropriate subject for speech and expression and
coverage by any form of mass media. The synopsis provided by petitioner does not relate to the
individual life and certainly not the private life of respondent Ponce Enrile. The “Four Day Revolution”
is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile. Moreso, Private
respondent Enrile is a public figure (which gives the public a legitimate interest of his doings, his
affairs, his character and has become a public “personage”), in other words he is a celebrity. To be
included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing
before the public. This includes public officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and even
ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, in short anyone who has arrived at a position where public is
focused upon him as a person. Private respondent Enrile is a public figure because of his participation
as principal action in the culminating events of the change of government. The right of privacy of a
public figure is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen.
But it must be noted that the proposed motion picture is required to be fairly truthful and historical in
its presentation of events. This serves as a line of equilibrium in this case between the constitutional
freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy. There must be no presentation of the
private life of the unwilling private respondent and certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrassing
personal facts. Portrayal of the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution should be
related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution.
 Page 429 of 601

161) Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Director-General NEDA (G.R. No. 167798, April 19, 2006)
[ G.R. NO. 167798, April 19, 2006 ]
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO
UNO (NAFLU-KMU), JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, SALVADOR T.
CARRANZA, MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, JR. AND ROQUE M. TAN, PETITIONERS, VS. THE
DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, AND THE
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS: EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005, required
all government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations to
streamline and harmonize their Identification (ID) systems. Under said EO, all
government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations were ordered
to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing identification (ID)
systems. Herein petitioners, sought to enjoin the Director-General from implementing the said EO
alleging that it is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the
executive branch of the government and infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy. Thus, filing these
two consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seeking the nullification of Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420).
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not EO 420 is a usurpation of legislative power by the President.
2. Whether or not EO 420 infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy.
RULING:
1. No. The President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under
the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution provides that the "President shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices." The same Section also mandates the President to "ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed." Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all
government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data
collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to
the public. The President’s constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any
implementing legislation. There are several laws mandating government entities to reduce costs,
increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. The adoption of a uniform ID data
collection and format under EO 420 is designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general,
 Page 430 of 601

improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the President is simply performing the constitutional
duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional
power of the President to promulgate. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power – the President’s
constitutional power of control over the Executive department.
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the
President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws.
EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in
the implementation of current ID systems of government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420
is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation. The act of issuing ID cards and
collecting the necessary personal data for imprinting on the ID card does not require legislation.
Private employers routinely issue ID cards to their employees. Private and public schools also
routinely issue ID cards to their students. Even private clubs and associations issue ID cards to their
members. What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID card system.
First, when the implementation of an ID card system requires a special appropriation because there is
no existing appropriation for such purpose. Second, when the ID card system is compulsory on all
branches of government, including the independent constitutional commissions, as well as
compulsory on all citizens whether they have a use for the ID card or not. Third, when the ID card
system requires the collection and recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or usually
required for such purpose, such that the citizen’s right to privacy is infringed. In the present case, EO
420 does not require any special appropriation because the existing ID card systems of government
entities covered by EO 420 have the proper appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not compulsory on all
branches of government and is not compulsory on all citizens. EO 420 requires a very narrow and
focused collection and recording of personal data while safeguarding the confidentiality of such data.
2. No. All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities
have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental functions. There
have been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of these government entities
violate their right to privacy. There have also been no complaints of abuse by these
government entities in the collection and recording of personal identification data.
Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy. Petitioners
cannot show such violation by a mere facial examination of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws
the data collection, recording and exhibition while prescribing comprehensive safeguards. EO 420
applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to
 Page 431 of 601

their regular functions under existing laws. In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national
ID system but makes the existing sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS,
Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the public. Hence, EO 420
is a proper subject of executive issuance under the President’s constitutional power of control over
government entities in the Executive department, as well as under the President’s constitutional duty
to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

R.A. 1405 Secrecy of Bank Deposits

162) Republic of the Philippines vs. Eugenio (G.R. No. 174629, February 14, 2008)
G.R. No. 174629 February 14, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL (AMLC), petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. EUGENIO, JR., AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC, MANILA, BRANCH 34,
PANTALEON ALVAREZ and LILIA CHENG, respondents.

*The Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) is the agency of the Government of the Philippines that
is tasked to implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 9160, also known as the “Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001” (AMLA)
Facts: Under the authority granted by the Resolution, the AMLC filed an application to inquire into or
examine the deposits or investments of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong before the RTC
of Makati, Branch 138, presided by Judge (now Court of Appeals Justice) Sixto Marella, Jr. The
application was docketed as AMLC No. 05-005. The Makati RTC heard the testimony of the Deputy
Director of the AMLC, Richard David C. Funk II, and received the documentary evidence of the
AMLC.Thereafter, on 4 July 2005, the Makati RTC rendered an Order (Makati RTC bank inquiry order)
granting the AMLC the authority to inquire and examine the subject bank accounts of Alvarez,
Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong, the trial court being satisfied that there existed p]robable cause
[to] believe that the deposits in various bank accounts, details of which appear in paragraph 1 of the
Application, are related to the offense of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act now the
subject of criminal prosecution before the Sandiganbayan as attested to by the Informations, Exhibits
C, D, E, F, and G Pursuant to the Makati RTC bank inquiry order, the CIS proceeded to inquire and
examine the deposits, investments and related web accounts of the four.
 Page 432 of 601

Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, Dennis Villa-Ignacio, wrote a
letter dated 2 November 2005, requesting the AMLC to investigate the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO,
and several other entities involved in the nullified contract. The letter adverted to probable cause to
believe that the bank accounts were used in the commission of unlawful activities that were
committed a in relation to the criminal cases then pending before the Sandiganbayan. Attached to
the letter was a memorandum on why the investigation of the [accounts] is necessary in the
prosecution of the above criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan. In response to the letter of the
Special Prosecutor, the AMLC promulgated on 9 December 2005 Resolution No. 121 Series of
2005,[19] which authorized the executive director of the AMLC to inquire into and examine the
accounts named in the letter, including one maintained by Alvarez with DBS Bank and two other
accounts in the name of Cheng Yong with Metrobank. The Resolution characterized the memorandum
attached to the Special Prosecutors letter as extensively justif[ying] the existence of probable cause
that the bank accounts of the persons and entities mentioned in the letter are related to the unlawful
activity of violation of Sections 3(g) and 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended.
Issue: Whether or not the bank accounts of respondents can be examined.
Held: No. Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be specifically
legislated. Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these
bank accounts may be examined by any person, government official, bureau or offial;
namely when: (1) upon written permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of
impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court
in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and (4) the money deposited
or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Section 8 of R.A. Act No. 3019, the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized by this Court as constituting
an additional exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality, and there have been other
similar recognitions as well.
The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section 11, the AMLC may inquire
into a bank account upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of the AMLA, it having
been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to unlawful
activities as defined in Section 3(i) of the law, or a money laundering offense under Section 4
thereof. Further, in instances where there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are
related to kidnapping for ransom,[certain violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002,hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and murder, then there is
 Page 433 of 601

no need for the AMLC to obtain a court order before it could inquire into such accounts. It cannot be
successfully argued the proceedings relating to the bank inquiry order under Section 11 of the AMLA
is a litigation encompassed in one of the exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act which is when money
deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. The orientation of the bank inquiry order
is simply to serve as a provisional relief or remedy. As earlier stated, the application for such does not
entail a full-blown trial. Nevertheless, just because the AMLA establishes additional exceptions to the
Bank Secrecy Act it does not mean that the later law has dispensed with the general principle
established in the older law that all deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in
the Philippines x x x are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature. Indeed, by force
of statute, all bank deposits are absolutely confidential, and that nature is unaltered even by the
legislated exceptions referred to above.
 Page 434 of 601

R.A. No. 4200 [Anti-Wire Tapping Law (1965)]

Arts. 290, 291, 292 and 299. Revised Penal Code
163) Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Director-General NEDA (G.R. No. 167798, April 19, 2006)
[ G.R. NO. 167798, April 19, 2006 ]
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO
UNO (NAFLU-KMU), JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, SALVADOR T.
CARRANZA, MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, JR. AND ROQUE M. TAN, PETITIONERS, VS. THE
DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, AND THE
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, RESPONDENTS.
Facts: EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005, required all
government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations to streamline
and harmonize their Identification (ID) systems. Under said EO, all government agencies
and government-owned and controlled corporations were ordered to adopt a uniform data
collection and format for their existing identification (ID) systems.
Herein petitioners, sought to enjoin the Director-General from implementing the said EO
alleging that it is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by
the executive branch of the government and infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy. Thus,
filing these two consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420)

Issue: Whether EO 420 infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy.

Ruling: NO. All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities
have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental functions. There
have been no complaints from citizens that these ID cards violate their right to privacy.
Neither have there been complaints of abuse by government entities in the collection and
recording of personal identification data. In fact, petitioners in the present cases did not claim
that the ID systems of government entities prior to EO 420 violated their right to privacy. Thus, they
had even less basis for complaining against a unified ID system under the executive order in
question. The data collected and stored under EO 420 were to be limited to only 14 specific data, and
the ID card itself would show only 8 of these.
 Page 435 of 601

Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy. Petitioners
cannot show such violation by a mere facial examination of EO 420 because EO 420
narrowly draws the data collection, recording and exhibition while prescribing
comprehensive safeguards. EO 420 applies only to government entities that already
maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under
existing laws. In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but
makes the existing sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS,
Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the public.
Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the President’s constitutional power of
control over government entities in the Executive department, as well as under the President’s
constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government
entities. With the exception of the eight specific data to be shown on an ID card, the
personal data to be collected and recorded under EO 420 shall be treated as “strictly
confidential” under Section 6(d) of the executive order. These data are to be considered
not only strictly confidential, but also personal matters. As such, they shall be exempt or
outside the coverage of the people’s right to information, under Section 7 of Article III of
the Constitution on matters of public concern. Being matters that are private and not of
public concern, the data treated as “strictly confidential” under EO 420 cannot be
released to the public or the press.

Compared with the personal medical data required for disclosure to the New York State in Whalen
(cited in the Dissent), the 14 specific data required for disclosure to the Philippine government under
EO 420 are far less sensitive and far less personal. They are, in fact, routine for ID systems, unlike
the sensitive and potentially embarrassing medical records of patients taking prescription drugs.
Whalen, therefore, carries persuasive force for upholding the constitutionality of EO 420 as non-
violative of the right to privacy.

Indeed, compared with the disclosures of personal data that the U.S. Supreme Court upheld in
Whalen, those required under EO 420 are far more benign. Hence, they cannot constitute any
violation of the right to privacy or be used to embarrass or humiliate anyone.
 Page 436 of 601

Ople v. Torres was not the proper authority on which to base the argument that EO 420 would
violate the right to privacy. In that case the assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of
safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that the subject matter required legislation.

EO 420 applies only to government entities that, pursuant to their regular functions under existing
laws, already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards. It does not grant these entities any power that
they do not already possess under existing laws.
 Page 437 of 601

164) Sps. Hing vs. Choachuy (G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)

Facts: On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with prayer for
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed
as Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr.
and Allan Choachuy.

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B)
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of
Mandaue, Cebu; that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc.
(Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners; that
respondents constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that
in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125; that in that case, Aldo claimed
that petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said
construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to petitioners
property; that the court, in that case, denied Aldos application for preliminary injunction for failure
to substantiate its allegations; that, in order to get evidence to support the said case,
respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo
Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners property; that
respondents, through their employees and without the consent of petitioners, also took
pictures of petitioners on-going construction; and that the acts of respondents violate
petitioners right to privacy. Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the
video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.

In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents claimed that they did not install the video
surveillance cameras, nor did they order their employees to take pictures of petitioner's
construction. They also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders.
On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting the application for a TRO.
 Page 438 of 601

Respondents moved for a reconsideration but the RTC denied the same in its Order dated
February 6, 2006. Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision granting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA
ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion
because petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.
The CA explained that the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil
Code was not violated since the property subject of the controversy is not used as a
residence. The CA also said that since respondents are not the owners of the building,
they could not have installed video surveillance cameras. They are mere stockholders of
Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality. Thus, they are not the proper parties.

Issue: Whether there is a violation of petitioners right to privacy.

Ruling: YES. The decision of the CA is reversed. The right to privacy is enshrined in our
Constitution and in our laws. It is defined as "the right to be free from unwarranted
exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as
to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities." It is the right of an individual
"to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by
the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned." Simply put, the
right to privacy is "the right to be let alone."

The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against the States abuse
of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their
houses. No one, not even the State, except "in case of overriding social need and then
only under the stringent procedural safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their
homes.

CIVIL LAW: right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code covers business offices where the
public are excluded therefrom and only certain individuals are allowed to enter.
 Page 439 of 601

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individuals right to privacy and
provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It
states:
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;

This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy
cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into,
peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of the
latter." The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," however, does not
mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy. This does not mean, however, that
only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also "similar acts." A
business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and
only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in.

Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to
his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or
deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of another's residence," therefore,
covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And
as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his
right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the
Civil Code only to residences.

165) Gaanan vs. IAC [145 SCRA 113 (1986)]

Facts: (SUMMARY) Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon offered
to withdraw the complaint for direct assault they filed against Laconico after demanding
 Page 440 of 601

P8,000 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension
as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon
receipt of the money. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without
complainant’s consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the
Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200). The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of
violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision
of the trial court.

(In Detail) A direct assault case against Leonardo Laconico was filed by complainant Atty. Tito
Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon. The said complainants made a telephone call to Laconico to
give their terms for withdrawal of their complaint. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

Laconico, later on, called appellant Gaanan, who is also a lawyer, to come to his office to advise him
about the proposed settlement. When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to
secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally
the proposed conditions for the settlement. After enumerating the conditions, several calls were
made to finally confirm if the settlement is agreeable to both parties.

As part of their agreement, Laconico has to give the money to the complainant's wife at the office of
the Department of Public Highways. But, he insisted to give the money to the complainant himself.

After receiving the money, the complainant was arrested by the agents of the Philippine
Constabulary, who were alerted earlier before the exchange. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court (IAC)

Appellant stated on his affidavit that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of
the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he filed against the complainant.

In defense, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act as
the appellant heard the telephone conversation without complainant's consent.
 Page 441 of 601

Trial Court: both Gaanan and Laconico were guilty of violating Sect. 1 of RA No. 4200.
IAC: affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Hence, this petition. The case at bar involves an interpretation of the Republic Act No. 4200
or also known as Anti-Wiretapping Act. Petitioner contends that telephones or extension
telephones are not included in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or
recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices
contemplated by law.

However, respondent argues that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the
term "device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or
portion of a complete set of a telephone apparatus.

Issue: Whether an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such
that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of
communications between the two parties using a telephone line

Ruling: NO. It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or
acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire
record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or
spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited
by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents
thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial,
to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any
civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by
this prohibition.

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for
the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There
must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of
a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
 Page 442 of 601

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone,

dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use
thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The
telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to
be there for ordinary office use.

It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the
legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. Furthermore, it is a general rule that
penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the
case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device
or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension
telephone.

The mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the
enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. The petition is GRANTED.
The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200,
otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

166) Katz vs. U.S. [389 U.S. 347 (1967)]

Facts: Acting on a suspicion that Katz was transmitting gambling information over the
phone to clients in other states, Federal agents attached an eavesdropping device to the
outside of a public phone booth used by Katz. Based on recordings of his end of the
conversations, Katz was convicted under an eight-count indictment for the illegal
transmission of wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami. On appeal, Katz
challenged his conviction arguing that the recordings could not be used as evidence
against him. The Court of Appeals rejected this point, noting the absence of a physical
intrusion into the phone booth itself. The Court granted certiorari.
 Page 443 of 601

Issue: Whether the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
require the police to obtain a search warrant in order to wiretap a public pay phone

Ruling: YES. The Court ruled that Katz was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection for his
conversations and that a physical intrusion into the area he occupied was unnecessary to
bring the Amendment into play. "The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," wrote
Justice Potter Stewart for the Court. A concurring opinion by John Marshall Harlan introduced the
idea of a 'reasonable' expectation of Fourth Amendment protection.

The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from which the petitioner
made his calls was constructed partly of glass, so that he was as visible after he entered
it as he would have been if he had remained outside. But what he sought to exclude when he
entered the booth was not the intruding eye—it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed
his right to do so simply because he made his calls from a place where he might be seen.
No less than an individual in a business office, in a friend's apartment, or in a taxicab, a
person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment. One
who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a
call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the
public telephone has come to play in private communication.

To reiterate, the Court held that the Government's eavesdropping activities violated the
privacy upon which petitioner justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus
constituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The
Court further held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible
items but extends as well to the recording of oral statements. The Court also opined that
because the Fourth Amendment protects people rather than places, its reach cannot turn
on the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure. Following
these, the Court overturned the Court of Appeals’ ruling.
 Page 444 of 601

167) Short Title: Ramirez vs. CA (G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995)
Long Title: G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.
Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner
offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy."1 In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and
sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of
P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion.
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly
taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and
penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other
purposes."
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A.
4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner
that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation
punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant
to the communication.4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this
Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division)
of June 19, 1989.

CA
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the
trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void. Motion for Reconsideration denied.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue"7 that the applicable provision of
Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the
 Page 445 of 601

parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized
taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication.8 In
relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in
the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.9 Finally,
petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private
conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private
respondent was not illegal under the said act.
Issue: Whether the provision Republic Act 4200 merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private
conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication.
Ruling: We disagree. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using
a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape
recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether
the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different
from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently,
as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who
records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a
violator" 13
under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make
illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken
either by the parties themselves or by third persons.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of
the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
 Page 446 of 601

enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a
private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an
offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT
before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be
regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person
should be professed."
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication"
to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning
"to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in
a conversation, 15
or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16
These
definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-
charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in
the privacy of the latter's office.
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18
a case which dealt with the issue of telephone
wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private
conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise
was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19
following the principle
that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused."20 The instant case turns on a
different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200
suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of
private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves
us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED.
168) Short Title: Salcedo-Ortanez vs. CA [235 SCRA 111 (1994)]
Long Title: G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994
TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, petitioner,
vs.
 Page 447 of 601

COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City and RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, respondents.
Facts: On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita
Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the
petitioner. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-5360 and raffled to Branch 94, RTC of
Quezon City presided over by respondent Judge Romeo F. Zamora.
Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence Exhibits "A" to
"M".
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of
alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's oral offer of evidence on 9 June
1992; on the same day, the trial court admitted all of private respondent's offered evidence.
A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied on 23 June 1992.
A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals assailing the admission in
evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.
CA
Petition dismissed.
It is much too obvious that the petition will have to fail, for two basic reasons:
(1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can be
admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are presented and
offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and
the even handed administration of justice.
(2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting
evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on
jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on
the merits and not through the special civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that
it exists, cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not
by certiorari. Otherwise, we will have the sorry spectacle of a case being subject of a
counterproductive "ping-pong" to and from the appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to
have made an error in any of its rulings with respect to evidentiary matters in the course of trial. This
we cannot sanction.
 Page 448 of 601

Issue: Whether “Tape Recordings” obtain in violation of RA 4200 is admissible as evidence in court.
Ruling: No. In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the
evidence offered by private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone
conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made
and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap
his home telephone.
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape
recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as follows:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using
a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-
recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured
by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in
any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of
the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both
parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the
subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
 Page 449 of 601

169) Short Title: Alejano vs. Cabuay (G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005)
Long Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY
ALEJANO, PN (MARINES) CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES) CAPT. GERARDO
GAMBALA, PA LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN CAPT. MILO MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG
ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN HOMOBONO ADAZA, and ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL)
PULIDO, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES, and SEC. ROILO
GOLEZ, Respondents.
Facts: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained
junior officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments
("Oakwood"), an upscale apartment complex, located in the business district of Makati
City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its
immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the
administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and
several cabinet members.
Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities
after several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the
explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks.
On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major
Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention
Center. The transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers’
involvement in the Oakwood incident.
On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003
Oakwood incident. The government prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup d’etat as
defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as
amended. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The trial court later issued the
Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV ("Trillanes") and
Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP.
On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to take
into custody the military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood
 Page 450 of 601

incident except the detained junior officers who were to remain under the custody of
ISAFP.
On 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. On 12
August 2003, the Court issued a Resolution, which resolved to:
(a) ISSUE the WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; (b) require respondents to make a RETURN of the
writ on Monday, 18 August 2003, at 10:00 a.m. before the Court of Appeals; (c) refer the case to the
Court of Appeals for RAFFLE among the Justices thereof for hearing, further proceedings and
decision thereon, after which a REPORT shall be made to this Court within ten (10) days from
promulgation of the decision.3
Thus, the Court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus dated 12 August 2003 directing respondents to make
a return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the Court of
Appeals on the scheduled date for hearing and further proceedings.
On the same date, the detainees and their other co-accused filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the trial court granted.
On 18 August 2003, pursuant to the directives of the Court, respondents submitted their Return of
the Writ and Answer to the petition and produced the detainees before the Court of Appeals during
the scheduled hearing. After the parties filed their memoranda on 28 August 2003, the appellate
court considered the petition submitted for decision.
On 17 September 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing the petition.
Nonetheless, the appellate court ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the
regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in
accordance with Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate court directed Gen.
Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in court regarding visiting hours and the detainees’ right
to exercise for two hours a day.
Petitioners also point out that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the detainees’ right
to privacy of communication when the ISAFP officials opened and read the personal letters of
Trillanes and Capt. Milo Maestrecampo ("Maestrecampo"). Petitioners further claim that the ISAFP
officials violated the detainees’ right against cruel and unusual punishment when the ISAFP officials
prevented the detainees from having contact with their visitors. Moreover, the ISAFP officials boarded
up with iron bars and plywood slabs the iron grills of the detention cells, limiting the already poor
light and ventilation in the detainees’ cells.
CA
 Page 451 of 601

The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes’ letter is an abhorrent
violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which is the proper subject
of habeas corpus proceedings.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed the petition and ordered Gen. Cabuay to fulfill the promise he
made in open court to uphold the visiting hours and the right of the detainees to exercise for two
hours a day.
Issue: hether letters determined or found to be from attorneys may be opened by prison authorities
in the presence of the inmate or whether such mail must be delivered unopened if normal detection
techniques fail to indicate contraband.
Ruling: No. Petition lacks merit. In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual
before the court is a preliminary step in the hearing of the petition.6 The respondent must produce
the person and explain the cause of his detention.7 However, this order is not a ruling on the
propriety of the remedy or on the substantive matters covered by the remedy. Thus, the Court’s
order to the Court of Appeals to conduct a factual hearing was not an affirmation of the propriety of
the remedy of habeas corpus.
For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the
determination of the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the detention
unlawful, then it should issue the writ and release the detainees. In the present case, after hearing
the case, the Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively participating in
the hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are estopped from claiming that the appellate
court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of their petition.
If prison officials had to check in each case whether a communication was from an attorney before
opening it for inspection, a near impossible task of administration would be imposed. We think it
entirely appropriate that the State require any such communications to be specially marked as
originating from an attorney, with his name and address being given, if they are to receive special
treatment. It would also certainly be permissible that prison authorities require that a
lawyer desiring to correspond with a prisoner, first identify himself and his client to the
prison officials, to assure that the letters marked privileged are actually from members of
the bar.
As to the ability to open the mail in the presence of inmates, this could in no way
constitute censorship, since the mail would not be read. Neither could it chill such
 Page 452 of 601

communications, since the inmate’s presence insures that prison officials will not read
the mail. The possibility that contraband will be enclosed in letters, even those from apparent
attorneys, surely warrants prison officials’ opening the letters. We disagree with the Court of
Appeals that this should only be done in ‘appropriate circumstances.’ Since a flexible
test, besides being unworkable, serves no arguable purpose in protecting any of the
possible constitutional rights enumerated by respondent, we think that petitioners, by
acceding to a rule whereby the inmate is present when mail from attorneys is inspected,
have done all, and perhaps even more, than the Constitution requires.
[A] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with the
close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security and
internal order. We are satisfied that society would insist that the prisoner’s expectation of privacy
always yield to what must be considered a paramount interest in institutional security. We believe
that it is accepted by our society that "[l]oss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents
of confinement."
The distinction between the limited privacy rights of a pre-trial detainee and a convicted
inmate has been blurred as courts in the U.S. ruled that pre-trial detainees might
occasionally pose an even greater security risk than convicted inmates. Bell v.
Wolfish reasoned that those who are detained prior to trial may in many cases be individuals who
are charged with serious crimes or who have prior records and may therefore pose a greater risk of
escape than convicted inmates.55 Valencia v. Wiggins56 further held that "it is impractical to draw a
line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security."
American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre-trial detainees’ non-privileged mail poses a
genuine threat to jail security.57 Hence, when a detainee places his letter in an envelope for non-
privileged mail, the detainee knowingly exposes his letter to possible inspection by jail officials.58 A
pre-trial detainee has no reasonable expectation of privacy for his incoming mail.59 However, incoming
mail from lawyers of inmates enjoys limited protection such that prison officials can open and inspect
the mail for contraband but could not read the contents without violating the inmates’ right to
correspond with his lawyer.60 The inspection of privileged mail is limited to physical contraband and
not to verbal contraband.61
Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading of the detainees’
letters in the present case violated the detainees’ right to privacy of communication. The letters were
 Page 453 of 601

not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same
purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband.
 Page 454 of 601

170) In re: laureta and maravilla, 148 Scra 382 (1987)

FACTS: Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of the her
case(aland dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it was an unjust
resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1st Division, that it was railroaded with
such hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics.

Illustre also threatened in her letter that, “there is nothing final in this world. This case is far from
finished by a long shot.” She threatened that she would call for a press conference. Illustre’s letter
basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was established that
Justice Yap was previously a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the
opponents.

The letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-resolution was
issued, the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to
retire), and that Justice Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was also
made clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case. Still, Illustre wrote letters to
the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera,Cruz), again with more threats to “expose the kind of judicial
performance readily constituting travesty of justice.” True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal
complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging the Justices with knowingly rendering an unjust Minute
Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also charged of using their influence in the First
Division in rendering said Minute Resolution.

Atty LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to the press, without
any copy furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were
charged with graft and corruption. The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint. Now, the SC is charging
them with contempt. They claim that the letters were private communication, and that they did not
intend to dishonor the court.

ISSUE: Whether Privacy of Communication is violated?

 Page 455 of 601

RULING: The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire
court. There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Court’s authority and duty under the premises
is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate
lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.

Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt and Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of
grave professional misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law until further
Orders.
Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak for
themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under
the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. The supremacy of the
Supreme Court’s judicial power is a restatement of the fundamental principle of separation of powers
and checks and balances under a republican form of government such that the three co-equal
branches of government are each supreme and independent within the limits of its own sphere.
Neither one can interfere with the performance of the duties of the other.
171) People vs. Albofera, [152 SCRA 123 (1987)]
FACTS: Sometime in June or July 1980, accused Albofera and 3 others killed Teodoro Carancio
a forester. Rodrigo Esma was at the house of one of the accused but did not participate in
the killing.The matter was later brought to the attention of the authorities by a certain Sisneros and
accused Albofera was arrested. The accused Lawi-an was subsequently arrested.

Albofera executed an extra-judicial confession before the Municipal Circuit Judge. He stated therein
that he was forced to join the NPA movement for fear of his life; that said group had
ordered the arrest of the victim, Carancio, and that the group sentenced him (the victim) to die
by stabbing.
Esma testified against the accused during the trial. While in prison, accused Albofera sent a letter to
Esma. Said letter was thereafter introduced as evidence by prosecution. In his letter,
accused Albofera was asking Esma to change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his favor
instead.
Later the accused were convicted of murder.
ISSUE: Whether the Albofera’s letter to Esma should be excluded as evidence in light of alleged
unwarranted intrusion or invasion of the accused’s privacy?
 Page 456 of 601

RULING: No. The production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of an
unlawful search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into
Albofera’s privacy. Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma
himself, who produced and identified the same in the course of his testimony in Court. Besides, there
is nothing really self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his
declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera’s) favor. Furthermore, nothing Alboferas tated
in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a determination of his culpability.

172) Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals [253 SCRA 699 (1966)]

Doctrine: The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable, except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. Any
evidence obtained in violation of this or the proceeding section, shall inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1962, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of
her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private respondents between
Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport,
and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for
legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner
had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought an action for the recovery of documents and papers, as well as
damages against her wife before the RTC. The RTC ruled in his favor, declaring him to be
the exclusive owner of such documents. The writ of preliminary injunction was made final and
petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or
submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
Cecilia’s side: She contends that the case of Alfredo Martin vs Alfonso Felix, Jr. (NOTE: the
case is between her husband, Dr. Martin and a lawyer, atty. alfonso) where the court ruled that
the documents and papers were admissible in evidence and that the use of those
documents by Atty. Alfonso did not constitute gross malpractice and gross misconduct.
 Page 457 of 601

ISSUE: Whether the papers and other materials obtained from forcible intrusion and from unlawful
means are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from
medical practice.
Ruling: NO, the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injuction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable"
is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's
infedility) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The
only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a "lawful order from the court or
which public safety or order require otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them in breaking
the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any tell-tale evidence
of marital infedility. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his
right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the
other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication;
quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
173) Short Title: Deano vs. Godinez (12 SCRA 483)
Complete Title: G.R. No. L-19518 November 28, 1964
TRINIDAD A. DEAÑO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
DIOGENES GODINEZ, defendant-appellee.
FACTS: This is an action for damages brought by Trinidad A. Deaño, assisted by her
husband Manuel Deaño against defendant Diogenes Godinez before the Court of First
Instance of Lanao del Norte based on a communication sent by the latter as district
supervisor to his immediate superior, the Division Superintendent of Schools. Trinidad
claims that with malice aforethought and in disregard of proper decorum and accepted administrative
practices, defendant wrote the aforesaid communication making therein statements which are
 Page 458 of 601

contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, and to existing rules and regulations, thereby
causing irreparable damage to her personal dignity and professional standing, for which reason she
asks that she be paid P30,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P10,000.00 attorney's fees for bringing the present action.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the letter complained of is
a privileged communication and the action has already prescribed. The motion was upheld,
and the court a quo dismissed the complaint. Hence this appeal.
The highlights of the letter may be boiled down as follows: Dr. Trinidad A. Deaño plaintiff
herein, as the school dentist of Lanao, required the teachers in the field to sign blank forms indicating
therein a contribution of P20.00 which she intended to be only for the dental-medical drive, when she
knew well that the drive included the Boy Scout Rally of the district. "In view of the above, Dr. Deaño
is a carping critic, a fault finder and suspects every teacher or school official to be potential grafters
and swindlers of the medical-dental funds. ... The lady dentist will not be welcomed in Lumbatan
district next school year. ... She did more harm than good to the teeth of the patients she treated."
The utterances or statements above referred to, if untrue, are indeed derogatory to the
personal dignity and professional standing of the plaintiff as a high official in the
government service as they in fact disturbed her peace of mind to the extent that they caused her
mental anguish, wounded her feelings and made her suffer moral shock and social humiliation for
which she now asks for damages in retribution. But defendant claims that he made those
statements in pursuance of a legal duty or in the exercise of his functions as a public
official and as such they are justifiable under the doctrine of privileged communication.
In this sense, defendant contends, they cannot be the basis of an action for damages.
ISSUE: Whether the letter in which the alleged defamatory statements appear partake of
the nature of a privileged communication.
RULING: YES. We find that the communication is privileged in nature and as such comes
within the purview of Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, which we quote:
ART. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the
following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or
social duty; and
 Page 459 of 601

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the
exercise of their functions.
Indeed, the communication now denounced by plaintiff as defamatory is one sent by
defendant to his immediate superior in the performance of a legal duty, or in the nature
of a report submitted in the exercise of an official function. He sent it as in explanation of
a matter contained in an indorsement sent to him by his superior officer. It is a report
submitted in obedience to a lawful duty, though in doing so defendant employed a
language somewhat harsh and uncalled for. But such is excusable in the interest of
public policy. As it has been aptly said, "The doctrine of privileged communication rests
upon public policy, which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice,
though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-
disposed and malignant slanderer."
The letter sent by defendant being a privileged communication, it is presumed that it was
sent without malice.1 It being a communication sent in the discharge of a legal duty, the
writer is not liable for damages.
It will be noted that all of the defendant's communications were of a public nature and addressed to
his superior officers, and that his investigation was made in the line of his duty. There is no evidence
that defendant was actuated by any malicious motive ... .
In the instant case, the alleged libel is based upon the official letters of the defendant to his superior
officers, which were written in the discharge of his official duties, and for which he is not liable in an
action for damages. (Gilmer v. Hilliard 43 Phil. 180.)

174) Waterhouse Drug Corporation vs. NLRC

Complete Title: G.R. No. 113271 October 16, 1997
WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. EMMA CO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANTONIA MELODIA
CATOLICO, respondents.
FACTS: Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation
(hereafter WATEROUS) on 15 August 1988.
 Page 460 of 601

On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum6 from WATEROUS Vice President-

General Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees
chargeable to the latter's accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. On the
same date, Co issued another memorandum7 to Catolico warning her not to negotiate with
suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing Department, as this would impair
the company's control of purchases and, besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the
suppliers.
As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained
that her act was "due to negligence," since fellow employee Irene Soliven "obtained the
medicines in bad faith and through misrepresentation when she claimed that she was
given a charge slip by the Admitting Dept." Catolico then asked the company to look into the
fraudulent activities of Soliven.8
On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he
noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (hereafter
YSP), which he described as follows:
. . . A case in point is medicine purchased under our Purchase Order (P.O.) No. 19045 with YSP Sales
Invoice No. 266 representing purchase of ten (10) bottles of Voren tablets at P384.00 per unit.
Previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the price per bottle is P320.00 while P.O. No. 19045
is priced at P384.00 or an over price of P64.00 per bottle (or total of P640.00). WDRC paid the
amount of P3,840.00 thru MBTC Check No. 222832 dated December 15, 1988. Verification was made
to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was found that the cost per bottle was indeed
overpriced. YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference
represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice no. 266 as per
their check voucher no. 629552 (shown to the undersigned), which was paid to Ms. Catolico through
China Bank check no. 892068 dated November 9, 1989 . . . .
The undersigned talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the check but she denied having received it and
that she is unaware of the overprice. However, upon conversation with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana
Pharmacy Clerk, she confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was actually received by Ms.
Catolico. As a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she opened the envelope
containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered her "talagang ganyan, bukas." It appears that the
amount in question (P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms. Catolico.10
 Page 461 of 601

Forthwith, in her memorandum11 dated 37 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to explain,

within twenty-four hours, her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional
time to give her explanation,12 and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3 February 1990.
However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7
March 1990, she would be placed on preventive suspension to protect the interests of the
company.13
In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file containing Sales
Invoice No. 266 for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In said letter she
protested Saldaña's invasion of her privacy when Saldaña opened an envelope addressed
to Catolico.14
On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum16 notifying
Catolico of her termination. On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor
Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension.
Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor practice against petitioners.
Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because petitioners failed to "prove what [they] alleged
as complainant's dishonesty," and to show that any investigation was conducted. Hence, the
dismissal was without just cause and due process. Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision
and urged the NLRC to set it aside because the Labor Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was
denied due process and that there was no just cause to terminate her services.
In its decision19 of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the
ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from her
employment. It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00
drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw when the latter
opened the envelope. But, it declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence
pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether the check is admissible as evidence.
RULING: YES. Petitioners submit that, in light of the decision in the People v. Marti,21 the
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one's
person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. The
OSG was convinced that Catolico's dismissal was based on just cause and that Catolico's admission of
the existence of the check, as well as her "lame excuse" that it was a Christmas gift from YSP,
 Page 462 of 601

constituted substantial evidence of dishonesty. Finally, the OSG echoed petitioners' argument that
there was no violation of the right of privacy of communication in this case,22 adding that petitioner
WATEROUS was justified in opening an envelope from one of its regular suppliers as it could assume
that the letter was a business communication in which it had an interest.
As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, we
find no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti34 that the Bill of Rights
does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by
private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse
against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to
both criminal and civil liabilities
 Page 463 of 601

Writ of Habeas Data

175) Short Title: Lee vs. Ilagan
Complete title: G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014
DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, Petitioner, v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN, Respondent.
FACTS: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated August
30, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 (RTC) in SP No. 12-71527, which
extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of respondent Police Superintendent Neri A.
Ilagan (Ilagan).
In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data3 dated June 22, 2012, Ilagan
alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were former common law
partners. Sometime in July 2011, he visited Lee at the latter’s condominium, rested for a while
and thereafter, proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that his digital camera
was missing.4 On August 23, 2011, Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter’s office regarding a
purported sex video (subject video) she discovered from the aforesaid camera involving
Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to return the
camera, but to no avail.5 During the confrontation, Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee’s head
against a wall inside his office and walked away.6Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video
as evidence in filing various complaints against Ilagan. Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of
reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper
echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only his right to
life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other woman, and thus, the
issuance of a writ of habeas data in his favor is warranted.9

granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data in Ilagan’s favor . The RTC issued a
Writ of Habeas Data10 dated June 25, 2012, directing Lee to appear before the court a quo,
and to produce Ilagan’s digital camera, as well as the negative and/or original of the subject
video and copies thereof, and to file a verified written return within five (5) working days from date
of receipt thereof.

In her Verified Return11 dated July 2, 2012, Lee admitted that she indeed kept the
memory card of the digital camera and reproduced the aforesaid video but averred that
she only did so to utilize the same as evidence in the cases she filed against Ilagan.
 Page 464 of 601

Accordingly, Lee contended that Ilagan’s petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
data should be dismissed because: (a) its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence
against Ilagan in the cases she filed; and (b) she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or
storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan.12
ISSUE: Whether the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in
favor of Ilagan.
RULING: No. A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was
conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances.16 It was conceptualized
as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to
informational privacy of individuals,17 which is defined as “the right to control the
collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself.”18

As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now
stands as “a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of
the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6
of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among
others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the
right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the petition must
adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand,
and the right to life, liberty or security on the other .19 Corollarily, the allegations in the petition
must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right
to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.20 In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ
of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.21

In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his
right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed
reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan
 Page 465 of 601

purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he fears would
somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption –
he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to
life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible
transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and
eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life,
liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either
account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.

In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be
dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan
submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial
evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would
indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s
right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even lead a reasonable mind
to conclude22 that Lee was going to use the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends – say for
instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan’s reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it
clear in her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately
utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan.23
Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring absence of substantial
evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in SP No. 12-71527is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data filed by respondent P/Supt. Neri A.
Ilagan is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

• Art. 26, Civil Code

• Art. 32, Civil Code, Liability for Damage
176) Aberca vs. Ver [160 SCRA 590 (1989)]
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
 Page 466 of 601

ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO NOEL ETABAG DANILO DE LA

FUENTE, BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN JAZMINEZ, EDWIN
LOPEZ, ALFREDO MANSOS, ALEX MARCELINO, ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO,
JOSEPH OLAYER, CARLOS PALMA, MARCO PALO, ROLANDO SALUTIN, BENJAMIN
SESGUNDO, ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN TULALIAN and REBECCA TULALIAN petitioners, vs.
MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL. GERARDO
B. LANTORIA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, 1ST LT. COL. PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ.
RODOLFO AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, 1ST LT. PEDRO TANGO, 1ST LT. ROMEO
RICARDO, 1ST LT. RAUL BACALSO, MSGT BIENVENIDO BALABA and REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XCV (95), Quezon City, respondents.
Facts: This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights
and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known
as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver «to conduct pre-emptive strikes
against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT
plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila,»
Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several
places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids,
certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to
plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some
period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were
interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated
them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory
information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional
rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory
statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously
known to and sanctioned by defendants.
A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito
Mendoza, alleging among others that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the
circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present
action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties.
 Page 467 of 601

Issue: Whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for
damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and
liberties guaranteed under the Constitution.
Ruling: NO. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy
petitioners’ right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations
of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or
detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention
through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

R.A. 8293 Intellectual Property Code

AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE AND ESTABLISHING THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, PROVIDING FOR ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
SECTION 2. Declaration of State Policy. The State recognizes that an effective intellectual
and industrial property system is vital to the development of domestic and creative activity, facilitates
transfer of technology, attracts foreign investments, and ensures market access for our products. It
shall protect and secure the exclusive rights of scientists, inventors, artists and other
gifted citizens to their intellectual property and creations, particularly when beneficial to
the people, for such periods as provided in this Act.
The use of intellectual property bears a social function. To this end, the State shall
promote the diffusion of knowledge and information for the promotion of national
development and progress and the common good.
It is also the policy of the State to streamline administrative procedures of registering
patents, trademarks and copyright, to liberalize the registration on the transfer of
technology, and to enhance the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the
Philippines.

Art. 723, Civil Code

Art. 723. Letters and other private communications in writing are owned by the person to
whom they are addressed and delivered, but they cannot be published or disseminated
without the consent of the writer or his heirs. However, the court may authorize their
publication or dissemination if the public good or the interest of justice so requires.
 Page 468 of 601

Balancing of Interest Test

The "balancing of interests" test requires that a determination must first be made whether
the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved by some
other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
- used as a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and individual
interests, and requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation.

Dangerous Tendency Test

This test permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated.
- The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the other hand, has been adopted in cases where extreme
difficulty is confronted determining where the freedom of expression ends and the right of
courts to protect their independence begins. There must be a remedy to borderline cases and
the basic principle of this rule lies in that the freedom of speech and of the press, as well as
the right to petition for redress of grievance, while guaranteed by the constitution, are not
absolute. They are subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them being the protection of
the courts against contempt (Gilbert vs. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325.)

Clear and Present Danger Test

This rule rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial
danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent.
- rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule requires
that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, “extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February
15, 2008).

Grave-but-Improbable Danger Test

To determine the clear and present danger of the utterances bringing about the evil which that
legislature has the power to punish, "In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of
 Page 469 of 601

the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger." In this case, an attempt to overthrow the Government by force
is a sufficient evil for Congress to prevent. It is the existence of the conspiracy which creates the
danger. [Dennis v. US (1951)]

Direct Incitement Test

The constitutional right of free speech is no longer protected if the speaker advocates to incite
imminent lawless action that is likely to produce such action.

Intermediate Review
Requires that the classification (means) must serve an important governmental objective
(ends) and is substantially related to the achievement of such objective. A classification
based on sex is the best-established example of an intermediate level of review (Garcia vs. Drilon,
G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013).

MODULE 4. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Art. III, Sec. 4.
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress or
grievances.

Art. III, Sec. 18(1)

No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations

Nature, Scope, Basis and Purpose

177) Chavez vs. Gonzales (G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008)
G.R. No. 168338 February 15, 2008
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs.
RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), respondents.
 Page 470 of 601

FACTS:
A year following the 2004 national and local elections, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye
disclosed to the public how the opposition planned to destabilize the administration by
releasing an audio tape of a mobile phoneconversation allegedly between President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Commissioner Garcillano of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). The conversation was alleged to have been audio-taped through wire-
tapping. On June 8, 2005, respondent Secretary Raul Gonzales of the Department ofJustice (DOJ)
warned reporters who are in possession of copies of the said conversation, as well as those
broadcasting companies and/or publishersthat they may be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping
Act. Consequently, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued a press
release strengthening the prohibition on the dissemination of the same that
thebroadcasting/airing of such information shall be just cause for the suspension,
revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued by the Commission.
Petitioner Francisco Chavez filed a petition against respondent Chavez and NTC, praying
for the issuance of writs of certiorari and prohibition for the nullification of the acts, issuances
of respondents as they were outright violations of the freedom ofexpression and of the
press, and the right of the people to information onmatters of public concern.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the respondents abridge freedom ofspeech and of the press.
RULING:
Yes. Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or
a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine, which limits
speech once a rational connection hasbeen established between the speech restrained
and the dangercontemplated; (b) the balancing of interests tests, a standard whencourts
balance conflicting social values and individualinterests, and (c) the clear and present
danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is
substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right
to prevent.
It appears that the great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape
recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. However, respondents’ evidence
falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press
Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the
taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one
 Page 471 of 601

supposed to be a complete versionand the other, an altered version. Thirdly, the evidence of the
respondents on the whos and the hows of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering
the tapes different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other
related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given allthese unsettled
facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.
We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech
and of the press.
The need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and
free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the
respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option
but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared
violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangersthe national security of the State.

178) NUHHRAIN-APL-IUF Dusit Hotel Nikki Chapter vs. CA 2008

G.R. No. 163942 November 11, 2008
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES
(NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF) DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO CHAPTER, petitioner,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Eighth Division), THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS INC., owner and
operator of DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO and/or CHIYUKI FUJIMOTO, and ESPERANZA V. ALVEZ,
respondents.

FACTS:
The Union is the certified bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file employees of
Dusit Hotel Nikko (Hotel).

On October 24, 2000, the Union submitted its Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) negotiation proposals to the Hotel. As negotiations ensued, the parties failed to
arrive at mutually acceptable terms and conditions. Due to the bargaining deadlock, the
Union, on December 20, 2001, filed a Notice of Strike on the ground of the bargaining
deadlock with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
 Page 472 of 601

Thereafter, conciliation hearings were conducted which proved unsuccessful.

Soon thereafter, in the afternoon of January 17, 2002, the Union held a general assembly
at its office located in the Hotels basement, where some members sported closely
cropped hair or cleanly shaven heads.

The next day, or on January 18, 2002, more male Union members came to work sporting the
same hairstyle. The Hotel prevented these workers from entering the premises claiming
that they violated the Hotels Grooming Standards.

In view of the Hotels action, the Union staged a picket outside the Hotel premises. Later, other
workers were also prevented from entering the Hotel causing them to join the picket. For this
reason, the Hotel experienced a severe lack of manpower which forced them to
temporarily cease operations in three restaurants.

Consequently, the Hotel issued notices to Union members, preventively suspending

them and charging them with the following offenses: (1) violation of the duty to bargain
in good faith; (2) illegal picket; (3) unfair labor practice; (4) violation of the Hotels
Grooming Standards; (5) illegal strike; and (6) commission of illegal acts during the
illegal strike.

The next day, the Union filed with the NCMB the second Notice of Strike on the
ground of unfair labor practice and violation of Article 248(a) of the Labor Code on illegal
lockout.

The Hotel terminated the services of 29 Union officers and 61 members; and
suspended 81 employees for 30 days, forty-eight 48 employees for 15 days, 4) employees for 10
days, and 3 employees for five days. On the same day, the Union declared a strike. Starting that day,
the Union engaged in picketing the premises of the Hotel. During the picket, the Union officials and
members unlawfully blocked the ingress and egress of the Hotel premises.
 Page 473 of 601

The Union filed its third Notice of Strike with the NCMB, this time on the ground of
unfair labor practice and union-busting.

NLRC Decision: It ordered the Hotel and the Union to execute a CBA within 30 days from the
receipt of the decision. NLRC ruled that the strike conducted was illegal.

CA affirmed NLRC’s decision

ISSUE: Whether the Union is guilty for illegal strike

RULING:
YES. First, the Unions violation of the Hotels Grooming Standards was clearly a deliberate
and concerted action to undermine the authority of and to embarrass the Hotel and was,
therefore, not a protected action. The appearances of the Hotel employees directly reflect the
character and well-being of the Hotel, being a five-star hotel that provides service to top-notch
clients. It can be gleaned from the records before us that the Union officers and members
deliberately and in apparent concert shaved their heads or cropped their hair. This was shown by
the fact that after coming to work on January 18, 2002, some Union members even had
their heads shaved or their hair cropped at the Union office in the Hotels basement.
Clearly, the decision to violate the company rule on grooming was designed and
calculated to place the Hotel management on its heels and to force it to agree to the
Unions proposals. This Court is of the opinion, therefore, that the act of the Union was
not merely an expression of their grievance or displeasure but, indeed, a calibrated and
calculated act designed to inflict serious damage to the Hotels finances or its reputation.
Thus, we hold that the Unions concerted violation of the Hotels Grooming Standards which resulted
in the temporary cessation and disruption of the Hotels operations is an unprotected act and should
be considered as an illegal strike.

Second, the Unions concerted action which disrupted the Hotels operations clearly
violated the CBAs No Strike, No Lockout provision.The facts are clear that the strike
arose out of a bargaining deadlock in the CBA negotiations with the Hotel. The concerted
 Page 474 of 601

action is an economic strike upon which the afore-quoted no strike/work stoppage and
lockout prohibition is squarely applicable and legally binding.

RELEVANT TO THE TOPIC REGARDING CONCILIATION: Third, the Union officers and members
concerted action to shave their heads and crop their hair not only violated the Hotels Grooming
Standards but also violated the Unions duty and responsibility to bargain in good faith. By shaving
their heads and cropping their hair, the Union officers and members violated then
Section 6, Rule XIII of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code. This rule
prohibits the commission of any act which will disrupt or impede the early settlement of
the labor disputes that are under conciliation. Since the bargaining deadlock is being
conciliated by the NCMB, the Unions action to have their officers and members heads
shaved was manifestly calculated to antagonize and embarrass the Hotel management
and in doing so effectively disrupted the operations of the Hotel and violated their duty
to bargain collectively in good faith.

Fourth, the Union failed to observe the mandatory 30-day cooling-off period and the seven-day strike
ban before it conducted the strike on January 18, 2002. The NLRC correctly held that the Union failed
to observe the mandatory periods before conducting or holding a strike. Records reveal that the
Union filed its Notice of Strike on the ground of bargaining deadlock on December 20, 2001. The 30-
day cooling-off period should have been until January 19, 2002. On top of that, the strike vote was
held on January 14, 2002 and was submitted to the NCMB only on January 18, 2002; therefore, the
7-day strike ban should have prevented them from holding a strike until January 25, 2002. The
concerted action committed by the Union on January 18, 2002 which resulted in the disruption of the
Hotels operations clearly violated the above-stated mandatory periods.

Last, the Union committed illegal acts in the conduct of its strike. The NLRC ruled that the strike was
illegal since, as shown by the pictures presented by the Hotel, the Union officers and members
formed human barricades and obstructed the driveway of the Hotel. There is no merit in the Unions
argument that it was not its members but the Hotels security guards and the police officers who
blocked the driveway, as it can be seen that the guards and/or police officers were just trying to
secure the entrance to the Hotel. The pictures clearly demonstrate the tense and highly explosive
situation brought about by the strikers presence in the Hotels driveway.
Page 475 of 601
 Page 476 of 601

179) US vs. Bustos [37 Phil. 731 (1918)]

G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELIPE BUSTOS, ET AL., defendants-
appellants.

Facts:
In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled,
and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary(privileged
communication) through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed
affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol,
Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The specific charges
against the justice of the peace include the solicitation of money from persons who have
pending cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused published a writing
which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against him.

Issue: Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free
speech and free press.

Held:
Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial
conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely
or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a
justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be
effectively suppressed. It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to
assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of
any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring
the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican

institutions and the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the
part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any
person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of
 Page 477 of 601

the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course,
assume responsibility for the charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient
administration of justice and of public affairs.

Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded
protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and
adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient
administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient
if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance
thereof although in fact he is mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true as to the justice
of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action.
Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The
ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be
venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege.

In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that
presumption. A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to
discover grounds of malice or falsity.

180) Burgos vs. Chief of Staff [133 SCRA 800 (1984)]

G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA
SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS:
The "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum” newspapers were searched and its office and
printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books
and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized based on the
 Page 478 of 601

strength of the two [2] search warrants alleged to have been used in subversive
activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations issued
by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano.

As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed,
with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were
discontinued

Petitioners averred that the search warrant should be declared illegal because:

1. The judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his
witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court.

2. There are two (2) search warrants issued but pinpointed only one place where
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed.

3. That the articles belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and
the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized although the warrants were directed
against Jose Burgos, Jr. Alone.

4. That real property was seized under the disputed warrants like machinery,
receptacles, instruments, etc.

5. The search warrant was based only on the affidavits of Col. Abadilla’s that they conducted
surveillance of the premises could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable
cause.

Respondents insinuates that petitioners are estopped by laches that they only impugned the search
warrant six months later.

ISSUE: Whether there is probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.
 Page 479 of 601

RULING: NO. The search warrant is in the nature of general warrants.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the
search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in
connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the
application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish.
Mere generalization will not suffice.

The broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession
or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and
other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of
committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as
amended ..."is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of
probable cause.

Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable

cause, said allegation cannot serve as the basis for the issuance of a search warrant and
it was a grave error for the respondent judge to have done so.

181) New York Times vs. Sulliven [380 U.S. 51 (1964)]

The NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY, Petitioner, v. L. B. SULLIVAN. Ralph D. ABERNATHY et
al.,

Facts:
During the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, the New York Times published an ad for
contributing donations to defend Martin Luther King, Jr., on perjury charges. The ad
contained several minor factual inaccuracies. The city Public Safety Commissioner, L.B.
Sullivan, felt that the criticism of his subordinates reflected on him, even though he was
 Page 480 of 601

not mentioned in the ad. Sullivan sent a written request to the Times to publicly retract the
information, as required for a public figure to seek punitive damages in a libel action under Alabama
law.

When the Times refused and claimed that they were puzzled by the request, Sullivan filed a libel
action against the Times and a group of African American ministers mentioned in the ad.
A jury in state court awarded him $500,000 in damages. The state supreme court affirmed and the
Times appealed.

Issue: Whether Alabama's libel law unconstitutionally infringes on the First Amendment's freedom of
speech and freedom of press protections?

Ruling:
NO. To sustain a claim of defamation or libel, the First Amendment requires that the
plaintiff show that the defendant knew that a statement was false or was reckless in
deciding to publish the information without investigating whether it was accurate.

In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Court ruled for the Times. When a
statement concerns a public figure, the Court held, it is not enough to show that it is
false for the press to be liable for libel. Instead, the target of the statement must show
that it was made with knowledge of or reckless disregard for its falsity. Brennan used the
term "actual malice" to summarize this standard, although he did not intend the usual meaning of a
malicious purpose. In libel law, “malice” had meant knowledge or gross recklessness rather
than intent, since courts found it difficult to imagine that someone would knowingly
disseminate false information without a bad intent.

182) Abrams vs. US [250 U.S. 616 (1919)]

Jacob Abrams vs. United States

Facts:
 Page 481 of 601

In 1918, the United States participated in a military operation on Russian soil against
Germany after the Russian Revolution overthrew the tsarist regime. Russian immigrants
in the US circulated literature calling for a general strike in ammunition plants to
undermine the US war effort. The defendants were convicted for two leaflets thrown from a New
York City window. One denounced the sending of American troops to Russia, and the second
denounced the war and advocated for the cessation of the production of weapons to be used against
"Workers Soviets of Russia". They were sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Issue: Whether the amendments to the Espionage Act or the application of those amendments in
this case violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment?

Ruling:
YES.The Court held that in calling for a general strike and the curtailment of munitions
production, the leaflets violated the Espionage Act. Congress’ determination that all such
propaganda posed a danger to the war effort was sufficient to meet the standard set
inSchenck v. United States for prosecuting attempted crimes. As in Schenck, the Court
emphasized that protections on speech are lower during wartime.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that the First Amendment
protects the right to dissent from the government’s viewpoints and objectives. Protections on speech,
he continued, should not be curtailed unless there is a present danger of immediate evil, or the
defendant intends to create such a danger. The evidence in this case consisted of two leaflets, which
he concluded did not meet the “clear and present danger” test.

183) Gonzales vs. COMELEC [27 SCRA 835 (1969)]

G.R. No. L-27833 April 18, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF RE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
REPUBLIC ACT 4880. ARSENIO GONZALES and FELICISIMO R. CABIGAO, petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Facts:
RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of
candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was
 Page 482 of 601

challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and
free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act.
Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th
District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he
was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private
individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. It is
their claim that “the enforcement of said Republic Act No. 4880 in question [would]
prejudice [their] basic rights…, such as their freedom of speech, their freedom of
assembly and their right to form associations or societies for purpose not contrary to
law, guaranteed under the Philippine Constitution,” and that therefore said act is
unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether the Right of Expression of Speech is susceptible of any limitation.

Held:
Yes, Freedom of expression is not an absolute. The Court spoke of two tests that may
supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction.

“The ‘clear and present danger’ rule means that the evil consequence of the comment or
utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high’
before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
‘substantive evil’ sought to be prevented.” It has the advantage of establishing according to the
above decision “a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be
public established.”

The “dangerous tendency” rule and explained “If the words uttered create a dangerous
tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is
not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be
advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it
necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of
force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable
 Page 483 of 601

effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body
seeks to prevent.

Why repression is permissible only when the danger of substantive evil is present? The evil
apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there
be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.” The apprehended evil
must be “relatively serious.” For “[prohibition] of free speech and assembly is a measure so
stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial
harm to society.”

This test then as a limitation on freedom of expression is justified by the danger or

evil a substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike the dangerous
tendency doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. The term clear seems to point
to a causal connection with the danger of the substantially evil arising from the utterance questioned.
Present refers to the time element. It used to be identified with imminent and immediate danger. The
danger must not only be probable but very likely inevitable.

184) Social Weather Station vs. COMELEC (G.R. No.147571, May 5, 2001)
G.R. No. 147571 May 5, 2001
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING
CORPORATION, doing business as MANILA STANDARD, petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-profit social
research institution conducting surveys in various fields, including economics, politics,
demography, and social development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly reporting
the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation
publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation, which features news-
worthy items of information including election surveys.
 Page 484 of 601

Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on

Elections from enforcing §5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides:
“Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an
election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days
before an election.”

Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the
period of the elections both at the national and local levels and release to the media the
results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing
Corporation, on the other hand, states that it intends to publish election survey results
up to the last day of the elections.
Issue: Whether or not the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior
restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such
restraint

Ruling:NO. The Supreme Court held that that in The United States Supreme Court, through Chief
Justice Warren, held in United States v. O 'Brien the test should thenbe employed to determine
the constitutional validity:

[A] Government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the

constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest

First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because the causal connection
of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest "not related to the
suppression of free expression." By prohibiting the publication of election survey results
because of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the
election, §5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the
expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists,
 Page 485 of 601

radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion takers. In effect, §5.4
shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by referring personal
opinion to statistical results. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression means that
"the government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content." The inhibition of speech should be upheld only if the expression falls within
one of the few unprotected categories

Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the

suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental, §5.4
nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the O 'Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater
than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated, §5.4 aims at the prevention
of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or "losing"
candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as these
aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of
expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than
speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils.

To summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior
restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3)
the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than
suppression of freedom of expression.

Freedom from Prior Restraint, Censorship, Obscenity and the Right to Privacy

185) Disini vs. Secretary of Justice (G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014)
G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL
and ERNESTO SONIDO, JR., Petitioners, vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND
 Page 486 of 601

COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL

POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Respondents.
Facts:
The main point of contention in this case was RA 10175, also known as the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of2012. Said law sought to regulate the use of the Internet, however, a
number of its provisions were subject to numerous petitions. These petitions prayed for
said provisions to be declared unconstitutional.
With regard to the right to privacy enunciated in Section 3, Article III of the Constitution, the
following were subjected to scrutiny by the Court:
Sec. 4(b) 3 (Identity Theft) – intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration,
or deletion of identifying information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without right
(petitioners’ stance: violates constitutional right to privacy, among others)
Sec. 12 (Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data) – law enforcement authorities with due cause
shall be authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time
associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system (Petitioners
assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or record traffic data
in real time as tending to curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for official abuse.
They claim that data showing where digital messages come from, what kind they are,
and where they are destined need not be incriminating to their senders or recipients
before they are to be protected. Petitioners invoke the right of every individual to privacy
and to be protected from government snooping into the messages or information that
they send to one another.)
Issue: W/N the said provisions violate the constitutional guaranty of the right to privacy
Held: NO and YES. Sec. 4(b) 3 (Identity Theft) is found to be valid and constitutional by the
Court. However, the Court found Sec. 12 (Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data) unconstitutional
for being in violation of one’s right to privacy.
Zones of Privacy
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form
of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary
legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction
that the right to privacy is a “constitutional right” and “the right most valued by civilized men,” but
 Page 487 of 601

also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, “no one
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy” and “every has the right to the protection
of the law against such interference or attacks.”
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and
(b) the right to privacy of communication and correspondence. In assessing the challenge
that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine
whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.
No showing how the provision violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as
the right to due process of the law.
The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship,
his residence address, his contact number, his place and date of birth, the name of his
spouse if any, his occupation, and similar data. The law punishes those who acquire or
use such identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners
simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft
violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of the
law.
However, the Court found Sec. 12 (Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data) unconstitutional for
being in violation of one’s right to privacy. This is because the gathering of a user’straffic data
can easily reveal such person’s patterns when using the Internet. Such is particularly
true especially when it involves the storage and review of collected data, which is a clear
invasion of privacy. It is notable that the collectionof traffic data is similar to the concept of
‘cookies,’ which is used by online advertising companies like Google in theirproliferation of ads, but
such is only limited to commercial uses, and requires the user’s consent beforehand.
Two categories of right to privacy
In Whalen v. Roe, the United States Supreme Court classified privacy in two categories:
decisional privacy and informational privacy.
Decisional privacy involves the right to independence in making certain important decisions, while
informational privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. It is the
latter right – the right to informational privacy – that those who oppose government collection or
recording of traffic data in real-time seek to protect.
 Page 488 of 601

Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the
messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient.
Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those “associated with specified
communications.” But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the law
enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications. The power is virtually
limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in “fishing expedition,”
choosing whatever specified communication they want. This evidently threatens the
right of individuals to privacy.

186) Ejercito vs. COMELEC (742 SCRA 210)

G.R. No. 212398 November 25, 2014
EMILIO RAMON "E.R." P. EJERCITO, Petitioner, vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR "EGA Y" S. SAN LUIS, Respondents.
FACTS:
Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections, a petition for
disqualification was filedby San Luis before the Office of the COMELEC Clerk in Manila
against E.R. Ejercito,who was a fellow gubernatorial candidate and, at the time, the
incumbent Governor of the Province of Laguna.

Ejercito distributed to the electorates of the province of Laguna the so-called

"Orange Card" with an intent to influence, induce or corrupt the voters in voting for his
favor. Province of Laguna has a total of 1,525,522 registered electorate. The authorized expenses of
candidates (aggregate amount) is three pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the
constituency where the candidate filed his certificate of candidacy.

A candidate for the position of Provincial Governor of Laguna is only authorized to

incur an election expense amounting to FOUR MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SIX
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX (P4,576,566.00) PESOS. However, in total
disregard and violation of the afore-quoted provision of law, [Ejercito] exceeded his
expenditures in relation to his campaign for the 2013 election. For television campaign
commercials alone, [Ejercito] already spent the sum of PhP23,730.784 based on our party's official
monitoring.
 Page 489 of 601

ISSUE: Whether or not Ejercito should be disqualified

RULING:Yes. Ejercito should be disqualified for spending in his election campaign an

amount in excess of whatis allowed by the OEC.

Ejercito claims that the advertising contracts between ABS-CBN Corporation and
Scenema Concept International, Inc. were executed by an identified supporter without
his knowledge and consent. He believes that an advertising contract paid for by a third
party without the candidate's knowledge andconsent must be considered a form of
political speech that must prevail against the laws suppressing it.

We refuse to believe that the advertising contracts between ABS-CBN Corporation

and Scenema Concept International, Inc. were executed without Ejercito's knowledge
and consent. His express conformity to the advertising contracts is actually a must
because non-compliance is considered as an election offense.

R.A. No. 9006 provides:

Sec. 4. Requirements for Published or Printed and Broadcast Election Propaganda. —
xxxxxxxxx
4.3 Print, broadcast or outdoor advertisements donated to the candidate or political party shall not
beprinted, published, broadcasted or exhibited without the written acceptance by the said candidate
orpolitical party. Such written acceptance shall be attached to the advertising contract and shall
besubmitted to the COMELEC as provided in Subsection 6.3 hereof. This Court cannot give weight to
Ejercito's representation that his signature on the advertising contractswas a forgery. The issue is a
belated claim, raised only for the first time in this petition for certiorari.Likewise, whether the
advertising contracts were executed without Ejercito's knowledge and consent, andwhether his
signatures thereto were fraudulent, are issues of fact.
Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646 does not invade and violate the constitutional guarantees
comprisingfreedom of expression. Regarding the regulation by the Commission of the enjoyment or
utilization offranchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media
ofcommunication or information, all grants, special privileges or concessions granted by the
 Page 490 of 601

Government,there is a provision that during the election period, the Commission may regulate,
among other things,the rates, reasonable free space, and time allotments for public information
campaigns and forums amongcandidates for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest and
peaceful elections.

The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to the candidate's allowable

limit of election expenses does not trample upon the free exercise of the voters' rights of
speech and of expression under Section4, Article III of the Constitution. As a content-
neutral regulation, the law's concern is not to curtail the message or content of the
advertisement promoting a particular candidate but to ensure equality between and
among aspirants with "deep pockets" and those with less financial resources. Any
restriction on speech or expression is only incidental and is no more than necessary to
achieve the substantial governmental interest of promoting equality of opportunity in
political advertising. Indeed, to rule otherwise would practically result in an unlimited
expenditure for political advertising, which skews thepolitical process and subverts the
essence of a truly democratic form of government.
 Page 491 of 601

187) GMA Network Inc. vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014)
G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014
GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
SENATOR ALAN PETER "COMPAÑERO" S. CAYETANO,Petitioner-Intervenor.

FACTS:
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of
Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio
advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an
aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180)
minutes, respectively.

They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates
freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to
information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forth
coming elections.

Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous “per station”
airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC approval for
candidates’ television and radio guestings and appearances.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits violates
freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.

RULING: YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates
and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted
reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not
constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the
freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and
 Page 492 of 601

programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the
imposition of such a prohibitive measure.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based

time limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only
composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken
among the citizens across the country.

Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as
possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements in
languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of
these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express
himself – a form of suppression of his political speech.

188) New Sounds Broadcasting Network Inc. vs. Dy (G.R. Nos. 170270 and 179411, April
2, 2009)
G.R. Nos. 170270 & 179411 April 2, 2009
NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK INC. and CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING
SYSTEM, INC., Petitioners, vs.
HON. CEASAR G. DY, FELICISIMO G. MEER, BAGNOS MAXIMO, RACMA FERNANDEZ-
GARCIA and THE CITY OF CAUAYAN, Respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners operate and run BomboRadyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio broadcast
station, and Star FM DWIT Cauayan, an FM radio broadcast station, in CauayanCitry,
Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of its broadcasting station, management
office, and transmitters on propery located in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela.

On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of the
Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and certified that
the commercial structure to be constructed conformed to local zoning regulations, noting
as well that the location is classified as a “commercial area”. The radio station was able
to fully operate smoothly thereafter.
 Page 493 of 601

In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayor’s permit, City
Zoning Administratior-Designate Bagnos Maximo refused to issue zoning clearance on
the grounds that petitioners were not able to submit conversion papers showing that the
agricultural land was converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the court to compel the
issuance of mayor’s permit but the court denied the action. In the meantime, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region II office issued to petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the
property from agricultural to commercial.

In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayor’s permit, attaching the
DAR Order. Respondent Felicisimo Meer, acting City Administrator of Cauayan City denied the same,
claiming that it was void on the grounds that they did not have record of the DAR Order. The
deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal
Officer of Cauayan City, closed the radio station. Due to the prvosion of Omnibus Election Code
which prohibits the closure of radio station during the pendency of election period,
COMELEC issued an order allowing the petitioners to operate before Febuary 17, 2004,
but was barred again by respondent Mayor CeasarDy on the grounds that the radio
station had no permit. Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to run again until June 10,
2004 after elections.

Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayor’s permit but both courts
denied the petition.

A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC to issue licenses
and permits, and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon
which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. In case of
Cauayan City, the authority to require a mayor’s permit was enacted through Ordinance No. 92-004,
enacted in 1993. However, nothing in the ordinance requires an application for a mayor’s
permit to submit “either an approved land conversion papers from DAR, showing that its
property was converted from prime agricultural land or an approved resolution from the
Sangguniang Bayan or SangguniangPanglungsod authorizing the reclassification of property from
agricultural to commercial land.
 Page 494 of 601

In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the property as commercial.
Petitioners are also armed with several certifications stating that the property is indeed a commercial
area. Also, petitioners paid real property taxes based on the classification of property as commercial
without objections raised by the respondents.

Petitioners argued that this consistent recognition by the local government of

Cauayan of the commercial character of the property constitutes estoppels against
respondents from denying the fact before the courts. The lower courts had ruled that “the
government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels, but petitioners classified that this concept is
understood to only refer to acts and mistakes of its official especially to those which are irregular.

Issue: Whether the lower court is correct in contending that the government of Cauayan City is not
bound by estoppels on the grounds that the state is immune against suits.

Ruling:No. While it is true that the state cannot be put in estoppels by mistake or error of
its officials or agents, there is an exception.

Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare
and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the
effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with
circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of
justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal
dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby
thing; and subject to limitations . . ., the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public
authorities as well as against private individuals

Thus, when there is no convincing evidence to prove irregularity or negligence on

the part of the government official whose acts are being disowned other than the bare
assertion on the part of the State, the Supreme Court have declined to apply State
immunity from estoppel. Herein, there is absolutely no evidence other than the bare
assertions of the respondents that the Cauayan City government had previously erred
 Page 495 of 601

when it certified that the property had been zoned for commercial use. The absence of
any evidence other than bare assertions that the 1996 to 2001 certifications were
incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion that respondents are estopped from asserting
that the previous recognition of the property as commercial was wrong.

Respondents were further estopped from disclaiming the previous consistent recognition by
the Cauayan City government that the property was commercially zoned unless they had evidence,
which they had none, that the local officials who issued such certifications acted irregularly in doing
so. It is thus evident that respondents had no valid cause at all to even require petitioners to secure
“approved land conversion papers from the DAR showing that the property was converted from prime
agricultural land to commercial land.”

Respondents closure of petitioner’s radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motvies. Petitioners
have been aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to
have favored respondent Dy and his political dynasty. Such statement manifests and confirms that
respondent’s denial of the renewal applications on the ground that property is commercial and merely
a pretext, and their real agenda is to remove petitioners from Cauayan City and suppress the latter’s
voice. This is a blatant violation of constitutional right to press freedom.

189) I-UTAK vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015)

G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015

1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent.

SHORT STORY: Petitioner assails certain provisions of Resolution No. 9615, which prohibit the
posting of election campaign materials on privately owned PUV’s and transport terminals, saying that
they violate certain constitutional provisions, among them the equal protection clause.

FACTS:
The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 (providing for the implementing rules of
RA No. 9006 [Fair Elections Act]) in connection with the May 2013 and all subsequent elections.
 Page 496 of 601

Sec. 7(f) of the said resolution prohibited the posting, displaying or exhibiting of any
election campaign or propaganda material outside of authorized common poster areas, in
public places, or in private properties without the consent of the owner thereof.

Sec. 7(g) enumerated the public places referred to in sec. 7(f), among them:

a. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs
and tricycles, whether motorized or not; and
b. Public transport terminals, such as BUS TERMINALS, airports, seaports, DOCKS,
piers, TRAIN STATIONS, and the like.

Said resolution provides that the violation of items 5 and 6 under subsection (g)
shall be a cause for the revocation of the public utility franchise and will make the owner
and/or operator of the transportation service and/or terminal liable for an election
offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006.

Petitioner sought for clarification from the COMELEC as regards the application of the said
items in the resolution, requesting the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of such
provisions and allow private owners of PUVS and transport terminals to post election
campaign materials on their vehicles and transport terminals.
The COMELEC en banc issued a resolution denying petitioner’s request to reconsider the
implementation of the assailed provisions.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
9615 are constitutional

RULING:
NO. In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental
act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four
requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely: 1. it must be based upon
substantial distinctions; 2. it must be germane to the purposes of the law; 3. it must not
 Page 497 of 601

be limited to existing conditions only; and 4. it must apply equally to all members of the
class.

PROHIBITING OWNERS OF PUVs AND TRANSPORT TERMINALS FROM POSTING

ELECTION CAMPAIGN MATERIALS VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
"Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.”

While the classification in the assailed provision is not limited to existing

conditions and applies equally to the members of the purported class, such remains
unconstitutional since it is not based on substantial distinction and is not germane to the
purpose of the law.

There is a distinction between PUVS and transport terminals as opposed to private vehicles
and other properties in that the former, to be considered as such, needs to secure a franchise or a
permit from the government to operate. However, the prohibition in Resolution No. 9615 refers to
the OWNERSHIP per se of the PUV and transport terminals, and not to the franchise nor the permit
to operate of the same.

As regards ownership, NO SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTION exists. While PUVs and transport

terminals are available for public use, their ownership remains private. Also, whether on PUVS and
transport terminals, or on private vehicles and other places frequented by the public, the election
campaign materials would still be seen by many people. If owners of private vehicles and other
properties are allowed to post election campaign materials, there is no reason to deny owners of
PUVS and transport terminals the same right.
 Page 498 of 601

190) Gonzales vs. COMELEC (27 SCRA 835)

G.R. No. L-27833 April 18, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF RE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
REPUBLIC ACT 4880. ARSENIO GONZALES and FELICISIMO R. CABIGAO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-27833 April 18, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF RE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
REPUBLIC ACT 4880. ARSENIO GONZALES and FELICISIMO R. CABIGAO, petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Facts:
RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of
candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was
challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and
free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act.

Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th
District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he
was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private
individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. It is
their claim that “the enforcement of said Republic Act No. 4880 in question [would]
prejudice [their] basic rights…, such as their freedom of speech, their freedom of
assembly and their right to form associations or societies for purpose not contrary to
law, guaranteed under the Philippine Constitution,” and that therefore said act is
unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether the Right of Expression of Speech is susceptible of any limitation.

Held:
Yes, Freedom of expression is not an absolute. The Court spoke of two tests that may
supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction.
 Page 499 of 601

“The ‘clear and present danger’ rule means that the evil consequence of the comment or
utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high’
before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
‘substantive evil’ sought to be prevented.” It has the advantage of establishing according to the
above decision “a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be
public established.”

The “dangerous tendency” rule and explained “If the words uttered create a dangerous
tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is
not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be
advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it
necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of
force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable
effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body
seeks to prevent.

Why repression is permissible only when the danger of substantive evil is present? The evil
apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there
be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.” The apprehended evil
must be “relatively serious.” For “[prohibition] of free speech and assembly is a measure so
stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial
harm to society.”

This test then as a limitation on freedom of expression is justified by the danger or

evil a substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike the dangerous
tendency doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. The term clear seems to point
to a causal connection with the danger of the substantially evil arising from the utterance questioned.
Present refers to the time element. It used to be identified with imminent and immediate danger. The
danger must not only be probable but very likely inevitable.

191) Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)
 Page 500 of 601

G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.
NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY,
ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
FACTS:
Bishop Vicente M. Navarra posted two (2) tarpaulins, each with approximately six feet
(6′) by ten feet (10′) in size, for public viewing within the vicinity of San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod. One of the tarpaulins stated: “Conscience Vote” and lists of
candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark or “(Pro-RH) Team
Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified as comprising
“Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.

When the said tarpaulin came to the attention of Comelec, it sent a letter to Bishop
Navarra ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin because it was in violation of
Comelec Resolution No. 9615 as the lawful size for election propaganda material is only
two feet (2’) by three feet (3’); otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense
against the latter.

Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free speech, Bishop
Navarra, et al. prayed for the Court to declare the questioned orders of Comelec as
unconstitutional, and permanently restraining the latter from enforcing them after notice and
hearing.

ISSUE: Whether or not the controversial tarpaulin is an election propaganda which the Comelec has
the power to regulate; otherwise its prohibition shall constitute an abridgment of freedom of speech.

RULING: NO. It is not election propaganda. While the tarpaulin may influence the
success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily
mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for
consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
 Page 501 of 601

Personal opinions, unlike sponsored messages, are not covered by the second
paragraph of Sec. 1(4) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 defining “political advertisement”
or “election propaganda.”

The caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech. That
petitioners chose to categorize them as purveyors of death or of life on the basis of a single
issue—and a complex piece of legislation at that—can easily be interpreted as an attempt to
stereotype the candidates and party- list organizations. Not all may agree to the way their
thoughts were expressed, as in fact there are other Catholic dioceses that chose not to
follow the example of petitioners.

But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our Constitution is an enumeration of our

fundamental liberties. It is not a detailed code that prescribes good conduct. It provides space for
all to be guided by their conscience, not only in the act that they do to others but also in judgment of
the acts of others.

192) National Press Club vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1992)
G.R. No. 102653 March 5, 1992
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 102925 March 5, 1992
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE represented by ZOILO DEJARESCO, JR., as its Past
Chairman and President, and FRAULIN A. PEÑASALES as its Corporate Secretary,
petitioners,vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by HON. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, its
Chairman; HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE and HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, respondents

Facts:
It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and
violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners
maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because
it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only
 Page 502 of 601

publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political

propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in
derogation of media’s role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public
information and public opinion relevant to election issues.
Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of
candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda
except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of
radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the
quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and issues in the election
thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.
The statutory text that petitioners ask to strike down as unconstitutional is that of Section 11 (b) of
Republic Act No. 6646, known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987:
“Sec. 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – In addition to the forms of election
propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas PambansaBlg. 881, it shall be unlawful:
b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass media,
or any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space
or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as
provided under Section 90 and 92 of Batas PambansaBlg. 881. Any mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality who is a candidate for any elective public
office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign period.”
Issue: Whether Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 is valid/constitutional
Held: Yes.
It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of
speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press (Article III [4], Constitution) has to be taken
in conjunction with Article IX(C)(4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a
specific limited period — i.e., “during the election period.” It is difficult to overemphasize the special
importance of the rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press in a democratic
polity, in particular when they relate to the purity and integrity of the electoral process
itself, the process by which the people identify those who shall have governance over them. Thus, it
is frequently said that these rights are accorded a preferred status in our constitutional
hierarchy. Withal, the rights of free speech and free press are not unlimited rights for they
are not the only important and relevant values even in the most democratic of polities. In
 Page 503 of 601

our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the
level of financial resources that one may have at one’s disposal, is clearly an important value. One of
the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is
the egalitarian demand that “the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.”
The essential question is whether or not the assailed legisla-tive or administrative provisions
constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of
communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has gone
beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional
repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11
(b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media
operations during election periods.
Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media
of the candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable
connection with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX(C)(4) and Article II (26)
of the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and
television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial
difference. Here lies the core problem of equalization of the situations of the candidates with deep
pockets and the candidates with shallow or empty pockets that Article IX(C)(4) of the Constitution
and Section 11 (b) seek to address. That the statutory mechanism which Section 11 (b) brings into
operation is designed and may be expected to bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal
time and space, for political candidates to inform all and sundry about themselves, cannot be
gainsaid.
(In relation to PRIOR RESTRAINT, the concept is found in the Dissenting Opinion of
Justice Cruz)
But the most important objection to Section 11(b) is that it constitutes prior restraint on
the dissemination of ideas. In a word, it is censorship. It is that officious functionary of
the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do
so, and no more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment
should he be so rash as to disobey. In his “Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing,” Milton
deplored the impossibility of finding a man base enough to accept the office of censor and at the
 Page 504 of 601

same time good enough to perform its duties. Yet a pretender to that meddler is in our midst today,
smugly brandishing the threat of this miserable law.
One could perhaps concede some permissible instances of censorship, as where private mail is
screened during wartime to prevent deliberate or unwitting disclosure of sensitive or classified
matters that might prejudice the national security or where, to take a famous example, a person is
prohibited from shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater. But these exceptions merely make and bolster
the rule that there should be no prior restraint upon a person’s right to express his ideas on any
subject of public interest. The rule applies whether the censorship be in the form of outright
prohibition, as in the cases before us, or in more subtle forms like the imposition of a tax upon
periodicals exceeding a prescribed maximum number of copies per issue or allowing the circulation of
books only if they are judged to be fit for minors, thus reducing the reading tastes of adults to the
level of juvenile morality.
I remind the Court of the doctrine announced in Bantam Books v. Sullivan that “any system of
prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against
its validity.” That presumption has not been refuted in the cases subjudice. On the contrary, the
challenged provision appears quite clearly to be invalid on its face because of its
undisguised attempt at censorship. The feeble effort to justify it in the name of social
justice and clean elections cannot prevail over the self-evident fact that what we have
here is an illegal intent to suppress free speech by denying access to the mass media as
the most convenient instruments for the molding of public opinion. And it does not
matter that the use of these facilities may involve financial transactions, for the element
of the commercial does not remove them from the protection of the Constitution.

193) Osmena vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 132231 March 31, 1998)
G.R. No. 132231 March 31, 1998
EMILIO M. R. OSMEÑA and PABLO P. GARCIA, petitioners, vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition, seeking a reexamination of the validity of 11(b) of R.A.
No. 6646, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits mass media from selling or
giving free of charge prints pace or air time for campaign or other political purposes,
 Page 505 of 601

except to the Commission on Elections. Petitioners are candidates for public office in the
forthcoming elections. Petitioner Emilio M. R. Osmeña is candidate for President of the
Philippines, while petitioner Pablo P. Garcia is governor of Cebu Province, seeking
reelection.

On June 20, 1991, RA No. 7056 was enacted. Such RA was made for the 1992 National and
Local Elections

On July 30, 1991, Governor Emilio Osmeña of Cebu, et al filed a petition against the COMELEC
for the nullity of the said RA on the reason that the said law was unconstitutional.

Such provisions in the said RA that were deemed by the petitioners unconstitutional were:

Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of synchronized national
and local elections on the second Monday of May 1992 Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd
paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing that all incumbent provincial, city and
municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their
successors shall have been duly elected and qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII
(Transitory Provision) of the Constitution.

The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens the term
or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of November,1992
violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.

Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for Presidential, Vice-
Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the provision of Section 9, Article IX under
the title "Commission on Elections" of the Constitution.

The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in Republic Act
7056 to synchronized national and local elections set by the Constitution on the second
Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less, valid justification for postponing the
local elections to the second Monday of November 1992, and in the process violating the
 Page 506 of 601

Constitution itself. If, at all, Congress can devise ways and means, within the parameters
of the Constitution, to eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if this, still, is
not feasible, resort can be made to the self-correcting mechanism built in the
Constitution for its amendment or revision.

The respondents, COMELEC, questioned the jurisdiction of the Court to review such case
for they stated that the controversy was merely a political one and therefore does not fall
under the court’s jurisdiction

ISSUE: Whether RA 7056 is unconstitutional

HELD:Yes. It is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held that the law contravenes
Article XVIII, Section 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution which provides for the
synchronization of national and local elections. The said law, on the other hand provides for
the desynchronization of election by mandating that there be two separate elections in 1992. The
term of synchronization in the mentioned constitutional provision was used synonymously as the
phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their office tenure on the
same day or occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every
three years.
R.A 7056 also violated Section 2, Article XVIII of the Constitution which provides that
the local official first elected under the Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30,
1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent local officials shall hold over beyond
June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and
qualified. The Supreme Court states that “it is not competent for the legislature to extend the term
of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified where
the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution
fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the
office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify within the time”.
RA 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8 Article X of the 1987 Constitution
which fixed the term of office of all elective local officials, except barangay officials, to three
years. If the local election will be held on the second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056,
those to be elected will be serving for only two years and seven months, that is, from
November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not three years.
 Page 507 of 601

The law was also held violative of Sec.9, Article IX of the Constitution by changing the
campaign period. RA 7056 provides for a different campaign period.

194) Chaves vs. Gonzales (G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008)
G.R. No. 168338 February 15, 2008
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs.
RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), respondents.

FACTS:
As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello Garci” compact disc
audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President
Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner VirgilioGarcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary
Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting
or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also
stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing
offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the National
Bureau of Investigation to go after media organizations “found to have caused the
spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.”
Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned in a press release all radio stations and TV network
owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and permits issued to them by government
like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that they shall not use
their stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation. The
NTC stated that the continuous airing or broadcast of the “Hello Garci” taped
conversations by radio and TV stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority. It
warned that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful
misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or
cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments.
Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and the Kapisanan ng mgaBrodkastersaPilipinas
(KBP) which resulted in the issuance of a Joint Press Statement which stated, among others, that the
supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and handled responsibly.
 Page 508 of 601

Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC
directly with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a
form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?

RULING:
YES, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a
form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution.
[I]t is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not
reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press
statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions.
Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued
its statement as the regulatory body of media. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and
on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior
restraint. The concept of an “act” does not limit itself to acts already converted to a
formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an
official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior
restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute
impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.

195) Gonzales vs. KalawKatigbak [137 SCRA 356 (1985)]

G.R. No. L-69500 July 22, 1985
JOSE ANTONIO U. GONZALEZ in behalf of MALAYA FILMS, LINO BROCKA, JOSE F.
LACABA, and DULCE Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners, vs.
CHAIRMAN MARIA KALAW KATIGBAK, GENERAL WILFREDO C. ESTRADA (Ret.), and THE
BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTION PICTURES AND TELEVISION (BRMPT), respondents.
FACTS:
The present case is a petition for Certiorari assailing the classification made by the Board
of Review for Motion Pictures and Television. The motion picture in question
“KapitsaPatalim” was classified for “Adults Only” by the respondent Board with initial
cuts and deletions. The Board then claimed that if they want to change the classification
 Page 509 of 601

of the said movie, the petitioners need to delete and change some scenes. Aggrieved, the
petitioner, who is the publisher of the said movie, assailed such decision. However, the
respondent claimed that issue has now become moot because they a permit to exhibit
without cuts and deletions was already issued. Still not satisfied with this, the petitioner
filed an amended petition now questioning the classification as “For Adults Only.”
Petitioner now contends that such classification is an impermissible restraint on the
artistic freedom and expression protected by the right to free speech and of the press.

ISSUE: Whether the classification made by the Board is an impermissible restraint on artistic
expression-
RULING:YES The Court reiterated in this case that importance of motion pictures as a
medium of communication of ideas and expression of artistic impulse. It is also
considered an organ of public opinion that must be afforded protection unless there is a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil. However, obscene materials do not enjoy
the same protection. The test that should be followed in determining what is obscene should
be whether the average person, applying the contemporary community standards, finds
the works taken as a whole appeal to prurient interest. It is because the portrayal of sex is
not immediately equal to obscenity and is not a sufficient reason to deny the material
constitutional protection. There is also an applicable law, EO 376, which used the Filipino cultural
values as the standard. It is a well-settled rule that when a law is susceptible of two interpretations,
the Court should adopt the one favoring validity. As thus construed, there can be no valid objection
to the sufficiency of the controlling standard and its conformity to what the Constitution ordains.

196) Lagunzad vs. Sotto Vda. De Gonzales [92 SCRA 476 (1979)]
G.R. No. L-32066 August 6, 1979
MANUEL LAGUNZAD, petitioner,
vs. MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
Sometime in August 1961, petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the
production of a movie entitled “The Moises Padilla Story” under the “MML Productions.”
It was based mainly on the copyrighted but unpublished book of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez
Jr., entitled “The Long Dark Night in Negros” subtitled “The Moises Padilla Story,” the
 Page 510 of 601

rights to which petitioner had purchased from Atty. Rodriguez in the amount of
P2,000.00.
Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were
portions which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some
scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales, private respondent herein, and of
one “Auring” as his girlfriend.
On October 3, 1961, petitioner received a telephone call from one Mrs. Nelly Amante, half-sister
of Moises Padilla, objecting to the filming of the movie and the “exploitation” of his life.
Shown the early “rushes” of the picture, Mrs. Amante and her sister, Mrs. Gaieres, objected to many
portions thereof notwithstanding petitioner’s explanation that the movie had been supervised by
Ernesto Rodriguez Jr. On Oct. 5, 1961, Mrs. Amante, for and in behalf of her mother, private
respondent, demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and deletions in the movie.
Petitioner contends that he acceded to the demands because he had already invested heavily in the
picture to the extent of mortgaging his properties, in addition to the fact that he had to meet the
scheduled target date of the premiere showing.

On the same date, after some bargaining as to the amount to be paid, which was
P50,000.00 at first, then reduced to P20,000.00, petitioner and private respondent,
represented by her daughters and Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, executed a “Licensing Agreement”.
Petitioner takes the position that he was pressured into signing the Agreement because
of private respondent’s demand, through Mrs. Amante, for payment for the “exploitation”
of the life story of Moises Padilla, otherwise, she would “call a press conference declaring
the whole picture as a fake, fraud and a hoax and would denounce the whole thing in the
press, radio, television and that they were going to Court to stop the picture.”

On Oct. 10, 1961, petitioner paid private respondent the amount of P5,000.00 but contends that he
did so not pursuant to their Agreement but just to placate private respondent.
Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement, on
Dec. 22, 1961, private respondent instituted the present suit against him praying for
judgment in her favor ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the amount of P15,000.00, with legal
interest from the filing of the Complaint; 2) to render an accounting of the proceeds from the picture
 Page 511 of 601

and to pay the corresponding 2-1/2% royalty therefrom; 3) to pay attorney’s fees equivalent to 20%
of the amounts claimed; and 4) to pay the costs.

Petitioner contended in his Answer that the episodes in the life of Moises Padilla depicted
in the movie were matters of public knowledge and occurred at or about the same time
that the deceased became and was a public figure; that private respondent has no
property right over those incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was without valid
cause or consideration and that he signed the same only because private respondent
threatened him with unfounded harassing action which would have delayed production;
and that he paid private respondent the amount of P5,000.00 in October 1961, only because of the
coercion and threat employed upon him. Petitioner demanded that the Licensing Agreement be
declared null and void for being without any valid cause.
Private respondent duly filed her Answer to Counterclaim alleging that the transaction between her
and petitioner was entered into freely and voluntarily.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Licensing Agreement is null and void for lack of or for having an illegal cause or
consideration of contract.

RULING:
No. The Licensing Agreement is valid.SC did not agree with petitioner’s submission that the
Licensing Agreement is null and void for lack of, or for having an illegal cause or consideration.While
it is true that petitioner had purchased the rights to the book entitled “The Moises Padilla
Story,” that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the
deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased’s life and in that of his
mother and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis, “a privilege may be
given the surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory, but the
privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a
violation of their own rights in the character and memory of the deceased.”
Petitioner’s averment that private respondent did not have any property right over the life of Moises
Padilla since the latter was a public figure, is neither well taken. Being a public figure ipso facto
does not automatically destroy in toto a person’s right to privacy. The right to invade a
 Page 512 of 601

person’s privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or

novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may be. In
the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life
story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film
because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.
SC also found it difficult to sustain petitioner’s posture that his consent to the Licensing
Agreement was procured thruduress, intimidation and undue influenceexerted on him by
private respondent and her daughters at a time when he had exhausted his financial resources, the
premiere showing of the picture was imminent, and “time was of the essence.” As held in Martinez
vs. Hongkong& Shanghai Bank, it is necessary to distinguish between real duress and the motive
which is present when one gives his consent reluctantly. A contract is valid even though one of
the parties entered into it against his own wish and desires, or even against his better
judgment. In legal effect, there is no difference between a contract wherein one of the
contracting parties exchanges one condition for another because he looks for greater
profit or gain by reason of such change, and an agreement wherein one of the
contracting parties agrees to accept the lesser of two disadvantages. In either case, he
makes a choice free and untrammelled and must accordingly abide by it. The Licensing
Agreement has the force of law between the contracting parties and since its provisions
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy (Art. 1306,
Civil Code), petitioner should comply with it in good faith.

197) Ayer Productions vs. Judge Capulong [160 SCRA 861 (1988)]
G.R. No. 82380 April 29, 1988
AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. and McELROY&McELROY FILM PRODUCTIONS,
petitioners,
vs. HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 82398 April 29, 1988
HAL MCELROY petitioner,
vs. HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 134 and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.

FACTS:
 Page 513 of 601

Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer
Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine
and international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The
proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and
other government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film
production. It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-
drama" style, creating four fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual
documentary footage as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and
Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian have
developed a script. Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation,
reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his
family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or
commercial exploitation. Petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was
deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion
picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC
ordered for the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to
plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which
nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence
the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated

HELD: The Court would once more stress that this freedom includes the freedom to film and
produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse
them through television. The respondent Judge should have stayed his hand, instead of issuing
an ex-parte Temporary Restraining Order one day after filing of a complaint by the private
respondent and issuing a Preliminary Injunction twenty (20) days later; for the projected motion
picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent
nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was,
in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy that
private respondent could lawfully assert. The subject matter, as set out in the synopsis
provided by the petitioners and quoted above, does not relate to the individual life and
 Page 514 of 601

certainly not to the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile. The extent of that
intrusion, as this Court understands the synopsis of the proposed film, may be generally
described as such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep that film a truthful
historical account. Private respondent does not claim that petitioners threatened to
depict in "The Four Day Revolution" any part of the private life of private respondent or
that of any member of his family. His participation therein was major in character, a film
reenactment of the peaceful revolution that fails to make reference to the role played by private
respondent would be grossly unhistorical. The right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily
narrower than that of an ordinary citizen. Private respondent has not retired into the seclusion of
simple private citizenship. he continues to be a "public figure." After a successful political campaign
during which his participation in the EDSA Revolution was directly or indirectly referred to in the
press, radio and television, he sits in a very public place, the Senate of the Philippines. The line of
equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech
and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the
proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events

198) People vs. Kottinger 1923

G.R. No. L-20569 October 29, 1923
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. J. J. KOTTINGER, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
On November 24, 1922, detective Juan Tolentino raided the premises known as Camera
Supply Co. located at 110 Escolta, Manila where he found and confiscated postcards
depicting non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines in their native attire and in poses
showing how they live. These were used as evidence against J. J. Kottinger, the manager
of the company.

Philippines, Bontoc Woman. Greetings from the Philippines (depicting five young boys) Ifugao Belle,
Philippines Igorot Girl, Rice Field Costume. Kalinga Girls, Philippines. Moros, Philippines.

Kottinger was charged of having kept for sale in the store, obscene and indecent pictures
in violation of section 12 of Act. No. 277 otherwise known as the “The Philippine Libel
 Page 515 of 601

Law”. No evidence proving the obscenity and indecency of the postcards was presented
by the prosecution as they believed the postcards themselves are the best evidence of
that. Dr. H. Otley Beyer, a UP professor, and corroborated by other witnesses, testified
that none of the pictures showed anything that he did not see on various occasions in his
studies.

The defendant interposed a demurrer based upon the ground that the facts alleged
therein do not constitute an offense and were not contrary to law. The trial court
overruled the demurrer. The defendant was found guilty of the offense. The question was one of
first impression not just in the Philippines, but also in the US, Great Britain and elsewhere, which is
why the case was submitted en banc for decision.

ISSUE: Whether the pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they
appear and can be seen in the regions in which they live, are obscene or indecent.

HELD:NO. The SC held that pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native
dress and as they appear and can be seen in the regions in which they live are not
obscene or indecent within the meaning of the Libel Law. Not one parallel case could be
found, so the Court perforce reason from the general to the specific, from universal principle to
actual fact. “Obscenity” is defined as something offensive to chastity, decency or delicacy.
“Indecency” is an act against good behavior and a just delicacy. The test for obscenity is
whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave or corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or
other article charged as being obscene may fall. Another test is whether or not it shocks
the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency.

The Libel Law does not define what constitutes obscene or indecent writings, pictures,
etc. but the words “obscenity” and “indecency” are themselves descriptive, words in
common use and every person of average intelligence understands their meaning.
Whether a picture is obscene/indecent must depend on the circumstances of the case.

The Court turned to Federal Laws prohibiting the use and importation of obscene materials into the
 Page 516 of 601

Philippines in order to shed light on what constitutes as obscene or indecent. “Obscene” as used in
the Federal statutes makes it a criminal offense to place in the mail any obscene, lewd, or lascivious
publication, signifies that form of immorality which has relation to sexual impurity, has the same
meaning given at common law in prosecutions for obscene libel.

The pictures in question merely depict persons as they actually live, without attempted
presentation of persons in unusual postures or dress. The aggregate judgment of the
Philippine community, the moral sense of all the people in the Philippines, would not be
shocked by photographs of this type.

199) Rosenbloom vs. Metromedia (403 US 29)

George A. ROSENBLOOM, Petitioner, v. METROMEDIA, INC.
FACTS:
George Rosenbloom distributed nudist magazines in the Philadelphia area. Police
arrested him at his home on obscenity charges and seized several of the magazines. A
local news broadcast, run by Metromedia, Inc., reported on the arrest, but failed to use
the words “allegedly” or “reportedly” in during one broadcast. In subsequent broadcasts,
the reporters called Rosenbloom and other similar distributors “girlie look peddlers” and
“smut distributors”. Eventually, Rosenbloom was acquitted on the obscenity charges.
Rosenbloom then sued Metromedia for libel. The district court held that the First
Amendment standard, which allowed recovery of damages only for knowingly and
recklessly false statements, did not apply because Rosenbloom was not a public official
or figure. The court instead instructed the jury to award damages where Metromedia did not use
reasonable care to discern the truth before broadcasting. The jury awarded Rosenbloom general and
punitive damages, although the district court reduced the punitive damages. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the knowingly and recklessly false standard
applied.

ISSUE: Should the knowingly and recklessly false standard for defamatory statements apply to
private individuals?
 Page 517 of 601

RULING:
Yes. In a 5-3 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the judgment of the court affirming the
Third Circuit decision. The Supreme Court held that the knowingly and recklessly false
standard applied because the story was a matter of public concern. It did not matter that
Rosenbloom was a private citizen. The Court also held that the evidence in the case did
not support the damages award under the proper constitutional standard.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a special concurrence, stating that the First Amendment protected the
news media from libel judgments even where the broadcaster knows their statements were false.
Justice Byron R. White also wrote a special concurrence, asserting that the press have the privilege to
comment on official actions of public servants, such as the police, in full detail.
Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent, expressing that states should be free to impose a duty of
reasonable care in defamation actions involving private citizens. He would remand the case for
further consideration of whether Rosenbloom sustained actual harm and whether Metromedia acted
with actual malice. Justice Thurgood Marshall also wrote a dissent, stating that the court should limit
damages in libel actions by private citizens to actual losses. Justice William O. Douglas did not
participate.

200) KMU vs. Director General (G.R. No. 167798, April 19, 2006)
G.R. No. 167798 April 19, 2006
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO
UNO (NAFLU-KMU), JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, SALVADOR T.
CARRANZA, MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, JR. and ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners,
vs. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, and
THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
FACTS:
In April 13, 2005, President Gloria Macapagal – Arroyo issued Executive Order 420
requiring all government agencies and government-owned corporations to streamline
and harmonize their Identification Systems. The purposes of the uniform ID data
collection and ID format are to reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability and ensure
compatibility and provide convenience to the people served by government entities.
Petitioners allege that EO420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of
 Page 518 of 601

legislative functions by the executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they

allege that EO420 infringes on the citizen’s rights to privacy.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 420 infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy.

RULING:
No. All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities have been issuing
ID cards in the performance of their governmental functions. There have been no complaints from
citizens that the ID cards of these government entities violate their right to privacy. There have also
been no complaints of abuse by these government entities in the collection and recording of personal
identification data. Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to
privacy. Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere facial examination of EO 420
because EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection, recording and exhibition while
prescribing comprehensive safeguards. EO 420 applies only to government entities that
already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under
existing laws. In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but
makes the existing sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS,
Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the public.
Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the President’s constitutional power of
control over government entities in the Executive department, as well as under the President’s
constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

201) MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN (G.R. No. 155282, January 17, 2005)
G.R. No. 155282 January 17, 2005
MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD (MTRCB), petitioner,
vs. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION and LOREN LEGARDA, respondents.
FACTS:
On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening, respondent ABS-CBN aired "Prosti-tuition,"
an episode of the television (TV) program "The Inside Story" produced and hosted by
respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable
them to pay for their tuition fees. In the course of the program, student prostitutes,
pimps, customers, and some faculty members were interviewed. The Philippine Women’s
University (PWU) was named as the school of some of the students involved and the
 Page 519 of 601

facade of PWU Building at Taft Avenue, Manila conspicuously served as the background
of the episode. The showing of "The Inside Story" caused uproar in the PWU community.
Dr. Leticia P. de Guzman, Chancellor and Trustee of the PWU, and the PWU Parents and
Teachers Association filed letter-complaints3 with petitioner MTRCB. Acting on the
letter-complaints, the MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a formal complaint with the MTRCB
Investigating Committee, alleging among others, that respondents (1) did not submit
"The Inside Story" to petitioner for its review and (2) exhibited the same without its
permission, thus, violating Section 74 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 19865 and
Section 3,6 Chapter III and Section 7,7 Chapter IV of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations
respondents explained that the "The Inside Story" is a "public affairs program, news
documentary and socio-political editorial," the airing of which is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press. Accordingly,
petitioner has no power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint
upon respondents

ISSUE: Whether the “inside story” is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of
expression and of the press

RULING: No. Respondents claim that the showing of "The Inside Story" is protected by
the constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the press. However, there has
been no declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of expression
and of the press has a preferred status. Respondent did not submit the “The Inside
Story” to petitioner MTRCB for its review and fails to exhibit the same without its
permission, thus violating Section 7 PD 1986 and Section 3, Chapter III and Section 7,
Chapter IV of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations.
If this Court, in Iglesiani Cristo, did not exempt religious programs from the jurisdiction and review
power of petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there is no justification to exempt therefrom "The
Inside Story" which, according to respondents, is protected by the constitutional provision on
freedom of expression and of the press, a freedom bearing no preferred status. The only exceptions
from the MTRCB’s power of review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986,
such as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its
departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels.
 Page 520 of 601

202) Iglesiani Cristo vs. CA 1996

G.R. No. 119673 July 26, 1996
IGLESIA NI CRISTO, (INC.), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BOARD
OF REVIEW FOR MOVING PICTURES AND TELEVISION and HONORABLE HENRIETTA S.
MENDOZA, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner has a television program entitled "AngIglesiani Cristo" aired on Channel 2
every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates
petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies
with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving
Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128.
The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they
"offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by
law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the President the classification
of its TV Series No. 128 which allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary
Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the
respondent Board. According to the letter the episode in is protected by the
constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression and no indication that the
episode poses any clear and present danger. Petitioner also filed Civil Case. Petitioner
alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-
rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer,
respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code. The Iglesiani Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that
our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is
found in the bible. The board contended that it outrages Catholic and Protestant's
beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the "angiglesianicristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form of
religious exercise and expression.
 Page 521 of 601

RULING:
Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is
the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to
discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. This is true in this case. So-
called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions.
RTC’s ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its
right to free exercise of religion. “attack” is different from “offend” any race or religion.
The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner
but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be.
Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by
protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at
war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of
freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent board
cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesiani Cristo simply because it attacks other
religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country.
The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by
encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably
necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the
smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the
type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the
threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be
justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent
evil. It is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar
because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of
speech.Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal
connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The determination
of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies
outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be
 Page 522 of 601

arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." A system of prior restraint may
only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies.

203) Reno vs. ACLU (June 26, 1997, D-96-511)

RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, et al. v. AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION et al.
FACTS:
Congress passed the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C.S. § 223,
which criminally prohibited, among other things, the knowing transmission of "obscene
or indecent" communications to minors and the display of communications to minors
that depict sexual or excretory activities or organs in terms "patently offensive" as
measured by community standards. Shortly after the Act was signed by the President,
two separate actions were filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, in each of which actions multiple plaintiffs--including organizations and
individuals who were involved with the computer or communications industries, the publication or
posting of materials on the Internet, or citizen groups--challenged the constitutionality of
223(a) and 223(d). The two actions were consolidated, and a three-judge District Court was
convened pursuant to an expedited review provision of the CDA. After an evidentiary hearing,
the District Court, ruling that 223(a) and 223(d) were unconstitutional, granted the
plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunction against enforcement of 223(a) and 223(d).
On direct appeal under the CDA's expedited review provision, the United States Supreme
Court Affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether the Communications Decency Act of 1996 violate the First Amendment?

RULING: Yes. The breadth of the coverage of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 ,
was wholly unprecedented. The scope of the CDA was not limited to commercial speech
or commercial entities. Its open-ended prohibitions embraced all nonprofit entities and
individuals posting indecent messages or displaying them on their own computers in the
presence of minors. Accordingly, the CDA was unconstitutional due to its overbreadth.
 Page 523 of 601

The Act failed to clearly define "indecent" communications, limit its restrictions to
particular times or individuals (by showing that it would not impact adults), provide
supportive statements from an authority on the unique nature of internet
communications, or conclusively demonstrate that the transmission of "offensive"
material is devoid of any social value. The Court added that since the First Amendment
distinguishes between "indecent" and "obscene" sexual expressions, protecting only the
former, the Act could be saved from facial overbreadth challenges if it dropped the words
"or indecent" from its text. The Court refused to address any Fifth Amendment issues.

204) Miller vs. California [413 U.S. 15 (1973)]

MARVIN MILLER, VS STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FACTS:
In this case, the Appellant, Miller (Appellant), conducted a mass mailing campaign to
advertise the sale of illustrated adult material books. Thereafter, appellant was convicted
of mailing unsolicited sexually explicit material in violation of California statute that
approximately incorporated the obscenity test formulated in Memoirs v Massachusetts. The
Appellant’s conviction was specifically based on his conduct in causing five unsolicited
advertising brochures to be sent through the mail. The brochures consist primarily of
pictures and drawings very explicitly depicting men and women in groups of two or more
engaging in a variety of sexual activities, with genitals often predominantly displayed.
This case thus involves the application of a state’s criminal obscenity statute to a
situation in which sexually explicit materials have been thrust by aggressive sales action
upon unwilling recipients.

ISSUE: Whether the obscenity presented in this case is prohibited by the applicable state statute?
RULING: In sum, the Supreme Court: (a) reaffirmed the Roth holding that obscene material is not
protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution), (b) held that such
material can be regulated by the States, subject to specific safeguards, without a showing that the
material is “utterly without redeeming social value and (c) held that obscenity is to be determined by
applying “contemporary community standards.” As a result, the majority determined that the
material at issue in this case was not protected by the First Amendment of the
Constitution and that the California state statute could regulate the matter. Furthermore,
 Page 524 of 601

the requirement that a California jury evaluate the materials with reference to
“contemporary standards” is constitutionally adequate.
Obscenity is not within the area of Constitutionally protected speech or press.

205) US vs. Bustos [37 Phil. 731 (1918)]

G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELIPE BUSTOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
FACTS: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga
assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary (privileged
communication) through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals
signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and
Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The specific
charges against the justice of the peace include the solicitation of money from persons
who have pending cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused published
a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against him.

ISSUE: Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free
speech and free press.

HELD:Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize
judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern.
Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper
comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any
other public officer, public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It is a duty which every
one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is
further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful
act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and
punish them.

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican

institutions and the complement of the part of free speech.Assembly means a right on the
 Page 525 of 601

part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any
person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of
the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course,
assume responsibility for the charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and
efficient administration of justice and of public affairs.

Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded
protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and
adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient
administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient
if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance
thereof although in fact he is mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true as to the justice
of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action.
Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The
ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be
venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege.

In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that
presumption. A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to
discover grounds of malice or falsity.

206) Alonzo vs CA 1995

G.R. No. 110088 February 1, 1995
DR. MERLE A. ALONZO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
JUDGE DAN VELASCO, and DR. ANGELES VELASCO, respondents.
FACTS:
From 1984 to 1986, accused Dra. Merle A. Alonzo was the Field Operations Officer of the
Philippine Medical Care Commission (PMCC) for Region XI. On June 13, 1985, accused
was directed by Executive Officer of the PMCC, Rossi Castro, to conduct inspections of
Medicare accredited clinics and hospitals. Among the Medicare-accredited clinics inspected by
accused were the Sto. Niño Medical Clinic in Astorga, and Our Lady of Fatima Medical Clinic in
Guihing, Hagonoy. The clinics were owned and managed by complainant Dra. Angeles
 Page 526 of 601

Velasco, married to Judge Dan Velasco of the MTC-Hagonoy, Davao del Sur. After the
inspection, accused submitted her report on her findings to Dr. Jesus Tamesis, PMCC Vice
Chairman, which reflected negative findings and indicated therein the following
statement: In all, this particular clinic should be closely monitored because, aside from
the above-mentioned violations, the husband is a judge and it gives them a certain
amount of "untouchability." In fact, they make court suits their pastime. Dr. Velasco and
her husband, Judge Dan Velasco, then filed a complaint for libel against the petitioner
with the Office of the City Fiscal of Davao City and, after preliminary investigation;
Assistant City Fiscal Raul Bendigo filed the corresponding information for libel against the petitioner
with the Regional Trial Court. After due trial, the trial court promulgated on 19 November 1990 its
decision finding the petitioner "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) crimes of libel, penalized
under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court found defamatory the statement in the
last paragraph, which read: "the husband is a judge and it gives them certain amount of
'untouchability.' In fact, they make court suits their past time." The trial court said that this statement
"conveys the meaning that Judge Velasco abuses his powers and authority as a judge thus enabling
him and his wife to violate the law with impunity and even 'make court suits their past time [sic].'"
Regarding the requirement of publication, it held that there was sufficient publication of
the petitioner's subject report when she sent it to Dr. Tamesis. In its decision of 29 January
1993 affirming the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeals conceded that the subject
report of the petitioner was a "qualified privileged communication" under the first
paragraph of Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code but held that the privilege was lost
because of proof of actual malice. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned report of the petitioner is libelous.

HELD:
NO. There can then be no doubt that the petitioner made her report in the exercise of her official
duty or function. She rendered it in due course to her superior who had a duty to perform with
respect to its subject matter and which the latter faithfully did by filing the appropriate complaint
against Dr. Velasco after an evaluation of the report. We thus fully agree with the Court of Appeals
that the report falls within the first paragraph of Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code.
Consequently, the privileged character of the report negated the presumption of malice
 Page 527 of 601

or malice in law. The privilege may only be lost by proof of malice in fact. It is,
nevertheless, settled that "[a] privileged communication should not be subjected to
microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny
would defeat the protection, which the law throws over privileged communications. The
ultimate test is that of bona fides." Finally there was, in law, no publication of the
questioned report. The rule is settled that a communication made by a public officer in
the discharge of his official duties to another or to a body of officers having a duty to
perform with respect to the subject matter of the communication does not amount to a
publication within the meaning of the law on defamation. There was also no publication
when Atty. Balasabas, a third person, read the complaint against Dr. Velasco and the
report of the petitioner attached thereto. The private respondents entrusted these
documents to Atty. Balasabas with the request that he give them to their counsel, Atty.
David Montana. Where the plaintiff himself communicated or by his acts caused the
communication of the libelous matter to a third person, there was no actionable
publication.

207) Short Title: Pita vs. CA (178 SCRA 362)

Full Title: LEO PITA doing business under the name and style of PINOY PLAYBOY, petitioner, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON BAGATSING, and NARCISO CABRERA, respondents.

Facts:
On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of
Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau,
Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from
dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications
and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the
seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of
Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student organizations.

Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-
edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.
 Page 528 of 601

Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the
City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiff’s
magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent,
artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected
by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent
Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and
burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary
injunction.

The Court granted the temporary restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the
TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether the seizure is violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner.

Ruling: YES. Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect
society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws
punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is easier said than
done to say, that if the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for
commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the
Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to
deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a
publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the
ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or
indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case and that the question is to be decided by
the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it."

The government authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof to justify a ban
and to warrant confiscation of the literature. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court
 Page 529 of 601

order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a
search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.

The court provides that the authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge,
if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and that; The authorities must convince the court
that the materials sought to be seized are obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an evil
substantive enough to warrant State interference and action; The judge must determine whether or
not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the
judge’s sound discretion.

208) Short Title: Soriano vs. Laguardia (G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009)

Full Title: ELISEO F. SORIANO, Petitioner, vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, in her capacity as
Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, MOVIE AND TELEVISION
REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M.
HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M.
SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO, Respondents.

Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan,
aired on UNTV 37, made the following remarks:

Lehitimonganak ng demonyo; sinungaling;

Gagokatalaga Michael, masaholka pa saputangbabae o di ba. Yung
putangbabaeanggumaganalangdoonyungibaba, [dito] kay Michael anggumaganaangitaas, o di
ba! O, masahol pa saputangbabaeyan. Sabi ng lolakomasahol pa saputangbabaeyan.
Sobraangkasinungalingan ng mgademonyongito.x xx
Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by
Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesiani Cristo
(INC),against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval,
who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of
 Page 530 of 601

the TV program AngTamangDaan. Forthwith, the MTRCB sent petitioner a notice of the hearing on
August 16, 2004 in relation to the alleged use of some cuss words in the August 10, 2004 episode of
Ang Dating Daan.

After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of August 16,
2004, preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance
with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3,
Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII
of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure.The same order also set the case for preliminary investigation.

The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order, praying that
Chairperson Consoliza P. Laguardia and two other members of the adjudication board recuse
themselves from hearing the case. Two days after, however, petitioner sought to withdraw his
motion for reconsideration, followed by the filing with this Court of a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 164785, to nullify the preventive suspension order thus issued.

The MTRCB finding respondent Soriano liable for his utterances and thereby imposing on him a
penalty of three (3) months suspension from his program, "Ang Dating Daan". Co-respondents
Joselito Mallari, Luzviminda Cruz and UNTV Channel 37 and its owner, PBC, are hereby exonerated
for lack of evidence.

Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief.

ISSUE:Whether Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious
discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.

Ruling: No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse
effect of petitioner‘s utterances on the viewers‘ fundamental rights as well as petitioner‘s clear
violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang
Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner‘s
suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a
subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights,
 Page 531 of 601

the public trusteeship character of a broadcaster‘s role and the power of the State to regulate
broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the
form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot
be expressed by the use of less offensive language.

The SC ruled that ―Soriano‘s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the
average child, and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing decisions
from the US Supreme Court, the High Court said that the analysis should be ―context based and
found the utterances to be obscene after considering the use of television broadcasting as a medium,
the time of the show, and the ―G rating of the show, which are all factors that made the utterances
susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily
understood by a child literally rather than in the context that they were used.

The SC also said ―that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather a ―form of permissible
administrative sanction or subsequent punishment. In affirming the power of the MTRCB to issue an
order of suspension, the majority said that ―it is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose
under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause. The Court said that the suspension
―is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan
as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB, rather, it was a sanction for ―the indecent
contents of his utterances in a ―G rated TV program

209) Short Title: Fernando vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 159751, December 6, 2006)
Full Title: GAUDENCIO E. FERNANDO and RUDY ESTORNINOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondent.

Facts:
Acting on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic materials, officers of the Philippine National
Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in the National Capital Region (PNP-CIDG NCR)
conducted police surveillance on the store bearing the name of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair
(Music Fair). Judge Perfecto Laguio of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, issued Search Warrant No.
 Page 532 of 601

99-1216 for violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner Gaudencio E.
Fernando and a certain Warren Tingchuy.
On the same day, police officers of the PNP-CIDG NCR served the warrant on Rudy Estorninos, who,
according to the prosecution, introduced himself as the store attendant of Music Fair. The police
searched the premises and confiscated twenty-five (25) VHS tapes (among of which
is“KahitsaPangarap Lang” with Myra Manibog as actress who is naked) and ten (10) different
magazines (Dalaga, Penthouse, Swank, Erotic, Rave, Playhouse, Gallery, QUI), which they deemed
pornographic.

All appellants pled not guilty to the offenses charged. They waived their right to present evidence.
The RTC acquitted Tingchuy for lack of evidence to prove his guilt, but convicted herein petitioners
Fernando and Estorninos.

The CA affirmed the decision. The petitioners sought for review in the SC on certiorari and assailed
the CA decision.

Issue: Whether the appellate court erred in affirming the petitioners’ conviction.

Ruling: No reversible error was committed by the appellate court as well as the trial court in finding
the herein petitioners guilty as charged.

As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State in pursuing
its mandate to protect, as parenspatriae, the public from obscene, immoral and indecent materials
must justify the regulation or limitation.

One such regulation is Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. To be held liable, the prosecution must
prove that (a) the materials, publication, picture or literature are obscene; and (b) the offender sold,
exhibited, published or gave away such materials.13 Necessarily, that the confiscated materials are
obscene must be proved.

There is no perfect definition of “obscenity” but the latest word is that of Miller v. California which
established basic guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average person, applying contemporary
 Page 533 of 601

standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. Obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be
treated on a case to case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion.

210) Short Title: Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) vs. Dans [137 SCRA 247 (1985)]

Full Title: EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (DYRE) petitioner, vs. THE HON. JOSE P.
DANS, JR., MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION & COMMUNICATIONS, THE HON. CEFERINO S.
CARREON, COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL TELECOM., COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents.

Facts:
A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was “summarily closed” on grounds of
national security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE
contends that they were denied due process.

There was no hearing to establish factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of the
radio station violates freedom of expression. Before the court could even promulgate a decision upon
the Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the
petition.

The rights of the station were sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in
pursuing the case. Despite the case becoming moot and academic, (because there are no longer
interested parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the Supreme Court still finds that there is need to
pass a “RESOLUTION” for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals in matters as
this case.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE.
 Page 534 of 601

(2) Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of
Freedom of Expression.

Ruling:

1. NO. The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void. The absence
of a hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights. The primary requirements in administrative
proceedings are laid down in the case of AngTibay v. Court of Industrial Relation (69 Phil.635).

The AngTibay Doctrine should be followed before any broadcast station may be closed. The AngTibay
Doctrine provides the following requirements:

1. The right to hearing, includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence presented.
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
3. The decision must have something to support itself.
4. Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to support conclusion)
5. Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing
6. The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and facts and not
simply accept subordinate’s views
7. Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know the various issued
involved and reasons for decisions rendered.

The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due Process, it gives an
unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty
and property is valid.

2. YES. The closure of the radio station is likewise a violation of the constitutional right of
freedom of speech and expression. The court stresses that all forms of media, whether print or
broadcast are entitled to this constitutional right.

Although the government still has the right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the
listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation of freedom of expression is the
 Page 535 of 601

“clear and present danger” rule. If in the circumstances that the media is used in such nature
as to create this danger that will bring in such evils, then the law has the right to prevent it.

However, Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or signal a start of
widespread uprising. The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a
representative democracy. The people continues to have the right to be informed on public
affairs and broadcast media continues to have the pervasive influence to the people being the
most accessible form of media. Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the the special
protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses
of the Constitution.

211) Short Title: FCC vs. Pacifica Foundation [438 U.S. 726 (1978)]

Facts:
On October 30, 1973, at 2:00 p.m., a New York radio station, owned by the Respondent, Pacifica
Foundation (Respondent) broadcast the “Filthy Words” monologue. A few weeks later, a man who
stated that he heard the broadcast while driving with his young son, wrote a letter complaining to the
Petitioner, the Federal Communications Commission (Petitioner). In response to the complaint, the
Respondent explained that the monologue had been played during a program about contemporary
society’s attitude toward language and that, immediately before its broadcast, listeners had been
advised of the monologue’s language. The Petitioner, after characterizing the language as patently
offensive, though not necessarily obscene, issued a declaratory order granting the complaint, but not
imposing any formal sanctions. The Petitioner concluded that the language as broadcast was
indecent and prohibited by 18 U.S.C. Section:1464, prohibiting the broadcast of obscene, indecent or
profane language. The United States Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue: Whether the Petitioner has any power to regulate a radio broadcast that is indecent but not
obscene.
Ruling: It is not necessary for the Petitioner to determine that a communication is obscene before it
may exercise its regulatory power. The Petitioner can use its regulatory power to “channel” indecent
material to times when children are not able, or much less likely, to receive it. As a result, the
Petitioner’s action is sustained and the decision of the United States Court of Appeals is reversed.
 Page 536 of 601

The decision was based upon the same principles that are found within the law of nuisance. In the
case before the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court), the majority focused upon the
prospect that children may be listening to the broadcast in question. Furthermore, the nature of radio
is one in which the audience is constantly tuning in and out and prior warnings cannot adequately
protect the listener. Since children could be forever harmed by merely being around when such a
broadcast is made, the court found that the Petitioner could regulate the Respondent through
“channeling” the indecent communication to a more appropriate time and place. The fact that the
monologue was broadcast at 2:00 p.m. in the afternoon made it more susceptible to regulation by
the Petitioner.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The concept of indecent is intimately connected with the exposure of
children to language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of
the day when there is reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.

212) Short Title: Kingsley Books vs. Brown (354 US 436)

Facts:
Under § 22-a of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, a city official may file for an injunction to
prevent the distribution of obscene and lewd materials. After the official files for the injunction and
gives notice to the distributor, there must be a trial within one day to adjudicate whether the material
is obscene. Afterward, a permanent injunction enjoining the dissemination of the material may be
granted.

Kingsley Books, Inc. and other bookstore owners (defendants) sold a series of lewd books under the
general title of Nights of Horror.

A city official (plaintiff) filed for an injunction to enjoin the future sale of the books and destroy any
existing copies. The defendants did not contest the filing. The trial judge found that the books were
obscene and enjoined the future distribution of the books. However, the judge refused to enjoin the
future distribution of subsequent issues in the Nights of Horror series, finding that such an injunction
would be an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. The defendants appealed the injunction.
 Page 537 of 601

Issue: Whether resort to this injunctive remedy is unconstitutional in that it amounts to a prior
censorship of literary product, and, as such, is violative of that "freedom of thought and speech"
which has been "withdrawn by the Fourteenth Amendment from encroachment by the states."

Ruling: NO. In an unbroken series of cases extending over a long stretch of this Court's history, it
has been accepted as a postulate that "the primary requirements of decency may be enforced
against obscene publications. And so, our starting point is that New York can constitutionally convict
appellants of keeping for sale the booklets incontestably found to be obscene.
The immediate problem, then, is whether New York can adopt as an auxiliary means of dealing with
such obscene merchandising the procedure of § 22-a. We need not linger over the suggestion that
something can be drawn out of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that restricts
New York to the criminal process in seeking to protect its people against the dissemination of
pornography. It is not for this Court thus to limit the State in resorting to various weapons in the
armory of the law. Whether proscribed conduct is to be visited by a criminal prosecution or by a qui
tam action, or by an injunction, or by some or all of these remedies in combination, is a matter within
the legislature's range of choice. \
If New York chooses to subject persons who disseminate obscene "literature" to criminal prosecution
and also to deal with such books as deodands of old, or both, with due regard, of course, to
appropriate opportunities for the trial of the underlying issue, it is not for us to gainsay its selection
of remedies.
The judicial angle of vision in testing the validity of a statute like § 22-a is "the operation and effect
of the statute in substance." The phrase "prior restraint" is not a self-wielding sword. Nor can it
serve as a talismanic test. The duty of closer analysis and critical judgment in applying the thought
behind the phrase has thus been authoritatively put by one who brings weighty learning to his
support of constitutionally protected liberties: "What is needed," writes Professor Paul A. Freund, "is a
pragmatic assessment of its operation in the particular circumstances. The generalization that prior
restraint is particularly obnoxious in civil liberties cases must yield to more particularistic analysis."
Criminal enforcement and the proceeding under § 22-a interfere with a book's solicitation of the
public precisely at the same stage. In each situation, the law moves after publication; the book need
not in either case have yet passed into the hands of the public. The Alberts record does not show
that the matter there found to be obscene had reached the public at the time that the criminal
charge of keeping such matter for sale was lodged, while here, as a matter of fact, copies of the
 Page 538 of 601

booklets whose distribution was enjoined had been on sale for several weeks when process was
served. In each case, the bookseller is put on notice by the complaint that sale of the publication
charged with obscenity in the period before trial may subject him to penal consequences. In the one
case, he may suffer fine and imprisonment for violation of the criminal statute; in the other, for
disobedience of the temporary injunction. The bookseller may, of course, stand his ground and
confidently believe that in any judicial proceeding the book could not be condemned as obscene, but
both modes of procedure provide an effective deterrent against distribution prior to adjudication of
the book's content -- the threat of subsequent penalization.
The method devised by New York in § 22-a for determining whether a publication is
obscene does not differ in essential procedural safeguards from that provided under
many state statutes making the distribution of obscene publications a misdemeanor.
Nor are the consequences of a judicial condemnation for obscenity under § 22-a more restrictive of
freedom of expression than the result of conviction for a misdemeanor. Section 22-a's provision for
the seizure and destruction of the instruments of ascertained wrongdoing expresses resort to a legal
remedy sanctioned by the long history of Anglo-American law. It is worth noting that, although
the Alberts record does not reveal whether the publications found to be obscene were destroyed,
provision is made for that by §§ 313 and 314 of the California Penal Code. Similarly, § 1144 of New
York's Penal Law provides for destruction of obscene matter following conviction for its dissemination.
It only remains to say that the difference between Near v. Minnesota, supra, and this
case is glaring in fact. The two cases are no less glaringly different when judged by the
appropriate criteria of constitutional law. Minnesota empowered its courts to enjoin the
dissemination of future issues of a publication because its past issues had been found
offensive. In the language of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, "This is of the essence of
censorship." As such, it was found unconstitutional. This was enough to condemn the
statute wholly apart from the fact that the proceeding in Near involved not obscenity,
but matters deemed to be derogatory to a public officer. Unlike Near, § 22-a is concerned
solely with obscenity, and, as authoritatively construed, it studiously withholds restraint
upon matters not already published and not yet found to be offensive. The judgment
isAffirmed.

213) Short Title: Near vs. Minnesota [283 US 697 (1931)]

Facts:
 Page 539 of 601

A 1925 Minnesota Act provided for the abatement, as a public nuisance, of a "malicious, scandalous
and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical." Defendant appellant Near published
articles that charged in substance that a Jewish gangster was in control of gambling, bootlegging and
racketeering in Minneapolis, and that law enforcing officers and agencies were not energetically
performing their duties.

Under the statute, an injunction was issued against defendant to prohibit it from printing its
newspaper based on claims that it was malicious, lewd, and defamatory. The defendant argued that
the statute unfairly denied it liberty of press because an injunction issued under the statute would
restrain any future newspaper publication.

The state appellate court affirmed. Defendant appellant sought further review.

Issue: Whether the issuance of an injunction, pursuant to a 1925 state nuisance law, prohibiting the
publication of the article by defendant newspaper violate its freedom of speech and of the press.

Ruling: Yes.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the previous rulings. The Court held
that the Minnesota nuisance statute of 1925, as applied against the newspaper publisher, infringed
the freedom of the press guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The language of the statute at
issue placed a prior restraint on the newspaper publisher to avoid language that might not be
protected, thereby denying him the right of publication. This freedom, by virtue of its very reason for
its existence, did not depend on proof of truth.

The Court explained that the Minnesota statute cannot be justified by reason of the fact that the
publisher is permitted to show, before injunction issues, that the matter published is true and is
published with good motives and for justifiable ends. If such a statute, authorizing suppression and
injunction on such a basis, is constitutionally valid, it would be equally permissible for the legislature
to provide that at any time the publisher of any newspaper could be brought before a court.

The Court concluded that, so far as it authorized the proceedings in this action under the 1925
statute, to be an infringement of the liberty of the press guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court qualified its holding by adding that the instant decision rests upon the operation and effect
 Page 540 of 601

of the statute, without regard to the question of the truth of the charges contained in the defendant's
periodical.

RULE:
The recognition of authority to impose previous restraint upon publication in order to protect the
community against the circulation of charges of misconduct, and especially of official misconduct,
necessarily would carry with it the admission of the authority of the censor against which the
constitutional barrier was erected. The preliminary freedom, by virtue of the very reason for its
existence, does not depend on proof of truth.

214) Short Title: People vs. Alarcon [69 Phil. 265 (1939)] (do not pick this case for recitation,
decision is not explained well kahitsa full text)
Full Title:THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle, vs. SALVADOR ALARCON, ET
AL., accused. FEDERICO MANGAHAS, respondent-appellant.

Facts:
As an aftermath of the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in Criminal Case
No. 5733, The People of the Philippines vs. Salvador Alarcon, et al., convicting the accused therein
except one of the crime of robbery committed in band, a denunciatory letter, signed by Luis M.
Taruc, was addressed to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines. A copy of said letter found
its way to the herein respondent, Federico Mangahas who, as columnist of the Tribune, a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines, quoted the letter in an article published by him in the issue of
that paper of September 23, 1937.

0n September 29, 1937, the provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed with the Court of First Instance of
that province to cite Federico Mangahas for contempt. 0n the same date, the lower court ordered
Mangahas to appear and show cause. Mangahas appeared and filed an answer, alleging, among
others, that "the publication of the letter in question is in line with the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of the press.
 Page 541 of 601

Issue: Whether the trial court properly cited Mangahas for contempt in as much as the robbery-in-a-
band case is still pending appeal.

Ruling: Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt, which is
summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. It must,
however, clearly appear that such publications do impede, interfere with, and embarrass the
administration of justice before the author of the publications should be held for contempt. That is
thus sought to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments is the all-important duty of
the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case.

Contempt of court is in the nature of a criminal offense and in considering the probable effects of the
article alleged to be contemptuous, every fair and reasonable inference consistent with the theory of
defendant's innocence will be indulged and where a reasonable doubt in fact or in law exists as to the
guilt of one of constructive contempt for interfering with the due administration of justice the doubt
must be resolved in his favor, and he must be acquitted.

The appealed order is hereby reversed, and the respondent acquitted, without pronouncement as to
costs.

215) Short Title: People vs. Aparici 1955

Full

Facts:
On February 3, 1953 Detectives Nibungco and Jose accompanied by photographers Fajardo and
Domingo of the Manila Chronicle, went to Azcarraga Theatre, in order to observe what was being
exhibited by the accused Virginia Aparici there. She was in a dimly lit stage “dancing with her hips
swaying” with nothing on except nylon patches over her breasts and a “too abbreviated pair of nylon
panties to interrupt her stark nakedness” and around her waist was a “furry white girdle with a
middle piece punctuating attention on the thing she was supposed to hide”. There were more than
100 customers and all of them were men. Most of them have been howling and shouting in tagalog:
“siguemuna, siguenakakalibog”.
 Page 542 of 601

Detectives Nibungco and Jose stopped the show and asked the accused to put on her dress and to
surrender to them her brassiere and panties. In her defence, she claimed that her performance (hula
hula dance) was her portrayal of the life of a widow whose guerrilla husband was killed by the
Japanese; depicting the different emotions of the widow such as sadness, anger and happiness.

She was prosecuted for violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code which penalizes: “3. Those
who in theatres, fairs, cinematographs or any other place open to public view, shall exhibit indecent
or immoral plays, scenes, acts and shows.”

Issue: Whether the appellant has performed or exhibited indecent or immoral scenes, acts, or
shows.

Ruling: YES. The court ruled that the accused had exhibited indecent and immoral acts. The gauge
whether her dancing was immoral or indecent was the reaction of the public. Nudity in itself is not
inherently indecent or obscene (such as in painting or sculpture), but it may be transformed into an
indecent and obscene object by postures and movements of such body which produce perceptible
and discernible reaction in the public or audience. The object of the law is to protect the morals of
the public.

Evidently, the spectators had given their unequivocal verdict when they were howling and shouting:
“Siguemuna, sigue, nakakalibog”. Counsel for defense also advances the argument that the reaction
of the low class and uncultured audience is an unreliable gauge in determining the objective
indecency and decency of a performance. The court clarified that the test whether a particular act is
obscene is its tendency “to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such influences”, be
they cultured or not.

Hula hula dancer covers her body with a grass skirt, which the appellant had nothing of the sort. It
may be true that she wanted to interpret the life of the widow of a guerilla husband who was killed
by the Japanese, but the effect of its performance was disgraceful, obscene and erotic. The motive
may be innocent, but the performance may be offensive and disgusting to good morals.
 Page 543 of 601

Appellant, therefore, is sentenced to pay a fine of P200, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs. So ordered.

216) Short Title: In Re: Jurado (A.M. No. 93-2-037 SC, April 6, 1995)

Full Title: IN RE Emil (Emiliano) P. JURADO Ex Rel.: Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT), per its First Vice-President, Mr. Vicente R. Samson, appellant,

Facts:
Emiliano P. Jurado, a lawyer and a journalist who writes in a newspaper of general circulation (Manila
Standard) wrote about alleged improprieties and irregularities in the judiciary over several months
(from about October 1992 to March 1993). Other journalists had also been making reports or
comments on the same subject. At the same time, anonymous communications were being
extensively circulated, by hand and through the mail, about alleged venality and corruption in the
courts.
What was particularly given attention by the Supreme Court was his column entitled “Who will
judge the Justices?” referring to a report that six justices, their spouses and children and
grandchildren (a total of 36 persons) spent a vacation in Hong Kong, and that luxurious hotel
accommodations and all their other expenses were paid by a public utility firm and that the trip was
arranged by the travel agency patronized by this public utility firm.
This column was made amidst rumors that a Supreme Court decision favorable to the public utility
firm appears to have been authored by a lawyer of the public utility firm. The seed of the proceeding
at bar was sown by the decision promulgated by this Court on August 27, 1992, in the so-called
“controversial case” of “Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Eastern Telephone
Philippines, Inc. (ETPI),” G.R. No, 94374. In that decision the Court was sharply divided; the vote
was 9 to 4, in favor of the petitioner PLDT. Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., wrote the opinion for
the majority.
The Chief Justice issued an administrative order creating an ad hoc committee to investigate the
said reports of corruption in the judiciary. A letter affidavit was also received from the public utility,
denying the allegations in Jurado's column. The Supreme Court then issued a resolution ordering that
the matter dealt with in the letter and affidavit of the public utility company be docketed and acted
 Page 544 of 601

upon as an official Court proceeding for the determination of whether or not the allegations made by
Jurado are true.
Issues:
1. Whether Jurado can invoke the principles of press freedom to justify the published writings.
2. Whether the court has the power to cite him for contempt.
Ruling:
1. NO. Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the
right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about
a public official, should enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false statement and the false
statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.

The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm for the proper exercise of any right,
constitutional or otherwise, viz.: “ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.” The provision is reflective of the universally accepted precept of
“abuse of rights,” “one of the most dominant principles which must be deemed always implied
in any system of law.”

Requirement to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements when
publishing statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other public
officials. Judges, by becoming such, are rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting themselves
to norms of conduct which embody more stringent standards of honesty, integrity, and
competence than are commonly required from private persons. Nevertheless, persons who
seek or accept appointment to the Judiciary cannot reasonably be regarded as
having forfeited any right to private honor and reputation. For to so rule will be to
discourage all save those who feel no need to maintain their self-respect from becoming
judges.

The public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of judges (and for
that matter, all other public officials) in the maintenance of private honor and reputation need
to be accommodated one to the other. And the point of adjustment or accommodation
between these two legitimate interests is precisely found in the norm, which
 Page 545 of 601

requires those, who, invoking freedom of speech, publish statements which are
clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials to exercise bona
fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish. The norm does not
require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does
prohibit the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory
statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof.

Note: In this case, Jurado failed to reliably confirmed that raw intelligence or reports he
received surrounding the corruption in the Judiciary. Moreover, some of his reports were
completely untrue because he did not bother to make any further verification.

2. YES. The Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the
furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all
other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court. The power to punish for
contempt is "necessary for its own protection against improper interference with the due
administration of justice." Contempt is punishable, even if committed without relation
to a pending case.

Jurado would also claim that the Court has no administrative supervision over him as a
member of the press or over his work as a journalist, and asks why he is being singled out,
and, by being required to submit to a separate administrative proceeding, treated differently
than his other colleagues in media who were only asked to explain their reports and comments
about wrongdoing in the judiciary to the Ad Hoc Committee. The answer is that upon all that
has so far been said, the Court may hold anyone to answer for utterances offensive to its
dignity, honor or reputation which tend to put it in disrepute, obstruct the administration of
justice, or interfere with the disposition of its business or the performance of its functions in an
orderly manner. Jurado has not been singled out. What has happened is that there
have been brought before the Court, formally and in due course, sworn statements
branding his reports as lies and thus imposing upon him the alternatives of
substantiating those reports or assuming responsibility for their publication.

Jurado would have the Court clarify in what capacity — whether a journalist, or as a member
 Page 546 of 601

of the bar — he has been cited in these proceeding. Thereby he resurrects the issue he once
raised in a similar earlier proceeding: that he is being called to account as a lawyer for his
statements as a journalist. This is not the case at all. Upon the doctrines and principles already
inquired into and cited, he is open to sanctions as journalist who has misused and abused
press freedom to put the judiciary in clear and present to the danger of disrepute and of public
obdium and opprobrium, detriment and prejudice of the administration of justice. That he is
at the same time a member of the bar has nothing to do with the setting in of those
sanctions, although it may aggravate liability.

Jurado’s actuations, in the context in which they were done, demonstrate gross
irresponsibility, and indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he might cause to the
name and reputation of those of whom he wrote. They constitute contempt of court, directly
tending as they do to degrade or abase the administration of justice and the judges engaged
in that function. By doing them, he has placed himself beyond the circle of reputable, decent
and responsible journalists who live by their Code or the “Golden Rule” and who strive at all
times to maintain the prestige and nobility of their calling.

217) Short Title: Miriam College vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 127930, December 15, 2000)

Full Title: MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC., Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JASPER
BRIONES, JEROME GOMEZ, RELLY CARPIO, ELIZABETH VALDEZCO, JOSE MARI RAMOS, CAMILLE
PORTUGAL, JOEL TAN and GERALD GARY RENACIDO, Respondents.

Facts:
The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundation’s school paper were subjected
to disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after letters of complaint were filed
before the Board following the publication of the school paper that contains obscene, vulgar, and
sexually explicit contents.

Prior to the disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required to submit a written statement
to answer the complaints against them to the Discipline Committee but the defendants, instead of
doing so wrote to the Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they alleged to have the
 Page 547 of 601

jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing through with the investigation ex parte the Committee found the
defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions.

Defendants filed before the court for prohibition with preliminary injunction on said decision of the
Committee questioning the jurisdiction of said Discipline Board over the defendants.

Issue: Whether the petitioner has the power to discipline and dismiss the students.

Ruling:YES. Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher
learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or
college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.

The essential freedoms subsumed in the term “academic freedom” encompasses the freedom to
determine for itself on academic grounds: (1) Who may teach, (2) What may be taught, (3) How it
shall be taught, and (4) Who may be admitted to study. The right of the school to discipline its
students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i. e., “how it shall be taught.”

A school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy. Thus, there can be no doubt that the
establishment of an educational institution requires rules and regulations necessary for the
maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational environment
conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the
students, faculty, and property. Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student
discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the
school teaches discipline.

Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom “what to teach.”
Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in its students. The
Constitution no less imposes such duty. [All educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and
nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national
heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship,
strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage
 Page 548 of 601

critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational
efficiency.

Section 4 (1), Article XIV of the Constitution recognizes the State’s power to regulate educational
institution: The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in the
educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational
institutions. As may be gleaned from the above provision, such power to regulate is subject to the
requirement of reasonableness. Moreover, the Constitution allows merely
the regulation and supervision of educational institutions, not the deprivation of their rights.

Campus journalism act (republic act no. 7079); section 7 thereof construed to mean that the school
cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles he or she has written,
except when such articles materially disrupts class work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of
the rights of others.

The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a
necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and
orderly educational environment conducive to learning. That power, like the power to suspend or
expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed
by the Constitution.

• Freedom from Subsequent Punishment

218) Short Title: Thornhill vs. Alabama (310 US 880)

Facts: A statute of Alabama makes it unlawful for any person, "without a just cause or legal
excuse," to go near to or "loiter" about any place of lawful business, for the purpose of, or with the
intention of, influencing or inducing other persons not to buy from, deal with, or be employed at such
place of business; or to "picket" a place of lawful business for the purpose of impeding, interfering
with, or injuring such business.
 Page 549 of 601

As construed by the courts of the State, the statute forbids the publicizing of facts concerning a labor
dispute, whether by printed sign, by pamphlet, by word of mouth, or otherwise, in the vicinity of the
business involved, and this without regard to the number of persons engaged in such activity, the
peaceful character of their conduct, the nature of the dispute, or the accuracy or restraint of the
language used in imparting the information.

Byron Thornhill, a union president, had joined a picket line protesting against his former employer.
He was the only picketer fined $100 and arrested under Section 3448, an Alabama state law that
made it a crime to picket a business. An Alabama state court convicted Thornhill, a decision that was
upheld by the Alabama Court of Appeals. After the Alabama Supreme Court declined to hear his
appeal, Thornhill petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review.

Issue: Whether the assailed law is constitutional.

Ruling: Court found the law unconstitutional.

The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the
least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without
previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment. The exigencies of the colonial period and
the efforts to secure freedom from oppressive administration developed a broadened conception of
these liberties as adequate to supply the public need for information and education with respect to
the significant issues of the times. The Continental Congress in its letter sent to the Inhabitants of
Quebec (October 26, 1774) referred to the 'five great rights' and said: 'The last right we shall
mention, regards the freedom of the press. The importance of this consists, besides the advancement
of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the
administration of Government, its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its
consequential promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or
intimidated, into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.' Freedom of discussion, if it
would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is
needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.
 Page 550 of 601

In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information concerning the facts
of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is
guaranteed by the Constitution. It is recognized now that satisfactory hours and wages
and working conditions in industry and a bargaining position which makes these possible
have an importance which is not less than the interests of those in the business or
industry directly concerned. The health of the present generation and of those as yet unborn
may depend on these matters, and the practices in a single factory may have economic repercussions
upon a whole region and affect widespread systems of marketing. The merest glance at State and
Federal legislation on the subject demonstrates the force of the argument that labor relations are not
matters of mere local or private concern. Free discussion concerning the conditions in industry and
the causes of labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the
processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society. The issues raised
by regulations, such as are challenged here, infringing upon the right of employees effectively to
inform the public of the facts of a labor dispute are part of this larger problem.

It is true that the rights of employers and employees to conduct their economic affairs
and to compete with others for a share in the products of industry are subject to
modification or qualification in the interests of the society in which they exist. This is but
an instance of the power of the State to set the limits of permissible contest open to
industrial combatants. It does not follow that the State in dealing with the evils arising
from industrial disputes may impair the effective exercise of the right to discuss freely
industrial relations which are matters of public concern. A contrary conclusion could be
used to support abridgment of freedom of speech and of the press concerning almost
every matter of importance to society.

The range of activities proscribed by Section 3448, whether characterized as picketing or loitering or
otherwise, embraces nearly every practicable, effective means whereby those interested including the
employees directly affected—may enlighten the public on the nature and causes of a labor dispute.
The safeguarding of these means is essential to the securing of an informed and educated public
opinion with respect to a matter which is of public concern. It may be that effective exercise of the
means of advancing public knowledge may persuade some of those reached to refrain from entering
into advantageous relations with the business establishment which is the scene of the dispute. Every
 Page 551 of 601

expression of opinion on matters that are important has the potentiality of inducing action in the
interests of one rather than another group in society. But the group in power at any moment may not
impose penal sanctions on peaceful and truthful discussion of matters of public interest merely on a
showing that others may thereby be persuaded to take action inconsistent with its interests.
Abridgment of the liberty of such discussion can be justified only where the clear danger of
substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by
competition for acceptance in the market of public opinion. We hold that the danger of injury to an
industrial concern is neither so serious nor so imminent as to justify the sweeping proscription of
freedom of discussion embodied in Section 3448.

The State urges that the purpose of the challenged statute is the protection of the community from
the violence and breaches of the peace, which, it asserts, are the concomitants of picketing. The
power and the duty of the State to take adequate steps to preserve the peace and to protect the
privacy, the lives, and the property of its residents cannot be doubted. But no clear and present
danger of destruction of life or property, or invasion of the right of privacy, or breach of the peace
can be thought to be inherent in the activities of every person who approaches the premises of an
employer and publicizes the facts of a labor dispute involving the latter. We are not now concerned
with picketing en masse or otherwise conducted which might occasion such imminent and aggravated
danger to these interests as to justify a statute narrowly drawn to cover the precise situation giving
rise to the danger. Section 3448 in question here does not aim specifically at serious encroachments
on these interests and does not evidence any such care in balancing these interests against the
interest of the community and that of the individual in freedom of discussion on matters of public
concern.

It is not enough to say that Section 3448 is limited or restricted in its application to such activity as
takes place at the scene of the labor dispute. '(The) streets are natural and proper places for the
dissemination of information and opinion; and one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of
expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other
place. The danger of breach of the peace or serious invasion of rights of property or privacy at the
scene of a labor dispute is not sufficiently imminent in all cases to warrant the legislature in
determining that such place is not appropriate for the range of activities outlawed by Section 3448.
 Page 552 of 601

Writing for the majority, Justice Frank W. Murphy noted that First Amendment freedoms were
secured against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment and were designed to allow for the
robust communication of ideas. He observed that the state had failed to narrow its
interpretation of a law, which therefore applied to peaceful activity. He likened the law to a
“licensing system” and observed that the law had been applied to a single individual engaged
in peaceful protest. The range of activities covered by the Alabama law, he wrote, “whether
characterized as picketing or loitering or otherwise, embraces nearly every practicable,
effective means whereby those interested — including the employees directly affected — may
enlighten the public on the nature and causes of a labor dispute.”

As to the state’s proclaimed interest in protecting the community from violence or breaches of
the peace, Murphy argued that Alabama had failed to demonstrate any clear and present
danger in this case; Schiller (1999, 30) says this is the first time a Court majority agreed on
this standard. The sites of labor disputes, like public streets, were appropriate places “for the
dissemination of information and opinion.”

• Content-Based and Content-Neutral Restrictions, Libel, and National Security

219) Short Title: New Sounds Broadcasting Network Inc. vs. Dy (G.R. Nos. 170270 and 179411,
April 2, 2009)

Full Title: NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK INC. and CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING

SYSTEM, INC., Petitioners, vs.HON. CEASAR G. DY, FELICISIMO G. MEER, BAGNOS MAXIMO, RACMA
FERNANDEZ-GARCIA and THE CITY OF CAUAYAN, Respondents.

Facts:
Petitioners operate and run BomboRadyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio broadcast station, and
Star FM DWIT Cauayan, an FM radio broadcast station, in CauayanCitry, Isabela. Back in 1996,
Newsounds commenced relocation of its broadcasting station, management office, and transmitters
on propery located in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela.
 Page 553 of 601

On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of the Municipal
Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and certified that the commercial structure
to be constructed conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as well that the location is classified
as a “commercial area”. The radio station was able to fully operate smoothly thereafter.

In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayor’s permit, City Zoning
Administratior-Designate Bagnos Maximo refused to issue zoning clearance on the grounds that
petitioners were not able to submit conversion papers showing that the agricultural land was
converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the court to compel the issuance of mayor’s permit
but the court denied the action. In the meantime, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region
II office issued to petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the property from agricultural to
commercial.

In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayor’s permit, attaching the DAR
Order. Respondent Felicisimo Meer, acting City Administrator of Cauayan City denied the same,
claiming that it was void on the grounds that they did not have record of the DAR Order.

The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia, City
Legal Officer of Cauayan City, closed the radio station. Due to the prvosion of Omnibus Election Code
which prohibits the closure of radio station during the pendency of election period, COMELEC issued
an order allowing the petitioners to operate before Febuary 17, 2004, but was barred again by
respondent Mayor CeasarDy on the grounds that the radio station had no permit. Nonetheless,
COMELEC allowed them to run again until June 10, 2004 after elections. Petitioners filed the case to
the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayor’s permit but both courts denied the petition.

A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC to issue licenses and permits, and
suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits
had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. In case of Cauayan City, the authority to require a
mayor’s permit was enacted through Ordinance No. 92-004, enacted in 1993. However, nothing in
the ordinance requires an application for a mayor’s permit to submit “either an approved land
conversion papers from DAR, showing that its property was converted from prime agricultural land or
 Page 554 of 601

an approved resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or SangguniangPanglungsod authorizing the

reclassification of property from agricultural to commercial land.

In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the property as commercial. Petitioners
are also armed with several certifications stating that the property is indeed a commercial area. Also,
petitioners paid real property taxes based on the classification of property as commercial without
objections raised by the respondents.

Petitioners argued that this consistent recognition by the local government of Cauayan of the
commercial character of the property constitutes estoppels against respondents from denying the fact
before the courts. The lower courts had ruled that “the government of Cauayan City is not bound by
estoppels, but petitioners classified that this concept is understood to only refer to acts and mistakes
of its official especially to those which are irregular.

Issue: Whether there is prior restraint against DZNC.

Ruling: YES.Petitioners have taken great pains to depict their struggle as a textbook case of denial
of the right to free speech and of the press. In their tale, there is undeniable political color. They
admit that in 2001, BomboRadyo was aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in
Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political dynasty.
Respondent CeasarDy is the brother of Faustino Dy, Jr., governor of Isabela from 2001 until he was
defeated in his re-election bid in 2004 by Grace Padaca, a former assistant station manager at
petitioners own DZNC BomboRadyo. A rival AM radio station in Cauayan City, DWDY, is owned and
operated by the Dy family. Petitioners likewise direct our attention to a 20 February 2004 article
printed in the Philippine Daily Inquirer where Dy is quoted as intending to file disenfranchisement
proceedings against DZNC-AM.

The partisan component of this dispute will no doubt sway many observers towards one opinion or
the other, but not us. The comfort offered by the constitutional shelter of free expression is neutral
as to personality, affinity, ideology and popularity. The judges tasked to enforce constitutional order
are expected to rule accordingly from the comfort of that neutral shelter.
 Page 555 of 601

The following undisputed facts bring the issue of free expression to fore. Petitioners are authorized
by law to operate radio stations in Cauayan City, and had been doing so for some years undisturbed
by local authorities. Beginning in 2002, respondents in their official capacities have taken actions,
whatever may be the motive, that have impeded the ability of petitioners to freely broadcast, if not
broadcast at all. These actions have ranged from withholding permits to operate to the physical
closure of those stations under color of legal authority. While once petitioners were able to broadcast
freely, the weight of government has since bore down upon them to silence their voices on the
airwaves. An elementary school child with a basic understanding of civics lessons will recognize that
free speech animates these cases.

Without taking into account any extenuating circumstances that may favor the
respondents, we can identify the bare acts of closing the radio stations or preventing
their operations as an act of prior restraint against speech, expression or of the press.
Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of
expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. While any system of prior
restraint comes to court bearing a heavy burden against its constitutionality, not all prior
restraints on speech are invalid.

That the acts imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of expression
of respondents who happen to be members of the press is clear enough. There is a long-standing
tradition of special judicial solicitude for free speech, meaning that governmental action directed at
expression must satisfy a greater burden of justification than governmental action directed at most
other forms of behavior. We had said in SWS v. COMELEC: Because of the preferred status of the
constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty
presumption of invalidity. Indeed, any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. . . . The Government 'thus carries a
heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such restraint. There is thus a reversal
of the normal presumption of validity that inheres in every legislation.

At the same time, jurisprudence distinguishes between a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely
concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner,
and under well defined standards; and a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is
 Page 556 of 601

based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. Content-based laws are generally treated as
more suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial concern with discrimination in the
regulation of expression.[44] Content-neutral regulations of speech or of conduct that may amount to
speech, are subject to lesser but still heightened scrutiny.

Ostensibly, the act of an LGU requiring a business of proof that the property from which it operates
has been zoned for commercial use can be argued, when applied to a radio station, as content-
neutral since such a regulation would presumably apply to any other radio station or business
enterprise within the LGU.

However, the circumstances of this case dictate that we view the action of the respondents as a
content-based restraint.

35.3. The timing of respondents closure of petitioners radio stations is also very telling. The closure
comes at a most critical time when the people are set to exercise their right of suffrage. Such timing
emphasizes the ill motives of respondents.

In their Answer with Comment to the petition for mandamus, respondents admitted that petitioners
had made such exposes during the 2001 elections, though they denied the nature and truthfulness of
such reports. They conceded that the Philippine Daily Inquirer story reported that Dy said he planned
to file disenfranchisement proceedings against [DZNC]-AM. While respondents assert that there are
other AM radio stations in Isabela, they do not specifically refute that station DWDY was owned by
the Dy family, or that DZNC and DWDY are the two only stations that operate out of Cauayan.

Prior to 2002, petitioners had not been frustrated in securing the various local government
requirements for the operation of their stations. It was only in the beginning of 2002, after the
election of respondent CeasarDy as mayor of Cauayan, that the local government started to impose
these new requirements substantiating the conversion of CDCs property for commercial use.
Petitioners admit that during the 2001 elections, BomboRadyo was aggressive in exposing the
widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored Respondent Dy and other
members of the Dy political dynasty. Respondents efforts to close petitioners radio station clearly
intensified immediately before the May 2004 elections, where a former employee of DZNC
 Page 557 of 601

BomboRadyo, Grace Padaca, was mounting a credible and ultimately successful challenge against the
incumbent Isabela governor, who happened to be the brother of respondent Dy. It also bears notice
that the requirements required of petitioners by the Cauayan City government are frankly beyond the
pale and not conventionally adopted by local governments throughout the Philippines.

All those circumstances lead us to believe that the steps employed by respondents to ultimately shut
down petitioners radio station were ultimately content-based. The United States Supreme Court
generally treats restriction of the expression of a particular point of view as the paradigm violation of
the First Amendment.[53] The facts confronting us now could have easily been drawn up by a
constitutional law professor eager to provide a plain example on how free speech may be violated.

The Court is of the position that the actions of the respondents warrant heightened or
strict scrutiny from the Court, the test which we have deemed appropriate in assessing
content-based restrictions on free speech, as well as for laws dealing with freedom of the
mind or restricting the political process, of laws dealing with the regulation of speech,
gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier
applications to equal protection.[54] The immediate implication of the application of the
strict scrutiny test is that the burden falls upon respondents as agents of government to
prove that their actions do not infringe upon petitioners constitutional rights. As content
regulation cannot be done in the absence of any compelling reason, the burden lies with
the government to establish such compelling reason to infringe the right to free
expression.

Notes: Whenever the force of government or any of its political subdivisions bears upon to close
down a private broadcasting station, the issue of free speech infringement cannot be minimized, no
matter the legal justifications offered for the closure. In many respects, the present petitions offer a
textbook example of how the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech, expression and of the
press may be unlawfully compromised. Tragically, the lower courts involved in this case failed to
recognize or assert the fundamental dimensions, and it is our duty to reverse, and to affirm the
Constitution and the most sacred rights it guarantees.

220) Short Title: Chaves vs. Gonzales (G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008)
 Page 558 of 601

Full Title: FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary
of the Department of Justice; and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
(NTC), respondents.

Facts:
Congress, acting as national board of canvassers, proclaimed President Arroyo winner in the 2004
presidential elections.President Arroyo received a total of 12,905,808 votes, 1,123,576 more than the
votes of her nearest rival, Fernando Poe, Jr.

Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station DZMM aired the Garci Tapes where the parties to the
conversation discussed "rigging" the results of the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo.
Presidential spokesperson Ignacio Bunye (Bunye) held a press conference in Malacañang Palace,
where he played before the presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of conversations
between a woman and a man. Bunye identified the woman in both recordings as President Arroyo
but claimed that the contents of the second compact disc had been "spliced" to make it appear that
President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano.

However, Bunye backtracked and stated that the woman's voice in the compact discs was not
President Arroyo’s after all. Meanwhile, other individuals went public, claiming possession of the
genuine copy of the Garci Tapes. Respondent Gonzalez ordered the National Bureau of Investigation
to investigate media organizations which aired the Garci Tapes for possible violation of Republic Act
No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

NTC issued a press release warning radio and television stations that airing the Garci Tapes is a
"cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations" issued to
them. NTC officers met with officers of the broadcasters group, Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters
saPilipinas (KBP), to dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement
expressing commitment to press freedom.

Petitioner Chavez, as citizen, filed this petition to nullify the "acts, issuances, and orders" of the NTC
and respondent Gonzalez (respondents) on the following grounds: (1) respondents’ conduct violated
 Page 559 of 601

freedom of expression and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern under
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, and (2) the NTC acted ultra vires when it warned radio and
television stations against airing the Garci Tapes.

Respondents raised threshold objections that (1) petitioner has no standing to litigate and (2) the
petition fails to meet the case or controversy requirement in constitutional adjudication. On the
merits, respondents claim that (1) the NTC's press release of 11 June 2005 is a mere "fair warning,"
not censorship, cautioning radio and television networks on the lack of authentication of the Garci
Tapes and of the consequences of airing false or fraudulent material, and (2) the NTC did not
act ultra vires in issuing the warning to radio and television stations.

Petitioner belied respondents' claim on his lack of standing to litigate, contending that his status as a
citizen asserting the enforcement of a public right vested him with sufficient interest to maintain this
suit. Petitioner also contests respondents' claim that the NTC press release of 11 June 2005 is a mere
warning as it already prejudged the Garci Tapes as inauthentic and violative of the Anti-Wiretapping
Law, making it a "cleverly disguised x xx gag order."

Issue: Whether the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005 constitutes an
impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression.

Ruling:
1. Standing to File Petition
Petitioner has standing to file this petition. When the issue involves freedom of expression, as
in the present case, any citizen has the right to bring suit to question the
constitutionality of a government action in violation of freedom of expression, whether
or not the government action is directed at such citizen. The government action may chill
into silence those to whom the action is directed. Any citizen must be allowed to take up the
cudgels for those who have been cowed into inaction because freedom of expression is a vital public
right that must be defended by everyone and anyone.
Freedom of expression, being fundamental to the preservation of a free, open and democratic
society, is of transcendental importance that must be defended by every patriotic citizen at the
 Page 560 of 601

earliest opportunity. We have held that any concerned citizen has standing to raise an issue
of transcendental importance to the nation,7 and petitioner in this present petition raises such issue.
2. Overview of Freedom of Expression, Prior Restraint and Subsequent Punishment
Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic society. Freedom of
expression is an indispensable condition8 to the exercise of almost all other civil and political rights.
No society can remain free, open and democratic without freedom of expression. Freedom of
expression guarantees full, spirited, and even contentious discussion of all social, economic and
political issues. To survive, a free and democratic society must zealously safeguard freedom of
expression.
Freedom of expression allows citizens to expose and check abuses of public officials. Freedom of
expression allows citizens to make informed choices of candidates for public office. Freedom of
expression crystallizes important public policy issues, and allows citizens to participate in the
discussion and resolution of such issues. Freedom of expression allows the competition of ideas, the
clash of claims and counterclaims, from which the truth will likely emerge. Freedom of expression
allows the airing of social grievances, mitigating sudden eruptions of violence from marginalized
groups who otherwise would not be heard by government. Freedom of expression provides a civilized
way of engagement among political, ideological, religious or ethnic opponents for if one cannot use
his tongue to argue, he might use his fist instead.
Freedom of expression is the freedom to disseminate ideas and beliefs, whether competing,
conforming or otherwise. It is the freedom to express to others what one likes or dislikes, as it is the
freedom of others to express to one and all what they favor or disfavor. It is the free expression for
the ideas we love, as well as the free expression for the ideas we hate.9 Indeed, the function of
freedom of expression is to stir disputes:
[I]t may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often
provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have
profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.10
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution prohibits the enactment of any law curtailing freedom of
expression:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
 Page 561 of 601

Thus, the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or censorship because the
Constitution commands that freedom of expression shall not be abridged. Over time, however, courts
have carved out narrow and well defined exceptions to this rule out of necessity.
The exceptions, when expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to
only four categories of expression, namely: pornography,11 false or misleading
advertisement,12 advocacy of imminent lawless action,13 and danger to national security.14 All other
expression is not subject to prior restraint. As stated in Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal
Communication Commission, "[T]he First Amendment (Free Speech Clause), subject only to narrow
and well understood exceptions, does not countenance governmental control over the content of
messages expressed by private individuals."15
Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value expression. Any
content-based prior restraint on protected expression is unconstitutional without
exception. A protected expression means what it says – it is absolutely protected from censorship.
Thus, there can be no prior restraint on public debates on the amendment or repeal of existing laws,
on the ratification of treaties, on the imposition of new tax measures, or on proposed amendments to
the Constitution.
Prior restraint on expression is content-based if the restraint is aimed at the message or idea of the
expression. Courts will subject to strict scrutiny content-based restraint. If the content-based prior
restraint is directed at protected expression, courts will strike down the restraint as unconstitutional
because there can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. The analysis thus
turns on whether the prior restraint is content-based, and if so, whether such restraint is directed at
protected expression, that is, those not falling under any of the recognized categories of unprotected
expression.
If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is content-neutral even
if it burdens expression. A content-neutral restraint is a restraint which regulates the time, place or
manner of the expression in public places16 without any restraint on the content of the expression.
Courts will subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny.17
An example of a content-neutral restraint is a permit specifying the date, time and route of a rally
passing through busy public streets. A content-neutral prior restraint on protected expression which
does not touch on the content of the expression enjoys the presumption of validity and is thus
enforceable subject to appeal to the courts.18 Courts will uphold time, place or manner restraints if
 Page 562 of 601

they are content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open
ample alternative channels of expression.19
In content-neutral prior restraint on protected speech, there should be no prior restraint on the
content of the expression itself. Thus, submission of movies or pre-taped television programs to a
government review board is constitutional only if the review is for classification and not for censoring
any part of the content of the submitted materials.20 However, failure to submit such materials to the
review board may be penalized without regard to the content of the materials.21 The review board
has no power to reject the airing of the submitted materials. The review board’s power is only to
classify the materials, whether for general patronage, for adults only, or for some other classification.
The power to classify expressions applies only to movies and pre-taped television programs22 but not
to live television programs. Any classification of live television programs necessarily entails prior
restraint on expression.
Expression that may be subject to prior restraint is unprotected expression or low-value
expression. By definition, prior restraint on unprotected expression is content-based23 since the
restraint is imposed because of the content itself. In this jurisdiction, there are currently only four
categories of unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. This Court recognized
false or misleading advertisement as unprotected expression only in October 2007.24
Only unprotected expression may be subject to prior restraint. However, any such prior
restraint on unprotected expression must hurdle a high barrier. First, such prior restraint is
presumed unconstitutional. Second, the government bears a heavy burden of proving the
constitutionality of the prior restraint.25
Courts will subject to strict scrutiny any government action imposing prior restraint on unprotected
expression.26 The government action will be sustained if there is a compelling State interest, and prior
restraint is necessary to protect such State interest. In such a case, the prior restraint shall
be narrowly drawn - only to the extent necessary to protect or attain the compelling State interest.
Prior restraint is a more severe restriction on freedom of expression than subsequent punishment.
Although subsequent punishment also deters expression, still the ideas are disseminated to the
public. Prior restraint prevents even the dissemination of ideas to the public.
While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, such expression may be subject to
subsequent punishment,27 either civilly or criminally. Thus, the publication of election surveys cannot
be subject to prior restraint,28 but an aggrieved person can sue for redress of injury if the survey
turns out to be fabricated. Also, while Article 201 (2)(b)(3) of the Revised Penal Code punishing
 Page 563 of 601

"shows which offend any race or religion" cannot be used to justify prior restraint on religious
expression, this provision can be invoked to justify subsequent punishment of the perpetrator of such
offensive shows.29
Similarly, if the unprotected expression does not warrant prior restraint, the same expression may
still be subject to subsequent punishment, civilly or criminally. Libel falls under this class of
unprotected expression. However, if the expression cannot be subject to the lesser restriction of
subsequent punishment, logically it cannot also be subject to the more severe restriction of prior
restraint. Thus, since profane language or "hate speech" against a religious minority is not subject to
subsequent punishment in this jurisdiction,30 such expression cannot be subject to prior restraint.
If the unprotected expression warrants prior restraint, necessarily the same expression is subject to
subsequent punishment. There must be a law punishing criminally the unprotected expression before
prior restraint on such expression can be justified. The legislature must punish the unprotected
expression because it creates a substantive evil that the State must prevent. Otherwise, there will be
no legal basis for imposing a prior restraint on such expression.
The prevailing test in this jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of government action
imposing prior restraint on three categories of unprotected expression – pornography,31 advocacy of
imminent lawless action, and danger to national security - is the clear and present danger test.32 The
expression restrained must present a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive evil
that the State has a right and duty to prevent, and such danger must be grave and imminent.33
Prior restraint on unprotected expression takes many forms - it may be a law, administrative
regulation, or impermissible pressures like threats of revoking licenses or withholding of
benefits.34 The impermissible pressures need not be embodied in a government agency regulation,
but may emanate from policies, advisories or conduct of officials of government agencies.
3. Government Action in the Present Case
The government action in the present case is a warning by the NTC that the airing or
broadcasting of the Garci Tapes by radio and television stations is a "cause for the
suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations" issued to
radio and television stations. The NTC warning, embodied in a press release, relies on two grounds.
First, the airing of the Garci Tapes "is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the
conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to radio and TV stations."
Second, the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated, and subsequent investigation may establish
that the tapes contain false information or willful misrepresentation.
 Page 564 of 601

Specifically, the NTC press release contains the following categorical warning:
Taking into consideration the country’s unusual situation, and in order not to unnecessarily
aggravate the same, the NTC warns all radio stations and television networks
owners/operators that the conditions of the authorizations and permits issued to them by
Government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that
said companies shall not use its stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false
information or willful misrepresentation. Relative thereto, it has come to the attention of the
Commission that certain personalities are in possession of alleged taped conversation which
they claim, (sic) involve the President of the Philippines and a Commissioner of the COMELEC
regarding their supposed violation of election laws. These personalities have admitted that the
taped conversations are product of illegal wiretapping operations.
Considering that these taped conversations have not been duly authenticated nor could it be
said at this time that the tapes contain an accurate or truthful representation of what was
recorded therein, (sic) it is the position of the Commission that the continuous airing
or broadcast of the said taped conversations by radio and television stations is a
continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the
Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to these radio and
television stations. If it has been (sic) subsequently established that the said tapes
are false and/or fraudulent after a prosecution or appropriate investigation, the
concerned radio and television companies are hereby warned that their
broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall
be just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or
authorizations issued to the said companies. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected expression
that may be subject to prior restraint. The NTC does not specify what substantive evil the State seeks
to prevent in imposing prior restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes. The NTC does not claim that
the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, of
grave and imminent character, that the State has a right and duty to prevent.
The NTC did not conduct any hearing in reaching its conclusion that the airing of the Garci Tapes
constitutes a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. At the time of issuance of the NTC
press release, and even up to now, the parties to the conversations in the Garci Tapes have not
complained that the wire-tapping was without their consent, an essential element for violation of the
 Page 565 of 601

Anti-Wiretapping Law.35 It was even the Office of the President, through the Press Secretary, that
played and released to media the Garci Tapes containing the alleged "spliced" conversation between
President Arroyo and Commissioner Garcillano. There is also the issue of whether a wireless cellular
phone conversation is covered by the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
Clearly, the NTC has no factual or legal basis in claiming that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes
a violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. The radio and television stations were not even given an
opportunity to be heard by the NTC. The NTC did not observe basic due process as mandated
in AngTibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.36
The NTC claims that the Garci Tapes, "after a prosecution or the appropriate investigation," may
constitute "false information and/or willful misrepresentation." However, the NTC does not claim that
such possible false information or willful misrepresentation constitutes misleading commercial
advertisement. In the United States, false or deceptive commercial speech is categorized as
unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. Recently, this Court upheld the
constitutionality of Section 6 of the Milk Code requiring the submission to a government screening
committee of advertising materials for infant formula milk to prevent false or deceptive claims to the
public.37 There is, however, no claim here by respondents that the Garci Tapes constitute false or
misleading commercial advertisement.
The NTC concedes that the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated as accurate or truthful. The
NTC also concedes that only "after a prosecution or appropriate investigation" can it be established
that the Garci Tapes constitute "false information and/or willful misrepresentation." Clearly, the
NTC admits that it does not even know if the Garci Tapes contain false information or
willful misrepresentation.
4. Nature of Prior Restraint in the Present Case
The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a content-based prior restraint because it
is directed at the message of the Garci Tapes. The NTC’s claim that the Garci Tapes might contain
"false information and/or willful misrepresentation," and thus should not be publicly aired, is
an admission that the restraint is content-based.
5. Nature of Expression in the Present Case
The public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression because it does not fall under any of
the four existing categories of unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The airing of the
Garci Tapes is essentially a political expression because it exposes that a presidential candidate had
 Page 566 of 601

allegedly improper conversations with a COMELEC Commissioner right after the close of voting in the
last presidential elections.
Obviously, the content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot. Public
discussion on the sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a protected expression that cannot be subject
to prior restraint. Public discussion on the credibility of the electoral process is one of the highest
political expressions of any electorate, and thus deserves the utmost protection. If ever there is a
hierarchy of protected expressions, political expression would occupy the highest rank,38 and among
different kinds of political expression, the subject of fair and honest elections would be at the top. In
any event, public discussion on all political issues should always remain uninhibited, robust and wide
open.
The rule, which recognizes no exception, is that there can be no content-based prior
restraint on protected expression. On this ground alone, the NTC press release is
unconstitutional. Of course, if the courts determine that the subject matter of a wiretapping, illegal
or not, endangers the security of the State, the public airing of the tape becomes unprotected
expression that may be subject to prior restraint. However, there is no claim here by respondents
that the subject matter of the Garci Tapes involves national security and publicly airing the tapes
would endanger the security of the State.39
The alleged violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law is not in itself a ground to impose a prior restraint
on the airing of the Garci Tapes because the Constitution expressly prohibits the enactment of any
law, and that includes anti-wiretapping laws, curtailing freedom of expression.40 The only exceptions
to this rule are the four recognized categories of unprotected expression. However, the content of
the Garci Tapes does not fall under any of these categories of unprotected expression.
The airing of the Garci Tapes does not violate the right to privacy because the content of the Garci
Tapes is a matter of important public concern. The Constitution guarantees the people’s right to
information on matters of public concern.41 The remedy of any person aggrieved by the public airing
of the Garci Tapes is to file a complaint for violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law after the
commission of the crime. Subsequent punishment, absent a lawful defense, is the remedy available in
case of violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
The present case involves a prior restraint on protected expression. Prior restraint on protected
expression differs significantly from subsequent punishment of protected expression. While there can
be no prior restraint on protected expression, there can be subsequent punishment for protected
expression under libel, tort or other laws. In the present case, the NTC action seeks prior restraint on
 Page 567 of 601

the airing of the Garci Tapes, not punishment of personnel of radio and television stations for actual
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
6. Only the Courts May Impose Content-Based Prior Restraint
The NTC has no power to impose content-based prior restraint on expression. The charter of the NTC
does not vest NTC with any content-based censorship power over radio and television stations.
In the present case, the airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression that can never be subject
to prior restraint. However, even assuming for the sake of argument that the airing of the Garci
Tapes constitutes unprotected expression, only the courts have the power to adjudicate on the
factual and legal issue of whether the airing of the Garci Tapes presents a clear and present danger
of bringing about a substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to prevent, so as to justify the
prior restraint.
Any order imposing prior restraint on unprotected expression requires prior adjudication by the
courts on whether the prior restraint is constitutional. This is a necessary consequence from the
presumption of invalidity of any prior restraint on unprotected expression. Unless ruled by the courts
as a valid prior restraint, government agencies cannot implement outright such prior restraint
because such restraint is presumed unconstitutional at inception.
As an agency that allocates frequencies or airwaves, the NTC may regulate the bandwidth position,
transmitter wattage, and location of radio and television stations, but not the content of the
broadcasts. Such content-neutral prior restraint may make operating radio and television stations
more costly. However, such content-neutral restraint does not restrict the content of the broadcast.
7. Government Failed to Overcome Presumption of Invalidity
Assuming that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected expression, the NTC action
imposing prior restraint on the airing is presumed unconstitutional. The Government bears a heavy
burden to prove that the NTC action is constitutional. The Government has failed to meet this
burden.
In their Comment, respondents did not invoke any compelling State interest to impose prior restraint
on the public airing of the Garci Tapes. The respondents claim that they merely "fairly warned" radio
and television stations to observe the Anti-Wiretapping Law and pertinent NTC circulars on program
standards. Respondents have not explained how and why the observance by radio and television
stations of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and pertinent NTC circulars constitutes a compelling State
interest justifying prior restraint on the public airing of the Garci Tapes.
 Page 568 of 601

Violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law, like the violation of any criminal statute, can always be subject
to criminal prosecution after the violation is committed. Respondents have not explained why there is
a need in the present case to impose prior restraint just to prevent a possible future violation of the
Anti-Wiretapping Law. Respondents have not explained how the violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Law, or of the pertinent NTC circulars, can incite imminent lawless behavior or endanger the security
of the State. To allow such restraint is to allow prior restraint on all future broadcasts that may
possibly violate any of the existing criminal statutes. That would be the dawn of sweeping and
endless censorship on broadcast media.
8. The NTC Warning is a Classic Form of Prior Restraint
The NTC press release threatening to suspend or cancel the airwave permits of radio and television
stations constitutes impermissible pressure amounting to prior restraint on protected expression.
Whether the threat is made in an order, regulation, advisory or press release, the chilling effect is the
same: the threat freezes radio and television stations into deafening silence. Radio and television
stations that have invested substantial sums in capital equipment and market development suddenly
face suspension or cancellation of their permits. The NTC threat is thus real and potent.
Although couched in a press release and not in an administrative regulation, the NTC threat to
suspend or cancel permits remains real and effective, for without airwaves or frequencies, radio and
television stations will fall silent and die. The NTC press release does not seek to advance a
legitimate regulatory objective, but to suppress through coercion information on a matter of vital
public concern.
In sum, the NTC press release constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected expression.
There can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. This rule has no exception.

221) Short Title: Babst vs. NBI [132 SCRA 316 (1984)
Full Title: ARLENE BABST, ODETTE ALCANTARA CERES P. DOYO, JO ANN Q. MAGLIPON, DOMINI
TORREVILLAS SUAREZ, LORNA KALAW-TIROL, CIELO BUENAVENTURA, SYLVIA MAYUGA, SHEILA S.
CORONEL, ET AL., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD, SPECIAL COMMITTEE NO. 2,
BRIG. GEN. WILFREDO ESTRADA (ret.), COL. RENATO ECARMA, NBI ASST. DIRECTOR PONCIANO
FERNANDO, COL. BALBINO DIEGO, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, COL. EUSTAQUIO PERALTA, ET
AL., respondents.
Facts:
 Page 569 of 601

Petitioners are columnists, feature article writers and reporters of various local publications. At
different dates since July, 1980, some of them have allegedly been summoned by military authorities
who have subjected them to sustained interrogation on various aspects of their works, feelings,
sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives.
Aside from the interrogations, a criminal complaint for libel was filed by Brig. Gen. ArtemioTadiar, Jr.
on February 9, 1983 with the Office of the City Fiscal, Manila, against petitioners Domini Torrevillas-
Suarez, editor of the Panorama, and Ma. Ceres Doyo based on an article written by Doyo and
published in the March 28, 1982 issue of the Panorama, on which the author had been interrogated
by respondents. The complaint included an staggering P10 million claim for damages. (An information
for libel has since been filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region against
Suarez and Doyo.)
Petitioners maintain that the respondents have no jurisdiction over the proceedings which are
violative of the constitutional guarantee on free expression since they have the effect of imposing
restrictive guidelines and norms on mass media; that they are a punitive ordeal or subsequent
punishment of petitioners for lawful publications; that they amount to a system of censorship,
curtailing the "free flow of information and petition and opinion," indispensable to the right of the
people to know matters of public concern guaranteed in Section 6 of Article IV of the Constitution;
and that they constitute intrusions into spheres of individual liberty. Regarding the libel charge
against Suarez and Doyo, petitioners denounce the filing as instituted with intent to intimidate and
based on illegally obtained evidence, referring to the matters inquired into by respondents in
previously conducted, allegedly illegal interrogations.
Respondents counter that no issue of jurisdiction exists since they do not pretend to exercise
jurisdiction over the petitioners; that what respondents have sent to petitioners were neither
subpoenas nor summonses, but mere invitations to dialogues which were completely voluntary,
without any compulsion employed on petitioners; that the dialogues themselves were designed
simply to elicit information and exchange Ideas and that the expression of personal preferences and
opinions by members of the respondent Board is not equivalent to the imposition of norms and
guidelines to be followed by petitioners. Relative to the libel case, respondents contend that
petitioners have no cause of action against respondent Board since respondent General Tadiar is not
a member of respondent Board and has filed the libel case in his personal capacity; and the libel case
is not pending before any of the respondents.
 Page 570 of 601

The petition is premised upon the alleged illegality and unconstitutionality of the issuance by
respondent NIB to petitioners of letters of invitation, their subsequent interrogation, and the filing of
the aforementioned libel suit.

Issue: Whether the issuance by respondent NIB to petitioners of letters of invitation, their
subsequent interrogation, and the filing of the aforementioned libel suit unconstitutional.
Ruling:
NO. The acts sought to be prohibited (i.e., the issuance of letters of invitation petition and
subsequent interrogations) have therefore been abated, thereby rendering the petition moot and
academic as regards the aforesaid matters.
Be that as it may, it is not Idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer
some questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or
constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily
assume a different appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a powerful group composed
predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when the country has just emerged from
martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not entirely
been lifted and the designated interrogation site is a military camp, the same can easily be taken, not
as a strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as an authoritative command which one
can only defy at his peril, especially where, as in the instant case, the invitation carries the ominous
seaming that "failure to appear . . . shall be considered as a waiver . . . and this Committee will be
constrained to proceed in accordance with law." Fortunately, the NIB director general and chairman
saw the wisdom of terminating the proceedings and the unwelcome interrogation.
Similarly, prohibition will not issue in respect of the libel charges now pending in court against two of
the petitioners and similar suits that might be filed.
Firstly, the writ of prohibition is directed against a tribunal, board or person acting without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion vis-a-vis certain proceedings pending before it.
The libel cases adverted to are not pending before respondent NIB or any other respondent.
Secondly, the issue of validity of the libel, charges by reason of their alleged collision with freedom of
expression, is a matter that should be raised in the proper forum, i.e., before the court where the
libel cases are pending or where they may be filed. The same rule applies to the issue of admissibility
as evidence of matters that have been elicited in the course of an inquiry or interrogation conducted
by respondent NIB, which petitioners claim to have been illegally obtained.
 Page 571 of 601

Finally, the right to seek redress when libeled is a personal and individual privilege of the aggrieved
party, and no one among the respondent officials has the authority to restrain any of his
subordinates who has been libeled from vindicating his right by instituting a libel suit. Brig. Gen.
Tadiar has filed the libel case against petitioners Suarez and Doyo in his personal capacity. Moreover,
he is not even a member of respondent NIB. And the NIB does not appear to have anything to do
with Gen. Tadiar's private right to complain of libel.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.

222) Short Title: Espuelas vs. NBI [132 SCRA 316 (1984)]
Full Title: G.R. No. L-62992 September 28, 1984
ARLENE BABST, ODETTE ALCANTARA CERES P. DOYO, JO ANN Q. MAGLIPON, DOMINI
TORREVILLAS SUAREZ, LORNA KALAW-TIROL, CIELO BUENAVENTURA, SYLVIA MAYUGA,
SHEILA S. CORONEL, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD, SPECIAL COMMITTEE NO. 2, BRIG. GEN. WILFREDO
ESTRADA (ret.), COL. RENATO ECARMA, NBI ASST. DIRECTOR PONCIANO FERNANDO,
COL. BALBINO DIEGO, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, COL. EUSTAQUIO PERALTA, ET
AL., respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners are columnists, feature article writers and reporters of various local
publications. At different dates since July, 1980, some of them have allegedly been
summoned by military authorities who have subjected them to sustained interrogation
on various aspects of their works, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even
their private lives. Typical of the letters received by the petitioners from respondent NIB is that
addressed to petitioner Arlene Babst.
Petitioners maintain that the respondents have no jurisdiction over the proceedings
which are violative of the constitutional guarantee on free expression since they have
the effect of imposing restrictive guidelines and norms on mass media; that they are a
punitive ordeal or subsequent punishment of petitioners for lawful publications; that they amount to
a system of censorship, curtailing the "free flow of information and petition and opinion,"
indispensable to the right of the people to know matters of public concern guaranteed in Section 6 of
 Page 572 of 601

Article IV of the Constitution; and that they constitute intrusions into spheres of individual liberty.
Regarding the libel charge against Suarez and Doyo, petitioners denounce the filing as instituted with
intent to intimidate and based on illegally obtained evidence, referring to the matters inquired into by
respondents in previously conducted, allegedly illegal interrogations.
Issue: Whether NBI have jurisisdictionto petitioners of letters of invitation, their subsequent
interrogation, and the filing of the aforementioned libel suit.
Ruling:
Under the circumstances of the case, the petition cannot be granted.
The assailed proceedings have come to an end. The acts sought to be prohibited (i.e., the issuance
of letters of invitation petition and subsequent interrogations) have therefore been abated, thereby
rendering the petition moot and academic as regards the aforesaid matters.
Be that as it may, it is not Idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing
and answer some questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure,
is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an
invitation can easily assume a different appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a
powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when the
country has just emerged from martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted and the designated interrogation site is a military camp,
the same can easily be taken, not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as an
authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril, especially where, as in the instant case,
the invitation carries the ominous seaming that "failure to appear . . . shall be considered as a waiver
. . . and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law." Fortunately, the NIB
director general and chairman saw the wisdom of terminating the proceedings and the unwelcome
interrogation.
Similarly, prohibition will not issue in respect of the libel charges now pending in court against two of
the petitioners and similar suits that might be filed.
Firstly, the writ of prohibition is directed against a tribunal, board or person acting
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion vis-a-vis certain
proceedings pending before it. The libel cases adverted to are not pending before respondent
NIB or any other respondent.
Secondly, the issue of validity of the libel, charges by reason of their alleged collision
with freedom of expression, is a matter that should be raised in the proper forum, i.e.,
 Page 573 of 601

before the court where the libel cases are pending or where they may be filed. The same
rule applies to the issue of admissibility as evidence of matters that have been elicited in the course
of an inquiry or interrogation conducted by respondent NIB, which petitioners claim to have been
illegally obtained.
Finally, the right to seek redress when libeled is a personal and individual privilege of the
aggrieved party, and no one among the respondent officials has the authority to restrain
any of his subordinates who has been libeled from vindicating his right by instituting a
libel suit. Brig. Gen. Tadiar has filed the libel case against petitioners Suarez and Doyo in his
personal capacity. Moreover, he is not even a member of respondent NIB. And the NIB does not
appear to have anything to do with Gen. Tadiar's private right to complain of libel.

223) Short Title: Elizalde vs. CFI [116 SCRA 93 (1982)]

Full Title: G.R. No. L-38753 August 25, 1982
RAFAEL S. MERCADO, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH V, CITY FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY
and VIRGINIA M. MERCADO, respondents.
Facts:
The information in this certiorari, mandamus and prohibition proceeding to
quash an information for libel against petitioner for the alleged offensive telegram he
sent to respondent. A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner Ramon Mercado on the ground of
the telegram being
a privileged communication, which was denied by the lower court. Thereafter, through another coun
sel, came a motion to quash, alleging that the facts charged do not "constitute
an offense," but, the same was denied.
In respondents’ comment, the stress was on the absence of any privilege, there
being malice and bad faith. As stated therein "The communication in issue was made by the
petitioner with evident malice and bad faith, a matter explicitly stated in the information
filed with the respondent court, and the pretense that it was made allegedly in line with the
resident appeal to give information on undesirable employees in the government service,
cannot cover up such fact. Malice in fact and bad faith on the part of the petitioner, and
or that he was motivated by vengeance and ill 'will in making the said communication, is shown
 Page 574 of 601

by, and can be established by the prosecution thru the testimony of the private respondent
and the following documentary evidence.
Prior to such hearing, there was a motion by petitioner to file memorandum in lieu of oral
argument, which was not acted upon before the hearing where the parties
appeared. Instead
of just filing a memorandum, petitioner had a motion to admit amended petition enclosing withsuch
motion the amended petition. The memorandum filed by him was on the basis thereof.
Issue: W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e t e l e g r a m b e i n g q u a l i f i e d l y p r i v i l e g e d s h o u l d b e t h e
b a s i s f o r t h e special civil action for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition
Ruling:
In the light of the above pleadings, this Court after a careful study, holds that certiorari
to annul the order denying the motion to quash as well as the motion for reconsideration
does not lie. Neither should respondent court be ordered to dismiss Criminal Case No. Q-
2936, the criminal complaint for libel against petitioner. Nor should the court be
prohibited from hearing the aforesaid criminal action. This petition lacks merit.
1. United States v. Bustos, as mentioned at the outset, is a landmark decision. It is to the credit of
the Supreme Court of the Philippines that such a ruling antedated by thirty-six years, a
similar doctrine announced by the United States Supreme Court, to the effect that a libel
prosecution must likewise survive the test of whether or not the offending publication is
within the guarantees of free speech and free press. To keep such guarantees, if not inviolate,
at the very least truly meaningful, certainly calls for such an approach.ït¢@lFº The judiciary lives up
to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should
continue to be so.
2. Justice Malcolm, however, is careful to point out that qualified privilege, and this is one such
instance, may be "lost by proof of malice." His opinion continues: " 'A communication made bona
fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in
reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a
corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without
this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.'
3. Respondents have in their favor a decision of this Court supporting their stand. In People v.
Monton, the question of whether or not a motion to quash based on a qualified privilege should be
upheld was decided adversely against the claim of those accused of libel, This Court
 Page 575 of 601

made clear that malice can be shown. It "simply puts the burden of doing so on the
prosecution."

224) Short Title: Lopez vs. Court of Appeals [34 SCRA 116 (1970)]
Full Title: G.R. No. L-26549 July 31, 1970
EUGENIO LOPEZ, publisher and owner of the "MANILA, CHRONICLE and JUAN T.
GATBONTON, petitioners,
vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FIDEL G. CRUZ, respondents.
Facts:
In the early part of January, 1956, there appeared on the front page of The Manila
Chronicle, of which petitioner Eugenio Lopez was the publisher, as well as on other
dailies, a news story of a sanitary inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz
by name, sending a distress signal to a passing United States Airforce plane which in turn
relayed the message to Manila. He was not ignored, an American Army plane dropping on
the beach of an island an emergency-sustenance kit containing, among other things, a
two-way radio set. He utilized it to inform authorities in Manila that the people in the
place were living in terror, due to a series of killings committed since Christmas of 1955.
Losing no time, the Philippines defense establishment rushed to the island a platoon of scout rangers
led by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion. Upon arriving at the reported killer-menaced Babuyan Claro,
however, Major Encarnacion and his men found, instead of the alleged killers, a man, the same Fidel
Cruz, who merely wanted transportation home to Manila. In view of this finding, Major Wilfredo
Encarnacion branded as a "hoax," to use his own descriptive word, the report of Fidel Cruz. That was
the term employed by the other newspapers when referring to the above-mentioned incident.
Respondent Fidel G. Cruz sued petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the
recovery of damages alleging the defamatory character of the above publication of his
picture. After trial duly had, he was awarded five thousand pesos as actual damages, another five
thousand pesos as moral damages, and one thousand pesos for attorney's fees. That judgment was
affirmed on appeal to respondent Court. Hence, this petition for certiorari with the result, as already
announced at the opening of this opinion, that while respondent Cruz is entitled to Prevail, the
damages awarded him should be reduced.

Issue: WON such error is sufficient ground for an action for libel to prosper?
 Page 576 of 601

Ruling: YES
It is on the freedom of the press that petitioners would stake their case to demonstrate
that no action for libel would lie arising from the publication of the picture of respondent
Cruz identified as responsible for the hoax of the year, when such was not the case at all.
It is easily understandable why. No liability would be incurred if it could be demonstrated
that it comes within the well-nigh all embracing scope of freedom of the press. Included
therein is the widest latitude of choice as to what items should see the light of day so long as they
are relevant to a matter of public interest, the insistence on the requirement as to its truth yielding at
times to unavoidable inaccuracies attendant on newspapers and other publications being subject to
the tyranny of deadlines. If no such showing could be plausibly made, however, it is difficult to resist
the conclusion that there was in fact the commission of such quasi-delict. It was held in Lu Chu Sing
v. Lu TiongGui, that "the repeal of the old Libel Law (Act No. 277) did not abolish the civil action
for libel. A libel was defined in that Act as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in
writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, ..., tending to blacken the memory of
one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged
or natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby "pose him to public hatred, contempt,
or ridicule," There was an express provision in such legislation for a tort or a quasi-delict action
arising from libel. There is reinforcement to such a view in the new Civil Code providing for the
recovery of moral damages for libel, slander or any other form of defamation.

225) Short Title: PJI vs. Thoenen (G.R. No. 143372, December 13, 2005)
Full Title: G.R. No. 143372 December 13, 2005
PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC. (PEOPLE’S JOURNAL), ZACARIAS NUGUID, JR. and
CRISTINA LEE, Petitioners,
vs. FRANCIS THOENEN, Respondent.
Facts:
For almost a century, this Court has sought that elusive equilibrium between the law on defamation
on one hand, and the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and press on the other. This
case revisits that search.
The subject of this article, Francis Thoenen, is a retired engineer permanently residing in
this country with his Filipina wife and their children. Claiming that the report was false
 Page 577 of 601

and defamatory, and that the petitioners acted irresponsibly in failing to verify the truth
of the same prior to publication, he filed a civil case for damages against herein
petitioners Philippine Journalists, Inc., ZacariasNuguid, Jr., its publisher, and reporter
Cristina Lee.
Thoenen claimed that the article destroyed the respect and admiration he enjoyed in the
community, and that since it had been published, he and his wife received several
queries and angry calls from friends, neighbors and relatives. For the impairment of his
reputation and standing in the community, and his mental anguish, Thoenen sought 200,000.00 in
moral damages, 100,000.00 in exemplary damages, and 50,000.00 in attorney’s fees.
The petitioners admitted publication of the news item, ostensibly out of a “social and
moral duty to inform the public on matters of general interest, promote the public good
and protect the moral public (sic) of the people,” and that the story was published in
good faith and without malice.
The petitioners claim that Lee, as the reporter assigned to cover news events in the CID, acquired a
copy of the above letter from a trusted source in the CID’s Intelligence Division. They claimed to
“have reasonable grounds to believe in the truth and veracity of the information derived (from their)
sources.”
It was proven at trial that the news article contained several inaccuracies. The headline,
which categorically stated that the subject of the article engaged in the practice of
shooting pets, was untrue. Thoenen also submitted a Certification from the Office of the
Bar Confidant that there was no lawyer in its rolls by the name of Efren Angara, earlier
cited by petitioner Lee as the author of the letter on which she based her article. Finally,
the trial also showed that despite the fact that respondent’s address was indicated in the letter,
Cristina Lee made no efforts to contact either him or the purported letter-writer, Atty. Angara.
The petitioners claim that Lee sought confirmation of the story from the newspaper’s
correspondent in Parañaque, who told her that a woman who refused to identify herself
confirmed that there had indeed been an incident of pet-shooting in the neighborhood
involving the respondent. However, the correspondent in question was never presented in court
to verify the truth of this allegation. Neither was the alleged CID source presented to verify that the
above letter had indeed come from the Department, nor even that the same was a certified true copy
of a letter on file in their office.
 Page 578 of 601

Issue:Whether or not the constitutional privilege granted under the freedom of speech and the press
against liability for damages extend to the petitioners in this case.
Ruling: NO
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is
a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses
of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the
wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too
thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and
dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless,
as the individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good?
Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the
Judiciary - to any or all the agencies of Government - public opinion should be the constant source of
liberty and democracy.
The demand to protect public opinion for the welfare of society and the orderly
administration of government inevitably lead to the adoption of the doctrine of privileged
communication. "A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or
qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not
actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art. VI of
the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in
the Congress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged
communications containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been
made without good intention or justifiable motive. To this genre belong ‘private communications’ and
‘fair and true report without any comments or remarks.’
Although it has been stressed that a newspaper "should not be held to account to a point
of suppression for honest mistakes, or imperfection in the choice of words," even the
most liberal view of free speech has never countenanced the publication of falsehoods,
especially the persistent and unmitigated dissemination of patent lies. "There is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the
careless error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open’ debate." The use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the premises of
democratic government and with the orderly manner in which economic, social, or political change is
 Page 579 of 601

to be effected. Calculated falsehood falls into that class of utterances which "are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality… The
knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not
enjoy constitutional protection"
226) Short Title: Texas vs. Johnson [491 U.S. 397 (1989)]
Full Title: Texas vs. Gregory Lee Johnson
Facts:
During the 1984 Republican National Convention, respondent Johnson participated in a
political demonstration to protest the policies of the Reagan administration and some
Dallas-based corporations. After a march through the city streets, Johnson burned an
American flag while protesters chanted. No one was physically injured or threatened
with injury, although several witnesses were seriously offended by the flag burning.
Johnson was convicted of desecration of a venerated object in violation of a Texas
statute, and a state court of appeals affirmed. However, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals reversed, holding that the State, consistent with the First Amendment, could not
punish Johnson for burning the flag in these circumstances. The court first found that
Johnson's burning of the flag was expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. The court
concluded that the State could not criminally sanction flag desecration in order to preserve the flag as
a symbol of national unity. It also held that the statute did not meet the State's goal of
preventing breaches of the peace, since it was not drawn narrowly enough to encompass
only those flag burnings that would likely result in a serious disturbance, and since the
flag burning in this case did not threaten such a reaction. Further, it stressed that another
Texas statute prohibited breaches of the peace and could be used to prevent disturbances without
punishing this flag desecration.
Issue: Whether flag burning constitutes "symbolic speech" protected by the First Amendment.
Ruling: YES
Johnson's conviction for flag desecration is inconsistent with the First Amendment.
(a) Under the circumstances, Johnson's burning of the flag constituted expressive
conduct, permitting him to invoke the First Amendment. The State conceded that the conduct
was expressive. Occurring as it did at the end of a demonstration coinciding with the Republican
 Page 580 of 601

National Convention, the expressive, overtly political nature of the conduct was both intentional and
overwhelmingly apparent.
(b) Texas has not asserted an interest in support of Johnson's conviction that is unrelated
to the suppression of expression and would therefore permit application of the test set
forth in United States v. O’Brien, whereby an important governmental interest in
regulating nonspeech can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms when
speech and nonspeech elements are combined in the same course of conduct. An interest in
preventing breaches of the peace is not implicated on this record. Expression may not be prohibited
on the basis that an audience that takes serious offense to the expression may disturb the peace,
since the Government cannot assume that every expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot,
but must look to the actual circumstances surrounding the expression.
(c) The latter interest does not justify Johnson's conviction. The restriction on Johnson's
political expression is content based, since the Texas statute is not aimed at protecting
the physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances, but is designed to protect it from
intentional and knowing abuse that causes serious offense to others. It is therefore
subject to "the most exacting scrutiny." Boos v. Barry. The Government may not prohibit the
verbal or nonverbal expression of an idea merely because society finds the idea offensive or
disagreeable, even where our flag is involved. Nor may a State foster its own view of the flag by
prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it, since the Government may not permit designated
symbols to be used to communicate a limited set of messages. Moreover, this Court will not create an
exception to these principles protected by the First Amendment for the American flag alone

227) Short Title: Borjal vs. CA. [301 SCRA 1 (1999)]

Full Title: G.R. No. 126466 January 14, 1999
ARTURO BORJAL a.k.a. ART BORJAL and MAXIMO SOLIVEN, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO WENCESLAO, respondents.
Facts:
Arturo Borjal was the president of PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., and Maximo Soliven was the
publisher and chairman of its editorial board. Borjal was among the regular writers
of The Philippien Star who runs the column Jaywalker. The case stems from the articles
written in Jaywalker, which called a certain organizer of a conference a self-proclaimed
hero.
 Page 581 of 601

Around that time, the First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) was organized. Its
objective was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term land transportation policy for
presentation to Congress. The conference was estimated to cost around Php1,815,000, which would
be funded through solicitations from various sponsors. Private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was
elected as Executive Director of the FNCLT. As such, he wrote numerous solicitation letters to the
business committee to support the conference.
The Jaywalker contained articles allegedly referring to these solicitation letters and other
defamatory statements. However, none of these articles named the organizer nor the
conference referred to. Wenceslao, thinking he was the one talked about in the article,
filed a case of libel against Borjal, Soliven, and others. The trial court as well as the
appellate court found the accused guilty of libel.

Issue:Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel.

Ruling: NO
The petition is impressed with merit. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that
the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not
sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed,
but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the
libelous publication. Regrettably, these requisites have not been complied with in the
case at bar.
The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press and that
privileged communications must be protective of public opinion. Fair commentaries on
matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for
libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every
discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed
innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed
malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public
person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable
imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a
comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on
 Page 582 of 601

established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from the facts.
The questioned article dealt with matters of public interest as the declared objective of the
conference, the composition of its members and participants, and the manner by which it was
intended to be funded no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely imbued with public interest.
Respondent is also deemed to be a public figure and even otherwise is involved in a public issue. The
court held that freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed and protected with the reminder
among media members to practice highest ethical standards in the exercise thereof.

228) Short Title: Baguio Midland Courier vs. CA (G.R. No. 107566, November 25, 2004)
Full Title: G.R. No. 107566 November 25, 2004
BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT AND GENERAL
MANAGER, OSEO HAMADA AND CECILLE AFABLE, EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, petitioners,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER SP, 6TH DIVISION) AND RAMON LABO,
JR., respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Oseo C. Hamada (Hamada) was the president and general manager of the Baguio Printing
and Publishing Co., Inc., which publishes the Baguio Midland Courier, a weekly newspaper published
and circulated in Baguio City and other provinces within the Cordillera region. . Petitioner
CecilleAfable (Afable) was Baguio Midland Couriers editor-in-chief and one of its columnists who ran
the column In and Out of Baguio. On the other hand, private respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., was
among the mayoralty candidates in Baguio City for the 18 January 1988 local elections. Before the 18
January 1988 local elections, petitioner Afable wrote in her column a series of articles dealing with
the candidates for the various elective positions in Baguio City. Respondent Labo alleged that in
Afable’s column on January 3, 1988 and January 10, 1988 made it appear that he (private
respondent) could not comply with his financial obligations of Php27,000.00, yet, he will be donating
millions to the people. Mr. Labo filed criminal and civil actions for libel. The trial court dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. The article in question was privileged and constituted fair comment on
matters of public interest. The decision, was, however, reversed by the appellate court. It declared
that the malicious nature of the article may be deduced from the fact that it was published in the
Baguio Midland Courier a few days before the scheduled local elections and from the style and tone
of writing employed by Afable.
 Page 583 of 601

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that there was malice in publishing the
article about MrLabo.

Ruling: Yes
The elements of libel are: 1) The imputation of a discreditable act or condition to
another; 2) publication of the imputation; 3) identity of the person defamed; and 4)
existence of malice. The law presumes that every defamatory imputation is malicious.
However, malice is not presumed when the information is for public interest.
Plainly, the rule only applies to fair comment on matters of public interest, fair comment being that
which is true, or which if false, expresses the real opinion of the author based upon reasonable
degree of care and on reasonable grounds. The principle, therefore, does not grant an absolute
license to authors or writers to destroy the persons of candidates for public office by exposing the
latter to public contempt or ridicule by providing the general public with publications tainted with
express or actual malice. In the latter case, the remedy of the person allegedly libeled is to show
proof that an article was written with the author's knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not. While the law itself creates the presumption that every
defamatory imputation is malicious, nevertheless, the privileged character of a communication
destroys said presumption. The burden of proving actual malice shall then rest on the plaintiff,
private respondent herein.
In the present case, private respondent was unable to prove that petitioner Afable's
column was tainted with actual malice. Verily, the records are replete with evidence that,
indeed, private respondent incurred an obligation which had remained unpaid until the
time the questioned article was published. While counsel for private respondent
persistently harped at the difference between the P27,000 which appeared in petitioner
Afable's column and the P27,415 actual indebtedness of private respondent to Baguio
Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., the minuscule difference in the amount fails to
establish reckless disregard for truth on the part of petitioners. As held by this Court in
the Borjal case –
Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity
alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of
truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press
 Page 584 of 601

should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections
in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for
misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and
effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy.
229) Short Title: Disini vs. Secretary of Justice (G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014)
Full Title: G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL
and ERNESTO SONIDO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.
Facts:
RA 10175 (Cybercrime Law) was enacted, which aims to regulate access to and use of
the cyberspace. Petitioners filed petitions to declare several provisions of Cybercrime
Law unconsitutional and void. One of the assailed provisions is Section 5, which punishes
the aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of Cybercrimes such as libel.
Petitioners argue that such provision suffers from overbreadth, creating chilling and
deterrent effect on protected expression. The OSG, however, contends that the current body of
jurisprudence and laws on aiding and abetting sufficiently protects the freedom of expression of
"netizens," the multitude that avail themselves of the services of the internet. He points out that
existing laws and jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of "aiding or abetting" a crime as
to protect the innocent.

Issue:Whether or not aiding or abetting libel on the cyberspace is constitutional.

Ruling:
When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge
grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. The inapplicability of the
doctrine must be carefully delineated. A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial" challenge
to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed
 Page 585 of 601

statute where it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute. The
rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech that
comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his
speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself
from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law
thus chills him into silence. Here, the terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep
that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace
posts, comments, and other messages. Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes
"aiding or abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a nullity

230) Short Title: Bulletin Publishing Corp. vs. Judge Noel (G.R. No. 76565, November 9,
1988)
Full Title: BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, represented by its President, MARTIN
ISIDRO and its Publisher, APOLONIO BATALLA, BEN F. RODRIGUEZ, FRED J. REYES,
JAMIL MAIDAN FLORES and JOHN DOES, Petitioners, v. HON. JUDGE EDILBERTO NOEL,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch VIII of the Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial
Region with station in Marawi City, ATTY. DIMATIMPOS MINDALANO, ATTY. MANGORSI
A. MINDALANO, SHIEK EDRES MINDALANO, SULTAN GUINAR MINDALANO, FAROUK
CALIPA MINDALANO, SULTAN MAHADI MINDALANO, SULTAN KHALID MINDALANO,
SULTAN MA-AMOR MINDALANO, DR. TAHER MINDALANO, DATU MAGUIDALA
MINDALANO, SOBAIDA MAGUMPARA VDA. DE MINDALANO, RAISHA MINDALANO
MANDANGAN, ATTY. KIMAL M. SALACOP, DATU KAMAR M. MINDALANO, MAYOR
RASLANI MINDALANO, VICE-MAYOR ALIDADI A. MINDALANO, ENG. RASHDI A.
MINDALANO, MRS. PAISHA MINDALANO AGUAM, DATU AZIS MINDALANO AGUAM, MRS.
MOOMINA MINDALANO OMAR, DATU AMINOLA MINDALANO OMAR, in behalf of the
Mindalano Clan, Respondents.

Facts:
The twenty-one (21) private respondents (plaintiffs below), claiming to be the nearest
relatives of the late Amir Mindalano, suing on their own behalf and on behalf of the
entire Mindalano clan of Mindanao, filed a Complaint 1 for damages (docketed as Civil
Case No. 81-86) before Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City charging
 Page 586 of 601

petitioners with libel. Private respondents’ action was anchored on a feature article written by
Jamil Maidan Flores entitled "A Changing of the Guard," which appeared in the 22 June 1986 issue of
Philippine Panorama, a publication of petitioner Bulletin Publishing Corporation.
About the only time that one who was not of any royal house became a leader of consequence in the
province was during the American era when the late Amir Mindalano held some sway. That was
because Mindalano had the advantage of having lived with an American family and was therefore
fluent and literate in English.
Private respondents alleged in their complaint that, contrary to the above portion of the
article, the Mindalanos "belong to no less than four (4) of the 16 Royal Houses of Lanao
del Sur." Private respondents likewise objected to the statement that the late Amir
Mindalano, grand patriarch of the Mindalano clan, had lived with an American family, a
statement which, they alleged, apart from being absolutely false, "has a distinct
repugnant connotation in Maranao society." Contending finally that petitioners had with malice
inflicted "so much damage upon the social standing of the plaintiffs" as to "irreparably injure" the
Mindalano name and reputation, private respondents interposed a claim for the award of moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses, all in the aggregate amount of
P2,350,000.00.
Reacting to the complaint, petitioners filed on 6 August 1986 a Motion to Dismiss 3 urging that (a)
venue had been improperly laid, (b) the complaint failed to state a cause of action, and (c) the
complainants lacked the capacity to bring the suit.
Issue: whether or not the complaint states a valid cause of action
Ruling:
The Court finds that libel has not here been committed; the civil suit for damages must
fail.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
It is axiomatic in actions for damages for libel that the published work alleged to contain
libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole. 6 We have accordingly
examined in its entirety the subject article "A Changing of the Guard" which is in essence
a popular essay on the general nature and character of Mindanao politics and the recent
emergence of a new political leader in the province of Lanao del Sur. We note firstly that the
essay is not focused on the late Amir Mindalano nor his family. Save in the excerpts complained
about and quoted above, the name of the Mindalano family or clan is not mentioned or alluded to in
the essay. The identification of Amir Mindalano is thus merely illustrative or incidental in the course of
 Page 587 of 601

the development of the theme of the article. The language utilized by the article in general and the
above excerpts in particular appears simply declaratory or expository in character, matter-of-fact and
unemotional in tone and tenor. No derogatory or derisive implications or nuances appear detectable
at all, however closely one may scrutinize the above excerpts. We find in the quoted excerpts no
evidence of malevolent intent either on the part of the author or the publisher of the article here
involved.

Private respondents, however, argue that petitioners had in the article falsely and
maliciously ascribed to the late Amir Mindalano, and to the rest of the extended
Mindalano family, an inferior status or condition — i.e., that of not belonging to any of the
royal Muslim houses of the Lanao provinces — which respondents assert substantially injured their
good family name and reputation. In their complaint before the trial court, private respondents
asserted their affiliations with at least five (5) royal houses:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"11. The late Amir Mindalano, as well as plaintiffs from their heritage from the Mindalano
genealogy, belong to no less than four (4) of the 16 royal Houses of Lanao del Sur,
namely; (1) the Sultanate of Ramain; (2) the Sultanate of Butig, (3) the Sultanate of
Masiu and (4) the Sultanate of Bayang. They also are distinctly favored for being scions
of the Royal House of Noron of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. Noron was the sister of
Pagayawan and Diwan of the Royal Houses of Pagayawan and Bayang respectively;

231) Short Title: Newsweek Inc. vs. IAC (G.R. No. L-63559 May 30, 1986)
Full Title: G.R. No. L-63559 May 30, 1986
NEWSWEEK, INC., petitioner,
vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
SUGARCANE PLANTERS INC., BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
ASOCIACION DE AGRICULTORES DE LA CARLOTA, LA CASTELLANA y PONTEVEDRA, INC.,
DONEDCO PLANTERS ASSOCIATION INC., ARMANDO GUSTILO, ENRIQUE ROJAS,
ALFREDO MONTELIBANO, JR., PABLO SOLA, JOSE MONTALVO, VICENTE GUSTILO,
JOSEPH MARANON, ROBERTO CUENCA, JOSE SICANGCO, FLORENCIO ALONSO, MIGUEL
GATUSLAO, PEDRO YULO, MARINO RUBIN and BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, respondents.
Facts:
 Page 588 of 601

Petitioner, Newsweek, Inc., a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, in this
special action for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeks to annul the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court dated December 17, 1982 sustaining the Order of the then Court of
First Instance of Bacolod City which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the complaint for libel filed
by private respondents and the Resolution dated March 10, 1983 which denied its Motion for
Reconsideration.
It appears that on March 5, 1981, private respondents, incorporated associations of
sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several
individual sugar planters, filed Civil Case No. 15812 in their own behalf and/or as a class
suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province of Negros Occidental, against
petitioner and two of petitioners' non-resident correspondents/reporters Fred Bruning
and Barry Came. The complaint alleged that petitioner and the other defendants committed libel
against them by the publication of the article "An Island of Fear" in the February 23, 1981
issue of petitioner's weekly news magazine Newsweek. The article supposedly portrayed
the island province of Negros Occidental as a place dominated by big landowners or
sugarcane planters who not only exploited the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane
workers/laborers, but also brutalized and killed them with imprunity. Complainants
therein alleged that said article, taken as a whole, showed a deliberate and malicious use
of falsehood, slanted presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts intended to put
them (sugarcane planters) in bad light, expose them to public ridicule, discredit and
humiliation here in the Philippines and abroad, and make them objects of hatred,
contempt and hostility of their agricultural workers and of the public in general. They
prayed that defendants be ordered to pay them PlM as actual and compensatory
damages, and such amounts for moral, exemplary and corrective damages as the court
may determine, plus expenses of litigation, attorney's fees and costs of suit. A photo
copy of the article was attached to the complaint.
On November 5, 1981, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the printed article
sued upon is not actionable in fact and in law; and (2) the complaint is bereft of allegations that
state, much less support a cause of action. It pointed out the non-libelous nature of the article and,
consequently, the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Private respondents filed an
Opposition to the motion to dismiss and petitioner filed a reply.
 Page 589 of 601

ISSUE: Whether the private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action
Ruling: Yes
In the case of Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr. (16 SCRA 807) this Court ruled that "in order to maintain
a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable (People vs. Monton, L-16772,
November 30, 1962), although it is not necessary that he be named (19 A.L.R. 116)." In an
earlier case, this Court declared that" ... defamatory matter which does not reveal the
Identity of the person upon whom the imputation is cast, affords no ground of action
unless it be shown that the readers of the libel could have Identified the personality of
the individual defamed." (Kunkle vs. Cablenews-American and Lyons 42 Phil. 760).
This principle has been recognized to be of vital importance, especially where a group or
class of persons, as in the case at bar, claim to have been defamed, for it is evident that
the larger the collectivity, the more difficult it is for the individual member to prove that
the defamatory remarks apply to him.
It is evident from the above ruling that where the defamation is alleged to have been
directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-
embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so
that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement
specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need be.
We note that private respondents filed a "class suit" in representation of all the 8,500 sugarcane
planters of Negros Occidental. Petitioner disagrees and argues that the absence of any actionable
basis in the complaint cannot be cured by the filing of a class suit on behalf of the aforesaid sugar
planters.
The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of
all (Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559) or where the representation of
class interest affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to make each member of the class
an actual party (Borlaza vs. Polistico, 47 Phil. 348). We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs
has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general
interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
The disputed portion of the article which refers to plaintiff Sola and which was claimed to
be libelous never singled out plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter. The news report merely
stated that the victim had been arrested by members of a special police unit brought into
the area by Pablo Sola, the mayor of Kabankalan. Hence, the report, referring as it does
 Page 590 of 601

to an official act performed by an elective public official, is within the realm of privilege
and protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press.

232) Short Title: MVRS Publication Inc. vs. Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Phils. (G.R. No. 135306,
January 28, 2003)
Full Title: G.R. No. 135306 January 28, 2003
MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and AGUSTINO G.
BINEGAS, JR., petitioners,
vs. ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ABDULRAHMAN R.T.
LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and
IBRAHIM B.A. JUNIO, respondents.
Facts:
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local federation of more than seventy (70)
Muslim religious organizations, and individual Muslims ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P.
ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A. JUNIO, filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in
behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY,
MYLA C. AGUJA and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., arising from an article published in the 1 August
1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid. The article reads:
"ALAM BA NINYO?
Na angmgababoy at kahitanonguri ng hayopsa Mindanao ay hindikinakain ng mga Muslim?
Para sakanilaangmgaito ay isangsagradongbagay. Hindi nilaitokailangangkaininkahitnasila pa
ay magutom at mawalan ng ulamsatuwingsilaaykakain. GinagawanilaitongDiyos at sinasamba
pa nilaitosatuwingaraw ng kanilangpangingilinlalung-lalonasaarawnatinatawagnilang
'Ramadan'."
The complaint alleged that the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the
Muslims; that these words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only
published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and
disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion in this country, in violation of law, public
policy, good morals and human relations; that on account of these libelous
words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim
world, especially every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries.
 Page 591 of 601

MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., in their defense, contended that the
article did not mention respondents as the object of the article and therefore were not entitled to
damages; and, that the article was merely an expression of belief or opinion and was published
without malice nor intention to cause damage, prejudice or injury to Muslims
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner committed defamation
Ruling: NO
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's
character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which
tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in
the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the
publication of anything which is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring
him into disrepute. Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion
which others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff.
In the present case, there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by
the Bulgar article. Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, private
respondents have no individual causes of action; hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly
disparaged. Private respondents must have a cause of action in common with the class to which they
belong to in order for the case to prosper.
An individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal, separate and distinct in the
community. Each Muslim, as part of the larger Muslim community in the Philippines of
over five (5) million people, belongs to a different trade and profession; each has a
varying interest and a divergent political and religious view — some may be conservative,
others liberal. A Muslim may find the article dishonorable, even blasphemous; others may find it as
an opportunity to strengthen their faith and educate the non-believers and the "infidels." There is no
injury to the reputation of the individual Muslims who constitute this community that can give rise to
an action for group libel. Each reputation is personal in character to every person. Together, the
Muslims do not have a single common reputation that will give them a common or general interest in
the subject matter of the controversy.
In the instant case, the Muslim community is too vast as to readily ascertain who among
the Muslims were particularly defamed. The size of the group renders the reference as
indeterminate and generic as a similar attack on Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists or
Mormons would do. The word "Muslim" is descriptive of those who are believers of
 Page 592 of 601

Islam, a religion divided into varying sects, such as the Sunnites, the Shiites, the
Kharijites, the Sufis and others based upon political and theological distinctions. "Muslim"
is a name which describes only a general segment of the Philippine population, comprising a
heterogeneous body whose construction is not so well defined as to render it impossible for any
representative identification.
Our conclusion therefore is that the statements published by petitioners in the instant case did not
specifically identify nor refer to any particular individuals who were purportedly the subject of the
alleged libelous publication. Respondents can scarcely claim to having been singled out for social
censure pointedly resulting in damages.
233) Short Title: US vs. O’Brien [391 U.S. 367 (1968)]
Full Title: United States v. O'BrienNo. 232
Facts:
O'Brien burned his Selective Service registration certificate before a sizable crowd in
order to influence others to adopt his anti-war beliefs. He was indicted, tried, and
convicted for violating 50 U.S.C.App. 462(b), a part of the Universal Military Training and
Service Act, subdivision (3) of which applies to any person "who forges, alters, knowingly
destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes any such certificate . . . ," the
words italicized herein having been added by amendment in 1965. The District Court
rejected O'Brien's argument that the amendment was unconstitutional because it was enacted to
abridge free speech and served no legitimate legislative purpose. The Court of Appeals held the 1965
Amendment unconstitutional under the First Amendment as singling out for special treatment persons
engaged in protests, on the ground that conduct under the 1965 Amendment was already
punishable, since a Selective Service System regulation required registrants to keep their registration
certificates in their "personal possession at all times,", and willful violation of regulations promulgated
under the Act was made criminal by 50 U.S.C.App. 462(b)(6). The court, however, upheld O'Brien's
conviction under 462(b)(6), which, in its view, made violation of the non-possession regulation a
lesser included offense of the crime defined by the 1965 Amendment.
Issue:Whether the law an unconstitutional infringement of O'Brien's freedom of speech?
Ruling:
No. The 7-to-1 majority, speaking through Chief Justice Earl Warren, established a test to
determine whether governmental regulation involving symbolic speech was justified. The
formula examines whether the regulation is unrelated to content and narrowly tailored
 Page 593 of 601

to achieve the government's interest. "[W]e think it clear," wrote Warren," that a government
regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidential restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is not greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."
The 1965 Amendment to 50 U.S.C.App. § 462(b)(3) is constitutional as applied in this case.
(a) The 1965 Amendment plainly does not abridge free speech on its face.
(b) When "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.
(c) A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government and furthers an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of free expression, and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedom
is no greater than is essential to that interest. The 1965 Amendment meets all these requirements.
(d) The 1965 Amendment came within Congress'."broad and sweeping" power to raise and support
armies and make all laws necessary to that end.
(e) The registration certificate serves purposes in addition to initial notification, e.g., it proves that
the described individual has registered for the draft; facilitates communication between registrants
and local boards, and provides a reminder that the registrant must notify his local board of changes
in address or status. The regulatory scheme involving the certificates includes clearly valid
prohibitions against alteration, forgery, or similar deceptive misuse.
(f) The preexistence of the nonpossession regulation does not negate Congress' clear interest in
providing alternative statutory avenues of prosecution to assure its interest in preventing destruction
of the Selective Service certificates.
(g) The governmental interests protected by the 1965 Amendment and the nonpossession regulation,
though overlapping, are not identical.
(h) The 1965 Amendment is a narrow and precisely drawn provision which specifically protects the
Government's substantial interest in an efficient and easily administered system for raising armies.
(i) O'Brien was convicted only for the willful frustration of that governmental interest. The
noncommunicative impact of his conduct for which he was convicted makes his case readily
distinguishable from Stromberg v. California
 Page 594 of 601

 Administration of Justice
234) Short Title: Cabansag vs. Fernandez (102 Phil. 152)
Full Title:APOLONIO CABANSAG, Plaintiff, v. GEMINIANA MARIA FERNANDEZ, ET
AL., Defendants. APOLONIO CABANSAG, ROBERTO V. MERRERA and RUFINO V.
MERRERA, Respondents-Appellants.

Facts:
ApolonioCabansag filed on January 13, 1947 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
a complaint seeking the ejectment of Germiniana Fernandez, Et. Al. from a parcel of land.
Defendants filed their answer on January 31, 1947 and a motion to dismiss on February
2, 1947, and when the latter was denied, the court upon motion of plaintiff’s counsel, set
the case for hearing on July 30, 1947. The hearing was postponed to August 8, 1947. On
that day only one witness testified and the case was postponed to August 25, 1947. Thereafter, three
incidents developed, namely: one regarding a claim for damages which was answered by defendants,
another concerning the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which was set for hearing on
March 23, 1948, and the third relative to an alleged contempt for violation of an agreement of the
parties approved by the court. Pleadings were filed by the parties on these incidents and the court
set the case for hearing on October 27, 1948. Hearing was postponed to December 10, 1948. On this
date, only part of the evidence was received and the next hearing was scheduled for January 20,
1949. Hearing was again postponed to January 24, 1949 when again only part of the evidence was
received and the case was continued to October 4, 1949.
On October 4, 1949, the court, presided over by Judge Villamor, upon petition of both parties,
ordered the stenographers who took down the notes during the previous hearings to transcribe them
within 15 days upon payment of their fees, and the hearing was postponed until the transcript of said
notes had been submitted. Notwithstanding the failure of the stenographers to transcribe
their notes, the hearing was set for March 17, 1950.Two more postponements followed
for March 23, 1950 and March 27, 1950. On August 9, 1950, August 23, 1950, September
26, 1950 and November 29, 1950, hearings were had but the case was only partly tried
to be postponed again to January 30, 1951 and February 19, 1951. Partial hearings were
held on February 20, 1951, March 12, 1951 and June 6, 1951. These hearings were
followed by three more postponements and on August 15, 1951, the case was partially
heard.
 Page 595 of 601

Issue: Has the lower court legitimately and justifiably exercised this power in the instant case?
Ruling:
The lower court tells us that it has because in its opinion the act of respondents tended to put it into
disrepute or belittle or degrade or embarrass it in its administration of justice, and so it punished
them for contempt to protect its judicial independence. But appellants believe otherwise, for they
contend that in sending the letter in question to the PCAC, they did nothing but to exercise their right
to petition the government for redress of their grievance as guaranteed by our constitution (section
1, paragraph 8, Article III).

"The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for
a redress of grievances.’ The First Amendments of the Federal Constitution expressly guarantees
that right against abridgment by Congress. But explicit mention there does not argue exclusion
elsewhere. For the right is one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles
of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions, — principles which the
Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due process clause." (Emerson and
Haber, Political and Civil Rights in the United States, p. 419.)

We are therefore confronted with a clash of two fundamental rights which lie at the bottom of our
democratic institutions — the independence of the judiciary and the right to petition the government
for redress of grievance. How to balance and reconcile the exercise of these rights is the problem
posed in the case before us.
". . . A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent
judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a
free society.

The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which
that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means for assuring
judges their independence is a free press." (Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 354-356)
Thus, speaking of the extent and scope of the application of this rule, the Supreme Court of the
United States said "Clear and present danger of substantive evils as a result of indiscriminate
 Page 596 of 601

publications regarding judicial proceedings justifies an impairment of the constitutional right of

freedom of speech and press only if the evils are extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high. . . . A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional
protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial
proceeding still pending in the courts, upon the theory that in such a case it must
necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justice. . . . The
possibility of engendering disrespect for the judiciary as a result of the published criticism of a judge
is not such a substantive evil as will justify impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of
speech and press." (Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, syllabi)

No less important is the ruling on the power of the court to punish for contempt in
relation to the freedom of speech and press. We quote; "Freedom of speech and press should
not be impaired through the exercise of the power to punish for contempt of court unless there is no
doubt that the utterances in question are a serious and imminent threat to the administration of
justice. . . . A judge may not hold in contempt one who ventures to publish anything that tends to
make him unpopular or to belittle him. . . . The vehemence of the language used in newspaper
publications concerning a judge’s decision is not alone the measure of the power to punish for
contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the
administration of justice." (Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, syllabi.)

235) Short Title: People vs. Alarcon [69 Phil. 265 (1939)]
Full Title: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SALVADOR ALARCON,
ET AL., Accused. FEDERICO MAÑGAHAS, Respondent-Appellant.

Facts:
As an aftermath of the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in
criminal case No. 5733, The People of the Philippines v. Salvador Alarcon, Et Al.,
convicting the accused therein except one — of the crime of robbery committed in band,
a denunciatory letter, signed by one Luis M. Taruc, was addressed to His Excellency, the
President of the Philippines. A copy of said letter found its way to the herein respondent,
Federico Manga has who, as columnist of the Tribune, a newspaper of general circulation in the
 Page 597 of 601

Philippines, quoted the letter in an article published by him in the issue of that paper of September
23, 1937.
‘Fifty-two (52) tenants in Floridablanca, Pampanga, have been charged and convicted on a trumped
up charge of robbery in band because they took each a few cavans of palay for which they issued the
corresponding receipts, from the bodega in the hacienda where they are working. These tenants
contend that they have the right to take the palay for their food as the hacienda owner has the
obligation to give them rations of palay for their main tenance and their families to be paid later with
their share of their crop. But this is not all. When the convicted tenants appealed the case and were
released on bail pending their appeal, court and public officials exerted pressure upon one of their
bondsmen, as this bondsman informed the tenants, to withdraw his bail for them, and the fifty two
tenants were arrested again and put in jail.’

Issue:Whether the lower court erred in finding the respondent guilty of contempt of court.

Ruling: YES
Consideration of the first error is all that is necessary as the same will lead incidentally to the
disposition of the other two.
The elements of contempt by newspaper publications are well defined by the cases
adjudicated in this as in other jurisdictions. Newspaper publications tending to impede,
obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or
proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punish able by the courts.
The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. (In re Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil., 801; In re
Abistado, 57 Phil., 668.) It must, however, clearly appear that such publications do impede,
interfere with, and embarrass the administration of justice before the author of the
publications should be held for contempt. (Nixon v. State 207 Ind., 426, 193 N. E., 591, 97 A.
L. R., 894.) What is thus sought to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments is the
all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. There is no
pending case to speak of when and once the court has come upon a decision and has lost control
either to reconsider or amend it. That, we believe, is the case at bar, for here we have a concession
that the letter complained of was published after the Court of First Instance of Pampanga had
decided the aforesaid criminal case for robbery in band, and after that decision had been appealed to
the Court of Appeals. The fact that a motion to reconsider its order confiscating the bond of the
 Page 598 of 601

accused therein was subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the important consideration is that it
was then without power to reopen or modify the decision which it had rendered upon the merits of
the case, and could not have been influenced by the questioned publication.

If it be contended, however, that the publication of the questioned letter constitutes

contempt of the Court of Appeals where the appeal in the criminal case was then
pending, as was the theory of the provincial fiscal below which was accepted by the
lower court, we take the view that in the interrelation of the different courts forming our
integrated judicial system, one court is not an agent or representative of another and
may not, for this reason, punish contempts in vindication of the authority and de corum
which are not its own. The appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court, and
this last court be comes thereby charged with the authority to deal with contempts
committed after the perfection of the appeal.

236) Short Title: In Re: Ramon Tulfo (AM 90-4-1545-0, April 17, 1990)
Full Title: COLUMN OF MR. RAMON TULFO IN THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER ISSUES
OF 13 AND 16 OCTOBER 1989
Facts:
On 13 October 1989, respondent Ramon Tulfo (Tulfo, for short) wrote an article entitled "Idiotic
Decision" in his column "On Target" in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, stating therein that the Supreme
Court rendered an "idiotic decision" in legalizing the checkpoints. This was followed by another article
in the same column on 16 October 1989, entitled "Sangkatutakna Bobo," Tulfo referring therein to
the members of the Supreme Court as "stupid" for having rendered such decision on checkpoints,
and calling them "sangkatutakna bobo justices of the Philippine Supreme Court."
Citing press freedom, a Motion for Intervention was filed by the National Press Club, Union of
Journalists of the Philippines, Press Photographers of the Philippines, and the People's Movement for
Press Freedom, in connection with the resolution of the Court requiring Tulfo to explain why he
should not be held in contempt of court. Movants alleged that such resolution is an unwarranted
assault and undue restriction on freedom of speech and press. Said motion was considered by the
Court in its deliberations leading to this resolution.

Issue: Whether Tulfo’s explanation is devoid of merit

 Page 599 of 601

Ruling: YES
At the outset, it should be stated that, contrary to Tulfo's pretense, the Court's decision on the issue
of checkpoints had not become final at the time he wrote the questioned articles. In fact, the Court
has yet to act on the motion for reconsideration of said decision, filed by the petitioner therein, to
which the Solicitor General, appearing for the respondents, has filed an opposition. Consequently, at
the time Tulfo wrote and published the questioned articles, the case had not been closed and
terminated but was subjudice.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, as it is essential to their right
of self-preservation. Courts are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very
creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence and
submission to their lawful mandates, and as corollary to this proposition, to preserve
themselves and their officers from the approach of insults and pollution. Any improper
conduct which tends, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice is punishable for indirect contempt.
There are two (2) types of publication of newspaper comments on proceedings in court, which have
been considered in contempt proceedings, namely: (1) those in which the object of the publication is
to affect the decision in a pending case or action, and (2) those which have for their purpose the
bringing of courts or judges or other court officers into discredit. Tulfo's articles comprise both types
of publication. As already pointed out, at the time his articles were written and published, the case on
the checkpoints was sub judice as the Court's decision therein had not became final. As to why and
how said articles have for their purpose to bring the Supreme Court and its members into discredit,
will be shown presently.
Coming to Tulfo's specific language employed in the questioned articles, a man in his
right senses would find no social; value, or intellectual significance or even literary
delight in its use. In fact, nothing constructive can be attained by an attempt
to downgrade, damage and even destroy the authority of the Court which is a focal
institution of democracy in this country. Most prudent observers believe (whether or not
Tulfo subscribes to it) that any act which tends to destroy the authority of the Court is in
itself an attempt to destroy that democracy -
"What is at stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of the country in
general and of the Supreme Court in particular. Damage to such institutions might not be quantifiable
 Page 600 of 601

at a given moment in time but damage there will surely be if acts like those of respondent Gonzales
are not effectively stopped and countered. The level of trust and confidence of the general public in
the courts, including the court of last resort, is not easily measured; but few will dispute that a high
level of such trust and confidence is critical for the stability of democratic government.
Freedom of speech and expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute, and
freedom of expression has, on appropriate occasions, to be adjusted and accommodated
to the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental
public interests is the maintenance of the authority, integrity and orderly functioning of
the courts. For, the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be
secured only within the framework of a functioning and orderly system of
justice.Freedom of expression is not license to insult the Court and its members and to
impair the authority, integrity and dignity of the Court.

237) Nestle Phils vs. Sanchez

G.R. No. 75209 September 30, 1987
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and THE UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES, respondents.
SUBJECT: Canon 13 – Influencing or Giving appearance of Influencing Court
FACTS:
The Union of FiliproEmployees and Kimberly Independent Union for Solidarity, Activism and
Nationalism-Olalia had been conducting pickets which intensified during the period of July 8-10,
1987 outside Padre FauragateoftheSCbuilding.SinceJune17,1981

On July 10, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to
withdraw graciously and requiring the union leaders and their counsels and other individuals to
appear before the Court on July 14 and then and there to show cause why they should not be held
in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, was further
required to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with.

Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court
with an assurance that such acts will not be repeated. He prayed for the Court’s leniency
considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the PAMANTIK, an
 Page 601 of 601

unregistered loosed alliance of about 75 unions in the southern Tagalog area and not by either the
UFE or KILU.

ISSUE: WON the respondents should be held in contempt and Atty. Espinas be administratively
dealt with.

HELD:
Grievances, if any, should be ventilated to the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions,
motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrator
of justice entitled to “proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from
outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of
justice.

“It is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune fromevery
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
Page 602 of 846

extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court;
and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies.” (Inre Stolen).
Theactsoftherespondentsarethereforenotonlyanaffronttothedignityof the Court, but
equally a violation of the constitutional right of the adverse
partyandthecitizenryatlargetohavetheircausestriedfairly.

The right of free speech and of assembly of the individuals herein are not violated
because any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of
either rights amounts to an abuse thereof and is no loner within the ambit of
constitutional protection. However, being non- lawyers, the duty and responsibility of
advising them rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record,
Atty. Espinas. It is the
dutyofallmembersofthelegalprofessionasofficersofthecourttoproperly apprise their
clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts ofjustice.

238) In Re: Atty. Emil Jurado

Facts:
Emiliano P. Jurado, a lawyer and journalist who writes in a newspaper of general
circulation wrote about alleged improprieties and irregularities in the judiciary over
several months. What was particularly given attention by the Supreme Court his column
entitled, "Who will judge the Justices?" referring to a report that six justices, their
spouses, children and grandchildren (a total of 36 persons) spent a vacation in Hong
Kong, and that luxurious hotel accommodations and all their other expenses were paid
by a public utility firm and that the trip was arranged by the travel agency patronized
by this public utility firm. This column was made amidst rumors that a Supreme Court
decision favorable to the public utility firm appears to have been authored by a lawyer
of the public utility firm. The Chief Justice issued an administrative order creating an ad
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
Page 603 of 846

hoc committee to investigate the said reports of corruption in the judiciary. A letter
affidavit was also received from the public utility, denying the allegations in Jurado's
column. The Supreme Court then issued a resolution ordering that the matter dealt with
in the letter and affidavit of the public utility company be docketed and acted upon as
an official Court proceeding for the determination of whether or not the allegations
made by Jurado are true.
Held:
Jurado's actuations, in the context in which they were done, demonstrate gross
irresponsibility, and indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he might cause
to the name and reputation of those of whom he wrote. They constitute contempt of
court, directly tending as they do to degrade or abase the administration of justice and
the judges engaged in that function. The Court declares Atty. Jurado guilty of contempt
of court and sentences him to pay a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00)
Free press not to be preferred to an independent judiciary. The court underscores the
importance of both the constitutional guarantee of free speech and the reality that
there are equally important public interests which need on occasion to be balanced
against and accommodated with one and the other. One such public interest is in the
maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.
There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of
administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression
itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of
dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions
for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter put it: ". . . A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary,
nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both
are indispensable to a free society." Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the
same thought in the following terms: 'The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of
speech and press. This constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. But
license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizens should not be confused with
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
Page 604 of 846

liberty in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and
the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance of the independence of
the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to scorn
a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and if such persons are to be
permitted by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential
proceedings to the embarrassment of the parties and the court.' (In Re Severino Lozano
and AnastacioQuevedo, 54 Phil. 801 at 807 [1930])."
Excercise of freedom of speech not to be abused.

The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm for the proper exercise of any right,
constitutional or otherwise, viz.: "ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith." The provision is reflective of the universally accepted
precept of "abuse of rights," "one of the most dominant principles which must be
deemed always implied in any system of law."
Requirement to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements
when publishing statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other
public officials.
Judges, by becoming such, are rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting themselves to
norms of conduct which embody more stringent standards of honesty, integrity, and
competence than are commonly required from private persons. Nevertheless, persons
who seek or accept appointment to the Judiciary cannot reasonably be regarded as
having forfeited any right to private honor and reputation. For to so rule will be to
discourage all save those who feel no need to maintain their self-respect from
becoming judges. The public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual
interest of judges (and for that matter, all other public officials) in the maintenance of
private honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the other. And the point
of adjustment or accommodation between these two legitimate interests is precisely
found in the norm which requires those who, invoking freedom of speech, publish
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
Page 605 of 846

statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials
to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish. The
norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or
publishes. But the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard of private reputation by
publishing or circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to
ascertain the truth thereof.

239) Secretary of Justice vs Estrada

A.M. No. 01-4-03-S.C. June 29, 2001
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL OF IN THE
SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER
PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA
BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY.
RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR
OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
BRIEF:
On March 13, 2001, the Kapisanan ng mgaBrodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association
representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout
the country, sent a letter requesting the Supreme Court to allow live media coverage of
the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former
President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of
full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The
request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 5 April 2001 to the Chief
Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On
17 April 2001, the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the petition.

FACTS:
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
Page 606 of 846

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners’ request for
permission to televise and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan. (ABOVE CASE)
The motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues
that there is really no conflict between the right of the people to public information and
the freedom of the press, on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused
to a fair trial; that if there is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor
of the right of the people and the press because the people, as the repository of
sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live media coverage is a safeguard
against attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish
interests.
On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the
live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will violate
the sub judice rule and that, based on his experience with the impeachment trial, live
media coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can
trigger massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a
decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the people to
information may be served through other means less distracting, degrading, and
prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not media coverage be allowed to air Estrada’s trial to the public.
HELD:
NO. In Estes v. Texas, US The Supreme Court held that television coverage of judicial
proceedings involves an inherent denial of due process rights of the criminal defendant:
"Witnesses might be frightened, play to the cameras, become nervous. They are then
subject to extraordinary out-of-court influences that might affect their testimony.
Telecasting increases the trial judge's responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the
defendant. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subjects
him to excessive public exposure and distracts him from an effective presentation of his
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defense. Finally, the television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or

inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the public."
The right of people to information does not prescribe that TV cameras be installed in
the courtroom. This right might be fulfilled by less distracting, degrading and more
judicial means. In a criminal case, a life is at stake, and the due process rights of the
accused shall take precedence over the people's right to information. The accused has
the right to a public trial, and the exercise of such a right is his to make, because it is
his life and liberty that is in the balance. A public trial is not the same as a publicized
trial.
IBP: "TV coverage can negate the rule on the exclusion of the witness intended to
ensure a fair trial...could allow the 'hooting throng' to arrogate upon themselves the
task of judging the guilt of the accused...will not subserve the ends of justice but will
only pander to the desire of publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers."
Court is not unmindful of the recent technological advances but to chance forthwith the
life and liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample
safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is
a price too high to pay.
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GOVERNMENT SPEECH, PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY, AND LIBEL

240) Osmena vs Pendatun

G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960
SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner, vs. SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z.
GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES,
JOPSE J. ROY, FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T.
LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN
ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity
as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No.
59, respondents.
FACTS
Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his privilege speech before
the House making serious imputations of bribery against the President of the
Philippines. Because of this, a Resolution was issuedauthorizing the creation of special
House Committee to investigate the truth of the charges made against the President, to
summon petitioner to substantiate his charges, and in case petitioner fails to do so, to
require petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished by the House.
Petitioner then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of said resolution on
the ground that it infringes his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for
speeches delivered in the House. Meanwhile, the Special Committee continued with its
proceeding, and after giving petitioner a chance to defend himself, found the latter
guilty of seriously disorderly behavior. A House resolution was issued and petitioner was
suspended from office for 15 months.
Thereafter, respondents filed their answer challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to
entertain the petition, and defended the power of Congress to discipline its members
with suspension.
Issue:
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Whether the House Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutionally granted

parliamentary immunity for speeches
Ruling: NO.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in
Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative “shall not be
questioned in any other place.” This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of
Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has always
been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for
their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be
questioned in Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be questioned in any
other place” than Congress.
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege
cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English
Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably necessary
that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from
the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may
occasion offense.” It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without
fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and
conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member
thereof.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes
disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, We believe, however, that the
House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends
mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be
depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.
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Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed.

241) JIMENEZ VS CABANGBANG

G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants, vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.

Facts:
Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its
Committee on National Defense. On 14 Nov 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication
of an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been
allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers,
with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had
collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was
planning a coup d’état to place him as the president. The “planners” allegedly have
Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may
not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was
said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a
case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging
that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be
dismissed because he said that as a member of the HOR he is immune from suit and
that he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not
even libelous.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to
members of Congress. NO.
HELD:
Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senatorsand Members of
theHouse of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the
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peace. Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the
Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate
therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.” The publication of the said
letter is not covered by said expressionwhich refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches
delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the
same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same
is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in
Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge
of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees
duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the
performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter
was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said
letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was
not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any
Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said
communication is not absolutely privileged.
The SC is satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support Jimenez’ action
for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the
persons unnamed therein alluded to as “planners”, and that, having been handpicked
by Vargas, it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that “it is of course
possible” that plaintiffs “are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have
absolutely no knowledge”. In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs’
action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged
operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners.The SC
does not think that this statement is derogatory to Jimenez to the point of entitling
them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that
as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the
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Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein
described as “planners” include these two (2) high ranking officers. Petitionis dismissed.
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 Balancing of Interest Test

 Dangerous Tendency Test
 Clear and Present Danger Test
 Direct Incitement Test
 Intermediate Review
Balancing of Interest Test
The "balancing of interests" test requires that a determination must first be
made whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved
may be achieved by some other measure less restrictive of the protected
freedom.
- used as a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and
individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in a given situation.
Dangerous Tendency Test
This test permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been
established between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated.
- The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the other hand, has been adopted in cases
where extreme difficulty is confronted determining where the freedom of
expression ends and the right of courts to protect their independence begins.
There must be a remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule
lies in that the freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right to
petition for redress of grievance, while guaranteed by the constitution, are not
absolute. They are subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them being the
protection of the courts against contempt (Gilbert vs. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325.)
Clear and Present Danger Test
This rule rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is
substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government
has a right to prevent.
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- rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial
danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to
prevent. This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented
must be substantive, “extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008).
Grave-but-Improbable Danger Test
To determine the clear and present danger of the utterances bringing about the evil
which that legislature has the power to punish, "In each case [courts] must ask
whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." In this case,
an attempt to overthrow the Government by force is a sufficient evil for Congress to
prevent. It is the existence of the conspiracy which creates the danger. [Dennis v. US
(1951)]

Direct Incitement Test

The constitutional right of free speech is no longer protected if the speaker
advocates to incite imminent lawless action that is likely to produce such
action.
Intermediate Review
Requires that the classification (means) must serve an important
governmental objective (ends) and is substantially related to the
achievement of such objective. A classification based on sex is the best-established
example of an intermediate level of review (Garcia vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June
25, 2013).

242) Chavez vs Gonzales

G.R. No. 168338 February 15, 2008
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FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the

Secretary of the Department of Justice; and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION (NTC), respondents.
Facts:
Congress, acting as national board of canvassers, proclaimed President Arroyo
winner in the 2004 presidential elections. Radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes
where the parties to the conversation discussed "rigging" the results of the 2004
elections to favor President Arroyo. Respondent Gonzalez ordered the NBI to investigate
media organizations which aired the Garci Tapes for possible violation of RA 4200 or the
Anti-Wiretapping Law.
NTC issued a press release warning radio and television stations that airing the
GarciTapes is a "cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses
or authorizations" issued to them.
Chavez, as citizen, filed this petition to nullify the "acts, issuances, and orders" of
the NTCand respondent Gonzalez; that respondents’ conduct violated freedom of
expression and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern
under Section 7, Article III of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005
constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression.
Held: Yes.
Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic society.
Freedom of expression is an indispensable condition to the exercise of almost all other
civil and political rights. No society can remain free, open and democratic without
freedom of expression. Freedom of expression guarantees full, spirited, and even
contentious discussion of all social, economic and political issues. To survive, a free and
democratic society must zealously safeguard freedom of expression.
Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by
either or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine, which
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limits speech once a rational connection has been established between the speech
restrained and the danger contemplated; (b) the balancing of interests tests, a standard
when courts balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and (c) the clear
and present danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained
because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the
government has a right to prevent.
The function of freedom of expression is to stir disputes: it may indeed best
serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and
challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound
unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.
When expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to
only four categories of expression, namely:
 pornography,
 false or misleading advertisement,
 advocacy of imminent lawless action, and
 danger to national security. All other expression is not subject to prior restraint.
Any content-based prior restraint on protected expression is unconstitutional without
exception. A protected expression means what it says – it is absolutely protected from
censorship.
Prior restraint on expression is content-based if the restraint is aimed at the
message or idea of the expression. Courts will subject to strict scrutiny content-based
restraint. If the content-based prior restraint is directed at protected expression, courts
will strike down the restraint as unconstitutional because there can be no content-based
prior restraint on protected expression. The analysis thus turns on whether the prior
restraint is content-based, and if so, whether such restraint is directed at protected
expression, that is, those not falling under any of the recognized categories of
unprotected expression.
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If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it
is content-neutral even if it burdens expression. A content-neutral restraint is a restraint
which regulates the time, place or manner of the expression in public places without
any restraint on the content of the expression. Courts will subject content-neutral
restraints to intermediate scrutiny.
An example of a content-neutral restraint is a permit specifying the date, time and
route of a rally passing through busy public streets. A content-neutral prior restraint on
protected expression which does not touch on the content of the expression enjoys the
presumption of validity and is thus enforceable subject to appeal to the courts.
Only unprotected expression may be subject to prior restraint. However, any such
prior restraint on unprotected expression must hurdle a high barrier. First, such prior
restraint is presumed unconstitutional. Second, the government bears a heavy burden
of proving the constitutionality of the prior restraint.
Prior restraint is a more severe restriction on freedom of expression than
subsequent punishment. Although subsequent punishment also deters expression, still
the ideas are disseminated to the public. Prior restraint prevents even the dissemination
of ideas to the public.
It appears that the great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing of a
tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. However, respondents’
evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various
statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape
recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press
Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a “complete” version
and the other, an “altered” version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the
who’s and the how’s of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the
tape’s different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission
and other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case. Fourthly,
given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would
violate the anti-wiretapping law.
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The prevailing test in this jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of

government action imposing prior restraint on three categories of unprotected
expression – pornography, advocacy of imminent lawless action, and danger to national
security - is the clear and present danger test. The expression restrained must present
a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive evil that the State has a
right and duty to prevent, and such danger must be grave and imminent.
The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes
unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. The NTC does not specify
what substantive evil the State seeks to prevent in imposing prior restraint on the airing
of the Garci Tapes. The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes
constitutes a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, of grave and imminent
character, that the State has a right and duty to prevent. Clearly, the NTC has no
factual or legal basis in claiming that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a violation
of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. The radio and television stations were not even given an
opportunity to be heard by the NTC.
We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.
The need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of
free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to
greater evils. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the
clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of
free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-
wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.

243) Chavez vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 162777 August 31, 2004
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
represented by its Chairman, BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ESMERALDA AMORA-
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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LADRA, in her capacity as Acting Director IV, National Capital Judicial Region,
Commission on Elections, and the SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with certain
establishments to endorse their products. Pursuant to these agreements, three
billboards were set up showing petitioner promoting the products of said
establishments.
On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for
the position of Senator.
On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which
contained Section 32:
Section 32. All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers
or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image, or name of
a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the
image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or
display thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall be immediately
removed by said candidate and radio station, print media or television station
within 3 days after the effectivity of these implementing rules; otherwise, he and
said radio station, print media or television station shall be presumed to have
conducted premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
On January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to comply with the said provision
by the COMELEC's Law Department. He replied, by requesting the COMELEC that he be
informed as to how he may have violated the assailed provision. He sent another letter,
this time asking the COMELEC that he be exempted from the application of Section 32,
considering that the billboards adverted to are mere product endorsements and cannot
be construed as paraphernalia for premature campaigning under the rules.
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The COMELEC, however, ordered him to remove or cause the removal of the
billboards, or to cover them from public view pending the approval of his request.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez filed a petition for prohibition with the SC,
asking that the COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing the assailed provision. He urges
the Court to declare the assailed provision unconstitutional as the same is
allegedly (1) a gross violation of the non-impairment clause; (2) an invalid
exercise of police power; (3) in the nature of an ex-post facto law; (4)
contrary to the Fair Elections Act; and (5) invalid due to overbreadth.

ISSUE:
Whether Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 unconstitutional?
Held:
Police power
Petitioner argues that the billboards, while they exhibit his name and image, do
not at all announce his candidacy for any public office nor solicit support for such
candidacy from the electorate. They are, he claims, mere product endorsements and
not election propaganda. Prohibiting, therefore, their exhibition to the public is not
within the scope of the powers of the COMELEC.
Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, or safety, and
the general welfare of the people. To determine the validity of a police measure, two
questions must be asked: (1) Does the interest of the public in general, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require the exercise of police power? and (2) Are the
means employed reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals?
A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives
are to prohibit premature campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of
public office, to equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand,
and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from
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enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and
popularity.
Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely product
endorsements and do not announce nor solicit any support for his candidacy. Under the
Omnibus Election Code, election campaign or partisan political activity is defined as an
act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates
to a public office. It includes directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for
or against a candidate.
It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to
endorse certain products, he acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend
his name and image to these products. However, when he filed his certificate of
candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name and image assumed partisan
political character because the same indirectly promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the
COMELEC was acting well within its scope of powers when it required petitioner to
discontinue the display of the subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to be
allowed, candidates for public office whose name and image are used to advertise
commercial products would have more opportunity to make themselves known to the
electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same chance
of lending their faces and names to endorse popular commercial products as image
models. Similarly, an individual intending to run for public office within the next few
months, could pay private corporations to use him as their image model with the
intention of familiarizing the public with his name and image even before the start of
the campaign period. This, without a doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule
against premature campaigning.

Non-impairment of contract
Section 32 is not a gross violation of the non-impairment clause. The non-
impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the
Government. Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the
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level of financial resources one may have at his disposal, is indeed of vital interest to
the public. The State has the duty to enact and implement rules to safeguard this
interest. Time and again, this Court has said that contracts affecting public
interest contain an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing
legal order. This power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the
contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general
welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to
and limited by the paramount police power.

Ex post facto law

Petitioner argued that the assailed provision makes an individual criminally liable
for an election offense for not removing such advertisement, even if at the time the
said advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly legal. Hence, it makes a
person, whose name or image is featured in any such advertisement, liable for
premature campaigning under the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines an offense and prescribes a
penalty for said offense. Laws of this nature must operate prospectively, except when
they are favorable to the accused. It should be noted, however, that the offense
defined in the assailed provision is not the putting up of propaganda materials such as
posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the
picture, image or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on
television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to
the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office. Nor does it
prohibit or consider an offense the entering of contracts for such propaganda materials
by an individual who subsequently becomes a candidate for public office. One definitely
does not commit an offense by entering into a contract with private parties to use his
name and image to endorse certain products prior to his becoming a candidate for
public office. The offense, as expressly prescribed in the assailed provision, is the non-
removal of the described propaganda materials three (3) days after the effectivity of
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COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If the candidate for public office fails to remove such
propaganda materials after the given period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it indicated in
the assailed provision that it shall operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post
facto law in this case.

Fair Elections Act

Next, petitioner urges that Section 32 is a violation of the Fair Elections Act.
According to him, under this law, billboards are already permitted as lawful election
propaganda. He claims, therefore, that the COMELEC, in effectively prohibiting the use
of billboards as a form of election propaganda through the assailed provision, violated
the Fair Elections Act. Petitioners argument is not tenable. The Solicitor General rightly
points out that the assailed provision does not prohibit billboards as lawful election
propaganda. It only regulates their use to prevent premature campaigning and to
equalize, as much as practicable, the situation of all candidates by preventing popular
and rich candidates from gaining undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account
of their resources and popularity. Moreover, by regulating the use of such election
propaganda materials, the COMELEC is merely doing its duty under the law.
Overbreadth
A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the
constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to State regulations may not be achieved by means that sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
The provision in question is limited in its operation both as to time and scope. It
only disallows the continued display of a persons propaganda materials and
advertisements after he has filed a certificate of candidacy and before the start of the
campaign period. Said materials and advertisements must also show his name and
image.
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There is no blanket prohibition of the use of propaganda materials and

advertisements. During the campaign period, these may be used subject only to
reasonable limitations necessary and incidental to achieving the purpose of preventing
premature campaigning and promoting equality of opportunities among all candidates.
The provision, therefore, is not invalid on the ground of overbreadth.

244) Gonzalez vs COMELEC

G.R. No. L-27833 April 18, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF RE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT 4880. ARSENIO GONZALES and
FELICISIMO R. CABIGAO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
Facts:
Petitioners so alleged in his action, which they entitled Declaratory Relief with
Preliminary Injunction, filed on July 22, 1967, a proceeding that should have been
started in the of Court of First Instance but treated by this Court as one of prohibition in
view of the seriousness and the urgency of the constitutional issue raised. Petitioners
challenged the validity of two new sections now included in the Revised Election Code,
under Republic Act No. 4880, which was approved and took effect on June 17, 1967,
prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election
campaign or partisan political activity. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing of
the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista
Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected
on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a
registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. It is their
claim that “the enforcement of said Republic Act No. 4880 in question [would] prejudice
[their] basic rights…, such as their freedom of speech, their freedom of assembly and
their right to form associations or societies for purpose not contrary to law, guaranteed
under the Philippine Constitution,” and that therefore said act is unconstitutional.
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Issue: Whether the Right of Expression of Speech is susceptible of any limitation.

Held: Yes, Freedom of expression is not an absolute. The Court spoke of two tests that
may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction.
“The ‘clear and present danger’ rule means that the evil consequence of the
comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high’ before the utterance can be punished. The
danger to be guarded against is the ‘substantive evil’ sought to be
prevented.” It has the advantage of establishing according to the above
decision “a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to
what words may be public established.”
The “dangerous tendency” rule and explained “If the words uttered create a
dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words
are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of
force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts
be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be
reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of
the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative
body seeks to prevent.
Why repression is permissible only when the danger of substantive evil is present? The
evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full
discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to
avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech,
not enforced silence.” The apprehended evil must be “relatively serious.” For
“[prohibition] of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be
inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to society.”
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This test then as a limitation on freedom of expression is justified by the danger or evil
a substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike the dangerous
tendency doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. The term clear
seems to point to a causal connection with the danger of the substantially evil arising
from the utterance questioned. Present refers to the time element. It used to be
identified with imminent and immediate danger. The danger must not only be probable
but very likely inevitable

245) Social Weather Station vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 147571 May 5, 2001
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN
PUBLISHING CORPORATION, doing business as MANILA STANDARD,
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Facts:
SWS filed an action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
enforcing §5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides: "Surveys affecting
national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and
surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an
election."
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and
present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters
conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998
elections up to as close as two days before the election day without causing confusion
among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to support
the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting process
posed by election surveys.
Comelec justifies the restrictions in §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to
prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and
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erroneous surveys just before the election. It contends that the prohibition on the
publication of election survey results during the period proscribed by law bears a
rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement
of the electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and
absence of reply.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an
unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the press.

Held:
Yes.
Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a
heavy Presumption against its constitutional validity. The Government thus carries a
heavy burden of showing justification for in enforcement of such restraint.
In testing the constitutionality of Sec. 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006; SC used the O
'Brien Test [US vs O 'Brien]:
A Government regulation is sufficiently justified
[1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
[2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
[3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and
[4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech,
expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
Under O 'Brien test; even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is "not unrelated to the
Expression of free expression." Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the
suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction
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on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental

purpose in question.

First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because the causal
connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest
"not related to the suppression of free expression." By prohibiting the publication of
election survey results because of the possibility that such publication might undermine
the integrity of the election, §5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while
allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper
columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion takers.
In effect, §5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by referring
personal opinion to statistical results.
Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the
suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental,
§5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the O 'Brien test, namely, that the
restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As
already stated, §5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the
creation of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and resort to
the form of election cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as these aims of the
regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of
expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts,
rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of
such evils.
To summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint
on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than
suppression of freedom of expression.
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246) ABS CBN Broadcasting vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 133486 January 28, 2000
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
FACT:
A Petition for Certiorari raised by ABS-CBN under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing
Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc Resolution No. 98-14191 dated April 21,
1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a
restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives
from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the
same.
The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable
source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct
radio-TV coverage of the elections . . . and to make [an] exit survey of the . . . vote
during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President,
results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately."
The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec
count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections
(Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to
undertake the exit survey.
On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by
petitioner. We directed the Comelec to cease and desist, until further orders, from
implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if
any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any
difficulty or problem.

ISSUE:
Whether the assailed resolution is valid?
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HELD:
The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot be justified. It does not leave open
any alternative channel of communication to gather the type of information obtained
through exit polling. On the other hand, there are other valid and reasonable ways and
means to achieve the Comelec end of avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion
that may be brought about by exit surveys.
A specific limited area for conducting exit polls may be designated. Only professional
survey groups may be allowed to conduct the same. Pollsters may be kept at a
reasonable distance from the voting center. They may be required to explain to voters
that the latter may refuse interviewed, and that the interview is not part of the official
balloting process. The pollsters may further be required to wear distinctive clothing that
would show they are not election officials.48 Additionally, they may be required to
undertake an information campaign on the nature of the exercise and the results to be
obtained therefrom. These measures, together with a general prohibition of disruptive
behavior, could ensure a clean, safe, and orderly election.
The freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our democratic government. It
"is a 'preferred' right and, therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive economic
or other liberties… [T]his must be so because the lessons of history, both political and
legal, illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of
nearly every other form of freedom.
Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press. In the landmark case Gonzales v. Comelec, this Court
enunciated that at the very least, free speech and a free press consist of the liberty to
discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without prior restraint.
The freedom of expression is a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining
the truth, of securing participation by the people in social and political decision-making,
and of maintaining the balance between stability and change. It represents a profound
commitment to the principle that debates on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide open. It means more than the right to approve existing political beliefs
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or economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures, or to take refuge in the

existing climate of opinion on any of public consequence. And paraphrasing the eminent
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, we stress that the freedom encompasses the thought
we hate, no less than the thought we agree with.
In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore,
the revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary.
Voters may also choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored
countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec, to minimize or suppress incidental
problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental rights of
our people.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by
the Court on May 9, 1998 is made PERMANENT. Assailed Minute Resolution No. 98-
1419 issued by the Comelecen banc on April 21, 1998 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE. No costs.

247) Sanidad vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 90878 January 29, 1990
PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
Nature: This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Section 19 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2167 on the ground that it violates the constitutional
guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press.
Keywords: Freedom of expression and of the press
Summary: Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution 2167 prohibits columnist,
commentators, and announcers to use their column, radio, television time to campaign
for or against plebiscite issues on the day before and during the day of plebiscite. A
columnist named PablitoSanidad filed a petition for prohibition and temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injuction against COMELEC claiming that the
said provision violates his constitutional freedom of expression and of the press.
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Facts:
On October 23, 1989, RA 6766, entitled “AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT
FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION” was enacted into law;
Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and Provinces of Benguet, Abra, Mt. Province,
Ifugao and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the autonomous region shall take part in a
plebiscite originally scheduled for December 27, 1989 but was reset to January 30,
1990 specifically for the ratification or rejection of the said act;
By virtue of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), the
Comelec issued Comelec Resolution No. 2167, Section 19 of which provides:

“Section 19. Prohibition on columnist, commentators or announcers.- During the

plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass
media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or
radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.”
On November 20, 1989, petitioner PABLITO V. SANIDAD who is a columnist
(“OVERVIEW”) for the Baguio Midland Courier, a weekly newspaper circulated in the
City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, filed a petition for Prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction against the
Comelec to enjoin the latter from enforcing Section 19 of resolution No. 2167. Petitioner
claims that the said provision is violative of his constitutional freedom of expression and
of the press and it also constitutes a prior restraint because it imposes subsequent
punishment for those who violate the same;
On November 28, 1989, the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the respondent from enforcing Section 19 of Resolution No. 2167;
On January 9, 1990, Comelec through the Solicitor General filed its Comment and
moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that Section 19 of Resolution No.
2167 does not absolutely bar the petitioner from expressing his views because under
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Section 90 and 92 of BP 881, he may still express his views or campaign for or against
the act through the Comelec space and airtime.

Issue: Whether or not Section 19 of resolution No. 2167 is violative of the

constitutional freedom of expression and of the press

Held: YES. Yes. While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner’s freedom of
expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his
view. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgment. We hold that
this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner’s freedom of
expression for no justifiable reason.
What is granted by Art. IX-C of the Constitution to the Comelec is the power to
supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants
issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities to the end that equal
opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are insured.
The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise
holder may favor or give undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising time
and space. This is also the reason why a columnist, commentator or announcer is
required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period if he is a
candidate.

HOWEVER, NEITHER ARTICLE IX-C OF THE CONSTITUTION NOR SECTION

11(B), 2ND PAR. OF RA 6646 CAN BE CONSTRUED TO MEAN THAT THE
COMELEC HAS ALSO BEEN GRANTED THE RIGHT TO SUPERVISE AND
REGULATE THE EXERCISE BY MEDIA PRACTITIONERS THEMSELVES OF
THEIR RIGHT TO EXPRESSION DURING THE PLEBISCITE PERIODS. Media
practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during the plebiscite periods are
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neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates in a
plebiscite.

While it is true that the petitioner is not absolutely barred from campaigning for or
against the Organic Act, said fact does not cure the constitutional infirmity of Section
19, Comelec Resolution No. 2167. This is so because IT IS STILL A RESTRICTION
ON HIS CHOICE OF THE FORUM WHERE HE MAY EXPRESS HIS VIEW.

Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people’s
right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision
would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues,
INCLUDING THE FORUM. The people affected by the issues presented in a
plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where
the right to expression may be exercised.

Ruling: ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec

Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional. The
restraining order herein issued is hereby made permanent.

248) Salonga vs Cruz Pano

G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985
JOVITO R. SALONGA, petitioner, vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII (Quezon City),
HON. JUDGE RODOLFO ORTIZ, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XXXI (Quezon City) CITY FISCAL SERGIO APOSTOL of Quezon City; COL.
BALBINO DIEGO and COL. ROMAN MADELLA, respondents.
Facts:
1. The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty
guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has
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been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against

him. Petitioner asks this Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents from
using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member
of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.
2. Background Facts: This case was being decided in the context of a series of
bombings that occurred in the Metro Manila area between the months of August,
September, and October. A certain Victor Lovely was hospitalized when he nearly
killed himself setting off a bomb in his room at the YMCA building in Manila. In
his possession, the police and military found pictures taken at the birthday party
of former Congressman Raul Daza’s in his Los Angeles residence. Petitioner
Salonga were among the people captured in the group pictures. Lovely was
then taken out of intensive care and was transferred to the office of Col. Madella
where was held incommunicado for some time.
3. From September-October of the same year, more bombs would go off around
the area.
4. Finally, on October 19, minutes after the President had finished delivering his
speech before the International Conference of American Society, a small bomb
exploded. This proved to be the final straw as within the next 24-hours arrest,
search, and seizure orders were issued against persons who were apparently
implicated by Lovely one of whom was Petitioner Salonga; who was arrested in
his hospital room while being treated for his chronic ailment of bronchial asthma.
5. Salonga was accused as leader of subversive organizations including
the “Movement for Free Philippines” because of two reasons:
a. His house was used as a “contactpoint” where the subversive group
allegedly met;
b. Because he “mentioned some kind of violent struggle in the
Philippines being most likely should reforms be not instituted by
President Marcos immediately.”
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6. Petitioner filed motion to dismiss the charges against him for failure of
prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. This was denied by
respondent judge, the resolution of which is now the subject of this current
petition.
Issue: Whether prosecution was able to establish prima facie case against
the petitioner. NO
Held:
After a painstaking review of the records, this Court finds the Evidence offered by the
prosecution utterly insufficient to establish a prima facie case against the petitioner. We
grant the petition.
Petitioner’s constitutional right to free speech, and freedom from arbitrary
arrest, punishment, and unwarranted prosecution applies to the case.

A. RIGHT TO FREE TO SPEECH.

To the first right of free speech, the court established the doctrine in saying that
“No man deserves punishment for his thought; and quoted the opinion of the
late Justice Oliver Holmes in US v Schwimmer, which reads as follows:
a. “If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively
calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought
not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the
thought that we hate.”
The Court interpreted this to mean that political discussion, even among those
opposed to the present administration is within the protective clause of freedom of
speech and expression. The only time that it would constitute prima facie evidence of
membership is such discussion amounts to “Conferring with officers or other members
of such association or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof.”
In this case at hand, no evidence was properly established to link petitioner and
any subversive organization.
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Although Lovely testified that political discussion took place at Daza’s birthday
party, no proof was adduced that such discussion was in furtherance of plans to
overthrow the government.

B. Right to Freedom From Arbitrary Arrest, Punishment, and Unwarranted

Prosecution
The court laid down the general rule as to the right of freedom from arbitrary arrest,
punishment, and unwarranted prosecution, established in People vs. Dayad, when it
stated:
a. “Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it
must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probably under the circumstances.”
In the case at hand, the prosecution was not able to come up with a single iota of
evidence which could positively link the petitioner to any proscribed activities of the
Movement for Free Philippines.
Lovely already testified that during the party of Daza no political action was taken but
only political discussion.
The “contact point” theory (House meeting) is too tenuous a basis to conclude that
Salonga was a leader or mastermind as to indict a person simply because some plotters
masquerading as visitors have somehow met in his house or office would be to
establish a dangerous precedent. The right of citizens to be secure against abuse of
governmental processes in criminal prosecution would be seriously undermined.
However insofar as the absence of prima facie case to warrant filing of subversion
charges is concerned, this decision is rendered moot and academic by action of
prosecution.
They have taken the initiative of dropping the charges against the petitioner. We
reiterate the rule however, that this Court will not validate the filing of an information
based on the kind of evidence against the petitioner found in the records. Wherefore,
the petition is dismissed for having become moot and academic.
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249) Zaldivar vs Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 79690-707 February 1, 1989
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as
Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.
Facts: The court have examined carefully the lengthy and vigorously written Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 18, 1988 filed by counsel for respondent Raul M.
Gonzalez, relating to the per curiam Resolution of the Court dated October 7, 1988. We
have reviewed once more the Court’s extended per curiam Resolution, in the light of
the argument adduced in the Motion for Reconsideration, but must conclude that we
find no sufficient basis for modifying the conclusions and rulings embodied in that
Resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration sets forth copious quotations and references
to foreign texts which, however, whatever else they may depict, do not reflect the law
in this jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, it might be useful to develop further, in some measure, some of the
conclusions reached in the percuriam Resolution, addressing in the process some of the
“Ten (10) Legal Points for Reconsideration,” made in the Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether the decision of the SC inviolate the Petitioner’s right to Freedom of
Expression.
Held: No, The Court penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: “any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice.” The “clear and present danger” doctrine invoked by
respondent’s counsel is not a magic incantation which dissolves all problems and
dispenses with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free
speech, and which compels a court to exonerate a defendant the moment the doctrine
is invoked, absent proof of impending apocalypse. The clear and present danger”
doctrine has been an accepted method for marking out the appropriate limits of
freedom of speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not, however, the only test
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which has been recognized and applied by courts. The right of freedom of expression
indeed, occupies a preferred position in the “hierarchy of civil liberties”. Freedom of
expression is not an absolute. The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present
danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on
freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass
media as radio, television and the movies, is the “balancing-of-interests
test”. The principle “requires a court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or
type of situation.
Under either the “clear and present danger” test or the “balancing-of-interest test,” the
court believe that the statements made by respondent are of such a nature and were
made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible
limits of free speech. This conclusion was implicit in the percuriam Resolution of
October 7, 1988. It is important to point out that the “substantive evil” which
the Supreme Court has a right and a duty to prevent does not, in the instant
case, relate to threats of physical disorder or overt violence or similar
disruptions of public order. What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme
Court to confront and prevent a “substantive evil” consisting not only of the obstruction
of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil
of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the
standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the
courts. The “substantive evil” here involved, in other words, is not as palpable
as a threat of public disorder or rioting but is certainly no less deleterious
and more far reaching in its implications for society.

250) Miriam College vs CA

G.R. No. 127930 December 15, 2000
MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, JASPER BRIONES, JEROME GOMEZ, RELLY CARPIO, ELIZABETH
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VALDEZCO, JOSE MARI RAMOS, CAMILLE PORTUGAL, JOEL TAN and GERALD
GARY RENACIDO, respondents.
FACTS: The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundation’s school
paper were subjected to disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after
letters of complaint were filed before the Board following the publication of the school
paper that contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit contents. Prior to the
disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required to submit a written
statement to answer the complaints against them to the Discipline Committee but the
defendants, instead of doing so wrote to the Committee to transfer the case to the
DECS which they alleged to have the jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing through with
the investigation ex parte the Committee found the defendants guilty and imposed
upon them disciplinary sanctions. Defendants filed before the court for prohibition with
preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee questioning the jurisdiction of
said Discipline Board over the defendants.

ISSUE: won the petitioner has the power to discipline and dismiss the students.

HELD: YES. Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of
higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the
right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best
to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the
overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. The essential freedoms subsumed in
the term “academic freedom” encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on
academic grounds: (1) Who may teach, (2) What may be taught, (3) How it shall be
taught, and (4) Who may be admitted to study. The right of the school to discipline its
students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i. e., “how it shall be taught.” A
school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy. Thus, there can be no
doubt that the establishment of an educational institution requires rules and regulations
necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of
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an educational environment conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations are

equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and property. Moreover,
the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not
indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches
discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the
freedom “what to teach.” Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to
develop discipline in its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty. [All
educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of
humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the
historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship,
strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline,
encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge,
and promote vocational efficiency.
Section 4 (1), Article XIV of the Constitution recognizes the State’s power to regulate
educational institution: The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and
private institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision
and regulation of all educational institutions. As may be gleaned from the above
provision, such power to regulate is subject to the requirement of reasonableness.
Moreover, the Constitution allows merely the regulation and supervision of educational
institutions, not the deprivation of their rights.
Campus journalism act (republic act no. 7079); section 7 thereof construed to mean
that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles he
or she has written, except when such articles materially disrupts class work or involve
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.
The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It
is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the
maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning. That
power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom
of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. We therefore rule that
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against respondent
students.

251) Malabanan vs Ramento

G.R. No. L-62270 May 21, 1984
CRISPIN MALABANAN, EVELIO JALOS, BEN LUTHER LUCAS, SOTERO
LEONERO, and JUNE LEE, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE ANASTACIO D.
RAMENTO
Facts:
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They
sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from
8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other
students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science
basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court
as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in
vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the
Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The same day, they
marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the
area covered by their permit. Even they rallied beyond the period allowed. They were
asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an
illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they were under
preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The
validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal against private respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and
Sports. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal assembly
which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the
disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one
academic year. Hence this petition.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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Issue:
Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty
imposed, there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate
right of free speech.

Held: Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be
ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the
academe. But with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the
daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without
prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts classwork
or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."

The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of
educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their
welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or
subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a
substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway
and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The
peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder
under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to
correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school
premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the
power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there
may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of
classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be
violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the
offense.
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252) Villar vs. Technological Institute of the Philippines (135 SCRA 706)
G.R. No. 89317 May 20, 1990
ARIEL NON, REX MAGANA, ALVIN AGURA, NORMANDY OCCIANO, JORGE
DAYAON, LOURDES BANARES, BARTOLOME IBASCO, EMMANUEL BARBA,
SONNY MORENO, GIOVANI PALMA, JOSELITO VILLALON, LUIS SANTOS, and
DANIEL TORRES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SANCHO DANES II, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of 5th
Regional Trial Court, Br. 38, Daet, Camarines Norte; and MABINI COLLEGES,
INC., represented by its president ROMULO ADEVA and by the chairman of
the Board of Trustees, JUSTO LUKBAN, respondents.

Facts:
In Malabanan v. Ramento, it was held that respect for the constitutional rights of
peaceable assembly and free speech calls for a negative answer. If that were then, the
petitioners are entitled to the remedy prayed for. There is, however, this other
circumstance to be taken into consideration. In the opposition to the petition for
preliminary mandatory injunction, reference was made to the academic records of
petitioners.
Two of the petitioners, Rufino G. Salcon, Jr., and Romeo L. Guilatco, Jr., had only one
failing grade each, with the first having failed in only one subject in either semester of
1984-1985 schoolyear and the second having failed in only one subject, having passed
in eight other subjects in the 1984-1985 schoolyear. Petitioner VenecioVillar failed in
two subjects but passed in four subjects in the first semester of the academic year,
1983-1984. Petitioner Inocencio F. Recitis passed all his subjects in the first semester of
19831984 schoolyear and had one failing grade during its second semester. He had two
failing grades during the first semester of 1984-1985 schoolyear. Petitioner
NovertoBarreto, had five failing grades in the first semester of schoolyear 1983-1984,
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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six failing grades in the second semester of the same schoolyear, and six failing grades
in the first semester of 1984-1985 schoolyear. Petitioner Edgardo de Leon, Jr., had
three failing grades, one passing grade and one subject dropped in the first semester of
schoolyear 1984-1985. Petitioner ReglobenLaxamana had five failing grades with no
passing grade in the first semester of 1984-1985 schoolyear. Petitioners Barreto, de
Leon, Jr. and Laxamana could be denied enrollment in view of such failing grades.
Respondent educational institution is under no obligation to admit them this coming
academic year. The constitutional provision on academic freedom enjoyed by
institutions of higher learning justifies such refusal.

Issue: Whether or not the exercise of the freedom of assembly on the part of
certain students of respondent Technological Institute of the Philippines
could be a basis for their being barred from enrollment.

Held:
No. Petitioners VenecioVillar, Rufino G. Salcon, Jr., Romeo L. Guilatco, Jr. and
Inocencio F. Recites are entitled to the writs of certiorari and prohibition.

Ratio:
Malabanan v. Ramento, -held that respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable
assembly and free speech calls for a negative answer.
Same case- As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the invocation of
the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right
to free speech has likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of
freedom of expression, which is identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment and which 'is
not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger
of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent."
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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Same case- Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech, they
are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express
their views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings
such as was held in this case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas
in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, 'shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.
Petitioners, therefore, have a valid cause for complaint if the exercise of the
constitutional rights to free speech and peaceable assembly was visited by their
expulsion from respondent College.
What cannot be stressed too sufficiently is that among the most important social,
economic, and cultural rights is the right to education not only in the elementary and
high school grades but also on the college level. The constitutional provision as to the
State maintaining "a system of free public elementary education and, in areas where
finances permit, establish and maintain a system of free public education" up to the
high school level does not per se exclude the exercise of that right in colleges and
universities.
As far as the right itself is concerned, not the effectiveness of the exercise of such right
because of the lack of funds, Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provides: "Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the
elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory.
Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher
education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.
It is quite clear that while the right to college education is included in the social
economic, and cultural rights, it is equally manifest that the obligation imposed on the
State is not categorical, the phrase used being "generally available" and higher
education, while being "equally accessible to all should be on the basis of merit." To
that extent, therefore, there is justification for excluding three of the aforementioned
petitioners because of their marked academic deficiency.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to
set academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice
for the expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be
followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who
exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so,
then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the
equal protection clause being disregarded.

253) Non vs. Danes (185 SCRA 523)

G.R. No. 89317 May 20, 1990
ARIEL NON, REX MAGANA, ALVIN AGURA, NORMANDY OCCIANO, JORGE
DAYAON, LOURDES BANARES, BARTOLOME IBASCO, EMMANUEL BARBA,
SONNY MORENO, GIOVANI PALMA, JOSELITO VILLALON, LUIS SANTOS, and
DANIEL TORRES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SANCHO DANES II, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of 5th
Regional Trial Court, Br. 38, Daet, Camarines Norte; and MABINI COLLEGES,
INC., represented by its president ROMULO ADEVA and by the chairman of
the Board of Trustees, JUSTO LUKBAN, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioners (Ariel Non, Rex Magana, Alvin Agura, Normandy Occiano, Jorge Dayaon,
Lourdes Banares, Bartolome Ibasco, Emmanuel Barba, Sonny Moreno. Giovani Palma,
JoselitoVillalon, Luis Santos and Daniel Torres), students in Mabini Colleges, Inc. in
Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the
academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions
against the school in the preceding semester. They thus filed a petition in the
Regional Trial Court of Daet (Branch 38) seeking their re-admission or re-
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition in an order
dated 8 August 1988.
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court on 24
February 1989; stating that they waived-their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment
with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for
the first semester of school year 1988-89.
In addition, for the same semester, they duly signed pledges "to abide and
comply with all the rules and regulations laid down by competent authorities
in the College Department or School in which I am enrolled."
Hence, the affected students filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:WON there was a violation of the students’ right to freedom of speech and
assembly.

HELD:
YES. The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary
contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given
by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory
and regulatory powers over all educational institutions. The authority for
schools to refuse enrollment to a student on the ground that his contract,
which has a term of one semester, has already expired, cannot be justified.
Still, institutions' discretion on the admission and enrollment of students as a
major component of the academic freedom guaranteed to institutions of
higher learning.
The right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards, however,
cannot be utilized to discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional
rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation of their right to
equal protection.
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Thus, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair
opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue.
However, when a student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the
required academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right; and the court should not
review the discretion of university authorities. Excluding students because of failing
grades when the cause for the action taken against them undeniably related to possible
breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation
of the basic tenets of fair play.
Further, the failures in one or two subjects by some cannot be considered marked
academic deficiency. Neither can the academic deficiency be gauged from the academic
standards of the school due to an insufficiency of information. Herein, the students
could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings in connection with the mass
actions, but the penalty that could have been imposed must be commensurate to the
offense committed and it must be imposed only after the requirements of procedural
due process have been complied with (Paragraph 145, Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools).
But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative
sanctions have become moot and academic. Petitioners, who have been refused
readmission or re-enrollment and who have been effectively excluded from respondent
school for four (4) semesters, have already been more than sufficiently penalized for
any breach of discipline they might have committed when they led and participated in
the mass actions that, according to respondents, resulted in the disruption of classes.
To still subject them to disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purpose and
would only further aggravate the strained relations between petitioners and the officials
of respondent school which necessarily resulted from the heated legal battle here, in
the Court of Appeals and before the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of respondent judge dated
August 8, 1988 and February 24, 1989 are hereby ANNULLED. Respondent Mabini
College is ORDERED to readmit and to allow the re- enrollment of petitioners, if they
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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are still so minded, without prejudice to its taking the appropriate action as to
petitioners Ariel Non, JoselitoVillalon, George (Jorge) Dayaon and Daniel Torres, if it is
shown by their records (Form 137) that they have failed to satisfy the school's
prescribed academic standards.

254) Schenck vs. US [249 U.S. 47 (1919)]

Facts:
Upon entering the first World War, Congress passed an Act making it a crime
to “willfully make or convey false reports or false statements” with intent to
interfere with military success or “promote the success of its enemies”
during wartime. In addition, the law prohibited willfully obstructing recruiting or
enlisting services of the U.S., imposing penalties of up to twenty years imprisonment
and $10,000. Schenck was indicted and charged with conspiracy to violate the Act after
he mailed circulars criticizing the draft to draftees. In response, Schenck was convicted
in federal district court for attempting to obstruct recruitment and cause
insubordination.
Issue:
Does the Espionage Act, which prohibits certain forms of otherwise protected speech,
during times of war violates the First Amendment? No.
Held:
Schenck mailed his literature to inform draftees of their right to assert opposition to the
draft in addition to criticizing supporters of the draft. Arguably, the literature would not
have been sent unless it was intended to prevent draftees from joining the draft.
Schenck Claims that under the First Amendment, he has a right to mail such literature.
Although this argument would most likely have been upheld if the nation were not at
war, it is struck down due to the countries wartime status. As a result, it can be stated
that the character of the act depends on the surrounding circumstances in which it was
done. Congress has the right to protect against substantive evils, and the Court must
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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ask whether the words used, when considering the circumstances, create a clear and
present danger.
Here, Schenck’s speech intended to incite draftees to obstruct the draft and
can be viewed as a clear and present danger since the nation is at war.
Congress has the power to raise and maintain military forces. As a result, the
prevention of the military draft is one of the substantive evils Congress may
prevent.

255) Yates vs. US [354 U.S. 298 (1957)]

Facts. Fourteen Petitioners stand convicted upon a charge of conspiring to
advocate and teach the duty and necessity of overthrowing the government
of the United States by force and violence, and to organize as the Communist
Party of the United States a society of persons who so advocate and teach,
all with the intent of causing the overthrow the government. The Petitioners
were later convicted under the Smith Act, which prohibited one from conspiring to
advocate and teach the duty and necessity of overthrowing the Government of the
United States by force and violence, and forbids one from organizing, as the Communist
Party of the United States, a society of persons who so advocate and teach, all with the
intent of causing the overthrow of the Government by force and violence as speedily as
circumstances would permit.

Issue. Whether the Smith Act, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights of free speech and assembly, prohibits advocacy and teaching of forcible
overthrow as an abstract principle, divorce from any effort to instigate action to that
end so long as such advocacy or teaching is engaged in with evil intent?

Held.
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No. The Smith Act does not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of
the Constitution, as it does not punish mere advocacy and teaching of
forcible overthrow as an abstract principle. The Smith Act does not punish mere
doctrinal justification of forcible overthrow, unless it is engaged with the intent to
accomplish overthrow. The Court states that the Smith Act does not denounce advocacy
in the sense of preaching abstractly the forcible overthrow of the government.
Furthermore, the trial court’s statement that the proscribed advocacy must include the
urging, necessity and duty of forcible overthrow, and not merely its desirability and
propriety, may not be regarded as a sufficient substitute for charging that the Smith Act
reaches only advocacy of action for the overthrow of government by force and violence.
The essential distinction is that those to whom the advocacy is addressed must be
urged to do something, now or in the future, rather than to merely believe in somethi
ng. Therefore, as the Smith Act requires more than just the mere teaching of beliefs in
order to be held in violation of the act, i.e. some overt action or the advocacy of
immediate violent action, the act does not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution.

256) Dennis vs. US [341 U.S. 494 (1951)

Facts:
The Smith Act made it a crime for anyone to knowingly advocate the
overthrow or destruction of the Government of the United States by force or
violence, to organize any group to do the same, or to conspire to do the
same. The petitioners in this case were leaders of the Communist Party in the U.S.,
and they were indicted for violations of the Smith Act. Specifically, they were
alleged to have conspired to organize a group to teach and advocate the
overthrow of the government. Petitioners were found guilty by a jury.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
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Issue:Did the Smith Act, making it a crime to advocate for the overthrow of the
government by force, violate the First Amendment? No.

Ruling:
The decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Where a statute speaks in non-speech terms, a conviction relying upon
speech as evidence can be sustained only when the speech created a “clear
and present” danger of attempting or accomplishing the prohibited crime.
A plurality of the Court reasoned as follows: In this case, the evidence presented at
trial established sufficient danger of activity to warrant the convictions. Just because, in
a three-year period, the petitioners’ activities did not result in an attempt to overthrow
the government does not mean that the group was not ready to make the attempt.
Petitioners formed a highly organized conspiracy with rigidly disciplined members. The
existence of the conspiracy here created the danger.
Further, the Smith Act is not intended to eradicate the free discussion of
political theories, rather it is focused on activity directed at the overthrow of
the government by force. Therefore, the Smith Act does not violate the First
Amendment or the other Bill of Rights, and it does not violate the First or Fifth
Amendments for indefiniteness.

257) Brandenburg vs. Ohio (395 US 444)

Facts:
Brandenburg, a Klu Klux Klan (KKK) leader, invited reporters to a KKK rally.
The reporters recorded him making racist statements and advocating for
vengeful action against the government. The State of Ohio convicted
Brandenburg under its Criminal Syndicalism statute, which essentially
prohibits advocating violence for political reform.
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Brandenburg appealed his conviction, citing violations of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Ohio’s intermediate appellate court and Supreme Court affirmed without
opinion. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.

Issue:Did Ohio’s Criminal Syndicalism statute violate Brandenburg’s right to

freedom of speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Yes.

Ruling:
The Court reversed the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision.The Government
cannot punish speech that advocates violence or violation of the law unless
that speech (i) is “directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action,”
and (ii) is “likely to produce such action.”There is a marked difference between
mere advocacy (which is protected speech) and inciting people immediately to commit
violence (which is not protected speech). Ohio’s Criminal Syndicalism statute does
make that distinction. Indeed, Ohio’s statute criminalizes mere advocacy as well as
incitement and, therefore, violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

258) Reno vs. ACLU (D-96-511, June 26, 1997)

Facts:
At issue is the constitutionality of two statutory provisions enacted to protect
minors from “indecent” and “patently offensive” communications on the
Internet. The District Court made extensive findings of fact about the
Internet and the CDA. It held that the statute abridges the “freedom of
speech” protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
(Constitution).

Issue. Whether the two CDA statutory provisions at issue are constitutional?

Held:
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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No. Judgment of the District Court affirmed. Under the CDA, neither parents’
consent nor their participation would avoid application of the statute. The
CDA fails to provide any definition of “indecent” and omits any requirement
that the “patently offensive material” lack serious literary, artistic, political
or scientific value. Further, the CDA’s broad categorical prohibitions are not limited to
particular times and are not dependent on any evaluation by an agency familiar with
the unique characteristics of the Internet. CDA applies to the entire universe of the
cyberspace. Thus, the CDA is a content-based blanket restriction on speech, as such,
cannot be properly analyzed as a form of time, place and manner restriction. The CDA
lacks the precision that the First Amendment of the Constitution requires when a
statute regulates the content of speech. In order to deny minors access to potentially
harmful speech, the statute suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a
constitutional right to receive. The CDA places an unacceptable burden on protected
speech, thus, the statute is invalid as unconstitutional.
Concurrence. The constitutionality of the CDA as a zoning law hinges on the extent to
which it substantially interferes with the First Amendment rights of adults. Because the
rights of adults are infringed only by the “display” provision and by the “indecency
transmission” provision, the judge would invalidate the CDA only to that extent.

259) Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs. Anti-Terrorism

Council [G.R. Nos. 178552, 178581, 178890, 179157 & 179461 (October 5,
2010)]
[ G.R. No. 178552, October 05, 2010 ]
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., ON BEHALF OF THE
SOUTH-SOUTH NETWORK (SSN) FOR NON-STATE ARMED GROUP
ENGAGEMENT, AND ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., PETITIONERS, VS.
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY

ADVISER, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,
RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:
Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism
Councilcomposed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson,
and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National
Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo
Puno, and Finance Secretary MargaritoTeves as members. All the petitions, except that
of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen.
HermogenesEsperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.

ISSUE: Should the petition prosper?

HELD:
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Petition for certiorari.
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.
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Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how
respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting

requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must
possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lismota of the case.

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most
essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous. Locus standi or legal
standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that
(1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injuryas a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected "communist

fronts" by the government, especially the military; whereas individual petitioners
invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens
and taxpayers.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 178890 allege that they have been subjected to "close security
surveillance by state security forces," their members followed by "suspicious persons"
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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and "vehicles with dark windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with military
build." They likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies of the State. Even
conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly
points out that petitioners have yet to show any connection between the
purported"surveillance" and the implementation of RA 9372.

Petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice
of respondent's alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National Peoples
Army (NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of
proscription without following the procedure under the law.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the
matter must be oneof common and general knowledge; (2) it must bewell and
authoritatively settledand not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what
facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said
that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable
dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice.
Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific
charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after its
effectivity,belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the
so-called tagging.
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The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554, who
merely harp as well on their supposed "link" to the CPP and NPA. They fail to
particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in
direct injury to their organization and members.

The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and
Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and
EU classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations. Such statement
notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts an application to declare the
CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA
9372. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their
activities fully and freely without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or
proscription under RA 9372.

RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation
from Congress for its implementation, while none of the individual
petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest in the
implementation of the law. It bears to stress that generalized interests,
albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus
standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate

or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion.

Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly being tagged

as "communist fronts" in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From
these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its
function. Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for
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declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again,
declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the
petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official
aremerely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of
the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary
fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to
measure the prohibited acts.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vaguenesswhen it lacks comprehensible

standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion
in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.Theoverbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that
individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from
that behavior, even though some of it is protected.

Distinguished from anas-applied challenge which considers only extant facts

affectingreallitigants, afacial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing
its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.

Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his concurring opinion that the
vagueness and overbreadthdoctrines,as grounds for a facial challenge, are not
applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge
against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds. Since a penal
statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited
vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible
absent an actual or imminent charge against them.

In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech,
petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism
must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free
speech clause.

Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a
predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying
phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to
accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first element, any attempt
at singling out or highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot
recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.

Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly

focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a
crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to
launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or
conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction.
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As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor

a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness
analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible.
The Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates
speculative counseling on a statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios
nor allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed legislative
lobbying in Congress. DISMISSED.

260) David vs. Arroyo (G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)

G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H.
HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S.
MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG,
Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II,
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF
STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO
LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.

Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the
Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of
national emergency, On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5
implementing PP 1017.
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Seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were
filed against the respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded President Arroyo
as respondent.
Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its “overbreadth.” They
claim that its enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and sent a “chilling effect” to the citizens.

Issue: 1.Whether PP 107 is void because of its “overbreadth”

2. Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.

Held:
No. A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing
“on their faces” statutes in free speech cases, also known under the American Law as
First Amendment cases.
A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even
speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,the US Supreme Court held that
“we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the
First Amendment” (freedom of speech).
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that
“reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct.” Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and
rebellion are considered “harmful” and “constitutionally unprotected conduct.” In
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, it was held:
It remains a ‘matter of no little difficulty’ to determine when a law may properly be held
void on its face and when ‘such summary action’ is inappropriate. But the plain import
of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to
our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset,
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attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction
moves from ‘pure speech’ toward conduct and that conduct –even if expressive – falls
within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in
maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only “spoken words” and again, that
“overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against
ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.”[106]Here,
the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not
free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as “manifestly strong medicine,”
to be used “sparingly and only as a last resort,” and is “generally disfavored;” The
reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional
adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be
heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied
unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court. A writer and
scholar in Constitutional Law explains further:

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception
to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant
claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails,
the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not
permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In
overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights
of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute “on its face,” not merely “as
applied for” so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly
authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart
from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the “chilling;” deterrent effect of
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the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court
assumes that an overbroad law’s “very existence may cause others not before the court
to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” An overbreadth ruling
is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.
In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court
to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual
operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may
cause others not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression. In Younger v. Harris,[109] it was held that:
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes,…ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge
to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance
when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show
whether this situation exists.
A facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness is likewise unwarranted.
Related to the “overbreadth” doctrine is the “void for vagueness doctrine” which holds
that “a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.”[110]It is subject to the same principles
governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing “on
their faces” statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant
may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications.
Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its
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application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot
understand the meaning and application of PP 1017.
2. The Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is
CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not
related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President,
are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017
declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize
the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected
with public interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the
PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of
terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such
portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal
and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their
rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts
constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the
imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press,
as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical
seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

MODULE 5. FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY

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Art III, Sec 4

Art III Sec 5
BP Blg. 880 (Public Assembly Act of 1985)
261) IBP vs. Mayor Lito Atienza (G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010)
G.R. No. 175241 February 24, 2010
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by its National
President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, and JOEL RUIZ
BUTUYAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE MANILA MAYOR JOSE "LITO" ATIENZA, Respondent.
FACTS:
On June 15, 2006, Petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed
with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to
rally at the foot of the Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to
5:30 p.m. to be participated by IBP officers and members, law students and
multi-sectoral organizations.
Respondent issued a permit dated June 16, 2006, allowing IBP to rally on given date
but indicated the venue as Plaza Miranda instead of Mendiola Bridge. IBP received the
permit only on June 19, 2006.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21, 2006 with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari against the Manila City Mayor. When the petition was unresolved within 24
hours, they filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court on June 22, 2006,
assailing the CA’s inaction with the period provided under the Public Assembly Act of
1985.
Meanwhile, the rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge. On June 26,
2006, the Manila Police District (MPD) instituted a criminal action against IBP President
Jose Anselmo Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue
not indicated in the permit.
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In the meantime, the CA finally ruled on the petition, dismissing it for being moot and
lacking merit. The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was also denied. For
its part, the Supreme Court also denied the petition before it for being moot and
academic and resolved not to hear the petition on its merits in view of the pendency of
the CA case. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, the filing of the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MODIFICATION OF THE
VENUE IN IBP’S RALLY PERMIT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION
WHETHER OR NOT THE PARTIAL GRANT OF APPLICATION RUNS CONTRARY
TO THE PUBLIC ASSEMBLY ACT AND VIOLATES THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PUBLIC ASSEMBLY
WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE HAS BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC DUE TO THE
HOLDING OF THE RALLY ON JUNE 22, 2006

RULING:
ON THE ISSUE OF MOOTNESS
The petition filed with the appellate court on June 21, 2006 became moot upon the
passing of the date of the rally on June 22, 2006.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use
or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of
mootness. However, in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, this
Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public. Moreover, as an exception to
the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of
repetition, yet evading review.
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THE OUTRIGHT MODIFICATION OF THE PERMIT TO RALLY BY THE LGU IS

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CONTRARY TO THE PUBLIC ASSEMBLY
ACT AND VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PUBLIC
ASSEMBLY.
In the present case, the question of legality of a modification of a permit to
rally will arise each time the terms of an intended rally are altered by the
concerned official, yet it evades review, owing to the limited time in
processing the application where the shortest allowable period is five days
prior to the assembly. The susceptibility of recurrence compels the Court to
definitely resolve the issue at hand.
The Court finds for petitioners.
Clear and Present Danger Test is a Condition to Deny or Modify the
Application for Permit
Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act reads:
Section 6. Action to be taken on the application –
It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or
grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public
assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety,
public convenience, public morals or public health.
The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application
within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing
which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor
or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a
permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of
the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.
If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall
immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.
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The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application
within twenty-four hours.
If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the
terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate
court of law.
In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate
Court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48)
hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required.
A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant
shall, be immediately executory.
All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours
from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the
executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.

Freedom of Assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on showing of a

clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.
In Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) v. Ermita, the Court
reiterated:
x x x Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for
consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded
the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935
Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence
of our republic institutions and complements the right of free speech. To paraphrase
the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the American Supreme
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Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to
freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights
of the people to peaceably assemble and to petition the government for redress of
grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case,
therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is
called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole
justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the
maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other
legitimate public interest.
The Court in Bayan stated that the provisions of the Public Assembly Act of 1985
practically codified the 1983 ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing. In juxtaposing Sections 4 to 6
of the Public Assemlby Act with the pertinent portion of the Reyes case, the Court
elucidated as follows:
x x x [The public official concerned shall] appraise whether there may be valid
objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an
indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present
danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is
such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard
on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be
transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus, if so minded, they can have
recourse to the proper judicial authority.
Modifying the permit without giving IBP the opportunity to be heard first is grave abuse
of discretion.
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did
not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his
perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the
changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit,
since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.
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Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit
against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an
indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which “blank” denial or modification
would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory
any judicial scrutiny thereof.
It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in
determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered
discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may
possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances,
still the assumption especially so where the assembly is schedule for a specific public
place is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such
a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is
not to be “abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.”
Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or explanation for his
action. It smacks of whim and caprice for respondent to just impose a change of venue
for an assembly that was slated for a specific public place. It is thus reversible error for
the appellate court not to have found such grave abuse of discretion and, under specific
statutory provision, not to have modified the permit “in terms satisfactory to the
applicant.”

262) Primicias vs. Fugoso [80 Phil. 71 (1948)]

G.R. No. L-1800 January 27, 1948
CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General Campaign Manager of Coalesced Minority
Parties, petitioner,
vs.
VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, Mayor of City of Manila, respondent.
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Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the
respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza
Miranda for redress of grievances to the government. The reason alleged by the
respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground
to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially
on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be
delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their
government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of
the peace and a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the delegated
police power to local government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927
prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any
act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a
riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or
disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein
is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.

Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.

Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section
provides for two constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested
with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the
holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets
and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is
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subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public

places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to
secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to
provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The
court favored the second construction. First construction tantamount to authorizing the
Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government
no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government,
except perhaps in cases of national emergency.
The Mayor’s first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone
justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to
free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech
there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is
practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is
imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is
a serious one. The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction
of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of
serious injury to the state.
263) Navarro vs. Villegas [31 SCRA 730 (1970)]
G.R. No. L-31687 February 26, 1970
NAVARRO, petitioner,
vs.
CITY MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, respondent.
Facts.
On February 24, 1970, Nelson Navarro (petitioner), acting in behalf of the
Movement of a Democratic Philippines, wrote a letter to Antonio J. Villegas
(respondent), the Mayor of the City of Manila, applying to hold a rally at
Plaza Miranda on February 26, 1970 from 4 to 11 p.m.
On the same day, the respondent wrote a reply, denying his request on the
grounds that, they have temporarily adopted the policy of not issuing any
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permit for the use of Plaza Miranda for rallies or demonstrations during
weekdays due to the events that happened from the past week.

On the same letter, the respondent gave the petitioner an option to use the Sunken
Garden near Intramuros for its rally, and for it to be held earlier for it to end before
dark. Mayor Villegas has not denied nor absolutely refused the permit sought by
Navarro. The petitioner filed suit contesting the Mayor’s action on the ground that it
violates the petitioner’s right to peaceable assembly and petition the government for
redress of grievances. Navarro filed the petition for mandamus. The Court, after
considering the pleadings and arguments of the parties, issued a Resolution “without
prejudice to a more extended opinion.”
Issue.
Whether the Mayor possesses discretion to determine the public places to be used for
assembly, i.e. the Sunken Garden, instead of Plaza Miranda.

Held.
As stated in Primicias v. Fugoso (80 Phil. 75), the Mayor possesses
reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to
be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others
and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder
and maintain public safety and order. The Mayor has expressly stated his
willingness to grant permits for peaceful assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays when they would not cause unnecessarily great disruption of the
normal activities of the community and has further offered Sunken Gardens as an
alternative to Plaza Miranda as the site of the demonstration sought to be held in the
afternoon of 26 February 1970. Experiences in connection with present assemblies and
demonstrations do not warrant the Court's disbelieving the Mayor's appraisal that a
public rally at Plaza Miranda, as compared to one at the Sunken Gardens as he
suggested, poses a clearer and more imminent danger of public disorders, breaches of
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the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies, and
petitioner has manifested that it has no means of preventing such disorders.
Consequently, every time that such assemblies are announced, the
community is placed in such a state of fear and tension that offices are
closed early and employees dismissed, storefronts boarded up, classes
suspended, and transportation disrupted, to the general detriment of the
public. Civil rights and liberties can exist and be preserved only in an ordered society.
Navarro has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of Mayor to grant their
application for permit unconditionally.
Ruling.
The Court resolved to deny the writ prayed for and to dismiss the petition.

264) Ignacio vs. Ela [99 Phil. 346 (1956)]

[G.R. No. L-6858. May 31, 1956.]
FERNANDO IGNACIO and SIMEON DE LA CRUZ, Petitioners-Appellants, vs.
THE HONORABLE NORBERTO ELA, Mayor of Sta. Cruz, Zambales,
Respondent-Appellee.

FACTS: Fernando ignacio and Simeon de la Cruz, both members of a religion

called Jehovah’s Witnesses requested that they be allowed to use the town
plaza proper, including the stand or kiosko for the purpose of holding a
meeting for religious purposes. They were permitted to hold said meeting but only
on the north western part of the plaza. They contend that they should be allowed to
use the town plaza proper including the kiosko for it allegedly infringed upon the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of freedom of speech, assembly, and worship. The
respondent countered that he did not prohibit the said meeting from
occurring but merely regulated where they could hold their religious
gathering. He also advanced the defense that he was merely exercising the
police power to regulate said meeting to maintain public order and public
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safety and to prevent any untoward incident from occurring, for the plaza
and the kiosko were located near a church of the Catholics.
ISSUE/S: WON the Jehovah’s witnesses were denied the right to assembly and
worship?
HELD: It therefore appears that the right to freedom of speech and to
peacefully assemble, though guaranteed by our Constitution, is not absolute,
for it may be regulated in order that it may not be “injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the
community or society”, and this power may be exercised under the “police
power” of the state, which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people. It cannot therefore be said that Petitioners were denied their
constitutional right to assemble for, as was said, such right is subject to regulation to
maintain public order and public safety. This is especially so considering that the tenets
of Petitioners’ congregation are derogatory to those of the Roman Catholic Church, a
factor which Respondent must have considered in denying their request.
265) J.B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing [125 SCRA 553 (1983)]
JOSE B.L. REYES, in behalf of the ANTI-BASES COALITION (ABC), petitioner,
vs.
RAMON BAGATSING, as Mayor of the City of Manila, respondent.
FACTS: Petitioners sought a permit to hold a peaceful march and rally,
requesting for the removal of the foreign military bases in Manila, starting
from Luneta park to the gates of the US Embassy. Respondent Mayor denied the
request as recommended by the police authorities and suggested another area where
the safety of the participants and the general public may be ensured. Petitioner
contends that said denial was a violation of free speech and assembly.
ISSUE: WON denial of a public rally on a public park and the US Embassy is a violation
of constitutional guarantee to free speech and assembly.
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HELD: Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly

carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been
disregarded. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to
parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on
who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. There
can be no legal objection, absent of clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta and US Embassy as the place for the
peaceful rally. Time immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Moreover,
denial of permit for a rally in front of the US Embassy is justified only in the presence of
a clear and present danger to life or property of the embassy.

266) Ruiz vs. Gordon [126 SCRA 233 (1983)]

G.R. No. L-65695 December 19, 1983
HECTOR S. RUIZ, as coordinator of the Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for
National Reconciliation, Petitioner, vs. RICHARD GORDON, as City Mayor of
Olongapo City, Respondent.

Facts:Hector S. Ruiz, Coordinator of Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for National

Reconciliation, filed a petition for mandamus against Richard Gordon to be allowed to
hold a parade/march from Gordon Avenue to the Rizal Triangle starting at 1:00 P.M.
The Court required the respondents to answer. Respondents replied by stating the
request for a prayer rally was received in the Office of the Mayor and that respondent
had repeatedly announced in his regular program on Sunday over the radio (DWGO)
and at the Monday morning flag ceremony before hundreds of government employees
that he would grant the request of any group that would like to exercise their freedom
of speech and assembly.
When interviewed on the matter by the Editor-in Chief of the 'Guardian', he
mentioned the fact that he had granted the permit of the petitioner, which
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interview appeared in the November 22-28, 1983 issue of the said

newspaper.
Given these, the respondent prayed for the dismissal of the petition. This was complied
with.
Issue: Can the petition be granted?
Held No. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
The Reyes case was given some discussion in the course of this petition as to the role
of the judiciary in petitions for permits to hold peaceable assembles.
"The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing
authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take
place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one
entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed
well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise
whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its
grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such
refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard
for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.”
Thereafter, his decision must be transmmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. They
can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. Free speech and peaceable
assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme
of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, — even
more so than on the other departments — rests the grave and delicate responsibility of
assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights.
As shown both in the manifestation and the answer, this action for mandamus could
have been obviated if only petitioner took the trouble of verifying on November 23
whether or not a permit had been issued. A party desirous of exercising the right
to peaceable assembly should be the one most interested in ascertaining the
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action taken on a request for a permit. Necessarily, after a reasonable time

or, if the day and time was designated for the decision on the request, such
party or his representative should be at the office of the public official
concerned. If he fails to do so, a copy of the decision reached, whether adverse or
favorable, should be sent to the address of petitioner.

267) Malabanan vs. Ramento [129 SCRA 359 (1984)]

Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent
University. They sought and were granted by tile school authorities a permit to
hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such
permit, along with other students, they held a general assemblyat the
Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place
indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at
the second floor lobby.
At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language
their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science
with the Institute of Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the same day, they marched
toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the
area covered by their permit. They continued their demonstration, giving
utterance to language severely critical of the University authorities and using
megaphones in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance of the classes
being held. Also, the non-academic employees, within hearing distance,
stopped their work because of the noise created.They were asked to explain
on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal
assembly.
Then on September 9, 1982, they were formed through a memorandum
that they were under preventive suspension for one academic year for their
failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front of the Life
Science Building. The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both
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before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a petition for mandamus with damages
against private respondents.

Issue: Whether the suspension of the students for 1 academic year was violative of the
constitutional rights of freedom of peaceable assembly and free speech.

Ruling: YES. As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the invocation
of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication
that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. Both are
embraced in the concept of freedom of expression which is identified with
the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of public interest
without censorship or punishment and which “is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing … of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
the state has a right to prevent.”

Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be

ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language
of the academe. But with the activity taking place in the school premises and
during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is
discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct,
"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights
of others."

It would be most appropriate then, as was done in the case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, for
this Court to lay down the principles for the guidance of school authorities and students
alike. The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed
students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss
matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be
subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a
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showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state,
has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the
content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of
an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the
name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to
correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school
premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid
of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting
such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the
assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-
academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the
penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense. Petition
Granted. One week suspension had been served.

268) Arreza vs. GAUF [137 SCRA 94 (1985)]

Facts: Student militancy manifested through rallies and demonstrations
characterized by condemnatory language in speeches and leaflets led
respondent Gregorio Araneta University to refuse enrollment to petitioners.
According to the version of petitioners, they were either leaders or
participants in what respondent University referred to as a
rally/demonstration held on September 28, 1982, in front of the Life Science
Building of the respondent University, but which for them, could be more accurately
described as “a continuation of the General Assembly of the student body held the day
before—one authorized by the School Administration.” Its purpose was to register
the opposition of the students to the abolition of the school’s Institute of
Animal Science, as those taking courses therein would not be able to
graduate.
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Such exercise of their right to peaceable assembly was visited by

respondent University with a refusal to let them enroll after what for
petitioners was a sham investigation of their alleged violation of school rules
and regulations. Respondent University denied granting the authorization to
hold such general assembly, or student rally on September 28, 1982, alleging
that the students on said date through the use of battery-operated
megaphones criticized and lambasted the school administration, specifically
the decision of the Board of Trustees of respondent University to merge its Institute of
Animal Science with its Institute of Agriculture, ignoring the fact that the
aforementioned merger of the above-named Institutes – intended as a cost-saving
measure – would not deprive the students enrolled in the former Institute of Animal
Science from earning their degrees.
Moreover, there were other rallies, according to respondent, held on
September 8, 27 and 29, 1982, for the purpose of sympathizing with the
suspension of five (5) student leaders who conducted an illegal assembly on
August 27, 1982, causing additional disturbance on the campus, not only by
the disorderly conduct observed but also by the resulting boycott of classes.
Issue: Whether the refusal of the university to enroll the students is violative of cognate
rights of free speech and peaceful assembly.

Ruling: YES. There is no need, to inquire into the allegations of respondent

University as to the non-peaceable character of the rally or demonstration. As
made clear from Malbanan v. Ramento case, infractions of University rules or
regulations by petitioner-students justify the filing of appropriate charges.
What cannot be justified is the infliction of the highly-disproportionate
penalty of denial of enrollment and the consequent failure of senior students
to graduate, if in the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and
peaceable assembly, improper conduct could be attributed to them.
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Petitioners, as all other students, may freely exercise such rights, “They
enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and
communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen”in rallies and
demonstrations.

In the even more recent case of Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines,
reference was made to Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights: “Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at ‘least
in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be
compulsory; Technical and professional education shall be made generally
accessible to all on the basis of merit,”

269) German vs. Barangan [135 SCRA 514 (1985)]

Facts: (SUMMARY) Petitioners wearing yellow shirts, marched with raised
clenched fist and shouts of anti-government sentiments on their way to a
chapel which adjoins Malacanang palace. They were stopped from getting
the church and were told that any similar attempt to enter the church will
likewise be prevented.
In the afternoon of October 2, 1984, petitioners, composed of about 50
businessmen, students and office employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for
the purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacañang
grounds located in the same street. Wearing yellow T-shirts, they started to march
down with raised clenched fists and shouts of anti-government invectives. The
marchers were barred by respondent Major Lariosa, upon orders of his superiors and
co-respondent Gen. Santiago Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the ground
that St. Jude Chapel was located within the Malacañang security area. Despite plea,
they were not allowed in the church.
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Because of the alleged warning given them by respondent Major Lariosa that any
similar attempt by petitioners to enter the church in the future would likewise be
prevented, petitioners took this present recourse.
Petitioners' alleged purpose in converging at J.P. Laurel Street was to pray and
hear mass at St. Jude church. At the hearing of this petition, respondents assured
petitioners and the Court that they have never restricted, and will never restrict, any
person or persons from entering and worshipping at said church. They maintain,
however, that petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious
worship, but to conduct an anti-government demonstration at a place close to the very
residence and offices of the President of the Republic.

Issue: Whether the prohibition on petitioners from worshipping and praying at the
chapel violates their freedom to worship.

Ruling: NO. The restriction imposed on the use of J.P. Laurel Street, was
established in the interest of national security. Petitioners are not denied or
restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner
by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. This curtailment is in
accord with the pronouncement of this Court in Gerona v. Secretary of Education.

While it is beyond debate that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable
right to religious freedom, the exercise thereof, and of all fundamental rights
for that matter, must be done in good faith. As Article 19 of the Civil Code
admonishes: "Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties ... observe honesty and good faith." Even assuming
that petitioners’ claim to the free exercise of religion is valid, there is still the
necessity of securing the lives of the President and his family, as well as
other government officials as well as to maintain smooth functioning of the
executive branch of the government.
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Petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship

but to conduct an anti- government demonstration since they wore yellow T-
shirts, raised their clenched fists and shouted anti- government slogans.
While every citizen has the right to religious freedom, the exercise must be
done in good faith. Besides, the restriction was reasonable as it was designed to
protect the lives of the President and his family, government officials and diplomatic
and foreign guests transacting business with Malacanang. The restriction was also
intended to secure the executive offices within the Malacanang grounds from
possible external attacks and disturbances.

(Minority opinion) The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise
of the freedom of religion is the existence of a grave and imminent, of a serious evil to
public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the
State has a right to prevent. The burden to show the existence of grave and imminent
danger lies on the officials who would restrain petitioners. Respondents were in full
control and had the capability to stop any untoward move. There was no clear and
present danger of any serious evil to public safety or the security of Malacanang.

270) Acosta vs. CA and CSC (G.R. No. 132088 Jun 28, 2000)
Facts: Petitioners are teachers from different public schools in metro manila.
On various dates in September and October 1990, petitioners did not report for
work and instead, participated in mass actions by public school teachers at
the liwasang bonifacio for the purpose of petitioning the government for
redress of their grievances.
On the basis of reports submitted by their respective school principals
that petitioners participated in said mass actions and refused to comply with
the return-to-work order issued September 17, 1990 by then Secretary Isidro D.
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Cariño of the department of education, culture and sports (DECS), petitioners were
administratively charged with such offenses as grave misconduct, gross
neglect of duty, gross violation of civil service law, rules and regulations and
reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross
insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
absence without official leave. Petitioners failed to answer the charges.
Secretary Cariño found petitioners guilty as charged and ordered their
immediate dismissal from the service. Petitioners were meted out the
penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay. Petitioners appealed that
respondent court of appeals grievously erred when it affirmed the assailed resolutions
of CSC.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the resolution by the CSC that penalized
petitioners whose only “offense” was to exercise their constitutional right to peaceful
assembly and petition the government for redress of grievances.

Ruling: NO. These ‘mass actions’ were to all intents and purposes a strike;
they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from,
work which it was the teachers’ sworn duty to perform, undertaken for
essentially economic reasons.

In Bangalisan v. Court of appeals, petitioners, are being penalized not because

they exercised their right of peaceable assembly and petition for redress of
grievances but because of their successive unauthorized and unilateral
absences which produced adverse effects upon their students for whose
education they are responsible. The actuations of petitioners definitely constituted
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, punishable under the civil service
law, rules and regulations.as aptly stated by the solicitor general, “it is not the
exercise by the petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceable assemble
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that was punished, but the manner in which they exercised such right which
resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service and classes
in various public schools in metro manila. For, indeed, there are efficient and
non-disruptive avenues, other than the mass actions in question, whereby
petitioners could petition the government for redress of grievances.”

As a general proposition, a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has

not rendered any service. While there recognized instances when backwages may be
awarded to a suspended or dismissed public official who is later ordered reinstated, as
pointed by petitioners in citing bangalisan, the factual circumstances of the case at bar
impel the Court to rule otherwise.

The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the absence
of statute, public employees do not have the right to engage in concerted
work stoppages for any purpose.

It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will

inevitably derail services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the
right to strike is denied government employees. It may be conceded that the
petitioners had valid grievances and noble intentions in staging the “mass
actions,” but that will not justify their absences to the prejudice of innocent
school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize an illegal work
stoppage.

271) Bayan vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 169848, April 25, 2006)
Facts: Several rallies were organized and participated by the petitioners,
Bayan, Jess del Prado, KMU, etc on September 26, October 5, and October 6, 2005.
According to the petitioners, these rallies were violently dispersed and
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several participants were injured, arrested and detained by the policemen

implementing B.P. 880 and the Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) policy
issued by the Malacanang.

All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others
only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. Bayan and
KMU has been violently preempted and and forcibly dispersed causing
injuries by police and peace keeping authorities under the “no permit, no
rally” policy whereby enforcing the Batasang Pambansa Blg 880 and the CPR.

Petitioners contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties
of which the Philippines is a signatory because it requires a permit before one can
stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and
present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to
the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly
form part of the message for which the expression is sought.B.P. No. 880 is
unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and
petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid
exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a
permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its
provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.

Issue: Whether BP 880 is constitutional.

Ruling: YES. BP 880 is a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and
manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmena v. Comelec, where the
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Court referred to it as a content-neutral regulation of the time, place, and

manner of holding public assemblies.

BP 880 it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places.
The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because
assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither are the words opinion, protesting and
influencing in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to
any subject. The words petitioning the government for redress of grievances
come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided.
Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists
and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present
danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or
public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.

On the issue of vagueness and overbroad: BP 880 is not vague. The

law is very clear and is nowhere vague in its provisions. Public does not
have to be defined. Its ordinary meaning is well-known. Websters Dictionary
defines it, thus:
public, n, x x x 2a: an organized body of people x x x 3: a group of people
distinguished by common interests or characteristics x x x.

Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers to

rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of
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mass or concerted action held in a public place. So it does not cover any
and all kinds of gatherings.

BP 880 is not overbroad because it regulates the exercise of the right

to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a
clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the
right to prevent.

The CPR policy is declared null and void: CPR serves no valid purpose if
it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it
means something else. The Solicitor General agreed with the observation of
the Chief Justice that CPR should no longer be used as a legal term
inasmuch as, according to respondents, it was merely a catchword
intended to clarify what was thought to be a misunderstanding of the
maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880 and that, as stated in
the affidavit executed by Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and submitted to
the Ombudsman, it does not replace B.P. No. 880 and the maximum
tolerance policy embodied in that law. What is to be followed is and
should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum tolerance --
yhe highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping
authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the
same.

272) De Jonge vs. Oregon [229 US 353 (1937)]

Facts: On July 27, 1934, at a meeting held by the Communist Party, Dirk De
Jonge addressed the audience regarding jail conditions in the county and a
maritime strike in progress in Portland. While the meeting was in progress,
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police raided it.De Jonge was arrested and charged with violating the State's
criminal syndicalism statute.
The law defines criminal syndicalism as "the doctrine which advocates
crime, physical violence, sabotage or any unlawful acts or methods as a
means of accomplishing or effecting industrial or political change or
revolution." After being convicted, De Jonge moved for an acquittal, arguing
that the evidence was insufficient to warrant his conviction.
Disagreeing, the State Supreme Court distinguished that the indictment
did not charge De Jonge with criminal syndicalism, but rather that he
presided at, conducted and assisted in conducting an assemblage of persons,
organization, society and group called by the Communist Party,which was
unlawfully teaching and advocating in Multnomah county the doctrine of criminal
syndicalism and sabotage.

Issue: Whether Oregon's criminal syndicalism statute violate the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.

Ruling: YES.The Court held that the Oregon statute, as applied, violated the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After reviewing the record,
the Court determined that De Jonge's sole offense was assisting in a public
meeting held under the auspices of the Communist Party. The Court reasoned
that to preserve the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly - principles
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment - not the auspices under which a
meeting is held, but the purpose of the meeting and whether the speakers'
remarks transcend the bounds of freedom of speech must be examined,
which had not occurred in De Jonge's case. Justice Harlan Fiske Stone took no
part in the consideration or decision of the case.
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The Supreme Court ruled that state governments may not violate the
constitutional right of peaceable assembly. The decision contributed to the
development of “symbolic speech” and “speech plus” categories, concepts
relating to speech combined with conduct or action. While De Jonge
appealed to some communist ideas during his speech, neither he nor the
other speakers advocated violence.
Court had previously distinguished between advocacy and incitement.While the
States are entitled to protect themselves from the abuse of the privileges of
our institutions through an attempted substitution of force and violence in
the place of peaceful political action in order to effect revolutionary changes
in government, none of our decisions goes to the length of sustaining such a
curtailment of the right of free speech and assembly as the Oregon statute
demands in its present application.
The De Jonge ruling rested on previous cases, most notably Gitlow v. New York (1925)
and Whitney v. California (1927). In Gitlow, the Court found that a state may
restrict expressions calling for the violent overthrow of government if the
expressions in question possess a “tendency” to incite such activity.
Freedoms of speech and of the press are fundamental rights which are
safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution.
Important in that case was that the Court’s opinion defended the concept that the 14th
Amendment’s due-process clause protects First Amendment rights — in this case free
speech and free press — at the state level.Further, although the Court had upheld a
state law against syndicalism in Whitney, Justice Louis D. Brandeis’s concurring opinion
provided a compelling defense of free speech and made the distinction between
advocacy and incitement.

273) Evangelista vs. Earnshaw (57 Phil 255)

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Facts: Plaintiff Crisanto Evangelista alleges that he is the president of the

Communist Party in the PH islands, a political group seeking the speedy granting of
independence in these Islands and the redemption of the proletariat. He sent a letter
to the defendant mayor of the city, requesting the necessary permission to
hold a popular meeting at Plaza Moriones to be followed by a parade through
the stress in order to deliver to the Governor-General a message from the
laboring class.
The mayor of the city denied the plaintiff’s petition, instructing the
chief of police to prohibit all kinds of meetings held by the Communist Party
throughout the city, because he had revoked their permits and licenses.In
refusing the requested permission and in prohibiting all meetings of the
party within the city, Evangelista claimed that the Mayor deprived the
Communist Party of a constitutional right.
The plaintiff further prays that a writ of mandamus be issued against
the herein defendant compelling him to issue a permit for the holding of
meetings and parades by the Communist Party in Manila. The defendant stated
that subsequent to the issuance of the above-mentioned permit, it was
discovered after an investigation conducted by the office of the fiscal for the
City of Manila that said Communist Party of the PH is an illegal association,
or organization, which having for its principal object to incite the revolt of
the proletariat or laboring class, according to its constitution and by-laws.
Statement of the communists: It was the duty of the laborers to bring the
government into their hands and to run it by themselves and for themselves, like
the laboring class in Russia; that when the laborers were united, neither the
Constabulary nor the United States Army nor the imperialist Governor-General
could stop them when they rose up as one body in order to free themselves from
slavery by the capitalists; that America was cunning and a coward, as evidenced
by the fact that when she entered the World War, her enemies were already
weak; that the Constabulary and the police were the ones who made trouble for
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the laborers because they were the agents of the American imperialists in the
Islands and they were used as instruments by the American Imperialist
Government; that united together, the laborers could down the American
Imperialist Government; and other terms and expression of similar tenor and
import.

Issue: Whether there is a violation of the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech,

press, and assembly.

Ruling: NO. It will be readily seen that the doctrines and principles advocated in
the constitution and by-laws of the Communist Party of the PH, and speeches
uttered and made by its members in public meetings and gatherings are
highly seditious. Such suggests and incites rebellious conspiracies and disturb
and obstruct lawful authorities in their duties.

Considering the actions of the so-called president of the Communist Party, it is evident
that he cannot expect the defendant to permit the CP to hold meetings and
parades in such manner. It must be considered that the respondent mayor,
whose sword duty is “to see that nothing should occur which would tend to provoke or
excite the people to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or order of the
Government” did only the right thing under the circumstance. The cancel and
withdrawal of the permit is in accordance with the power granted to him by law.

MAIN POINT: At any rate, the right of peaceful assembly not an absolute one.
When the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional
guaranties of freedom speech and press and of assembly and petition must
yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige constituted
authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and existence of
the State.
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MODULE 6. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATIONS

Art III, Sec 8
Art IX, Sec 2 (5)
Art XIII, Sec 3, Par 2
Art XIII, Sec 15
274) Ang Ladlad LGBT vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010)
Facts: “Ang Ladlad” is an organization of people who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals or trans- genders. The Comelec dismissed the
petition on moral grounds as “the definition of the LGBT sector makes it
crystal clear that it tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs.”
The COMELEC refused to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under
R.A. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, on the ground that the LGBT
sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and R.A. 7941, nor is it associated with
or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
In denying Ang Ladlad’s registration, the Comelec’s Second Division ruled:
“Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual
orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its
application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.
x x x x Even if society’s understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBT’s
is elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males
and females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the
same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike. x x x x As a society, the
Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian
upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have
seeped into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.”
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Issue: Whether party-list application should be denied as the organization allegedly

tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs.

Ruling: NO. The denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of
religion; including its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly,
and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

Rather than relying on religious belief, the government must act for secular purposes
and in ways that have primarily secular effects. “Ang Ladlad” has sufficiently
demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Hence, its
application as a party-list should be granted.

The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The

crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but
whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and R.A. 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that, “no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government
neutrality in religious matters.
Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with
this policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the Comelec to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the
exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
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governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation

in the party-list system.

The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts

more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a
tool to further any substantial public interest.

275) SSS Employees Association vs. CA (G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989)
Facts:Primarily, the issue raised in this petition is whether or not the Regional Trial
Court can enjoin the Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) from
striking and order the striking employees to return to work. Collaterally, it is whether or
not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.
SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for
damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners, alleging that officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal
strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-
striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from
transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector
Labor – Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the
strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a
result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to
return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay
damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on
the union’s demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old
SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment
of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of
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temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular
and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and
benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children’s
allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of
the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor
practices.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction filed by petitioners, the Court of Appeals held that
since the employees of the SSS, are government employees, they are not
allowed to strike, and may be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had
jurisdiction over the SSS’ complaint for damages, from continuing with their strike.

Issue: Whether SSS employees have the right to strike.

Ruling: NO. The 1987 Constitution provides that the State “shall guarantee the rights
of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law” [Art. XIII, Sec.
31].

By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and
employees, including those in the public sector, to strike. But the
Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for it provides,
after defining the scope of the civil service as “all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters,” that “[t]he right to
self-organization shall not be denied to government employees” [Art. IX(B),
Sec. 2(l) and (50)].
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Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that “[tlhe right of the people,
including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged”
[Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the Constitution
recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to
whether such recognition also includes the right to strike.

Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding
the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right
of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to
the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.

At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees

to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the
right, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum
Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180.

The SSS is a GOCC with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No.
1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil
Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case,
the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal. The strike staged
by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union being prohibited
by law, an injunction may be issued to restrain it.

276) United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU) vs. Laguesma (G.R. No.
122226, March 25, 1998)
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Facts: Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that on March

20, 1995 the union filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the
route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its petition
was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial
employees and, therefore, ineligible for union membership under the first
sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, which provides:
Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of
supervisory employees. — Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or
form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join,
assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order,
dismissed. Hence, this petition. Pressing for resolution its contention that the
first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial
employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join unions, contravenes Art. III,
§8 of the Constitution which provides:
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to
law shall not be abridged.

Issue: Whether Article 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from forming,
joining or assisting labor unions, violates Art. III, Section 8 of the Constitution.

Ruling: NO. Article 245 is the result of the amendment of the Labor Code in
1989 by R.A. No. 6715, otherwise known as the Herrera-Veloso Law. Unlike
the Industrial Peace Act or the provisions of the Labor Code which it
superseded, R.A. No. 6715 provides separate definitions of the terms
“managerial” and “supervisory employees,” as follows:
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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Art. 212. Definitions. . . .

(m) “managerial employee” is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to
lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire transfer, suspend, lay
off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are
those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such
managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or
clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees
not falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file
employees for purposes of this Book.

The distinction between top and middle managers, who set management policy, and
front-line supervisors, who are merely responsible for ensuring that such policies are
carried out by the rank and file, is articulated in the present definition. When read in
relation to this definition in Art. 212(m), it will be seen that Art. 245 faithfully carries
out the intent of the Constitutional Commission in framing Art. III, §8 of the
fundamental law.

*Framer’s Intent: MR. LERUM. My amendment is on Section 7, page 2, line 19, which is
to insert between the words “people” and “to” the following: WHETHER EMPLOYED BY
THE STATE OR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS. In other words, the section will now read
as follows: “The right of the people WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR PRIVATE
ESTABLISHMENTS to form associations, unions, or societies for purposes not contrary
to law shall not be abridged.”

Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, §8 infringed by a ban

against managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art.
III, §8 is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes
“not contrary to law.” In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor

organizations.

277) Manila Public School Teachers Association vs. Laguio, Jr. 2001
Facts: The series of events that touched off these cases started with the so-
called "mass action" undertaken by some 800 public school teachers, among
them members of the petitioning associations in both cases, on September 17, 1990 to
"dramatize and highlight" the teachers' plight resulting from the alleged failure of
the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been
brought to the latter's attention.
The subject of the petitions: immediate payment of due chalk, clothing
allowances, 13th month pay for 1989 arising from the implementation of the
Salary Standardization Law, the recall of DECS Order 39 s. 1990 directing the
oversizing of classes and overloading of teachers pursuant to the cost-cutting measures
of the government, etc. On September 14, 1990, the petitioners and other
teachers in other cities and municipalities in Metro Manila, staged a protest
rally at the DECS premises without disrupting classes as a last call for the
government to negotiate the granting of demands.
No response was made by the respondent Secretary of Education,
despite the demonstration, so the petitioners began the ongoing protest
mass actions on September, 17,1990. September 17, 1990 fell on a Monday, which
was also a regular school day. There is no question that some 800 teachers
who joined the mass action did not conduct their classes on that day; instead,
as alleged in the petition in G.R. No. 95590, they converged at the Liwasang Bonifacio
in the morning whence they proceeded to the National Office of DECS.
The mass actions continued into the week despite the return to work
directive, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. Based on
reports submitted by the principals of the various public schools in Metro Manila, the
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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respondent Secretary of Education had filed motu proprio administrative

complaints against the teachers who had taken part in the mass actions and
defied the return-to-work order on assorted charges like grave misconduct,
gross neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil Service Law, absence
without official leave, etc., and placed them under 90-day preventive
suspension.
Earlier, on September 19, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 95445 had filed with
the Manila RTC a petition for prohibition, declaratory relief and preliminary mandatory
injunction to restrain the implementation of the return-to-work order of September 17,
1990 and the suspension or dismissal of any teacher pursuant thereto and to declare
said order null and void. RTC rendered judgment declaring the assailed return-to-work
order valid and binding, and dismissing the petition for lack of merit. G.R. No. 95590 is
a parallel original proceeding which was consolidated with G.R. No. 95445.
The petitioners filed an appeal to the CSC. They claim that they are such parties
although not individually so named in the petition in said case, being among those
referred to in its title as "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to
be impleaded.

Issue: (1) Whether there was denial of due process and (2) whether the employees in
public service are prohibited to conduct strikes. ANS: YES and NO.

Ruling: (1) NO. The underlying issue here is due process; not whether the
petitioners have a right to strike, which it is clear they do not, however
justifiable their reasons, nor whether or not there was in fact such a strike, it being
equally evident from the pleadings that there was, and there being no dispute about
this. What therefore, is brought before the Court is the question of whether or not any
rights of the petitioners under the due process clause of the Constitution as it applies to
administrative proceedings were violated in the initiation, conduct, or disposition of the
investigations complained of.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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There are, however, insuperable obstacles to the Court's taking up that issue
and resolving it in these cases. Said issue is not ripe for adjudication by this
Court in the exercise of its review jurisdiction; and this, for the obvious
reason that it is one of fact.

The petitions and subsequent pleadings of the petitioners allege the following facts: (a)
that teachers were dismissed on the sole basis of unsworn reports of their principals
and without evidence of their alleged failure to obey the returnto-work order; (b) that
the charge sheets failed to specify the particular charges or offenses allegedly
ommitted; (c) that some teachers were not furnished sworn complaints, and others
were suspended without any formal charges; (d) that teachers who attempted to return
within a reasonable time after notice of the return-to-work order were not accepted
back; and similar allegations.

These are however denied and disputed by the public respondents, who set forth their
own version: (a) Petitioners in G.R. No. 95545 and G.R. No. 95590 admit engaging in a
strike (referred by semantic interplay as "concerted activity" or "mass action") directed
against public respondent Cariño beginning September 17, 1990; (b) The striking
teachers were given a period of five days to file their Answers in line with Sec. 8, Rule
III of Rules on Administrative Disciplinary Cases; (c) Many of the striking teachers
refused to appear at the hearings but preferred to submit their case on the basis of
their answers. This Court finds that the facts regarding the denial of due process would
turn are still in issue, actively controverted, hence not yet established.

The petitioners cannot-as it seems they have done lump together into what amounts to
a class action hundreds of individual cases, each with its own peculiar set of facts, and
expect a ruling that would justly and correctly resolve each and everyone of those cases
upon little more than general allegations, frontally disputed as already pointed out, of
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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incidents supposedly "representative" of each case or group of cases. This case

illustrates the error of precipitate recourse to the Supreme Court, especially when
numerous parties desparately situated as far as the facts are concerned gather under
the umbrella of a common plea, and generalization of what should be alleged with
particularity becomes unavoidable.

The petitioners' obvious remedy was NOT to halt the administrative proceedings but, on
the contrary, to take part, assert and vindicate their rights therein. Parties-litigant are
duty bound to observe the proper order of recourse through the judicial hierarchy; they
by-pass the rungs of the judicial ladder at the peril of their own causes. WHEREFORE,
both petitioners are DISMISSED, without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that
the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters
complained of.

(2) YES. The SC held thatthe mass actions held by the teachers shall be
considered strikes because their main purpose was the stoppage of or
absence from work. Employees in public service do not have the right to
strike because this constitutes a disturbance in public service. In addition,
employment in the government is governed by law and the terms and
conditions of employment are affected through statutes and administrative
rules and regulations, not by collective bargaining agreements. In this case the
teachers absented from their work in order to participate in the mass action that was
happening on a Monday.

278) Occena vs. COMELEC, 127 SCRA 404 (1985)

Facts: Samuel C. Occena filed a petition for prohibition seeking that sections
4 and 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election
Act of 1982, be declared as unconstitutional insofar as it prohibits any
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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candidate in the Barangay election of 17 May 1982 "from representing or

allowing himself to be represented as a candidate of any political party or
prohibits a political party, political group, political committee from intervening in the
nomination of a candidate in the barangay election or in the filing of his certificate of
candidacy, or giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise,
favorable to or against his campaign for election." On this basis, it is also prayed
that "judgment be rendered declaring the 1982 Barangay elections null and void ab
initio, for being unconstitutional, and directing the holding of new barangay elections
without any ban on the involvement of political parties, political committees, political
organizations and other political group."

Issue: Whetherthe ban on the intervention of political parties in the election of

barangay officials is violative of the constitutional guarantee of the right to form
associations and societies for purposes not contrary to law.

Ruling: The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary
to law is neither absolute nor illimitable; it is always subject to the pervasive
and dominant police power of the state and may constitutionally be
regulated or curtailed to serve appropriate and important public interests
(Gonzales vs. Comelec, 27 SCRA 835; Imbong vs. Comelec, 35 SCRA 28).

Whether a restriction imposed is constitutionally permissible or not depends upon the

circumstances of each case. Examining Section 4 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982,
the right to organize is intact. Political parties may freely be formed although
there is a restriction on their activities, i.e., their intervention in the election
of barangay officials on 17 May 1982 is proscribed. But the ban is narrow, not
total. It operates only on concerted or group action of political parties.
Members of political and kindred organizations, acting individually, may
intervene in the barangay election.
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As the law says: "Nothing (therein) shall be construed as in any manner affecting or
constituting an impairment of the freedom of individuals to support or oppose any
candidate for any barangay office." Moreover, members of the family of a
candidate within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity as well as
the personal campaign staff of a candidate (not more than 1 for every 100
registered voters in his barangay) can engage in individual or group action to
promote the election of their candidate. There are reasons for insulating the
barangay from the divisive and debilitating effects of a partisan political campaign.

The Barangay Captain and the Barangay Council, apart from their legislative and
consultative powers, also act as an agency for neutral community action such as the
distribution of basic foodstuff and as an instrument in conducting plebiscites and
referenda.

The Barangay Captain, together with the members of the Lupon Tagapayapa appointed
by him, exercises administrative supervision over the barangay conciliation panels in the
latter's work of settling local disputes. The Barangay Captain himself settles or helps
settle local controversies within the barangay either through mediation or arbitration. It
would definitely enhance the objective and impartial discharge of their duties for
barangay officials to be shielded from political party loyalty. In fine, the ban against
the participation of political parties in the barangay election is an appropriate
legislative response to the unwholesome effects of partisan bias in the
impartial discharge of the duties imposed on the barangay and its officials as
the basic unit of our political and social structure.

279) In re: Edillon, 84 SCRA (1979)

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Facts: Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978, the vote being
unanimous. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated.
Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of
respondent may not be amiss.
In the case at bar, the IBP Board of Governors recommended the
removal of the respondent from the Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to
pay his membership dues' to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding
due notice. The IBP Board of Governors then submitted a recommendation to the
Supreme Court for the Removal of the Edillion from the Roll of Attorneys for non-
payment of dues under Sec 12 of Rules of Court.
Edillion responded that the above provisions of the Court Rule and of
the IBP ByLaws are void and of no legal force and effect as it is invasive of
his constitutional rights in the sense that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
In reply, the unanimous conclusion reached by the Court was that the
integration of the Philippine Bar raises no constitutional question and is
therefore legally unobjectionable, "and, within the context of contemporary
conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.
As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the decision
was rendered, there were various pleadings led by respondent for reinstatement. Since
then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a different
attitude on his part was discernible. The tone of defiance was gone and circumstances
of a mitigating character invoked the state of his health and his advanced age. He
likewise spoke of the welfare of former clients who still rely on him for counsel, their
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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confidence apparently undiminished. For he had in his career been a valiant, if at times
unreasonable, defender of the causes entrusted to him.

Issue: WhetherMarcial A. Edillon should be reinstated back into the bar.

Ruling: YES. It made certain that there was full acceptance on his part of the
competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate
the legal profession and can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly
paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two years had elapsed during which
he was barred from exercising his profession was likewise taken into
account. \

This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so it
did in the resolution of October 23, 1980. It may likewise be said that as in the case of
the inherent power to punish for contempt and paraphrasing the dictum of Justice
Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban, the power to discipline, especially if
amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not
on the vindictive principle.

It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as far

as admission to the bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of
membership. What must ever be borne in mind is that membership in the
bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with conditions.Failure to
abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof
warrants such drastic move. Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after
actuations evidencing that there was due contrition on the part of the transgressor, he
may once again be considered for the restoration of such a privilege.
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Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a
different attitude on his part was discernible. The tone of defiance was gone
and circumstances of a mitigating character invoked — the state of his health
and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of the welfare of former clients who
still rely on him for counsel, their confidence apparently undiminished. For he
had in his career been a valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender of the
causes entrusted to him.

280) Boy Scouts of America vs. Dale [530 U.S. 640 (2000)]
Facts: The Boy Scouts of America revoked former Eagle Scout and assistant
scoutmaster James Dale's adult membership when the organization
discovered that Dale was a homosexual and a gay rights activist. In 1992,
Dale filed suit against the Boy Scouts, alleging that the Boy Scouts had
violated the New Jersey statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in places of public accommodation. The Boy Scouts, a private,
not-for-profit organization, asserted that homosexual conduct was
inconsistent with the values it was attempting to instill in young people.
The New Jersey Superior Court held that New Jersey's public
accommodations law was inapplicable because the Boy Scouts was not a
place of public accommodation. The court also concluded that the Boy
Scouts' First Amendment freedom of expressive association prevented the
government from forcing the Boy Scouts to accept Dale as an adult leader.
The court's Appellate Division held that New Jersey's public
accommodations law applied to the Boy Scouts because of its broad-based
membership solicitation and its connections with various public entities, and
that the Boy Scouts violated it by revoking Dale's membership based on his
homosexuality. The court rejected the Boy Scouts' federal constitutional claims. The
New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed.
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The court held that application of New Jersey's public accommodations

law did not violate the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive
association because Dale's inclusion would not significantly affect members'
abilities to carry out their purpose. Furthermore, the court concluded that
reinstating Dale did not compel the Boy Scouts to express any message.

Issue: Whetherthe application of New Jersey's public accommodations law violate the
Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association to bar homosexuals from
serving as troop leaders.

Ruling: YES. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the
Court held that "applying New Jersey's public accommodations law to require
the Boy Scouts to admit Dale violates the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right
of expressive association."

In effect, the ruling gives the Boy Scouts of America a constitutional right to
bar homosexuals from serving as troop leaders. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for
the Court that, "[t]he Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual conduct is
inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill," and that a gay troop leader's
presence "would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message,
both to the young members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."

The Supreme Court ruled that the Boy Scouts of America had the expressive
association right to revoke the membership of an assistant scoutmaster after
he publicly announced his sexual orientation by leading a gay group at
Rutgers University.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
Page 713 of 846

Primary Holding: Laws that prohibit discrimination against certain protected

groups in public accommodations do not prevent private organizations from
expelling members based on a protected status such as sexual orientation.

281) Rotary Int’l vs. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987)
Facts: Rotary International is a nonprofit corporation composed of
local Rotary Clubs. Its purposes are to provide humanitarian service, to
encourage high ethical standards in all vocations, and to help build world peace
and good will.
Individuals are admitted to local club membership according to a
"classification system" based on business, professional, and institutional
activity in the community. Although women are permitted to attend
meetings, give speeches, receive awards, and form auxiliary organizations, the
Rotary constitution excludes women from membership.
Because it had admitted women to active membership, the Duarte,
California, Rotary Club's membership in the international organization was
terminated. That club and two of its women members filed a suit alleging
that the termination violated California's Unruh Act (Act), which entitles all
persons, regardless of sex, to full and equal accommodations, advantages,
facilities, privileges, and services in all business establishments in the State.
The state trial court entered judgment for Rotary International,
concluding that neither it nor the Duarte Club is a "business establishment"
within the meaning of the Act. However, the State Court of Appeal reversed on
this point, and rejected the contention that Rotary's policy of excluding
women is protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court ordered
the Duarte Club's reinstatement, and enjoined the enforcement of the gender
requirements against it The California Court of Appeals, however, in
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
Page 714 of 846

reversing a lower court decision, found that Rotary International's action

violated a California civil rights act prohibiting sexual discrimination.

Issue: Whethera law which required California Rotary Clubs to admit women members
violate Rotary International's First Amendment rights of association.

Ruling: NO. The Supreme Court found that Rotary International did not have
a First Amendment right to exclude women. The decision affirmed the
judgment of the Court of Appeals of California, respecting a state statute
requiring that business establishments admit women members.

(a) Application of the Act to local Rotary Clubs does not interfere unduly with
club members' freedom of private association. In determining whether a
particular association is sufficiently intimate or private to warrant
constitutional protection, consideration must be given to factors such as size,
purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded from critical aspects of
the relationship. Here, the relationship among Rotary Club members does not
warrant protection, in light of the potentially large size of local clubs, the high
turnover rate among club members, the inclusive nature of each club's membership,
the public purposes behind clubs' service activities, and the fact that the clubs
encourage the participation of strangers in, and welcome media coverage of, many of
their central activities.

Application of the Act to California Rotary Clubs does not violate the First
Amendment right of expressive association. Although clubs engage in a
variety of commendable service activities that are protected by the First
Amendment, the evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting women will
affect in any significant way the existing members' ability to carry out those
activities. Moreover, the Act does not require clubs to abandon or alter their
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
Page 715 of 846

classification and admission systems, but, in fact, will permit them to have an
even more representative membership with a broadened capacity for
service.Even if the Act does work some slight infringement of members'
rights, that infringement is justified by the State's compelling interests in
eliminating discrimination against women and in assuring them equal access
to public accommodations. The latter interest extends to the acquisition of
leadership skills and business contacts, as well as tangible goods and services.

Considering the size, purpose, selectivity, and exclusivity of Rotary's membership, the
Court found that the relationship among the club's members was not of the
intimate or private variety which warrants First Amendment protection.
Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Powell argued that because many of Rotary's
activities (including their meetings) are conducted in the presence of strangers, and
because women members would not prevent the club from carrying out its purposes,
there was no violation of associational rights. Furthermore, even if there were a slight
encroachment on the rights of Rotarians to associate, that minimal infringement would
be justified since it "serves the State's compelling interest" in ending sexual
discrimination.

282) Short Title: Alliance of Government Workers vs. Ministry of Labor and
Employment (124 SCRA 1)
Long Title: G.R. No. L-60403 August 3, 1983
ALLIANCE OF GOVERNMENT WORKERS (AGW); PNB-FEMA BANK EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (AGW); KAISAHAN AT KAPATIRAN NG MGA MANGAGAWA AT
KAWANI NG MWSS (AGW); BALARA EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (AGW); GSIS
WORKERS ASSOCIATION (AGW); SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (AGW);
PVTA EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (AGW); NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF TEACHERS
AND OFFICE WORKERS (AGW); , petitioners,
vs.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
Page 716 of 846

THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR and EMPLOYMENT, PHILIPPINE

NATIONAL BANK (PNB); METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS and SEWERAGE
SYSTEM (MWSS); GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS);
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS); PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO
ADMINISTRATION (PVTA) PHILIPPINE NORMAL COLLEGE (PNC);
POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES (PUP), respondents.
Facts: Petitioner Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) is a registered labor
federation while the other petitioners are its affiliate unions with members from among
the employees of the following offices, schools, or government owned or controlled
corporations.
On February 28, 1983, the Philippine Government Employees Association (PGEA) filed a
motion to come in as an additional petitioner.
According to the petitioners, P.D. No. 851 requires all employers to pay the 13th-month
pay to their employees with one sole exception found in Section 2 which states that
"(E)mployers already paying their employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent are not
covered by this Decree. " The petitioners contend that Section 3 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851 included other types of
employers not exempted by the decree. They state that nowhere in the decree is the
secretary, now Minister of Labor and Employment, authorized to exempt other types of
employers from the requirement.
Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851
provides:
Section 3. Employers covered — The Decree shall apply to all employers
except to:
a) Distressed employers, such as (1) those which are currently incurring
substantial losses or 112) in the case of non-profit institutions and
organizations, where their income, whether from donations, contributions,
grants and other earnings from any source, has consistently declined by
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
Page 717 of 846

more than forty (40%) per cent of their normal income for the last two
(2) )years, subject to the provision of Section 7 of this issuance.
b) The Government and any of its political subdivisions, including
government-owned and controlled corporations, except)t those
corporation, operating essentially as private, ,subsidiaries of the
government;
c) Employers already paying their employees 13th-month pay or more in a
calendar year or its equivalent at the of this issuance;
d) Employers of household helpers and persons in the personal service of
another in relation to such workers: and
e) Employers of those who are paid on purely commission, boundary, or
task basis and those who are paid a fixed for performing a specific work,
irrespective of the time consumed in the performance thereof, except
where the workers are paid an piece- rate basis in which case the
employer shall be covered by this issuance :insofar ab such workers are
concerned ...
The petitioners assail this rule as ultra vires and void. The petitioners argue that
regulations adopted under legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions
of the law and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. They
state that a legislative act cannot be amended by a rule and an administrative officer
cannot change the law. Section 3 is challenged as a substantial modification by rule of a
Presidential Decree and an unlawful exercise of legislative power.
At the outset, the petitioners are faced with a procedural barrier. The petition is one for
declaratory relief, an action not embraced within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. (Remotigue v. Osmena,, Jr., 21 SCRA 837; Rural Bank of Olongapo v.
Commission of Land Registration, 102 SCRA 794; De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294).
There is no statutory or jurisprudential basis for the petitioners' statement that the
Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory relief suits where
only questions of law are involved. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. The petitioners have
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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not pointed to any provision of the Constitution or statute which sustains their sweeping
assertion. On this ground alone, the petition could have been dismissed outright.
Following similar action taken in Nacionalista Party v. Angelo Bautista (85 Phil. 101)
and Aquino v. Commission on Elections (62 SCRA 275) we have, however, decided to
treat the petition as one for mandamus. The petition has far reaching implications and
raises questions that should be resolved.
The workers in the respondent institutions have not directly petitioned the heads of
their respective offices nor their representatives in the Batasang Pambansa. They have
acted through a labor federation and its affiliated unions. In other words, the workers
and employees of these state firms, college, and university are taking collective action
through a labor federation which uses the bargaining power of organized labor to
secure increased compensation for its members.
Under the present state of the law and pursuant to the express language of the
Constitution, this resort to concerted activity with the ever present threat of a strike can
no longer be allowed.
Issue: Whether the respondent institutions may act through labor federations which
uses the collective bargaining power to secure increased compensation for its members.
Ruling: Petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The general rule in the past and up
to the present is that "the terms and conditions of employment in the Government,
including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law". Since
the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government
workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to
secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private
industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law.
Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially
voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor
and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized
private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In government
employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power,
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
Page 719 of 846

the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of
employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and
regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements.
At the same time, the old Industrial Peace Act excepted employees and workers in
proprietary functions of government from the above compulsion of law. Thus, in the
past, government employees performing proprietary functions could belong to labor
organizations imposing the obligation to join in strikes or engage in other concerted
action. (Section 11, R.A. 875, as amended). They could and they did engage in
concerted activities and various strikes against government owned and controlled
corporations and other government institutions discharging proprietary functions.
Among the institutions as falling under the exception in Section 11 of the Industrial
Peace Act were respondents Government Service Insurance System (GSISEA v.
Alvendia, 108 Phil. 505) and Social Security System (SSSEA v. Soriano, 7 SCRA 1016).
And this Court has supported labor completely in the various strikes and concerted
activities in firms and agencies discharging proprietary functions because the
Constitution and the laws allowed these activities.
The exception, however belongs to the past.
Our dismissal of this petition should not, by any means, be interpreted to imply that
workers in government-owned and controlled corporations or in state colleges and
universities may not enjoy freedom of association. The workers whom the petitioners
purport to represent have the right, which may not be abridged, to form associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law. (Constitution, Article IV, Section 7). This is a
right which share with all public officers and employees and, in fact, by everybody living
in this country. But they may not join associations which impose the obligation to
engage in concerted activities in order to get salaries, fringe benefits, and other
emoluments higher than or different frm that provided by law and regulation.
The very Labor Code, P.D. No. 442 as amended,, which governs the registration and
provides for the rights of legitimate labor organizations states:
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
Page 720 of 846

ART. 277. Government employees.— The terms and conditions of

employment of all government employees, including employees of
government-owned and controlled corporations, shall be governed by the
Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. Their salaries shall be
standardized by the National Assembly as provided for in the new
constitution. However, there shall be no reduction of existing wages,
benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment being enjoyed by
them at the time of the adoption of this code.
Section 6, Article XII-B of the Constitution gives added reasons why the government
employees represented by the petitioners cannot expect treatment in matters of
salaries different from that extended to all others government personnel. The provision
states:
SEC. 6. The National Assembly shall provide for the standardization of
compensation of government officials and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, taking into account the
nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required
for the positions concerned.
It is the legislature or, in proper cases, the administrative heads of government and not
the collective bargaining process nor the concessions wrung by labor unions from
management that determine how much the workers in government-owned or controlled
corporations may receive in terms of salaries, 13th month pay, and other conditions or
terms of employment. There are government institutions which can afford to pay two
weeks, three weeks, or even 13th-month salaries to their personnel from their
budgetary appropriations.

283) Short Title: Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions vs. Secretary for Labor
1969
Long Title: G.R. No. L-22228 February 27, 1969
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
Page 721 of 846

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU) SOCIAL SECURITY

SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-PAFLU, AL FAJARDO AND ALL THE
OTHER MEMBERS AND OFFICERS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY AND
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-PAFLU, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS and THE
REGISTRAR OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, respondents.
Facts: Petitioners pray for writs of certiorari and prohibition to restrain respondents,
the Secretary of Labor, the Director of Labor Relations and the Registrar of Labor
Organizations, from enforcing an order of cancellation of the registration certificate of
the Social Security System Employees Association — hereinafter referred to as the
SSSEA — which is affiliated to the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions —
hereinafter referred to as PAFLU — as well as to annul all proceedings in connection
with said cancellation and to prohibit respondents from enforcing Section 23 of Republic
Act No. 875. Petitioners, likewise, pray for a writ of preliminary injunction pending the
final determination of this case. In their answer, respondents traversed some
allegations of fact and the legal conclusions made in the petition. No writ of preliminary
injunction pendente lite has been issued.
It appears that on September 25, 1963, the Registration of Labor Organizations —
hereinafter referred to as the Registrar — issued a notice of hearing, on October 17,
1963, of the matter of cancellation of the registration of the SSSEA, because of:
1. Failure to furnish the Bureau of Labor Relations with copies of the reports on
the finances of that union duly verified by affidavits which its treasurer or
treasurers rendered to said union and its members covering the periods from
September 24, 1960 to September 23, 1961 and September 24, 1961 to
September 23, 1962, inclusive, within sixty days of the 2 respective latter dates,
which are the end of its fiscal year; and
2. Failure to submit to this office the names, postal addresses and non-
subversive affidavits of the officers of that union within sixty days of their
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
Page 722 of 846

election in October (1st Sunday), 1961 and 1963, in conformity with Article IV
(1) of its constitution and by-laws.
In violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875. Counsel for the SSSEA
moved to postpone the hearing to October 21, 1963, and to submit then a
memorandum, as well as the documents specified in the notice. The motion
was granted, but, nobody appeared for the SSSEA on the date last mentioned. The next
day, October 22, 1963, Manuel Villagracia, Assistant Secretary of the SSSEA filed with
the Office of the Registrar, a letter dated October 21, 1963.
On the following day, Manuel Villagracia, Assistant Secretary of the SSSEA filed with the
Office of the Registrar, a letter enclosing documents that supposed to comply with the
abovementioned requirements, but the Registrar found out that the following are still
not complied with:
1. Non-subversive affidavits of Messrs. Teodoro Sison, Alfonso Atienza, Rodolfo
Zalameda, Raymundo Sabino and Napoleon Pefianco who were elected along
with others on January 30, 1962.
2. Names, postal addresses and non-subversive affidavits of all the officers who
were supposedly elected on October (1st Sunday), of its constitution and by-
laws.
Alfredo Fajardo, president of the SSSEA moved for a reconsideration of said decision
and prayed for time, up to November 15, within which to submit the requisite papers
and data. An opposition thereto having been filed by one Paulino Escueta, a member of
the SSSEA, upon the ground that the latter had never submitted any financial statement
to its members, said motion was heard on November 27, 1963. Subsequently, or on
December 4, 1963, the Registrar issued an order declaring that the SSSEA had “failed
to submit the abovementioned requirements and granting the SSSEA 15 days from
notice to comply with said requirements, as well as meanwhile holding in abeyance the
resolution of its motion for reconsideration.
Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 states that “Any labor organization, association or
union of workers duly organized for the material, intellectual and moral well being of its
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
Page 723 of 846

members shall acquire legal personality and be entitled to all the rights and privileges
granted by law to legitimate labor organizations within thirty days of filing with the
office of the Secretary of Labor notice of its due organization and existence and the
following documents, together with the amount of five pesos as registration fee, except
as provided in paragraph “d” of this section:”
Issue: Whether or not the effect of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 unduly curtails
the freedom of assembly and association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.
Ruling: The theory to the effect that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 unduly
curtails the freedom of assembly and association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is
devoid of factual basis.
The registration prescribed in paragraph (b) of said section 1 is not a limitation to the
right of assembly or association, which may be exercised with or without said
registration. 2 The latter is merely a condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal
personality by labor organizations, associations or unions and the possession of the
"rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations". The Constitution
does not guarantee these rights and privileges, much less said personality, which are
mere statutory creations, for the possession and exercise of which registration is
required to protect both labor and the public against abuses, fraud, or impostors who
pose as organizers, although not truly accredited agents of the union they purport to
represent. Such requirement is a valid exercise of the police power, because the
activities in which labor organizations, associations and union of workers are engaged
affect public interest, which should be protected.
Furthermore, the obligation to submit financial statements, as a condition for the non-
cancellation of a certificate of registration, is a reasonable regulation for the benefit of
the members of the organization, considering that the same generally solicits funds or
membership, as well as oftentimes collects, on behalf of its members, huge amounts of
money due to them or to the organization.
There is no incompatibility between Republic Act No. 875 and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. Upon the other hand, the cancellation of the SSSEA’s registration
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
Page 724 of 846

certificate would not entail a dissolution of said association or its suspension. The
existence of the SSSEA would not be affected by said cancellation, although its juridical
personality and its statutory rights and privileges — as distinguished from those
conferred by the Constitution — would be suspended thereby.
To be registered, pursuant to Section 23(b) of Republic Act No. 875, a labor
organization, association or union of workers must file with the Department of Labor
the following documents:
(1) A copy of the constitution and by-laws of the organization together with a list of all
officers of the association, their addresses and the address of the principal office of the
organization;
(2) A sworn statement of all the officers of the said organization, association or union to
the effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and that they are not
members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by force
or by any illegal or unconstitutional method; and
(3) If the applicant organization has been in existence for one or more years, a copy of
its last annual financial report.
Moreover, paragraph (d) of said-Section ordains that:
The registration and permit of a legitimate labor organization shall be cancelled by the
Department of Labor, if the Department has reason to believe that the labor
organization no longer meets one or more of the requirements of paragraph (b) above;
or fails to file with the Department Labor either its financial report within the sixty days
of the end of its fiscal year or the names of its new officers along with their non-
subversive affidavits as outlined in paragraph (b) above within sixty days of their
election; however, the Department of Labor shall not order the cancellation of the
registration and permit without due notice and hearing, as provided under paragraph
(c) above and the affected labor organization shall have the same right of appeal to the
courts as previously provided.
284) Short Title: People vs. Ferrer (48 SCRA 382)
Long Title: G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
Page 725 of 846

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac, Branch I), FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob,"
and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias "Taba," respondents.
Facts: That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas,
Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the
Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to
overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit,
subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines
a totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and domination of
an alien power, by being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training
school of recruits of the New People's Army, the military arm of the said Communist
Party of the Philippines.
That in the commission of the above offense, the following aggravating
circumstances are present, to wit:
(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to
public authorities;
(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and afford impunity.
(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court,
sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion.
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the
grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one
subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denied him the equal protection of
the laws.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
Page 726 of 846

Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of September
15, 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that
it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the informations against the two accused. The
Government appealed. We resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action
for certiorari.
Issue: Whether the Anti-Subversion Act, which outlaws the Communist Party of the
Philippines and other “subversive associations,” and punishes any person who
“knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a
member” of t he Party or of any other similar “subversive” organization” is
constitutional.
Ruling: Freedom of expression and freedom of association are sofundamental that
they are thought by some to occupy a"preferred position" in the hierarchy of
constitutional values. 35
Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise mustbe justified by
the existence of a substantive evil.
The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.

A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It
is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In
order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be
present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute
is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an
ex post facto law.)

In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for
the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act.
The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same
purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person.

Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that

 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
Page 727 of 846

membership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of the
organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with
KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a member’s
direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid
and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to
its unlawful acts.

Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed

after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the
passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership
in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or
that the necessary changes having been made.

The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine
Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4
of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the
exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter. Before the
enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the
Congress were done. The court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of
speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are
weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.

The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In
addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements
must also be established:

1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization
purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
Page 728 of 846

domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt

acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is
willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.

The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The
Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.
285) Short Title: Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union (59 SCRA 54)
Long Title: G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974
BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC.,
defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION, defendant-appellant.
Facts: Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the
religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde
Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Company) since 1958. As such
employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter
referred to as Union) which had with the Company a collective bargaining
agreement containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows:
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment
for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement.
The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was renewed the
following day, March 4, 1964.
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by
Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement
with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein,
if such labor organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961,
however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to —
paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
Page 729 of 846

such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation
of their members in any such labor organization".
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its
members with any labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation to
appellant Unionin 1962, and when no action was taken thereon, he reiterated his
resignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to
the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in view
of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member.The
management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the
Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would
be constrained to dismiss him from the service.
This prompted Appellee to file an action for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No.
58894 in the Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the Company and the Union
from dismissing Appellee.1 In its answer, the Union invoked the "union security clause"
of the collective bargaining agreement; assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
3350; and contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 875, Sections 24 and 9 (d) and (e).2
In support of the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350, the Union
contented, firstly, that the Act infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful
associations; that "the very phraseology of said Republic Act 3350, that membership in
a labor organization is banned to all those belonging to such religious sect prohibiting
affiliation with any labor organization"4 , "prohibits all the members of a given religious
sect from joining any labor union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their members
thereto"5 ; and, consequently, deprives said members of their constitutional right to
form or join lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and
thus becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the 1935 Constitution.
Appellee, assailing appellant's arguments, contended that Republic Act No. 3350 does
not violate the right to form lawful associations, for the right to join associations
includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor organization, if one's conscience
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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does not allow his membership therein, and the Act has given substance to such right
by prohibiting the compulsion of workers to join labor organizations
Issue: Whether or not RA No. 3550 is unconstitutional for infringing on the
fundamental freedom to form associations.
Ruling: No. Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and
coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects
which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization. What the
exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop
agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members
of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on
the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. It is
clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on
freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of
said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the
liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If,
notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign
up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious
faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join;
neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor
union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the
constitutional provision on freedom of association.
286) Short Title: Gonzales vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969)
Long Title: G.R. No. L-27833 April 18, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF RE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT 4880. ARSENIO GONZALES and
FELICISIMO R. CABIGAO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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Facts: Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing 6f the petition, an incumbent
councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for
Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11,
1967;petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a
registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-
petitioner. It is their claim that "the enforcement of said Republic Act No.
4880 in question [would] prejudice [their] basic rights..., such as their
freedom of speech, their freedom of assembly and their right to form
associations or societies for purpose not contrary to law, guaranteed under
the Philippine Constitution," and that therefore said act is unconstitutional.
After invoking anew the fundamental rights to free speech, free press, freedom of
association and freedom of assembly with a citation of two American Supreme Court
decisions, 5 they asserted that "there is nothing in the spirit or intention of the law that
would legally justify its passage and [enforcement] whether for reasons of public policy,
public order or morality, and that therefore the enactment of Republic Act [No.] 4880
under, the guise of regulation is but a clear and simple abridgment of the constitutional
rights of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and the right to form associations
and societies for purposes not contrary to law, ..." There was the further allegation that
the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are matters
of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate or
curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or
agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the
police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render the
constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect.
To the plea of petitioners that after hearing, Republic Act No. 4880 be declared
unconstitutional, null and void, respondent Commission on Elections, in its answer filed
on August 1, 1967, after denying the allegations as to the validity of the act "for being
mere conclusions of law, erroneous at that," and setting forth special affirmative
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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defenses, procedural and substantive character, would have this Court dismiss the
petition.
Thereafter the case was set for hearing on August 3, 1967.
On August 9, 1967, another resolution, self-explanatory in character, came from this
Court. Thus: "In ease G.R. No. L-27833 (Arsenio Gonzales, et al. vs. Commission on
Elections), the Court, with eight (8) Justice present, having deliberated on the issue of
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 4880; and a divergence of views having
developed among the Justices as to the constitutionality of section 50-B, pars. (c), (d)
and (e) of the Revised Election Code: considering the Constitutional provision that "no
treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-thirds of
all the members of the (Supreme) Court' (sec. 10, Art, VII), the Court [resolved]
to defer final voting on the issue until after the return of the Justices now on
official leave."
The case was then reset for oral argument. At such hearing, one of the co-
petitioners, now Vice-Mayor Felicisimo Cabigao of the City of Manila acting as counsel,
assailed the validity of the challenged legislation relying primarily on American Supreme
Court opinion that warn against curtailment in whatever guise or form of the cherished
freedoms of expression, of assemble and of association, all embraced in the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Respondent Commission on Elections
was duly represented by Atty. Ramon Barrios.
The matter was then discussed in conference, but no final action was taken. The
divergence of views with reference to the paragraphs above mentioned having
continued, on Oct. 10, 1968, this Court, by resolution, invited certain entities to submit
memoranda as amici curiae on the question of the validity of R.A. Act No. 4880. The
Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P.
Women Lawyers' Circle were included, among them. They did file their respective
memoranda with this Court and aided it in the consideration of the constitutional issues
involved.
Issue: Whether Republic Act 4880 is violative of the freedom to association.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
Page 733 of 846

Ruling: The right of association is affected. Political parties have less

freedom as to the time during which they may nominate candidates; the
curtailment is not such, however, as to render meaningless such a basic
right. Their scope of legitimate activities, save this one, is not unduly
narrowed. Neither is there infringement of their freedom to assemble. They
can do so, but not for such a purpose. We sustain in validity. We do so
unanimously.
Our Constitution likewise recognizes the freedom to form association for purposes not
contrary to law. 33
With or without a constitutional provision of this character, it may be
assumed that the freedom to organize or to be a member of any group or society
exists. With this explicit provision, whatever doubts there may be on the matter are
dispelled. Unlike the cases of other guarantee which are mostly American in origin, this
particular freedom has an indigenous cast. It can trace its origin to the Malolos
Constitution.
In a sense, however, the stress on this freedom of association should be on its political
significance. If such a right were non-existent then the likelihood of a one-party
government is more than a possibility. Authoritarianism may become unavoidable.
Political opposition will simply cease to exist; minority groups may be outlawed,
constitutional democracy as intended by the Constitution may well become a thing of
the past.
Political parties which, as is originally the case, assume the role alternately of being in
the majority or in the minority as the will of the electorate dictates, will lose their
constitutional protection. It is undeniable therefore, that the utmost scope should be
afforded this freedom of association.
It is indispensable not only for its enhancing the respect that should be accorded a
human personality but equally so for its assurance that the wishes of any group to
oppose whatever for the moment is the party in power and with the help of the
electorate to set up its own program of government would not be nullified or frustrated.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
Page 734 of 846

We recognize the wide discretion accorded Congress to protect vital interests.

Considering the responsibility incumbent on the judiciary, it is not always possible, even
with the utmost sympathy shown for the legislative choice of means to cure an
admitted evil, that the legislative judgment arrived at, with its possible curtailment of
the preferred freedoms, be accepted uncritically. There may be times, and this is one of
them, with the majority, with all due reject to a coordinate branch, unable to extend
their approval to the aforesaid specific provisions of one of the sections of the
challenged statute. The necessary two-third vote, however, not being obtained, there is
no occasion for the power to annul statutes to come into play.
Such being the case, it is the judgment of this Court that Republic Act No. 4880 cannot
be declared unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the writ of prayed for denied. Without costs.
287) Short Title: PADCOM Condominium Corp. vs. Ortigas Center Association
Long Title: G.R. No. 146807 - May 9, 2002
PADCOM CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. ORTIGAS CENTER
ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent.
Facts: Petitioner Padcom Condominium Corporation (hereafter PADCOM) owns and
manages the Padilla Office Condominium Building (PADCOM Building) located at
Emerald Avenue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City. The land on which the building stands was
originally acquired from the Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership (OCLP), by Tierra
Development Corporation (TDC) under a Deed of Sale dated 4 September 1974. Among
the terms and conditions in the deed of sale was the requirement that the transferee
and its successor-in-interest must become members of an association for realty owners
and long-term lessees in the area later known as the Ortigas Center. Subsequently, the
said lot, together with improvements thereon, was conveyed by TDC in favor of
PADCOM in a Deed of Transfer dated 25 February 1975.
In 1982, respondent Ortigas Center Association, Inc. (hereafter the
Association) was organized to advance the interests and promote the general
welfare of the real estate owners and long-term lessees of lots in the Ortigas
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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Center. It sought the collection of membership dues in the amount of two thousand
seven hundred twenty-four pesos and forty centavos (P2,724.40) per month from
PADCOM. The corporate books showed that PADCOM owed the
Association P639,961.47, representing membership dues, interests and penalty charges
from April 1983 to June 1993.5 The letters exchanged between the parties
through the years showed repeated demands for payment, requests for
extensions of payment, and even a settlement scheme proposed by PADCOM
in September 1990.
In view of PADCOM's failure and refusal to pay its arrears in monthly dues,
including interests and penalties thereon, the Association filed a complaint
for collection of sum of money before the trial court below, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 63801. The Association averred that purchasers of
lands within the Ortigas Center complex from OCLP are obligated under their
contracts of sale to become members of the Association. This obligation was
allegedly passed on to PADCOM when it bought the lot from TDC, its
predecessor-in-interest.
In view of PADCOM’s failure and refusal to pay its arrears in monthly dues, including
interests and penalties thereon, the Association filed a complaint for collection of sum of
money before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 264 (Civil Case No. 63801),
but the same was dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside
the trial court’s dismissal. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether PADCOM can be compelled to join the association pursuant to the
provisions on automatic membership appearing as a condition in a Deed of Sale .
Ruling: Yes. After a careful examination of the records of this case, the Court sees no
reason to disturb the assailed decision. The petition should be denied.
Evidently, it was agreed by the parties that dues shall be collected from an automatic
member and such fees or assessments shall be a lien on the property.
As lot owner, PADCOM is a regular member of the Association. No application for
membership is necessary. If at all, acceptance by the Board of Directors is a
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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ministerial function considering that PADCOM is deemed to be a regular

member upon the acquisition of the lot pursuant to the automatic
membership clause annotated in the Certificate of Title of the property and
the Deed of Transfer.
This is so because any lien annotated on previous certificates of title should be
incorporated in or carried over to the new transfer certificates of title. Such lien is
inseparable from the property as it is a right in rem, a burden on the property
whoever its owner may be. It subsists notwithstanding a change in ownership; in
short, the personality of the owner is disregarded.16 As emphasized earlier, the provision
on automatic membership was annotated in the Certificate of Title and made a
condition in the Deed of Transfer in favor of PADCOM. Consequently, it is bound by and
must comply with the covenant.
Moreover, Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides that contracts take effect between the
parties, their assigns and heirs. Since PADCOM is the successor-in-interest of TDC, it
follows that the stipulation on automatic membership with the Association is also
binding on the former.
As lot owner, PADCOM is a regular member of the Association. No application for
membership is necessary. If at all, acceptance by the Board of Directors is a ministerial
function considering that PADCOM is deemed to be a regular member upon the
acquisition of the lot pursuant to the automatic membership clause annotated in the
Certificate of Title of the property and the Deed of Transfer.
In addition, under the principle of estoppel, PADCOM is barred from disclaiming
membership in the Association. In estoppel, a person, who by his act or conduct has
induced another to act in a particular manner, is barred from adopting an inconsistent
position, attitude or course of conduct that thereby causes loss or injury to another.
Generally, it may be said that a quasi-contract is based on the presumed will or intent
of the obligor dictated by equity and by the principles of absolute justice. Examples of
these principles are: (1) it is presumed that a person agrees to that which will benefit
him; (2) nobody wants to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another; or (3) one
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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must do unto others what he would want others to do unto him under the same
circumstances.19
As resident and lot owner in the Ortigas area, PADCOM was definitely benefited by the
Association's acts and activities to promote the interests and welfare of those who
acquire property therein or benefit from the acts or activities of the Association.

MODULE 7. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

• Art. III, Sec. 5
• Art. II, Sec. 6 (Separation of State and Church)
• Free Exercise Clause, Benevolent Neutrality Doctrine, Clear and Present
Danger Test and
Compelling State Interest
288) Short Title: Fonacier vs. CA [96 Phil. 417 (1955)]
Long Title: G.R. No. L-5917 January 28, 1955
SANTIAGO A. FONACIER, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABELO DE LOS REYES, Jr., respondents.
Facts: This case was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by the Iglesia
Filipina Independiente, represented by its Supreme Bishop Gerardo M. Bayaca, against
Bishop Santiago A. Fonacier seeking to require the latter to render an
accounting of his administration of all the temporal properties he has in his
possession belonging to said church and to recover the same from him on the
ground that he had ceased to be the Supreme Bishop of said religious
organization. Bishop Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr., having been elected as Supreme
Bishop after the filing of the original complaint, was later made a co-plaintiff in a
supplementary complaint.
Mons. Fonacier claims as a defense that he has not been properly removed as
Supreme Bishop; that his legal successor was Juan Jamias who had been
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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elected in accordance with the constitution of the church; that he had already
rendered an accounting of his administration to Bishop Jamias and turned over all the
properties to the latter; that Bishop Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. formally joined the
Protestant Episcopal Church of America and for this reason he has ceased to be a
member of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente; and that Bishops De los Reyes and
Bayaca having abandoned the faith, fundamental doctrines and practices of the Iglesia
Filipina Independiente, they ceased to be members thereof and consequently, have no
personality to maintain the present action.
On May 17, 1950, the court rendered judgment declaring Mons. Isabelo de los Reyes,
Jr. as the sole and legitimate Supreme Bishop of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente, and
ordering Mons. Fonacier to render an accounting of his administration of the
properties and funds of the church"from the time he began occupying the position
of Secretario de Economia Temporal thereof until the present time.".
On September 2, 1945, the Consejo Supremo de Obispos (Supreme Council of Bishops)
of the IFI convened and approved the designation of bishops to their respective
bishoprics. Here began the conflict which culminated in the division Mons. Alejandro
Remollino was assigned as bishop of the diocese of Cavite. Upon learning that
the latter notified the priests of his bishopric regarding his assignment, Mons. Fonacier
wrote him a letter dated September 18, 1945 enjoining him from assuming the duties of
his office and from taking possession of the diocese of Cavite until he (Fonacier) had
approved the appointment made by the Supreme Council as provided for in the
constitution. To this letter Bishop Remollino replied explaining his side and adding that
he was ready to defend his stand on the matter before the courts of justice. In view of
this attitude, Mons. Fonacier ordered the expulsion of Bishop Remollino from the church
and also of Bishop Manuel Aguilar (Exhibits 3 and 4) whom Mons. Fonacier suspected to
be the instigator of certain acts of insubordination and defamation against him.
"On December 1, 1945, Bishop Manuel Aguilar filed charges (Exhibit B) against Mons.
Fonacier as Supreme Bishop which were submitted to a meeting of the
Supreme Council of Bishops, held on January 21, 1946, which decreed the
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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forced resignation of appellant, and to the Asemblea Magna or Asemblea General

of the church, held on January 22, 1946. This body approved the forced resignation of
appellant (petitioner Fonacier) and elected Bishop Gerardo M. Bayaca as Supreme
Bishop to succeed Mons. Fonacier.
"When notified of his removal as Obispo Maximo and required to turn over all
the funds, documents and other properties of the church to his successor,
appellant refused. Hence, the commencement of the instant action in the Court of
First Instance of Manila.
On September 1, 1946 the Asemblea Magna convened and elected Mons.
Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. as Obispo Maximo (respondent herein). On the same
date Mons. Fonacier and some of his followers met at the Manila Hotel and
elected Mons. Juan Jamias as their Supreme Bishop. Thus two factions of the
IFI were created.
"The faction under Mons. Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. according to the statement (Exhibit
EE) of the Director of National Library, issued on May 22, 1947, have nineteen bishops
and 252 priests while the faction under Mons. Juan Jamias had ten bishops and only 40
priests. Thus on June 23, 1947, the Secretary of Public Instruction promulgated an
order to the effect that for administrative purposes, Mons. Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr.,
was recognized as sole head of IFI and the applications of priests of said church for
permits to solemnize marriages would be granted if it were shown thereon that they
recognized Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr., as the Obispo Maximo of said church.The
Supreme Court, however, denied the power of the Secretary to stop the
Fonacier group from obtaining licenses to solemnize marriages.
When the case was taken to the Court of Appeals, the latter found the decision
of the Court of origin in accordance with law and the evidence and affirmed
the same in toto, and the case is now before us by virtue of a petition for review
interposed by defendant Mons. Fonacier.
Issue: Was the ouster of Bishops Manuel Aguilar and Alejandro Remollino legal and
valid?.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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Ruling: No. The claim that the ouster in question was legal and validbecause
petitioner, as Supreme Bishop, could act alone pursuant to the constitution of the
church wherein it is provided that the Supreme Bishop is the supreme head of the
Iglesia Filipina Independiente and as such shall have full powers to impose the penalties
of dismissal, confinement in the seminary, suspension, fine, transfer, etc. which,
without contravening the penal laws of the constituted government, can be imposed
upon the bishops, and that said power can be exercised even without the intervention
of the Supreme Council, cannot be entertained in the light of the very provisions of
the constitution of the church, it appearing that the alleged power of the Supreme
Bishop under the constitution is not all-embracing but limited and, in any event, the
final action shall be taken by the Supreme Council.
It can be plainly seen from a cursory reading of the foregoing provisions that the
Supreme Bishop cannot punish an erring member without first giving him an
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself, and, in any event, without first
securing the opinion of the Judge of the Curia de Apelaciones, and in serious cases, the
case needs to be referred to the Supreme Council of Bishops. With regard to a case
where a bishop is involved, the action shall be submitted to the Supreme Bishop for
approval. And in case of guilt, the accused may appeal to the Curia de Apelaciones,
whose decision shall be final. Such is the procedure laid down by the constitution of the
church when disciplinary action needs to be taken against a delinquent member. It is
not, therefore, correct to say that the Supreme Bishop can take action alone in
connection with an erring bishop, even in disregard of the Supreme Council, in view of
the over-all powers he claims to possess under the circumstances.
The claim that Bishop Aguilar had no authority to convene the Supreme Council by
reason of his previous ouster cannot now be sustained in view of our finding that said
ouster was made in violation of the constitution of the church. The same thing may be
said with regard to the claim that Bishop Vega had no right to participate in the meeting
because of his voluntary separation from the church. It is only important to note in this
connection that in the session of the Supreme Council held on September 2,1945,
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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(Exhibit M), Bishop Aguilar was elected president of said council and his designation has
not been disputed by petitioner. It was in this capacity that he issued the call for a
meeting of the Asemblea General on January 22, 1946 and the call for a meeting of the
Supreme Council on January 21, 1946.
To finally dispose of the property issue, the Court, citing Watson v. Jones,368 declared
that the rule in property controversies within religious congregations strictly
independent of any other superior ecclesiastical association (such as the Philippine
Independent Church) is that the rules for resolving such controversies should be those
of any voluntary association. If the congregation adopts the majority rule then the
majority should prevail; if it adopts adherence to duly constituted authorities within the
congregation, then that should be followed.
289) Short Title: Imbong vs. Ochoa (G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
Long Title: G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in
behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE
CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER,
INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T.
ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

Facts: Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of
population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society,
diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely
circulate in various media. From television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies
by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy4 - the
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and
progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite
calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from
various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to
wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners,
notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law
would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and
injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception.35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to
contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other
health problems.36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the
RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use
of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of
public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in
the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal
prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical
practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health
programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.
Issue: Whether the RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
Ruling: Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our
fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well
aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow
each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he
believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common
good."
It is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of
contraceptives or one’s participation in the support of modem reproductive
health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is
right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief.For the Court has declared
that matters dealing with “faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law,
custom and rule of a church … are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are
outside the province of the civil courts.”The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to
public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at
bench should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated
otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical
matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine
whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.

Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot
enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply because the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State
is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being
dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his
taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church
and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and unto
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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God the things that are God’s. The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer
imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious
objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking
information on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform
an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas)
has written, “at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of
the human conscience.

The Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether
public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector
should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be
compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of
“the principle of non-coercion” enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of
religion.

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the
freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is
violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting
according to one's belief.
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the
law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render
reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs,
an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the
mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner
would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a
mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing
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CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of
violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency."237

290) Short Title: Ronulo vs. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014)
Long Title: G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014
RENE RONULO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts:The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were
scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish
Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.However, on the day of the wedding, the
supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the
marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As
a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire, clad in a
wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the
Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They
requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to
which the latter agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they
had no marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same
date. He conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their
parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.4
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended, was filed against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.5
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment.
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of
the ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in
the wedding. Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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saw the couple exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a
document.6 She heard the petitioner instructing the principal sponsors to sign the
marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the reception, had lunch and took pictures.
She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the wedding invitation given to her by
Joey.7
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during
the ceremony that they take each other as husband and wife.8 Days after the wedding,
she went to the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty.
Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was
issued to the couple.9
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that
his act of blessing the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the
marriage as contemplated by law.
MTC
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended,
and imposed on him a 200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613.
RTC
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances
surrounding the act of the petitioner in "blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a
marriage ceremony had transpired.
CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no
prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides
minimum standards in determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted,
viz.: (1) the contracting parties must appear personally before the solemnizing officer;
and (2) they should declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of at least two witnesses of legal age.14
Issue: Whether the State can interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the
administration of matrimony.
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Ruling: Petitioner contends that under the principle of separation of church and
State, the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of
matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the "blessing" into a "marriage
ceremony."
We find the petition unmeritorious.
Contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article
6 of the Family Code when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect
the freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital rites, subject only to the
requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as
an inviolable social institution and that our family law is based on the policy that
marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The State has paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional
policies and the preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its
power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as amended,
which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of
marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a
marriage ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were complied with.
While the petitioner may view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the
requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing"
into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code and
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

291) Short Title: Re: Request of Muslim Employees in the Different Courts of Iligan
(A.M. No. 02-2-10-SC December 14, 2005)
Long Title: A.M. No. 02-2-10-SC December 14, 2005
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RE: REQUEST OF MUSLIM EMPLOYEES IN THE DIFFERENT COURTS IN

ILIGAN CITY (RE: OFFICE HOURS)
Facts: In their Letter dated November 19, 2001 addressed to Executive Judge Valerio
M. Salazar, Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, several Muslim employees in the different
courts in the said city request that they be allowed to enjoy the following privileges:
1. to hold office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without lunch break or coffee breaks
during the month of Ramadan;
2. to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer
Day) during the entire calendar year.
Judge Salazar forwarded the said letter-request to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA). Judge Salazar expressed his conformity with the first request, i.e.,
allowing them to hold office from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without any break
during the month of Ramadan.However, he expressed some misgivings about
the second request, i.e., excusing them from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00
p.m. every Friday during the entire calendar year.
In support of their requests, the Muslim employees invoke Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 2911 as amended by P.D. No. 3222 enacted by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
The avowed purpose of P.D. No. 291 was to reinforce national unity by recognizing
Muslim holidays and making them part of our national holidays. Section 2 thereof, as
amended by P.D. No. 322, provides the recognized Muslim holidays.Muslims employees
in the government are excused from reporting to office during these holidays in order
that they may be able to properly observe them.
Pursuant thereto, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) promulgated Resolution No. 81-
1277 dated November 13, 1981. Moreover, in its Resolution No. 00-0227 dated January
26, 2000, the CSC clarified that the term "Friday" in the above resolution is not limited
to the Fridays during the month of Ramadan, but refers to "all Fridays of the
calendar year."However, in order not to run afoul of Section 5,3 Rule XVII of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2924 which enjoins
civil servants to render public service not less than eight hours a day or forty (40) hours
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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a week, the CSC prescribes the adoption of a flexible working schedule to accommodate
the Muslims’ Friday Prayer Day subject to certain conditions, e.g., the flexible working
hours shall not start earlier than 7:00 a.m. and end not later than 7:00 p.m.5
Issue: Whether the request of the Muslim employees to be excused from work from
10:00 am to 2:00 pm every Friday to allow them to attend the Muslim Prayer Day
should be denied.
Ruling: Yes. The Court is not unmindful that the subject requests are grounded on
Section 5, Article III of the Constitution:
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil and political rights.
This provision contains two aspects: (1) the non-establishment clause; and (2)
the free exercise clause. The subject requests are based on the latter and in
interpreting this clause (the free exercise clause) embodied in the Constitution, the
Court has consistently adhered to the doctrine that:
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz.,
freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s beliefs. The first is absolute as
long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
(1) Freedom to Believe
The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter.
He may indulge his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or
none at all; embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any
being that appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the immortality of his soul – in
fact, cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd his
beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the majority, he has
full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs. He
may not be punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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"Men may believe what they cannot prove." Every one has a right to his beliefs and he
may not be called to account because he cannot prove what he believes.
(2) Freedom to Act on One’s Beliefs
But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the
public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as
this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all other rights guaranteed in the
Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others. It is
error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State and
render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be
exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true even if such
practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the purpose
of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.
The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not
create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is
freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law
because of religious dogma.7
The Court recognizes that the observance of Ramadan and the Friday Muslim Prayer
Day is integral to the Islamic faith. However, while the observance of Ramadan and
allowing the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold flexible office hours from 7:30
a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without any break during the month of Ramadan finds support in
Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No. 322, there is no such basis to
excuse them from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday, the Muslim Prayer
Day, during the entire calendar year.

292) Short Title: Estrada vs. Escritor [A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006]
Long Title: A.M. No. P-02-1651 June 22, 2006
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P)
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, Complainant,
vs.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, Respondent.

Facts: In a sworn-letter complaint dated July 27, 2000, complainant Alejandro Estrada
requested Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253, Regional Trial
Court of Las Piñas City, for an investigation of respondent Soledad Escritor,
court interpreter in said court, for living with a man not her husband, and
having borne a child within this live-in arrangement.Estrada believes that
Escritor is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she
should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court
condones her act.2 Consequently, respondent was charged with committing "disgraceful
and immoral conduct" under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised
Administrative Code. 3

Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was
already a widow, her husband having died in 1998.4 She admitted that she started living
with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago
when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She also admitted that
she and Quilapio have a son.5 But as a member of the religious sect known as
the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society,
respondent asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with
their religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation.6 In fact, after
ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a "Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness."7
For Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Declaration allows members of the
congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into
marital relations. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and binding
within the congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed.
As laid out by the tenets of their faith, the Jehovah’s congregation requires that at the
time the declarations are executed, the couple cannot secure the civil authorities’
approval of the marital relationship because of legal impediments. Only couples who
have been baptized and in good standing may execute the Declaration, which requires
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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the approval of the elders of the congregation. As a matter of practice, the marital
status of the declarants and their respective spouses’ commission of adultery are
investigated before the declarations are executed.8 Escritor and Quilapio’s declarations
were executed in the usual and approved form prescribed by the Jehovah’s
Witnesses,9 approved by elders of the congregation where the declarations were
executed,10 and recorded in the Watch Tower Central Office.11
Moreover, the Jehovah’s congregation believes that once all legal
impediments for the couple are lifted, the validity of the declarations ceases,
and the couple should legalize their union. In Escritor’s case, although she
was widowed in 1998, thereby lifting the legal impediment to marry on her
part, her mate was still not capacitated to remarry. Thus, their declarations
remained valid.12 In sum, therefore, insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is
nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and
they remain members in good standing in the congregation.
By invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards of her congregation, in
asserting that her conjugal arrangement does not constitute disgraceful and immoral
conduct for which she should be held administratively liable,13 the Court had to
determine the contours of religious freedom under Article III, Section 5 of the
Constitution, which provides, viz:
Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Issue: Whether by invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards of her
congregation, in asserting that her conjugal arrangement does not constitute
disgraceful and immoral conduct for which she should be held administratively liable.
Ruling: The two streams of jurisprudence - separationist or accommodationist - are
anchored on a different reading of the "wall of separation."Separationist - This
approach erects an absolute barrier to formal interdependence of religion and state.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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Religious institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or indirect, from the state.
Nor could the state adjust its secular programs to alleviate burdens the programs
placed on believers. the strict neutrality or separationist view is largely used by the
Court, showing the Court’s tendency to press relentlessly towards a more secular
society
Accommodationist - Benevolent neutrality thus recognizes that religion plays an
important role in the public life of the United States as shown by many traditional
government practices which An accommodationist holds that it is good public policy,
and sometimes constitutionally required, for the state to make conscious and deliberate
efforts to avoid interference with religious freedom.
On the other hand, the strict neutrality adherent believes that it is good public policy,
and also constitutionally required, for the government to avoid religion-specific policy
even at the cost of inhibiting religious exercise First, the accommodationist
interpretation is most consistent with the language of the First Amendment. Second,
the accommodationist position best achieves the purposes of the First Amendment.
Third, the accommodationist interpretation is particularly necessary to protect
adherents of minority religions from the inevitable effects of majoritarianism, which
include ignorance and indifference and overt hostility to the minority Fourth, the
accommodationist position is practical as it is a commonsensical way to deal with the
various needs and beliefs of different faiths in a pluralistic nation.
The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for
the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state’s
interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others
delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in
preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary In
applying the test, the first inquiry is whether respondent’s right to religious freedom has
been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing between keeping her employment and
abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on the one hand, andgiving up
her employment and keeping her religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a
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burden on her free exercise of religion. The second step is to ascertain respondent’s
sincerity in her religious belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious belief
and practice and is not merely using the "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid
punishment for immorality.
She did not secure the Declaration only after entering the judiciary where the
moral standards are strict and defined, much less only after an
administrative case for immorality was filed against her. Indeed, it is
inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on
the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be
discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the
Solicitor General. To properly settle the issue in the case at bar, the
government should be given the opportunity to demonstrate the compelling
state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s stance that her
conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the
scope of free exercise protection.

293) Short Title: Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu [219 SCRA
256 (1993)]
Facts: Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS) Regional Office in Cebu
received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovah’s Witness,
which refused to sing the Philippine National Anthem, salute the flag and recite the
patriotic pledge.

Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division

of DECS directed to remove from service, after due process, teachers and
school employees, and to deprive the students and pupils from the benefit of
public education, if they do not participate in daily flag ceremony and doesn’t
obey flag salute rule.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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Members of the Jehovah’s Witness sect find such memorandum to be contrary to their
religious belief and choose not to obey. Despite a number of appropriate persuasions
made by the Cebu officials to let them obey the directives, still they opted to follow
their conviction to their belief. As a result, an order was issued by the district supervisor
of Daan Bantayan District of Cebu, dated July 24, 1990, ordering the ‘dropping from the
list’ in the school register of all Jehovah’s Witness teachers and pupils from Grade 1 to
Grade 6 who opted to follow their belief which is against the Flag Salute Law, however,
given a chance to be re-accepted if they change their mind.
Some Jehovah’s Witness members appealed to the Secretary of Education but the latter
did not answer to their letter.

Therefore, Petitioners students and their parents filed special civil actions for
Mandamus, Certiorari and prohibition, alleging that the respondents acted without or in
excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in ordering their expulsion
without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their
right to free public education and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship.
Petitioners prayed for the voiding of the order of expulsion or ‘dropping from the rolls’
issued by the District Supervisor.
On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, commanding the respondents to immediately re-admit
the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders.

On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions
defending the expulsion orders issued by the respondents.

Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag
ceremony, they do not engage in ‘external acts’ or behavior that would
offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country
through observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during
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the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate
in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no
warrant for their expulsion.
Issue: Whether members of Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school (both
public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the
flag ceremony or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and
reciting the patriotic pledge.
Ruling: No. Upholding religious freedom as a fundamental right deserving the "highest
priority and amplest protection among human rights," this Court, in Ebralinag
vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu4 re-examined our over two decades-old
decision in Gerona and reversed expulsion orders made by the public respondents
therein as violative of both the free exercise of religion clause and the right of citizens
to education under the 1987 Constitution.5
The religious convictions and beliefs of the members of the religious sect, the Jehovah's
Witnesses are widely known and are equally widely disseminated in numerous books,
magazines, brochures and leaflets distributed by their members in their house to house
distribution efforts and in many public places. Their refusal to render obeisance to any
form or symbol which smacks of idolatry is based on their sincere belief in the biblical
injunction found in Exodus 20:4,5, against worshipping forms or idols other than God
himself. The basic assumption in their universal refusal to salute the flags of the
countries in which they are found is that such a salute constitutes an act of religious
devotion forbidden by God's law. This assumption, while "bizarre" to others is firmly
anchored in several biblical passages.6
And yet, while members of Jehovah's Witnesses, on the basis of religious convictions,
refuse to perform an act (or acts) which they consider proscribed by the Bible, they
contend that such refusal should not be taken to indicate disrespect for the symbols of
the country or evidence that they are wanting in patriotism and nationalism. They
point out that as citizens, they have an excellent record as law abiding
members of society even if they do not demonstrate their refusal to conform
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to the assailed orders by overt acts of conformity. On the contrary, they aver
that they show their respect through less demonstrative methods manifesting their
allegiance, by their simple obedience to the country's laws,7 by not engaging in
antigovernment activities of any kind,8 and by paying their taxes and dues to society as
self-sufficient members of the community.9 While they refuse to salute the flag, they are
willing to stand quietly and peacefully at attention, hands on their side, in order not to
disrupt the ceremony or disturb those who believe differently.10
The religious beliefs, practices and convictions of the members of the sect as a minority
are bound to be seen by others as odd and different and at divergence with the
complex requirements of contemporary societies, particularly those societies which
require certain practices as manifestations of loyalty and patriotic behavior. Against
those who believe that coerced loyalty and unity are mere shadows of patriotism, the
tendency to exact "a hydraulic insistence on conformity to majoritarian standards,"11 is
seductive to the bureaucratic mindset as a shortcut to patriotism.
No doubt, the State possesses what the Solicitor General describes as the responsibility
"to inculcate in the minds of the youth the values of patriotism and nationalism and to
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs." The teaching of these values
ranks at the very apex of education's "high responsibility" of shaping up the minds of
the youth in those principles which would mold them into responsible and productive
members of our society. However, the government's interest in molding the
young into patriotic and civic spirited citizens is "not totally free from a
balancing process"12 when it intrudes into other fundamental rights such as those
specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the constitutional right to education
and the unassailable interest of parents to guide the religious upbringing of their
children in accordance with the dictates of their conscience and their sincere religious
beliefs.13 Recognizing these values, Justice Carolina Grino-Aquino, the writer of the
original opinion, underscored that a generation of Filipinos which cuts its teeth on the
Bill of Rights would find abhorrent the idea that one may be compelled, on pain of
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expulsion, to salute the flag sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge
during a flag ceremony.14 "This coercion of conscience has no place in a free society".15
The State's contentions are therefore, unacceptable, for no less fundamental than the
right to take part is the right to stand apart.16 In the context of the instant case, the
freedom of religion enshrined in the Constitution should be seen as the rule,
not the exception. To view the constitutional guarantee in the manner suggested by
the petitioners would be to denigrate the status of a preferred freedom and to relegate
it to the level of an abstract principle devoid of any substance and meaning in the lives
of those for whom the protection is addressed. As to the contention that the
exemption accorded by our decision benefits a privileged few, it is enough to
re-emphasize that "the constitutional protection of religious freedom
terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious
equality, not civil immunity."17 The essence of the free exercise clause is
freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to
law because of religious dogma.18 Moreover, the suggestion implicit in the State's
pleadings to the effect that the flag ceremony requirement would be equally and evenly
applied to all citizens regardless of sect or religion and does not thereby discriminate
against any particular sect or denomination escapes the fact that "[a] regulation,
neutral on its face, may in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional
requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of
religion."19

294) Short Title: Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance (235 SCRA 630)
Long Title: G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.
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Facts: These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the
petitions filed in these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716,
otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The motions, of which there
are 10 in all, have been filed by the several petitioners in these cases, with the
exception of the Philippine Educational Publishers Association, Inc. and the Association
of Philippine Booksellers, petitioners in G.R. No. 115931.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, filed a consolidated comment, to
which the Philippine Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 115852, and the Philippine
Press Institute, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, and Juan T. David, petitioner in G.R.
No. 115525, each filed a reply. In turn the Solicitor General filed on June 1, 1995 a
rejoinder to the PPI's reply.
RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that
seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various
suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of
Representatives but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it
did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI,
Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase
of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively
in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it
has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final
form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the
yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Issue: Whether Ra 7716 is unconstitutional.
Ruling: No. We have held that, as a general proposition, the press is not exempt from
the taxing power of the State and that what the constitutional guarantee of free press
prohibits are laws which single out the press or target a group belonging to the press
for special treatment or which in any way discriminate against the press on the basis of
the content of the publication, and R.A. No. 7716 is none of these.
The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not discriminate against
the press because "even nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed
freedom is unconstitutional." PPI cites in support of this assertion the following
statement in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 87 L. Ed. 1292 (1943):
The fact that the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory" is immaterial. The protection afforded
by the First Amendment is not so restricted. A license tax certainly does not acquire
constitutional validity because it classifies the privileges protected by the First
Amendment along with the wares and merchandise of hucksters and peddlers and
treats them all alike. Such equality in treatment does not save the ordinance. Freedom
of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in preferred position.
The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is
mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a
prior restraint on the exercise of its right. Hence, although its application to others,
such those selling goods, is valid, its application to the press or to religious
groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale
of religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme
Court put it, "it is one thing to impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is
quite another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon."

295) Short Title: American Bible Society vs. City of Manila [181 Phil. 386 (1957)]
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Long Title:
Facts: Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary
corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine
agency established in Manila in November, 1898, with its principal office at 636 Isaac
Peral in said City. The defendant appellee is a municipal corporation with powers that
are to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as
the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.
In the course of its ministry, plaintiff's Philippine agency has been
distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (except during
the Japanese occupation) throughout the Philippines and translating the
same into several Philippine dialects. On May 29 1953, the acting City Treasurer of
the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general
merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's
permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and
Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within
three days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with
compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd
quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45 (Annex A).
Plaintiff protested against this requirement, but the City Treasurer demanded that
plaintiff deposit and pay under protest the sum of P5,891.45, if suit was to be taken in
court regarding the same (Annex B). To avoid the closing of its business as well as
further fines and penalties in the premises on October 24, 1953, plaintiff paid to the
defendant under protest the said permit and license fees in the aforementioned
amount, giving at the same time notice to the City Treasurer that suit would be taken in
court to question the legality of the ordinances under which, the said fees were being
collected (Annex C), which was done on the same date by filing the complaint that gave
rise to this action. In its complaint plaintiff prays that judgment be rendered
declaring the said Municipal Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and
Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364 illegal and unconstitutional, and that
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the defendant be ordered to refund to the plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 paid under
protest, together with legal interest thereon, and the costs, plaintiff further praying for
such other relief and remedy as the court may deem just equitable.
When the case was set for hearing, plaintiff proved, among other things, that it has
been in existence in the Philippines since 1899, and that its parent society is in New
York, United States of America; that its, contiguous real properties located at Isaac
Peral are exempt from real estate taxes; and that it was never required to pay
any municipal license fee or tax before the war, nor does the American Bible
Society in the United States pay any license fee or sales tax for the sale of
bible therein. Plaintiff further tried to establish that it never made any profit from the
sale of its bibles, which are disposed of for as low as one third of the cost, and that in
order to maintain its operating cost it obtains substantial remittances from its New York
office and voluntary contributions and gifts from certain churches, both in the United
States and in the Philippines, which are interested in its missionary work.
Issue:Whether the City Treasurer may impose permit fee upon the religious
organization before the latter may distribute and sell bibles with the City of Manila.
Ruling: Article III, section 1, clause (7) of the Constitution guarantees the freedom of
religious profession and worship. Religion has been spoken of as 'a profession of faith
to an active power that binds and elevates man to its Creator. It has reference to one's
views of his relations to His Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence to
His being and character, and obedience to His Will.

The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious

profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious
information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like other
restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent.
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A tax on the income of one who engages in religious activities is different

from a tax on property used or employed in connection with those activities.
It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a preacher. It is
quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon.
The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or
suppress its enjoyment. The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these
freedoms is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court has
repeatedly struck down. It is not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to
defray the expenses of policing the activities in question. It is in no way apportioned. It
is flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose
enjoyment is guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and religion and
inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. Such is the inherent vice and evil of a flat
license tax.
Dissemination of religious information cannot be conditioned upon the
approval of an official or manager. The right to enjoy freedom of the press
and religion occupies a preferred position as against the constitutional right
of property owners. Herein, Section 27 (e) of Commonwealth Act 466 (NIRC) --
which exempts corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes, Provided however, That the income of
whatever kind and character from any of its properties, real or personal, or from any
activity conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be
liable to the tax imposed under the Code -- does not apply to the Society as its act of
distributing and selling bibles, etc. is purely religious in nature. Ordinance 2529, as
amended, cannot as well be applied to the Society, for in doing so it would impair its
free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights
of dissemination of religious beliefs.
The fact that the price of the bibles and other religious pamphlets are little higher than
the actual cost of the same does not necessarily mean that it is already engaged in the
business or occupation of selling said “merchandise” for profit. Lastly, Constitutional
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Law II, 2005 ( 20 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Ordinance 3000 of the City of Manila,
which requires the obtention of the Mayor's permit before any person can engage in
any of the businesses, trades or occupations enumerated therein, is not applicable to
the Society, as its business, trade or occupation is not particularly mentioned in Section
3 of the Ordinance, and the record does not show that a permit is required therefor
under existing laws and ordinances for the proper supervision and enforcement of their
provisions governing the sanitation, security and welfare of the public and the health of
the employees engaged in the business of the Society.
296) Short Title: Swaggart Ministries vs. Cal Bd. of Equalization [493 U.S. 378 (1990)]
Facts: California law requires retailers to pay a 6% sales tax on in-state sales of
tangible personal property and to collect from state residents a 6& use tax on such
property purchased outside the State. During the tax period in question, appellant
religious organization, which is incorporated in Louisiana, sold a variety of religious
materials at “”evangelistic crusades”” within California and made mail-order sales of
other such materials to California residents. Appellee State Board of Equalization
audited appellant and advised it that it should register as a seller as required by state
law and report and pay sales and use taxes on the aforementioned sales. Appellant paid
the taxes and the Board ruled against it on its petitions for redetermination and refund,
rejecting its contention that the tax on religious materials violated the First Amendment.
The state trial court entered judgement for the Board in appelant refund suit, the State
Court of Appeal affirmed and the State Supreme Court denied discretionary review.
Issue: Whether taxes were constitutional.
Ruling: Yes. The collection and payment of the tax imposes no constitutionally
significant burden on appellant's religious practices or beliefs under the Free Exercise
Clause, which accordingly does not require the State to grant appellant a tax
exemption. Appellant misreads Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, and Follett v.
McCormick, 321 U. S. 573, which, although holding flat license taxes on commercial
sales unconstitutional with regard to the evangelical distribution of religious materials,
nevertheless specifically stated that religious activity may constitutionally be subjected
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to a generally applicable income or property tax akin to the California tax at issue.
Those cases apply only where a flat license tax operates as a prior restraint on the free
exercise of religious belief. As such, they do not invalidate California's generally
applicable sales and use tax, which is not a flat tax, represents only a small fraction of
any sale, and applies neutrally to all relevant sales regardless of the nature of the seller
or purchaser, so that there is no danger that appellant'sreligious activity is being singled
out for special and burdensome treatment.
Moreover, the concern in Murdock and Follett that flat license taxes operate as a
precondition to the exercise of evangelistic activity is not present here, because the
statutory registration requirement and the tax itself do not act as prior restraints -- no
fee is charged for registering, the tax is due regardless of preregistration, and the tax is
not imposed as a precondition of disseminating the message. Furthermore, since
appellant argues that the exercise of its beliefs is unconstitutionally burdened by the
reduction in its income resulting from the presumably lower demand for its wares
(caused by the marginally higher price generated by the tax) and from the costs
associated with administering the tax, its free exercise claim is in significant tension
with Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U. S. 680, 490 U. S. 699, which made clear that,
to the extent that imposition of a generally applicable tax merely decreases the amount
of money appellant has to spend on its religious activities, any such burden is not
constitutionally significant because it is no different from that imposed by other
generally applicable laws and regulations to which religious organizations must adhere.
While a more onerous tax rate than California's, even if generally applicable, might
effectively choke off an adherent's religious practices, that situation is not before, or
considered by, this Court. Pp. 493 U. S. 384-392.
297) Torcaso vs. Watkins [367 U.S. 488 (1961)]
FACTS:
Roy Torcaso was appointed as a notary public by the governor of Maryland, but was
denied his commission for refusing to affirm his belief in the “existence of
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God” as required by article 37 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland

Constitution.
Torcaso sued in state court to receive his commission and was denied. The
Maryland Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court, upheld the lower court decision,
finding that the state’s constitutional requirement was self-executing while also
concluding that Torcaso was “not compelled to hold office.” Torcaso said of his suit,
“The point at issue is not whether I believe in a Supreme Being, but whether the
state has a right to inquire into my beliefs” (Bernstein 2007).
ISSUE: Whether the use of religious test is constitutional in practice?
RULING:
NO, The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, declaring the use of a religious test an
unconstitutional practice. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Hugo L.
Black stated that the Maryland requirement clearly places the “power and authority of
the State of Maryland . . . on the side of one particular set of believers — those who are
willing to say they believe in ‘the existence of God.’” Black then dismissed Maryland’s
claim that its oath requirement does not compel any citizen to “believe or disbelieve.”
Rather, it only compels those who voluntarily seek public office to affirm belief in God,
and no person is “compelled to hold office.” Black, citing Wieman v. Updegraff (1952),
wrote that the mere fact “that a person is not compelled to hold public office cannot
possibly be an excuse for barring him from office by state-imposed criteria forbidden by
the Constitution.”
298)Cantwell vs. Connecticut (310 US 296)
Newton Cantwell and his sons, Jehovah's Witnesses, were proselytizing a
predominantly Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut. They were travelling door-
to-door and approaching people on the street. Two pedestrians reacted angrily to an
anti-Catholic message.
Cantwell and his sons were arrested and charged with:
(1)Violation of a Connecticut statute requiring solicitors to obtain a
certificate before soliciting funds from the public, and
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(2) Inciting a common-law breach of the peace.

Issue: Whether the Cantwells’ free communication of views were violated?
NO, In a unanimous decision, the Court held the Cantwells’ actions were protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Writing for the Court, Justice Owen Roberts
reasoned that while general regulations on solicitation were legitimate, restrictions
based on religious grounds were not. Because the statute allowed local officials to
determine which causes were religious and which ones were not, it violated the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court also held that while the maintenance of
public order was a valid state interest, it could not be used to justify the
suppression of "free communication of views."The Cantwells' message, while
offensive to many, did not threaten "bodily harm" and was protected religious speech.
299) West Virgina Board of Education vs. Barnette [319 US 624 (1943)]
FACTS:
In 1942, the West Virginia Board of Education required public schools to
include salutes to the flag by teachers and students as a mandatory part of
school activities.The children in a family of Jehovah's Witnesses refused to
perform the salute and were sent home from school for non-compliance. They
were also threatened with reform schools used for criminally active children, and their
parents faced prosecutions for causing juvenile delinquency.
ISSUE:
Does a requirement of a local school board that all public school students and
teachers salute the flag violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
RULING:
Yes, there is no doubt that, in connection with the pledges, the flag salute is a form of
utterance, as symbolism is an effective way of communicating ideas.
The question that underlies the flag salute controversy is whether such a
ceremony conveying matters of opinion and political attitude may be
imposed upon an individual by official authority. In addition, the Fourteenth
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Amendment, as now applied to the states, protects the citizen against the state itself
and all of its creatures – including the Board of Education.
It is important to distinguish between the First and the Fourteenth Amendments in this
analysis. While the test for the Fourteenth Amendment only requires that the
legislation have a “rational basis,” freedoms of speech and of press, of
assembly, and of worship, may not be infringed on such slender grounds.
They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate
danger to interests that the State may lawfully protect. Here, no one disputes
that national unity is an important end, but the problem is whether compulsion as here
employed is a permissible means for its achievement.
The Supreme Court concluded that the action of the local authorities in
compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends the constitutional
limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit
which is the purpose of the First Amendment to reserve from all official
control. Thus, the Board of Education’s resolution is unconstitutional on both grounds.
300) Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union [59 SCRA 54 (1974)]
FACTS:
Victoriano was an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. As such employee, he
was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union which had a closed shop agreement
with the Company that membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of
employment for all its permanent employees.
Prior to its amendment, Section 4(a)(4) of Republic Act No. 875 allows the employer to
require as a condition of employment membership in a labor organization, if such
organization is the representative of the employees. However, the provision was later
amended by the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, which reads: … “but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of
their members in any such labor organization”.
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any
labor organization, Victoriano presented his resignation to the Union. In turn, the Union
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asked the Company to dismiss Victoriano from the service in view of the fact that he
was resigning from the Union as a member. This prompted Victoriano to file an action
to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing him. The Union assails the
constitutionality of RA No. 3350, contending that it infringes on the fundamental right
to form lawful associations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA No. 3550 is unconstitutional for infringing on the fundamental
freedom to form associations.
RULING:
No. As ruled by the Supreme Court:
“RA No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed
shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation
of their members with any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore,
is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor
unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in
spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused
employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members
of the collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from
infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces
it.
It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor
unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to
affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of
said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in
deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the
law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and
neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350,
therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association.”
301) Pamil vs. Teleron (G.R. no. L-34854, November 20, 1978)
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FACTS:
Private respondent, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was elected to the position
of municipal mayor of Alburque, Bohol in 1971. He was duly proclaimed.
However, a suit for quo warranto was then filed by petitioner Fortunato R. Pamil, an
aspirant for the office, of his disqualification based on the Administrative Code
provision: “In no case shall there be receiving salaries or compensation from
provincial or national funds or contractors for public works of the
municipality.”
The suit on the other hand, did not prosper as the respondent Judge Honorable
Victorino C. Teleron, sustained the right of Father Gonzaga to the office. The
respondent ruled that such statutory ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the Election
Code of 1971.
The matter was then elevated to this Tribunal by petitioner with his contention that
there was no such implied repeal that it is still in full force and effect.
In the Tribunal, the court was divided on the said issue. Seven members of the Court
are of the view that the judgment should be affirmed as the challenged provision is no
longer operative either because it was superseded by the 1935 Constitution or repealed.
The remaining five members of this Court, on the other hand, hold that such a
prohibition against an ecclesiastic running for elective office is not tainted with any
constitutional infirmity.
ISSUE: Whether the disqualification of the respondent based on the Administrative
Code provision is constitutional.
RULING:
The vote was thus indecisive as five members of the Court constitute a minority and the
remaining votes did not suffice or failed to obtain a majority vote of 8 to render the
challenge provision ineffective and which, is needed for this law to be binding upon the
parties in this case.
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The Revised Administrative Code was enacted in 1917. In the 1935 Constitution, as it is
now under the present Charter, it is explicitly declared: “No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.”
It would be an unjustified departure from a settled principle of the applicable
construction of the provision on what laws remain operative after 1935 if the plea of
petitioner in this case were to be heeded. The challenged Administrative Code
provision, certainly insofar as it declares ineligible ecclesiastics to any
elective or appointive office, is, on its face, inconsistent with the religious
freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To so exclude them is to impose a
religious test.
In Torcaso v. Watkins, an American Supreme Court decision, has persuasive weight.
What was there involved was the validity of a provision in the Maryland Constitution
prescribing that “no religious test ought ever to be required as a disqualification for any
office or profit or trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the existence of
God …” Such a constitutional requirement was assailed as contrary to the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution by an appointee to the office of notary
public in Maryland, who was refused a commission as he would not declare a belief in
God. He failed in the Maryland Court of Appeals but prevailed in the United States
Supreme Court, which reversed the state court decision. It could not have been
otherwise. As emphatically declared by Justice Black: “this Maryland religious test for
public office unconstitutionally invades the appellant’s freedom of belief and religion and
therefore cannot be enforced against him.”It was also pointed out that how can one
who swore to serve the Church’s interest above all be in duty to enforce state policies
which at times may conflict with church tenets. This is in violation of the separation of
the church and state. The Revised Administrative Code still stands because there is no
implied repeal.Nonetheless, tie above view failed to obtain the necessary eight votes
needed to give it binding force. The attack on the continuing effectivity of Section 2175
having failed, it must be, as noted at the outset, given full force and application.
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Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The judgment a quo is reversed
and set aside. Respondent Father Gonzaga was hereby ordered immediately to
vacate the mayoralty of the municipality of Albuquerque, Bohol, there being
a failure to elect. No pronouncement as to costs.
Non-Establishment Clause
302) Ang Ladlad LGBT vs. COMELEC (G.R no. 190582, April 8, 2010)
“AngLadlad” is an organization of people who identify themselves as lesbians,
gays, bisexuals or trans- genders. The Comelec dismissed the petition on moral
grounds as “the definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that it tolerates
immorality which offends religious beliefs and advocates sexual immorality. P
etitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral
doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it or any of
itsnominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws,
rules, or regulationsrelating to the elections.
Furthermore, states COMELEC, AngLadlad will be exposing our youth to anenvironment
that does not conform to the teachings of our faith.
ISSUE: Whether the denial of accreditation by COMELEC, violated the constitutional
guarantees against the establishment of religion?
HELD: YES
Comelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s application was a
violation of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the
Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a
secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is
“detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society"), rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed
to substantiate their allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad would be detrimental
to society. The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its
constitutionally vested rights on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general
application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in
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the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own
laws nor by any international laws to which we adhere.
303) Garces vs. Estenzo (104 SCRA 510)
The barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City, adopted Resolution No. 5, “reviving the
traditional socio-religious celebration” every 5th day of April “of the feast day of Señor
San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia”. It provided for the acquisition of
the image of San Vicente Ferrer that would be obtained through the selling of
tickets and cash donations. They subsequently passed Resolution No. 6 designating
the chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta to be the caretaker of the image and
would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his next successor.
The said image would also be made available to the Catholic parish church during the
celebration of the saint’s feast day.
Through the funds raised by means of solicitations and cash donations of the
barangay residents and those of the neighboring places of Valencia, the
wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by the barangay council
for four hundred pesos. It was then temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic
church of Barangay Valencia so that the devotees could worship the saint during the
mass for the fiesta.
A controversy arose after the mass when the parish priest, Father Sergio
Marilao Osmeña, refused to return that image to the barangay council on the
pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were
used for its acquisition.
ISSUE:
Whether the resolutions contravene the constitutional provision that “no law
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion”.
RULING:
No.The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any
religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor was appropriate public money or
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property for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman for the image
purchased with private funds and not with tax money.
This is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saint’s image and there is no question that
the image belongs to the barangay council. As the owner, it designated a layman as the
custodian of the wooden image in order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the
Catholic church. Manifestly puerile and flimsy is petitioners’ argument that the barangay
council favored the Catholic religion by using the funds raised by solicitations and
donations for the purchase of the patron saint’s wooden image and making the image
available to the Catholic church.
The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the
barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the
purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the
religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the
mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when
the mass was celebrated.
304) Glassroth vs. Moore 229 [F. Supp. 2d 1290 (M.D. Ala. 2002)]
RULING:
Lawyers concerned about state endorsement of religion and possible bias
against their clients said they were offended when the chief justice of the
Alabama Supreme Court installed a religious monument in the rotunda of the
state judicial building. Without the associate justices' awareness or consent, the 2
1/2-ton monument was installed under cover of night in August 2001.
They said they were afraid that their clients might not get a fair hearing if
they did not share the justice's religious beliefs and that the sight of visitors
to the state building kneeling and praying before the Ten Commandments
monument was disturbing. They wanted the monument removed.
The Center sued Chief Justice Roy Moore on their behalf, alleging that his actions
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S Constitution and
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the principle of separation of church and state. The suit was litigated in cooperation
with the ACLU and Americans United for the Separation of Church and State.
ISSUE: Whether a religious sanctuary within the walls of a courthouse
whould be removed?
RULING:
YES. U.S. District Court Judge Myron Thompson agreed and ruled that the
monument created "a religious sanctuary within the walls of a courthouse"
and must be removed. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on
July 1, 2003. Moore refused to remove the monument, and his defiant refusal
to obey the federal courts led to his suspension as Chief Justice.
In addition to the state Supreme Court, the building where the monument sits houses
the Court of Criminal Appeals, the Court of Civil Appeals, the Alabama Administrative
Office of Courts, and the state law library.
The monument was removed from public view under order of the associate
justices on August 27, 2003. After a decision by the Alabama Court of the Judiciary,
Moore was removed from office due to ethics violations on November 13, 2003.
305) Epperson vs. Arkansas [33 U.S. 27 (1968)]
FACTS:
Appellant Epperson, an Arkansas public school teacher, brought this action for
declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the constitutionality of
Arkansas' "anti-evolution" statute.That statute makes it unlawful for a
teacher in any state supported school or university to teach or to use a
textbook that teaches "that mankind ascended or descended from a lower
order of animals." The State Chancery Court held the statute an abridgment of free
speech violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The State Supreme Court,
expressing no opinion as to whether the statute prohibits "explanation" of
the theory or only teaching that the theory is true, reversed the Chancery
Court. In a two-sentence opinion, it sustained the statute as within the State's power
to specify the public school curriculum.
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ISSUE: Whether the prohibition of state laws respecting religion was

violated?
RULING:
The statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces the First
Amendment's prohibition of state laws respecting an establishment of religion.
(a) The Court does not decide whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague, since,
whether it is construed to prohibit explaining the Darwinian theory or teaching that it is
true, the law conflicts with the Establishment Clause. (b) The sole reason for the
Arkansas law is that a particular religious group considers the evolution theory to
conflict with the account of the origin of man set forth in the Book of Genesis.
(c) The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and
religion, and between religion and nonreligion.
(d) A State's right to prescribe the public school curriculum does not include the right to
prohibit teaching a scientific theory or doctrine for reasons that run counter to the
principles of the First Amendment.
(e) The Arkansas law is not a manifestation of religious neutrality.

306) Lemon vs. Kurtzman [403 U.S. 602 (1971)

FACTS:
Rhode Island's 1969 Salary Supplement Act provides for a 15% salary supplement to be
paid to teachers in nonpublic schools at which the average per-pupil expenditure on
secular education is below the average in public schools. Eligible teachers must
teach only courses offered in the public schools, using only materials used in
the public schools, and must agree not to teach courses in religion.
A three-judge court found that about 25% of the State's elementary students attended
nonpublic schools, about 95% of whom attended Roman Catholic affiliated schools, and
that to date about 250 teachers at Roman Catholic schools are the sole beneficiaries
under the Act. The court found that the parochial school system was "an
integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church," and held that
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the Act fostered "excessive entanglement" between government and

religion, thus violating the Establishment Clause.
Pennsylvania's Non-public Elementary and Secondary Education Act, passed in 1968,
authorizes the state Superintendent of Public Instruction to "purchase" certain "secular
educational services" from non-public schools, directly reimbursing those schools solely
for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials. Reimbursement is
restricted to courses in specific secular subjects, the textbooks and materials must be
approved by the Superintendent, and no payment is to be made for any course
containing "any subject matter expressing religious teaching, or the morals or forms of
worship of any sect." Contracts were made with schools that have more than 20% of all
the students in the State, most of which were affiliated with the Roman Catholic
Church. The complaint challenging the constitutionality of the Act alleged that the
church-affiliated schools are controlled by religious organizations, have the purpose of
propagating and promoting a particular religious faith, and conduct their operations to
fulfill that purpose. A three-judge court granted the State's motion to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim for relief, finding no violation of the Establishment
or Free Exercise Clause.
ISSUE: Whether there was excessive entanglement between the government and
religion?
RULING:
YES. Both statutes are unconstitutional under the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, as the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the
statutes involves excessive entanglement between government and religion.
(a) The entanglement in the Rhode Island program arises because of the religious
activity and purpose of the church-affiliated schools, especially with respect to children
of impressionable age in the primary grades, and the dangers that a teacher under
religious control and discipline poses to the separation of religious from purely secular
aspects of elementary education in such schools. These factors require continuing state
surveillance to ensure that the statutory restrictions are obeyed and the First
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Amendment otherwise respected. Furthermore, under the Act, the government must
inspect school records to determine what part of the expenditures is attributable to
secular education, as opposed to religious activity, in the event a nonpublic school's
expenditures per pupil exceed the comparable figures for public schools.
(b) The entanglement in the Pennsylvania program also arises from the restrictions and
surveillance necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly nonideological role and the
state supervision of nonpublic school accounting procedures required to establish the
cost of secular, as distinguished from religious, education. In addition, the Pennsylvania
statute has the further defect of providing continuing financial aid directly to the
church-related schools. Historically, governmental control and surveillance measures
tend to follow cash grant programs, and here the government's post-audit power to
inspect the financial records of church-related schools creates an intimate and
continuing relationship between church and state.
(c) Political division along religious lines was one of the evils at which the First
Amendment aimed, and in these programs, where successive and probably permanent
annual appropriations that benefit relatively few religious groups are involved,
politicalfragmentation and divisiveness on religious lines are likely to be intensified.
(d) Unlike the tax exemption for places of religious worship, upheld in Walz v. Tax
Commission, 397 U. S. 664, which was based on a practice of 200 years, these
innovative programs have self-perpetuating and self-expanding propensities which
provide a warning signal against entanglement between government and religion.

307) Martin vs. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop (434 Mass. 141)
FACTS:
The specific provision of a particular zoning by-law providing that the board of appeals
should take into consideration the "visual consequences" of any proposed structure and
that "views from public ways and developed properties should be considerately treated
in the site arrangement and building design," was sufficient to confer standing on an
abutter who challenged the construction of an eighty-three foot high church steeple in
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her residential zoning district that would be visible to the abutter from most, if not all,
of her property, both during the day and when lit at night. That the projection height
restriction of the applicable zoning bylaw, if applied to a steeple proposed for the roof
of a temple constructed by the church, would be an unreasonable, regulation of a
religious structure prohibited by the Dover Amendment G.L.c. 40A, § 3, second par., the
judge erred in determining that, even if the Dover Amendment applied, the church
failed to prove that application of the bylaw to its temple was unreasonable, where a
rigid application of the town's height restrictions for uninhabited "projections" would
impair the character of the temple without advancing any municipal concern.
ISSUE: Whether a church steeple should be exempted from local height restrictions?
RULING:
The court held that the height of the steeple was reasonable and that a church steeple
should be exempted from local height restrictions as a "religious" use of land, noting
that "churches have long built steeples to express elevation towards the infinite.
308) Schools District of Abington vs. Schempp [374 U.S. 203 (1973)]
FACTS:
Under Pennsylvania law, public schools were required to read from the bible at the
opening of each school day. The school district sought to enjoin enforcement of the
statute. The district court ruled that the statute violated the First Amendment, even
after the statute had been amended to permit a student to excuse himself.
The Court consolidated this case with one involving Maryland atheists who challenged a
city rule that provided for opening exercises in the public schools that consisted
primarily of reading a chapter from the bible and the Lord's Prayer. The state's highest
court held the exercise did not violate the First Amendment. The religious character of
the exercise was admitted by the state.
ISSUE: Whether the Pennsylvania law requiring public school students to participate in
classroom religious exercises violate the religious freedom of students as protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
RULING:
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Public schools cannot sponsor Bible readings and recitations of the Lord’s Prayer under
the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.
In an opinion authored by Justice Clark, the majority concluded that, in both cases, the
laws required religious exercises and such exercises directly violated the First
Amendment. The Court affirmed the Pennsylvania decision, and reversed and remanded
the Maryland decision because the mandatory reading from the bible before school
each day was found to be unconstitutional.
Justice Stewart dissented, expressing the view that on the records it could not be said
that the Establishment Clause had necessarily been violated. He would remand both
cases for further hearings.
309) Board of Education vs. Allen (392 US 236)
FACTS:
A 1965 amendment to New York's Education Law required public school boards to lend
textbooks to elementary and secondary school students enrolled in private and
parochial schools. The Board of Education for New York Central School District No. 1,
contending that the law violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the
First Amendment, filed suit against James Allen, Commissioner of Education, requesting
a declaratory injunction to prevent enforcement of the statute.
The trial court agreed with the board and found the statute unconstitutional. The
Appellate Division reversed the ruling, finding that the boards lacked standing. On
appeal, the New York Court of Appeals ruled the boards did have standing, but also
found that, because the law's purpose was to benefit all students regardless of the type
of school they attended, the law did not violate the First Amendment.
ISSUE:
Whether the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment forbid
New York from requiring that public school boards loan textbooks to parochial school
students without cost?
RULING:
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No. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Byron R. White, the Court applied the test
constructed in Abington School District v. Schempp and found that, because the stated
legislative purpose and necessary effects of the statute did not advance any one
religion or religion in general, the law did not violate the First Amendment. Because the
books were given to the students, rather than the parochial schools themselves, the
Court reasoned, "the financial benefit is to parents and children, not schools."
310) Tilton vs. Richardson (403 US 672)
FACTS:
The Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 provides federal construction grants for
college and university facilities, excluding "any facility used or to be used for sectarian
instruction or as a place for religious worship, or . . . primarily in connection with any
part of the program of a school or department of divinity."
The United States retains a 20-year interest in any facility constructed with funds under
the Act, and if, during this period, the recipient violates the statutory conditions, the
Government is entitled to recovery of funds. Four church-related colleges and
universities in Connecticut received federal construction grants for five facilities.
Appellants attempted to show, in a three-judge court, that the recipient institutions
were "sectarian" by introducing evidence of their relations with religious authorities, the
curricula content, and other indicia of religious character. Appellee colleges introduced
testimony that they had fully complied with the statutory conditions, and that their
religious affiliations did not interfere with their secular educational functions. The court
held that the Act authorized grants to church-related schools, and sustained its
constitutionality, finding that the Act had neither the purpose nor the effect of
promoting religion.
ISSUE:
Whether the act violates the religion clause?
RULING:
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that only the 20-year limitation portion of the Act
violated the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. The Court invalidated the 20-
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year clause, arguing that subsidizing the construction of facilities used for
non-secular purposes would have the effect of advancing religion. The Court
held that the church-related institutions in question had not used their
federally-funded facilities for religious activities, and that the facilities were
"indistinguishable from a typical state university facility."The Court also held
that the Act did not excessively entangle the government with religion, noting that
college students were less susceptible to religious indoctrination, that the aid was of
"non-ideological character," and that one-time grants did not require constant state
surveillance.
311) Newdow vs. US Congress (328 F.3D 466)
FACTS:
Petitioner school district requires each elementary school class to recite daily
the Pledge of Allegiance. Respondent Newdow’s daughter participates in this
exercise. Newdow, an atheist, filed suit alleging that, because the Pledge
contains the words “under God,” it constitutes religious indoctrination of his
child in violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. He also
alleged that he had standing to sue on his own behalf and on behalf of his
daughter as “next friend.”
The Magistrate Judge concluded that the Pledge is constitutional, and the District Court
agreed and dismissed the complaint. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Newdow
has standing as a parent to challenge a practice that interferes with his right to direct
his daughter’s religious education, and that the school district’s policy violates the
Establishment Clause. Sandra Banning, the child’s mother, then filed a motion to
intervene or dismiss, declaring, inter alia, that she had exclusive legal custody under a
state court order and that, as her daughter’s sole legal custodian, she felt it was not in
the child’s interest to be a party to Newdow’s suit.
Concluding that Banning’s sole legal custody did not deprive Newdow, as a noncustodial
parent, of Article III standing to object to unconstitutional government action affecting
his child, the Ninth Circuit held that, under California law, Newdow retains the right to
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expose his child to his particular religious views even if they contradict her mother’s, as
well as the right to seek redress for an alleged injury to his own parental interests.
Issue: Whether Newdow has the standind and power as a legal custodian to insist her
child be subjected to unconstitutional state action?
RULING:

The court declined to rule on whether Newdow has standing in his own right
as a parent to maintain this case in federal court.They Held that Banning has
no power, even as sole legal custodian, to insist that her child be subjected
to unconstitutional state action. Newdow's assertion of his retained parental
rights in this case, therefore, simply cannot be legally incompatible with any
power Banning may hold pursuant to the custody order. Further, Ms. Banning
may not consent to unconstitutional government action in derogation of Newdow's
rights or waive Newdow's right to enforce his constitutional interests. Neither Banning's
personal opinion regarding the Constitution nor her state court award of legal custody is
determinative of Newdow's legal rights to protect his own interests.
When school teachers lead a recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance according to school
district policy, they present a message by the state endorsing not just religion generally,
but a monotheistic religion organized "under God." While Newdow cannot expect
the entire community surrounding his daughter to participate in, let alone
agree with, his choice of atheism and his daughter's exposure to his views,
he can expect to be free from the government's endorsing a particular view
of religion and unconstitutionally indoctrinating his impressionable young
daughter on a daily basis in that official view. The pledge to a nation "under
God," with its imprimatur of governmental sanction, provides the message to Newdow's
young daughter not only that non-believers, or believers in non-Judeo-Christian
religions, are outsiders, but more specifically that her father's beliefs are those of an
outsider, and necessarily inferior to what she is exposed to in the classroom.
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Banning's motion for leave to intervene is DENIED because she has no

protectable interest at stake in this action.
312) Short Title: Engel vs. Vitale 370 US 421
FACTS: The Union Free School District in New Hyde Park, N.Y., adopted the
recommendation and instituted a practice whereby teachers led students in the
prayer every morning. The practice was voluntary, and students could be
excused without punishment upon written request from their parents.
Steven Engel and several other parents challenged the officially sponsored
prayer as a violation of the First Amendment. Engel, a Jewish man, believed that
the state should not impose a one-size-fits-all prayer upon children of many different
faiths or no faith. The petitioners argue that the law violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment, as made applicable to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs lost before the
Supreme Court of New York in 1959, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
New York in 1960, and the Court of Appeals of New York in 1961, none of which viewed
the prayer practice as the establishment of an official religion. Engel and the others
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the school-sponsored nondenominational prayer in public
schools violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
RULING: Yes.The majority, via Justice Black, held that school-sponsored
prayer violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The
majority stated that the provision allowing students to absent themselves
from this activity did not make the law constitutional because the purpose of
the First Amendment was to prevent government interference with religion.
The majority noted that religion is very important to a vast majority of the American
people. Since Americans adhere to a wide variety of beliefs, it is not appropriate for the
government to endorse any particular belief system. The majority noted that wars,
persecutions, and other destructive measures often arose in the past when the
government involved itself in religious affairs.
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The state cannot hold prayers in public schools, even if participation is not
required and the prayer is not tied to a particular religion. Specifically, the
policy breached the constitutional wall of separation between church and
state. The Court ruled that the constitutional prohibition of laws establishing
religion meant that government had no business drafting formal prayers for
any segment of its population to repeat in a government-sponsored religious
program.

313) Short Title: Tudor vs. Board of Education

FACTS: The Gideons are a group that originally consisted of traveling salesmen whose
purpose is to distribute scriptures in order to win people to Christ. They are perhaps
best known for their goal of placing a Bible in each motel and hotel room in the United
States. In furtherance of this campaign it applied by letter to the Board of
Education of the Borough of Rutherford for permission to distribute its Bible
to the public schools of that municipality.These efforts have sometimes been
challenged on the grounds that they violate the First Amendment
establishment clause and the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Prior to the distribution of the books the present action was commenced
demanding judgment as to the validity of the distribution under the Federal
and New Jersey Constitutions and seeking an injunction against it. On
February 19, 1952 the trial judge granted a temporary injunction and by order,
restrained the board of education from carrying out the terms of its
resolution until further determination of the action. By consent, Gideons International
was permitted to intervene as a party defendant. After a full hearing the trial judge
on March 30, 1953 found in favor of the defendant and vacated the restraint and
stay. By consent of the parties, however, the stay has been continued pending appeal.
While the appeal was before the Appellate Division of the Superior Court, we ordered
certification on our own motion.
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The plaintiff Bernard Tudor is an adherent of the Jewish religion, while

plaintiff Ralph Lecoque is a member of the Catholic faith, each being a New
Jersey citizen and taxpayer of Rutherford and a parent of a pupil in a
Rutherford public school. Each contends that the Gideon Bible is "a sectarian
work of peculiar religious value and significance to members of the
Protestant faith." Mr. Tudor claiming that "its distribution to children of the
Jewish faith violates the *36 teachings, tenets and principles of Judaism,"
while Mr. Lecoque states that "its distribution to children of Catholic faith
violates the teachings, tenets and principles of Catholicism." After this action
was commenced, the child of plaintiff Ralph Lecoque transferred from the public school
to a Catholic parochial school and to the extent that the complaint was based upon his
status as a parent, the issue became moot. The State of New Jersey was originally
named as a party defendant but the action as to it has been dismissed. The Synagogue
Council of America and the National Community Relations Advisory Council have
submitted a brief amici curiae.
ISSUE: Whether the distribution of Bibles in public schools by Gideons is
constitutional.
RULING: No. The U.S. Supreme Court does not appear to have decided on the
constitutionality of distributing Bibles to children in public schools, but there
is a leading case written by the Chief Justice of New Jersey and agreed to by
a unanimous court, which is legally binding only in that state (Kruse 2015,
169), that has ruled against the practice and provided substantial reasons for
doing so.
"The `establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. * * *
The author of a recent law note, however, observes that the Gideons might have a
constitutional opening to distribute Bibles through the open forum doctrine. That is, if
schools have created an open or limited public forum for the distribution of other forms
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of literature (and not simply for the purpose of aiding the Gideons) they might, under
the precedent of Good News Club v. Milford Central School (2001), be equally entitled
to distribute literature as other groups.
In such a case, specifically banning the distribution of Bibles could be an
unconstitutional form of viewpoint-based discrimination. The note observes
that such distributions might be appropriate “only when there is a true
limited public forum: (1) distribution takes place outside the classroom; (2)
no school personnel are present; and (3) other similar types of speech are
also permitted” (Clark 2008, 420-421).

314) Short Title: Stone vs. Graham

FACTS: A Kentucky statute requires the posting of a copy of the Ten
Commandments, purchased with private contributions, on the wall of each
public classroom in the State. Sydell Stone and a number of other parents
challenged a Kentucky state law that required the posting of a copy of the
Ten Commandments in each public school classroom. They filed a claim against
James Graham, the superintendent of public schools in Kentucky. Petitioners, claiming
that this statute violates the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment, sought an injunction against its enforcement.
The state trial court upheld the statute, finding that its "avowed purpose" was "secular
and not religious," and that the statute would "neither advance nor inhibit any religion
or religious group" nor involve the State excessively in religious matters.
ISSUE: Whether the Kentucky statute violates the Establishment and Free
exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.
RULING: Yes. This Court has announced a three-part test for determining
whether a challenged state statute is permissible under the Establishment
Clause of the United States Constitution: First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be
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one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally the statute must not
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.
If a statute violates any of these three principles, it must be struck down under the
Establishment Clause. We conclude that Kentucky's statute requiring the
posting of the Ten Commandments in public schoolrooms had no secular
legislative purpose, and is therefore unconstitutional.
The trial court found the "avowed" purpose of the statute to be secular, even as it
labeled the statutory declaration "self-serving. Under this Court's rulings, however, such
an "avowed" secular purpose is not sufficient to avoid conflict with the First
Amendment. The pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on
schoolroom walls is plainly religious in nature. The Ten Commandments are
undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative
recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact.
 Tax exemption
 Art. VI, Sec. 28 (3)
 Art. VI, Sec. 29 (2)
 Public aid to religion
315) Short Title: In Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano A.M. No. 10-4-19-
SC
Complete Title: RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. V ALENCIANO, HOLDING OF
RELIGIOUS RITUALS AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE BUILDING IN QUEZON CITY
FACTS:
This controversy originated from a series of letters, written by Tony Q.
Valenciano (Valenciano) and addressed to then Chief Justice Reynato S.
Valenciano reported that the basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon
City (QC) had been converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with
offertory table, images of Catholic religious icons, a canopy, an electric organ, and a
projector. He believed that such practice violated the constitutional provision
on the separation of Church and State and the constitutional prohibition
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against the appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of a

sect, church, denomination, or any other system of religion.
Valenciano further averred that the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of
Justice showed that it tended to favor Catholic litigants; that the rehearsals of the choir
caused great disturbance to other employees; that the public could no longer use the
basement as resting place; that the employees and litigants of the Public Attorney's
Office (PAO), Legal Library, Philippine Mediation Center, and Records Section of the
Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) could not attend to their personal necessities such as
going to the lavatories because they could not traverse the basement between 12:00
o'clock noontime and 1: 15 o'clock in the afternoon; that the court employees became
hostile toward each other as they vied for the right to read the epistle; and that the
water supply in the entire building was cut off during the mass because the generator
was turned off to ensure silence.
On March 23, 2010, Valenciano wrote another letter, praying that rules be
promulgated by the Court to put a stop to the holding of Catholic masses, or
any other religious rituals, at the QC Hall of Justice and in all other halls of
justice in the country. The Court noted the March 23, 2010 letter of Valenciano and
referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report
and recommendation.
The OCA believed that the practical inconveniences cited by Valenciano were
unfounded. The OCA opined that the principle of separation of Church and State,
particularly with reference to the Establishment Clause, ought not to be interpreted
according to the rigid standards of separation; that the neutrality of the State on
religion should be benevolent because religion was an ingrained part of society and
played an important role in it; and that the State, therefore, instead of being belligerent
(in the case of Strict Separation) or being aloof (in the case of Strict Neutrality) towards
religion should instead interact and forbear.
ISSUE: whether the holding of masses at the basement of the Quezon City
Hall of Justice violates the Constitutional principle of separation of church
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and state as well as the Constitutional prohibition against appropriation of

public money or property for the benefit of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution, or system of religion.
RULING: No. The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the
OCA and denies the prayer of Valenciano that the holding of religious rituals
of any of the world's religions in the QC Hall of Justice or any halls of justice
all over the country be prohibited.
The Holding of Religious Rituals in the Halls of Justice does not Amount to a
Union of Church and State.
Indeed, Section 6, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides: The separation of
Church and State shall be inviolable. The Court once pronounced that "our history, not
to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is
prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when the state will use the church, and
the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their respective ends and aims."
Justice Isagani Cruz expounded on this doctrine, viz.: The rationale of the rule is
summed up in the familiar saying, "Strong fences make good neighbors." The idea is to
delineate the boundaries between the two institutions and, thus, avoid encroachments
by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of the limits of their respective
exclusive jurisdictions. The demarcation line calls on the entities to "render therefore
unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's."This,
notwithstanding, the State still recognizes the inherent right of the people to
have some form of belief system, whether such may be belief in a Supreme
Being, a certain way of life, or even an outright rejection of religion.
Religious freedom, however, is not absolute. It cannot have its way if there is
a compelling state interest. To successfully invoke compelling state interest,
it must be demonstrated that the masses in the QC Hall of Justice unduly
disrupt the delivery of public services or affect the judges and employees in
the performance of their official functions. As reported by the Executive Judges of
Quezon City, the masses were being conducted only during noon breaks and were not
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disruptive of public services. The court proceedings were not being distracted or
interrupted and that the performance of the judiciary employees were not being
adversely affected. Moreover, no Civil Service rules were being violated. As there has
been no detrimental effect on the public service or prejudice to the State, there is
simply no state interest compelling enough to prohibit the exercise of religious freedom
in the halls of justice.
Non-Establishment Clause
On the opposite side of the spectrum is the constitutional mandate that "no
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion," otherwise known
as the non-establishment clause. Indeed, there is a thin line between
accommodation and establishment, which makes it even more imperative to
understand each of these concepts by placing them in the Filipino society's
perspective.
The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation between
Church and State. It simply means that the State cannot set up a Church; nor
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one religion over
another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion; that
the state cannot punish a person for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance; that no tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activity or institution whatever they may be
called or whatever form they may adopt or teach or practice religion; that the state
cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious organization or group
and vice versa.36 Its minimal sense is that the state cannot establish or sponsor an
official religion.
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the
government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or
cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines
as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To
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do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and,
thus, establish a state religion.
Guided by the foregoing, it is our considered view that the holding of Catholic
masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not a case of
establishment, but merely accommodation. First, there is no law, ordinance
or circular issued by any duly constitutive authorities expressly mandating
that judiciary employees attend the Catholic masses at the
basement. Second, when judiciary employees attend the masses to profess
their faith, it is at their own initiative as they are there on their own free will
and volition, without any coercion from the judges or administrative
officers. Third, no government funds are being spent because the lightings
and airconditioning continue to be operational even if there are no religious
rituals there. Fourth, the basement has neither been converted into a Roman
Catholic chapel nor has it been permanently appropriated for the exclusive
use of its faithful. Fifth, the allowance of the masses has not prejudiced other
religions.
It has also been held that the aforecited constitutional provision "does not inhibit the
use of public property for religious purposes when the religious character of such use is
merely incidental to a temporary use which is available indiscriminately to the public in
general." Hence, a public street may be used for a religious procession even as it is
available for a civic parade, in the same way that a public plaza is not barred to a
religious rally if it may also be used for a political assemblage.43
In relation thereto, the phrase "directly or indirectly" refers to the manner of
appropriation of public money or property, not as to whether a particular act involves a
direct or a mere incidental benefit to any church. Otherwise, the framers of the
Constitution would have placed it before "use, benefit or support" to describe the same.
Even the exception to the same provision bolsters this interpretation. The exception
contemplates a situation wherein public funds are paid to a priest, preacher, minister,
or other religious teacher, or dignitary because they rendered service in the armed
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forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. That a

priest belongs to a particular church and the latter may have benefited from the money
he received is of no moment, for the purpose of the payment of public funds is merely
to compensate the priest for services rendered and for which other persons, who will
perform the same services will also be compensated in the same manner.
316) Short Title: Aglipay vs. Ruiz
Complete Title: GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,
vs. JUAN RUIZ, respondent.
FACTS:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine
Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of
prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and
selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he
would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in
the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress,
organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what
he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine
Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the
protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced
having sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps for
printing. The important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the
Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. It is
alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of
section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is
unconstitutional.
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RULING: No. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the
provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines
which is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state. Without the
necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is
sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us
that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when
the estate will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance
of their recognized this principle of separation of church and state in the early stages of
our constitutional development.
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the
postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the
Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:
No. 4052. — AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND
MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT
OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE
STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view.What it gives the
Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance
of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of
course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation
of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public
money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the
present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the
Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was
not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not issue and
sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived
from the sale of the stamps given to that church.On the contrary, it appears
from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page
2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling
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the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this
country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of
international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people" (Letter of
the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to the President of the
Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that the
stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic
Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location
of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International
Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic
Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It
is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be
inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if
any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the
Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be
embarassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less
religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could
legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose
should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere incidental results not
contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44
Law. ed., 168.)
Upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending
circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there has been no
constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of
Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed
advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made
use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the
case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor
judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be
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filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a
constitutional inhibition.

317) Short Title: Islamic Da ‘wah Council vs. Executive Secretary [G.R. No.
153888, July 9, 2003]
FACTS:
Petitioner IDCP is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary
services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. Regional
Islamic Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP)
accredited petitioner to issue halal certifications in the Philippines. Thus,
among the petitioner’s functions is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal
food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. On account
of the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food
producers' request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and
procedures based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah for the analysis of food,
inspection thereof and issuance of halal certifications. In that same year,
petitioner began to issue, for a fee, certifications to qualified products and
food manufacturers. Petitioner even adopted for use on its halal certificates a distinct
sign or logo registered in the Philippine Patent Office under Patent No. 4-2000-03664.
The respondent, Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the
Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to
oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive
authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory
activities.
A news article entitled "OMA Warns NGOs Issuing Illegal 'Halal' Certification" was
published in the Manila Bulletin. In said article, OMA warned Muslim consumers to buy
only products with its official halal certification since those without said certification had
not been subjected to careful analysis and therefore could contain pork or its
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derivatives. Respondent OMA also sent letters to food manufacturers asking them to
secure the halal certification only from OMA lest they violate EO 46 and RA 4109. As a
result, petitioner lost revenues after food manufacturers stopped securing
certifications from it.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition. Petitioner contends that the subject
EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and
State. It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and
guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a
function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and
validly perform for the Muslims. According to petitioner, a food product becomes
halal only after the performance of Islamic religious ritual and prayer. Thus, only
practicing Muslims are qualified to slaughter animals for food. A government agency like
herein respondent OMA cannot therefore perform a religious function like certifying
qualified food products as halal. According to petitioner, the subject EO was issued with
utter haste and without even consulting Muslim people's organizations like petitioner
before it became effective.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Order 46 violates the constitutional
provision on the separation of Church and State (religious freedom).
RULING: YES.Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious
function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic
beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal,
EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like
herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit
for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal
certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own
interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.
To justify EO 46's intrusion into the subject religious activity, the Solicitor General
argues that the freedom of religion is subservient to the police power of the
State. By delegating to OMA the authority to issue halal certifications, the
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government allegedly seeks to protect and promote the muslim Filipinos'

right to health, and to instill health consciousness in them. We disagree.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom.If
the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat,
State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic
framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its
citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and
religious activity.
In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to
deprive muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to
classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of muslim
Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive
power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the muslim
Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by
government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market
are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do
not encroach on the religious freedom of muslims.
Through the laws on food safety and quality, therefore, the State indirectly aids muslim
consumers in differentiating food from non-food products. The NMIC guarantees that
the meat sold in the market has been thoroughly inspected and fit for consumption.
Meanwhile, BFD ensures that food products are properly categorized and have passed
safety and quality standards. Then, through the labeling provisions enforced by the
DTI, muslim consumers are adequately apprised of the products that contain
substances or ingredients that, according to their Islamic beliefs, are not fit for human
intake. These are the non-secular steps put in place by the State to ensure that the
muslim consumers' right to health is protected. The halal certifications issued by
petitioner and similar organizations come forward as the official religious approval of a
food product fit for muslim consumption.
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318) Short Title: Mueller vs. Allen 463 US 388 (1983)

FACTS:
A Minnesota statute, § 290.09, subd. 22, allows state taxpayers, in computing
their state income tax, to deduct expenses incurred in providing "tuition,
textbooks and transportation" for their children attending an elementary or
secondary school.Petitioner Mueller and other Minnesota taxpayers brought
suit in Federal District Court against respondent Minnesota Commissioner of
Revenue and respondent parents who had taken the tax deduction for
expenses incurred in sending their children to parochial schools, claiming
that § 290.09, subd. 22, violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment by providing financial assistance to sectarian institutions. The
District Court granted summary judgment for respondents, holding that the statute is
neutral on its face and in its application and does not have a primary effect of either
advancing or inhibiting religion. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether the statute violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.
RULING: No.The Court held that the law did not have "the primary effect of
advancing the sectarian aims of the non-public schools," nor did it
"excessively entangle" the state in religion.Most importantly, argued Justice
Rehnquist, the deductions were available to all parents; in effect, Minnesota
did not "confer any imprimatur of state approval" on religious schools. Thus,
the law passed the Court's three-pronged test announced in Lemon v.
Kurtzman (1971) used to evaluate claims regarding the Establishment
Clause. The fact that notwithstanding the statute’s facial neutrality, a
particular annual statistical analysis shows that the statute's application
primarily benefits religious institutions, does not provide the certainty
needed to determine the statute's constitutionality. Moreover, private
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schools, and parents paying for their children to attend these schools, make
special contributions to the areas in which the schools operate.

Section 290.09, subd. 22, does not violate the Establishment Clause, but
satisfies all elements of the "three-part" test laid down in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, that must be met for such a statute to be upheld
under the Clause.
(a) The tax deduction in question has the secular purpose of ensuring that the State's
citizenry is well educated, as well as of assuring the continued financial health of private
schools, both sectarian and nonsectarian.
(b) The deduction does not have the primary effect of advancing the sectarian aims of
nonpublic schools. It is only one of many deductions - such as those for medical
expenses and charitable contributions - available under the Minnesota tax laws; is
available for educational expenses incurred by all parents, whether their children attend
public schools or private sectarian or nonsectarian private schools; and provides aid to
parochial schools only as a result of decisions of individual parents rather than directly
from the State to the schools themselves. The Establishment Clause's historic purposes
do not encompass the sort of attenuated financial benefit that eventually flows to
parochial schools from the neutrally available tax benefit at issue.
(c) Section 290.09, subd. 22, does not "excessively entangle" the State in religion. The
fact that state officials must determine whether particular textbooks qualify for the tax
deduction and must disallow deductions for textbooks used in teaching religious
doctrines is an insufficient basis for finding such entanglement.

319) Short Title: Wallace vs. Jaffree472 US 38

FACTS:
An Alabama law authorized teachers to conduct regular religious prayer
services and activities in school classrooms during the school day.Ishmael
Jaffree, a resident of Mobile County, Alabama, filed an action on behalf of his
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minor children against the governor, school board and other public officials
(Appellants), seeking an injunction restraining appellants from maintaining
or allowing regular prayer services in the public schools.The father alleged
that his two children were subjected to various acts of religious
indoctrination during the school year and that appellants refused to stop the
services. He also alleged that the defendant teachers had "on a daily basis" led their
classes in saying certain prayers in unison; that the minor children were exposed to
ostracism from their peer group class members if they did not participate; and that
Ishmael Jaffree had repeatedly but unsuccessfully requested that the devotional
services be stopped. The original complaint made no reference to any Alabama statute.
The action was later certified as a class action. At trial, appellants relied on three
statutes enacted to allow voluntary prayer in the schools. The district court
dismissed the father's claim, concluding that the Establishment Clause of
U.S. Const. amend. It did not bar the states from establishing a religion.
The United States District Court found that the statute was intended to encourage
religious activity, but held that it was constitutional because a state has the power to
establish a state religion if it chooses to do so; accordingly, the district court dismissed
the complaint. The United States Court of Appeals reversed, holding that such
statute, though permissive in form, was nevertheless state involvement
respecting an establishment of religion and was thus unconstitutional.
Subsequently, appellants challenged the decision of the appellate court.
ISSUE: Whether the state law violated First Amendment’s Establishment
Clause and thus unconstitutional.
RULING: Yes. The enactment of Senate Bill 8 [§ 16-1-20.2] and § 16-1-20.1 is an
effort on the part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious activity. Even though
these statutes are permissive in form, it is nevertheless state involvement respecting an
establishment of religion. The Supreme Court of the United States held that Ala.
Code § 16-1-20.1 is a law respecting the establishment of religion and thus
violates the First Amendment. The Court noted that one of the well-
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established criteria for determining the constitutionality of a statute under

the Establishment Clause is that the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose.According to the Court, the First Amendment requires that a statute
must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance
religion. In the case at bar, it has been established that § 16-1-20.1's
purpose was to endorse religion. Furthermore, the Court held that the enactment
of the statute was not motivated by any clearly secular purpose. The Court concluded
that the State's endorsement, by enactment of § 16-1-20.1, of prayer activities at the
beginning of each school day, is not consistent with the established principle that the
government must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward religion
The freedom of religion protected by the Constitution also includes freedom
from religion. Everyone is allowed to practice the religion of their choosing,
or none at all. The Establishment Clause prohibits Congress or any other
government entity from creating laws that establish an official religion - or
favor one religion over another. Under the Establishment Clause and the related
case law, the government must strive for "complete neutrality toward religion."
Moreover, the states have no more right to restrain the individual freedoms guaranteed
by the Constitution than the federal government does. Since Alabama's law on
prayer in schools endorsed religion and was not motivated by any clearly
secular purpose, it violated the Establishment Clause.

 Religious Test
320) Short Title: Torcaso vs. Watkins [367 U.S. 488 (1961)]
Facts: Appellant was appointed by the Governor of Maryland to the office of
Notary Public but he was denied a commission because he would not declare
his belief in God, as required by the Maryland Constitution.Claiming that this
requirement violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
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he sued in a state court to compel issuance of his commission;but relief was

denied. The State Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the state constitutional
provision is self-executing without need for implementing legislation and requires
declaration of a belief in God as a qualification for office.
Issue: Whether the Maryland test for public office violated his rights under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
RULING: Yes.We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the
Federal Government can constitutionally force a person "to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion." Neither can constitutionally pass laws nor
impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and
neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as
against those religions founded on different beliefs.
In upholding the State's religious test for public office the highest court of
Maryland said: "The petitioner is not compelled to believe or disbelieve,
under threat of punishment or other compulsion. True, unless he makes the
declaration of belief he cannot hold public office in Maryland, but he is not
compelled to hold office."
The fact, however, that a person is not compelled to hold public office cannot possibly
be an excuse for barring him from office by state-imposed criteria forbidden by the
Constitution. This was settled by our holding in Wieman v. Updegraff. We there pointed
out that whether or not "an abstract right to public employment exists," Congress could
not pass a law providing "` . . . that no federal employee shall attend Mass or take any
active part in missionary work.'"
This Maryland test for public office cannot be enforced against appellant,
because it unconstitutionally invades his freedom of belief and religion
guaranteed by the First Amendment and protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment from infringement by the States. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals of Maryland is accordingly reversed and the cause is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
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321) Short Title: In Re: Summers (325 US 561)

FACTS: Clyde Wilson Summers has complied with all prerequisites for
admission to the bar of Illinois except that he has not obtained the certificate
of the Committee on Character and Fitness. Clyde Summers was denied
admission to practice law in Illinois based on a finding of unfit character
because he elected conscientious objector status and declared that he could
not kill another human being.Summers initiated his own appeal and the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the Illinois’ decision reaffirming that admission to
practice law be denied. Petitioner appraises the denial of admission from the
viewpoint of a religionist.
Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari from this Court under Section 237(b) of the
Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 344(b), to review the action of the Supreme Court of
Illinois in denying petitioner's prayer for admission to the practice of law in that state.
It was alleged that the denial was 'on the sole ground that he is a
conscientious objector to war' or to phrase petitioner's contention slightly
differently 'because of his conscientious scruples against participation in
war.' Petitioner challenges here the right of the Supreme Court to exclude
him from the bar under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which secured to him
protection against state action in violation of the principles of the First
Amendment.

ISSUE: Whether Illinois’ act violates the principles of religious freedom

which the Fourteenth Amendment secures.

RULING: No.It is impossible for us to conclude that the insistence of Illinois

that an officer who is charged with the administration of justice must take an
oath to support the Constitution of Illinois and Illinois' interpretation of that
oath to require a willingness to perform military service violates the
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principles of religious freedom which the Fourteenth Amendment secures

against state action, when a like interpretation of a similar oath as to the
Federal Constitution bars an alien from national citizenship.
Refusal of an application for admission to the practice of law in a State on
the ground that the applicant would be unable in good faith to take the
required oath to support the constitution of the State, because of
conscientious scruples resulting in unwillingness to serve in the state militia
in time of war, held not a denial of any right of the applicant under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution.
Petitioner will not serve in the armed forces. While he recognizes a difference between
military and police forces, he would not act in the latter to coerce threatened violations.
Petitioner would not use force to meet aggressions against himself or his family, no
matter how aggravated or whether or not carrying a danger of bodily harm to himself
or others. He is a believer in passive resistance. We need to consider only his attitude
toward service in the armed forces. Illinois has constitutional provisions which require
service in the militia in time of war of men of petitioner's age group. The return of the
Justices alleges that petitioner has not made any showing that he would serve not
withstanding his conscientious objections. This allegation is undenied in the record and
unchallenged by brief. We accept the allegation as to unwillingness to serve in the
militia as established.

322) People vs. Zosa (38 OG 1676)

Complete Title: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
PRIMITIVO DE SOSA, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: FACTS: In these two cases (G.R. Nos. L-45892 and 45893), the
appellants Tranquilino and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of
section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law.
It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached
the age of twenty years refused to register in the military service
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notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so. The evidence
shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to
appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service in
accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these notices, had not
registered up to the date of the filing of the information.
The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they
have not registered in the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is
fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and
Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military learnings,
and does not wish to kill or be killed. The CFI sentenced them to one month
and one day imprisonment.
ISSUE:Whether the National Defense Law is impugned on the ground that it
is unconstitutional.
RULING: No.The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory
military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on
the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith.The duty of the Government to
defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the
organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty
of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who
volunteer to enlist therein.
The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support
does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the
Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for determent in
complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary
allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth
Act No. 1).

MODULE 8. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

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 Art. III, Sec. 7 (Right to Information on Matters of Public Concern)

 Art. II, Sec. 28 (Policy of Full Public Disclosure)
 Executive Order No. 2, s. 2016 (Freedom of Information Program)
 Scope, Restrictions and Limitations
 Access to Court Records
 Canon II- Confidentiality Code of Conduct for Court Personnel (A.M.
No. 03-06-13- SC)

323) Short Title: IDEALS vs. PSALMS (G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012)
Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment Through Alternative Legal
Services, Inc. (IDEALS, Inc.) vs. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Corporation (PSALM) [682 SCRA 602 (2012)]
FACTS: Respondent PSALM is a GOCC created by virtue of Republic Act No.
9136, otherwise known as the "Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001"
(EPIRA).The EPIRA provided a framework for the restructuring of the electric
power industry, including the privatization of the assets of the National
Power Corporation (NPC), the transition to the desired competitive structure,
and the definition of the responsibilities of the various government agencies
and private entities. Said law mandated PSALM to manage the orderly sale,
disposition, and privatization of NPC generation assets, real estate and other disposable
assets, and Independent Power Producer (IPP) contracts with the objective of
liquidating all NPC financial obligations and stranded contract costs in an optimal
manner.
Sometime in August 2005, PSALM commenced the privatization of the 246-
megawatt (MW) AHEPP located in San Lorenzo, Norzagaray, Bulacan.
AHEPP’s main units form part of the Angat Complex which includes the Angat
Dam, Angat Reservoir and the outlying watershed area. The Angat Dam and
AHEPP are utilized for power generation, irrigation, water supply and flood control
purposes.
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On December 15, 2009, PSALM’s Board of Directors approved the Bidding

Procedures for the privatization of the AHEPP.An Invitation to Bid was
published in three major national newspapers. Subject of the bid was the
AHEPP. After holding pre-bid with various stakeholders, PSALM received the
highest bid from K-Water. PSALM’s Board of Directors approved and
confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award to the highest bidder, K-Water.
But even before K-Water was given the Notice of Award, IDEALS had been
sending letters to PSALM to request for copies of documents pertaining to
the sale. The first letter requested for copies of the Terms of Reference and proposed
bids submitted by the bidders. There was no response because at the time no
bids have been submitted yet. Besides, updates about the ongoing bidding were
posted on the PSALM website anyway. The second letter requested for
information regarding the winning bidder, such as company profile, contact
person, office address, and Philippine registration. Despite press releases
announcing K-Water as the winning bidder, PSALM failed to sufficiently
provide the petitioners with the information they were asking for, almost as
if PSALM officials were trying to hide something.

On May 19, 2010, the present petition with prayer for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction was filed by the petitioners.
They contend that the participation in the bidding of and award of contract to K-Water
which is a foreign corporation clearly violated paragraph 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution. In this case, the AHEPP is in dire danger of being wholly-owned by a
Korean corporation which probably merely considers it as just another business
opportunity, and as such cannot be expected to observe and ensure the smooth
facilitation of the more critical purposes of water supply and irrigation. The said
provision is implemented by the Water Code of the Philippines limiting water rights to
Filipino citizens and corporations which are at least 60% Filipino-owned. Petitioners
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further assert that the PSALM violated the Constitution in withholding documents of
public interest.
ISSUE: Whether PSALM violated the Constitution in withholding documents
of public interest.
RULING: Yes.In failing to provide the petitioners with the information they
were asking for on their second letter, PSALM violated Section 7, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.The Court ruled that people's right
to information is intertwined with the government's constitutional duty of
full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest, pursuant to
Section 28, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which states a policy of full
public disclosure. Both of these provisions are also essential to hold public
officials accountable for their actions. An informed citizenry, said the Court,
is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy.
The Court made it clear that the public is entitled to information even
on on-going negotiations before a final contract, subject to the following
exceptions: privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets, and
similar matters relating to national security and public order. In addition, the
Court highlighted the difference between duty to disclose information and duty to
access information on matters of public concern. The duty to disclose information
is mandatory under the Constitution, but it only covers transactions involving
public interest. In the absence of an enabling law for Section 28, Art. II (e.g.,
Freedom of Information Act, which has been languishing in the congress for more than
20 years), postings in public bulletin boards and government websites will suffice.
The duty to access information, on the other hand, requires a demand
or request for one to gain access to documents and paper of a particular
agency. It has a broader scope of information, covering not only transactions of public
interest, but also matters contained in official communications and public documents of
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any government agency. Because of this ruling, PSALM was compelled by the
Court to provide all the documents the petitioners were requesting for.

324) Short Title: Antolin vs. Domondon [G.R. No. 165036 : July 05, 2010]
Complete Title: HAZEL MA. C. ANTOLIN, PETITIONER, vs. ABELARDO T.
DOMONDON, JOSE A. GANGAN, AND VIOLETA J. JOSEF, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:
Petitioner took the accountancy licensure examinations (the Certified Public
Accountant [CPA] Board Exams) conducted by the Board of Accountancy (the
Board) in October 1997. The examination results were released on October 29,
1997; out of 6,481 examinees, only 1,171 passed. Unfortunately, petitioner did
not make it. When the results were released, she received failing grades in four out
of the seven subjects. Convinced that she deserved to pass the Exam, she wrote
to the Board of Accountancy (Board), requesting that her answer sheets be
re-corrected.She was shown her answer sheets but since these showed only
shaded marks, she was unable to determine why she failed the
Exam.Consequently, she asked the Board for copies of the questionnaire, her
answer sheets, the answer keys and an explanation of the grading system
(collectively, the Examination Papers).
Acting Chairman Domondon denied petitioner's request on two grounds: (1)
Section 36, Article III of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and
Practice of Professionals, as amended by Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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Resolution No. 332, series of 1994, only allowed access to her answer sheets, and
reconsideration of the result of her examination can be made only on grounds of
mechanical error in the grading of the answer sheets, or malfeasance; and (2) The
Board was precluded from releasing the Examination Papers (other than the answer
sheets) by Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994. The Board
later informed her that her exam was investigated and no mechanical error was found
in the grading.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages, with application for
preliminary mandatory injunction, against the Board and its members before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), praying that the Board provide her with all
documents that would show whether the Board fairly administered the exam and
correctly graded her answers, and if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of
registration as a CPA.
Respondents also filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim in the main
case, which asked that the Petition for Mandamus with Damages be
dismissed for lack of merit on the following grounds: (1) petitioner failed to
exhaust administrative remedies; (2) the petition stated no cause of action because
there was no ministerial duty to release the information demanded; and (3) the
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern is subject to
limitations provided by law, including Section 20, Article IV, of PRC
Resolution No. 338, series of 1994.

Petitioner later amended her Petition to clarify that she only wanted access
to the documents requested, not re-correction of her exam, deleting in the
process her original prayer for issuance of a certificate of registration as CPA.
On June 23, 1998, respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Application
for Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, on the ground that petitioner had taken
and passed the May 1998 CPA Licensure Examination and had taken her oath as a CPA.
The RTC granted the respondent’s petition to dismiss the application. The
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petitioner appealed and the Court reconsidered its Order dismissing the
petition. Respondents appealed to the CA,the CA ruled that the petition has
become moot in view of petitioner's eventual passing of the 1998 CPA Board
Exam. The CA found, in a Decision dated February 16, 2004, that (i) Section 20,
Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338 constituted a valid limitation on
petitioner's right to information and access to government documents; (ii)
the Examination Documents were not of public concern, because petitioner
merely sought review of her failing marks;

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has a right to obtain copies of the examination

papers so she can determine for herself why and how she failed and to
ensure that the Board properly performed its duties.

RULING: YES. As always, our inquiry must begin with the Constitution. Section 7,
Article III provides: Sec.7.The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Together with the guarantee of the right to information, Section 28,
Article II promotes full disclosure and transparency in government, viz:Sec.
28.Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not
absolute. The people's right to information is limited to "matters of public
concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions
involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed
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by law". The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public
interest" and "public concern." As observed in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:
In determining whether x xx a particular information is of public concern
there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public
interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case
by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it
relates to or affects the public.
We have also recognized the need to preserve a measure of confidentiality on
some matters, such as national security, trade secrets and banking transactions,
criminal matters, and other confidential matters.
We are prepared to concede that national board examinations such as
the CPA Board Exams are matters of public concern. The populace in
general, and the examinees in particular, would understandably be
interested in the fair and competent administration of these exams in order
to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting
profession. And as with all matters pedagogical, these examinations could be
not merely quantitative means of assessment, but also means to further
improve the teaching and learning of the art and science of accounting.

On the other hand, we do realize that there may be valid reasons to

limit access to the Examination Papers in order to properly administer the
exam. More than the mere convenience of the examiner, it may well be that there
exist inherent difficulties in the preparation, generation, encoding, administration, and
checking of these multiple-choice exams that require that the questions and answers
remain confidential for a limited duration. However, the PRC is not a party to
these proceedings. They have not been given an opportunity to explain the reasons
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behind their regulations or articulate the justification for keeping the Examination
Documents confidential. In view of the far-reaching implications of this case,
which may impact on every board examination administered by the PRC, and
in order that all relevant issues may be ventilated, we deem it best to
remand these cases to the RTC for further proceedings.

325) Short Title: Baldoza vs. Dimaano

Complete Title: A.M. No. 1120-MJ May 5, 1976
DOMINADOR C. BALDOZA, complainant, vs. HON. JUDGE RODOLFO B.
DIMAANO, respondent.
In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal Secretary
of Taal, Batangas, charges Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same
municipality, with abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees of the
Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the Municipal
Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report on the
peace and order conditions of the said municipality.
Respondent, in answer to the complaint, stated that there has never been an
intention to refuse access to official court records; that although court
records are among public documents open to inspection not only by the
parties directly involved but also by other persons who have legitimate
interest to such inspection, yet the same is always subject to reasonable
regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be inspected.He
further asserted that a court has unquestionably the power to prevent an
improper use or inspection of its records and the furnishing of copies
therefrom may be refused where the person requesting is not motivated by a
serious and legitimate interest but acts out of whim or fancy or mere
curiosity or to gratify private spite or to promote public scandal.
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In his answer, the respondent significantly observed that restrictions are imposed by
the Court for fear of an abuse in the exercise of the right. For fear that the dirty hands
of partisan politics might again be at play. Some of the cases filed and decided by the
Court after the declaration of Martial Law and years after the election still bore the
stigma of partisan politics as shown in the affidavits and testimonies of witnesses.
Without casting aspersion on any particular individual, it is worth mentioning, that the
padlocks of the door of the Court has recently been tampered by inserting papers and
matchsticks. Under the circumstances, to allow an indiscriminate and unlimited exercise
of the right to free access, might do more harm than good to the citizenry of Taal.
Disorder and chaos might result defeating the very essence of their request. The
undersigned is just as interested as Mr. Baldoza in the welfare of the community and
the preservation of our democratic principles.
ISSUE: Whether the judge abused its authority in refusing to allow
employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of
the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated
report on the peace and order conditions of the said municipality.
HELD: NO. After a careful evaluation of the recommendation, We find that the
respondent did not act arbitrarily in the premises. As found by the
Investigating Judge, the respondent allowed the complainant to open and
view the docket books of respondent certain conditions and under his control
and supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and conditions
imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The access to public records
predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public
concern. Undoubtedly in a democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in
matters of social and political significance.
The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled
to information on matters of public concern and thus are expressly granted
access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or
transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law. The
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incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the

fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can
be no realistic perception by the public of the nation’s problems, nor a meaningful
democratic decision making if they are denied access to information of general interest.
Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of
the times. As has been aptly observed: “Maintaining the flow of such information
depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either
process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases.” However, restrictions on access
to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions imposed
to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of
immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary means of control
inadequate to maintain order.

326) Short Title: Tanada vs. Tuvera (G.R. No. L- 63915, December 29, 1986)

FACTS:Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the

disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not
been published as required by law. The government argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise
provided,” as when the decrees themselves declared that they we to become
effective and immediately upon their approval.In the decision of this case on
April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of
these decrees. The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision. Specifically, they ask the following
questions:
6. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
7. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which
are not?
8. What is meant by "publication"?
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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9. Where is the publication to be made?

10. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction
between laws of general applicability and those which are not, that publication
means complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith the
Official Gazette.
Petitioners invoked that a law, to be valid and enforceable, must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when
it was “otherwise provided,” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were
to become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUE: Whether publication is an indispensable requirement for the
effectivity of the presidential issuances in question.
RULING: Yes. The clause “unless otherwise provided” refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself. Publication is
indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen day period shall be shortened or extended. The term
“laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application,
for strictly speaking all laws related to the people in general albeit there are
some that do not apply to them directly.
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be
dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend
due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that
are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law
shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of
publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely
that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not
because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its
existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also
be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit
there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law
granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President
Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that
such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly
to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any
member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper
party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public
would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act
of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it
might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not
to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated
by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,

regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so called

letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules
or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies
to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that
place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a
public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or
requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are
meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which
that body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the

Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for
adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the
assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms.
Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
Government Code. We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication
at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.

326) Short Title: Tanada vs. Tuvera (G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985)
FACTS: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine
Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable
must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette
of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative

orders.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a
sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that
since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to
the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not
indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of
the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
ISSUE: Whether the Presidential issuances be published.
RULING: YES. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.Obviously,
presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
violation or otherwise impose a burden or the people, such as tax and
revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or
"of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that
before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta
vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all
form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of
Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so
that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect
this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential
decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had
been enforced or implemented prior to their publication.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and
effect.

327) Chavez vs. PCGG (G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998)

G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG) and MAGTANGGOL GUNIGUNDO (in his capacity as
chairman of the PCGG), respondents, GLORIA A. JOPSON, CELNAN A. JOPSON,
SCARLET A. JOPSON, and TERESA A. JOPSON, petitioners-in-intervention.

Facts: Petitioner Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former gov’t official, impelled to
bring this action regarding several news reports on: (1) the alleged discovery
of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in
Swiss banks and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the
government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share
these assets.
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information, demands that
respondents make public any negotiations and agreements pertaining to
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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PCGG’s task of recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any
compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of paramount
public interest, since it has a “debilitating effect on the country’s economy” that would
be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino People. Hence, they have
the right to know the transactions effected by the Government.
Respondents, on the other hand, contended that petitioner’s action is
premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to
disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may
not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions
of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.
Further, Pres. Ramos, in his Memorandum, commanded the PCGG Chairman NOT to
approve the Compromise Agreements. Embodied in the covenant that (a) the Marcoses
shall provide the gov’t assistance by way of testimony or disposition on any information
that may shed light on the cases; (b) the assets determined to belong to the Marcoses
shall be net of and exempt from, any form of taxes due the Republic of the Philippines;
(c) that all disclosures of assets shall not used as evidence by the Gov’t in any criminal,
civil, tax or administrative case against the former.
Issue: Whether the constitutional right to information may prosper against
respondents’ argument that the “should be disclosed” proposed terms and conditions of
the Agreements are not yet effective and binding.
Ruling: Yes, the PCGG should disclose public information regarding the
Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.
The Court held that the "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject
provisions of the Constitution (Sec. 7 [Article III]) have as yet no defined scope and
extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the
right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged.
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is
incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government
representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed
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settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and
holders of ill-gotten wealth, subject to some of the following recognized
restrictions: (1) national security matters and intelligence information, (2) trade
secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential
information.

328) Chavez vs. PEA and Amari (G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002)
G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and
AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts:
• In 1973, the government signed a contract with the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of
Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in
consideration of 50% of the reclaimed land.
• In 1977, then President Marcos created the Public Estates Authority (PEA), tasking it
to “reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas” and “to develop, improve,
acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands” and issued another Presidential
Decree transferring to PEA the “lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the
Manila Bay” under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
• In 1981, then President Marcos issued a memo directing PEA to amend its contract
with CDCP, so that “All future works in MCCRRP shall be funded and owned by PEA.
• In 1988, then President Aquino issued a Special Patent transferring to PEA the
reclaimed parcels of land. Then, the Register of Deeds of Parañaque issued titles in the
name of PEA, covering the “Freedom Islands”.
• In 1995, the PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private
corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands without public bidding.
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• In 1998, Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Mandamus with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order. Petitioner contends that the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the
sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of
lands of the public domain as a violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private
corporations.
• Court denied his motion for a TRO.
Issue: Whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on
on-going negotiations before a final agreement.
Ruling: Yes. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to
information on matters of public concern.The court has held that the
constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract.The information, however, must
constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover
recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic
secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order.
Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to information in several
legislations.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged
information rooted in the separation of powers.The information does not cover
Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet
meetings which, like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate
courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as
confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of
government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the
glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the
independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative
and Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant case.
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329) The Province of North Cotabato vs. The Government of the Republic of
the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (G.R. No. 183591, October
14, 2008)
G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008
THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR
JESUS SACDALAN and/or VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIÑOL, for and in his
own behalf, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by
SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY
CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON,
JR., the latter in his capacity as the present and duly-appointed Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) or the so-called Office of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, respondents.
Facts: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‘s
policy of pursuing peace negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to convince the MILF to
continue negotiating with the government. MILF, thereafter, convened its Central
Committee and decided to meet with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
(GRP). Formal peace talks were held in Libya which resulted to the crafting of
the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) which
consists of three (3) aspects: a.) security aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and c.)
ancestral domain aspect. Various negotiations were held which led to the
finalization of the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD). The said memorandum was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. In its
body, it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and
Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE).
The latter, in addition, has the freedom to enter into any economic
cooperation and trade relation with foreign countries. ―The sharing between
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the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources
is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further provides for the extent of the
territory of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass as well as the maritime,
terrestrial, fluvial, and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric
space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region. Regarding
governance, on the other hand, a shared responsibility and authority between the
Central Government and BJE was provided. The relationship was described as
associative. With the formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the
negotiation and finalization of the MOA-AD violates constitutional and
statutory provisions on public consultation, as mandated by Executive Order
No. 3, and right to information. They further contend that it violates the
Constitution and laws. Hence, the filing of the petition.
Issue: Whether the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation and right to information.
Ruling: Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution
involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy
of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec
28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of
1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if
nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information
necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-
executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be
provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern
involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to
information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the
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consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the

executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national
and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of
the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek
relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners
and concerned sectors of society.

330) Akbayan vs. Aquino (G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008)
G.R. No. 170516 July 16, 2008
AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (“AKBAYAN”), PAMBANSANG
KATIPUNAN NG MGA SAMAHAN SA KANAYUNAN (“PKSK”), ALLIANCE OF
PROGRESSIVE LABOR (“APL”), VICENTE A. FABE, ANGELITO R. MENDOZA,
MANUEL P. QUIAMBAO, ROSE BEATRIX CRUZ-ANGELES, CONG. LORENZO R.
TANADA III, CONG. MARIO JOYO AGUJA, CONG. LORETA ANN P. ROSALES,
CONG. ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, AND CONG. EMMANUEL
JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, Petitioners, vs. THOMAS G. AQUINO, in his capacity as
Undersecretary of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and Chairman
and Chief Delegate of the Philippine Coordinating Committee (PCC) for the
Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement, et al. Respondents.
Facts: Petitioners, as non-government orgs, congresspersons, citizens and
taxpayers, filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition seeking to compel
respondents, Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas
Aquino, et al., to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines
Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese
offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and
annexes thereto.
The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by
the Philippines with another country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it,
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covers a broad range of topics which includes trade in goods, rules of origin, customs
procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights,
government procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition
policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the
business environment, and general and final provisions.
Petitioners emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said
agreement violates their right to information on matters of public concern
and of public interest. That the non-disclosure of the same documents
undermines their right to effective and reasonable participation in all levels
of social, political and economic decision making.
Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that
the matter sought involves a diplomatic negotiation then in progress, thus
constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full
disclosure of matters that are of public concern like the JPEPA - that
diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege.
Issue: Whether the refusal of the government to disclose the docuiment bearing JPEPA
negotiation violates their right to information on matters of public concern
Ruling: To be covered by the right to information, the information sought
must meet the threshold requirement that it be a matter of public concern.
From the nature of the JPEPA, as in international trade agreement, it is evident that the
Japanese and Philippine offers submitted during the negotiations towards its executions
are matters of public concern. It is established, however, that neither the right
to information nor the policy of full public disclosure is absolute, there being
matters which, albeit of public concern or interest, are recognized as
privileged. The categories of information that may be considered privileged includes
matters of diplomatic character and under negotiation and review. The documents on
the proposed JPEPA as well as the text which is subject to negotiations and
legal review by the parties fall under the exceptions to the right of access to
information on matters of public concern and policy of public disclosure. They
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come within the coverage of executive privilege. At the time when the
Committee was requesting for copies of such documents, the negotiations were
ongoing as they are still now and the text of the proposed JPEPA is still uncertain and
subject to change. Considering the status and nature of such documents then and now,
these are evidently covered by executive privilege consistent with existing legal
provisions and settled jurisprudence.

331) Gonzales vs. Narvasa (G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000)
G. R. No. 140835. August 14, 2000
RAMON A. GONZALES, Petitioner, v. HON. ANDRES R. NARVASA, as Chairman,
PREPARATORY COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS; HON.
RONALDO B. ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary; COMMISSION ON AUDIT;
ROBERTO AVENTAJADO, as Presidential Consultant on Council of Economic
Advisers/Economic Affairs; ANGELITO C. BANAYO, as Presidential Adviser
for/on Political Affairs; VERONICA IGNACIO-JONES, as Presidential
Assistant/ Appointment Secretary (In charge of appointments), Respondents.
Facts: PetitionerRamon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999,
assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission
on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants,
advisers and assistants. The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform
(PCCR) was created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of
Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order “to study and recommend
proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the
manner of implementing the same.” Petitioner disputes the constitutionality
of the PCCR based on the grounds that it is a public office which only the
legislature can create by way of a law.
Issue: Whether the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 43.
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Ruling: The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he
can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger
of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If
at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any “injury” in this case since,
according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the legislature’s powers to
create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR.
Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury.

Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger
of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a
result of the PCCR’s activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi
so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.
Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a
constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been
disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. It is readily
apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The
PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No.
70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is “appropriated” for its
operational expenses “to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President.”
Being that case, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest - that
he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will be
entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner
presume to make such a representation.

332) Valmonte vs. Belmonte [170 SCRA 256 (1989)]

G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989
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RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL CASTILLO, ROLANDO

BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN
"NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO and ROLANDO FADUL,
petitioners, vs. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary
injunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed:
(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean
loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal
note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or
(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing
their respective loans; and/or
(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.
Such request was on the premise that Art. IV, Sec. 6 of the Constitution provides the
right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitation as may
be provided by law.
The Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS replied to such letter, however, not having yet
received the reply of the Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote
respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, “(W)e are now
considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to
pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest.”
Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant suit.
On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137 former
members of the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10)
opposition members, were granted housing loans by the GSIS. Separate comments
were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed a
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to
file their memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was deemed submitted for
decision.
In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus, among which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative
remedies, hence, petitioners have no cause of action.
Issue: Whether petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans
granted by the GSIS.
Ruling: YES. In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents
evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that
the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination,
to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue
interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be
prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records
may be insured
The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by
petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said regarding the first act sought by
petitioners, i.e., “to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to
secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos.”
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto,
are entitled to “access to official records,” the Constitution does not accord
them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries, and the like in their desire to acquire information on
matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the
applicant has a well-defined, clear, and certain legal right to the thing demanded and
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The
corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and
specific.
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the
part of respondent to prepare the list requested.
The petition was granted and respondent General Manager of the GSIS was ordered to
allow petitioners access to documents and records evidencing loans granted to
Members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, subject to
reasonable regulations as to the time and manner of inspection, not incompatible with
this decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary.

333) Legaspi vs. CSC [150 SCRA 530 (1987)]

G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987
VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
Facts:The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of
public concern is invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted
by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The
respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu
City.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that
he has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to acquire the
information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of
mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said
information.
Issue: Whether petitioner may invoke his constitutional right to information in the case
at bar.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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Ruling: The court held that when the question is one of public right and the object of
the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded
as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are
instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being
sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the
laws. The Constitution provides the guarantee of adopting policy of full public disclosure
subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law as in regulation in the manner of
examining the public records by the government agency in custody thereof. But the
constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute.
Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to
limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may
therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those
affecting national security.
The court delves into determining whether the information sought for by the petitioner
is of public interest. All appointments in the Civil Service Commission are made
according to merit and fitness while a public office is a public trust. Public employees
therefore are accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities to their positions in
the government. The court also noted that the information on the result of the CSC
eligibility examination is released to the public therefore the request of petitioner is one
that is not unusual or unreasonable. The public, through any citizen, has the right to
verify the civil eligibilities of any person occupying government positions.

334) Garcia vs. BOI [177 SCRA 374 (1989)]

G.R. No. 88637 September 7, 1989
CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, Second District of Bataan, petitioner, vs.
THE BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY,
BATAAN PETROCHEMICAL CORPORATION and PILIPINAS SHELL
CORPORATION, respondents.
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Facts: PSALM is a Government Owned and Controlled Corporation (GOCC)

created by virtue of Republic Act No. 9136 (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of
2001 aka EPIRA), to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of NPC
generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and Independent Power
Producer (IPP) contracts over a 25 year period.
Within the discharge of its lawful mandate, PSALM held a public bidding for
the sale of the 246-megawatt (MW) AHEPP located in San Lorenzo, Norzagaray,
Bulacan. On May 5, 2010, and after a post-bid evaluation, PSALM’s Board of Directors
approved and confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award to the highest bidder, K-
Water, a Korean owned corporation.
Even before, PSALM gave the Notice of Award to K-Water. IDEALS had been
sending letters to PSALM to request for copies of documents pertaining to
the sale. The first letter dated April 20, 2010 requested for documents such as Terms
of Reference and proposed bids submitted by the bidders. At that time, the bids were
yet to be submitted at the bidding scheduled on April 28, 2010. PSALM’s website
carried news and updates on the sale of AHEPP, providing important
information on bidding activities and clarifications regarding the terms and
conditions of the Asset Purchase Agreement (APA) to be signed by PSALM
and the winning bidder (Buyer).
The second letter dated May 14, 2010 specifically requested for detailed information
regarding the winning bidder, such as company profile, contact person or responsible
officer, office address and Philippine registration. Despite PSALM’s own press
releases over the award given to K-Water, it failed to sufficiently provide
IDEALS with the information it was asking for.
Issue: Whether PSALM violated of the constitutional right to information of the
petitioner IDEALS.
Ruling: YES, PSALM violated the constitutional right to information of the
petitioner IDEALS.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, which reads: Sec. 7. The right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The people’s constitutional right to information is intertwined with the
government’s constitutional duty of full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest. Section 28, Article II of the Constitution declares the State
policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest, to wit: Sec. 28.
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
The foregoing constitutional provisions seek to promote transparency in
policymaking and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the
people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional
rights. They are also essential to hold public officials "at all times
accountable to the people," for unless citizens have the proper information,
they cannot hold public officials accountable for anything. Armed with the right
information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of
government policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is
essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy.
In the case of Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, the court laid down the rule
that the constitutional right to information includes official information on
on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however,
must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not
cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and
diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public
order. In addition, Congress has prescribed other limitations on the right to information
in several legislations.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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335) Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 177271, May
4, 2007)
G.R. No. 177271 May 4, 2007
BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941, represented by MR. AMEURFINO E.
CINCO, Chairman, AND URBAN POOR FOR LEGAL REFORMS (UP-LR),
represented by MRS. MYRNA P. PORCARE, Secretary-General, Petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BIYAHENG PINOY, et al., Respondents.
Facts: Petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for
Legal Reforms (UP-LR) assail the various Comelec resolutions accrediting
private respondents BiyahengPinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming
party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining
whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications
defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the “Party-List System Act” and belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to represent.
On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing
rules and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to
participate and submission of names of nominees under the party-list system
of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant
thereto, a number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations. Subsequent
events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to
Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list
organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the names of the nominees sought
to be disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list of nominees.
Petitioner Rosales sent a letter to Director AliodenDalaigod the Comelec‘s
Law Department requesting a list of that groups‘ nominees. Another letter was
sent but to no avail. Thereafter, Manila Bulletin carried the front-page banner
headline “COMELEC WON‘T BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES”, with the
following sub-heading: “Abalos says party-list polls not personality oriented.”
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr., and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their
own behalves and as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter to the Comelec
formally requesting action and definitive decision on Rosales‘ earlier plea for information
regarding the names of several party-list nominees. Unknown to Rosales et al. was the
issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 virtually declaring the nominees‘
names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales‘ basic disclosure
request.
Issue: Whether Comelec is correct in refusing to disclose the names of the nominees
of party-list organizations.
Ruling: The petitions are impressed with merit.No national security or like
concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups in question. Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reads: Sec.
28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
The Comelec’s reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of
personalities is valid to a point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its
assailed non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a weighty
presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to
information. Respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and
release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the
herein petitions.

336) Senate vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)
G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his
capacity as Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate
President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority
Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader,
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY

EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A.
MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS,
Petitioners, vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary
and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his
stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines, Respondents.
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the
President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the
Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for
Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being
unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various
Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call
for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department,
bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National
Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the
Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public
hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud
in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-
called “Gloriagate Scandal”.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the
President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public
officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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Issue: Whether Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials,
enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional.
Ruling: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is
covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is
premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity,
be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by
definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this
case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh
the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it
is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the
ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it
must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so
and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

337) Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (G.R. No.
180643, March 25, 2008)
G.R. No. 180643 March 25, 2008
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner, vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE
AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, respondents.
Facts: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE)
 CRIMINAL LAW 2 MIDTERM CASES
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for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN)
Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The
Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China. The Senate issued various
Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an investigation regarding
the NBN-ZTE deal.
Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain
personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among
those invited. He was summoned to appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26
and October 25, 2007.
On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent Committees for eleven
(11) hours. He disclosed that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman
Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN
Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery
attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed
further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a)
whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she
directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
Issue: Whether the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive
privilege.
Ruling:The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential
communications privilege. It pertains to “communications, documents or other
materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the
President believes should remain confidential.” Presidential communications
privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the
constitutional principle of separation of power and the President’s unique
constitutional role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the
subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution
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to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. The
information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than
others.
Elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.” - i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other
countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without
the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence.
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close
advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor
must be in “operational proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that
may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought
“likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. - there is no adequate showing of
a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

338) Perez vs. Estrada (A.M. No. 00-1-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001)
A.M. No. 01-4-03-S.C. June 29, 2001
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL OF IN THE
SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER
PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA
BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY.
RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR
OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
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Facts: On March 13, 2001, the Kapisanan ng mgaBrodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an

association representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks
throughout the country, sent a letter requesting the Supreme Court to allow live media
coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against
former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the
public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history."
The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 5 April 2001 to the
Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo.
On 17 April 2001, the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the petition.
Issue: Whether media coverage be allowed to air Estrada’s trial to the public.
Ruling: NO. In Estes v. Texas, US The Supreme Court held that television coverage of
judicial proceedings involves an inherent denial of due process rights of the criminal
defendant: "Witnesses might be frightened, play to the cameras, become nervous. They
are then subject to extraordinary out-of-court influences that might affect their
testimony. Telecasting increases the trial judge's responsibility to avoid actual
prejudice to the defendant. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental
harassment and subjects him to excessive public exposure and distracts him
from an effective presentation of his defense. Finally, the television camera is
a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an
accused and his case in the eyes of the public."

The right of people to information does not prescribe that TV cameras be

installed in the courtroom. This right might be fulfilled by less distracting, degrading
and more judicial means. In a criminal case, a life is at stake, and the due process
rights of the accused shall take precedence over the people's right to information. The
accused has the right to a public trial, and the exercise of such a right is his to make,
because it is his life and liberty that is in the balance. A public trial is not the same as a
publicized trial.
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339) Lantaco vs. Llamas (A.M. No. 1037-CJ October 28, 1981)
A.M. No. 1037-CJ October 28, 1981
MARTIN LANTACO, SR., ESTEBAN DEL BARRIO, ROSALITO ALAMAG and
BORROMEO VITALIANO, complainants, vs. CITY JUDGE FRANCISCO R.
LLAMAS, respondent.

Facts: This is a verified letter-complaint addressed to the President (and this

was referred by the Office of the President to the Supreme Court) by jeepney drivers
and residents of Pasay City against Judge Llamas for "Backsliding and Grave Abuse of
Discretion."
On Jan. 8, 1975, criminal cases for estafa were filed against Ricardo Paredes,
an officer of the PASCAMASCON, an association of jeepney operators, for
"non-remittance of SSS contribution premiums." These cases were assigned to
Judge Llamas. The defense moved to dismiss the cases on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence.
At 9:45am on July 31, 1975, Judge Llamas' clerk of court, upon his
instruction, read the dispositive portion thereof acquitting Paredes of all 4
estafa cases on the ground of reasonable doubt.According to complainants,
after the reading of the decision, a recess was made by Judge Llamas and
they requested for a copy of the decision. They were told by Judge Llamas
that there are no more copy so they asked a xerox copy instead but Judge
Llamas told them that xerox copy is not permitted and just instructed his
employee (steno-typist) to type another copy for them.
After going back to the office several times, the complainants failed to get a
copy of the Decision.They were told that the folder of the case is at the house
of Judge Llamas because the Judge is making "CORRECTION." They
wondered why a correction is being made when the decision has already
been rendered.
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The Supreme Court required Judge Llamas to comment on the complaint and also sent
a follow-up letter by registered mails and a tracer letter. The Bureau of Posts certified
that these follow-up letters were delivered to and received by the office of Judge
Llamas.
Finally, the Supreme Court received Judge Llamas' comment. His brief comment was
that the criminal cases were validly and properly decided, validly promulgated in the
presence of the accused, fiscal and Ginete and all complaining parties. The records of
the decision show that the accused signed the same and copies were furnished to the
accused and prosecuting fiscal. Judge Llamas also submitted a copy of the decision.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Llamas committed grave abuse of authority Judge in
refusing to give the complainants a copy of his decision.
Ruling: YES. Judge Llamas committed grave abuse of authority in refusing to
give the complainants a copy of his decision. The complainants were
understandably interested in securing a copy of the decision as they were the
complaining witnesses in the criminal cases. The request was made during office
hours and was relayed personally to Judge Llamas. The decision in question was
already promulgated furnished to counsels, it was already part of the public record
which the citizen has a right to scrutinize. And if there was no more copy, the
complainants were amenable to a xerox copy, a copy of which is allowed to be given to
interested parties upon requestm duly certified as true copy of the original on file.
What aggravates the situation is that Judge Llamas, without just cause,
denied complainants access to public records and gave them a run-around,
which is oppressive as it is arbitrary. The New Constitution now expressly
recognizes that the people are entitled to information on matters of public
concern and thus are expressly granted access to official records, as well as
documents of official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to such
limitations imposed by law (Article IV, Section 6, New Constitution). The
incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the
fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can
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be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a

meaningful democratic decision- making if they are denied access to
information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been
aptly observed: Maintaining the flow of such information depends on
protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either
process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases.