IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION NO. __/2023

IN THE MATTER OF
BAKO CHARITABLE TRUST …PETITIONER
NO. 1
TOM RIDDLE … PETITIONER
NO. 2
VERSUS
STATE OF NORTH PRADESH …RESPONDENT

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA

ON SUBMISSION TO
THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION JUSTICE OF
THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

WRITTEN STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

1
 TABLE OF CONTENT
S. NO. PARTICULAR PAGE NO.

1. List of Abbreviations 4
2. Index of Authorities 5-6
3. Statement of Jurisdiction 7
4. Statement of Facts 8
5. Issues Raised 9
6. Summary of Arguments 10-11
7. Argument Advanced 12-27

ISSUE 1: Whether the speech made by Mr. Arya Stark is violation 13-16
of Article 19(1)(a) of constitution of Indiana
1.1 The speech made by Ms. Arya Stark disturbs the Public Order,
1.2. The speech made by Ms. Arya Stark is a hate speech.
1.3 The statement of Ms. Stark is a punishable offence under IPC.

2
 ISSUE II: Whether state of North Pradesh was justified in
withdrawing the prosecution against Ms. Arya Stark 17-20

2.1 The withdrawal of prosecution was not in accordance with the

provisions of section 321 of CrPC.
2.2 The state of North Pradesh did not provide any reasons for
withdrawal from prosecution.
2.3 The withdrawal from prosecution was not in interest of
administration of justice.

ISSUE III: Whether Place of Workship Act is applicable to Shine and

nir in question?

3.1 The definition of place of worship' covers the Shine and Nit in 20-25
question.
3.2 The Shine and Nir in question is protected by the General and
Specific provisions of the Act.
3.3 The Shine and Nir in question does not come under the ambit of
exceptions provided in Section 4/3).
3.4 The Shine and Nir in question is not same as Ram Janma Bhumi-
Babri Majid.

ISSUE IV: Whether Place of Workship Act, 1991 is ultra vires to 25-28
constitution of Indiana?

4.1 The Act has been made with legitimate jurisdiction of the Centre.
4.2 The purpose of The Places of Worship Act, 1991 protects and
secures the fundamental values of the constitution.
4.3 The Places of Worship Act, 1991 promotes the spirit of
Secularism.
4.4 Law is not always the answer for disputes having their origins in
the past.
4.5 The cut-off date chosen is nothing less than logical.
9. PRAYER 29

3
 LIST OF ABBREVATIONS

S. No. ABBREVATIONS FULLFORM

1. & And
2. AIR All India Reporter
3. Anr. Another
4. Art. Article
5. FRs Fundamental Rights
6. HC High Court
7. Hon’ble Honorable
8. IPC Indian Penal Code
9. Ors. Others
10. p. Page
11. SC Supreme Court
12. u/Art. Under Article
13. u/s Under Section
14. v. Versus
15. w.r.t With respect to

4
 TABLE OF CASES

S. NO. NAME OF THE CASE CITATION P. NO.

1. Babu Rao Patel v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1980) 2 SCC 15

402
2. Collector & Dist. Magistrate v. S. Sultan AIR 2008 SC 13
2096
3. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 26
225
4. M. Karunanidhi v. UOI 1979 AIR 898, 26
1979 SCR (3)
254.
5. M Siddiq (D) Thr Lrs v. Mahant Suresh (2019) 19 SCC 26
433
6. Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. vs. Union of AIR 2018 SC 15
India 4321
7. Noor Mohd. V. Rex AIR 1949 All 13
120
8. Rajendra Kumar Jain v. State AIR 1980 SC 19
1510
9. Sheonandan Paswan v State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 19
288.
10. State of Punjsb v. UOI AIR 1987 SC 19
189
11. S R Bommai v. UOI AIR (1994) 3 27
SCC 1
12. Subhash Chander v. State (1980) 2 SCC 20
155

5
 COMMENTARIES & BOOKS USED
1. Constitutional Law of India (Dr. Narendra Kumar, 11th edition, 2022)
2. The Indian Panel Code, 1860 (Ram Jethmalani, D.S. Chopra, Volume-1, 2nd edition)
3. Indian Penal Code (RA Nelson, SK Sarvaria, Volume-2, 9th edition)

STATUTES REFERRED
1. The Constitution of India, 1949
2. The Indian Penal Code, 1860
3. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1974
4. Places of Workship Act, 1991
5. Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958

LEGAL DATABASE
1. MANUPATRA
2. SCC ONLINE
3. Live Law
4. Legal service India
5. Bar and Bench
6. Legally India

6
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The petitions approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Indiana under Article 136 of the
Constitution of Indiana which deals with Special Leave Petition to appeal by the Supreme
Court.

7
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. The State of Indiana is a sovereign, democratic, republic country which got its
independence from the Nitishers in 1947. The religious demographics of Indiana were quite
diverse. It has witnessed numerous acts of communal violence since its Independence in
1947.

2. In 1991, the Local Priests belonging to Indo religion filed a petition at the Sanarasi Civil
Court, Sanarasi, North Pradesh to seek permission to pray in the Shanvapi Shine complex and
seeks an archaeological survey of the site. Despite opposition from the clerics and followers
of the Bako religion, a survey was conducted.

3. The Bako Charitable Board challenged the proceedings pending before the Sanarasi Civil
Court before the Hon’ble High Court of Ballabad on the ground that the proceedings, as
regards to the shine for determination of existence of nir, are violative of the Places of
Worship Act, 1991.

4. Mee News is a popular News Channel in Indiana, which is known for its debate show i.e.
Aapki Nazar. A debate was being held on the Shanvapi Shine controversy which was
attended by Ms. Arya Stark and Mr. Genghiz. The statement made by Ms. Arya Stark that
nirs have been converted into shines as a result of suppression and it is necessary to undo the
wrong, sparked nationwide communal violence.

5. FIRs were registered against Ms. Stark for instigating riots and public peace in several
districts of North Pradesh. Ms. Stark filed a Petition before the Honble High Court of
Ballabad to transfer all the FIRs registered against her to the State Capital of Bucknow.

However, the state has withdrawn its prosecution which resulted in acquittal of Ms. Stark
from all criminal cases. It was alleged that speech made by Ms. Stark is directly in violation
of Article 19(1)(a). A large segment of society condemned her speech as 'hate speech'.

6.) The Hon'ble High Court of Ballabad dismissed the Petition filed by the Bako Charitable
Trust. The Bako Charitable Trust and Mr. Tom Riddle, who was one of the complainants in
the FIR against Ms. Stark, aggrieved by the acquittal order of Ms. Stark filed an SLP before
the Hon'ble Apex Court of Indiana.

8
 ISSUES RAISED

ISSUE 1:

WHETHER SPEECH MADE BY MS. ARYA STARK IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE

19(1)(a) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA?

ISSUE 2:

WHETHER THE STATE OF NORTH PRADESH WAS JUSTIFIED IN

WITHDRAWING THE PROSECUTION AGAINST MS. STARK?

ISSUE 3:

WHETHER THE PLACES OF WORSHIP ACT, 1991 IS APPLICABLE ON THE

SHINE AND NIR IN QUESTION?

ISSUE 4.

WHETHER THE PLACES OF WORSHIP ACT, 1991 IS ULTRA VIRES THE

CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA?

9
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I: THAT THE SPEECH MADE BY MS. ARYA STARK IS VIOLATIVE OF

ARTICLE 19(1)(A) OF CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA.

1. It is most humbly submitted to the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the speech made by Ms.
Stark is violative of right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution of Indiana.

2. The speech made by her disturbs the public order which is a reasonable restriction
imposed on the right to freedom of speech and expression.

3. The words she uttered on a news debate show is a hate speech and is a punishable offence
under IPC.

II: THAT THE STATE OF NORTH PRADESH WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN

WITHDRAWING THE PROSECUTION AGAINST MS. STARK.

1. It is most humbly contended that the state of North Pradesh was not justified in
withdrawing the prosecution against Ms. Stark.

2. The withdrawal of prosecution was not in accordance with the provisions of Section 321

Of CrPC.

3. The state of North Pradesh did not provide any reason for the withdrawal from
prosecution.

4. The withdrawal from prosecution was not in interest of administration of justice.

III: THAT PLACES OF WORSHIP ACT, 1991 IS APPLICABLE ON SHINE AND

NIR IN QUESTION.

1. It is most humbly submitted that the Places of Worship Act, 1991 is applicable on shine
and nir in question.

2. The definition of 'place of worship' covers the Shine and Nir in question.

10
3. The Shine and Nir in question is protected by the general and specific provisions of the
Act.

4. The Shine and Nir in question does not come under the ambit of exceptions provided in

Section 4(3).

5. The Shine and Nir in question is not same as Ram Janma Bhumi- Babri Masjid on which
the Act is not applicable.

IV: THAT PLACES OF WORSHIP ACT, 1991 IS NOT ULTRA VIRES THE

CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA.

1. It is most humbly submitted that the Places of Worship Act, 1991 is not ultra vires the
Constitution of Indiana.

2. The Act has been made with legitimate jurisdiction of the Centre.

3. The purpose of The Places of Worship Act, 1991 protects and secures the fundamental
values of the constitution.

4. The Places of Worship Act, 1991 promotes the spirit of secularism.

5. The Act is in accordance with the principle of non-retrogression of laws and progressive
realization of rights.

6. Law is not always the answer for disputes having their origin in the past.

11
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I: THAT THE SPEECH MADE BY MS. ARYA STARK IS VIOLATIVE OF

ARTICLE 19(1)(A) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA.

1. It is humbly submitted that the speech made by Ms. Stark is violative of right to freedom
of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of Indiana.

2. The speech made by her disturbs the public order which is a reasonable restriction imposed
on the right to freedom of speech and expression.

3. The words she uttered on a news debate show is a hate speech and is a punishable offence
under IPC.

1.1. The speech made by Ms. Arva Stark disturbs the Public Order.

1. It is humbly submitted that according to Article 19(1) (a) of the constitution of Indiana

"All citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression"

2. Article 19(2) imposes some reasonable restrictions on the right to freedom of speech

and expression which says-

"Nothing in sub clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or
prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions
on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause in the interests of the sovereignty
and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public
order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an
offence"

3. Thus, if any speech disturbs the public order in the country, that speech is restricted by
way of reasonable restrictions. Restrictions can be imposed on utterances that have the
tendency to lead to disorder.

4. In Supdt. Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lobia1, it was held that

1
Supdt. Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia, AIR 1960 SC 633

12
"The expression "public order" is synonymous with "public peace, safety, and tranquillity"

5. In Collector & Dist. Magistrate v. S. Sultan2

It was held that "The test for determining whether an act affects law and order or public
order is to see whether that act leads to the disturbance of the current life of the community,
or whether the act affects merely an individual, the tranquillity of the society being
undisturbed"

6. The statement made by Ms. Arya Stark on the show

"the members of the Indo religion despite being in majority have been supressed by the
followers of Bako Religion since centuries, as a result of which all their nirs have been
converted into shines. It is now necessary to undo the wrong."

sparked nationwide communal riots and opposition.

7. The nationwide communal riots that were the result of the speech made by Ms. Arya stark
has disturbed the public order of the country and hence, it is a violation of right to

freedom of speech and expression.

8. In Noor Mohd. V. Rex3, it was held that "Spreading communal bitterness" clearly means
that the relations between the new communities would be disturbed which would again lead
to the disturbance of public order.

9. If an allegation is made on a particular community where it has done such torture and
atrocities in the past, this constitutes an allegation on the character of the community and it
expected to cause hatred amongst the communities. And the same did happen, as it is evident
that the statement made by her did give rise to nationwide riots and breached public peace at
large. This proves that her freedom of speech did take a toll on the public

order and clearly teased with provisions in articles 19(1](a] and 19[21.

1.2. The speech made by Ms. Arva Stark is a hate speech.

10. It is most humbly submitted that according to the 267th report of Law Commission

of India on Hate Speech-

2
Collector & Dist. Magistrate v. S. Sultan, AIR 2008 SC 2096
3
Noor Mohd. V. Rex, AIR 1949 All 120

13
"The intent of freedom of speech is not to disregard the weaker sections of the society but to
give them equal voice. "

"Incitement to not only violence but also to discrimination has been recognized as a ground
for interfering with freedom of expression "

"Hate speech is an expression which is likely to cause distress or offend other individuals on
the basis of their association with a particular group or incite hostility towards them "

11. The speech given by Ms. Stark disregarded the Bako religion and incited not only
violence but also discrimination. The statement of her offended and caused disregard to the
individuals associated with Bako religion which resulted in communal riots. Therefore, her
speech was a hate speech and violated the provisions of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution
of Indiana.

12. The Human Rights Council's Report expressed that freedom of expression can be

restricted on the following grounds, namely.

• child pornography (to protect the rights of children),

• hate speech (o protect the rights of affected communities!

• defamation (to protect the rights and reputation of others against unwarranted
attacks)

• direct and public incitement to commit genocide (to protect the rights of others)

• advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to

discrimination, hostility or violence (to protect the rights of others, such as the right to life).

13. The statement of Ms. Stark is a hate speech and promoted religious hatred, thus, a

violation of freedom of expression.

1.3 The statement of Ms, Stark is a punishable offence under IPC

14. It is most humbly submitted that the speech made by Ms. Stark is punishable under

Section 153A, 153B, 295A, 298 and 505 of IPC for which many FIRs have been registered
against her in several districts of the State.

14
15. Sub clause (a) and (b) under Section 153A of IPC says that-

"153A. Promoting enmity between different groups on ground of religion, race, place of
birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony.-(1)
Whoever-

(a) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise,

promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence,
language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of
enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious, racials, language or regional groups or
castes or communities, or

- b) commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of-harmony between different
religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, and which disturbs
or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity"

16. Moreover, in Babu Rao Patel v. State (Delhi Admn.4, it was held that-

"both the articles do promote feelings of enmity, hatred and ill-will between the Hindu and
Muslim communities on grounds of community and this cannot be done in the guise of
political thesis or historical truth. "

17. Thus, it is submitted that the statement of Ms. Stark promoted the feeling of enmity and
ill will between Bako and Indo religion in the guise of historical truth which is punishable.

18. According to Section 153B of IPC-

"153 B. Imputations, assertions prejudicial to national-integration.-

(1) Whoever, by words either spoken or written or by signs or by visible representations or

otherwise,-

(a) makes or publishes any imputation that any class of persons cannot, by reason of their
being members of any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community,
bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established or uphold the
sovereignty and integrity of India, or

4
Babu Rao Patel v. State (Delhi Admn (1980) 2 SCC 402

15
(b) asserts, counsels, advises, propagates or publishes that any class of persons shall, by
reason of their being members of any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste
or community, be denied or deprived of their rights as citizens of India.

19. The Section 298 in Indian Penal Code says –

"298. Uttering, words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound the religious feelings of any
person- Whoever, with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of any
person, utters any word or makes any sound in the hearing of that person or makes any
gesture in the sight of that person or places, any object in the sight of that person, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or
with fine, or with both."

20. According to Section 505 of IPC.-

505. Statements conducing to public mischief.- (1) Whoever makes, publishes or circulates
any statement, rumour or report,-

(a) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, any officer, soldier, sailor or airman in
the Army, Navy or Air Force of India to mutiny or otherwise disregard or fail in his duty as
such; or

(b) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, fear or alarm to the public, or to any
section of the public whereby any person may be induced to commit an offence against the
State or against the public tranquillity; or

(c) with intent to incite, or which is likely to incite, any class or community of persons to
commit any offence against any other class or community, shall be punished with
imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

(2) Statements creating or promoting enmity, hatred or ill-will between classes.-

Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement or report containing rumour or

alarming news with intent to create or promote, or which is likely to create or promote, on
grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any
other ground whatsoever, feelings of enmity, hatred or illwill between different religious,
racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, shall be punished with
imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. "

16
21. The speech made by Ms. Stark incited communal riots and violence between people of
Indo and Bako religion and promoted hatred and enmity between Bako and Indo religion,
therefore punishable under Section 505 of IPC.

22. This whole incident can be seen as conspiracy of Ms. Arya stark to cause and promote
enmity and hatred among the people of Indo and Bako religion and cause violent riots in
whole country to disrupt public peace and national security of Indiana.

II: THAT THE STATE OF NORTH PRADESH WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN

WITHDRAWING THE PROSECUTION AGAINST MS. STARK.

1. It is most humbly contended that the state of North Pradesh was not justified in
withdrawing the prosecution against Ms. Stark.

2. The withdrawal of prosecution was not in accordance with the provisions of Section 321
of CrPC.

3. The state of North Pradesh did not provide any reason for the withdrawal from
prosecution.

4. The withdrawal from prosecution was not in interest of administration of justice.

2.1 The withdrawal of prosecution was not in accordance with the provisions of section
321 of CrPC.

23. According to Section 321 of CIPC-

"321. Withdrawal from prosecution. The Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public in charge of
a case may, with the consent of the Court, at any time before the judgment is pronounced,
withdraw from the prosecution of any person either generally or in respect of any one or
more of the offences for which he is tried, and, upon such withdrawal-

(a) if it is made before a charge has been framed, the accused shall be discharged in respect
of such offence or offences;

(b) if it is made after a charge has been framed, or when under this Code no charge is
required, he shall be acquitted in respect of such offence or offences:

17
Provided that where such offence-

(i) was against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union
extends, or

(ii) was investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment under the Delhi

Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), or

(iii) involved the misappropriation or destruction of, or damage to, any property belonging to
the Central Government, or

(iv) was committed by a person in the service of the Central Government while acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty and the Prosecutor in charge of the case
has not been appointed by the Central Government, he shall not, unless he has been
permitted by the Central Government to do so, move the Court for its consent to withdraw
from the prosecution and the Court shall, before according consent, direct the Prosecutor to
produce before it the permission granted by the Central Government to withdraw from the
prosecution.”

24. It is most humbly submitted that the public prosecutor cannot withdraw from the present
case in any circumstance.

25. There was direct involvement of executive powers of Union with regard to Places of
Worship Act, 1991. As per the proposition, when the high court had already declared that the
Places of Worship Act, 1991 is ultra vires the Constitution of Indiana vide its judgment dated
01/07/2022, how can Mr. Jagendra Toshi (the Current ruling party head and P.M, as well as
the head of the executive) declare that their Govt. will consider to repeal sec 2,3,4 of places
of worship act? Thus, prosecution cannot be withdrawn by public prosecutors overseeing the
provisions of Section 321(i).

26. The speech made by Ms. Arya Stark was hate speech and consequently invoked and
instigated violence all across the nation which would have resulted in damage and loss of
property even belonging to the central government. So, this speech directly resulted in public
turmoil and unrest and hence, its prosecution could not be withdrawn overseeing the
provision of Section 321 (iii).

27. It is submitted that from the Moot Proposition, it is not clear whether

(a) the public prosecutor was appointed by the central govt.? or

18
(b) if not, the public prosecutor is permitted by the central govt. to withdraw from the
prosecution?

28. Hence, in the absence of both these essentials, the withdrawal of public prosecutors

from prosecution is unjust and illegal.

2.2 The state of North Pradesh did not provide any reasons for withdrawal from
prosecution.

29. In Rajendra Kumar Jain v. State5, it was held that

"It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to inform the court and it shall be the duty of the
court to apprise itself of the reasons which prompted prosecutor to withdraw from the
prosecution"

30. The public prosecutor in the present matter did not provide any reason for the

withdrawal from prosecution and hence, the prosecution withdrawal is unjustified.

2.3 The withdrawal from prosecution was not in interest of administration of justice.

31. In Sheonandan Paswan v State of Bihar6, it was held that

"The paramount consideration must always be the interest of administration of justice. that is
the touchstone on which the question must be determined whether an application for
withdrawal of the prosecution can be sustained."

32. It is submitted that an action on the part of State of North Pradesh through its prosecuting
officer to withdraw from prosecution is arbitrary act which openly smacks out undue
favouritism towards Indo religion. IDP being the govt. in power and the staunch follower of
the Indo religion, such an action is illogical and unlawful in such type of criminal cases,
causing nationwide riots, breaching the peace of the public at large and hurting the religious
sentiments of Bako religion. Thus, the withdrawal of prosecution was not in interest of
administration of justice.

33. In State of Punjab v. UOI7, it was held that- "The prosecution of a case may be
withdrawn not merely not merely on the ground of paucity of evidence, but also in order to

5
Rajendra Kumar Jain v. State, AIR 1980 SC 1510
6
Sheonandan Paswan v State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 288
7
State of Punjab v. UOI AIR 1987 SC 189

19
further the broad ends of public justice and such broad ends of public may well include
appropriate social, economic and political purposes."

34. The withdrawal of prosecution in the case against Ms. Arya Stark was not justified
because she must be prosecuted for promoting enmity and hatred between the Indo and Bako
religion and inciting riots and violence. The statement made by her outraged the religious
sentiments of the community of Bako religion. Therefore, withdrawal from prosecution
which resulted in her acquittal from all criminal cases was justified in any manner.

35. In Subhash Chander v. State8, it was held that

"The functionary clothed by the Code with the power to withdraw from the prosecution is the
Public Prosecutor. The Public Prosecutor is not the executive, nor a flunkey of political
power. Invested by the statute with a discretion to withdraw or not to withdraw, it is for him
to apply an independent mind and exercise his discretion. In doing so, he acts as a limb of the
judicative process, not as an extension of the executive."

36. The public prosecutors have withdrawn from prosecution under the influence of the govt.
and have not applied their free mind. Thus, the withdrawal from prosecution is unjustified.

III: THAT THE PLACES OF WORSHIP ACT, 1991 IS APPLICABLE ON SHINE

AND NIR IN QUESTION.

1. It is most humbly submitted that the Places of Worship Act, 1991 is applicable on shine
and nir in question.

2. The definition of ‘place of worship' covers the Shine and Nir in question.

3. The Shine and Nir in question is protected by the general and specific provisions of the
Act.

4. The Shine and Nir in question does not come under the ambit of exceptions provided in

Section 4(3).

5. The Shine and Nir in question is not same as Ram Janma Bhumi- Babri Masjid on which
the Act is not applicable.

8
Subhash Chander v. State (1980) 2 SCC 155

20
3.1 The definition of 'place of worship' covers the Shine and Nir in question.

37. The preamble of THE PLACES OF WORSHIP ACT, 1991" says-

"An Act to prohibit conversion of any place of worship and to provide for the maintenance of
the religious character of any place of worship as it existed on the 15th day of August, 1947,
and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto."

38. Section 2(c) of The Places of Worship Act, 1991 says-

"2(c) "place of worship" means a temple, mosque, gurudwara, church, monastery or any
other place of public religious worship of any religious denomination or any section thereof,
by whatever name called. "

39. The expression 'place of worship' is defined in the broadest possible terms to cover places
of public religious worship of all religions and denominations. Therefore, Shanvapi shine
(holy place of worship of the followers of Bako religion) and Tashinath Nir (Nir- a religious
place of worship of followers of Indo Religion) comes under the ambit of places of worship'
and thus, the Act is applicable on the Shine and Nir in question.

3.2 The Shine and Nir in question is protected by the General and Specific provisions of
the Act.

40. According to Section 3 of the Places of Worship Act, 1991- “3. Bar of conversion of
places of worship. -No person shall convert any place of worship of any religious
denomination or any section thereof into a place of worship of a different section of the same
religious denomination or of a different religious denomination or any section thereof."

41. It stipulates against future suits to seek a change in the religious character of places of
worship that existed at independence. Therefore any suit to seek changes in the religious
character of the Shanvapi Shine Complex shall not sustain.

42. The 1991 Act contains both a general and a special protection. Section 3 is the general
provision that protects every place of worship, whatever be its date of construction. Section 4
adds a special provision for the protection of places of worship that existed on August 15,
1947.

43. Section 4 of the Places of worship Act, 1991 says-

21
4. Declaration as to the religious character of certain places of worship and bar of
jurisdiction of courts, etc. - (1) It is hereby declared that the religious character of a place of
worship existing on the 15th day of August, 1947 shall continue to be the same as it existed
on that day. (2) If, on the commencement of this Act, any suit, appeal or other proceeding
with respect to the conversion of the religious character of any place of worship, existing on
the 15th day of August, 1947, is pending before any court, tribunal or other authority, the
same shall abate, and no suit, appeal or other proceeding with respect to any such matter
shall lie on or after such commencement in any court, tribunal or other authority:

Provided that if any suit, appeal or other proceeding, instituted or filed on the ground that
conversion has taken place in the religious character of any such place after the 15th day of
August, 1947, is pending on the commencement of this Act, such suit, appeal or other
proceeding shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1)."

44. Section 4 stipulates a summary abatement of pending suits that seek a change in the
religious character of places of worship that existed at independence.

45. This Section also stipulates the restoration of the religious character of a place of worship
as it was at the time of independence, if its religious character has been. converted afterwards.

46. The religious character of shine and nir in question on 15 August, 1947 was that of a
Shanvapi shine belonging to Bako religion. Therefore, Shanvapi Shine also exercises special
protection against change in religious character, provided in Section 4 of the Act.

3.3 The Shine and Nir in question does not come under the ambit of exceptions provided
in Section 4(3).

47. Section 4(3) of the Places of worship Act, 1991 provides certain exceptions to clause

(1) and (2) of Section 4.

"4(3) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) shall apply to-

(a) any place of worship referred to in the said sub-sections which is an ancient and
historical monument or an archaeological site or remains covered by the Ancient Monuments
and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 (24 of 1958) or any other law for the time
being in force;

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(b) any suit, appeal or other proceeding, with respect to any matter referred to in subsection
(2), finally decided, settled or disposed of by a court, tribunal or other authority before the
commencement of this Act;

(c) any dispute with respect to any such matter settled by the parties amongst themselves
before such commencement;

(d) any conversion of any such place effected before such commencement by acquiescence;

(e) any conversion of any such place effected before such commencement which is not liable
to be challenged in any court, tribunal or other authority being barred by limitation under
any law for the time being in force."

48. Every 'ancient or historic monument' or 'archaeological sites' is not protected by the
Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958', only those notified by
the Central Govt. and National Monuments Authority are. However, the information
regarding whether the Shanvapi Shine or the adjoining Tashinath Nir have been notified by
the Authority, is not given in the moot proposition.

49. The matter of Shanvapi Shine and Tashinath Nir has neither been decided, settled, or
disposed off by the court nor it has been settled by the parties amongst themselves.

50. The Shanvapi Shine and Tashinath Nir have not been converted before the
commencement of the Act, by acquiescence. Moreover, no such conversion has taken which
cannot be challenged in the competent court.

51. Therefore, it is submitted that the Shanvapi Shine does not fall under exceptions and is
entitled to both general and specific protection of Section 3 and 4 respectively.

52. It is also contended that non-obstante clause of the Section 4(3) says- "Nothing contained
in sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) shall apply to" which means that clause (1) and (2) of
Section 4 shall not be applicable on places of worship falling under the exceptions of Section
4(3). However, they will always be entitled to the general protection provided by Section 3.

53. Moreover, the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958
brings its own protection. Section 16 of this act prohibits any use of a place of worship that is
inconsistent with its religious character and obligates the State to ensure that outsiders will
not have access to that place of worship unless its religious managers permit.

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54. Therefore, it is humbly contended that the Shanvapi shine and Tashinath Nir, not being
covered under the exceptions provided in section 4(3), it is entitled to both general and
special protection of the Places of Worship Act, 1991.

3.4 The Shine and Nir in question is not same as Ram Janma Bhumi- Babri Majid.

55. The Section 5 of The Places of worship act, 1991-

"5. Act not to apply to Ram Janma Bhumi-Babri Masjid. -Nothing contained in this Act
shall apply to the place or place of worship commonly known as Ram Janma Bhumi-Babri
Masjid situated in Ayodhya in the State of Uttar Pradesh and to any suit, appeal or other
proceeding relating to the said place or place of worship.".

56. There is no evident proof or statement given in the proposition which can establish that
the Shine and Nir involved in this case are same as the Ram Janam Bhumi or Babri
mentioned in Section 5 of the Places of Worship Act, 1991 and hence, they are to be treated
as any other shine and nir.

57. Therefore, the Shine and Nir in question does not come under the ambit of exception of
Ram Janma Bhumi- Babri Masjid and the Act is thus, applicable on them.

58. The purpose of enacting the the Places of worship Act, 1991 is to provide and develop
glorious traditions of love, peace and harmony. These traditions are part of a cultural heritage
of which every Indian is justifiably proud. Tolerance for all faiths has characterized our great
civilization since time immemorial. These traditions of amity, harmony and mutual respect
came under severe strain during the pre-independence period when the colonial power sought
to actively create and encourage communal divide in the country. After independence, it is
important to set about healing the wounds of the past and endeavoure to restore our traditions
of communal amity and goodwill to their past glory. By and large there have been success,
although there have been, it must be admitted, some unfortunate setbacks. Rather than being
discouraged by such setbacks, it should be the duty and commitment to take lesson from them
for the future.

59. In M Siddiq (D) Thr Lrs v. Mahant Suresh Das & Ors9, it was held that- "The law
which sought to prohibit the forcible conversion of places of worship was not -to create new

9
M Siddiq (D) Thr Lrs v. Mahant Suresh Das & Ors, (2019) 19 SCC 433

24
disputes and to rake up old controversies which had long been forgotten by the people... but
facilitate the object sought to be achieved."

60. The real intension behind enactment of the act is to avoid communal violence and riots
which may arise due to conversion of places of worship.

61. Section 7 confers upon the Places of Worship Act, 1991 overriding force and effect

"7. Act to override other enactments- The provisions of this Act shall have effect

notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being
in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this

Act."

62. Since, the Act is applicable on Shanvapi Shine and Tashinath Nir, any other law dealing
with conversion of the religious places of worship in the present case which is inconsistent
with the provisions of the Act shall not override the provisions of the Act.

IV: THAT THE PLACES OF WORSHIP ACT, 1991 IS NOT ULTRA VIRES THE

CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA.

1. It is most humbly submitted that the Places of Worship Act, 1991 is not ultra vires the
Constitution of Indiana.

2. The Act has been made with legitimate jurisdiction of the Centre.

3. The purpose of The Places of Worship Act, 1991 protects and secures the fundamental
values of the constitution.

4. The Places of Worship Act, 1991 promotes the spirit of secularism.

5. The Act is in accordance with the principle of non-retrogression of laws and progressive
realization of rights.

6. Law is not always the answer for disputes having their origin in the past.

4.1 The Act has been made with legitimate jurisdiction of the Centre.

63. According to Concurrent List in the 7th Schedule-

"28: Charities and charitable institutions, charitable and religious endowments and religious
institutions. "

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64. In M. Karunanidhi v. UOI10, it was held that

"Where the provisions of a Central Act and a State Act in the Concurrent List are fully
inconsistent and are absolutely irreconcilable, the Central Act will prevail and the State Act
will become void in view of the repugnancy."

65. Therefore, it is submitted that Religious Institutions fall under the ambit of Concurrent
list, and in case of dispute between laws enacted by Centre and State on the subject matter of
Concurrent List, the law enacted by Centre shall operate.

66. Hence, the centre's jurisdiction was completely legitimate in passing the law in

question.

4.2 The purpose of The Places of Worship Act, 1991 protects and secures
thefundamental values of the constitution.

67. In M Siddig (D) Thr Lrs v. Mahant Suresh Das & Ors11, it was held that "The Places
of Worship Act which was enacted in 1991 by Parliament protects and secures the
fundamental values of the Constitution. The Preamble underlines the need to protect the
liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship. It emphasises human dignity and
fraternity. Tolerance. respect for and acceptance of the equality of all religious faiths is a
fundamental precept of fraternity..”

4.3 The Places of Worship Act, 1991 promotes the spirit of Secularism.

68. "WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a

SOVEREIGN, SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC”

The aforementioned lines from the Preamble of the constitution, declares the country to

be sovereign, socialist, SECULAR, democratic and republic.

69. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala12," the Supreme court held that "Secularism
is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The elements that constitute the basic
structure cannot be amended by the Parliament.”

10
M. Karunanidhi v. UOI, 1979 SCR (3) 254.
11
M Siddig (D) Thr Lrs v. Mahant Suresh Das & Ors, Supra note 16, at 30.
12
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225

26
70. In S R Bommai v Union of India13, it was held that "A secular nature of a society does
not make it an atheist society. Secularism makes society more heterogeneous. The law of a
secular nation provides equal status to all religions and does not favour or discriminate
against anvone.”

71. The Places of Worship Act is intrinsically related to the obligations of a secular state. It
reflects the commitment of India to the equality of all religions. Above all, the Places of
Worship Act is an affirmation of the solemn duty which was cast upon the State to preserve
and protect the equality of all faiths as an essential constitutional value, a norm which has the
status of being a basic feature of the Constitution. There is a purpose underlying the
enactment of the Places of Worship Act. Therefore, the Places of Worship Act, 1991 should
be upheld as valid.

4.4 Law is not always the answer for disputes having their origins in the past.

72. The Supreme court in M Siddiq (D) Thr Lrs v. Mahant Suresh Das & Ors14.

stated "This Court cannot entertain claims that stem from the actions of the Mughal rulers
against Hindu places of worship in a court of law today. For any person who seeks solace or
recourse against the actions of any number of ancient rulers, the law is not the answer. Our
history is replete with actions that have been judged to be morally incorrect and even today
are liable to trigger vociferous ideological debate. If the law is removed, there would be
many claims by different religious groups of the society to demand their religious right on the
religious site of another religion.”

4.6 The cut-off date chosen is nothing less than logical.

73. The cut-off date August 15, 1947 is crucial because on that date we are supposed to have
emerged as a modern, democratic and sovereign State thrusting back such barbarity into the
past once and for all. From that date, we also distinguished ourselves...as State which has no
official religion and which gives equal rights to all the different religious denominations. So,
whatever may have happened before that, we all expected that from that date there should be
no such retrogression into the past. Therefore, the cut-off date in the Act is absolutely logical.
74. Thus, it is humbly contended that since, the Act holds the constitutional values and

13
S R Bommai v Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1
14
M Siddiq (D) Thr Lrs v. Mahant Suresh Das & Ors Supra note 16, at 30.

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promotes the spirit of secularism, the Act is not ultra vires the Constitution of Indiana.

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 PRAYER

In the light of the facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
humbly requested that the Hon'ble Supreme Court may be pleased to adjudge, hold and
declare:

1. The Speech made by Ms. Arya Stark is violative of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of
Indiana.

2. The State of North Pradesh was not justified in withdrawing the prosecution against Ms.
Stark.

3. The Places of Worship Act, 1991 is applicable on Shine and Nir in question.

4. The Places of Worship act, 1991 is not ultra vires the Constitution of Indiana.

And pass any such order or direction as the Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper, in the
interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.

For this act of kindness, the Petitioners shall duty bound pray forever.

All of which is respectfully submitted

Counsel For Petitioners

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