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DEF STAN 00970 Part2Vol1Amd11 PDF
DEF STAN 00970 Part2Vol1Amd11 PDF
PART 2
CONTENTS
CONTENTS (continued)
CONTENTS (continued)
APPENDIX No 1 STRUCTURAL STRENGTH AND DESIGN FOR FLIGHT FOR
MILITARY DERIVATIVES OF CIVIL AEROPLANES
(Note: See relevant para of this Appendix for military
derivative requirements relating to particular chapters of
Part 2)
APPENDIX No 2 U.S. MILITARY SPECIFICATIONS, STANDARDS AND
HANDBOOKS
CHAPTER 200
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 This chapter states the requirements for static strength and freedom
from deformation which might adversely affect the airworthiness, handling
o r maintenance.
1.3 Critical design cases, corresponding to the most severe authorised use
of the aeroplane, must be identified and the loads associated with each case
must be traced through the structure.
1.4 All Grade A details must be identified and for each of them an
allowable s t r e s s or strength must be determined. This would normally be
the appropriate allowable ultimate s t r e s s or strength determined on a 'B'
value basis. Refer to' Chapter 400, para 2.2 for definition of Grade A
details.
1.5 The allowable ultimate stresses o r loads must not be exceeded at the
design ultimate load, normally 1.5 times the maximum load in the design
case (the design l i m i t load).
1.8 It must be shown that these proof and ultimate requirements can be
satisfied under the most adverse loading and environmental conditions.
For composites these conditions apply with the s t r u c t u r e at the most
adverse moisture level that is expected to occur during the life.
2 DESIGN CASES
2 . 2 The loads associated with each case must be traced through the
structure far enough to ensure that the requirements a r e satisfied
everywhere. Many of the cases overlap, and the whole s t r u c t u r e need
not be analysed for every one. When it can be shown that a particular
case is covered by other more stringent requirements, it need not be
considered any further.
2 . 3 There may be cases that are more demanding of some designs than
those defined i n this publication. When such a case is identified it must
b e defined and then compliance w i t h t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s must be
demonstrated i n that case also.
3 . 1 I n general the ultimate factor shall be 1 . 5 and the proof factor shall
be a t least 1 . 1 2 5 . I n some particular design cases different values a r e
required, and they a r e given i n the appropriate chapters of this
publication.
3 . 2 Until the design proof load is reached, no Grade A items shall sustain
deformation detrimental to safety, and moving parts essential to safety
shall function satisfactorily. After removal of the design proof load no
effects of loading shall remain that might reasonably cause t h e aeroplane
t o b e deemed unserviceable.
4 . 2 The allowable must be determined under the most adverse loading and
environmental conditions arising i n the critical design case for t h e detail
in question.
4 . 4 I n general the material 'BI value for each mode of failure should be
derived i n accordance with DEF STAN 00-932. Should this b e impractical
the value shall be based upon at least 15 coupons. These m u s t be tested
under the most adverse environmental conditions if these conditions
significantly affect the strength.
7 DEFINITIONS
7.1 COUPON The simplest form of test specimen suitable for obtaining the
properties of a material in a particular mode of failure.
7.3 THE DESIGN LIMIT LOAD is the greatest load that is expected to
occur during the specified life i n any particular design case.
7.4 THE D E S I G N PROOF LOAD is the product of the design limit load and
the proof factor.
7.5 T H E DESIGN ULTIMATE LOAD is the product of the design limit load
and the ultimate factor.
7 . 6 THE STATIC TEST FACTOR is the ratio between the load that an item
is required to withstand under test and the design ultimate load. The
factor also applies to the proof load.
8.1 This para is applicable to all engine and auxiliary power unit
mountings, including VTOL, VSTOL and STOVL installations. The
mounting together with any other structure liable to b e critically affected
shall have sufficient strength and rigidity to withstand t h e flight and
ground loads prescribed i n Parts 2 and 3 for the aeroplane a s a whole
together with the loads resulting from the engine a t all practical ranges of
t h r u s t and torque.
9.2 Drain holes and drip fences should be provided wherever needed.
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LEAFLET 200/1
1.1 The purpose of this leafiet is to outline the basic principles underlying
strength and deformation requirements in this publication and, i n
particular to show w h y these requirements a r e sometimes expressed i n
terms of proof loads, sometimes ultimate loads, and sometimes both.
2 THE ULTIMATE STRENGTH AND PROOF REQUIREMENTS
2.2 I n the majority of desigr? cases, the severity of the loads that may
arise in service is not limited naturally, and limiting conditions have to be
chosen for design purposes. A classic example is provided b y the
symmetric flight case. There a r e usually no means to prevent the
exceedance of either the speeds o r the normal accelerations that are
permissible for an aeroplane in symmetrical flight. In choosing the limiting
conditions for design, use is made of past experience of the speeds and
accelerations needed for t h e operational duty of the type, of t h e predicted
flight characteristics and performance of the aeroplane, and of the way
structure mass is l i k e l y to depend on the severity of the chosen conditions.
2.3 Every aeroplane in service is, of course, subject to flying limitations
that prohibit its use beyond the limiting conditions chosen for design (see
Leaflet 9 0 0 / 1 ) .
2.8 Since the real proof strength defines the conditions u p to which the
structural airworthiness can be depended upon, it is usually a more
meaningful measure of the capability of a design than the ultimate s t r e n g t h
that is achieved. Beyond the proof strength, catastrophe could result
from structurally induced causes such as jamming of controls o r unstable
aerodynamic loadings. For these reasons, greater emphasis will b e placed
on establishing the real proof load.
3 SPECIAL CASES
3.5 Finally there a r e several cases in which both the proof and ultimate
factors are higher than the usual values. They represent the normal
operations of systems and installations in which the loads a r e particularly
difficult to estimate. The difficulties are caused principally b y transient
pressures in hydraulic, pneumatic and fuel systems, b y variability in the
performance of pressure relief devices, and b y variability i n the loading on
air brakes, flaps and undercarriages. Since these cases represent events
that happen frequently, the greater risks associated with the greater
uncertainty in estimation of t h e loads must be compensated b y higher
factors. Examples a r e flap systems (Chapter 205) undercarriage retraction
a n d lowering (Chapter 306) and refuelling and defuelling systems (Chapter
701).
4 COMMENTS
REFERENCE
LEAFLET 200/2
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Experience has proved the value of testing representative examples of
aeroplane structures. This Leaflet sets out t h e aims which should be kept
in view when t h e programme of static tests is being planned and gives
recommendations on some points of test procedure which will help to ensure
that these aims a r e achieved.
2 TEST AIMS
3.2 The test procedure should be phased in with any flight load
measurement programme (see Leaflet 1015/1). A n y environmen tal
conditioning should meet with the approval of t h e Aeroplane Project
Director (in conjunction with Airworthiness Division R A E ) .
( i v ) Repeat tests (iii) for each of the other selected loading cases.
4 NOTES
4.2 The proposals i n this Leaflet a r e not intended to cover any part of t h e
fatigue test programme (for fatigue testing, see Leaflet 201/1).
LEAFLET 200/3
1 INTRODUCTION
ENGINE TYPES
(ii) t u r b i n e e n g i n e w i t h propeller
(iii) turbofan
( iv) turbojet
PROPELLER TYPES
( i i ) c o u n t e r - r o t a t i n g c o n c e n t r i c (with o r without r e v e r s i b l e p i t c h )
3 ENGINE LOADS
3 . 1 THRUST
3.1.1 For all engines, the net t h r u s t (forward o r r e v e r s e ) on the
engine mountings (i.e. gross thrust - intake d r a g ) depends mainly on
the following variables:
3 . 2 TORQUE
3.2.1 For the purpose of the requirements 'torque' is defined as the
maximum occurring a t any instant in the given condition. The normal
limit torque for stressing purposes should not be less than:-
4 AEROPLANE MANOEUVRES
1 6 2 4 2 4 1 02bGbb4 256 =
~-
less than 1 . 2 times stalling speed with flaps in the landing position)
should be examined. This will be the worst case since reverse t h r u s t
increases with aeroplane forward speed.
4.8 SIDELOAD
4 . 8 . 1 The design load factor in the lateral direction may be determined
b y t h e maximum value obtained i n the specified flight o r ground
conditions. However an overriding limit load factor of 1 . 3 3 o r
0.33111, which e v e r is the greater, is suggested. This overriding
limit load factor may b e assumed to be independent of other flight o r
ground loads.
5 SUMMARY
5.1 A tabular summary of the basic conditions of the stressing cases which
may be critical for the engine mounting is given i n Table 1.
TABLE 1
IA Recovery from “1 Ma x im u m
dive power with
and without
1B Recovery from “3 the limit
inverted dive torque
TABLE 1 (contd)
I I
I Landing I L2VS
FL
* Zero See note
below
Idling
9 Excess Max im u m Ma x i m u rn
torque Climbing power
Speed with
excess
torque,
see para
3.2.3
LEAFLET 200 I 4
1 INTRODUCTION
3 CALCULATIONS
(ii) the flow pattern over the surfaces of the aeroplane and the
type of flow, laminar or turbulent,
(iii) the heat transfer to the surface allowing for emission and
the convective flow from the boundary layer, and
4 FACTORED CONDITIONS
4 . 1 When the stresses due to thermal effects and to the applied loads a r e
of the same sign, the combined factored conditions for a n individual
structural member may be obtained by the method of either para 4.2 or
4 . 3 . The case when stresses a r e opposite in sign is discussed in para 4.5.
When a designer wishes to use a different method he should consult the
Aeroplane Project Director ( i n conjunction with Airworthiness Division RAE)
I
4 . 2 In the first method, the factored thermal strain for a particular
member is obtained by calculating the unfactored therinal strain assuming
no applied loads and multiplying it by the same proof and ultimate factors
a s a r e used for the loads w i t h which the thermal effects a r e to be
combined. This factored thermal strain is then added to the strain
corresponding to t h e factored loads, calculated assuming no thermal strain.
This gives the total factored strain, and the corresponding factored s t r e s s
is obtained from t h e stress-strain curve for the particular member.
Strains, not s t r e s s e s , a r e added because thermal strain cannot produce
more s t r e s s than that corresponding to the plastic deformation if the
elastic Limit is exceeded. It is permissible to neglect the effect on adjacent
members of factoring the loads and strains, but the combined effect
obtained in this way should be treated w i t h reserve as it may result in
lower stresses than those obtained if the total forces a r e brought into
equilibrium u n d e r factored conditions b y the method of para 4 . 3 .
4.4 In both methods the thermal strain, rather than the thermal s t r e s s , is
factored, and this means that the ratio of stress at limit conditions to that
a t ultimate conditions is usually higher for thermal effects, and therefore
also for combined loading and thermal effects, than the usual values
associated with loading only. This choice was made on the grounds that an
ultimate factor on thermal s t r e s s is not justified a s far as static strength is
concerned, because thermal stresses a r e relieved when plastic deformation
occurs. As a consequence, a thorough investigation is necessary of all
fatigue and creep aspects, including creep buckling and progressive
distortion under cyclic temperature and loading conditions.
4.5 Cases where the load and thermal effects a r e opposite in sign may not
b e critical because the most severe cases may well be when either one or
other of these affects is absent. If there is a critical case when both a r e
present and the load effect is the greater it may be desirable to disregard
any alleviating thermal effects. When the thermal effect is the greater, it
appears reasonable to combine it with the load effect using the appropriate
factors. In either case, care should be taken to ensure that an adequate
net load is used for design purposes, particularly when the opposing
effects a r e comparable in magnitude.
5 DESIGN CASES
6.2 This Leaflet does not call for the provision of a safety margin by an
a r b i t r a r y increase in the structural temperature, either directly by
'factoring the temperature o r indirectly by factoring the design speed.
Thus flight in excess of the design speed could lead to a temperature
higher than that considered in design. Although cases of exceeding the
design speed a r e r a r e , it is recommended that, as far as practicable,
materials should be used which do not suffer a substantial reduction in
properties a t a temperature slightly higher than that corresponding to the
design speed.
7 GROUND T E S T S
8 INSTABILITY FAILURES
LEAFLET 200/5
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Full structural certification of a new aeroplane project normally
involves a substantial programme of analysis, structural tests and flight
loads measurement.
1.4 The extent of the restriction that is imposed will depend upon a
number of considerations, the main ones being listed in para 3.
t h e static test specimen has successfully sustained the design limit load and
sufficient confirmation of flight loads exists.
2.4 Flight beyond 80% of the design limit load, other than in accordance
with para 2 . 3 , is normally permitted only after the static test specimen has
demonstrated t h e higher loads multiplied b y the usual factor of safety of
1.5.
3.8 Are the total flight hours required relatively small, and can account
be taken of statistically reduced load occurrence, o r absence of fatigue
considerations?
CHAPTER 201
(i> To ensure that the materials used have good resistance to the
growth of detectable damage, in the event that in-service
difficulties dictate the need for inspection to maintain
airworthiness.
2 SAFE-LIFE DETAILS
( i i ) The safe life with all the loads amplified b y a factor of 1.20
shall be equal to a t least one half of the life established i n
(i).
( i i i ) The material from which the detail is made shall have good
resistance to the growth of detectable damage.
3 INSPECTION-DEPENDENT DETAILS
3.1 A detail need not satisfy the conditions of para 2.1(ii), (iii) a n d
( i v ) and may be treated as inspection-dependent if t h e economic and
operational consequences of inspection and any subsequent modification or
replacement a r e acceptable.
(v) The maximum inspection interval under both anticipated and amplified
loading such that the probability of damage propagating to the
critical size without detection is acceptably low.
4 SERVICE MONITORING
4.1 Acceptable instrumentation shall be provided in every aeroplane for the purpose of
estimating the fatigue life consumption of the significant details of the aeroplane
throughout the life.
4.2 In addition a few aeroplanes in the fleet shall be provided with comprehensive
instrumentation, to define the loads on the major structural components in each of the
roles in which the aeroplane is used.
5 DEMONSTRATION OF COMPLIANCE
5.2 For new projects two major fatigue tests are required:
Both these tests shall be continued for five times the specified life (or an equivalent
life) or until the specimen, through reasons of repair or production changes, is no
longer representative.
5.3 If a detail has a test life factor that is higher than that used in the airframe or
component test, or if the detail is sensitive to environmental effects it shall be shown
that acceptable allowances have been made in design.
5.4 After completion of the fatigue test a residual strength test and, where relevant,
measurements of residual stiffness may be required.
5.5 A tear down inspection of all major load carrying structure shall be carried out
after completion of tests.
5.6 Results of these tests and the tear down inspection shall be fully reported in the
Fatigue Type Record (FI’R) (ref DEF STAN 05-123 Chapter 333).
i 5.7 All compliance procedures and judgements are subject to the approval of the
Aeroplane Project Director (in conjunction with Airworthiness Div, RAE).
6.1 Where civil and military aeroplanes not designed to DEF STAN 00-970 are being
considered by the MOD Procurement Executive to meet Staff Requirements (Air), they
might need to be assessed to show compliance with this Chapter if there are to be
changes in role or changes to meet specific military requirements involving structural
modifications. Leaflet 201/8 contains an analytical procedure to be used when making
this assessment. The need for and the extent of the assessment will be as detailed in
the Aeroplane Specification or as directed by the Aeroplane Project Director. Neither
this para nor Leaflet 201/8 apply to aeroplanes designed to jointly agreed requirements
formulated by members of an international collaborative project of which the UK is a
partner.
7 DEFINITIONS
7.1 GENERAL
7.1.1 Life. This is a period of service usage expressed as a number of flying
hours, or a number of landings or in terms of any other parameter that is
acceptable to the Aeroplane Project Director (in conjunction with Airworthiness
Division, RAE).
7.1.2 Specified Life. This is the reference life which the item is required to
achieve when subjected to the spectra of environmental conditions (particularly
loads, temperatures and humidities) specified for design. It is usual to specify
spectra which are believed to be typical of the anticipated operating conditions.
The weakest item will nomally have a safe life of at least the specified life under
the specified conditions.
7.1.4 Safe Life. The safe life of an item is the life at which the weakest
example just retains the required standard of strength, deformation, stiffness or
mechanical function. The minimum standard of strength is 80% of the design
ultimate.
7.1.5 Test Life Factor. This is the ratio of the mean life of a detail to the
safe life of that detail under a loading severity for which the required safe life
is just achieved.
7.2 STRUCTURE
7.2.1 Structural Detail. A structural detail is part of a component such as a
joint, a panel or a structural or mechanical assembly.
7.2.5 Critical Damage Size. The critical damage size for a structural detail is
the maximum size to which damage may grow without changing to an unacceptable
degree the strength, deformation or stiffness of the structure, or impeding the
function of a mechanical system.
7.3 INSPECTION
7.3.1 Inspection System. An inspection system is the repeated application of an
inspection process to a particular structural detail at regular and predefined
intervals, commencing at a particular point in the life of the detail.
7.3.4 Threshold Damage Size. The threshold size of damage is the maximum size
of damage that has a zero probability of detection when subject to the application
of a specified inspection process.
7.3.5 Threshold Time. The threshold time is the point in the life of a detail
corresponding to the achievement of damage of threshold size.
PRELIMINARY DESIGN -
or RE- DESIGN A
L
I,
IS S A F E LIFE WITH
ANTICIPATED LOADS NO -
ACCEPTABLE?
I
-a
DOES MATERIAL HAVE
GOOD RESISTANCE TO
T H E GROWTH OF
DETECTABLE DAMAGE?
I
YES
t
NO -
TAKE OPTION
TO RE-DESIGN?
NO
I
-YES
IS S A F E LIFE WITH
ANTICIPATED LOADS
FACTORED x1.20
\ - NO
DETERMINE:
1 T H E S A F E LIFE*
ACCEPTABLE? \ 2 T H E LIKELIHOOD OF DAMAGE
B Y IMPACT,MAINTENANCE,
ENVIROMENT, O R
YES MANUFACTURING DEFECTS.
t 3 INSPECTION RELIABILITY
IS DETAIL PROTECTED 4 AVERAGE DAMAGE
FROM DAMAGE BY IMPACT, GROWTH CURVE*
MAINTENANCE, ENVIROMENT 5 INSPECTION INTERVAL*
AND MANUFACTURING DEFECTS? * For both anticipated
and amplified loading
i
YES
ARE INSPECTION
INTERVALS
SAFE-LIFE ACCEPTABLE?
ROUTE
I INSPECTION-
DEPENDENT ROUTE
YES
1
APPROVAL
LEAFLET 201/1
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 The main aims of the requirement a r e to provide a good safe life
u n d e r the anticipated usage and to provide tolerance to damage caused b y
increases in the severity of loading with the changes in usage occurring
during many years of service. Those details which a r e u n d u l y sensitive
t o increases i n loading severity, and a r e difficult or uneconomic to inspect
and modify o r replace, must have their stresses reduced. B y identifying
sensitive details in t h i s way, any increases i n mass a r e small and a r e
applied only where they are most effective.
1.8 The first part of the FTR will contain an introductory statement
outlining the philosophy used in design and test and describing the
principal design features that affect fatigue considerations in the operation
of the aeroplane. The second part will contain a formal statement of the
fatigue Substantiation of each structurally significant detail, using the
d e s i g n spectrum confirmed o r modified a s n e c e s s a r y b y f l i g h t
measurements of the maximum and minimum loads associated with the
principal fatigue damaging manoeuvres. The third part will be an
accountable (continually up-dated) document recording, for each detail,
the supplementary substantiation for fatigue and residual strength arising
from the actual operational usage. I t w i l l also contain a formal statement
of the substantiation of each modification.
1.9 The requirements refer primarily to metal details, but the principles
apply equally to composite p a r t s unless they a r e shown to be insensitive to
fati gue .
2 MATERIAL SELECTION
2.4 Exceptionally, a material which has a relatively low rating may b e used
in a structurally significant detail. There may be economic or operational
reasons for the limited use of such a material, but each individual case
must be discussed with t h e Aeroplane Project Director (in conjunction
with the Airworthiness Division, RAE).
3.1 Compliance with the safe life requirements of Chapter 201 is normally
achieved b y calculations supported b y a comprehensive series of tests.
These tests must be agreed with t h e Aeroplane Project Director (in
conjunction with the Airworthiness Division, RAE). Guidance is given in
Leaflet 201/3.
3.6 The safe S-N curve referred to i n para 3 . 3 covers only the
variability in fatigue performance. Considerable scatter exists in the
severity of loading i n a n y one role, and where the service loading of an
individual aeroplane is not monitored, it is customary to apply an
additional factor (see Leaflet 201/3 para 4 ) .
3 . 7 The shape of the S-N curve is of major importance when the severity
of the service loading differs markedly from that used on test. Additional
factors may b e required, depending upon the relative severity of t h e
service and test loadings and the slope of the S-N curve (see Leaflet 201/3
para 5.1).
5.3 The loading for t h e preproduction fatigue test will be based upon the
specified flight profiles and estimated load spectrum and will be applied in
a representative sequence. The loading and the control system will be
simplified as far as possible to achieve t h e test aims of Chapter 201 para
5.2(i). For the same reason, any repairs shown to be necessary by the
testing should be as simple as possible.
6 SERVICE MONITORING
7.2 In general, extensions cannot be granted for safe life parts unless a
reassessment reveals suitable margins, or an acceptable inspection system
can be developed.
7.4 Leaflet 20117 gives guidance on the topics to be considered when the
specified life is to be extended.
REFERENCES
LEAFLET 201/2
MATERIAL SELECTION
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 This leaflet refers only t o the selection of metallic materials. Guidance
is given on the parameters which should be considered in t h e assessment
of damage tolerance qualities.
2
a - -
K
ref d
o. 2
The comparison should be made i n the three principal directions in which
t h e fracture toughness K is measured.
LEAFLET 201 / 3
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Compliance with the safe life requirements of Chapter 201 wil normally
be demonstrated by a balanced programme of calculations and tests on
elements , sub-assemblies and major components.
2 . 1 . 4 I f the test life of the detail was exactly equal to the t r u e mean,
and if this was divided b y a factor of 2 to give the service life, then
a t the end of this life t h e probability of failure would rise to about 1
i n 1000. I f the test life was say 20% lower than the true mean, the
risk of failure i n service would b e nearer 1 i n 10,000. However, if the
test mean was 20% high, there would be a disproportionate increase i n
the probability of failure, which would rise to nearer 1 i n 100.
Furthermore, if the test result were 508 high the probability of
failure would approach 1 i n 10.
blend them together to form a'safe S - N curve'. The need to blend the
curves arises w h e n the shape of the S-N curve for constant amplitude
loading differs from that under t h e spectrum loading from w h i e h t h e
scatter data was derived.
2.2.4 The aim should be to produce a safe S-N curve that blends the
life and stress factors w h i l s t having much the same shape as the mean
S - N curve. For consistency, the safe S-N curve s h o u l d be in
accordance with the following graphical procedure:
(ii) The mean S-N curve should be drawn through the half-
cycle point a t a 'static' value of S defined b y the
difference between the mean static strength of the
material and the appropriate fatigue mean stress. This
ensures that the mean static strength will never be
exceeded.
2.3.4 In order to calculate the required test life factor for the
specified loading the safe S-N curve for the chosen detail should first
be adjusted on s t r e s s , so that the safe life is equal to the specified
life. If more than one test is to be done, or there are other nominally
identical details subject to the same loading, the safe S-N curve should
be constructed using the appropriate factors of Table 1 . In all cases
it is acceptable to derive a safe value of static strength a s shown in
Fig. 1.
-2.3.5 The next s t e p is to derive the notional mean curve to which the
safe curve relates, reversing the procedure of para 2.2 above. This
mean curve gives t h e estimated performance of the test specimen
u n d e r the same s t r e s s spectrum. The ratio of the estimated mean life
t o the specified life gives the test life factor that would be needed to
demonstrate compliance using the specified loading.
2 . 3 . 7 If a detail has a test life factor that is higher than the factor
used in the airframe or component test, then it must be shown that an
acceptable allowance has been made in design. This may involve a
special test on the detail concerned.
3.1.4 Sometimes the fatigue loading can be deduced directly from the
periodic loading sequence on the item concerned.
3.2.4 Those cycles which fall beneath t h e safe S-N curve for the
chosen detail (based on the number of f u l l scale tests to be done) may
be omitted.
5.1.4 The shape chosen for the S-N curve, s t e p ( i ) , becomes of major
importance when the severity of service loading differs markedly from
that used on test. Typically, according to the slope of the curve, life
is inversely proportional to stress raised to a power of between about 2
and 10. However, the practice of scaling the chosen curve, step ( i i )
to give 1 n / N = 1 for the test, means that in principle a curve of any
shape can be fitted to the test data. Therefore, an increase i n the
s e v e r i t y of s e r v i c e loading of o n l y 5%, for example, can be
interpreted as a reduction in life of between about 10% and 40&,
according to the curve shape that is used.
1
(iii) Choice of a suitable value of n/N t o use with Miner's
rule in estimating the life under the service loading.
5.2.3 N o hard and fast guide can be given to the validity of the
assumptions in choosing which structural details govern the life.
5.2.4 The location chosen for the mean S-N curve will be a best
estimate based upon evidence from a substantial number of relevant
tests. It is appropriate therefore to derive t h e safe S-N curve using
t h e factors for '6 o r more tests' from Table 1.
6.3 If the service loading differs appreciably from that used on t e s t , some
conservatism is needed to allow for the effects of curve shape and
uncertainties i n Miner's rule (para 5.1 and Table 2).
6 . 5 If a detail has a test life factor that is higher than that used for the
major test then it must b e shown that an acceptable allowance for this
higher variability has been made i n design. I n some instances the detail
may need to be tested separately.
REFERENCES
Factor on Factor on
Number Log mean Arithmetic
of I terns Endurance Mean strength
Tested over Steep at High
Part of Endurances
S-N Curve
1 3.0 1.50
2 2.6 1.45
3 2.5 1.43
4 2.4 1.42
1 3.2 1.54
2 2.8 1.49
3 2.6 1.47
4 2.5 1.45
1 I 3.4 1 1.57 1
2 2.9 1.51
3 2.7 1.49
-
4 2.6 1.48
4 o r 5 Items
1 3.5 1.60
2 3.0 1.54
3 2.8 1.52
i
. 6 o r more
4 2.7
2.6
1.50
1.49
2
TABLE 2
GUIDANCE ON THE FACTORS BY WHICH THE T E S T ENDURANCE OF METAL
DETAILS SHOULD BE DIVIDED TO ALLOW FOR UNCERTAINTIES IN
ADJUSTING THE RESULT TO A NEW LOADING SEVERITY.
Other
curve 3.0*
Acceptable allowances
made for residual
stresses 1.0
(elastic interaction
accounted for b y test) I
1 I
Miner’s No Test
Rule allowance severity 3.0*
made for too high
r e sidu al
stresses
fi
1.0
too low
I
*These factors are for guidance, and supporting evidence must be presented
if lower factors are to be used.
(A separate allowance must be made for the effects of scatter)
LEAFLET 201/4
1 INTRODUCTION
2.1 The average damage growth curve should be derived over the range
between threshold size and critical size. Guidance on t h e threshold size
from which the crack growth should b e estimated is given a t para 10.2.
2.2 The stress intensity factor solution should represent both the
geometry of the detail and the mode(s) of stress to which it is subjected
e.g., tension, tearing and/or shear.
4.1 Commonly, the loading used for component tests differs from that
experienced i n service. It is assumed that the test loading is realistic in
that it represents the general sequence of the service loading and the
general shape of the amplitude distribution.
4.4 The 'test result can be used to increase confidence in the calculated
crack growth curve under a new spectrum. The crack growth should first
be calculated for the test spectrum and compared with the test result,
bearing in mind the following points:
4.4.1 If only one test specimen is used differences of less than 50% in
crack propagation life a r e unlikely to be significant.
4.4.2 If t h e calculated crack propagation life and the test life a r e of
the same o r d e r , bearing in mind that linear summation usually gives a
conservative estimate, this increases confidence in the stress intensity
factor solution and i n the materials data. The same solution and data
can then be used i n conjunction with the service loading spectrum to
calculate the expected life under the new spectrum.
(iii) Inadequate -
da vsAK data.
dN
8.1 The residual strength of the damaged structure should not normally
b e allowed to fall below 80% of the design ultimate load.
8 . 2 The critical crack length is the maximum crack length with which the
structure can sustain 80%of design ultimate load. I t may be determined b y
classical linear elastic fracture mechanics or b y s u c h methods as R-curve
techniques. The fracture toughness value should take account of the
thickness and grain orientation of the material, t h e mode of failure and the
most adverse temperature in the operational envelope. A conservative
value based on the available data should be used.
1 0 . 2 Although the data from para l O . l ( i ) and/or para lO.l(ii) will define
the reliability of the inspection process reasonably well a t PDs of 0.5 and
above, t h e data will be very sparse a t PDs approaching zero. I t will b e
necessary to extrapolate the reliability curve to the zero PD level.
Caution should be applied when assessing the shape of s u c h a curve
extension, a s a significant number of detections can be expected a t
damage sizes corresponding to the PDs i n this region. Truncation a t zero
PD is preferable to postulating an arbitrarily smooth fairing of t h e lower
end of the curve into the axis of the reliability/damage size diagram. The
damage size where the PD becomes zero is the 'threshold size', which
occurs a t the 'threshold time'. The chosen threshold size should not be
less than t h e minimum damage size for which damage growth can reliably
be forecast.
11.1 The overall PD depends on the time of the first inspection and the
i n t e r v a l between i n s p e c t i o n s o v e r t h e period of damage growth
corresponding to the damage range detailed in para 11.3.1. A system of
repeated inspections will invariably be required because, in practice,
inspection reliability never attains the value of u n i t y .
12 NON-PROPAGATING DAMAGE
intervals and inspection process used should be set such that the damage
will have a specified overall PD for a specified period of usage. The
values specified shall be acceptable to the Aeroplane Project Director (in
conjunction with Airworthiness Division, RAE).
REFERENCES
TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF FACTORS TO BE USED WHEN DERIVING CRACK GROWTH
CURVES AND ESTIMATING INSPECTION 'INTERVALS
LEAFLET 201/5
TESTING
1 INTRODUCTION
DESIGN DEVELOPMENT T E S T S
2.1 The aim of the design development tests is to provide data for
material selection, t o establish data for d e s i g n a n d t o eliminate
uncertainties in analysis before the final design is established.
2.3 Confidence in the fatigue and damage growth data used for design
s h o u l d be obtained by a programme of element and component tests.
These tests should represent significant details and s t r u c t u r e in which
fatigue or damage growth requirements influence working strain levels.
The anticipated load spectra and environmental conditions should be
applied in a flight-by-flight or other representative sequence. Tests
should also be conducted with the anticipated spectra increased in load
severity b y a factor of 1.20, except for tests representing a single detail
where there is sufficient evidence to show that simple damage rules are
applicable.
2.4 It may not be possible to represent all of the constraints on a detail
in a relatively simple test, i n which case a major sub-assembly will have to
be used. There is also a need to consider this t y p e of test for details
which will be for all practical purposes uninspectable. This is to ensure,
3 PRE-PRODUCTION FATIGUE T E S T S
4 PRODUCTION FATIGUE T E S T S
4.2 The structural standard of the test specimen should be that of the
majority of aeroplanes in service, using a s t r u c t u r e which has not
previously been subjected to fatigue or strength tests. Subject to timing
constraints (para 4.1) it is essential that all modifications which affect the
main load carrying structure, even to the most minor extent, are
incorporated. Those which are introduced after entry into service must
b e incorporated during the test at lifetimes which, a s f a r as possible,
represent the designated time for modification embodiment in service
multiplied by the test life factor. However, care needs t o be taken to
ensure that this does not result in there being damage beyond the limit
that can be catered for by the appropriate modification. The test
specimen should be structurally complete, but excluding control r u n s and
systems. The restraint to structure which arises from any item of
equipment must be represented to avoid non-typical failures. In addition
t o the full scale fatigue test there will be a need for supplementary tests
on structural details or assemblies which cannot be adequately loaded in
the full scale test, or where it may be more economical to t e s t separately,
provided that representative support can be achieved. Structural
differences which apply to a minority of the aeroplane fleet may also be
covered by supplementary tests.
4.3 In general, the production fatigue tests should utilise load spectra
obtained from operational loads measurement and include all significant
f l i g h t and g r o u n d l o a d s , including loads on c o n t r o l s u r f a c e s ,
undercarriage and similar devices. Loads should be applied i n a flight-by-
flight or other representative sequence, with sufficient randomisation of
loads and sorties to ensure that a typical strain history is obtained (see
Leaflet 201/3 para 3.2)
4.4 The full scale fatigue test specimen and those for supplementary
programmes should be strain-gauged to ensure that the s t r u c t u r a l strains
agree, within experimental accuracy, with those measured during the
operational loads programme and the flight load measurement programme.
During testing the specimen should be periodically examined to ensure
that any failures a r e noted at an early stage. Where possible the means
and the frequency of service inspections should be the basis of the test
examinations. When structural damage is found, the damage propagation
r a t e should be measured to enable the frequency and method of the service
inspection to be confirmed. If repairs a r e necessary, they should be
done in a manner which can be translated directly to service modification
o r repair drawings.
5 TEST ACCURACY
6 RESIDUAL STRENGTH T E S T S
6.3 The test should be used to confirm critical damage sizes, where
possible. The procedure must be agreed, in detail, with the Aeroplane
Project Director (in conjunction with Airworthiness Division, RAE)
7.1 The purpose of a tear down inspection is' to identify any significant
damage that is present at the completion of a fatigue test that has not
been detected during the test. This should be accomplished b y completely
dismantling the main load carrying structure, including the removal of
fasteners. Extreme care is needed when dismantling in order to avoid
masking or destroying fatigue damage. The s t r u c t u r e should then be
examined using appropriate non-destructive inspection procedures,
paying particular attention to fastener holes, changes of section and
cut-outs. Structure loaded primarily in compression should be included.
A selection of those damage sites which a r e found should be t h e subject of
fractographic examination to determine the origin, t y p e and size of
damage.
7.2 For the pre-production fatigue test, the tear down inspection w i l l
give invaluable information on areas which, although not justifying prior
modification, would benefit from close examination during the production
fatigue test. For the production fatigue test the information obtained
from the tear down inspection is an essential basis of any life extension
beyond the specified life (Leaflet 201/7). Although such extension may
not be anticipated at the time of the test, the collection of the data from
t h e tear down inspection is necessary to provide for any f u t u r e need.
Also, subsequent operational loads measurement may indicate loading
actions different from those on test. Thus it may be necessary to use life
extension procedures for any detaiis more highly loaded than on the
fatigue test, in order to maximise the substantiated life of such details.
LEAFLET 201/6
FATIGUEDAMAGE TOLERANCE
1 INTRODUCTION
2.1 I n order to comply with Chapter 201, each aeroplane should b e fitted
with a compact, robust and reliable recording instrument w h i c h monitors
the usage of t h e major structural components. This may record an
indirect parameter s u c h as normal acceleration, o r a direct parameter such
a s strain for each component to be monitored. Each parameter should be
chosen so that the most damaging loading actions on the component can be
determined.
2.2 The recorded data needs to be extracted after every flight in order
t o obtain the maximum benefit, in that instrumentation faults a r e quickly
noted, individual sortie variables can be accounted for economically in life
estimation and data for forward planning can be separated b y sortie type.
The means of extraction may be manual o r b y electronic transfer to
ground-based equipment. It should be possible to accomplish t h i s simply,
after every flight. It should also be possible to make a coarse check of t h e
quality of recorded data a t the operationa u n i t i n order to identify
instrumentation unserviceability .
The penalties on fatigue life of such
unserviceability a r e those for unmonitored components, given in Leaflet
201/3, and apply for the period of unserviceability plus any preceding
period for which the quality of data may be in doubt.
2.3 The instrumentation used for fleetwide recording will need to have an
adequate response bandwidth, so that the recorded data does not have
significant load contributions removed or attenuated by filtering. There
will generally need to be compression of data, but this should avoid
routines which restrict subsequent analysis to a specific method.
However, the time sequence of events within a flight need not be
retained. The amount of data that can be recorded, and the number of
components monitored, will be limited by practical constraints on
recording systems and by the volume of data that can subsequently be
analysed .
2.4 When the data is extracted after each flight, it will be necessary
manually to record additional data required for fatigue life estimation or
for usage statistics. If the data extraction is manual onto a standard form,
t h e additional data will be entered on the same form. If t h e data is
electronically transferred to ground based equipment it should be possible
t o input the additional data direct into the equipment immediately before o r
a f t e r the transfer. This additional data will include, for example, t h e
sortie pattern flown, take-off mass, fuel and stores, landing fuel and
stores, fuel received in flight, number of roller and full stop landings,
etc. The data collection is the responsibility of the Services, who will
agree the data to be recorded with the Design Authority, subject to the
agreement of t h e Aeroplane Project Director (in conjunction with
Airworthiness Division, RAE).
2.5 The data must be examined by the Services at the Operational Unit to
check for instrumentation unserviceability and to check whether the
appropriate parametric values approach or exceed the l i m i t s given in the
Release to Service. If the limit values a r e exceeded, action will then be
taken to examine the airframe in accordance with specified servicing
procedures.
2.6 The data for each flight will be added to that already held for the
aeroplane. This will enable the fatigue life used up to that time to be
calculated for each major component monitored, and it will be expressed a s
a life used in units appropriate to the usage of that component, e.g.,
number of landings for an undercarriage, or Fatigue Index units for a wing
(see para 2.8). These data will be used for establishing when the safe life
has been reached, o r when structurally significant inspections o r
modifications should be undertaken. The algorithms for calculating the life
used will b e provided b y the Design Authority and will include factors for
u s e as appropriate when recording systems a r e unserviceable. Where
simple counting is used as the basis for life usage, say in flying hours or
number of landings, the promulgated safe life must be based on an average
spectrum of usage and include the factors for unmonitored components.
2.7 The life usage data is used additionally for fleet planning purposes
and identifying in broad terms the relative damage level of various sortie
types. This can then be used for forecasting the effects of changes in
usage, providing that the sortie content does not change. The basic
recorded data provide fleetwide statistics which form the basis, in
2.8 The Fatigue Index (FI) is a measure of the fatigue life usage of a
structure o r component, based on a cumulative damage summation. A n FI
of 100 is generally set to a damage equal to the specified life under the
anticipated loads, b u t may be set to any convenient milestone. FI is not
used where the safe life can be expressed in simple terms, such as flying
hours, without building excessive conservatism into the calculation and
t h u s wasting fatigue life. I t is generally related to the wing history and
t o those components which experience a similar load history, and it is
used as the principal measure of fatigue usage for each aeroplane.
3 . 3 The recorded data will need to be extracted a t the end of every flight
i n parallel with the normal fleetwide recording for each OLM aeroplane.
T h e OLM data will usually be processed at a specialist ground station.
T h e organisation undertaking the analysis will also need to be provided
w i t h a copy of each flight record from the fleetwide recording system of
t h e OLM aeroplane for the duration of the OLM programme. It is not
anticipated that OLM will be continuous during the operational life of the
fleet. Each period of recording should aim to provide an adequate sample
of each sortie type flown by each squadron. The first task of OLM will be
t o provide data for the load spectra of the production fatigue tests. It
should be undertaken as soon as possible after entry into service,
allowing time for operating patterns to stabilise. Follow-on programmes
would generally aim a t checking whether operating patterns had changed
o r investigating the implications of a knomn change. For these purposes
it would be expected that the same OLM-instrumented aeroplane would be
used, owing to the installation cost, and rotated through appropriate
squadrons during the programme.
LEAFLET 201/7
1 INTRODUCTION
2 SAFE-LIFE DETAILS
3 INSPECTION-DEPENDENT DETAILS
3.4 Where previous data a r e not sufficiently extensive, the need for
additional o r extended testing on details o r complete structures or
components should be considered.
LEAFLET 201/8 .
FATIGUE DAMAGE TOLERANCE
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 This leaflet áetails the analytical procedure to be followed for fatigue and
inspection dependent damage tolerance clearance of aeroplanes which have not been
designed to DEF STAN 00-970. (See Chapter 201 para 6 and Appendix 1 to Part 2
para 4).
1.2 The procedure is a step-by-step review of the existing design to establish the
fatigue life in relation to the requirements of Chapter 201. (See the Flow Charts at
Figs 1 and2).
1.3 Throughout the review it is essential that the Staff Requirement (Air) (SR(A)), the
Aeroplane Specification, MOD(PE) requirements, and the Certification Data as supplied
to the Airworthiness Approving Authority for the aeroplane are available. Without this
data the review cannot proceed.
1.4 A non DEF STAN 00-970 aeroplane will require, in parallel, a review of other
aspects of the design such as the Flight Envelope, Static Strength, Environmental
Spectrum etc. as these will have an impact on Fatigue.
1.5 Most civil transport aeroplanes have large 'open' easily inspectable structures,
and use materials with relatively slow crack growth properties and reasonably long
critical crack lengths. It is possible to treat the structure as inspection-dependent
rather than safe life, and it will, usually, be the inspection-dependent option of
Chapter 201 that is the criterion for assessment of derivatives of civil aeroplanes.
2.1 The determination and substantiation of the fatigue life for an aeroplane is
dependent on the accuracy and validity of the design and Service spectrums and flight
profiles.
2.2 All subsequent analysis, tests and reviews are fallible unless there is factual
flight and ground measured data to substantiate the design and Service spectrum used.
This statement is relevant to every step of the review.
2.3 The final outcome of this review should be a report which comments on all aspects
connected with the fatigue life, and makes recommendations for consideration by the
Aeroplane Project Director (in conjunction with the Airworthiness Division, RAE).
3 THEREVIEWS
(i i ) Aeroplane Specification.
(i i i ) MOD(PE) Requirements.
3.2.2 Obtain fatigue type record where available (See DEF STAN 05-123).
3.2.3 For UK Services, operation a new spectrum will arise from the Statement of
Operating Intent (SOI). It is therefore necessary to review any deviations against
the new spectrum to confirm or otherwise, their validity. Should any of the
deviations be unacceptable the action required to eliminate them should be included
in the report to the Aeroplane Project Director.
3.3.2 The comparison may show that further substantiation is required such as
further analysis andor testing and preparation of fatigue type record.
3.4.2 Compare the Aeroplane Under Review with the MOD(PE) Specification and
SOI. As this review is likely to be carried out in the early stages of procurement
of the aeroplanes a full SOI may not be available. However, sufficient data should
be available from the SR(A) and MOD(PE) Specification together with advice from
the Service to develop an operational programme suitable for an initial comparison
to be made. Changes in gross take-off and landing weights, in performance required
and special to type operation such as tanking, receiving, air drop etc. are to be
particularly noted for consideration during this review.
3.4.3 Identify Flight Times. Where civil life is quoted in flights, the flight
hour differences between civil and Service operations may be considerable.
3.4.4 C o n f m the Basis for the Derivation of the Design Spectrum. All the data
used to determine the design specmm should be identified, whether it is from
measured data on the aeroplane under consideration, an aeroplane of a similar
configuration or from analytical data.
3.4.5 Review the Measured and/or Analytical Data. The measured data could be
from a similarly configured aeroplane, where a certain amount of analysis would
have then been required. Analytical data would be expected if the aeroplane is of
a completely new configuration and, therefore, all conclusions would be subject to
in-flight measwmenrs.
3.5.2 Review of the truncation, grouping and random application of the loads and
frequency in the test spectra against the design spectrum, to assess the effect of
the validity of the test results for application to the new spectrum. This will
enable an accurate assessment to be made of the aeroplane’s ability to meet the UK
military requirements.
3.5.3 The design and test spectra will show, in particular for large transport
aeroplanes, an assumed or quantified payload factor for each flight included in the
spectrum. Civil aeroplanes tend to be operated on a 70 to 75% payload factor,
whereas Service military operation will almost certainly be close to 100%, with
inevitably higher gross take off and landing weights. The overall effect of this
on the fatigue/safe life of the aeroplane will be significant and will require an
assessment of its effect to be carried out.
3.6.2 Establish from the above if the test specimens, configurations and loading
are representative, or if there are deviations which are to be identified.
3.6.3 Assess the deviations listed to determine their effect on the fatigue life
by reviewing the test results. Ad-hoc testing may be necessary to substantiate the
fatigue life.
3.7.2 Review Tear Down Inspection. The review should identify all failed and/or
flawed areas which affect the fatigue life.
3.7.3 Determine Scatter Factors Used. From all the individual tests which make up
the test programme as a whole, the scatter factors used to determine the fatigue
life and/or the structurai integrity inspections should be identified.
Justification and substantiation for any shortfalls in the factors specified in
Chapter 201 and its associated leaflets will need to be reviewed.
3.7.5 At the completion of the test programme and tear down inspections, damage
which affects the fatigue life will have been identified.
3.8.2 Review the Existing Life Monitoring Programme. Take into account
differences in flight durations, in flight refuelling if applicable, load factors
and runway roughness in its applicability to UK Service operation. Noting also
that military operations may require aeroplanes to operate from airfields at a
lower standard than normal civil airfields particularly in their surface
roughness.
3.9.2 Review the fatigue and damage tolerance tests and the associated test
spectra and compare them with the UK Service Spectra.
changes to environmental conditions which could well give rise to stress corrosion
particularly in under-carriages and their back up structure as well as main wing
structure with full integral fuel tanks. Additional inspection may be required, to
ensure that protective treatments in these areas is not flawed and to detect any
stress corrosion at an early stage.
3.9.5 Compliance with MIL A 87221 is likely to have been by only two lifetimes of
fatigue testing followed by up to one further lifetime for demonstration of
residual strength and damage growth limits, and a tear down inspection. The
results of tests carried out in compliance with MIL A 87221, therefore, require a
detailed analysis to determine their relevance to DEF STAN 00-970.
3.9.7 BCAR’s, FAR’S and JAR’S do not specifically call for testing to any
lifetime, but it is implied that to substantiate the fatigue life and damage
tolerance a certain amount of testing will be required.
3.9.8 Review the damage tolerance tests, in the light of paras 3.9.3 to 3.9.7
above, to check their compliance, or otherwise, with the requirements of Chapter
201. This review should concentrate on interpreting the test results against the
requirements and their impact primarily on inspection methods and periodicity.
Sane additional ad-hoc testing may arise from this review.
(i x) Freighter conversion.
(x) Armament.
3.10.2 The review should detail any additional testing necessary to confum or
otherwise the airframe life and damage tolerance.
3.13.2 Civil transport aircraft operate a gust avoidance policy, Service operation
on the other hand, for military necessity, may well require penetration of
turbulence as a routine manoeuvre. Operation in severe turbulence may be
unavoidable, especially when required to reach a rendezvous during a tanking
(i i i ) Fighter affiliation.
(iv) Tanking.
(v) Receiving.
3.13.3 Limitations arising from static strength requirements are not part of this
review, but the fatigue life may be strongly influenced by the operating limits
that are set. Any changes in limitations therefore arising from the static
strength review should be assessed at this stage for their affect on the fatigue
life and inspection periods.
4 STRUCTURAL COMPLIANCE
4.1 Collate the reviews and listing of deviations and differences to determine the
extent of further analysis and/or structural tests.
4.2 Confirm the SOI with the UK Services and finalise the spectrum.
4.3 Compare the final spectrum with the original design spectrum and recommend
any additionai analysis and/or testing required to show compliance with DEF STAN
00-970 Chapter 201.
4.4 Identify additional test requirements for consideration by the Aeroplane Project
Director.
5 OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS
5.1 With the confirmed SOI resulting in finalisation of flight profiles, operating
weights, flight frequency and environmental conditions, recommendations can be made
to the Aeroplane Project Director together with any ad-hoc flight testing required prior
to the OLM programme.
6.1 Complete any additional analysis and testing required, and provide overall report
to the Aeroplane Project Director on the fatigue and damage tolerance of the aeroplane
subject to confirmation of loads from the OLM Programme.
7.1 Derive the OLM Programme determining from the static, fatigue and flight test
programmes the location of measurement transmitters and the data retrieval system as the
OLM programme will require to duplicate some of the locations and methods for
correlation.
7.2 Derive the fatigue monitoring programme to track the fatigue life consumption to
determine the periodicity of structural integrity inspections. Existing aeroplanes will
have some form of fatigue monitoring in some cases with AIDS equipment backed up by
Flight Log and Crew reports. Combat and some trainer aeroplanes may already have
fatigue meters. Dependent on the review just completed the additional parameters
required to be measured for service operation must be defined.
8.1 Up date the structurai integrity inspection schedule with periodicities reflecting
the RAF operation.
9 CA RELEASE DATA
9.1 Complete data and supporting documentation for promulgation of CA Release by the
Aeroplane Project Director.
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CHAPTER 202
SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 The requirements of this chapter apply to all aeroplane types and to the aeroplane
as a whole in each case. The requirements are expressed in terms of a flight envelope,
the Co-ordinates of which are the forward speed and normal acceleration.
2 FACTORS
2.1 The structure shall have proof and ultimate factors as specified in Chapter 200,
para 3, unless otherwise agreed with the Aeroplane Project Director in conjunction with
Airworthiness Division, RAE, under conditions involving steady normal acceleration and
forward speed as represented by all points within and on the boundary of the specified
flight envelope, and under specified manoeuvres involving pitching acceleration within
the envelope.
3.1 The structural design flight envelope is defined by Fig 1 and by the values of
n i and VD which will be given, with any necessary amplification for special types, in
the particular Aeroplane Specification. All altitudes up to the maximum operating
altitude shall be considered.
3.2 In this context level coordinated turns and wind up turns shall be considered as
symmemc manoeuvres. Any rate of roll required to minimise lateral acceleration on
entering the turn shall be allowed for. See also Chapter 203, para 7.
4 MANOEUVRES TO BE CONSIDERED
4.2.2 Consideration shall be given to the loads arising from a movement of the
pitch motivators to cause a transition from steady level flight at a speed within
or on the boundary to the appropriate extreme steady normal acceleration condition.
The speed shall be assumed constant until the extreme value of the normal
acceleration is achieved.
4.2.3 In evaluating the loads which arise in the manoeuvres covered by para 4.2.1
and 4.2.2 consideration shall be given to:
4.2.4 When the flight control system of the aeroplane incorporates load limiting
devices the combination of normal accelerations and pitching conditions described
in para 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 shall be determined in agreement with the Aeroplane Project
Director. See also Leaflet 202/3, and Chapter 208, para 4.
4.2.5 When the flight control system of the aeroplane is of conventional design
such that movement of the motivators is directly related to the movement of the
pilot’s inceptors use shall be made of a rational motivator motion versus time
profile when determining the loads which occur in the manoeuvres described in para
4.2.1 and 4.2.2. See also Leaflet 202/1.
5.2.2 When airbrakes are fitted all positions that can be selected in flight shall
be considered. S e e also Chapter 205, para 4.
5.2.3 All positions of the undercarriage which can occur in association with a
particular condition shall be considered. Refer also to Chapter 306.
5.3.2 Appropriate allowance shall be made for the effects of the following on the
pitching moment coefficient Cmo and the position of the aerodynamic centre:
5.3.3 Allowance shaíl also be made for the effects of propellers and slip-stream,
or flow through jet engines, on the pitching moment coefficient Cmo and the
position of the aerodynamic centre. This allowance shall be based, whenever
possible, on the results of wind tunnel or other tests of the particular design.
(i) The minimum flying mass (that is the take off mass less bombs,
ammunition and other items readily dropped or expended except
for sufficient fuel for a normal descent and 30 minutes cruise
at sea level at the engine conditions appropriate to maximum
endurance)
(ii) The maximum mass at which the aeroplane can reach the altitude
considered.
5.5.2 The design centre of gravity positions at each mass and aerodynamic
configuration shall include a tolerance beyond the actual maximum forward and
actual maximum aft positions which are attainable in that configuration. This
tolerance shall be 1.5% of the mean aerodynamic chord unless otherwise agreed with
the Aeroplane Project Director.
-
ai
U
U
U
g+;+
O
I
L
1 -
C
Z
I /1
EQUIVALENT AIRSPEED
m
C
-n
I I
1
VALUES SPECIFIED FOR PARTICULAR AEROPLANE TYPES (see Leaflet 202/2 for
definitions).
DEPENDENT VALUES
(Unless otherwise specified in the Aeroplane Specification)
VA is the manoeuvring speed, that is that minimum flying speed at which n i can be
achieved.
VH shall be the maximum speed attainable in level flight with the aeroplane flying at the
basic design mass, with no external stores at the maximum continuous cruise engine
condition.
n2 = 1-0.3111
n3 = -0.6(nl -1)
NOTE:
On aeroplanes designed for dive bombing or ground attack duties:
VH will be equal to v D 1 which means that n2 will be equal to n3.
LEAFLET 202/0
SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES
REFERENCES
ARC Reports
LEAFLET 202/1
SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Chapter 202, para 4 requires the use of a rational representation of the motion of
the pitch control motivator to be used to evaluate the loads which arise during a
pitching manoeuvre. The control systems of many aeroplanes are complex and it is not
possible to present a detailed analytical procedure for the load evaluation which will
cover all cases. In the more general case it is possible to give a broad outline of the
stages of the analysis required to derive the loads. For these cases see Leaflet 202/3.
1.2 Where there is effectively a direct link between the pilot’s inceptor and the
deflections of the pitch motivator it is possible to give an analytical technique.
Examples of such closed algebraic forms may be found in R and M 3001 and 3327.
2 MANOEUVRE CONDITIONS
2.1 The complete pitching manoeuvre involves the transition of the aeroplane from
steady level flight at a particular speed and altitude to a condition of steady normal
acceleration, usually at some point on the boundary of the flight envelope; and then a
return to level flight. As the manoeuvre is primarily the response of the aeroplane to
control input in the short period longitudinal mode it is rapid and it is adequate to
assume that the forward speed does not vary during the manoeuvre.
2.2 The aim of the analysis is to specify the control input which results in a maximum
increment in the normal acceleration corresponding to the desired value at the
appropriate point on the boundary of, or within, the flight envelope. It should be noted
that unless the short period response is overdamped the motion of the aeroplane will be
oscillatory, in which case the maximum incremental value of normal acceleration will
exceed the steady state value appropriate to that control input. Whilst the steady state
value is simply related to the dynamic characteristics of the aeroplane for a given
motivator deflection, the maximum value is a function of the shape of the motivator
movement versus time profile.
2.3 The final phase of the manoeuvre is conventionally analysed by assuming that the
aeroplane has achieved the steady state value of the normal acceleration and then
applying the pitch inceptor input required to return it to level flight.
2.4 From the foregoing description it will be realised that the important parameter is
the way in which the movement of the pitch motivator varies with time rather than the
motion of the pilot’s inceptor. In a complex control system, such as one using active
control techniques, it is necessary to consider the effect of all the inceptors which
contribute inputs to the longitudinal control system. Refer to Leaflet 202/3 and Chapter
208, para 4.
3 PILOTINPUT
3.1 For those cases where the pilot’s inceptor is either directly linked mechanically
to the longitudinal control motivator, or through a power control unit having no other
inputs it is possible to specify the motivator movement in terms of the input of the
pilots inceptor. Two separate forms of motion have been used, in the past:-
3.2 The variation of the inceptor motion with respect to time generally takes a form
closely described by a ramp function, although for analytical purposes the unchecked
motion has often been represented by an exponential relationship.
3.3 The U.S. Mil-A-008861A para 3.19.2 identifies three specific movements of the
pitch inceptor, all based on ramp functions. in each case the inceptor is assumed to be
deflected through an angle, 6, such as to give the desired normal acceleration at the
end of the aeroplane response time. The class of aeroplane effects the time, t i ,
assumed to achieve the angle, 6, it varying from 0.2 seconds for highly manoeuvrable
aeroplanes to 0.4 seconds for transport types. The three conditions relate to the
movement of the inceptor after the angle, 6, has been achieved.
(i) Movement of the inceptor back to the original position in the same
time as the application, unless inceptor angle limitation requires a
dwell time, t2, at angle 6 to enable the specified normal
acceleration to be achieved.
4.1 The first stage in the actual calculation of the loads which arise in a pitching
manoeuvre is to determine the response of the aeroplane to the specified pilot andor
other inceptor inputs.
4.2 This involves setting up the equations of motion of the aeroplane. In accord with
the assumptions of para 2 these consist merely of the Z-force equation and the pitching
moment equation (as in the approximation to the short period motion of the aeroplane).
This completes the description of the dynamic system for the class of aeroplane, for
which 6 is a prescribed function of time.
4.3 In the more general case, it is necessary to add all the equations governing the
dynamic behaviour of the control system.
4.5 In addition the variation of motivator deflection during the manoeuvre will either
have been specified or will have to be determined as a response quantity.
5.1 At any time during the manoeuvre the total load is the algebraic sum of the load on
a controlhtabiliser surface due to its incidence at that time and the incremental load
due to the deflection of any part of it at that same time.
5.2 When the aeroplane having a conventional wing-tail layout is pitched from steady
level flight towards the positive normal acceleration boundary the total surface load
will pass through a maximum download in the early stages of the manoeuvre, then
through a maximum upload before reaching the steady circling flight value. It finally
passes through another maximum in the upload sense when during the second stage of
manoeuvre the input is reversed to return the aeroplane to steady level flight. In the
case of an aeroplane having a foreplane-wing layout the foreplane load passes through a
maximum upload during the f i t part of the manoeuvre as the steady circling flight value
is approached. A maximum download condition may result as the input is reversed to
return the aeroplane to steady level flight. It should be noted that in this second
configuration the critical design loads conditions are reversed. That is the critical
foreplane load is likely to arise in a steady state condition whilst the transient case
is likely to give the wing design conditions.
6.1 The moment about the hinge line of the aerodynamic load acting on a control
surface is also dependent on the incidence of the control/stabiliser where appropriate
and the control surface deflection. Again this passes through maximum positive and
negative values as does the load, when the aeroplane is of conventional wing-tail
layout.
7 GENERAL REMARKS
(i) variation of forward speed and the gravity component during the motion
is neglected, already mentioned.
(ii) the contribution of the control motivator force to the total lift is
Omitted.
(iv) the equations of motion are linearised and the aerodynamic derivatives
assumed constant throughout the manoeuvre.
7.2 Should it be considered necessary in a given case to account for any of these
effects, the equations of motion of the aeroplane must be amended accordingly.
7.3 If the data required under para 5.3.2(i) and (ii) of Chapter 202 are not
forthcoming from wind-tunnel or other tests, it is acceptable that the effects under
items (i) and (U) shall be estimated using appropriate theories, in combination with
the best available structural data in respect of item (U). Whenever possible, the
effects under para 5.3.2 (Ui) shall be based on the data from model and full-scale
tests of a closely similar design.
7.4 For aeroplanes with unswept wings and of conventional structural design flying at
low Mach numbers, in the absence of data from any of the investigations detailed above,
some allowances should be made. Changes in Cmo of i 0.0075 and a shift of f2.5% of
the mean chord in the position of the aerodynamic centre should be considered.
LEAFLET 202/2
SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES
DEFINITIONS
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 The definitions given in this Leaflet and in the British Standard Glossary of
Aeronautical Terms (BS Specification No. 185) are recommended for general use. To
avoid confusion, it is particularly important that alternative and undefined terms
should be avoided in type records, strength calculation and test reports submitted for
official approval.
2 ACCELERATION
3.1 A powered flying control system is one in which the whole or part of the power
required to move the main flying control surface (or surfaces) concerned is supplied by
an electric, hydraulic, or other non-human source.
4 SPEED
LEAFLET 202/3
SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 The application of the techniques described in Leaflet 202/1 is inappropriate for
those aeroplanes which use an active control system incorporating load limiting devices.
In these aeroplanes the automatic system can override pilot input and result in a so
called "carefree" manoeuvring situation. For the purposes of structural load evaluation
it is usually necessary to consider cases where motion of the aeroplane occurs in six
degrees of freedom, although constant forward speed may be assumed in some
circumstances. The analysis may be further complicated by the integration of flight and
propulsion controls, as in the case of vectored-thrust aeroplanes. Reference in all
these cases should be made to Chapter 208, para 4, which deals with the airframe aspects
of active control systems design.
1.2 The use of a simple expression to specify the movement of the control motivators is
not appropriate for advanced flight control systems. The specification of the flight
envelope itself is relevant since the implied accelerations are one of the common design
features of the airframe and control system.
2 MANOEUVRE PARAMETERS
2.1 One way of proceeding with the design of both the airframe and control system is to
establish a set of "manoeuvre parameters". These include aeroplane velocities as well
as accelerations. They should be derived after consideration of the handling and
agiiity requirements of the aeroplane and in consultation with the Aeroplane Project
Director.
2.2 Design loads are calculated by balancing the aeroplane at selected points within
and on the boundaries using an assumed, appropriate control usage.
2.3 Subsequently, as the design of the flight control system becomes more fully defined
it is necessary to investigate the effect of control response on the manoeuvre
parameters and to check the load calculations in order to obtain flight clearance.
2.4 Reference should be made to Leaflet 208/4 for a further discussion of the
sinictural implications of active control systems.
A typical form of the envelope for a supersonic aeroplane is shown at Fig 1. As would
be expected maximum negative, nose down, pitching acceleration coincides with all
positive values of normal acceleration. Equally there is a reduction in design
positive, nose up, pitching acceleration as the maximum normal acceleration is
approached.
3.2 The value of maximum normal acceleration is defined in Chapter 202, para 3 and the
maximum pitch acceleration by aeroplane handling and agility considerations.
C
.-+O
CJ
L
Qi
aJ
V
ü
-30
L
U
C
a
+I
lar Rate
i
FIG. 2 COMBINATIONS OF ANGULAR RATES AND ACCELERATIONS
CHAPTER 203
ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES
1 GENERAL
1.1 The requirements of this chapter are applicable to all aeroplanes and to the
aeroplane as a whole unless otherwise specified. The asymmetric flight-conditions
associated with side-slipping and rolling are considered, spinning being dealt with in
Chapter 207.
2 FACTORS
2.1 The structure shall have proof and ultimate factors as specified in Chapter 200,
para 3, unless otherwise agreed with the Aeroplane Project Director (in conjunction with
the Airworthiness Division, RAE), under the loads which arise in each of the following
cases.
3 MANOEUVRES TO BE CONSIDERED
3.1 When the flight control system of the aeroplane incorporates load limiting devices
the appropriate combinations of asymmetric and symmetric manoeuvre conditions to be
considered shall be agreed with the Aeroplane Project Director. The cases stated in
para 4 to 7 of this Chapter shall be considered in so far as they are applicable.
Reference shall be made to Chapter 208 and Leaflets 202/3,203/2 and 208/4.
3.2 When the flight control system of the aeroplane is of conventional design such that
the movement of the control motivators is directly related to the movement of the
pilot’s inceptors the asymmetric manoeuvres stated in para 4 to 7 of this Chapter shall
apply. Guidance on the application of the requirements is given in Leaflet 203/1.
4 YAWING MANOEUVRES
4.2.3 For all aeroplanes, other than transport types, consideration shall also be
given to pilot input such that the yaw motivator, or combination of motivators,
moves sinusoidally at the natural frequency of the Dutch Roll Motion of the
aeroplane (see Chapter 602 and Leaflet 602/1, para 3). The maximum value reached
by the deflection of the directional motivator(s) during this process shall be two
thirds of that specified in para 4.2.1 and the input shall consist of one and half
cycles of the pilot's inceptor (that is left-central-right-central-left-central).
4.4.3 Consideration shall also be given in the design to the possible effects of
asymmetrical longitudinal stabiliser/control surface loads due to buffeting which
may occur near the minimum permissable flight speed as defined in Chapter 603,
para 1.2.3.
5.1 Multi engined aeroplanes shall be designed to withstand the loads which arise from
the sudden failure of the critical engine.
5.2 The aeroplane shall be considered to be in level flight at any speed from the
minimum control speed, VMC, (see Chapter 602, para 4) up to the design diving
speed, VD, at any attainable altitude. The remaining engine(s) shall be assumed to be
delivering the maximum rated power appropriate to the speed and altitude.
5.3 When reverse thrust or propeller drag may occur because of automatic features,
consideration shall also be given to these effects being present on the failed engine.
5.4 Corrective action by the pilot may be assumed to be initiated at the time the
aeroplane has reached the maximum yawing velocity subsequent to the engine failure, but
not before two seconds after the engine failure. The magnitude of the corrective action
shall be based on the control forces stated in Chapter 206, para 2.2, unless it can be
demonstrated by analysis or test that lower values can control the yaw and roll which
result from the prescribed engine failure conditions.
6 ROLLING MANOEUVRES
6.1 Chapter 602, para 3 specifies minimum roll performance for handling purposes and
Leaflet 60213 gives acceptable criteria for meeting these requirements. The loads which
arise during rolling manoeuvres are covered by the Combined Rolling and Pitching cases
specified in para 7. The roll control conditions which contribute to these cases are
specified in the following sub-paragraphs.
6.2 The maximum roll inceptor input to be used for stressing purposes at a particular
speed and altitude shall be that which gives the largest steady-state deflection, or set
of deflections, of the roll control motivator, or motivators, whichever is applicable,
defined by the most critical of the following conditions:
(b) where the motivators are driven solely by the deflection of the
pilot’s stick or wheel, that corresponding to a control force of
267N (601bf) for a stick control of 222N (501bf) applied to the
rim of a wheel of diameter Dm (Din), resulting in a couple of
magnitude 2221) (Nm) or 50D (lbf in).
If the deflection (or any one deflection), so defined, exceeds that for
full travel, it shall be replaced by the maximum available deflection.
6.3 For transport aeroplanes, para 6.2 (iii) need not be considered.
6.4 In applying the conditions of para 6.2 (iii)(b) the accuracy with which the
actual hinge moments of each individual motivator may be predicted may sometimes be
such that doubts arise as to the magnitude of the deflections so defined. The assumed
deflections shall be increased, in such cases, by 30 per cent.
6.5 For ailerons or spoilers having differential motion, the actual angles shall be
used for stressing, but the mean of the actual angles shall correspond to the angle
given by para 6.2 (i), (ii) or (iii) as appropriate.
6.6 Regardless of which of the conditions specified in para 6.2 is critical the
following specific phases of the manoeuvre shall be considered:
(i) The loads which arise due to the rolling acceleration consequent upon
the deflection(s) of the roll motivator(s) with the aeroplane initially
in steady level flight.
(ii) The loads when the rate of roll has reached its steady value consequent
upon the prescribed deflection(s) of the roll motivator(s).
(iii) With the aeroplane in the steady rate of roll condition referred to in
(ii) above, the loads which arise when the roll motivator(s) are
returned to the neutral position(s).
(iv) With the aeroplane in the steady rate of roll condition referred to in
. (ii) above, the loads which arise when the roll motivator(s) are moved
to a deflected position of equal magnitude of that in (i) above, but of
opposite direction.
7.1 The loads arising from the combined application of the pitch and roll motivators
shall be considered for all speeds up to the design diving speed, VD, and all
altitudes up to the maximum operating altitudes for the following conditions:
(a) The critical value specified in para 6.2 for all values of normal
acceleration from -1.Og up to 0.67nlg except that for transport
aeroplanes the normal acceleration values shall be from zero to
0.67nlg, and
(b) One half of the critical value specified in para 6.2 associated
with a normal acceleration of 0.9nlg, and
(c) Linear variation between the values specified in (a) and (b) with
normal accelerations between 0.67nlg and 0.9nlg
(a) Held fixed in the position(s) for trim with the aeroplane in
wings-level flight, and
(iii) Air brakes shall be either open or closed, as appropriate to the speed
- see Chapter 205, para 4.
(iv) For the definition of normal acceleration see Chapter 202, para 3 and
Leaflet 202/2, para 2.
8.1 The flight loading cases which arise from the conditions specified in para 4, 5 and
7 are applicable to bomb bays when the doors are open and to bomb doors, their operating
mechanisms and supporting structure when the doors are in all positions from fully open
to fully closed and locked. The aerodynamic loads on the bomb doors, and their
distribution, shall be obtained from full scale or wind tunnel tests. Consideration
shall gven to buffet effects.
f
9.1 The range of masses to be considered and the corresponding positions of the centre
of gravity shall be as specified in Chapter 202, para 5.5.
10.1 The values of relevant aerodynamic coefficients and derivations shall be based on
the best available data. Wind tunnel or flight test results shall be used wherever
possible to determine or check values. S e e also Leaflet 203/1, para 6.
LEAFLET 203/0
ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES
REFERENCE PAGE
RAE Report
Structures 76 Dynamic fin and rudder loads in yawing manoeuvres
LEAFLET 203/1
ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 This leaflet gives explanatory notes on the requirements of Chapter 203 and
outlines the methods of determining the critical stressing conditions arising in the
course of the manoeuvres specified therein. It is particularly applicable to those
aeroplanes where the movement of the control motivators is directly related to the
movement of the pilot’s inceptors.
1.2 As in the case of the symmetric manoeuvres of Chapter 202 and Leaflet 202/1,
present-day developments in aeroplane control systems can render past practices
inapplicable in the general case. Whilst in the past there always existed a direct
relationship between a given manoeuvring task and a control device, this is no longer
the case. The demands of improved performance in a number of directions have resulted
in an increasing trend to combine the effects of a number of control devices for a given
task. Simple examples of this trend are provided by the use of ailerons supplemented by
differentially deflected tail panels. When this is coupled with the increased
application of automatic control systems and unusual aerodynamic configurations the
consequence can be an extremely complex situation. However, there does exist a class of
conventional aeroplanes, namely those for which the pilot’s control is connected
directly, or via a power unit only, to the rudder and aileron control surfaces, that can
be catered for by simplified methods as hitherto (RAE Report Structures 76).
2.1 Whether a yawing moment arises from the application of the yaw motivator(s) or by
a sudden loss of engine thrust on one side of a multi-engined aeroplane, the resulting
motion has the same character, being primarily a combination of yawing, sideslipping and
rolling.
2.2 For the simple class of aeroplane mentioned in para 1.2 above the first stage in
satisfying the requirements of Chapter 203, paras 4 and 5 is the calculation of the
response of the aeroplane as the solution of the laterddirectional equations of
motion. In the more general case it is necessary to include the equations which govern
the dynamics of the control system when determining the overall response.
2.3 The inputs referred to in para 2.1 above principally give rise to yawing moments
but in certain cases there may be significant induced rolling moments and sideforces.
2.4 It has been usual for the linearised equations of motion to be used in calculating
the response of the aeroplane. Often the effect of the sideforce may be neglected in the
calculation of the overall response of the aeroplane but it does have a significant
effect upon the lateral and yawing accelerations. If the wing of the aeroplane is
unswept and of moderate to high aspect ratio it may be acceptable to neglect the rolling
i
content of the lateral motion, at least over part of the range of operating conditions.
When this is so for the simple class of aeroplane referred to, the response of the
aeroplane is derived from a solution of the two equations which describe the lateral and
yawing motions.
2.5 For the simple class of aeroplane it is adequate to assume that there is no input
from the roli or pitch motivators during the execution of the complete yawing described
in Chapter 203, para 4.2. However, when inertial or aerodynamic cross-coupling is
present it is admissible to introduce corrective action both in the rolling and
longitudinal senses. In order to ensure that adequate allowance is made for the loads
which may arise before this corrective action is effective, Chapter 203, para 3.3
specifies minimum values of bank angle, coupled with dynamic sideslip angle and normal
acceleration which must be catered for, unless it can be demonstrated that the flight
control system ensures lower limited values.
3.1 The inputs into the yaw channel are generally specified such that the deflection(s)
of the appropriate motivator(s) may be derived. For the simple class of aeroplane with a
more direct link between the pilot and the yaw motivator the input may be specified
directly or indirectly in terms of applied pilot force or inceptor movement. See
Chapter 203, para 4.2.
3.2 When the yaw motivator(s) is(are) sensitive or powerful the application of a
specific deflection may result in unrealistically high loads for the directional
stabilising/control surface. It may then be desirable to change the characteristics of
the motivator to reduce the load. Alternatively there may be strong reasons for
retaining the sensitivity or power of the control, in which case some reduction of the
severity of the loading case might be reasonable if there is an aeroplane characteristic
(such as high lateral acceleration on the pilot) which would act as a natural deterrent
against high pilot inceptor inputs. In such cases the Aeroplane Project Director should
be consulted.
5.1 The solution of the overall equations which govern the motion of the aeroplane, as
described in para 2 above, yields the response parameters which are required to
determine the loads acting on the vertical (directional) stabiliser/control surface(s).
These are:
From these the effective angle of incidence of a location on the vertical surface(s) may
be calculated. The corresponding deflection of the yaw motivator(s) is(=) also required
to enable the total loads to be evaluated.
6.1 Chapter 203, para 4.4 specifies the loading conditions to be applied to the
longitudinal stabiliser/control surface in yawed flight.
6.2 It is required that the magnitude of the pitching moment coefficient, Cmo, be
increased to allow for the effect of sideslip angle. The required value should be derived
by the best available method and verified in the flight testing, but in the absence of
more precise infomation it should be assumed that the low speed value of Cmo is
increased by -0.0015 per degree of sideslip.
6.3 It is also required that the resulting trim (balancing) load be distributed
asymmetrically. The effective roiling moment on the longitudinal stabiliser/control
surface is defmed as:
E V2 St bt Kß
2
K is the slope of the curve of longitudinal surface roiling moment coefficient versus
sideslip angle at the appropriate Mach number.
6.4 The value of the derivative K should, wherever possible, be verified by actual tests.
It depends upon the configuration of the aeroplane, and for instance in a conventional
aeroplane layout it is significantly affected by such factors as tailplane dihedral,
sweepback and the position of the tailplane on the fin and also to a lesser extent by
other aerodynamic components. However, experience has indicated that, for unswept,
relatively low down tailplanes having no dihedral, a value of K of -0.025 per degree of
sideslip is conservative.
6.5 The provision of strength to meet the effects of asymmetric buffeting which may
occur near the minimum permissible flight speed has apparently been covered incidentally
on many past aeroplanes by the use of K = -0.0025 in the asymmetric flight cases. It is
important however to ensure adequate strength on aeroplanes which are designed for much
smaller numerical values of K. It will probably be satisfactory to cater for a difference
in lift coefficient between the two halves of the horizontal stabiliser of 1.0 or Q,
max, whichever is smaller. As an oveniding minimum it is suggested that the horizontal
stabiliser shear strength inboard of the pick-up points should not be less than the
strength outboard.
6.6 During asymmetric flight the drag as well as the lift on the longitudinal surface
will usually be distributed asymmetrically. This asymmetry of drag loads should be
considered in the design, although the provision of extra structure to meet it should
not normally be necessary.
7.2.4 The roll motivator power on some aeroplane designs may be so great that the
application of the requirements of Chapter 203, para 6.2(iii) results in unduly
high values of the rate of roll. In this case it is suggested that for the ground
attack role, the maximum rate of roll that need be considered to develop before the
specified deflection of the roll motivator (or the deflections of each
roll-motivator, where a number of these are used in combination) is removed, is the
maximum that can be achieved in rolling from a steady pull-out with zero bank into
a 90 degree banked turn, when the specified roll input is applied as rapidly as
possible, or 200 degrees/sec, whichever is less. For air fighting and evasive
manoeuvres, the maximum rate of roll that need be considered to develop before the
specified deflection of the roll motivator (or the deflections of each roll
motivator, where a number of these are used in combination) is removed, is the
maximum that can be achieved in rolling from a 90 degree banked turn in one
direction to a 90 degree banked turn in the opposite direction when the specified
roll input is applied as rapidly as possible, or 200 degrees/sec, whichever is
less. The value of 200 degrees/sec is tentatively suggested as an operationally
usable maximum for fighters. Corresponding rates of roll for other aeroplanes are
not suggested as it is possible that on these aeroplanes the maximum rate of roll
corresponding to the specified roll input may be an adequate criterion.
7.2.5 Any of the four stages of the manoeuvre, specified in Chapter 203, para 6.6
(Le., the initiation, the steady roll, the arresting of the rolling motion and
reversed roll), may give critical loads in some parts of the structure. If
instantaneous roll motivator movement is assumed, it will probably be satisfactory
to consider only the four separate cases. If instantaneous roll input is not
assumed, or if the maximum rate of roll considered is less than the steady rate of
roll corresponding to the applied roll input, then examination of the response of
the aeroplane throughout the manoeuvre becomes advisable.
8 GENERAL REMARKS
8.1 Although the effects of the sideslip which occurs during asymmetric manoeuvres are
most easily calculated for the fin and rudder loads, there are noticeable effects on
other parts of the airframe which are not so amenable to calculation. Such items
include undercarriage doors, cabin hoods, radar scanning housings and externally
carried stores, in general. Special wind-tunnel tests to investigate the magnitude of
these effects are recommended whenever it is not possible to base an estimate on the
results of previous tests of a closely similar design.
8.2 The yawing velocities which occur during asymmetric manoeuvres cause a
gyroscopic pitching couple on the engine and propeller which should be considered in
the design of the engine mounting. The effect of rate of yaw on other rotating parts
within the aeroplane should not be overlooked. See Chapter 200, para 8 and Leaflet
2OO/3.
LEAFLET 20312
..
ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 The application of the techniques described in Leaflet 203/1 is inappropriate for
those aeroplanes which use an active control system incorporating load limiting devices.
This different design situation is discussed in Leaflet 202/3 to which reference should
be made, as well as in Chapter 208, para 4 and Leaflet 208/4.
1.2 One way of dealing with the design is to make use of Manoeuvre Parameters, see
Leaflet 202/3, para 2. These should be determined after consideration of the handling
and agility requirements of the aeroplane and in conjunction with the Aeroplane Project
Director.
2.1 Chapter 203, para 4 specifies the yawing manoeuvre load cases for aeroplanes with
conventional controls. In the case of aeroplanes with active control systems it is
useful to consider an envelope which describes the interaction of lateral acceleration
and yawing acceleration. In practice it is convenient to use a 'modified' yawing
acceleration defined as:-
2.2 The maximum value of the yawing acceleration is determined by the control system
characteristics required to meet the aeroplane handing and agility requirements. The
maximum lateral acceleration is likely to be limited by consideration of crew
tolerance.
3.1 Chapter 203, para 7 specifies the design load cases for an aeroplane with
conventional controls in combined pitching and rolling manoeuvres. The situation is more
complex in the case of aeroplanes designed to possess 'carefree' manoeuvring
characteristics due to the need to consider all six degrees of & d o m at the same
time.
3.2 Fig 2 is an example of an envelope which specifies the relative values of lateral
manoeuvre parameters in terms of the normal acceleration. The lateral manoeuvre
parameters covered are:-
The diagram shows that for values of each of these parameters of up to 25% of the
maximum value there is coincidence with the maximum normal acceleration. There is
then a linear variation so that 80% of the maximum value coincides with 80% of the
normal acceleration. Further linear variation of the parameters occurs so that the
maximum values coincide with 50% of the normal acceleration.
3.3 The maximum values of the roll and yaw rates and acceleration are determined by
consideration of the handling and agility requirements of the aeroplane.
4.1 The combination of maximum angular acceleration with angular-rate for both the
roll and yaw motions is a further consideration. A typical diagram showing this relation
can be found in Leaflet 202/3, para 4.1 and Fig 2.
I
Yaw Accel.
+ve
( i + p q1
C
.-
c
O
-$
8
-8
E
L
I I
=O
0.- I I I I 1 I I I I
- Man. Parameter
-ve -
CHAPTER 204
G U S T LOADS
1 GENERAL
1.1 The requirements of this chapter are applicable to all aeroplanes and to
the strength of the complete structure, when the aeroplane encounters
g u s t s normal to the flight path both in the plane of symmetry (vertical
g u s t s ) and perpendicular to the plane of symmetry (lateral g u s t s ) .
2 FACTORS
2.1 The structure shall have proof and ultimate factors not less than 1 . 1 2 5
and 1.5 respectively on the loads arising i n each case specified below.
3 DESIGN CONDITIONS
3.4 I n those cases where terrain following flight is specified the aeroplane
shall be designed for the case when a vertical gust of 7.6m/s (25ft/sec) is
encountered a t the same time as it is performing a manoeuvre of 60% of the
maximurn limit load factor.
4 DISCRETE G U S T C A S E S
( b ) Weapon s y s t e m a e r o p l a n e s a n d o t h e r s w h e r e
s p e e d V H i s e q u i v a l e n t t o a Mach n u m b e r of
u n i t y or greater; VG s h a l l b e d e t e r m i n e d
b y mission r e q u i r e m e n t s , t h e permissibility
o f r e d u c i n g s p e e d a n d t h e slow-down s p e e d s
a t t a i n a b l e and s h a l l b e agreed with t h e
Aeroplane Project Director, b u t need not b e
greater t h a n VH.
(ii) Speed VH: s h a l l b e t h e maximum s p e e d a t t a i n a b l e i n
l e v e l f l i g h t with t h e a e r o p l a n e f l y i n g a t t h e
basic d e s i g n mass, with no e x t e r n a l stores a t
t h e maximum c o n t i n u o u s c r u i s e e n g i n e
conditions .
(iii) S p e e d V D : is t h e d e s i g n d i v i n g s p e e d a t a p p r o p r i a t e
a l t i t u d e . (see Leaflet 202/2, p a r a 4.1)
5 DESIGN ANALYSIS
where Ude is the design gust velocity as specified i n paras 4 . 1 and 4.3
"0 ,
I
GUST LOADS THROUGHOUT THE SPEED RANGE
LEAFLET 204/0
GUST LOADS
REFERENCE PAGE
ARC Reports
NACA Reports
LEAFLET 204/1
GUST LOADS
1 INTRODUCTION
2.2 S a f e s p e e d r a n g e s at v a r i o u s a l t i t u d e s c a n b e s h o w n o n a s p e e d -
a l t i t u d e e n v e l o p e . A s a f e speed-altitude e n v e l o p e a n d t h e s a f e s t s p e e d s
within t h e e n v e l o p e s h o u l d b e determined f o r g u s t s of 20 i n / s (66 f t / s e c )
EAS below 6100 i n (20,000 f t ) a l t i t u d e t h e r e a f t e r d e c r e a s i n g l i n e a r l y to
11.6 i n / s (38 f t / s e c ) a t 15,200 i n (50,000 f t ) a l t i t u d e , w i t h t h e a e r o p l a n e
a t t h e most adverse weight f o r t h e a l t i t u d e c o n s i d e r e d . Fig 1 s h o w s
examples f o r h y p o t h e t i c a l s u b s o n i c a n d s u p e r s o n i c fighter a e r o p l a n e s .
3 STRENGTH BOUNDARY
3.1 T h e s t r e n g t h b o u n d a r y s h o u l d c o r r e s p o n d to t h e a c h i e v e d s t r e n g t h ,
u n f a c t o r e d , r e s u l t i n g from t h e g u s t or m a n o e u v r i n g s t r e n g t h
r e q u i r e m e n t s , a n d s h o u l d b e determined f o r u p w a r d , d o w n w a r d a n d
sideways gusts.
6.1 For operational reasons, it is not always practicable to fly a t the safest
speed determined from t h e foregoing considerations, and a compromise
between this and the normal operating speeds for best r a t e of climb and
desceht, o r maximum range t h e n becomes necessary. Consideration of the
speed band within which 95%of the maximum range could be obtained might
assist in reaching a compromise. On high altitude aeroplanes, particular
attention should be given to climbing and descent where turbulence is most
likely to be met. A n y special limitations which might arise from the use of
flaps or airbrakes during descent should be considered. For crew comfort
and efficiency, a speed somewhat lower than the safest speed may have to
be chosen, particularly with supersonic aeroplanes in which excessive
pitching may be troublesome a t supersonic speeds.
6.2 I t i s important that t h e speed finally recommended in Pilots' Notes
should be i n the simplest terms, so that it is easily remembered. A range
of speeds should be given covering all stages of flight, and lying w i t h i n
t h e strength boundary of t h e safe speed-altitude envelope a s near as
possible to the safest speed. If a single speed can be chosen that is a
reasonable compromise for all stages of flight, this should be quoted for
simplicity. Complicated variations of speed with altitude should be avoided
a s far a s possible.
8
U 18
+
w
2
1s
O
in
n
=Q 12
in
3
O
29
I
w
O
3 6
I-
¡=
J
a
3
O
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.o 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 .o
MACH No.
-
F I G . 1 S A F E SPEED ALTITUDE ENVELOPE FOR FLIGHT Il SEVERE
TURBULENCE A S REPRESENTED B Y G U S T S O F 20 m/s ( 6 6 ft/sec) T O
E A S BELOW 6100 m (20,000 f t ) ALTITUDE THEREAFTER DECREASING
LINEARLY 11.6 m/s ( 3 8 f t / s e c ) at 15200 m ( 5 0 , 0 0 0 f t )
LEAFLET 204/2
GUST LOADS
1 INTRODUCTION
pl.03
Supersonic flight:- F =
1.03
6.95+p
2 RI
where p is a mass parameter defined as:- p = p S a
where h'i is the aeroplane mass (kg o r slugs)
S is the wing area ( m 2 o r ft2
-
c is the aerodynamic mean chord ( m o r f t )
CHAPTER 205
1 GENERAL
1 . 2 A t t e n t i o n i s d r a w n to t h e f a t i g u e a n d damage t o l e r a n c e r e q u i r e m e n t s
o f C h a p t e r 2 0 1 a n d to t h e a e r o e l a s t i c i t y r e q u i r e m e n t s o f C h a p t e r 5 0 0 .
2 FACTORS
2 . 1 T h e h i g h l i f t d e v i c e s a n d a i r b r a k e s , t h e i r o p e r a t i n g mechanisms a n d
associated a t t a c h m e n t s t r u c t u r e s h a l l h a v e p r o o f a n d u l t i m a t e f a c t o r s of
n o t less t h a n 1.125 a n d 1 . 5 r e s p e c t i v e l y i n e a c h of t h e a p p r o p r i a t e l o a d i n g
c a s e s s p e c i f i e d below u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e s t a t e d .
3 HIGH L I F T DEVICES
( i ) Take-off position at a n y f l i g h t s p e e d u p to a n d
i n c l u d i n g a limited s p e e d f o r t h e take-off c o n d i t i o n .
( i i ) An i n t e r m e d i a t e position which s h a l l be t h a t u s e d
d u r i n g t h e a p p r o a c h to l a n d i n g or t h a t r e q u i r e d
immediately a f t e r a b a u l k e d l a n d i n g , w h i c h e v e r is more
s e v e r e at a n y f l i g h t s p e e d u p to a n d i n c l u d i n g t h e
limiting s p e e d for t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e c o n d i t i o n .
3.4.3 For Class I and Class I V aeroplanes the flaps should retract a s
quickly as possible consistent w i t h no serious sinking o r change of t r i m
incompatible with the handling requirements of Chapter 6 0 4 .
3.5.2 The design speed shall not be less than the following:-
3.6 STRENGTH
3.6.1 When t h e high lift d e v i c e s a r e i n t h e r e t r a c t e d position t h e
s t r e n g t h of t h o s e p a r t s of t h e a i r f r a m e s p e c i f i e d i n p a r a 1.1
s h a l l b e a d e q u a t e to meet t h e c o n d i t i o n s s t a t e d i n C h a p t e r 2 0 2 p a r a
5.2.1, t h r o u g h o u t t h e f l i g h t e n v e l o p e .
3.6.3 T h e e n g i n e c o n d i t i o n s s h a l l b e a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h e position of t h e
h i g h l i f t devices:-
( i ) Take-off p o w e r f o r take-off a n d b a u l k e d l a n d i n g
c o n d i t i o n s (MAT o r MT as a p p r o p r i a t e - see L e a f l e t
600/6 1.
( i v ) Take-off p o w e r f o r e n - r o u t e o r c o m b a t p o s i t i o n s (MAT
o r MT as a p p r o p r i a t e ) .
( i ) T h e a e r o p l a n e s h a l l b e a s s u m e d to be s u b j e c t e d to
m a n o e u v r e s a n d gusts within t h e r a n g e : -
( a ) M a n o e u v r i n g to a p o s i t i v e l i m i t l o a d factor o f 4.0
for Class I V , a n d 2.0 for o t h e r t y p e s .
( b ) P o s i t i v e a n d n e g a t i v e gusts of 7.60 m / s ( 2 5
ft/sec) ( E A S ) normal to t h e f l i g h t p a t h w h i l s t t h e
a e r o p l a n e is i n l e v e l f l i g h t , u p to a n a l t i t u d e of
6100 m (20,000 f t ) .
(ii) With t h e a e r o p l a n e i n l e v e l f l i g h t t h e s e p a r a t e e f f e c t s
of :-
(a) P r o p e l l e r s l i p s t r e a m o r f a n / j e t e f f l u x w h e r e
a p p r o p r i a t e , c o r r e s p o n d i n g to b o t h t h e maximum
continuous power at t h e design speed a n d t h e
take-off p o w e r a p p r o p r i a t e to n o t less t h a n 1.4
times t h e s t a l l i n g s p e e d a t t h e r e l e v a n t position of
t h e h i g h lift d e v i c e s a n d a e r o p l a n e mass.
3.6.5 When the high lift devices a r e used en-route or in combat the
design load cases at the speeds specified i n para 3.5.4 shall be those
of para 3 . 6 . 4 ( i ) and 3.6.4(ii) unless otherwise agreed with the
Aeroplane Project Director.
4 AIRBRAKES
4.2 STRENGTH
4.2.1 The airbrakes shall be designed to have adequate strength
under those conditions specified in Chapter 2 0 2 , para 5.2.2 and Fig 1 ,
a t the appropriate design speed defined as:-
CHAPTER 206
I CONTROL SYSTEMS
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 The requirements of this chapter apply to all control systems, including engine
controls, in which the position of the motivators is determined solely by the pilot
through a direct connexion from the inceptors. It also applies to those parts of the
flight control system which are not covered by the requirements of Chapter 208 for
active control systems, or of Chapter 729 for autopilot systems. The requirements
relate mainly to mechanical components, but powered controls, power operated trimmers
and devices such as Q-feel and variable stops are also included. Autostabilizers,
auto-trim and similar devices which can move the motivators independently of inceptor
inputs are not included, but are covered by Chapter 208 or 729.
1.2 The requirements shall be met over a range of temperatures (as given in Chapter
201) from that at ground level to the minimum value at the service ceiling of the
aeroplane when operating at the lightest practicable weight, and for all design speed
and acceleration conditions.
1.3 The requirements shall be considered in conjunction with other relevant chapters
including:
2 STRENGTH
2.1 GENERAL
2.1.1 Each circuit shall have proof and ultimate factors not less than 1.1 5 and
1.5 respectively under the given loading conditions, unless otherwise stated.
( S e e Chapter 200, para 4.1).
2.1.2 The ultimate factor for cables shall be 2.0 and for chains shail be 3.0.
2.1.3 The loads shall be applied in each case at the point at which the pilot
would normally apply them and shall be reacted as appropriate:
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2.3 DUALCONTROL
2.3.1 Dual control systems shall be designed to the following conditions:
(i) That part of the control circuit between the cockpit controls
and the control stops nearest to the surface shall be
subjected to the loads arising from a limit hinge moment, H,
defined in para 2.4.2 below but not exceeding those of paras
2.2.1 or 2.3.1 above, as appropriate.
(ii) The control system locks and the stops nearest to the
surfaces and any parts of the control circuit between these
locks and stops and the control surface final operating lever
shall be subjected to the loads arising from a limit hinge
moment, H, para 2.4.2.
3.1.2 Within the limitations of the airframe design and the overall requirements
of the control system, the routing of control circuits shall be as simple and
direct as possible and their length shall not change during operation, or due
to structural deformation or flight accelerations, such as to affect the control
of the aeoplane.
3.1.3 Control systems for essential services shall be so designed that when a
movement to one position has been selected, a different position can be selected
without waiting for the completion of the initially selected movement, and the
system shall arrive at the finally selected position without further attention.
The movements which follow and the time taken by the system to allow the required
sequence of selection shall not be such as to adversely affect the airworthiness
of the aeroplane.
I 3.1.4 Where practical, the sense of movement involved in the operation of the
inceptors shall correspond with the sense of aeroplane’s response.
3.1.5 Where appropriate the design shaU be such that each circuit will retain
any given setting and will not tend to creep under control loading or vibration.
3.1.6 Each circuit shall possess adequate stiffness to react to the operating
loads without excess deflection (see also Leaflet 5 0 / 6 , para 4).
Page 4
3.22 For control systems which, if incorrectly assembled would hazard the
aeroplane, the design shall be such that at ali reasonable break-down points it
is mechanically impossible to assemble elements of the system to give out of
phase action, reverse sense of the control or unintended interconnection between
two systems.
3.3 FAILURE IMMUNITY, SAFETY (see also Leaflet 20616 and 604/4)
3.3.1 All foreseeable kinds of failure shall be considered. It shall be shown
by analysis, test or both that the aeroplane is capable of continued safe flight
and landing after any of the following failures of the flight control systems,
(including trim, lift, drag, feel and thrust systems) within the permissible
flight envelope (see Chapter 600,para 7.3) without requiring exceptional pilot
skill or strength, unless it is agreed with the Aeroplane Project Director that
such failures are acceptably improbable:
I 3.32 The design and location of the inceptors shall be such as to minimise the
risk of inadvertent operation either by personnel entering or leaving the
aeroplane or by the flight crew during normal movement in the cockpit.
3.4.3 The design of the control system shall be such as to minimise backlash.
Page 5
3.7.4 Wherever practical the primary flight control systems and their trim
systems shall be so arranged that in the event of a primary circuit being
rendered inoperative sufficient use of the autopilot or trim circuit will be
available to provide a measure of control of the aeroplane.
3.7.5 When an aerodynamic servo control surface is fitted the control system
shall be arranged so that, in the event of the servo surface being rendered
inoperative by enemy action or other cause, it will be possible to retain some
measure of control over the aeroplane.
Page 6
4.2 STOPS
4.2.1 The range of movement of each flight control surface, including trimming,
lift and drag devices and wing sweep shall be limited by stops. Each stop shall
be able to withstand any loads corresponding to the design conditions for the
control system.
4.2.2 Each stop shall be located so that wear, slackness, or take-up adjustments
will not adversely affect the control characteristics of the aeroplane as a
result of a change in the range of surface travel.
4.3 GUSTLOCKS
4.3.1 Where a device is used for locking a control surface whilst the aeroplane
is stationary, the locking device shall:
4.3.2 Means shall be provided to preclude the possibility of the locks becoming
engaged in flight.
4.5.2 The aileron connecting circuit shall have an ultimate factor at least as
great as that for the wings as a whole in all stressing cases where the ailerons
share the total load on the wings. (See also the stiffness requirements of
Leaflet 500/3).
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Chapter 206 Volume 1
5.1 Trim controls shail normally be provided for each of the three principal control
axes.
5.2 Trim controls shall be designed to avoid inadvertent operation or abrupt effect.
5.3 The trim inceptors shall operate in the plane and with the sense of motion of the
aeroplane. Means shall be provided, preferably adjacent to the inceptor, to indicate
the direction or inceptor movement relative to the aeroplane motion.
5.4 Trim controls shail be designed to retain any given setting and shal not creep
under control loading or vibration.
5.6 If, due to failure, a power operated trim control can stop at such a position
that the piloting requirements of Part 6 cannot be satisfied then a stand-by trim
system shall be provided. The inceptor for this stand-by system, and, if applicable,
the power supply for it shall be separated from and independent of the main system.
6 POWER CONTROL UNITS AND SYSTEMS (seealso Chapter 208 and Leaflet 20611)
6.1 Power operated control systems shall comply with the requirements of this chapter
in so far as they are applicable.
6.1.2 Where appropriate the strength requirements shall be met with the system
both operative and inoperative.
6.1.3 The proof and ultimate factors shall be 1.125 and 1.5 respectively under
the maximum load which can be developed in the system under all. practicable
operating conditions.
6.2 TESTS ON POWERED FLYING CONTROL UNïïS (see also Leaflets 206/2,
206/3 and 206/5)
6.2.1 The tests required by para 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 shall be carried out in a
ground test rig.
6.2.2 Flight Clearance Test - Any new type of powered flying control unit shall
be submitted to a flight clearance test before the fxst flight test of the
unit.
6.2.3 Unit Design Clearance Test - Any prototype of any new design of powered
flight control unit shall be submitted to a ground test for design clearance.
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8.1 ACCESSIBILITY
8.1.1 Components shall be designed, installed, located and provided with access
so that inspection, rigging, repair, replacement and lubrication can be easily
accomplished, including visual inspection of fairleads, pulleys, terminals and
turnbuckles.
8.2 SAFETY
8.2.1 Systems and components shall be designed and installed to preclude injury
of personnel during maintenance and testing. WheIe positive protection cannot be
provided adequate warning and instructions shall be given.
Page 9
TABLE 1
-
CONTROL CIRCUITS BREAKOUT FORCE
All heavy bombers, and other types over 45 (10) 36(8) 45 (10)
22,680 kg (50,000 lb).
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LEAFLET 206/0
CONTROL SYSTEMS
REFERENCE PAGE
RAE Reports
Aero 1972 .. Spring tab controls - Notes on development to date, with
special reference to design aspects
Aero 2232 .. Papers and proceedings of a meeting to discuss powered
flying controls
Mech.Eng. 12 .. Transitional friction effects in powered controls with
particular reference to hydraulic jacks
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RAE Specifications
ARC Papers
RAeS Journal
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LEAFLET 206/1
I CONTROL SYSTEMS
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Basic safety requirements for powered flying controls are specified in Chapter
604. This Leaflet deals with the strength of the powered flying control circuit,
mounting the control unit into the aeroplane and the control characteristics when the
controls are operated in conjunction with an automatic stabilisation device.
2.1 The design load for a mechanical input circuit of a powered flying control system
is that applied by the pilot in the presence of a feed-back or artificial feel
mechanism: the powered control unit valve(s) input may, therefore, be loaded by the
pilot’s maximum effort, less whatever is absorbed by the feel mechanism. Hence there
is no significant difference between a mechanical input circuit of a powered control
and a manual control circuit. This part of the circuit should meet the strength
requirements of Chapter 206 which call for an ultimate factor of at least 1.5 on the
maximum effort which a pilot is capable of applying, with a jam of the powered control
unit input. The pilot’s normal effort, however, is only a small fraction of his
attainable maximum and so this part of the circuit will usually meet the fatigue
strength requirements of Chapter 201 (see para 2.4 below), when designed to the
strength requirements of Chapter 206. Reaction of the maximum effort in both
directions should be assumed at all possible parts of the circuit including an extreme
position at the power unit. As this loading implies a failure of the powered control
unit or its input valve to respond to normal effort, its application must be
considered in both directions.
2.2 Account should be taken of loads that may be induced in the parked condition when
surfaces may deflect downwards under weight or upwards and downwards due to wind
loads. Circuit loads will depend on the location of input circuit stops, possibly
artificial feel forces, and damping devices if fitted.
2.3 The design load for the output circuit should be the maximum load which the power
unit is capable of applying increased by the pilot’s effort through the feed-back or
artificial feel mechanism where this is possible. The contribution of the powered
control unit is, however, much larger than that due to the pilot and in general the
working load in this circuit is much closer to the maximum attainable load than is the
case in the input circuit. Consideration should also be given to conditions arising
in the circuit during and after change-over to any emergency system of control. High
transient peak loads may occur when the system is brought to rest rapidly e.g., by
sudden closure of a valve after movement at maximum velocity, owing to the kinetic
energy to be dissipated in a small displacement. It is important therefore in
hydraulic systems to stress for the loads then arising as these may be greater than
those due to the maximum working pressure.
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Leaflet 206/1 Volume 1
Care should also be taken -to avoid stress concentrations; testing to an approval
schedule will be necessary. The maximum load may be greater than that needed for
aeroplane control: for instance, each part of a duplicated power system may be
capable of three quarters of all of the necessary force.
2.4 The fatigue strength of mechanical powered flying control circuits should be
established in accordance with the principle outlined in Chapter 201. (Account should
be taken of the loading actions referred to above).
3.1 When the powered flying controls are to be operated by an automatic flight
control or in conjunction with an auto-stabiliser the control characteristics under
powered flying controls should be satisfactory both with and without the automatic
flight control and/or the auto-stabiliser in operation (see Chapter 604).
Page 2
LEAFLET 206/2
I CONTROL SYSTEMS
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 In this Leaflet, information and explanation are given regarding the tests of
powered flying controls called for in Chapter 206, para 9.
(i) the powered control unit by itself - part of the Type Approval of
the Unit, and
2.1 The test rig for the powered control unit should be capable of applying loads to
the output member of the unit varying at the required relationship to the displacement
and should operate the input member through the required duty cycle at any required
load, speed, frequency, and for any desired endurance period. Means should be
provided for measuring all characteristics of the control such as loadings, friction,
rates of operation, elasticity, mass, inertia, resonance frequencies, stability, and
temperatures and pressures, where applicable, at critical points in the control. The
need to apply assisting loading and not merely resistive, when this may occur
naturally in flight, should not be overlooked. A chamber should be available for
checking the operation of the unit at high and low temperatures as required by Chapter
101.
2.2 In the case of the complete control system the test rig should represent, as
closely as possible, the conditions of the aeroplane in which the powered control is
to be flight tested. All loads should be applied to the actual control surface or its
test rig equivalent and operation of the input member should be through the pilot’s
input. A local rig ‘structure to represent aeroplane stiffness for stability and
resonance tests is normally essential. For check testing of the complete system when
installed in the aeroplane, some form of control surface loading rig should be
available.
Page 1
be either separate from, or included in, the Flight Clearance Test of the
installation in which the unit is to be flight tested, described in para 4.1
below. An endurance test, followed by an inspection and performance check,
should be carried out before flight.
3.2.2 For endurance testing, the input member should be operated through a 'duty
cycle' repeating it continuously for an adequate total running time. The
composition of this duty cycle should be decided on before the start of the test
to suit the particular control and the type of aeroplane for which the control is
intended, in accordance with Leaflet 206/3.
3.2.3 The aim of the complete test should be to establish that the performance
of the unit is maintained over the specified flying hours between scheduled
removals. Should unit design clearance testing be included in Installation
Design Clearance testing only sufficient testing to give confidence for
development flying need be done.
3.2.4 No modifications or major adjustments should be made during the test and
on completion there should be a complete strip and examination of the unit. The
unit will not be deemed to have passed the test unless the strip and examination
is satisfactory, the standard to be that its condition is such that the unit
would still be satisfactory for safe use in the aeroplane.
Page 2
4.1.2 The rig test should be carried out on a prototype of the complete system
to a test schedule which should be representative of the test flying intended.
The test schedule should cali for an endurance period but this need not be
extensive if the unit is already cleared for flight since the aeroplane controls
themselves do not usually require long endurance testing. If the control unit is
not already cleared for flight by either of the tests at paras 3.1 or 3.2
adequate endurance testing should be included in the schedule. All other
characteristics of the system such as performance, stability, resonance and
functioning of safety devices under all required conditions should be thoroughly
investigated. (For resonance testing, see Chapter 500 and Leaflet 500/8).
4.1.4 The aeroplane ground test may be made on the actual installation which is
to be flight tested. This installation should be identical with that tested in
the rig. If both rig and aeroplane ground tests are satisfactory and meet the
standards declared in the pre-test declarations, flight testing may proceed.
4.1.5 It is possibie that the rig test may reveal that flying time should be
restricted until further ground tests have proved the reliability of the system.
4.2.2 In cases where the control unit employed in the installation has not
already been tested and approved separately, the Installation Design Clearance
Test may be extended to cover the Control Unit Design Clearance Test of para
3.2.
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LEAFLET 206/3
I CONTROL SYSTEMS
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 In this Leaflet, specimen test schedules for the testing of powered flying
controls, as called for in Chapter 206 and as described in Leaflet 206/2, are given in
detail. These schedules are intended to show the general form that the testing
procedure should take and should be modified where necessary to suit any particular
design of control.
(iii) the maximum loads at the control unit output with the
corresponding maximum rate, and
2.2 ENDURANCETEST
2.2.1 With the power supply, if engine driven, at conditions corresponding to
continuous cruising, operate the input member of the unit, repeating the
appropriate duty cycle for a total running time of 25 hours.
2.2.2 Every 5 hours approximately, carry out full cycles of the input member
(full cycle comprises movement from the neutral to one extreme position, return
through neutral to opposite extreme and return to neutral) as follows:
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3 . 4 ENDURANCE TEST
3.4.1With t h e power s u p p l y , i f e n g i n e d r i v e n , a t conditions
corresponding to continuous cruising, operate the input member of the
unit, repeating the appropriate endurance duty cycle, for a total
running t i m e of approximately 200 hours (see Leaflet 2 0 6 / 2 para
3.2.4).
3.4.5 At some suitable time during the test, check under the
temperature. conditions of Chapter 101, as appropriate t o the particular
case under consideration. Record time taken to reach satisfactory
functioning condition from starting. Check safety device.
3 . 6 STRIP EXAMINATION
3 . 6 . 1 Strip and examine working parts.
4 . 1 PRE-TEST DECLARATION
4 . 1 . 1 The following, each at the appropriate power supply conditions,
need to be decided before commencement of the tests:
4 . 4 ENDURANCE TEST
4 . 4 . 1 With the system in the test rig and with the power supply, if
engine driven, at cruising conditions, operate the pilot's control
through the declared endurance duty cycle for a total running time
of:
4 . 4 . 2 Carry out 600 full cycles of the pilot's control (full cycle defined
at para 3 . 4 . 2 ) as follows:
4 . 4 . 3 After every 50 cycles and at same load and speed, operate safety
device as in para 4 . 2 . 1 and allow five cycles in the emergency
conditions in each case.
5.4 E N D U R A N C E TEST
5.4.1 With the system in the test rig and with power supply, if engine
driven, at cruising conditions, operate the pilot's control through the
declared endurance d u t y cycle f o r a total running time of:
(i> in a 50 hour t e s t :
5.4.3 After every 50 full cycles and at same load and r a t e , operate
safety device a s at para 4.2 and allow five cycles in the emergency
condition in each case. When a means of change-over from emergency
control back to normal is provided, this should be operated in each
case.
5 . 6 STRIP EXAMINATION
5.6.1 Strip and examine all working parts.
LEAFLET 20614
I CONTROL SYSTEMS
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 The purpose of this Leaflet is to draw attention to certain airworthiness aspects
which should be considered when bob-weights or similar mass elements are incorporated
in conjunction with springs in flying control systems.
1.2 Cases have a c c d in the past where such devices have been introduced into
flying control circuits in order to improve the stick force/g characteristics or to
achieve some measure of g restriction. A device of this type is sensitive to the
normal acceleration, the angular acceleration in pitch, the longitudinal acceleration
or any other response quantity of the disturbed longitudinal motion of the aeroplane,
or to a combination of such quantities; in turn it moves the pitch control surface
and so controls the normal acceleration of the aeroplane.
1.3 It may sometimes happen that an element such as an unbalanced link may be
unintentionally included in a control system in such a way as to act as a bob-weight
and so introduce a coupling between pitching of the aeroplane and motion of the
control circuit. Such a case should be treated as if the mass-spring unit had been
deliberately included, and the following recommendations should be taken as
applicable.
2 RECOMMENDATIONS
2.1 In all cases where a mass spring system of the general type described in para 1.2
is to be installed, a full analytical investigation should be made of the stability of
the aeroplane-control system combination.
2.2 For such investigations the following points should be borne in mind:
(iv) the forward speed may be an important parameter, and its whole
practical range should be covered in the analytical investigation.
Page 1
2.3 The abo.ve recommendations apply also to any devices having dynamic properties
similar to those of the g-restrictors considered, and in particular to devices
intended to improve stick forcelg characteristics.
2.4 Some g-restrictors of the general type considered, though efficient and otherwise
satisfactory, may induce excessive control surface loads. The magnitude of these
loads should be assessed by appropriate response calculations embracing both the
initiation of an unduly severe manoeuvre and the checking movement of the control
surface as induced by the g-restrictor. For this part of the investigation R.A.E.
Technical Note No. SME 349 may be of assistance.
2.5 The effect of accelerations on unbalanced control circuits controlling other axes
should also be considered.
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LEAFLET 206/5
CONTROL SYSTEMS
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 This Leaflet contains details of the fatigue testing of hydraulic powered flying
controls required by Chapter 206. The tests aim to ensure that hydraulic powered
flying controls have adequate fatigue life under conditions of varying pressure stress
to which they will be subjected in service. Included in the tests are screw jacks
driven by hydraulic motors and, where applicable, automatic flight control system
actuators and artificial feel simulators.
2.1 The duty cycle for the control surfaces should be specified by the airframe
designer who should state clearly whether the additional factor of Leaflet 201/1 para
6 has been taken into account. In the absence of such a specification the standard
duty cycle in Table 1 should be used, in which case the factor specified in Leaflet
201/1 para 6 is not required. Tests should then be applied in accordance with paras 3
and 4 below.
2.2 Due to the wide variation between the pexformance characteristics of various
types of hydraulic powered fíying control, standardisation of test conditions is based
on flight duty cycles as applied to the control surfaces rather than the fluid
pressures in the hydraulic powered control circuits. In the case of small amplitude
high frequency control surface movements, the internal jack pressures in a throttled
valve servo will be entirely different from the pressures in a variable delivery servo
pump. Similarly, for identical output conditions, the internal pressure will depend
upon the precise nature of valve overlaps or underlaps, and in duplicated jacks, upon
the inter-jack mechanical stiffness.
2.3 In addition to the standard duty cycle, which is based on aerodynamic hinge
moment, fatigue loading on a powered control component may arise from other sources,
and in many cases these may constitute the heaviest fatigue loading. These sources
include ground testing cases, operation of other surfaces both on the ground and in
flight, pump ripple and parking locks. The conditions controlling the above factors
must be given full consideration in addition to the effects of the standard duty
cycles.
3.2 Factors influencing the pressure variations are given below, but it is emphasised
that this list does not necessarily include all the parameters significant to the
performance of a powered flying control:
(i i i) aerodynamic damping,
4 METHOD OF TEST
4.1 The tests should be carried out under any one or a combination of the following
conditions, or by any other approved method:
(iii) With the jack and fittings uncoupled, in particular cases where the
simulated internal pressure conditions could impose loads on the
external attachments of the jacks in excess of those experienced in
flight. in this condition, pressures on opposite sides of the jack
piston should be suitably balanced.
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5 TESTFACTORS
5.1 Fatigue test factors should be derived in accordance with Chapter 201.
TABLE 1
Normal
Manoeuvre
30
I 30
Continuous
residual 10 2 3600
displacement (see Note) (see Para
(straight 3.2 (vi))
and level)
Note: For control systems without autostabilisation the jack stroke may be
insignificant in the standard duty cycle at 10%hinge moment.
Page 314
LEAFLET 206/6
1 CONTROL SYSTEMS
DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 The leaflet presents supplementary information with respect to the design of
mechanical components in control systems. The aim is to amplify the requirements of
Chapter îû6 for particular detail design considerations. In many cases the adoption
of the recommendations of this leaflet will be found to be necessary to meet the
specified requirements.
2.1 GENERAL,
2.1.1 Chapter 206, para 3 requires that a control system shall be designed to
tolerate the possibility of jamming, chafing and interference from personnel,
cargo, loose objects and freezing of moisture. These overall considerations
shoufd be applied to each detail component.
2.3 JOINTS
2.3.1 All adjoining parts should be secured in a manner that will prevent
loosening when subjected to internal, external and vibration loads. All pins,
etc., subjected to load or motion should be positively secured and locked using
slotted nuts and split pins together with additional means of retention where
possible. Clevis pins retained only by split pins are not acceptable.
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Leaflet 206/6 Volume 1
2.3.2 Control system joints in push-pull systems that are subjected to angular
motion, except those in ball and roller bearing systems, should have an ultimate
factor of safety of not less than 3.33 with respect to the ultimate bearing
strength of the softest material used as a bearing. The approved ratings of ball
or roller bearings may not be exceeded.
2.5.2 Pulleys should not be arranged so that a reverse bend in the cable arises
as it traverses from one puiley to another, and the pulleys should be in the
plane of the cables so that the cable does not rub against the pulley flange.
2.5.3 The wrap angle of the cable round the pulley should be adequate and
pulleys and sprocket should be guarded to prevent any cable or chain jamming or
coming off when slack and re-engaging correctly after slack has been taken up.
2.5.4 Each kind and size of puiley should correspond to the cable with which it
is used, to ensure that the minimum bend radius of the cable is equalled or
exceeded.
2.5.5 Fairleads should be installed so that they do not cause a change in cable
direction.
2.5.6 Where turnbuckles are attached to parts having angular motion they should
be arranged so that fouling is positively prevented throughout the range of
travel.
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2.7.4 Each torque tube in a link system should be removable and re-installable
in the aeroplane without having to disturb the support, component, or other
interfacing system elements at either end of the tube.
2.7.5 The rated operating speed of a torque tube system should be no greater
than 75% of the critical speed unless a supercritical design has been agreed with
the Aeroplane Project Director.
2.7.6 Where a broken tube could cause damage to other components an adequate
guard should be provided.
3 CONSIDERATION OF FAILURES
3.3 Any kind of interlock between main and standby trimmers should be avoided.
Systems which, when the console switch is used, automatically render the main system
dead until it is reset, should not be used.
3.4 When pitot and static pressures are used to operate mechanisms in the flight
control system the consequences of failure of the Pitot-static system by blockage or
breakage shall be considered.
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3.5 Control system sensors such as probes, vanes and other mechanical devices should
be installed at locations which minimize exposure to conditions which could result in
inaccurate output signals or failures.
3.6 When pilot intervention is necessary to recover from a failure in the control
system or to change to a reversionary mode, a realistic time delay should be allowed
for. See Leaflet 604/4.
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CHAPTER 207
S P I N N I N G AND S P I N RECOVERY
1 GENERAL
2 STRENGTH REQUIREMENTS
2.1 FACTORS
2.1.1 T h e ultimate factor i n Chapter 200, para 4 of a t least 1 . 5 shall
a p p l y to the whole aeroplane u n d e r the loads arising d u r i n g a s p i n and
d u r i n g e n t r y and recovery therefrom. The proof factor i n C h a p t e r 200
para 4 of a t least 1.125 shall also be met i n the c a s e of aeroplanes i n
Class I a n d Class I V a s defined i n Chapter 6 0 0 , para 3 , b u t need not
b e met o n o t h e r types.
2.2 DESIGN C O N D I T I O N S
2.2.1 T h e spinning conditions u s e d for s t r e n g t h calculations shall be
those w h i c h give t h e most a d v e r s e combination of t h e yaw, pitch and
roll components of t h e rotation. T h e effect of u n s t e a d i n e s s shall be
considered. Leaflet 2 0 7 / 1 gives an acceptable means of estimating t h e
r a t e of rotation for design purposes i n t h e a b s e n c e of o t h e r
information.
2.2.3 To cover roll during recovery from a spin o r post stall gyration
t h e most a d v e r s e r a t e of rotation about a longitudinal a x i s , assumed to
b e vertical, m u s t be used, s e e also Leaflet 207/1.
3 RECOVERY STANDARD
LEAFLET 207/0
REFERENCE PAGE
ARC R e p o r t s
C P 195 .. .. A c r i t e r i o n f o r t h e p r e d i c t i o n of t h e r e c o v e r y
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of s p i n n i n g a i r c r a f t .
AGARD P r o c e e d i n g s
CP No. 1 9 9
CP No. 235
..
..
..
..
S t a l l / s p i n p r o b l e m s of m i l i t a r y a i r c r a f t
Dynamic stability p a r a m e t e r s
( P a p e r s 19 a n d 29)
O t h e r PaDers
LEAFLET 207/1
SPINNING A N D S P I N RECOVERY
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Chapter 207 para 2 prescribes that the spinning conditions used for
strength calculations shall b e those which give the most adverse
combination of the yaw, pitch and roll components of the rotation, with
adequate allowance for unsteadiness. This leaflet outlines t h e means which
may be used to derive the design r a t e of rotation in t h e spin.
2.1 The design rate of rotation may be derived b y one o r more of the
methods outlined below.
Qs=
- K r;X ,
18.57 ~ 1 4 rads/sec
LEAFLET 207/2
1 GENERAL
2 SPIN RESISTANCE
(see for example A G A R D CP-199 Paper 5, and CP-235 Paper 1 9 ) .
2.2 Design criteria suitable for use during the design stage have been
developed, but must be substantiated b y subsequent model and f u l l scale
testing a s prescribed by Chapter 207 para 3. The full attainable incidence
range should be investigated.
N =N cosa - I-
Z i,
V
sina
V~~~ I,
where K = -
C and r e p r e s e n t s the a i l e r o n / r u d d e r interconnect
5
Again LCDP should be positive to avoid d e p a r t u r e .
w h e r e = -ß -=-tan-l
-
t)
(Nt
3 SPIN RECOVERY
3.1 The design of an aeroplane for spin recovery is complicated by the number of
design parameters which influence the problem. The most important of these are:-
(i) The relative moments of inertia of the aeroplane about its three
reference axes in all appropriate configurations including with
stores.
(iii) The fuselage shape, especially in cross section and nose shape.
(v) The effectiveness of the motivators and their cross axis effects.
3.2 A relatively simple criterion known as the Tail Damping Power Factor (TDPF) was
used for many years. This basically relates the product of a so called tail damping
ratio and the 'unshielded' rudder volume coefficient to the difference between the
moments of inertia in roll and yaw. More recent work has shown clearly that it is not
a satisfactory criterion as it does not describe either a necessary or sufficient
characteristic for satisfactory spin recovery. This is not surprising in view of the
limited parameters covered.
3.3 A more comprehensive criterion is that given in ARC CP No. 195. This method
predicts an overall unbalanced (anti-spin) rolling moment coefficient (URMC) and
relates it to the moment of inertia parameter
The unbalanced rolling moment coefficient is the sum of three separate quantities:-
(i) that due to the body damping coefficient, LB, which makes
allowance for body shape - Fig la. The effect depends upon the
width of the Strakes, if present, which are horizontal extensions to
the fuselage forward and in the plane of the tailplane.
(ii) that due to the unshielded rudder volume coefficient, LRV Fig
lb. The elevator position used should be that which results in the
minimum unshielded rudder area.
Page 3
The boundaries for satisfactory spin recovery are shown in Fig 3. The technique has
shown good correlation with fiight tests for aeroplanes of conventional layout with
wings of moderate aspect ratio. The parameter
represents a simplification which effectively assumes that the second moment of mass in
the z direction is negligible. This may introduce errors when Ix is approximately
equal to Iy. However, the method considers only finkudder recovery effect and is
thus limited to aeroplanes of conventional layout. AGARD CP 199 Paper 7, Fig 10
suggests a criterion for roll control which may be dominant on slender configurations.
4 NOTATION
AR Wing aspect ratio
b Wing span
bl (Iz-IxY[ pS(b), 1
-2
pitching moment derivative due to sideslip
CmIv
h local height of body (Fig la)
moments of inertia about body axes in roll, pitch and yaw respectively
ratio of rudder deflection to aileron deflection
rolling moment coefficient due to body damping - Fig l a
rolling moment coefficient due to wing effect - Fig 2
rolling moment coefficient due to unshielded rudder volume
coefficient. Fig l b
dihedral effect derivatives - body axes
aileron rolling moment derivative
rudder rolling moment derivative
directional stability derivative - body axes
directional departure parameter
Page 4
V t r u e r a t e of descent in spin
a angle of attack
“6
x (&.)& = 2
2v
P air density
CIRCULAR + 0.6
RECTANGULAR + 1.5 * D e p e n d s on t h e
ELLIPTICAL + 2.1
w i d t h of s t r a k e .
ROUND TOP, FLAT BOTTOM + 1.1
The values q u o t e d
ROUND TOP, FLAT BOTTOM + STRAKES + 1.7*
are f o r a w i d t h
ROUND BOTTOM, FLAT TOP + 2.5
of 0.014 R where
ROUND BOTTOM, FLAT TOP + STRAKES + 3.5"
(FREE + 1.5 R = d i s t a n c e from
t h e c.g. t o the
FIN (UNDER TAILPLANE + 3.0
rudder p o s t
(ABOVE TALLPLANE - 0.4
(FREE + 1.5
RUDDER (UNDER TAILPLANE + 2.0
( I N TAILPLANE WAKE - 0.25
t =
+ 1.5.
AR - Shaded A r e a
R - Distance b e t w e e n
C e n t r o i d of Shaded
Area and cg of
Aeroplane
- ARP.
F I G 1 B UNSHIELDED RUDDER VOLUME C O E F F I C I E N T LRV -
Sb
-
= 10% 12'10 14'/0 16'10 18'10
CHAPTER 208
ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS
1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS (see also Leaflet 208/1)
1.1 INTRODUCTION
1.1.1 This Chapter contains the requirements relating to flight with active
controls. Active Control Systems (ACS) a~ systems in which commands to the
motivators are computed from sensor inputs with or without inceptor inputs.
Thus, although the term is normally applied to systems which must operate
continuously and without whose correct operation safe flight cannot be
maintained, it also includes all forms of autostabilizer and other systems which
can command motivator position independently of inceptor units. Definitions of
terms are given at para 8.
1.1.2 The requirements of this chapter are concerned primarily with the most
critical systems, those. which operate continuously (full-time). The extent to
which they apply to other flight control systems will be stated in the Aeroplane
Specification. All flight control systems, including ACS, must satisfy the
requirements of Chapter 206. Requirements for autopilots are stated in Chapter
729. For piloting aspects, handling qualities are dealt with in Part 6, and,
in particular, the reaction of the pilot to mode changes and failures, in Chapter
604.
1.1.3 ACS may be provided for purposes other than flight control. In all cases
the requirements of this chapter will apply if maintenance of safe flight is
involved. Fig 1 shows the fundamental features which constitute an ACS. The
Categories A and B outlined define those functions which are respectively purely
automatic and those which involve manual inputs. Table 1 lists representative
control functions in Categories A and B.
1.2 INTEGRAïED SYSTEMS
1.2.1 If a full-time active flight control system is required the aeroplane
designer m a y elect to integrate a number of other control functions, e.g.,
structural mode and secondary controls, thrust and thrust vectoring, within that
one system. Such an integrated system would not necessarily replace the need
for, say, a dedicated engine control system but could certainly perform the
necessary thrust command computations.
1.2.2 Further integration is possible and arises from the fundamental high
integrity implicit in the Full-time ACS.
1.2.3 In determining the integrity of a Full-time ACS all inputs to that system
and the effects of associated systems must be taken into account. These effects
and their influence upon integrity must be identiñed during qualification.
1.3 APPLICATIONS (see also para 7 and Leaflet 208/1)
1.3.1 Full-time Active Flight Control systems must provide vehicle control and
where necessary stability augmentation. They may also provide structural mode
control, either through the conventional control surfaces or by means of
additional specially located surfaces or other motivators. However some
structural mode control systems may be designed as discrete autonomous active
control systems and may even not require to be full-time.
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(i) Full-time
1.4.2 For systems involving reversion, as in 1.4.1 (ii) and (Ui) above, the
integrity of the reversionary system and the ability to make the essential
transition to it shall be considered to be flight safety critical.
2.1.2 A fully integrated ACS will include some or all of the following
features:
2.2 INTEGRITY
2.2.1 The system shall be designed to meet the specified levels of integrity to
be agreed with the Aeroplane Project Director.
2.2.2 A detailed analysis of the System Design in respect of integrity shall be
presented to show the basis upon which the Aeroplane Specification is to be met.
In particular the philosophy for treating common-made failures shall be stated
and shall be to the approval of the Aeroplane Project Director.
2.2.3 Where redundancy is used to meet integrity targets, care shall be taken
that performance after failure is acceptable. This may require testing of
simulated failure modes.
2.3 RELIABILITY
2.3.1 The system shall be designed to meet the specified levels of reliability,
to be a p e d by the Aeroplane Project Director.
2.3.2 A full reliabilis. development plan shall be prepared to show how the full
reliability potential of the design is to be realised, to establish compliance
with the requirements and to specify how the reliability achievement will be
maintained throughout production and service. ( S e e DEF STAN 00-40(Part 1)
(NATOARMP-1)).
2.3.3 The ACS design shall take account of maintenance requirements under all
anticipated environmental conditions.
2.4 I " E R A B I L l ï Y (see also Chapter 112)
2.4.1 The system shall be designed to survive all threats defined in the
specification. The susceptibility levels for all environmental influences shall
be determined, and all practical limitations affecting effectiveness and
survivability shall be declared to the satisfaction of the Aeroplane Project
Director as early as possible in the design and development process.
2.4.2 The system design shall take full account of its installation in the
airframe, variations in the operating environment including the effects of
failures of and within other on-board systems, the potential for maintenance
e m , flight crew error, enemy action and flight in lightning conditions.
2.4.3 Wherever possible survival shall be achieved by providing inherent passive
resistance to the influencing factors.
2.4.4 In the event of the aeroplane sustaining damage, the probability of the
ACS providing less than Level 3 flying qualities shall be to the satisfaction of
the Aeroplane Project Director (ref Chapter 600, para 5).
2.4.5 Where parallel processing or control paths are provided to ensure
redundancy, they should be physically separated as far as possible, so that minor
accidental or battle damage does not cause failure of the active control system.
2.4.6 In designing resistance to Electromagnetic Interference (EM) consideration
shall be given, in particular, to the following:
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(iii) The designer must show that his design meets the specified
threats as part of an overall system safety analysis (ref
para 2.2.2).
2.4.7 The ACS and its installation, together with all other installed
equipments, shall be mutually electromagnetically compatible when installed in
the aeroplane; and demonstration of their satisfactory integration into the
total aeroplane is required.
I 2.4.10 To avoid ACS failure due to maintenance error, the system shall be designed
so that it is impossible to install or connect any component part improperly.
2.5.2 Power transients shall not degrade the performance of the ACS.
2.5.4 Essential flight controls shall be given priority over non-flight phase
essential controls in apportioning the use of power supplies.
2.6 COMPUTERS
2.6.1 The response of the ACS to both pilot commands and external disturbances
will be determined by signal computation effected by computers. Feedback signals
from specially provided sensors will enable the computers to take account of the
motion of the aeroplane, changes in configuration and, where incurred, flexure of
its structure.
2.6.2 ACS computers shall be designed to provide speed of operation and levels
of discrimination fully compatible with the intended performance of the control
laws, and they shall enable all management functions to be effective without
incurring significant penalties arising from time delays.
2.6.3 The designer shall aim to ensure that ail functions embedded in a
processor or computer are identified and fully understood with respect to their
possible influence upon correct functioning of the ACS, whether or not these
functions are intentionally employed during normal ACS operation.
Page 4
2.6.4 Each ACS computer, as an LRU and its interface, shall be uniquely
identified such that its correct function when installed in an aeroplane system
is assured.
2.6.5 The ACS computer design and its interfaces shall have sufficient reserve
or be capable of growth, to meet later expansion requirements to be agreed with
the Aeroplane Project Director.
2.7 SENSORS
2.7.1 The locations of primary sensors in an aeroplane shall be chosen making
due allowance for rigid and flexible body motions, and the achievement of
adequate protection from birá-strike, accidental and battle damage. Furthermore,
the location of akdata sensors, and the processing of their signals shall take
account of normal disturbances (eg sideslip, effect of asymmetric manoeuvres).
~
2.9.4 The requirements of paras 2.11,3.2.4 and 3.2.5 shall also be noted.
2.11.4 The effects of failures upon the motion of the aeroplane shall be
minimised and shall not exceed the levels stated in the Aeroplane Specification.
It is important that first failures shall incur minimum disturbance; subsequent
failures may be permitted to give rise to greater transients, but these shall be
to the satisfaction of the Aeroplane Project Director.
2.11.5 The means whereby failures are detected and isolated shall be designed so
that the compromise between failure transient level and nuisance disconnect
frequency is acceptable to the Aeroplane Project Director.
2.11.6 The designer shall ensure that nuisance disconnects do not compromise
system integrity and performance.
2.11.7 Consideration shall be given in the design and in the failure analysis to
air-data and other sensors which may lack coherent physical input and for which
cross-monitoring is difficult. See Leaflet 208/2, para 3.
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Volume 1 Chapter 208
2.12.2 Data acquired by the ACS must be controlled by the ACS to render its use
fully compatible with the ACS integrity requirements.
3.1.2 Where control laws (mode) can compete for control authority a clear
protocol shall be established to prevent essential control laws suffering
premature saturation. (See also para 7.1.4).
3.1.3 The designer must treat Control Laws and common software as common-mode
elements in design and proving.
3.2.2 Control laws essential to initial flights of any new configuration shall
be robust in that they shall be insensitive to those aeroplane characteristics
which may be subject to uncertainty prior to flight validation.
3.2.3 Gain and phase margins or equivalent measures relating to all modes shall
be maintained at acceptable levels for all predictable variations in system
operating conditions and aeroplane configurations throughout the specified life
of the system.
3.2.4 Residual oscillations and quantisation effect shall not exceed levels
which significantly affect the piloting task or pilot subjective acceptance, or
which can result in significant wear of the system and airfame components.
3.2.6 Mode compatibility logic shall provide flexibility of ACS operation and
ease of mode selection by the pilot. Where changes of control law (mode) can
occur in flight, either automatically or by pilot selection, they shall incur
minimum disturbance to controlled flight. The need to manually re-trim following
a mode change shall be avoided by design.
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3.2.7 The designer shall ensure that control laws permit the aeroplane to make
safe and controlled entries into and departures from conditions of full and
partial constraint (e.g., undercaniage restraint).
3.2.8 Where control laws involve a trimming or integral function, which can
result in motivators moving progressively towards authority limits during normal
operations, such conditions shall be fully identified and appropriate pilot
warnings introduced.
3.2.9 Recovery from unusual attitudes, particularly beyond the stall, or from
intentional manoeuvres which involve transition through a period of low or
negative airspeed shall be considered and appropriate control law strategies
implemented to ensure safe and controlled behaviour.
3.2.1 1 The data describing the mathematical model of the aeroplane and ACS shall
be defined in Master Data Sets which shall be revised and corrected with the
SRS.
3.3 SOFTWARE (The overall standards for software in Critical Systems are given in
Interim Defence Standard 00-31. The requirements of this chapter are not
intended as replacements for, nor do they invalidate, the above DEF STAN.
However, they shall be read as enlargements which emphasise the needs of this
critical software application).
3.3.2 Every reasonable effort shall be made to ensure that the software is free
from errors and is wholly compatible with Safety Critical function.
Page 8
3.3.4 The software shall be structured so that its functions are visible and
discrete changes permissible, without involving large areas of code.
3.3.5 At least one completely independent software audit shall be carried out to
assess correct functioning of the software. Independence may be achieved by the
employment of a separate and different team for this purpose from that designing
the software.
3.3.7 All software anomalies or related anomalies which arise during software
development and testing shall be recorded together with the details of changes
arising therefrom.
3.3.8 The Flight Resident Software (FRS) or In-Flight Software, shall be tested
on the CS rig (ref: para 6.2.1 and Leaflet 208/6).
3.3.9 These FRS rig tests shall be carried out using the ACS flight standard
hardware.
3.3.10 FRS rig tests shall cover all modes of operation and shall explore the
full context of conditions to be met in the required flight envelope.
3.3.11 Where software other than the FRS is required to facilitate testing the
ACSD hardware, e.g., during environmental testing, such SOfhVare shall be
rigorously tested to show that as far as is possible it is free from anomalies
which could reduce the effectiveness of the hardware test.
3.3.14 A Software Plan or Control Statement shall be prepared and shall cover
all aspects of the software development life cycle.
3.3.16 Ali changes shall be subject to the FRS audit and rig test procedures,
unless specifically identified and excluded by agreement with the Aeroplane
Project Director.
4.1 GENERAL
4.1.1 Interaction will occur between the overall airframe design and ACS design.
The resulting performance, reliability and integrity will depend upon an
optimisation of such features as motivators, airframe configuration, and ACS
control laws.
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Chapter 208 Volume 1
Page 10
Page 11
(i i ) In-Service Aeroplanes
In-service aeroplanes incorporating ACS shall, as required by
the Aeroplane Project Director, be fitted with
instrumentation to enable defined critical fatigue loads (as
defined by actions taken to comply with para
4.2.4(i)) to be measured and assessed, so that consumption of
structural life can be quantified. In addition, a
representative sample of in-service aeroplanes shall be
fitted with a comprehensive load measurement system, which
although not necessarily as comprehensive as that fitted to
prototype and development aeroplanes, shall be sufficient to
enable defined critical static and fatigue loads to be
monitored and to allow any new critical loading actions
(caused for example by differences between actual aeroplane
usage and that assumed during design and development flying)
to be identified. In cases where such new critical loading
actions are identified there must be a reassessment of the
structural substantiation for the aeroplane to determine
whether any remedial action is required. If a re-design or
developemnt of in-service ACS software is necessary, either
to ensure that the structure has sufficient strength to
sustain newly identified critical loading actions or to
modify aeroplane performance characteristics, then flight
trials must be repeated to reassess all critical loading
actions.
4.2.5 MODIFICATIONS TO SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE
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5.1.5 All system performance aspects must be considered in the context of normal
service and battle damage deterioration of components and due allowance made for
these effects. The method whereby the designer takes account of these
deteriorations must be to the satisfaction of the Aeroplane Project Director.
5.2.2 The level of testing provided in the pre-flight test shall be sufficient
to determine whether the ACS is flight-worthy.
5.2.4 The fault status for take-off under normal conditions shall be specified
by the aeroplane designer. Special operational cases where take-off will be
required to be made at lower levels of integrity will be d e f i e d by the Aeroplane
Project Director.
5.2.5 System status, as detected by the pre-flight test and interruptive and
continuously operating BIT, shall be presented to the pilot during pre-flight
tests.
Page 14
6.2.2 R i g t e s t i n g s h a l l i n c l u d e m e a s u r e m e n t of p e r f o r m a n c e , b o t h as
a f a u l t free s y s t e m a n d f o r all classes of failure.
6.2.3 A s c h e d u l e of tests to be p e r f o r m e d detailing all p e r f o r m a n c e
a n d f a i l u r e m e a s u r e m e n t shall b e p r e p a r e d a n d agreed with t h e
A e r o p l a n e Project D i r e c t o r p r i o r to t h e commencement of rig t e s t i n g .
6.2.5 A period of f a u l t - f r e e e n d u r a n c e t e s t i n g of t h e f u l l s y s t e m i n
t h e ACS rig with pilot i n t h e loop, s h a l l p r e c e d e f i r s t f l i g h t . T e s t i n g
time s h a l l be k e p t a h e a d of f l i g h t time d u r i n g initial d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e
d u r a t i o n of t h e t e s t s h a l l b e agreed with t h e A e r o p l a n e Project
Director.
6.4.2 E a r l y f l i g h t t e s t s s h a l l b e carried o u t to v e r i f y t h e a e r o d y n a m i c
data u s e d for t h e ACS d e s i g n .
6.4.3 A n y s p e c i a l f u n c t i o n s r e q u i r e d f o r t h e p u r p o s e s of f l i g h t t e s t
(e. g., f a u l t simulation) shall be d e s i g n e d a n d tested i n compliance with
t h i s c h a p t e r . S u c h f u n c t i o n s m u s t be identified e a r l y i n t h e s y s t e m
d e s i g n a n d t h e i r p r o v i s i o n made as p a r t of t h e o v e r a l l ACS D e s i g n .
7.1 INTRODUCTION
7.1.1 A p a r t from t h o s e A c t i v e C o n t r o l a p p l i c a t i o n s d i r e c t l y a f f e c t i n g
stability augmentation a n d flight control, t h e r e are specific
a p p l i c a t i o n s w h i c h affect s t r u c t u r a l b e h a v i o u r a n d a e r o p l a n e
configuration. T h e s e a p p l i c a t i o n s may be d i s c r e t e l y implemented or
i n t e g r a t e d within, f o r example, a Full-Time Active F l i g h t C o n t r o l
System.
7.6.4 C o n s i d e r a t i o n s h a l l b e g i v e n t o implementing S S P i n s u c h a
manner t h a t t h e pilot may c h o o s e to e x c e e d t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s i n a n
emergency.
8 DEFINITIONS
8.2 ACTUATOR
8.4 AVAILABILITY
8.7 DEFECT
8 . 1 0 DEFECT, DORMANT
8 . 1 2 FAILURE, PRIMARY
FRS forms the software programme to be implemented within the ACS and
which is to fly.
8.14 FULL-TIME
8 . 1 5 HAZARDOUS SITUATION
A situation where conditions arise which threaten the safety of the crew
and/or the aeroplane.
8.16 INCEPTORS
8.17 INTEGRITY
The probability that the system will provide a specified level of safety.
The facility integrated into an LRU to measure and check out its
serviceability to module level.
8.21 RIAINTAINABILITY
8.22 RIODE
The devices which produce forces or moments which affect the aeroplane
motion, e. g. , control s u r f a c e s , nozzles, etc.
8.25 RELIABILITY
8.26 SENSORS
8.28 TESTABILITY
8.29 TRANSDUCERS
TABLE 1
ACTIVE CONTROLS
Categories of function
fl
- f
1
Control
Laws
1
A
'
.
* Actuator Moti va t o r
1
m
b.
t
Sensor ~ Airframe
and
I Flight
Dynamic c
A
w
?xt e r n a 1
Inputs
i
B A
Categories:
LEAFLET 208/0
REFERENCE PAGE
MIL-F-9490D .. .. Flight c o n t r o l s y s t e m s - d e s i g n , i n s t a l l a t i o n a n d
test of piloted a i r c r a f t , g e n e r a l s p e c i f i c a t i o n f o r
AFFDL-TR-74-116 .. J.L.Townsend a n d E.T.Raymond - B a c k g r o u n d
information a n d user g u i d e f o r MIL-F-9490D, J a n .
1975
LEAFLET 208/1
1 INTRODUCTION
2 APPLICATIONS
2 . 1 RELATED APPLICATIONS
2.1.1 An ACS can offer the potential for providing facilities to
support a number of other airframe systems.
LEAFLET 20812
ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS
SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
1 INTEGRITY
1.1 Two of the most dominant problems in the development of an ACS are the selection
of the means to achieve a very low probability of catastrophic failure and to
demonstrate that this has been achieved.
1.2 Designers may be asked to aim for a risk of loss of the aeroplane due to ACS
failure in the order of 10-7 per flight hour. For this reason, systems employing
redundancy are necessary.
1.3 Single lanes using electronic control may exhibit failure rates exceeding 1 in
loo0 flying hours, it follows that a simple cross-compared redundant system of this
1 quality may require four independent lanes of control.
1.4 Fewer lanes may be utilised if adequate methods of self-monitoring can be
satisfactorily demonstrated.
1.5 Use of redundancy introduces the prospect of having to transfer data between
otherwise isolated lanes.
1.6 Where such intercommunication is utilised great care should be taken to avoid all
sources of common-mode failure.
1.7 Use of similar redundancy is attractive to the designer because of the ability to
thereby secure good identity of data. It does, however, present another source of
common-mode failure.
1.8 The natural distribution of random defects or failures amongst similar hardware
components results in a low probability of simultaneous failure, but there
nevertheless remains the possibility of an unidentified common susceptibility to
undefined influences arising from the inherent commonality of design and manufacture.
For this reason great care should be exercised in the selection of components for use
in redundant systems.
2 SENSOR CONFIGURATIONS
2.1 Conventionally, in redundant systems, there are three choices of primary motion
feedback sensor configurations, which may be summarised as follows:
(i) Orthogonal, single axis packs.
Measuring axis close to aeroplane body axis and packaged in packs of redundant
similar sensors.
(ii) Orthogonal, multi-axis set.
Measuring axes close to body axes but with a group of, say three axis sensors in
each set, one set per lane.
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2.2 The disadvantages of the skewed axis system lie in the extra computing required to
resolve the skewed sensor signals into the required axis and that necessary to handle
the failure management, together with the architectural complications associated with
this computing and its power supplies.
2.3 A trade-off exists between the minimum number of sensors and the magnitude of
failure transients and nuisance warnings.
2.4 There are inevitable compromises which arise from the co-located sensors and the
fact that there may need to be at least two redundant sets located apart.
2.5 Each sensor and each set may sense variable mixes of structural mode responses,
the eradication or resolving of which demands special attention.
2.6 The optimisation of management of a skewed axis sensor configuration can lead to
this being implemented as a discrete sub-system with a different level of redundancy to
that of the ACS proper. In this case the choice of method by which essential sensor
data is transferred to the control computers needs special care, in order to ensure
that the required levels of integrity are met.
3 AIR-DATA SENSORS
3.1 Air-data sensors (Pitot-static probes and airstream direction sensors) present
special difficulties. The spacial separation needed to ensure that two or more sensors
are not damaged by the same event (eg bird strike) causes inevitable differences
between their signals, especially at low speeds or at extreme attitudes. To avoid
unacceptably frequent rejection of their signals when no fault has occurred,
cross-monitoring has to be compromised with the risk that some faults remain
undetected.
3.2 In some systems (eg Q-feel) the air-data signal only affects the characteristics
of the inceptor in some way and does not affect the position of the motivator. In
others the signal is fed into the system and automatically applies motivator movement.
Both cases should be considered, but for the second type some form of "fail safe" in
the design is essential.
4 CONTROL AUTHORITIES
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4.2 Finite motivator authorities have a profound effect upon the behaviour of an
aeroplane which relies upon an ACS to provide essential performance. The choice of
displacement and rate authority for a given function has to be made in the light of
both specified performance and malfunction requirements and the nature of
circumstances expected to be met at and beyond control saturation.
Page 314
LEAFLET 208/3
1 MATHEMATICAL MODEL
1.3 The efficient design of control laws will depend upon the accuracy of
the model.
2 COMMONALITY OF SOFTWARE
LEAFLET 208/4
1 INTRODUCTION
1.2 The procedures used for static 8.nd fatigue design of aeroplanes
incorporating ACS a r e similar to those for conventional aeroplanes.
However, critical design cases may be more difficult to determine, and the
design process will necessitate integration of the procedures used for
structural, aerodynamic and active control system design.
2.2 ACS i n the first category might include, for example, carefree
manoeuvring ( t o p r e v e n t d e p a r t u r e from controlled f l i g h t ) , r i d e
improvement, weapon platform improvement, relaxed stability, manoeuvre
enhancement, direct lift control.
2.4 For systems in the first category and, for those systems in t h e second
category which as a secondary effect enhance performance (e.g., flutter
suppression), loading actions a r e usually of a different form to those for
conventional aeroplanes.
2.6 I n particular, attention should be given to the flight and ground loads
which arise when the active control system is:
( i ) Fully serviceable.
2.7 When identifying those loads which a r e likely to occur during flight i n
t h e degraded state t h e designer should consider whether t h e pilot could, if
he was aware of t h e degradation, r e d u c e t h e severity of the loads which
a r e likely to be encountered by taking appropriate measures such as:
2 . 1 2 There can be no guarantee that the loads analysis can identify all
critical combination of possible loading actions. Consequently, Chapter
2 0 8 , para 4.2 contains requirements for the in-service confirmation of t h e
load levels deduced from the analysis.
3 COMBAT AEROPLANES
4 T R A N S P O R T AEROPLANES
4.2 The use of load alleviation systems to achieve lighter and smaller
s t r u c t u r e s may result in reduced structural stiffness and reduced flutter
stability. Consequently, ACS aeroplanes may feature unconventional sizing
of s t r u c t u r a l items, for example wing skin thicknesses may be greater a t
the tip than at the root to achieve maximum torsional stiffness o r vary
across the chord to achieve an optimum position of the flexural axis.
LEAFLET 208/5
1 INTRODUCTION
(i) Design for maximum performance and allow for airframe life
consumption b y investing i n a more resistant airframe ( a t
possible weight cost).
The latter option has system design and training implications in that a
lower level performance has to be defined and appropriate mode selection
provided, with possibly instinctive override available to the higher level of
performance.
1 . 3 NUISANCE WARNINGS
1.3.1 Redundant Systems with voting incur a finite probability of
nuisance failure warnings, although with careful design these may be
minimised. When apparently 'nuisance' failures occur t h e conditions
leading to the event can, if known, enable confirmation a n d / o r
rectification to be carried out to avoid repetition and investigatory
loss of aeroplane availability. I t is therefore desirable for context
data to b e recorded for each 'failure' incident.
- Failed item
- Relative errors (redundant items)
- Control system status
- Dynamic data ( 3 axes)
- Flight case (speed, height, mach no.)
LEAFLET 208/6
1 INTRODUCTION
1.2 The rig simulation should also be utilised to enable test pilot
assessments to be carried o u t with particular reference to system
management including the effects of failures. The tests should also allow
impromptu pilot investigations which explore off-design cases and any
other points of curiosity.
1.3 This facility should provide the basis for system performance proving
prior to first flight. A detailed schedule of failure cases should be
assessed.
1.8 Subsequent to first flight, rig tests should continue to back-up flight
development.
1.9 A separate life test programme is necessary for individual ACS items
and these life tests are conducted b y the suppliers prior to delivery for
installation i n the aeroplane.
LEAFLET 208 /7
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 The provisions of Chapter 208 are specifically for those control
systems where correct operation of the system i s essential for continued
safe flight, so called 'full-time' systems. (Refer Chapter 208, para
1.1.2). A 'full-time' system may be understood to include those systems
where there is automatic reversion to an alternative active mode in
appropriate circumstances. When an active control system i s employed in
such a way that continued safe flight is possible a f t e r a n incorrect
operation of the system by reversion to some form of direct control b y the
pilot it may be referred to as a 'part-time' active control system. The
extent to which the provisions of Chapter 208 then apply will be related to
the required flight envelope and has to be defined in conjunction w i t h the
Aeroplane Project Director. This Leaflet i s intended a s a guide in making
this definition.
(i) 1 . 4 . 1 - Reversion.
CHAPTER 209
1 INTRODUCTION
2 . 1 FLYING QUALITIES
2.1.1 The effect of a single birdstrike under the conditions defined in
para 3 shall not degrade the flying qualities of the aeroplane below
Level 2 in all flight categories (see Chapter 600 paras 4 and 5 ) .
2.2 MAINTENANCE
2.2.1 Consideration shall be given during the design stage to the
provision of adequate access to internal s t r u c t u r e and other features
t o minimise the cost of repairing birdstrikes in the area defined in
para 3 . 4 .
3 THETHREAT
3.4 The frontal aspects of the following areas shall be considered a t risk
from birdstrikes:
4 DETAILED REQUIREMENTS
4 . 2 FRONT FUSELAGE
4.2.1 The front fuselage s t r u c t u r e is to be taken a s including, where
appropriate, the boundaries of the cockpit and front mounted radomes.
Following birdstrike, t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e front fuselage shall exhibit:
4 . 3 E N G I N E AIR I N T A K E S
4 . 3 . 1 Engine air intakes shall provide resistance to birdstrike as
follow s :
4.6 SYSTEMS
4 . 6 . 1 On impact at speeds u p to 1 . 0 V ~there shall be.
5 TESTING
CHAPTER 210
RADOMES
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 The general requirements for radomes are given in Chapter 708 'Radio and Radar
Installations'. These include, in para 5.1, specific requirements relating to
aerodynamic and structural considerations, including, resistance to erosion, impact
damage and lightning strike.
1.2 It is accepted that good radome design will involve a trade-off between electrical
and structural properties and the purpose here is to draw attention to the procedures
that shall be followed in supporting any deviation from the structural standards that
normally apply.
2 REQUIREMENTS
2.1 The structural requirements include those for static strength and stiffness,
fatigue performance, impact from hail and resistance to bird impact and lightning
strike.
2.2 In each design case where it is found to be impractical to achieve these standards,
the reasons for compromise and the basis of the trade-off between structural and
electrical properties shall be referred by the Design Authority, to the Aeroplane
Project Director for a concession before proceeding with the design. This supporting
evidence shall include a failure analysis, containing descriptions of failure modes and
consequential effects, including those on flight aerodynamics and engine(s).
2.3 For those design cases which result in a likelihood of structural failure of the
radome, it shall be shown that the integrity of the aeroplane is not impaired to an
extent unacceptable to the Aeroplane Project Director.
LEAFLET 210/0
RADOMES
REFERENCE PAGE
=
~
PART 2 APPENDIX No 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 This Appendix covers structural strength and design for flight requirements for
military derivatives of civil aeroplanes.
1.2 Each Appendix para consists of a table and amplifying notes comparing military and
civil requirements for individual chapters from Part 2 of DEF STAN 00-970 Volume 1.
Only those parts of the DEF STAN in which military and civil requirements differ are
included in the Appendix and where no reference is made to DEF STAN chaptedpara
numbers it is considered covered by the military requirements (unless explained
otherwise with amplifying notes).
1.3 The issue or change number of the civil airworthiness requirements referred to i n
this Appendix are recorded in paragraph 8.5 of the main introduction to DEF STAN
00-970 Volume 1.
COMPLIANCE CHECKS/ASSESSMENTS
2.1 Throughout this Appendix reference is made of the need for ’Compliance Checks or
Assessments’ of the existing aeroplane against the military requirements of DEF STAN
00-970. A full explanation of the aims of these ’compliance checks or assessments’ is
given in para 8 of the main introduction to DEF STAN 00-970 Volume 1.
Page i
3.2 REQUIREMENTS .
3.2.1 DEF STAN 00-970 Chapter 200 para 3.1 states that generally the Ultimate
Factor shall be 1.5 and the Proof Factor shall be at least 1.125. The
corresponding civil requirements in BCAR’s FARs and JARS, specify an Ultimate
Factor of 1.5 and quote a Proof Factor of 1.0 except that BCAR 23, FAR’Sand JAR
25 do not quote a Proof Factor. (The loading cases relevant to the factors are
defined within the requirements, and comments on these are included at the
appropriate references.)
3.2.2 DEF STAN 00-970 Chapter 200 para 3.2 states that until the design proof
load is reached, no grade A items shall sustain deformation detrimental to safety.
The civil requirements however state that up to proof (limit load x 1.0 factor)
load where quoted or limit load, that deformation may not interfere with safe
operation. In assessing the design of the civil aeroplane for compliance with DEF
STAN 00-970 the Proof Load conditions will need to be assessed in relation to the
1.125 Proof.
3.3 COMPLIANCE
3.3.1 Whilst both the civil and military requirements specify an Ultimate Factor
of 1.5, it is important to consider whether the proposed military usage will
increase the frequency of occurrence of higher loads so that the chance of
reaching or exceeding limit load is increased. In effect, such usage reduces the
margin of strength implicit in the factor of 1.5 and for this reason there is less
room for uncertainty in the compliance procedure. Due emphasis must also be
placed on establishing the real proof strength or ’structural airworthiness
limit’. Therefore, if the military derivative is to be operated very differently
to its civil counterpart. or at a higher AUW, or is a new design incorporating
novel features, then a detailed compliance check of the proof strength of the
structure may be required in accordance with Chapter 200.
3.3.2 The need for a compliance check of the static strength of a military
derivative of a civil aeroplane should be discussed with the Aeroplane Project
Director. (In conjunction with Airworthiness Division RAE).
4 FATIGUE DAMAGE TOLERANCE
4.1 MILITARY AND CIVIL REQUIREMENTS
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4.2 DEF STAN 00-970 Chapter 201 does not refer directly to the pressure cabin but the
interaction of this with the airframe structure and vice versa, must be taken into
account in the fatigue damage tolerance analysis and testing. Pressure cabin
requirements are specified in Chapter 7 16 and Appendix No. 7
4.3 REQUIREMENTS
4.3.1 In general, the military and civil requirements for fatigue strength are
compatible. However, it is important to recognise that DEF STAN 00-970 is
primarily concerned with compact structures whereas BCAR’s, FAR’S and JAR’S
address the large open type of structure, which is usually much easier to inspect.
Military requirements specify that the residual strength of an
inspection-dependent structure shall not fall below 80% of UL. Civil requirements,
however, specify that a fail safe structure should be expected to withstand only
limit load once it has failed.
4.4 COMPLIANCE
4.4.1 DEI= STAN 00-970 specifies that compliance with the fatigue strength
requirements shall be demonstrated by test; BCAR’s FAR’S and JAR’S, however,
place the onus on analysis supported by tests where necessary. In compact
structures it is important to check safe life compliance by tests using realistic
loading. In open structures compliance is adequately defined in the civil
fail safe requirements.
4.4.2 Because of the vital importance of establishing the correct fatigue life of
a military derivative it will be necessary:
4.5 DEF STAN 00-970 Chapter 201 Leaflet 201/8 details an analytical procedure to be
followed for fatigue and damage tolerance clearance of aeroplanes which have not been
designed to DEF STAN 00-970. The need for and the extent of the application procedure
will be as detailed in the Aeroplane Specification, or as directed by the Aeroplane
Project Director.
Page 3
5 SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES
5.2 Comments on proof and ultimate factor requirements are covered in para 3.2 above.
5.3 The flight envelopes, in the form of Vn diagrams from civil and military
requirements are generally similar. Particular values of n and V will have been
employed in the design of the military derivative of the civil aeroplane. A compliance
check between the required values of "2, n3 and n4 etc, relative to maximum
positive normal acceleration n1 will be required.
5.4 It should be noted that, even when the values of normal accelerations and speeds
coincide, the effects of the different proof and ultimate factors (para 3.2 above)
between civil and military aeroplanes will have to be considered in parallel with the
checks of para 5.3 above.
Page 4
6 ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES
8. Bomb Bay
and Door
Loads - -
6.2 Comments on proof and ultimate factor requirements are covered in para 3.2 above.
6.3 DEF STAN 00-970 Chapter 203 para 8 states that the flight cases are applicable to
bomb bay and doors and their supporting structure and operating mechanisms etc. Civil
requirements contain no reference to bomb bay and doors. However, cover doors, similar
in principle and function to bomb bay doors may be required for military derivatives and
the relevant requirements from DEF STAN 00-970 should apply to such items.
Page 5
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7 GUST LOADS
7.2 Comments on proof and ultimate factor requirements are covered in para 3.2 above.
The effects of the different proof and ultimate factors should be assessed in
conjunction with para 7.3.
7.3 The design conditions as typically outlined in DEF STAN 00-970, Chapter 204
and in the civil requirements are basically similar, however, where the dynamic
response analysis in Chapter 204 and BCAR Section D.3 is mandatory no such
requirement is specified in BCAR 23 or FAR’S. A compliance check into the detailed
compatibility of a military derivative with the DEF STAN 00-970 will be required.
Page 6
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~
8.2 Comments on proof and ultimate factor are covered in para 3.2 above.
8.3 The Aeroplane Specification may require the High Lift Devices and airbrakes to be
used en-route (including air to air refuelling) and in combat. A detailed assessment
of the limitations imposed on these items and their operating mechanisms will be
required to determine compliance with DEF STAN 00-970 and the Aeroplane
Specification.
8.4 The retracting times for landing flaps are quoted in DEF STAN 00-970 Chapter 205
para 3.4. For a military derivative such retracting times will have been established
and normally would be quoted in the Civil OperatingMaintenance manuals for the type.
A comparison with the military requirements from DEF STAN 00-970 to determine the
acceptability of the retraction times in the proposed role of the derivative will be
necessary .
8.5 The comments in para 3 will apply to the strength requirements for the High Lift
Devices. For mechanical interconnection of the systems in port and starboard wings the
military requirements call for proof factor 1.0 and ultimate factor 1.33 for the
mechanical interconnection system with a single operating unit jammed. A military
derivative will have to be checked for compliance against this requirement which will
apply to the High Lift Devices and Airbrakes.
Page 7
8.6 The stressing cases for airbrakes are given in DEF STAN 00-970Chapter 205 para 4
and the comments in para 8.5 above are relevant.
9 CONTROL SYSTEMS
3.7 Combat - -
Vulnerability
7. G Resmctors - - - - - -
9.2 Comments on proof and ultimate factor are covered in para 3.2 above, noting
however that in this Chapter different ultimate factors are required in particular
design cases.
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9.3 For a military derivative the DEF STAN 00-970 Chapter 206 requirements should be
met by the existing design, subject to compliance checks.
9.4 The civil requirements of BCAR’s and FAR 23 relate to pilots effort linearly with
aeroplane weight resulting in requirements of para 2 Chapter 206 being higher or lower
than the civil requirements over the weight range. A detailed assessment of the
differences in the requirements will be required to determine the effect on military
capability.
10 SPINNING AND SPIN RECOVERY
10.1 MILITARY AND CIVIL REQUIREMENTS
10.2 Comments on proof and ultimate factor are covered in 3.2 above.
10.3 DEF STAN 00-970 Chapter 207 is primarily concerned with Class 1 - Light
Aeroplanes and Class IV - Highly Manoeuvrable Aeroplanes and the Aeroplane
Specification should defiie the military derivative classification.
10.4 Civil requirements, BCAR Section D, FAR 25 and JAR 25 define that the aeroplane
shall not display any undue spinning tendency and a safe recovery can be made with
normal pilot skill from any stall. DEF STAN 00-970 Chapter 603 and its Appendix No 1
deals with stalling and post stall behaviour for all classes of aeroplane.
11 ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS
11.1 MILITARY AND CIVIL REQUIREMENTS
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11.2 Active Control Systems (ACS) are provided not only for flight control but also to
enhance structural life by manoeuvre and gust alleviation. It should be noted
therefore that ali other chapters of DEF STAN 00-970 Part 2 are structurally
inter-dependent with Chapter 208 diagrammatically shown in Figure 1. All strength
factors, where appropriate, specified throughout Part 2 are applicable to the
requirements of Chapter 208.
11.5 DEF STAN 00-970 Chapter 208 makes reference to MIL-F-9490D and this
specification may be used by USA aeroplane manufacturers in complying with civil
requirements.
13 RADOMES
13.1 MILITARY AND CIVIL REQUIREMENTS
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Page 11/12
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Leaflet 101/3 ra 3.2
-
m2 OK
(87)
Leaflet 102/1 para 3.1 l i n e 4
AL/1 i n "5.4" delete 4 insert 2
Chapter 109 T a b l e 1
AL/4 i n "Chapter 801" delete 801 and insert 409
Leaflet 200/4 para 4.1
AL/i l i n e 6, delete "through" and insert "in conjunction with"
ara 5.1
%/2 ( i )l i n e 3, delete "the"
AL/l ( i i ) l i n e 4 , delete "following" and insert "followed"
( i i )Notes 2 l i n e 5, delete ''through" and insert "in conjunction with"
ara 6.1
L/l l i n e 1 0 , delete "degredation' and insert "degradation"