REVIEWS REVIEWS REVIEWS

479
Integrating conservation and development:
a case of institutional misfit
Katrina Brown

Designing appropriate management institutions for the successful integration of conservation and develop-
ment has proven very difficult. It appears that these activities and interventions often fail to meet either eco-
logical or social objectives. But does this mean that we should abandon our attempts? This paper explores the
concept of institutional fit to explain these problems, using an example of a protected area in the Terai region
of Nepal. Integration of conservation and development goals is constrained by a lack of fit between the insti-
tutions and ecosystems, and between sets of stakeholders. To succeed, we need innovative institutions based
on adaptive management, as well as more equitable and inclusionary decision making.
Front Ecol Environ 2003; 1(9): 479–487

W hy are attempts to integrate conservation and devel-

opment so often unsuccessful? This question is par-
ticularly relevant in developing countries, where rural peo-
ple’s livelihoods are dependent on natural resources and
biodiversity. Efforts at integration broadly seek to address
biodiversity objectives through the use of socioeconomic
investment tools; this approach is based on the premise
that, where local peoples’ resource use threatens biodiver-
sity, through poaching, encroachment, and a lack of
enforcement of conservation, they have an incentive to
behave differently, and this includes managing resources
more sustainably (Hutton and Leader-Williams 2003).
Integrated conservation and development can involve a
number of different approaches, including managing tradi-
tional protected areas to allow local people access to
resources, developing income-generating activities such as
ecotourism in buffer zones, community conservation, and
wildlife utilization, as well as partnership and collaborative
management approaches (Salafsky and Wollenberg 2000;
McShane and Wells 2003).
Hughes and Flintan (2001) provide a useful summary of
examples of integrating conservation and development,
noting that when they were first introduced in the 1980s,
these methods were viewed as a radical divergence from
conventional preservationist protected area approaches,
whereas now they are used worldwide. Although there has
In a nutshell:
• Conservation needs to go hand in hand with development in
poor countries if it is to be fair and sustainable
• Integrating the two requires innovations in management
• Adaptive co-management approaches are part, but not all, of
the solution
• New institutions, such as extractive reserves and new decision-
making procedures, are necessary for success in both conserva-
tion and development
School of Development Studies and CSERGE, University of East
Anglia, Norwich, UK (k.brown@uea.ac.uk)
been a certain amount of backlash against systems that
marry conservation and development – Wilshusen et al.
(2002) refer to a “resurgent protection paradigm” – it is
becoming clear that exclusive protected areas are not the
only way to conserve biodiversity.
In particular, concerns for social justice and equity have
encouraged more people-oriented and community-cen-
tered approaches to conservation (Jeanrenaud 2002). In
poor countries, this means providing development oppor-
tunities alongside conservation. Two decades of trying
such methods have provided very mixed results (Wells et
al. 1999; Newmark and Hough 2000; Hughes and Flintan
2001). A key reason why these attempts have not
achieved their (often very ambitious) goals lies in the
design of their managing institutions (broadly defined, the
term “institution” encompasses the formal and informal
rules that govern human behavior). Ecosystems and the
management institutions are maladapted or do not fit.
Made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions)
and informal constraints (norms of behavior, self-imposed
codes of conduct) and their enforcement characteristics
(North 1990), institutions are often referred to as “rules in
use”. They therefore include the constitution of the pro-
tected area or designated conservation area and its legal
and organizational framework, the formal and informal
property rights and rules that govern the management of
its resources, and the norms and traditions of the different
stakeholders and people who use them. The concept of
institutional fit addresses the appropriateness of the institu-
tions – the “rules in use” – in achieving the integration of
development and conservation. The concept has been
developed by authors such as Berkes, Folke, and Holling,
who draw on insights from ecology, political science, and
institutional economics (Hanna et al. 1997; Berkes and
Folke 1998; Pritchard et al. 1998; Young 2002).
Institutions do not “fit” the ecosystems they seek to
manage for a number of reasons, including the complexity
and dynamics of the ecosystems, uncertainty over future
changes, and factors such as irreversibility, resilience, and

© The Ecological Society of America www.frontiersinecology.org

 Integrating conservation and development
480 disturbance. There is the problem of fit – both between
the institutions involved in integrating conservation and
development (in terms of their objectives, interests, and
worldviews), and their respective scales of operation.
Finding ways to overcome these problems of fit through
appropriate formal and informal organizations, rules, and
modes of management, poses a considerable challenge to
the successful and sustainable integration of conservation
and development.
Analyses of natural resource management institutions
have generally focused on the sociopolitical factors that
make “successful” institutions, leading to a set of design
principles (Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 2002). However, the
ecological characteristics of the resource systems these
institutions seek to manage are often treated as contextual
factors, and are thus outside of these design principles,
rather than intrinsic to them (Steins and Edwards 1999).
The problems of fit, therefore, are outside the remit of
conventional analysis.
Emerging interdisciplinary approaches seek more holistic
and integrated analyses. For example, Pritchard et al. (1998)
attempt to analyze the links between social systems and key
structuring processes in ecosystems, and in some senses see
human systems as a subset of the ecosphere. Walker et al.
(2002) describe linked socioecological systems as complex
adaptive systems and see managers as integral components
of the system itself. Neither approach, however, compre-
hensively analyzes or conceptualizes the dynamics and het-
erogeneity of the social (or community and stakeholder)
components. This paper will explore the problems of
designing institutions to manage complex ecosystems and
biodiverse resources, and the misfit between institutions
and the different sets of stakeholders and interests involved
in integrating conservation and development, using Nepal’s
Royal Bardia National Park as an example.
 Misfit between ecosystems and institutions
The first area of misfit is between institutions and the
ecosystems they seek to manage. Biodiversity conserva-
tion is a particular challenge for institutional design
because of its “slipperiness” as a concept, the multiple
resources, uses, and users it involves, and the scientific
uncertainty about its extent and value (Guyer and
Richards 1996; Brown 1998). Conventional ecosystem
management leads to what Pritchard et al. (1998) call the
“pathology of natural resource management” – manage-
ment is often highly problematic and fails to meet ecolog-
ical objectives (Imperial 2000). In the case of biodiversity
conservation, past management strategies have sought to
exclude people from biodiversity. Problems of fit derive
from three aspects of conventional management
approaches: they tend to have narrow, poorly defined, or
conflicting objectives; they attempt to suppress variabil-
ity and block out disturbance, which paradoxically
increases the chances of large-scale disturbance; and they
have short-term rather than long-term goals.
www.frontiersinecology.org
K Brown
These difficulties of conventional exclusive conserva-
tion are further compounded in methods that seek to com-
bine conservation and development. The compatibility of
objectives between conservation and development is
questionable (McShane and Wells 2003). For example,
the linkages between conservation objectives and devel-
opment activities, central to the rationale of integration,
are often poorly understood (Salafsky and Wollenberg
2000). There is often an implicit assumption that if de-
velopment (however defined) is successful, then conserva-
tion will follow. Gibson and Marks (1995) argue that
many integrated conservation and development projects
in Africa fail because the economic incentives presented
to communities are insufficient to alter their behavior.
Incentives may overlook the cultural or social importance
of practices such as hunting, and these activities are not
easily replaced by income-earning alternatives. Further-
more, there may well be a tendency for poor households to
add, not substitute, resources or activities. In the Maya
Biosphere Reserve in Guatemala, for example, Langholz
(1999) reported that the provision of alternative eco-
nomic opportunities actually caused some households to
increase their extraction of forest, and other, products
from the protected area.
Ecosystems, particularly those with high biodiversity,
are complex and dynamic. They tend to be spatially and
temporally heterogeneous, and to evolve and change over
time. Their complexity therefore has organizational, func-
tional, and temporal dimensions. A key feature is distur-
bance, which occurs as a result of natural phenomena and
(most importantly) human activities. There are important
interactions between natural and human disturbances, as
for example in the case of forest fires. Disturbance is
increasingly considered as an important factor in develop-
ing diversity and resilience in ecological systems.
However, attempts to reduce variability and disturbance,
particularly that represented by anthropogenic activities,
is a key feature of most conservation and development
interventions. Creating more static systems may ulti-
mately work against the interests of biodiversity and
restrict human uses (Walker et al. 2002).
Conservation and development approaches often work
for short periods, aiming to ameliorate the detrimental
impacts of reduced or controlled resource use in the short
term rather than providing more long-term sustainable
resource management. Furthermore, short-term costs are
often borne locally, whereas potential and actual long-
term benefits accrue internationally (Wells 1992;
Bodmer and Lozano 2001), so time scales and social scale
do not fit.
 Misfit between stakeholders and institutions
The integration of conservation and development
involves many different institutions and stakeholders
who often have varied interests and objectives. They will
commonly include, on the one hand, conservation and
© The Ecological Society of America
K Brown Integrating conservation and development

international development organizations 481

such as the World Bank, and locally based
informal groups of resource users on the
other. They work through national and sub-
national governments and non-governmen-
tal organizations. It is probable that differ-
ent government agencies will be involved,
as responsibility for the conservation of nat-
ural resources and environment usually rests
with departments or ministries with no
interest in social and economic develop-
ment. The result is a multitude of organiza-
tions with different sources of power and
legitimacy, all involved in trying to inte-
grate conservation with development.
Their objectives, mandates, skills, knowl-
edge, and resources are mobilized differ- Figure 1. The Karnali River forms the western boundary of Royal Bardia
ently; for example, in the case of extractive National Park, Nepal.
reserves in the Amazon region, we have
highlighted the sources of misfit between the institutions, subsistence needs of poor people living nearby.
namely the scale of operations and worldviews (Brown The RBNP consists of 968 km2 of floodplains and low
and Rosendo 2000). hills, an extension of the Ganges River plain. The land-
At a local level, communities are socially and economi- scape is dominated by the wide, braided Karnali River,
cally differentiated in many ways – by gender, ethnicity, which forms the western boundary of the Park (Figure 1).
wealth, religion, livelihood, and reliance on natural Seven major vegetation types have been identified inside
resources. Compared with national and international stake- the park (Dinerstein 1979; Pokharel 1993), including four
holders, they are less able to access and mobilize resources types of forest and three different grassland habitats. The
and power. Their interests and the means of achieving them sal (Shorea robusta) forest covers approximately 70% of the
may therefore be fundamentally different, a disparity which park, dominating the alluvial floodplain and parts of the
constitutes another source of problems of fit. south-facing slopes of the Churiya Hills to the north.
Furthermore, the way these different stakeholders orga- Three types of grassland have been identified: wooded
nize themselves and interact with natural resources is grassland, open areas of grassland known as phanta, and
vastly different, and may include informal collective floodplain grassland. The first two types consist of tussock-
action or formal legal frameworks. Simplistic assumptions forming perennials, such as Imperata cylindrica, Saccharum
about the homogeneity of key stakeholder groups and spontaneum, Erianthus ravennae, and Vetivera zizaniodes.
their formal and informal institutions are linked to poor The wooded grassland is savannah-like, often dotted with
performance and the inequitable distribution of the costs simal (Bombax ceiba) or silk cotton trees. The phantas
and benefits of integrated conservation and development consist of open areas, and are thought to represent previ-
initiatives within and between communities (Agrawal ously disturbed and cultivated sites. The third grassland
and Gibson 1999; Flinton 2003). habitat is found in the floodplain and along the banks of
the Geruwa, Babai, and Aurai Rivers, in areas that are
 Nepal’s Royal Bardia National Park commonly inundated during the monsoon. These regions
are characterized by tall grasses, including S spontaneum,
S bengalense, and Phragmites karka.
Managing succession
The combination of these different habitats – the
Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world, but it patches of forest, grassland, and floodplain – provide cover
encompasses a remarkable diversity of habitats and for the rare species of flora and fauna that make the region
species. The Terai plains in the southern part of the coun- so important for biodiversity conservation. It is ironic that
try contain five protected areas that are home to a num- in such a crowded country, where much of the land con-
ber of rare and endangered species of international impor- sists of steep slopes and thin soils on mountains and hill-
tance, including the Bengal tiger (Pantera tigris), the sides, areas such as the RBNP are among the most highly
Asian one-horned rhinoceros (Rhinoceros unicornis), the productive.
Hispid hare (Aprophagus hispidus), and the Bengal flori- Changes in conservation policies and shifts in designa-
can (Houbaropis begalensis). Royal Bardia National Park tion and property rights have meant a gradual extension
(RBNP) is one of these protected areas, and represents a in the size of the protected area and a decline in local peo-
complex habitat where the pressures to protect globally ple’s rights of access and use of its various resources. The
endangered rare species have to be balanced against the forests were considered the property of the royal family

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 Integrating conservation and development K Brown

482 until the 1950s, and were nationalized in 1956. In 1976, Table 1. Grasses collected from Royal Bardia National
the area was declared a royal hunting reserve, although Park, Nepal
local people had unlimited access to the forest and were
Species Local name Uses
allowed to graze their livestock. That same year, 386 km2
of the reserve was officially set aside as the Royal Karnali Narenga khadai, kharai Burned cane – building;
porphorycoma unburned cane – grain
Wildlife Reserve, renamed the Royal Bardia Wildlife silo
Reserve in 1982. This area was enlarged 2 years later, and
was upgraded to national park status in 1988. As a result, Saccharum bengalense narkat Cane for walls and
only very limited exploitation of natural resources is Phragmite kharka ceiling, baskets, lamp
stands for Diwali festival
allowed, and no human habitation is permitted inside its
boundaries. This has not always been the case, and in fact Tifa augustifolia, pat, pater Mats, fans, mattresses,
part of the area was inhabited and cultivated as recently as T elephantina howdahs
1984, when the park boundary was extended (Upreti
Imperata cylindrica khar Thatch, brooms; flower
1994; Brown 1997). head used for
Since 1994, an attempt to integrate conservation and ceremonial lamps
development has been implemented by a partnership con-
Eulaliopsis binata buncas, sabai, Rope for beds, chairs,
sisting of the country’s Department of National Parks and babiyo bullock carts, tying
Wildlife Conservation (DNPWC), the King Mahendra thatch, paper
Trust for Wildlife Conservation, and the World Wildlife
Fund (WWF). The Parks and People Project (PPP), Saccharum khans Reeds and canes for
spontaneum walls, bed, thatch, and
funded in part by the United Nations Development Pro- fodder
gramme, defines a buffer zone in the districts bordering From Brown (1998)
each of the five protected areas in the Terai (HMGN and
UNDP 1994; DNPWC 2003). The PPP has three objec-
tives: to provide new sources of income for local residents, 1997). Grass and grass products are crucial to local liveli-
so they don’t have to rely on park resources so much; to hoods, particularly for the poorer, landless, and indigenous
devise compensation mechanisms for local communities Tharu households. Grass products contribute to the eco-
in exchange for the loss of access to park resources; and to nomic, social, and cultural life of local communities in a
change the local users’ incentives and perceptions of the number of ways (Table 1). Grass cutting is allowed for 10
park by forming user groups that can participate in park days at the end of the dry season, with a permit purchased
management. Panel 1 shows the activities supported by from park authorities for individual hand cutting (Brown
the PPP to meet these objectives. Agrawal and Verughese 1997; Figure 2). This system also exists in other Terai pro-
(2000) have provided an assessment of the impacts of tected areas (Lehmkuhl et al. 1988; Straede and Hjortso
these initiatives; in the case of RBNP, during the first 2000). Although estimates vary greatly, the annual value
phase of the project (1994–1997), 43 Village Develop- of the cut grass has been estimated to be worth many
ment Committees (the administrative unit equivalent to a thousands of dollars per year (Brown 1997; Lehmkuhl et
village) were covered by the initiative, accounting for al. 1998). It also has a very important subsistence value.
43% of the targeted population. In addition to these buffer There are no direct substitutes available locally, and nei-
zone activities, limited resource extraction from the pro- ther the variety nor the volume of grasses exists outside
tected area is permitted. the protected areas, so this is essentially the only source of
People have interacted with, and intervened in, the these materials for the people of the Terai (Agrawal and
ecosystems of the RBNP for many years. Starting with Varughese 2000).
habitation by the indigenous Tharu people, this has pro-
gressed through hunting to, more recently, the use of prod- Ecosystem–institution misfits
ucts from the park, including the illegal collection of fire-
wood and other non-timber forest products and the Grass cutting in the park by local people is one of the key
cutting of grass for thatch, fodder, and other uses (Brown elements of the buffer zone implementation, and part of
the PPP. It is seen as compensation for the loss of access to
other products, such as timber and grazing, from the pro-
Panel 1. People and Parks Project (PPP) activities in Royal
tected area, and as a way of reducing conflicts between
Bardia National Park, Nepal
local people and park authorities. In some respects, the
• Sustainable forestry and agriculture system was not originally meant to mix conservation and
• Improving animal husbandry and livestock development; rather, it was implemented to reach exter-
• Improving natural forest regeneration nally defined conservation goals more effectively. Despite
• Promoting alternative income schemes
this, some conservationists still resist the idea of allowing
• Developing nature-based tourism
• Credit schemes local people into the park itself for any reason, claiming
that they disturb wildlife and set fires which are difficult to

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K Brown Integrating conservation and development

control, that sustainable levels 483

of off-take are difficult to cal-
culate and implement, and
that legal grass cutting is used
as cover for poaching. Some
think that human pressures on
the park resources are increas-
ing and constitute a threat
(Peet et al. 1999). Figure 3
shows an example of the peo-
ple–wildlife conflicts caused
by extraction of resources from
the National Park.
Historical evidence suggests
that human intervention plays
a critical role in managing
grassland ecosystems, and is
necessary for their mainte-
nance. The cutting and burn-
ing of grass, by both local vil-
lagers and park staff, takes
place every year. However, the
impacts of these different Figure 2. Thatch is just one of the many useful grass products collected from inside the Royal
actions are poorly understood Bardia National Park, Nepal, by local villagers.
(Peet et al. 1999). In particular,
the role of natural disturbance, such as fire and flooding habitats. Third, the focus is on short-term management of
(perhaps indirectly affected by human action), is likely to protected area resources to meet externally defined eco-
be crucial. For example, Peet et al. (1999) report substan- logical objectives, rather than on long-term harmoniza-
tial historic movements of rivers – up to 100 km in the tion of displaced residents in order to achieve coexistence
case of Kosi Thappu Reserve – across the floodplains in with the protected area and its species. These misfits are
the past two centuries. The spatial and temporal dynamics summarized in Table 2.
and the complexity of the mosaic of grassland and forest
ecosystems make broad policy prescriptions and manage- Misfit between institutions
ment plans problematic for RBNP, and indeed for all five
of the Terai protected areas (Brown 1997). The evidence from studies on RBNP by Brown (1998)
There are many difficulties in reconciling the manage- and Agrawal and Verughese (2000) also indicates misfit
ment of resources inside the protected area and in the between different stakeholders and institutions. Table 3
buffer zone with the complex and dynamic ecology and lists a number of the key stakeholders, and shows that they
the diverse social and economic interests of local commu- have very different scales of influence, power, and interest.
nities and others involved. We can characterize this as a These range from local indigenous people and migrant
misfit between the ecosystems and the institutions that farmers, who are very poor and are marginalized from most
aim to manage them, and we can identify the aspects of decision-making processes, to internationally funded
misfit outlined earlier. The primary objective is to con- NGOs who work closely with national government orga-
serve a small number of emblematic rare species (the nizations and tourism concessions. Some of these stake-
rhino and tiger in particular). Attempts are therefore holders are able to influence policy and management deci-
made to manage a complex set of ecosystems and habitats, sions while others are not, and they have quite different
despite the fact that little is known about their spatial and understandings of what the problems of RBNP manage-
temporal dynamics, in order to conserve these species, and ment are and how they should be addressed.
with the urgency and threat of extinction used to justify The analysis presented by Brown (1998) shows how
interventions. diverse sets of beliefs about fundamental human–ecological
Second, the management approach seeks to suppress interactions by various stakeholders lead to different policy
disturbance of the ecosystems. It controls the use of prescriptions. However, the dominant conservationist dis-
resources in the protected area by restricting access at cer- course uses ecological science in its most conventional
tain times of the year, justifying this on the grounds of mode to give weight to management strategies that separate
sound ecological principles, yet the phantas only exist local resource users from the management of the protected
because human disturbance has arrested and adapted the area. The mechanisms initiated under the PPP attempt to
succession to forest and created a patchwork or mosaic of overcome some of the conflicts and to provide a means for

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 Integrating conservation and development K Brown

484 individuals within the community, and the literature on

integrated conservation and development and community-
based approaches to conservation is rife with criticisms con-
cerning attempts at community participation (Agrawal and
Gibson 1999). Some of these difficulties are evident in the
efforts to involve user groups in conservation management
through the PPP in Nepal. Agrawal and Verughese (2000)
describe how, in the case of the RBNP buffer zone, elite
groups are more likely to get involved and how women in
particular are under-represented, even though they may be
directly impacted by altered access regimes for resources
such as grass, fodder, or firewood. Chakraborty (2001)
reports that forest user groups in the Terai tend to reflect
existing hierarchies in society, and are therefore biased in
favor of the richer and more powerful. This implies that fos-
tering these local level institutions may not be enough to
meet conservation and development aims without making
them more innovative. Table 4 summarizes the misfits
between institutions and stakeholders in RBNP.

 Designing institutions that fit

Nepal has a very progressive policy towards integrating
Figure 3. Human–wildlife encounters are frequent in the Royal conservation and development. There are examples of
Bardia National Park and its buffer zone. This python was innovations throughout the country’s different ecoregions,
injured during the grass cutting, but recovered and was later and the government has made considerable progress in
released. implementing the PPP and other programs (Sharma
2003). It is therefore an excellent context within which to
local participation in management – through user groups in observe evolving institutions and initiatives. What can
Village Development Committees. Agrawal and Verughese the analysis of RBNP tell us about designing institutions
(2000) show that the impacts of these projects can be prob- to successfully integrate conservation and development?
lematic and that they are biased toward community elites. Clearly, we need institutions that fit dynamic ecosystems
The impacts of the first stages of the PPP around RBNP led and can accommodate diverse stakeholders and interests,
the authors to challenge some of the basic assumptions of, but this is a tall order given the state of knowledge about
and rationale for, the buffer zone
approach. If the initiatives are Table 2. Ecosystem–institution misfits in Royal Bardia National Park, Nepal
based on flawed assumptions
about people’s behavior, liveli- Source of misfit Characteristics in RBNP Implications for managing
integrated conservation and
hoods, needs, and aspirations, development
they will surely fail to meet both
conservation and development Ecosystem complexity RBNP ecosystems are a mosaic Management plans are not able to
of riverine, flood plain, phanta, reflect complexity and multiple
objectives. and sal forest, providing habitats functions
Designing institutions that can for a wide range of flora and
accommodate different interests fauna species
and include diverse individuals is
Ecosystem dynamics Maintenance of the grassland Management of grassland by
very difficult. The institutional mosaic depends on disturbance restricted extraction of grasses
architecture of conservation and – flooding and burning and the by local people, followed by
development (Brown and Ros- removal of biomass through controlled cutting and burning
endo 2000) encompasses formal grazing and cutting by park authorities; succession
and dynamics are suppressed
and informal institutions, from
local community collective action Biodiversity at Pressure to manage areas Species-based approaches rather
and mores concerning the ritual different scales for emblematic species such as than an ecosystem-based approach
rhino, elephants, and tigers
significance of natural resources to
national and multinational legal Uncertainty and Uncertainties about the impact Trade-offs between livelihoods and
frameworks and conservation des- trade-offs of anthropogenic and other biodiversity cannot be made
ignations. A major problem con- disturbances on ecosystems and because of lack of information
species
cerns the inclusion of various

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K Brown Integrating conservation and development

Table 3. Stakeholders in conservation in the Terai region, Nepal

485
Stakeholder Scale of influence Source of power Interests

Indigenous people Local Very limited Livelihood maintenance – use protected area
as source of subsistence and ritual resources
(thatch, fodder, fuel, building material, wild
foods, medicines, hunting and fishing);
some trading

Migrant farmers Local Limited Livelihood maintenance – use protected

area as source of subsistence resources
(thatch, fodder, fuel, building material);
some trading

Local entrepreneurs Local May hold official positions Commercial interests and profit motive; small
in locality enterprises based on tourism and non-tourist
activities

Tourist concessions National, some Lobbying; may hold official Commercial and profit-driven; some revenue
international positions earned overseas; links to conservation
interests

Government National Administrative and regulatory Conserving wildlife and biodiversity;

conservation agencies facilitating tourist development

Conservation pressure Local, national some Lobbying; may have personal Conserving biodiversity but with
groups international linkages contacts in government and consideration for local livelihoods
international NGOs, and
international funding

International International International funding Conserving biodiversity; some interest in local

conservation groups livelihoods

complex ecosystems, and the differences in power and (Holling 1978). In this sense, policies are treated as
worldviews of conservationists and local resource users. hypotheses and management as experiments from which
The case study illustrates many of the difficulties managers can learn, so that uncertainty is accepted and
involved. The dynamic nature of complex social and eco- surprises are expected (Gunderson et al. 1995; Olsson
logical systems – such as that found in the Terai, with peri- 2003). This approach addresses misfits between ecosys-
odic flooding, a mosaic of habitats, and interactions tems and institutions, but not necessarily between institu-
between humans, domesticated livestock, and wildlife – tions. For adaptive management to be effective in situa-
provides challenges to management. The seasonal and tions such as RBNP, management efforts require more
year-to-year fluctuations and complex interactions inclusionary processes, in which stakeholders are involved
between species all make it hard to draft a management in all stages of project design, implementation, and evalu-
plan, let alone implement one
when, for example, key parame- Table 4. Misfits between institutions at Royal Bardia National Park, Nepal
ters such as sustainable off-take Source of misfit Manifestation Implications for integrating
cannot be predicted from one conservation and development
season to the next.
The solution may lie in adap- Multiple uses and Tourism vs conservation Conflicts are frequent; lack clear
users vs local livelihoods goals and objectives
tive management or resilience
management, as suggested by Stakeholder power Stakeholders range from Difficult to develop plans that
Walker et al. (2002). Certainly, relationships powerful international include stakeholder interests
the science of sustainability and conservation groups and and voices equitably
private companies to local
resilience (or panarchy) is help- peasant farmers
ing to provide insights into the
interactions between ecological Management Stakeholders have very different Confusion between objectives of
and social systems (Gunderson objectives management objectives and conservation, tourism development,
worldviews and support for local livelihoods
and Holling 2001). Adaptive
management is particularly suit- Community People in local communities have Danger that user groups reinforce
able where knowledge about the heterogeneity different resource needs and existing power relationships and
different access to decision that poorer households miss out
complexity and interconnected- making on benefit sharing
ness of ecosystems is incomplete

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 Integrating conservation and development
486 ation, and can see the management as rational and fair.
Some authors believe that one adaptive management
approach can encompass all these social dynamics, often
using the term “adaptive co-management” to indicate the
collaborative aspects of management. Ruitenbeek and
Cartier (2001) define this in terms of three characteristics:
a way for the rights and responsibilities of stakeholders to
be defined and shared, a way for stakeholders to learn
through their actions and modify their actions in the future,
and the capacity to deal with the longer time scales of the
bio-economic system. Adaptive co-management involves
not only allowing change, but also surrendering power to
other stakeholders. It means recognizing and embracing
multiple values and different forms of knowledge as valid
(Berkes 1999). This is difficult and counterintuitive for
managers trained in reductionist science – what Ruitenbeek
and Cartier (2001) see as a need to control, and Adams and
Mulligan (2003) refer to as “colonial science”.
Even if adaptive management is expanded to open up
planning, decision-making, and implementation in this
way, it may still be very difficult to apply adaptive co-man-
agement principles to existing conservation projects, such
as buffer zones surrounding long-existing protected areas.
These areas often have complex and contested histories
and an institutional inertia that precludes change and
flexibility. They are rooted in institutional cultures that
are strongly associated with classic conservation
approaches, and many conservation groups have had long
experience with exclusionary approaches.
Existing institutions, both formal and informal, often
work within inequitable power structures and hierar-
chies which may resist development objectives. It may
therefore be necessary to design new institutions,
including organizations and systems of property rights.
Ostrom and Schlager (1996) suggest that a federation
rather than a hierarchical arrangement of institutions
may be most appropriate for the management of diverse
and diffuse resources. Well-defined property rights at
each scale are a necessary precondition. Cross-scale
institutions, as discussed by Berkes (2002), can provide
an opportunity to include various stakeholders, and
innovative decision-making procedures will support
more dynamic and adaptive management. Changing
institutions is a long-term venture that needs to happen
at each scale of management and policy. The adoption
of adaptive co-management procedures and inclusive
decision making are the most promising starting point
for creating institutions that fit conservation and
development.
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