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MOD*UK DSTAN*00-970 :PT*Z:VOL*L 03 W L b 2 4 2 4 1 O269642 695 =

STRUCTURAL STRENGTH AND DESIGN FOR FLIGHT

COPYRIGHT MODUK British Defence Standards


Licensed by Information Handling Services
DEF STAN 00-970 Re-issued Oct 1992 (Arndt 12)
Volume 1

PART 2

STRUCTURAL STRENGTH AND DESIGN FOR FLIGHT

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 200 STATIC STRENGTH AND DEFORMATION

Leaflet 200/1 Principles underlying the requirements


Leaflet 200/2 Static structural strength test loading sequence
Leaflet 200/3 Engine and auxiliary power unit mounting loads
Leaflet 200/4 Strength of structures under conditions of
heating and cooling
Leaflet 200/5 Considerations in setting permissible flight
loads for experimental and prototype aeroplanes

CHAPTER 201 FATIGUE DAMAGE TOLERANCE

Leaflet 201/1 Main features of the requirement


Leaflet 201/2 Material selection
Leaflet 201/3 Substantiation of fatigue life
Leaflet 20 1/4 Substantiation of damage growth and associated
inspection procedures
Leaflet 20115 Testing
Leaflet 201/6 Service monitoring
Leaflet 201D Operation beyond the specified life of an
equivalent life
Leaflet 201/û Clearance of aeroplanes designed and developed to
airworthiness requirements other than DEF STAN 00-970

CHAPTER 202 SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

Leaflet 20210 Reference page


Leaflet 202/1 The calculation of the response of an aeroplane to
pitch control input and associated loads when a
conventional control system is used
Leaflet 202/2 Definitions
Leaflet 202/3 The calculation of the loads associated with
symmetric manoeuvres for aeroplanes having control
systems with load limiting devices

CHAITER 203 ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

Leaflet 20310 Reference page


Leaflet 203/1 Yawing, sideslipping and rolling motions
Leaflet 203/2 The calculation of the loads associated with
asymmetric manoeuvres for aeroplanes having control
i systems with load limiting devices

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Volume 1

CONTENTS (continued)

CHAPTER 204 GUST LOADS

Leaflet 204/0 Reference page


Leaflet 204/1 Safe speeds for aeroplanes flying in turbulent
weather
Leaflet 204/2 A method of calculating gust loads for preliminary
design purposes

CHAPTER 205 HIGH LIFT DEVICES AND AIRBRAKES

I CHAPTER 206 CONTROL SYSTEMS

Leaflet 206/0 Reference page


Leaflet 206/1 Powered flying controls
Leaflet 20612 Testing of powered flying controls
Leaflet 206/3 Test schedules for powered flying controls
Leaflet 206/4 Use of mass-spring units
Leaflet 206/5 Fatigue testing of hydraulic powered flying
controls
Leaflet 206/6 Design recommendations

CHAITER 207 SPINNING AND SPIN RECOVERY

Leaflet 207/0 Reference page


Leaflet 207/1 Design rates of rotation
Leaflet 20712 Design criteria for spin resistance and spin
recovery

CHAPTER 208 ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS

Leaflet 208/0 Reference page


Leaflet 208/1 General requirements and applications
Leaflet 208/2 System requirements
Leaflet 208B Control laws and software
Leaflet 208/4 Structural implications of ACs
Leaflet 208/5 Operational and piloting aspects
Leaflet 208/6 Airframe and system proving
Leaflet 208D Part time systems
CHAITER 209 AIRFRAME DESIGN TO RESIST BIRDSTRIKE DAMAGE

CHAITER 210 RADOMES

Leaflet 210/0 Reference page

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Volume 1

CONTENTS (continued)
APPENDIX No 1 STRUCTURAL STRENGTH AND DESIGN FOR FLIGHT FOR
MILITARY DERIVATIVES OF CIVIL AEROPLANES
(Note: See relevant para of this Appendix for military
derivative requirements relating to particular chapters of
Part 2)
APPENDIX No 2 U.S. MILITARY SPECIFICATIONS, STANDARDS AND
HANDBOOKS

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Volume 1

CHAPTER 200

STATIC STRENGTH AND DEFORMATION

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This chapter states the requirements for static strength and freedom
from deformation which might adversely affect the airworthiness, handling
o r maintenance.

1.2 The requirements apply to airframes and mechanical components,


including undercarriages and systems.

1.3 Critical design cases, corresponding to the most severe authorised use
of the aeroplane, must be identified and the loads associated with each case
must be traced through the structure.

1.4 All Grade A details must be identified and for each of them an
allowable s t r e s s or strength must be determined. This would normally be
the appropriate allowable ultimate s t r e s s or strength determined on a 'B'
value basis. Refer to' Chapter 400, para 2.2 for definition of Grade A
details.

1.5 The allowable ultimate stresses o r loads must not be exceeded at the
design ultimate load, normally 1.5 times the maximum load in the design
case (the design l i m i t load).

1.6 The s t r u c t u r e as a whole must be tested to the design ultimate load


and supplementary evidence must be provided that 'BI values a r e not
exceeded. It is, of course, for t h e designer to decide what material
allowables should be associated with his own design procedure in order
that this requirement is satisfied.

1.7 In addition, it must be shown that no detrimental deformations occur


a t loads of at least 75% of the design ultimate load.

1.8 It must be shown that these proof and ultimate requirements can be
satisfied under the most adverse loading and environmental conditions.
For composites these conditions apply with the s t r u c t u r e at the most
adverse moisture level that is expected to occur during the life.

1.9 Flight load measurements must be made at an early stage to confirm


design assumptions .
1.10 In service a programme of operational loads measurement must be
maintained to ensure that any new critical loading actions, a r e identified
so that appropriate action can be taken.

1.11 All compliance procedures and judgements a r e subject to the


a p p r o v a l of t h e Aeroplane Project Director ( i n conjunction with
Airworthiness Division, RAE)

1.12 Definitions a r e given in para 7.

1.13 Advice on compliance with these requirements is given in Leaflets


20011 to 20014.

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Chapter 200 Volume 1

2 DESIGN CASES

2 . 1 For the purpose of design and of demonstration of compliance with the


design requirements, a limited number of discrete design cases a r e
prescribed for which the loads and other conditions a r e specified. They
a r e defined in the appropriate chapters of this publication.

2 . 2 The loads associated with each case must be traced through the
structure far enough to ensure that the requirements a r e satisfied
everywhere. Many of the cases overlap, and the whole s t r u c t u r e need
not be analysed for every one. When it can be shown that a particular
case is covered by other more stringent requirements, it need not be
considered any further.

2 . 3 There may be cases that are more demanding of some designs than
those defined i n this publication. When such a case is identified it must
b e defined and then compliance w i t h t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s must be
demonstrated i n that case also.

3 THE ULTIMATE STRENGTH AND PROOF REQUIREMENTS

3 . 1 I n general the ultimate factor shall be 1 . 5 and the proof factor shall
be a t least 1 . 1 2 5 . I n some particular design cases different values a r e
required, and they a r e given i n the appropriate chapters of this
publication.

3 . 2 Until the design proof load is reached, no Grade A items shall sustain
deformation detrimental to safety, and moving parts essential to safety
shall function satisfactorily. After removal of the design proof load no
effects of loading shall remain that might reasonably cause t h e aeroplane
t o b e deemed unserviceable.

3 . 3 Until the design ultimate load is exceeded, no Grade A item shall


collapse, and the s t r e s s , load or strain a t each detail shall not exceed the
static allowable value.

4 SUBSTANTIATION OF THE S T A T I C ALLOWABLE S T R E S S FOR GRADE A


DETAILS

4 . 1 A l l static allowable values must be based on nominal dimensions u n l e s s


adverse tolerances significantly affect the strength.

4 . 2 The allowable must be determined under the most adverse loading and
environmental conditions arising i n the critical design case for t h e detail
in question.

4 . 3 The derivation m u s t be based upon a strength no greater than the 'BI


value for the critical failure mode of the material from which the detail is
made, using an acceptable method of structural analysis.

4 . 4 I n general the material 'BI value for each mode of failure should be
derived i n accordance with DEF STAN 00-932. Should this b e impractical
the value shall be based upon at least 15 coupons. These m u s t be tested
under the most adverse environmental conditions if these conditions
significantly affect the strength.

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Volume 1 Chapter 200

4.5 When only 15 material coupons a r e used these m u s t comprise a t least 5


samples from each source of supply and a t least 3 batches of material from
each source. Similar representative samples must be used if larger
numbers of coupons a r e tested.

4.6 Exceptionally, it may be acceptable to allocate allowable values to


individual batches of material: in circumstances where the mean strength
of the material varies from batch to batch, b u t the coefficient of variation
( c v ) (based on individual batches) remains reasonably constant, t h e 'BI
value for a detail in a given batch of material must be reduced if the mean
of the batch in question is lower than that of t h e batch on which the
reference IB1 value is based i n accordance with (paras 4.3 and 4 . 8 ) . No
increase in the reference 'BI value is permissible unless it can be shown
that other failure modes do not thereby become significant.

4.7 METHOD OF STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS


4.7.1 The method of structural analysis must be substantiated b y test
for each class of structural detail for w h i c h the method has not
already been verified.

4.7.2 To verify the analysis a t least one specimen representing the


detail in question m u s t be tested under the most adverse loading and
environmental conditions specified for design. The value of strength
s o obtained must be reduced in order to obtain an acceptable
estimate of the 'BI value for the test specimen (Table i), and where
appropriate a f u r t h e r allowance must b e made for differences between
t h e test specimen and t h e structural detail itself. The size of the
reduction factor of Table 1 depends upon t h e failure mode that is
observed, t h e variability associated with t h i s failure mode and the
number of coupons used in establishing that variability ( p a r a s 4 . 4
and 4 . 5 ) . In general, t h e larger the sample of coupons upon which
t h e variability is based t h e smaller the reduction factor.

4.7.3 I t is possible that the overall airframe static test adequately


exercises some of t h e Grade 'A' details and a separate detail test may
not be necessary. Indeed it may b e difficult to apply the correct
boundary conditions to the detail test.

5 DEMONSTRATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE ULTIMATE STRENGTH AND


PROOF REQUIREMENTS FOR COMPLETE STRUCTURES OR COMPONENTS

5.1 Usually compliance must be demonstrated by testing a complete


structure or component. Exceptionally such a test may be deemed
unnecessary. In these circumstances an appropriate allowance must be
made for the added uncertainties that a r e involved.

5 . 2 The test programme and the results of t h e tests must be discussed


with t h e Aeroplane Project Director (in conjunction with Airworthiness
Division RAE).

5 . 3 To allow for the variability in strength between nominally identical


items, a test factor appropriate to each test shall be determined from
Table 2. The factors given in Table 2 correspond to a 'Br level of
assurance normalised to the variability test factor of 1.0 that is customary
for metal structures.

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Chapter 200 Volume 1

6 MEASUREMENT OF LOADS ON AEROPLANE STRUCTURES

6.1 Measurements of the loads and temperatures on t h e aeroplane


structure during manoeuvres i n flight and on the ground, to an extent to
be agreed with the Aeroplane Project Director (in conjunction with
Airworthiness Division R A E ) , shall be made on one or more early
development aeroplanes and on Service aeroplanes as required b y t h e
appropriate chapters of t h i s publication.

7 DEFINITIONS

7.1 COUPON The simplest form of test specimen suitable for obtaining the
properties of a material in a particular mode of failure.

7 . 2 STRUCTURAL DETAIL A structural detail is part of a component such


a s a joint, panel or structural or mechanical assembly.

7.3 THE DESIGN LIMIT LOAD is the greatest load that is expected to
occur during the specified life i n any particular design case.

7.4 THE D E S I G N PROOF LOAD is the product of the design limit load and
the proof factor.

7.5 T H E DESIGN ULTIMATE LOAD is the product of the design limit load
and the ultimate factor.

7 . 6 THE STATIC TEST FACTOR is the ratio between the load that an item
is required to withstand under test and the design ultimate load. The
factor also applies to the proof load.

7.7 THE STATIC ALLOWABLE VALUE OF STRESS is the 'B1 value of


s t r e s s for a structural detail under the most adverse loading and
environmental conditions arising in the critical design case for the detail.
For composites these conditions apply with the detail a t t h e most adverse
moisture level that is expected to occur during the life. ( T h e 'B1 value is
that below which not more than 1 in 1 0 items will fail with 95% confidence).

8 ENGINE AND AUXILIARY POWER UNIT MOUNTING LOADS

8.1 This para is applicable to all engine and auxiliary power unit
mountings, including VTOL, VSTOL and STOVL installations. The
mounting together with any other structure liable to b e critically affected
shall have sufficient strength and rigidity to withstand t h e flight and
ground loads prescribed i n Parts 2 and 3 for the aeroplane a s a whole
together with the loads resulting from the engine a t all practical ranges of
t h r u s t and torque.

8.2 Consideration shall be given to all forces imposed on the airframe


arising from causes which may include the following:-

( i ) t h r u s t , forward and reverse.

(ii) engine torque including the excess torque arising due to


powerplan t malfunction .

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Volume 1 Chapter 200

(iii) gyroscope couples due to angular motion of the aeroplane.

(iv) inertia forces due to linear and angular accelerating angular


velocity including crash cases

(VI aerodynamic forces and moments on propellers due to the


inclination of the propeller axis to the airstream.

(vi) airloads on exposed nacelles.

( V i 9 structural flexibility effects (airframe and engine supports).

(viii) thermal effects.

8.3 Guidance on the interpretation of the requirements of this paragraph


is contained in Leaflet 200/3.

9 REDUCTION OF VULNERABILITY TO BATTLE DAMAGE (Chapter 112)


9.1 The aeroplane structure should be designed to be tolerant to Battle
Damage and to be easily repairable.

9.2 Drain holes and drip fences should be provided wherever needed.

10 CONSIDERATIONS IN SETTING PERMISSIBLE FLIGHT LOADS FOR


EXPERIMENTAL AND PROTOTYPE AEROPLANES

10.1 The extent of the restriction that is imposed w i l l depend upon a


number of considerations. These a r e discussed in Leaflet 200/5.

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Volume 1 Chapter 200

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 200/1

STATIC STRENGTH AND DEFORMATION

PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE REQUIREMENTS


1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The purpose of this leafiet is to outline the basic principles underlying
strength and deformation requirements in this publication and, i n
particular to show w h y these requirements a r e sometimes expressed i n
terms of proof loads, sometimes ultimate loads, and sometimes both.
2 THE ULTIMATE STRENGTH AND PROOF REQUIREMENTS

2.1 A n aeroplane i n service is subject to an enormous variety of


combinations of loads a n d o t h e r conditions, a n d it is obviously
impracticable and unnecessary t o consider them all. The most adverse of
these are identified i n the f o r m of design cases, which must be used i n
demonstrating compliance with the requirements.

2.2 I n the majority of desigr? cases, the severity of the loads that may
arise in service is not limited naturally, and limiting conditions have to be
chosen for design purposes. A classic example is provided b y the
symmetric flight case. There a r e usually no means to prevent the
exceedance of either the speeds o r the normal accelerations that are
permissible for an aeroplane in symmetrical flight. In choosing the limiting
conditions for design, use is made of past experience of the speeds and
accelerations needed for t h e operational duty of the type, of t h e predicted
flight characteristics and performance of the aeroplane, and of the way
structure mass is l i k e l y to depend on the severity of the chosen conditions.
2.3 Every aeroplane in service is, of course, subject to flying limitations
that prohibit its use beyond the limiting conditions chosen for design (see
Leaflet 9 0 0 / 1 ) .

2.4 There a r e several causes of uncertainty that must b e taken into


account in designing t h e aeroplane to withstand the chosen limiting
conditions. First, t h e methods used in the evaluation of t h e aerodynamic
loads and in the s t r e s s analysis a r e inexact. Second, every aeroplane is
expected to encounter the chosen limiting conditions in each design case
only once, or a t most a few times, during its life. I n other words the
aeroplane is designed to sustain the maximum load in an average spectrum
of loads. Some aeroplanes will inevitably experience loads greater than the
average and will, therefore, experience a maximum load that is greater
than the limit load. Finally, when the aeroplane enters service, the most
severe conditions under which it is actually used may differ from the
design cases. For all these reasons the aeroplane m u s t be designed to
have, in each design case, an ultimate strength that is more than would be
needed j u s t to sustain the limit load.

2.5 The uncertainty caused b y variability i n the strength of materials and


structural features is taken into account separately, in 3 ways.
2.5.1 First, t h e designer is encouraged to use 'B' allowable values of
stress i n design (see Chapters 400 and 4 0 1 and DEF STAN 00-932)
because they a r e founded on a standardised test procedure and give a

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Leaflet 2 O0 / 1 Volume 1

uniform statistical assurance of the strength of materials. N o such


uniformity is associated with the minimum specification or S values
although these typically were somewhat lower than 'B' values and closer
t o 'A' values. A problem in accepting a move from IS' to 'BI values was
a natural reluctance to move from an allowable value that would be
reached or exceeded by 99 out of 100 items to a higher value that
would be reached or exceeded by 9 out of 10 items. However, it was
noted that the allowable value was associated with the design ultimate
load which itself had an extremely low probability of occurrence. It
was agreed that the probability of structural failure in service was
influenced predominantly by considerations such as the identification
of design cases, choice of design limit load and the value of t h e static
factor of safety.

2.5.2 Second, any test of a structural feature or test element is


subject to a test factor. The test factors required by Table 1 of
Chapter 200 are related to the measured variability in the s t r e n g t h of
the materials from which the features or elements a r e made; relevant
data on variability will usually be found in DEF STAN 00-932. The
test factors are calculated, by means of statistical theory, t o give
assurance, with 95% confidence, that 90% of similar items will equal or
exceed the required strength. It i s emphasised that separate
allowance must be made for any uncertainties arising from differences
between elements and the structural features that they represent.

2.5.3 Finally the designer must make separate allowance for


environmental degradation and demonstrate that the allowable values
( o r S values) of ultimate s t r e s s a r e not exceeded under the design
ultimate load. The most appropriate allowance for degradation can be
obtained by conducting tests on elements under degraded conditions.
2.6 Though t h e design ultimate strength defines the margin of s t r e n g t h
that must be provided, it is not sufficient on its own to ensure t h a t there
is also a margin of airworthiness. This margin of airworthiness is defined
b y the design proof requirement.

2.7 The proof requirement defines the minimum conditions u p to which t h e


airworthiness and serviceability of the aeroplane can be depended upon.
The designer should ensure, by design and tests as appropriate, that
loads u p to the design proof load will neither impair safety nor necessitate
servicing other than to predetermined and defined schedules acceptable to
t h e operator. Thus under the design proof load and after its removal
there should be no loosening or pulling of rivets, structura1 deformation
which might cause unacceptable redistributions of aerodynamic loads,
jamming or undue slackness of controls, or any other sign of s t r u c t u r a l
distress which might cause a service engineer in the field to have doubts
about the serviceability of the aeroplane. In this matter, tests a r e the
only trustworthy guide. Moreover a proof test should not be stopped
merely because the design proof load has been reached; it should b e
continued until the real proof load has been found, beyond which the
proof requirement cannot be satisfied. Two or three tests at increasing
loads may be necessary (see Leaflet 200/2).

2.8 Since the real proof strength defines the conditions u p to which the
structural airworthiness can be depended upon, it is usually a more
meaningful measure of the capability of a design than the ultimate s t r e n g t h
that is achieved. Beyond the proof strength, catastrophe could result
from structurally induced causes such as jamming of controls o r unstable
aerodynamic loadings. For these reasons, greater emphasis will b e placed
on establishing the real proof load.

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3 SPECIAL CASES

3 . 1 I n most design cases both strength and deformation are regarded as


important. I t seldom happens that both requirements can be satisfied
exactly; usually a margin a b o v e t h e s t a n d a r d r e q u i r e d b y one
requirement must b e provided in order to comply with the other.
Nevertheless w h e n both requirements are imposed, the designer is
expected to demonstrate compliance with them both.

3 . 2 I n some exceptional design cases, deformation is all that matters and a


design ultimate requirement is superfluous. The principal example is that
of ejection seats and their surrounding structure. Under the worst
possible combinations of flight loads and ejection gun t h r u s t , the seats and
the airframe m u s t not distort s o much that they prevent an ejection, o r
cause a seat to eject too slowly or in the wrong direction, or make the
ejection of one seat interfere w i t h the ejection of another.

3.3 I n a few other cases, strength is critical b u t deformation is not


important, and a design ultimate requirement is imposed without a design
proof requirement. A n example is that of seats and harnesses at crash
stations, and their supporting structures. I n a crash landing that would
do serious damage to the aeroplane, some distortion of the seat and
harness attachments would be trivial, (and may be beneficial in absorbing
t h e energy of impact), but the crew must remain safely restrained w i t h i n
reasonable physiological limits. Accordingly an ultimate factor of 1. O is
required in the crash landing case b u t there is no proof requirement (see
Chapter 3 0 7 ) .

3.4 There a r e a few other special cases in which t h e respective values of


the proof and ultimate factors a r e lower than the usual 1.125 and 1.5.
These cases represent r a r e events such as malfunctions of systems and
operation of systems under exceptional conditions. Provision of the f u l l
strength and stiffness that would be necessary to achieve the usual factors
in these cases would add mass to the aeroplane that would penalise it i n
normal operations. In emergencies that are infrequent and of short
duration, and in which t h e aeroplane may be a t additional risk for other
reasons, t h e higher risks to t h e aeroplane and its crew that a r e associated
with t h e lower factors a r e regarded as acceptable. Examples a r e
malfunctions of automatic flight control systems and the use of anti-spin
parachutes a t exceptionally high speeds (Chapter 7 1 4 ) .

3.5 Finally there a r e several cases in which both the proof and ultimate
factors are higher than the usual values. They represent the normal
operations of systems and installations in which the loads a r e particularly
difficult to estimate. The difficulties are caused principally b y transient
pressures in hydraulic, pneumatic and fuel systems, b y variability in the
performance of pressure relief devices, and b y variability i n the loading on
air brakes, flaps and undercarriages. Since these cases represent events
that happen frequently, the greater risks associated with the greater
uncertainty in estimation of t h e loads must be compensated b y higher
factors. Examples a r e flap systems (Chapter 205) undercarriage retraction
a n d lowering (Chapter 306) and refuelling and defuelling systems (Chapter
701).

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Leaflet 2 0 0 / 1 Volume 1

4 COMMENTS

4 . 1 The foregoing paragraphs indicate the diverse nature of t h e strength


requirements and the reasons w h y emphasis is sometimes placed on a proof
requirement, sometimes on an ultimate strength requirement, and w h y often
both a r e specified. I t is clear that t h e same factors, and the same ratio of
proof factor to ultimate factor, cannot b e used in all cases without serious
loss i n structural integrity. This is a consideration that far outweighs the
convenience that uniform factors might bring.

REFERENCE

National Agency for Finite Element Methods & Standards


(NAFEMS) - Guidelines to Finite Element Practice

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LEAFLET 200/2

STATIC STRENGTH AND DEFORMATION


STATIC STRUCTURAL STRENGTH TEST LOADING SEQUENCE

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Experience has proved the value of testing representative examples of
aeroplane structures. This Leaflet sets out t h e aims which should be kept
in view when t h e programme of static tests is being planned and gives
recommendations on some points of test procedure which will help to ensure
that these aims a r e achieved.

2 TEST AIMS

2.1 The test procedure adopted should give t h e maximum practicable


amount of information on t h e structure. In particular, the tests should be
conducted with t h e following aims:

( i ) to verify t h e structural analysis b y means of strain measurements


under all test conditions and thereby to demonstrate, for each
Grade A structural detail, that the allowable values of s t r e s s or
strain are not exceeded a t t h e design ultimate load,

(ii) to establish, for selected design cases, t h e highest load a t which


the proof requirement is satisfied,

(iii) to demonstrate, in t h e critical design case established by earlier


testing, a strength that is sufficient to show, as far as
practicable, that all Grade A structural details have been
identified.

3 RECOMMENDED TEST PROCEDURE

3.1 The test item m u s t be fitted w i t h s u c h control r u n s and systems a s


a r e necessary to demonstrate compliance with the proof requirement.

3.2 The test procedure should be phased in with any flight load
measurement programme (see Leaflet 1015/1). A n y environmen tal
conditioning should meet with the approval of t h e Aeroplane Project
Director (in conjunction with Airworthiness Division R A E ) .

3.3 The following procedure is recommended:

(i) Load in increments up to the design proof load in each


critical loading case. Exceptionally, measured flight loads
may be available. A t t h e design proof load, check that
moving parts essential to safety, function satisfactorily and
that there is no structural deformation which might cause
unacceptable redistributions of aerodynamic loads. A f t e r
removal of t h e load, examine and report on the condition of
t h e specimen noting, with photographs, all structural
distress which, if it occurred on an aeroplane in service,
might cause it to be declared unserviceable o r not
airworthy, (e.g., skin distortion, loose rivets, serious
permanent deformation, etc).

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Leaflet 2001 2 Volume 1

Note: The adjustment of the applied loads and temperatures to


conform to the prescribed values may not be practicable with
some loading systems, if a change in load distribution o r in
surface temperature is involved. In such cases an estimate of
the effect of t h e difference between the prescribed values and
the test values should be made and appropriate corrections
applied to the results.

( i i ) Continue the loading above t h e specified design proof load in


suitable increments, each time checking that essential moving
parts function satisfactorily and there is no unacceptable
deformation, before removing all load and examining the condition
of the specimen, until the real proof load for that particular
loading condition has been established.

(iii) Demonstrate an appropriate test factor from Table 2 of


Chapter 200 on the design ultimate load for static tests and
80% of the design ultimate load for residual strength tests. If
during these tests, serious damage to the specimen occurs
unexpectedly or appears imminent, a decision should b e made
whether to repair the specimen o r proceed to ( i v ) .

( i v ) Repeat tests (iii) for each of the other selected loading cases.

4 NOTES

4 . 1 The aim of the proposed sequence is to secure as much factual


information as possible from each structural specimen tested; especially
information needed for determining Service clearances on permissible speed
and normal acceleration.

4.2 The proposals i n this Leaflet a r e not intended to cover any part of t h e
fatigue test programme (for fatigue testing, see Leaflet 201/1).

4 . 3 The meaning of structural distress is admittedly vague. Opinions


differ, between inspectors, Service engineer officers and the test
engineer. Therefore the aim must be to record facts so t h a t , a s
experience accumulates, it will be possible to make the definition more
precise.

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 200/3

STATIC STRENGTH AND DEFORMATION

ENGINE AND AUXILIARY POWER UNIT MOUNTING LOADS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 T h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of C h a p t e r 200 demand t h a t consideration shall b e


g i v e n to t h e forces imposed b y t h e e n g i n e unit on t h e a e r o p l a n e s t r u c t u r e .
T h e conditions of operation involving e n g i n e loads for which t h e a e r o p l a n e
a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e e n g i n e s u p p o r t i n g structure m u s t b e s a t i s f a c t o r y a r e
specified in t h e various C h a p t e r s ( p a r t i c u l a r l y P a r t 2 a n d P a r t 3 ) a n d t h e
e n g i n e o p e r a t i n g conditions to b e assumed are specified in each c a s e .
T h e s e a r e chosen so t h a t all c a s e s in which a p p r e c i a b l e e n g i n e or auxiliary
power unit loads o c c u r are c o v e r e d .

1.2 T h e p u r p o s e of t h i s Leaflet i s to d e s c r i b e how t h e s e loads a r i s e , to


g i v e g u i d a n c e on their m a g n i t u d e a n d direction u n d e r t h e various flight
a n d g r o u n d conditions, a n d t o g i v e t h e r e a s o n s for t h e chosen e n g i n e
p o w e r conditions in each case. All t y p e s of loading, (e.g., t h r u s t ,
t o r q u e , etc.), a r e c o n s i d e r e d a n d for a n y aeroplane manoeuvre, t h e
r e s u l t a n t e n g i n e mounting loads will be obtained b y a combination of some
o r all of these loads.
2 ENGINE AND PROPELLER TYPES

2.1 T h e magnitude a n d direction of t h e f o r c e s imposed b y t h e e n g i n e unit


d e p e n d on t h e t y p e of e n g i n e a n d propeller. A l l t y p e s i n c u r r e n t use a r e
listed below a n d s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d w h e r e applicable:

ENGINE TYPES

( i ) piston e n g i n e with propeller

(ii) t u r b i n e e n g i n e w i t h propeller

(iii) turbofan

( iv) turbojet

PROPELLER TYPES

(i) single rotating (with or without reversible pitch)


( a ) two bladed, a n d
( b ) t h r e e o r more bladed

( i i ) c o u n t e r - r o t a t i n g c o n c e n t r i c (with o r without r e v e r s i b l e p i t c h )

( a ) two p r o p e l l e r s d i r e c t l y coupled h a v i n g three o r more b l a d e s ,


( b ) two p r o p e l l e r s i n d e p e n d e n t l y d r i v e n having t h r e e o r more
blades, a n d

( c ) two p r o p e l l e r s , either directly coupled o r i n d e p e n d e n t l y


d r i v e n , each h a v i n g two blades.

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3 ENGINE LOADS

3 . 1 THRUST
3.1.1 For all engines, the net t h r u s t (forward o r r e v e r s e ) on the
engine mountings (i.e. gross thrust - intake d r a g ) depends mainly on
the following variables:

( i) engine rotational speed.

( i i ) engine power output.

(iii) aeroplane speed.


( i v ) aeroplane altitude.

3.1.2 The first two, rotational speed and power o u t p u t , a r e defined


b y the engine power conditions and hence for a given altitude, engine
conditions and aeroplane speed specified for each manoeuvre, a r e
those which result i n the maximum t h r u s t i n each case. The altitude
w i l l depend on the particular aeroplane and its role but that giving
the most severe conditions of thrust should be assumed.

3 . 2 TORQUE
3.2.1 For the purpose of the requirements 'torque' is defined as the
maximum occurring a t any instant in the given condition. The normal
limit torque for stressing purposes should not be less than:-

( i ) I n the case of a piston engine, twice the mean torque


for a four cylinder engine or 1.5 times the mean
torque for more than four cylinders.

( i i ) I n the case of a turboprop o r turbofan engine, 1.25


times the mean torque.

(iii) In the case of a turbojet engine, the maximurn


accelerating torque.

3.2.2 For aeroplanes with propellers, t h e resultant engine mean


torque depends upon engine operating conditions, aeroplane speed and
altitude and type of propeller.

( i ) With a single rotating propeller, the mean torque is


determined b y t h e power and engine rotational speed.

( i i ) When directly coupled counter-rotating propellers a r e


used, the resultant mean torque from the two halves
should be estimated. This depends largely on the
relative pitch setting and the pitch changing
mechanisms of the two propellers. If the pitch
changing mechanisms a r e directly coupled, the
resultant mean torque may be small. However, if they
a r e independently con trolled, a considerable
difference i n the torque of the two propellers may
occur. The resultant mean torque should be estimated
for the worst conditions liable to occur and this torque
used for stressing with an overriding minimum value
of one quarter of the torque which would arise from
one of the propellers acting alone and absorbing half
the engine power output.

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( i i i ) When there are two i n d e p e n d e n t l y d r i v e n c o u n t e r


rotating p r o p e l l e r s , t h e g r e a t e s t r e s u l t a n t mean
t o r q u e will be obtained when one of t h e propellers is
s t o p p e d . Hence t h e t o r q u e t o be used for s t r e s s i n g is
t h a t which arises from e i t h e r of t h e propellers
o p e r a t i n g alone.

3.2.3 In a d d i t i o n , a condition of 'excess torque' s h o u l d b e considered


to allow for t h e possibility of malfunction of t h e powerplant. T h i s is
defined as:-

( i ) In t h e case of a propeller e n g i n e , 1.6 times t h e limit


t o r q u e a s defined a b o v e to c o v e r t h e situation of
propeller c o n t r o l s y s t e m failure, including r a p i d
propeller feat h e r i n g .
(ii) T h a t applicable to complete s t o p p a g e from maximum
t a k e off power i n a time a p p r o p r i a t e t o s e i z u r e for a
t u r b o j e t . In t h e a b s e n c e of better information t h e
run-down time of t h e main r o t a t i n g system a s s o c i a t e d
with s u c h a f a i l u r e should be assumed to be not
greater than 0.3 seconds, unless for t h e particular
e n g i n e t y p e c o n c e r n e d t h e evidence can b e p r o d u c e d ,
based on t e s t o r o p e r a t i n g e x p e r i e n c e , to j u s t i f y a
d i f f e r e n t time. When t h e e n g i n e i n c o r p o r a t e s more
t h a n o n e main r o t a t i n g system each s y s t e m s h o u l d b e
c o n s i d e r e d s e p a r a t e l y . T h i s applies to both t u r b o jet
a n d t u r b o f a n e n g i n e s . I n t u r b o propeller
installations , i n a s s e s s i n g t h e t o r q u e g e n e r a t e d by t h e
a b o v e s u d d e n e n g i n e s t o p p a g e condition, t h e i n e r t i a
of the propeller may be ignored. T h i s is d u e t o t h e
fact t h a t t h e run-down time of 0 . 3 s e c o n d s i s based on
a n a n a l y s i s of o b s e r v e d i n t e r n a l damage i n a c t u a l
cases, w h i c h h a v e been on turbojet e n g i n e s . I t
c o r r e s p o n d s to the seizing t o r q u e g e n e r a t e d by
i n t e r n a l damage only if t h e i n e r t i a of t h e propeller is
disregarded.

T h e e x c e s s t o r q u e condition should be applied t o t h e flight condition


of unit normal acceleration at m a x i m u m climbing s p e e d a p p r o p r i a t e to
maximum t a k e off power a n d with zero a n g u l a r velocity.
3 . 3 GYROSCOPIC COUPLES
3.3.1 ENGINES WITH PROPELLERS - T h e mean g y r o s c o p i c couple of
t h e propeller alone s h o u l d be a d d e d to t h a t of t h e r o t a t i n g components
of t h e e n g i n e a n d g e a r b o x .

( i ) SINGLE ROTATING PROPELLERS


When there a r e three or more blades, t h e p r o p e l l e r
b e h a v e s as a simple g y r o s c o p e a n d t h e r e s u l t a n t mean
g y r o s c o p i c couple h a s a s t e a d y value of I d where
I = polar moment of i n e r t i a of o n e propeller
w = a n g u l a r velocity of propeller

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B = angular velocity of the aeroplane a s a whole


(given in the relevant chapter)

A two bladed propeller does not possess polar symmetry and


gyroscopic couple varies from zero to twice the mean value, UUQ, and
there is an associated couple i n the plane a t right angles to the
gyroscopic couple which fluctuates between -hQ and +IwQ.

(ii) COUNTER-ROTATING CONCENTRIC PROPELLERS -


T H R E E O R MORE BLADED -
The actual value of t h e
gyroscopic couple depends on the grouping of the
propellers t h u s :

( a ) Directly coupled - This combination of propellers


will behave as two uniform discs rotating in
opposite directions and the gyroscopic couples
w i l l nearly balance o u t a t the bearing of the
concentric torque shafts. Allowance should
therefore be made for any difference i n speed o r
moment of inertia of the two propellers. The net
gyroscopic couple should b e estimated from the
best available data and the estimated value should
be used for stressing purposes if it is greater
than the over-riding minimum of 1 / 8 IwQ.

( b ) Independently driven - In this case, t h e speeds


of the two propellers a r e liable to differ
considerably and the extreme case of one propeller
stopped should be considered.

(iii) COUNTER-ROTATING CONCENTRIC PROPELLERS -


-
TWO BLADED In the plane in which the steady
gyroscopic couple would act for a simple gyroscope,
the couple arising in the worst case, whether for a
directly coupled o r an independently drive
combination, will fluctuate between - 2 1 ~ 2and + 2 1 d .
There is also a couple in t h e plane a t right angles to
the above which also fluctuates, in the worst case,
between -2IwsZ and +2IuQ. These couples a r e not less
than the couple of a two bladed propeller acting alone
and t h e case of one of t h e two propellers stopped will
not therefore be critical.

3.3.2 TURBOJET ENGINES -


The gyroscopic couples on the engine
mounting due to angular rotation of the aeroplane a r e very much less
for an aeroplane fitted with a pure jet o r turbofan engine than for one
having an engine of comparable power driving a single disc propeller.
However, due to the high rotational speed of the gas turbine rotor,
considerable loads may be produced on t h e s p i n , i n the recovery from
a dive o r other manoeuvres; these should, therefore, be considered.

3.4 INERTIA FORCES


3.4.1 Inertia forces on the engine mounting due to linear and angular
accelerations i n pitching, yawing and rolling motion of the aeroplane
s h o u l d be investigated as should those due to crash conditions.

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3.5 PROPELLER LOADS DUE TO ASYMMETRIC AIRFLOW


3.5.1 When the general direction of the airflow a t entry to the
propeller disc is not perpendicular to the disc (see Leaflet 7 0 0 / 1 ) the
cyclic variation of blade air loadings produces, in the case of a
propeller with three o r more blades, a steady stationary force a t the
propeller s h a f t in the plane of t h e disc and a steady stationary couple
about an axis in the plane of t h e disc. For example, d u e to sideslip, a
propeller experiences a sideways force a t its centre and a pitching
couple about its centre, and d u e to incidence in the pitching plane, a
propeller experiences a vertical force and a yawing couple.

3.5.2 On a two bladed propeller the force and couple fluctuate i n


magnitude and direction, t h e magnitude becoming zero twice per
revolution, and the direction varying through 900 on either side of
t h e direction corresponding to the maximum magnitude.

3.5.3 The propeller designer should be consulted on the magnitudes


of those forces and couples, which d e p e n d on several factors including
aeroplane geometry, propeller diameter, blade planform and operating
condition.

4 AEROPLANE MANOEUVRES

4.1 SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES (see Chapter 202)


4.1.1 U n d e r the symmetric flight condition of Chapter 202 an
important condition to be covered is one a t the maximurn normal
acceleration n l g which corresponds to a recovery from a dive. A s
the greatest t h r u s t normally occurs a t the lowest aeroplane speed, the
case which may be critical for t h e engine mounting is a t the
m a n o e u v r e s p e e d , V A , with t h e e n g i n e a t maximum power
conditions. This case also involves the highest pitching angular
velocity for a given normal acceleration and therefore covers t h e case
of recovery from a dive. For a normal acceleration of n l g the
appropriate speed is V S 6 1 and t h e angular velocity i n pitch may
be taken a s fi where Vs i s the stalling speed in level flight.
VS

4.1.2 The corresponding case of recovery from an inverted dive with


a maximum negative normal acceleration of n3g should also be
considered. The associated aircraft speed and angular velocity in
pitch may be taken a s V s i n K 3 and - g s respectively
Vs*n
w h e r e VSin is the stalling speed in inverted level flight!.

4.1.3 Since these cases may occur w h e n the engine i s accelerating o r


running a t constant speed, t h e effect of both f u l l accelerating torque
o r zero torque must be examined.
4.1.4 The acceleration and corresponding inertia forces which arise
during transient manoeuvres including those from a rolling p u l l out
should also be investigated.

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4.2 GUST EFFECTS (see Chapter 204) .


4.2.1 The discrete gust cases of paragraph 4 of Chapter 204 can be
analysed to give a maximum normal acceleration consequent upon the
aeroplane encountering an u p gust. This may occur a t any one of t h e
three aircraft design speeds, VG, VH o r VD. Regardless of the
speed a t which the maximum vertical acceleration occurs, it is
appropriate to use the maximum continuous cruising engine conditions
with the associated thrust and torque. The normal acceleration due to
a gust encounter is inversely proportional to the mass of the
aeroplane; and gust effects can therefore be critical.

4 . 2 . 2 The corresponding case of the aeroplane encountering a down


gust which gives the most severe negative acceleration should also be
considered.

4.3 S P I N N I N G A N D SPIN RECOVERY ( s e e Chapter 2 0 7 )


4.3.1 Maximum engine power and rotational speed a r e specified for
trainers and fighters to cover, i n the former case, pupil's mishandling
of the controls i n a spin, and in the latter case, t h e possibility of a
spin developing inadvertently from a steep turn a t high power. This
is consistent too with standard flying instructions for the recovery
from a spin of a twin engined aeroplane, which calls for t h e opening of
the throttle of the engine nearer the axis of the spin. The forward
speed of the aeroplane in t h e spin is low and the t h r u s t will
approximate closely to the static t h r u s t .

4 . 3 . 2 For all other aeroplanes, spinning is unlikely to occur and a


less severe case is justified. Hence the use of t h e maximum continuous
cruising rating is reasonable.

4.4 TAKE-OFF AT MAXIMUM THRUST


4.4.1 The maximum thrust produced b y the engine during take-off
should be established b y considering speeds from zero up to the
take-off condition. The value of t h e normal acceleration coefficient ( n )
should be based on the best available data and i n t h e absence of better
information values ranging from zero to a t least 1 . 5 should be
considered. For ship borne aeroplanes, the roll and pitch of the ship
will give added acceleration both positive and negative, and the value
of n should b e taken as a t least 2 1.5.

4 . 5 YAWING MANOEUVRES (see Chapter 203)


4 . 5 . 1 In the case of yawing manoeuvres a t the maximum speed in level
flight with maximum engine power conditions, it is possible for
considerable loads and couples to be exerted on t h e engine mounting as
a result of airloads on the yawed nacelle. This i s in addition to the
normal t h r u s t , torque and inertia loadings due to angular velocity and
acceleration in yaw.

4.5.2 Recommendations on the calculation of the angle of sideslip a r e


given i n Leaflet 203/1.

4.6 PROPELLER REVERSE THRUST


4.6.1 It is usual practice to operate reverse t h r u s t immediately a f t e r
touch-down. The loss of forward speed while the engines a r e being
accelerated to full, negative t h r u s t conditions can b e neglected and a
case a t the maximum touch-down speed (which should be taken as not

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less than 1 . 2 times stalling speed with flaps in the landing position)
should be examined. This will be the worst case since reverse t h r u s t
increases with aeroplane forward speed.

4.7 LANDING ( s e e Chapter 304)


4.7.1 I n all landing cases, engine idling speed is specified and hence
the only engine loads will be inertia loads. It is unlikely that the
critical condition for side and drag loading on the engine supporting
s t r u c t u r e is produced since the spin o r side load cases may well
give greater loads than the landing case. With the exception of
VSTOL installations the thrust/weight ratio of modern jet engines
makes it usual for loading in the fore and aft direction to be
determined b y engine performance r a t h e r than by inertia loading.

4.7.2 I n many cases vertical loads in landing will be covered b y the


vertical loads of symmetric flight. Serious dynamic loads however can
occur a t the engine mounting in landing, particularly where there is
appreciable overhang of the engine mass. Estimation of these loads is
usually stated in terms of a dynamic factor. In the past a value of 1.5
was often used for this b u t there is evidence to suggest that a value
of 3 . 0 may be appropriate in some conditions. These high dynamic
loads a r e likely to arise due to the sudden reduction of the wheel s p i n
up d r a g load a t the e n d of the spin up process when the vertical
reaction is still very large.

4 . 7 . 3 Any estimate of dynamic engine loads should therefore be based


on both vertical reaction and drag loads with d u e account taken of the
time relation between t h e two. In those designs w i t h overhanging
engines some distance outboards on the wings and in which a high drag
moment is applied to t h e wing during spin u p , a high dynamic load
factor may prove necessary.

4.8 SIDELOAD
4 . 8 . 1 The design load factor in the lateral direction may be determined
b y t h e maximum value obtained i n the specified flight o r ground
conditions. However an overriding limit load factor of 1 . 3 3 o r
0.33111, which e v e r is the greater, is suggested. This overriding
limit load factor may b e assumed to be independent of other flight o r
ground loads.

4.9 EXCESS TORQUE


4.9.1 The excess torque case is intended to cover the case of
powerplant malfunction. The appropriate case is that of t h e aeroplane
flying along a straight path a t the maximum climbing speed and
maximum take off power.

4 . 1 0 ENGINE MOUNTING LOADS


4 . 1 0 . 1 When the engine is mounted on a relatively flexible s t r u c t u r e ,
s u c h a s long nacelle o r pylon, t h e additional loads d u e to dynamic
structural effects should be investigated. These will include those
arising during aeroplane manoeuvres and gusts described i n paras
4 . 1 , 4 . 2 , 4 . 3 a n d 4 . 5 a s wellas those during landing, para 4 . 7 . 2 .

5 SUMMARY
5.1 A tabular summary of the basic conditions of the stressing cases which
may be critical for the engine mounting is given i n Table 1.

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Leaflet 2 0 0 / 3 Volume 1

TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF STRESSING CONDITIONS

Case Aeroplan e Aeroplane Aeroplan e Normal Engine


O perati n g Forward An g ular Acceleration Con ditions
o r Design Speed Velocity Coe f fi Cie n t
Condition

IA Recovery from “1 Ma x im u m
dive power with
and without
1B Recovery from “3 the limit
inverted dive torque

2 Flight Appropriate Max im u m Ma x im u m


i n gusts to maximum positive and continuous
acceleration negative cruising
factors values from with cor-
Chap t e r 2 04 res pon ding
para 4 t h r u s t and
torque

3 Spinning Zero Rates of 3.33)but not Ma x im u m


a >Trainers yaw and )greater power with
& fighters roll from 2.67)than and with-
b ) A l l other Zero Chapter 1 out the
aeroplanes 207 limit
torque
and maximum
rotational
speed
4 Standing a t Zero Zero a ) Land based Ma x im u m
rest (take aircraft power with
off) 1.0. and without
b ) Ship based the limit
a i rc r a f t torque
- 1.5

5 Yawing Maximum Zero but 1.0 Maxim u m


manoeuvres appropriate maxim u m power and
speed sideslip limit
angle given torque
by Leaflet
20311

6 Prop elle r 1.2vs * Zero See note Maximum


braking FL below power
w i t h reverse
pitch

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TABLE 1 (contd)

SUMMARY OF STRESSING CONDITIONS

Aeroplane Aeroplane Normal Engine


Op era ti ng Forward Angular Acceleration Conditions
o r Design Speed Velocity Coefficient
Con dition
I

I I
I Landing I L2VS
FL
* Zero See note
below
Idling

Sideload Zero Zero Zero


(see note
below)

9 Excess Max im u m Ma x i m u rn
torque Climbing power
Speed with
excess
torque,
see para
3.2.3

Notes Case 1 VS i s stalling speed i n level flight, flaps retracted

VS is stalling speed i n inverted flight, flaps retracted


in

Case 6 , 7 Vs i s stalling speed in level flight with flaps a t


FL landing setting.

The normal acceleration component in these cases


should include dynamic effects where appropriate, see
para 4.7. Fore and aft and lateral deceleration effects
should be included.

Case 8 The overriding sideload limit load factor should not


b e less than t h e lower of 1.33 or 0.33nl. No other
loads need be considered.

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LEAFLET 200 I 4

S T A T I C STRENGTH AND DEFORMATION

STRENGTH OF STRUCTURES UNDER CONDITIONS OF


HEATING AND COOLING

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 When a s t r u c t u r e is heated or cooled, the following effects need to be


taken into account:

(i) s t r e s s e s and strains caused by differential expansion within


the s t r u c t u r e ,

(ii) a temporary loss i n strength in the material due to


temperature rise,

(iii) permanent deterioration in material properties due to


prolonged exposure to high temperature, and

(iv) creep due to prolonged exposure to temperature and stress.

1 . 2 This Leaflet contains recommendations on the methods to be used in


the design of s t r u c t u r e s and in the application of safety factors to ensure
that an adequate standard of safety is maintained when thermal effects are
significant .
1 . 3 I t will not generally be necessary to allow for temperature changes
with altitude on subsonic aeroplanes, but the effect of temperature changes
on transparencies and of high temperatures in structural parts arising from
their proximity to the engines should be considered.

2 THERMAL STRESS AND STRAIN

2 . 1 When a structure* is subjected to a change in temperature each


element will tend to change its dimensions by R a T (where I is the length
in the direction being considered, a is the coefficient of thermal expansion
and T is the change in temperature). However if either a or T has
different values in different parts of the structure, the change in length
of each element may differ from R or T because of mutual constraints
between the various elements. The final length of each element will be
such that the conditions of geometrical compatibility and equilibrium of
internal forces a r e satisfied. Thermal stresses and strains are thus
induced. The amount of thermal strain in each element is equal to the
difference between the actual change in length and R a T, divided by the
length.

3 CALCULATIONS

3 . 1 The process of calculating the magnitude of the thermal stresses and


strains and their effect on the ability of the structure to withstand the
specified proof and ultimate loads involves a knowledge of:

(i) the flight plan in terms of ambient conditions and of speeds


and speed changes,

* For the purpose of this definition, a structure can be either a single


member or a n u v b e r of members joined to make a complete structure.

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(ii) the flow pattern over the surfaces of the aeroplane and the
type of flow, laminar or turbulent,

(iii) the heat transfer to the surface allowing for emission and
the convective flow from the boundary layer, and

(iv) the tenperature distribution in the s t r u c t u r e taking


account of the heat flow through complex paths and joints
and the possible presence of other heat sources and sinks.

From the temperature distribution, the thermal stresses and strains as


defined above a r e obtained.

3.2 Allowance should be made for the variability of thermal properties of


materials and structural elements, and it is preferable that design values
and their variability be determined by test wherever possible. Otherwise,
reasonably conservative values of all properties should be assumed in the
calculations.

3 . 3 The conductivity of joints may depend on the tenperature, the


p r e s s u r e between the surface and the surface finish. The variability can
be very large, but this does not necessarily result in large variations in
s t r e s s . in those cases where local stress is sensitive to the conductivity
of a particular joint, the variability should be investigated and then taken
into account when assessing the results of subsequent strength tests.

3 . 4 When external loads a r e present there a r e additional stresses and


strains which combined with the thermal stresses and strains must satisfy
t h e overall conditions of loading equilibrium and geometrical compatibility.
If the total stress is below the elastic limit the stresses and strains due to
t h e two effects a r e independent, and can therefore be calculated separately
and superimposed. However, if the total s t r e s s exceeds the elastic limit the
s t r e s s e s and strains due to the two effects a r e interdependent and should
therefore be calculated simultaneously.

3.5 The inaccuracies which arise in each stage of the calculation of


thermal stresses and strains a r e likely t o be a s great as those occurring
when estimating the magnitude and distribution of s t r e s s due to the
external loads. Hence an equal safety factor on thermal effects is
necessary and it is recommended that factored conditions should be
calculated as described in para 4.

4 FACTORED CONDITIONS

4 . 1 When the stresses due to thermal effects and to the applied loads a r e
of the same sign, the combined factored conditions for a n individual
structural member may be obtained by the method of either para 4.2 or
4 . 3 . The case when stresses a r e opposite in sign is discussed in para 4.5.
When a designer wishes to use a different method he should consult the
Aeroplane Project Director ( i n conjunction with Airworthiness Division RAE)
I
4 . 2 In the first method, the factored thermal strain for a particular
member is obtained by calculating the unfactored therinal strain assuming
no applied loads and multiplying it by the same proof and ultimate factors
a s a r e used for the loads w i t h which the thermal effects a r e to be
combined. This factored thermal strain is then added to the strain
corresponding to t h e factored loads, calculated assuming no thermal strain.

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This gives the total factored strain, and the corresponding factored s t r e s s
is obtained from t h e stress-strain curve for the particular member.
Strains, not s t r e s s e s , a r e added because thermal strain cannot produce
more s t r e s s than that corresponding to the plastic deformation if the
elastic Limit is exceeded. It is permissible to neglect the effect on adjacent
members of factoring the loads and strains, but the combined effect
obtained in this way should be treated w i t h reserve as it may result in
lower stresses than those obtained if the total forces a r e brought into
equilibrium u n d e r factored conditions b y the method of para 4 . 3 .

4.3 In the second method the loading equilibrium and geometrical


compatibility of the s t r u c t u r e a r e recalculated in the presence of the
factored loads when the thermal expansion coefficient(s1 of the rnaterial(s1
concerned is multiplied by the same proof and ultimate factors as applied to
the loads. This calculation will give the total factored strains due to the
factored loads and factored thermal effects which the member has to
withstand. This method is preferable to that stated in para 4.2 because it
is a closer approximation to what would happen in flight or in a laboratory
t e s t , but it is recognised that, for complex structure, it may not be
practicable

4.4 In both methods the thermal strain, rather than the thermal s t r e s s , is
factored, and this means that the ratio of stress at limit conditions to that
a t ultimate conditions is usually higher for thermal effects, and therefore
also for combined loading and thermal effects, than the usual values
associated with loading only. This choice was made on the grounds that an
ultimate factor on thermal s t r e s s is not justified a s far as static strength is
concerned, because thermal stresses a r e relieved when plastic deformation
occurs. As a consequence, a thorough investigation is necessary of all
fatigue and creep aspects, including creep buckling and progressive
distortion under cyclic temperature and loading conditions.

4.5 Cases where the load and thermal effects a r e opposite in sign may not
b e critical because the most severe cases may well be when either one or
other of these affects is absent. If there is a critical case when both a r e
present and the load effect is the greater it may be desirable to disregard
any alleviating thermal effects. When the thermal effect is the greater, it
appears reasonable to combine it with the load effect using the appropriate
factors. In either case, care should be taken to ensure that an adequate
net load is used for design purposes, particularly when the opposing
effects a r e comparable in magnitude.

5 DESIGN CASES

5.1 The chapters of Part 2 define the manoeuvres to be considered in


design, specifying aeroplane speeds in each case, but they do not define
those conditions giving rise to thermal stress or strain (i.e., rate of
change of speed and time spent at any given speed). For each type of
aeroplane, therefore, it is necessary to examine alI flight conditions in
which the combination of applied loads and thermal strains a r e likely to
produce critical structural loads. The following conditions should
therefore be considered :

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(i) sustained steady flight at all speeds up to VB*. in each


case at the most adverse temperature and altitude conditions
of Chapter 101, following' the appropriate manoeuvres or
gusts of Part 2, taking account of any change in
temperature due to speed changes during the manoeuvre or
gust, and
(ii) the most adverse practicable speed and altitude change
between any two sets of conditions within the speed range
up to V,,, and within the temperature and altitude
conditions of Chapter 101, immediately followed by, or
combined with, the appropriate manoeuvres or gusts of Part
2, including excursions from any point within the envelope
to VD and back.

Notes 1 When considering speed changes to or from V D , it may be


necessary in some cases to consider a longer period of time
at V than that implied by a transient excursion. This
9
w i l l epend on the length of time the aeroplane is capable of
sustaining VD.

2 The above stressing cases call for the combination of full


manoeuvre loads with the most adverse thermal effects.
Where such cases are thought to be improbable, appropriate
alternative cases should be formulated and these should be
discussed with the Aeroplane Project Director ( i n conjunction w i t h
Airworthiness Division R A E ) .

6 THERMAL EFFECTS ON MATERIALS

6 . 1 Structural materials may suffer a temporary loss in strength while at


high temperature, and also permanent deterioration in properties due to
prolonged exposure to high teniperature (see AvP932). The material
properties assumed in calculations should, therefore, take account of the
temperature that could occur in the case considered, the time for which it
is maintained, and also the temperature history. Both upper and lower
limits of the values of the various properties should be considered in cases
where the thermal strains may either aggravate or relieve the s t r e s s due to
the applied loads. In any estimate of s t r u c t u r e life under conditions of
thermal degradation and/or creep, an appropriate allowance should be made
for the variability of material properties, the variability, between
individual aeroplanes, of structural temperatures, and the variability of
operational conditions and also to cover other unknowns such as thermal
cycling effects and the interaction between these and fatigue.

* V K is the rnaximum permitted speed for continuous cruising, and


may be based on handling qualities, structural strength or engine
limitations. For the purpose of these stressing cases it should be
chosen for the particular aeroplane and need not be greater than the
expected Service limiting speed for the type.

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6.2 This Leaflet does not call for the provision of a safety margin by an
a r b i t r a r y increase in the structural temperature, either directly by
'factoring the temperature o r indirectly by factoring the design speed.
Thus flight in excess of the design speed could lead to a temperature
higher than that considered in design. Although cases of exceeding the
design speed a r e r a r e , it is recommended that, as far as practicable,
materials should be used which do not suffer a substantial reduction in
properties a t a temperature slightly higher than that corresponding to the
design speed.
7 GROUND T E S T S

7.1 When s t r e n g t h t e s t s including thermal effects a r e necessary to


demonstrate compliance with the requirements, the factored loads and, if
practicable, the factored thermal strains should be applied. The method of
simulating the factors on thermal strain should be discussed with the
Aeroplane Project Director (-inconjunction with Airworthiness Division RAE).

7.2 It should be noted that, in order to obtain realistic conditions in any


structural member, it will usually be necessary to test it as part of the
complete s t r u c t u r e so that all balancing loads can be developed. When this
is not done, results of the t e s t s should be interpreted bearing in mind any
differences between t h e actual and the applied balancing loads.

8 INSTABILITY FAILURES

8.1 For s t r u c t u r e s in which failure by instability is possible, thermal


strain may cause instability which could be followed by structural collapse
under low external loads, whereas neither the thermal strain nor even the
design ultimate load would cause collapse when applied separately. It is
important, therefore, that this effect be taken into account in all design
cases when considering the combination of thermal strain and applied
load.

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 200/5

STATIC STRENGTH AND DEFORMATION


CONSIDERATIONS IN SETTING PERMISSIBLE FLIGHT LOADS FOR
EXPERIMENTAL AND PROTOTYPE AEROPLANES

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Full structural certification of a new aeroplane project normally
involves a substantial programme of analysis, structural tests and flight
loads measurement.

1.2 The total programme is costly and time-consuming and a reduced


version is commonly used to assess t h e structural strength of experimental
aeroplanes. I n consequence the permissible flight loads a r e restricted.

1.3 Similarly, early prototypes of a design destined to go into production


need to be flown before the total programme is completed and permissible
flight loads a r e again restricted.

1.4 The extent of the restriction that is imposed will depend upon a
number of considerations, the main ones being listed in para 3.

1 . 5 The following guidelines indicate the levels of release that a r e likely


t o be acceptable.

2 GUIDELINES FOR SETTING PERMISSIBLE PLIGHT LOADS

2 . 1 For prototype aeroplanes it is customary to compare the data from


flight measurements and major structural tests. Flight loads a r e gradually
increased to the extent of those demonstrated on the major static test
specimen .
2 . 2 Flight to 80% of the design limit load is usually permitted only after

t h e static test specimen has successfully sustained the design limit load and
sufficient confirmation of flight loads exists.

2 . 3 Exceptionally a ground proving test may be conducted on the flight


aeroplane itself and in these circumstances flight may be permitted to 87%
of the load sustained on test providing that no significant degradation is
anticipated within the proposed flight environment.

2.4 Flight beyond 80% of the design limit load, other than in accordance
with para 2 . 3 , is normally permitted only after the static test specimen has
demonstrated t h e higher loads multiplied b y the usual factor of safety of
1.5.

2 . 5 I n the absence of an acceptable programme of flight loads measurement


o r structural t e s t t h e release conditions arising from the chosen method of
substantiating the strength of the structure would need to b e reduced to
allow for the added uncertainties. Exceptionally, in the absence of both
flight loads measurement and relevant test data flight should not be
permitted beyond 50%of the design limit load.

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2 . 6 T h u s , there are 4 benchmarks to be considered i n setting permissible


flight loads :

( i ) Test to design ultimate loads, accompanied by a substantial


programme of analysis and flight loads measurement; flight
to 100% design limit load.

( i i ) Test of flight aeroplane itself to design limit load,


accompanied by an acceptable programme of analysis and
flight loads measurement: flight to 87% design limit load.

( i i i ) Test to design limit load, accompanied b y an acceptable


programme of analysis and flight loads measurement; flight
to 80%design limit load.

( i v ) Analysis alone w i t h no supporting tests and no flight loads


measurement; flight to 50% design limit load.

3 CONSIDERATIONS IN SETTING PERMISSIBLE FLIGHT LOADS FOR


EXPERIMENTAL AND PROTOTYPE AEROPLANES

3.1 Are there satisfactory calculations for all significant structural


parts, and a r e there the calculations based on estimated, o r measured
loads?
3.2 Have there b e e n ground tests of items relevant to strength
determination, and with what loading information?

3 . 3 Is the aeroplane instrumented for the direct or indirect measurement


of flight loads?
3 . 4 Has there been any prior flight o r test evidence of relevance on similar
airframe configurations , materials and methods of construction?

3.5 Are any special inspection, condition monitoring, o r ground NDT


procedures (including proof testing) being adopted to ensure a high
standard for construction or is there frequent inspection throughout the
flight programme coupled with higher standards of maintenance, repair and
replacement?

3.6 Can reduced standards be accepted by reason of flight in remote


regions, unmanned flight, or through reliable escape systems?

3 . 7 Does the flight programme itself impose a well disciplined procedure,


with progressive increase i n clearance, avoidance of adverse flight
conditions and weather, and with better than average pilots?

3.8 Are the total flight hours required relatively small, and can account
be taken of statistically reduced load occurrence, o r absence of fatigue
considerations?

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Volume 1

CHAPTER 201

FATIGUE DAMAGE TOLERANCE


1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Fatigue damage tolerance is the capability of a structure to maintain,


with an acceptable probability, satisfactory strength and stiffness whilst
containing insidious damage until it is detected by scheduled inspection or
t h e s t r u c t u r e i s withdrawn from service at the end of its specified life, or
an equivalent life, having taken account of its actual usage. Insidious
damage could be caused for example by manufacture, handling, corrosion
o r fatigue.

1.2 This chapter states the principles that shall be followed in


establishing compliance with the requirement of a specified life.

1.3 The requirements apply to airframes and mechanical components ,


including undercarriages and systems. They apply to all structurally
significant details and those whose failure would impose a significant
economic burden. The requirements refer primarily to metal details, but
the principles apply equally to composite parts unless they a r e shown to be
insensitive to fatigue

1 . 4 The safe life approach is central to the requirements, but this is


supplemented by two important safeguards :

(i> To ensure that the materials used have good resistance to the
growth of detectable damage, in the event that in-service
difficulties dictate the need for inspection to maintain
airworthiness.

(ii) To ensure that design details are reasonably tolerant to


increases in spectrum severity, such a s those which arise
from uncertainties in identifying and quantifying loads and i n
structural analysis, increases in all u p weight and changes in
the way in which aeroplanes a r e used.

1.5 The effect of an increase in spectrum severity is to produce a


reduction in the life. However, some structural details, such as low load
t r a n s f e r joirits, a r e more sensitive to increases in spectrum severity, and
i t is these alone which govern the life of the structure when the severity
of loading is increased. These particularly sensitive details shall be
identified at the design stage and their stresses reduced, in order to
provide a tolerance to increased spectrum severity that is as good as the
r e s t of the structure. Exceptionally, if the sensitive detail .concerned is
easily and economically inspectable and replaceable there may be no need
t o reduce the allowable stress. Design for ease of inspection and
replacement is therefore encouraged. However, inspections should not
normally be necessary under the specified loading and environmental
conditions.

1 . 6 When the requirements a r e applied to new projects, two airframe tests


a r e required. The first shall take place at the pre-production stage and
should be completed in time for any substantial design changes to be made
early in the production r u n . The second test shall be done on a
i production structure.

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1 . 7 The requirements address only tolerance to fatigue damage, although


the use of materials w i t h good fracture toughness can have advantages in
providing tolerance to other forms of damage, such as bird strikes and
uncontained engine failures.

1.8 The steps to be followed i n designing to meet these requirements a r e


summarised i n Fig 1.

1 . 9 Definitions a r e given in para 6 .

2 SAFE-LIFE DETAILS

2.1 To qualify as a safe-life detail the following conditions shall b e


satisfied:

( i ) The safe life under the specified loading and environmental


conditions shall be equal to at least the specified life o r ,
exceptionally, to a lower life at which it is acceptable for the
detail to be modified o r replaced, having regard to economic
and operational penalties.

( i i ) The safe life with all the loads amplified b y a factor of 1.20
shall be equal to a t least one half of the life established i n
(i).

( i i i ) The material from which the detail is made shall have good
resistance to the growth of detectable damage.

( i v ) The detail shall not be susceptible to damage by impact,


environment o r abnormalities i n manufacture and/or
maintenance.

3 INSPECTION-DEPENDENT DETAILS

3.1 A detail need not satisfy the conditions of para 2.1(ii), (iii) a n d
( i v ) and may be treated as inspection-dependent if t h e economic and
operational consequences of inspection and any subsequent modification or
replacement a r e acceptable.

3.2 To enable this assessment to be made, the following shall be


established :

( i ) The safe life under both anticipated and amplified loading.

(ii) The likelihood of damage by impact, maintenance,


environment or abnormalities in manufacture.

(iii) The average damage growth curve to critical damage size


under both anticipated and amplified loading from the smallest
damage that can be detected w i t h an inspection technique
that is acceptable to the Services.

( i v ) The inspection technique reliability curve for t h e range of


damage growth i n (iii).

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(v) The maximum inspection interval under both anticipated and amplified
loading such that the probability of damage propagating to the
critical size without detection is acceptably low.

4 SERVICE MONITORING

4.1 Acceptable instrumentation shall be provided in every aeroplane for the purpose of
estimating the fatigue life consumption of the significant details of the aeroplane
throughout the life.

4.2 In addition a few aeroplanes in the fleet shall be provided with comprehensive
instrumentation, to define the loads on the major structural components in each of the
roles in which the aeroplane is used.

5 DEMONSTRATION OF COMPLIANCE

5.1 Compliance with the requirements shall be demonstrated by calculations supported


by relevant tests on details, sub-assemblies and the structure, component or system
as a whole. Guidance on acceptance procedures is given in the accompanying Leaflets.

5.2 For new projects two major fatigue tests are required:

(i) A pre-production airframe shall be tested to at least three times


the specified life under the design spectrum, in time for all
significant design changes arising from the test to be incorporated
in production aeroplanes with a minimum of retrospective
modification.

(ii) A production airfme shall be tested preferably under the actual


service loading as derived from a programme of operational loads
measurement, but an earlier test may be needed if major shortcomings
are revealed by the pre-production test.

Both these tests shall be continued for five times the specified life (or an equivalent
life) or until the specimen, through reasons of repair or production changes, is no
longer representative.

5.3 If a detail has a test life factor that is higher than that used in the airframe or
component test, or if the detail is sensitive to environmental effects it shall be shown
that acceptable allowances have been made in design.

5.4 After completion of the fatigue test a residual strength test and, where relevant,
measurements of residual stiffness may be required.

5.5 A tear down inspection of all major load carrying structure shall be carried out
after completion of tests.

5.6 Results of these tests and the tear down inspection shall be fully reported in the
Fatigue Type Record (FI’R) (ref DEF STAN 05-123 Chapter 333).

i 5.7 All compliance procedures and judgements are subject to the approval of the
Aeroplane Project Director (in conjunction with Airworthiness Div, RAE).

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6 COMPLIANCE OF AEROPLANES NOT DESIGNED TO DEF STAN 00-970


(See also Part 2 Appendix 1 Para 4)

6.1 Where civil and military aeroplanes not designed to DEF STAN 00-970 are being
considered by the MOD Procurement Executive to meet Staff Requirements (Air), they
might need to be assessed to show compliance with this Chapter if there are to be
changes in role or changes to meet specific military requirements involving structural
modifications. Leaflet 201/8 contains an analytical procedure to be used when making
this assessment. The need for and the extent of the assessment will be as detailed in
the Aeroplane Specification or as directed by the Aeroplane Project Director. Neither
this para nor Leaflet 201/8 apply to aeroplanes designed to jointly agreed requirements
formulated by members of an international collaborative project of which the UK is a
partner.

7 DEFINITIONS

7.1 GENERAL
7.1.1 Life. This is a period of service usage expressed as a number of flying
hours, or a number of landings or in terms of any other parameter that is
acceptable to the Aeroplane Project Director (in conjunction with Airworthiness
Division, RAE).

7.1.2 Specified Life. This is the reference life which the item is required to
achieve when subjected to the spectra of environmental conditions (particularly
loads, temperatures and humidities) specified for design. It is usual to specify
spectra which are believed to be typical of the anticipated operating conditions.
The weakest item will nomally have a safe life of at least the specified life under
the specified conditions.

7.1.3 Equivalent Life. With an associated loading spectrum, an equivalent life


produces the same fatigue damage as the specified life with the specified loading
spectrum.

7.1.4 Safe Life. The safe life of an item is the life at which the weakest
example just retains the required standard of strength, deformation, stiffness or
mechanical function. The minimum standard of strength is 80% of the design
ultimate.

7.1.5 Test Life Factor. This is the ratio of the mean life of a detail to the
safe life of that detail under a loading severity for which the required safe life
is just achieved.

7.2 STRUCTURE
7.2.1 Structural Detail. A structural detail is part of a component such as a
joint, a panel or a structural or mechanical assembly.

7.2.2 Structurally Significant Detail. A structurally significant detail is one


whose failure would cause an unacceptable change in structural strength,
deformation or stiffness or an unacceptable loss of structural or mechanical
function.

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7.2.3 Safe-Life Detail. A safe-life detail is one that is capable of maintaining


satisfactory strength -and stiffness, until the structure is withdrawn from service
at the end of its specified life, or an equivalent life having taken into account
the actual usage.

7.2.4 Inspection.-Dependent Detail. An inspection-dependent detail is one that is


capable of maintaining satisfactory strength and stiffness whilst containing
insidious damage such as may be caused by manufacture, handling, corrosion or
fatigue until such damage is detected by scheduled inspection.

7.2.5 Critical Damage Size. The critical damage size for a structural detail is
the maximum size to which damage may grow without changing to an unacceptable
degree the strength, deformation or stiffness of the structure, or impeding the
function of a mechanical system.

7.3 INSPECTION
7.3.1 Inspection System. An inspection system is the repeated application of an
inspection process to a particular structural detail at regular and predefined
intervals, commencing at a particular point in the life of the detail.

7.3.2 Inspection Interval. The inspection interval is the predetermined scheduled


interval between inspections, expressed in terms of an appropriate parameter.

7.3.3 Overall Probability of Detection. The overall probability of detection is


the probability that damage will be detected in a structural detail before it
propagates to critical size during the anticipated usage.

7.3.4 Threshold Damage Size. The threshold size of damage is the maximum size
of damage that has a zero probability of detection when subject to the application
of a specified inspection process.

7.3.5 Threshold Time. The threshold time is the point in the life of a detail
corresponding to the achievement of damage of threshold size.

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Chapter 201 Volume 1

PRELIMINARY DESIGN -
or RE- DESIGN A
L

I,

IS S A F E LIFE WITH
ANTICIPATED LOADS NO -
ACCEPTABLE?
I

-a
DOES MATERIAL HAVE
GOOD RESISTANCE TO
T H E GROWTH OF
DETECTABLE DAMAGE?
I
YES
t
NO -
TAKE OPTION
TO RE-DESIGN?

NO

I
-YES

IS S A F E LIFE WITH
ANTICIPATED LOADS
FACTORED x1.20
\ - NO
DETERMINE:
1 T H E S A F E LIFE*
ACCEPTABLE? \ 2 T H E LIKELIHOOD OF DAMAGE
B Y IMPACT,MAINTENANCE,
ENVIROMENT, O R
YES MANUFACTURING DEFECTS.
t 3 INSPECTION RELIABILITY
IS DETAIL PROTECTED 4 AVERAGE DAMAGE
FROM DAMAGE BY IMPACT, GROWTH CURVE*
MAINTENANCE, ENVIROMENT 5 INSPECTION INTERVAL*
AND MANUFACTURING DEFECTS? * For both anticipated
and amplified loading
i
YES

ARE INSPECTION
INTERVALS
SAFE-LIFE ACCEPTABLE?
ROUTE

I INSPECTION-

DEPENDENT ROUTE
YES
1

APPROVAL

FIG 1 STEPS TO BE FOLLOWED IN DESIGNING TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 201/1

FATIGUE DAMAGE TOLERANCE

MAIN FEATURES OF THE REQUIREMENT

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The main aims of the requirement a r e to provide a good safe life
u n d e r the anticipated usage and to provide tolerance to damage caused b y
increases in the severity of loading with the changes in usage occurring
during many years of service. Those details which a r e u n d u l y sensitive
t o increases i n loading severity, and a r e difficult or uneconomic to inspect
and modify o r replace, must have their stresses reduced. B y identifying
sensitive details in t h i s way, any increases i n mass a r e small and a r e
applied only where they are most effective.

1 . 2 This leaflet describes an acceptable procedure for estimating the life


of structurally significant details, as required b y Chapter 201, and shows
how compliance with the specified life can be established. Further advice
on the main features of these requirements is given i n Ref. 1.

1.3 The safe life approach is central to the requirements, b u t if the


economic and operational consequences of inspection and modification or
replacement a r e acceptable then an inspection-dependent approach may be
adopted.

1.4 The requirements of Chapter 2 0 1 and its supporting advisory leaflets


contain provisions that a r e expected to result in a substantial reduction i n
maintenance and repair costs. These include:

(i) A requirement to use materials with relatively good resistance


to t h e growth of detectable damage.

(ii) A requirement to design structural details which have a good


fatigue life a n d which a r e relatively insensitive to increases in
t h e severity of t h e anticipated loads.

(iii) The introduction of a preliminary airframe fatigue test to.


obtain indications of areas of weakness in time for any
necessary changes to be incorporated in most production
aeroplanes during man u fact Ure.
1.5 Owing to uncertainties in identifying and quantifying design loads and
i n structural analysis, increases in all up weight and changes in the way in
which aeroplanes a r e used, many structural details are found to experience
a more severe fatigue spectrum than anticipated in t h e original design.
Consequently, supplementary calculations must be performed to identify
those structural details which a r e sensitive to increases in s t r e s s so that,
w h e r e appropriate, design changes can b e made to protect the structure
a g a i n s t i n c r e a s e s in operational s t r e s s e s . These supplementary
calculations m u s t show that each structurally significant detail has a safe
life of not less than half of the specified life with the loads elevated b y a
factor of 1.20. Design changes may not be necessary if t h e detail can
easily and economically be inspected and modified or replaced.

1.6 Compliance will normally be demonstrated by tests which include two


examples of complete items and will b e supported b y calculations.
Exceptionally, w h e n calculations show a large margin on t h e specified life,
a test may be deemed unnecessary.

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1.7 The fatigue substantiation of each structurally significant detail is to


b e summarised and recorded in a Fatigue Type Record (FTR). The
procedure to be followed in preparing this document should be in
accordance with DEF STAN 05-123 Chapter 333.

1.8 The first part of the FTR will contain an introductory statement
outlining the philosophy used in design and test and describing the
principal design features that affect fatigue considerations in the operation
of the aeroplane. The second part will contain a formal statement of the
fatigue Substantiation of each structurally significant detail, using the
d e s i g n spectrum confirmed o r modified a s n e c e s s a r y b y f l i g h t
measurements of the maximum and minimum loads associated with the
principal fatigue damaging manoeuvres. The third part will be an
accountable (continually up-dated) document recording, for each detail,
the supplementary substantiation for fatigue and residual strength arising
from the actual operational usage. I t w i l l also contain a formal statement
of the substantiation of each modification.

1.9 The requirements refer primarily to metal details, but the principles
apply equally to composite p a r t s unless they a r e shown to be insensitive to
fati gue .
2 MATERIAL SELECTION

2.1 For compliance w i t h t h e requirements of Chapter 2 0 1 para 1 . 4 ( i ) ,


materials used in the design of structurally significant items should have
good resistance to the growth of detectable damage.

2.2 For metals, tolerance to crack growth under fatigue loads is


dependent upon crack growth rate, whilst residual strength is dependent
upon fracture toughness. Thus crack propagation rate and fracture
toughness provide a means of assessing t h e relative performance of
metals.

2.3 Good fracture toughness also aids resistance to discrete source


damage, e.g., disc b u r s t , bird strike, etc.

2.4 Exceptionally, a material which has a relatively low rating may b e used
in a structurally significant detail. There may be economic or operational
reasons for the limited use of such a material, but each individual case
must be discussed with t h e Aeroplane Project Director (in conjunction
with the Airworthiness Division, RAE).

2.5 In selecting a material, consideration should be given to the


environmental conditions i n which t h e material will operate.

2.6 Leaflet 2 0 1 / 2 gives guidance on material selection.

3 SUBSTANTIATION OF FATIGUE LIFE

3.1 Compliance with the safe life requirements of Chapter 201 is normally
achieved b y calculations supported b y a comprehensive series of tests.
These tests must be agreed with t h e Aeroplane Project Director (in
conjunction with the Airworthiness Division, RAE). Guidance is given in
Leaflet 201/3.

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3.2 There is considerable variability in the fatigue performance of


nominally identical details subjected to the same loading conditions.
Allowance must be made for t h i s variability b y t h e use of scatter factors;
which ensure that the weakest element has a safe life which is not less than
t h e specified life.

3 . 3 I n order to use these scatter factors in estimating a safe fatigue life,


it is recommended that a 'Safe S-N curve' be constructed (Leaflet 201/3
para 2 . 2 ) . To do t h i s , the estimated mean S-N curve is reduced b y a
factor on life, where the curve is steep, and b y a factor on stress where
t h e curve is more or less flat. The two parts a r e faired together to give
t h e allowable curve upon which the calculated life is based.

3 . 4 The factors to allow for scatter in the fatigue performance of metal


details a r e normally 3 on life and 1 . 5 on stress, but there is evidence that
higher factors may be required i n some instances.

3.5 The assumptions made i n deriving loading spectra can have a


significant influence on the design and on the validity and duration of
tests. Guidance on acceptable procedures is given in Leaflet 201/3 para 3.

3.6 The safe S-N curve referred to i n para 3 . 3 covers only the
variability in fatigue performance. Considerable scatter exists in the
severity of loading i n a n y one role, and where the service loading of an
individual aeroplane is not monitored, it is customary to apply an
additional factor (see Leaflet 201/3 para 4 ) .

3 . 7 The shape of the S-N curve is of major importance when the severity
of the service loading differs markedly from that used on test. Additional
factors may b e required, depending upon the relative severity of t h e
service and test loadings and the slope of the S-N curve (see Leaflet 201/3
para 5.1).

3.8 Leaflet 201/3 Para 5 . 2 outlines acceptable procedures for making


allowance for t h e uncertainties in calculations based on element data alone.

4 SUBSTANTIATION OF DAMAGE GROWTH AND ASSOCIATED INSPECTION


PROCEDURES

4 . 1 I t is desirable that structural details s h o u l d be substantiated on a safe


life basis. However, if the economic and operational consequences of
inspection a r e acceptable, t h e n they may be s u b s t a n t i a t e d a s
inspection-dependent. Leaflet 201/4 gives guidance on acceptable
methods of compliance.

4 . 2 The crack growth curve for metal details can be determined b y an


acceptable linear elastic fracture mechanics approach, in which the crack
propagation data takes account of the mean stress and threshold s t r e s s
intensity factor. There is, however, considerable variability in t h e crack
propagation life of nominally identical specimens subjected to the same
loading. Leaflet 201/4 gives guidance on how to allow for this variation
and on factors to cover other uncertainties.

4 . 3 Leaflet 201/4 also outlines methods of determining inspection intervals


which will give an acceptable probability of detecting damage.

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Leaflet 201/1 Volume 1

5 FATIGUE DAMAGE TOLERANCE TESTING

5.1 Compliance with Chapter 201 will be supported by a series of tests on


elements, details, sub-assemblies and full-scale structures.

5.2 *4ny shortcomings in the design must be identified before a


significant number of aeroplanes have been manufactured. To achieve
this, an early major fatigue test should be performed on an airframe
manufactured to the anticipated initial production build standard.
Ideally, the second airframe manufactured should be used.

5.3 The loading for t h e preproduction fatigue test will be based upon the
specified flight profiles and estimated load spectrum and will be applied in
a representative sequence. The loading and the control system will be
simplified as far as possible to achieve t h e test aims of Chapter 201 para
5.2(i). For the same reason, any repairs shown to be necessary by the
testing should be as simple as possible.

5 . 4 The major aim of the pre-production fatigue test is to complete three


lifetimes under the anticipated loads in the shortest possible time;
ideally a t least one lifetime should be achieved before first flight. The
need for any further testing, a s required b y Chapter 201, must be agreed
with the Aeroplane Project Director (in conjunction with Airworthiness
Division, R A E ) .

5.5 Subject to no major shortcomings being revealed by the pre-production


fatigue test, a production fatigue test will be started nuch later in the
programme when aeroplanes have been in operational service and the flight
profiles and use of the aeroplanes a r e well establishd. The loading for a
later test of this kind will be derived from an operational flight loads
measurement programme. The specimen will be subjected to typical flight
profiles and utilisation, and loads will be applied in a flight-by-flight or
other representative sequence. During the test, special aeroplane
inspections ( S I , STI, PWI etc). , modifications and servicing should be
applied to the specimen at the appropriate time.

5.6 Tests of residual strength and, where appropriate, stiffness may be


required on the specimens to demonstrate adequate structural integrity in
the cracked condition. Tear down inspection will be required to locate
any damage which was not revealed during the earlier tests. This
information will assist in any life extension programmes.

5.7 Leaflet 2 0 1 / 5 gives details of an acceptable programme of tests to


comply with Chapter 201.

6 SERVICE MONITORING

6.1 Leaflet 2 0 1 /6 outlines acceptable procedures to provide :


(i) A system for t h e fleetwide monitoring of the fatigue
consumption of each aeroplane.

(ii) An operational loads measurement (OLM) programme which


comprises comprehensive instrumentation to define the loads
on the major structural components. This may be restricted
to a few aeroplanes in the fleet. The data from this system
form the basis of the Production Fatigue Test (see Leaflet
2 0 1 / 5 ) and also provides the link between the individual
aeroplane and the results from t h e major fatigue test.

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Volume 1 Leaflet 201 / 1

7 SERVICE BEYOND THE SPECIFIED LIFE OR AN EQUIVALENT LIFE

7.1 Experience has shown that there is often a requirement to operate


beyond the specified life or an equivalent life. This may be due to
increases in loads caused by changes i n the operational role, increased
weight, additional stores or a general requirement for the aeroplane to
remain i n service for a longer period of time.

7.2 In general, extensions cannot be granted for safe life parts unless a
reassessment reveals suitable margins, or an acceptable inspection system
can be developed.

7.3 In order to justify a life extension it is necessary to reassess each


structurally significant detail. Stricter and additional inspections,
s t r u c t u r a l re-work, modifications or replacement may be required. Due
consideration must be taken of any residual strength tests and 'tear down'
inspections. Additional testing may be necessary to achieve the required
life extension.

7.4 Leaflet 20117 gives guidance on the topics to be considered when the
specified life is to be extended.

REFERENCES

No Au thor Title etc

1 Cardrick A.W. 'How future UK military aircraft will be


Maxwell R D J & designed for tolerance to fatigue damage'
Morrow, Sarah M. (Proceedings of I Mech E International
Conference on Fatigue of Engineering Materials
and Structures
Univ of Sheffield, Sept. 1986).

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 201/2

FATIGUE DAMAGE TOLERANCE

MATERIAL SELECTION

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 This leaflet refers only t o the selection of metallic materials. Guidance
is given on the parameters which should be considered in t h e assessment
of damage tolerance qualities.

1.2 It is considered that the data customarily obtained on crack


propagation rates, threshold stress intensity factors and fracture
toughness can b e used to provide an index of material performance to be
u s e d i n identifying materials with undesirable damage t o l e r a n c e
characteristics, so that these can be avoided. This will automatically
provide a certain degree of damage tolerance, even for those structural
details that are not recognised as critical. A method of determining an
index which takes into account these various influences a n d , i n
particular, tolerance to the growth of detectable cracks, has yet to be
d efi ned .
1 . 3 Under static loads, tolerance to cracks is dependent on the fracture
toughness of the material. The fracture toughness is also dependent on
t h e material thickness, temperature and grain orientation. For material
selection purposes, the comparison should recognise the importance of
both the absolute value of fracture toughness and its value relative to the
proof static strength. Alloys and heat treatments developed to give high
static strength do not necessarily give increased fracture toughness.
The reverse is often the case, and this can result in very small critical
crack lengths. A u s e f u l guide to the tolerance to cracks is provided b y
comparing t h e reference crack length of materials, a,,f, using the
formula:

2
a - -
K
ref d
o. 2
The comparison should be made i n the three principal directions in which
t h e fracture toughness K is measured.

1 . 4 U n d e r fatigue loads, tolerance to crack growth is required and t h i s


is dependent on both the threshold stress intensity factor and the shape
of t h e da/dN v s A K curve. Tolerance to crack growth can b e assessed in
terms of the crack propagation performance from a crack of detectable
size a t s t r e s s levels representative of t h e use of the material in
fatigue-sensitive locations. Materials with high fracture toughness do not
always exhibit slow rates of crack growth.

1.5 There is evidence to show that crack propagation rates a r e influenced


b y environment, and t h i s should be taken into account where necessary.

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Leaflet 201/2 Volume 1

1 . 6 In cases where insufficient materials data a r e available, a programme


of testing will be required. This could take the form of either a test
programme to determine a material performance index or a programme of
comparative tests against a material with an acceptable established
p e r for man ce.

1 . 7 Exceptionally a material with a relatively low rating i n the selection


criteria might still be acceptable for limited use i n the main load paths if
there were overriding reasons for its use, and appropriate special
precautions could be taken.

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 201 / 3

FATIGUE DAMAGE TOLERANCE

SUBSTANTIATION OF FATIGUE LIFE

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Compliance with the safe life requirements of Chapter 201 wil normally
be demonstrated by a balanced programme of calculations and tests on
elements , sub-assemblies and major components.

1.2 If environmental conditions affect the fatigue-sensitive parts of the


s t r u c t u r e , and if they are not to be reproduced in the major test, a
satisfactory programme of supporting tests must be done. For instance, it
might be necessary to include large and realistically complex boxes tested
t o failure a t room temperature 'as manufactured! and under cyclic
environmental conditions.

1.3 Guidance is given on:

(i) Allowances for scatter in the performance of nominally


identical details when they are subjected to the same loading.
This includes safe S-N curves and test life factors for
details and major tests.

(U) Derivation of loading spectra for calculations and tests.

(iii) Allowances for variations in service loading when this is not


monitored.

(iv) Allowances for uncertainties in calculations when:


(a> Calculated adjustments are made to component test data
to allow for a change in the severity of service loading from
that represented in the test, and

(b) Calculations are based upon element data alone.

2 ALLOWANCES FOR SCATTER IN FATIGUE PERFORMANCE

2.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS


2.1.1 There is a considerable scatter in the fatigue performance of
s t r u c t u r a l details when they a r e subjected to the same loading
conditions.

2.1.2 When metal details, such a s fastened joints in aluminium alloy,


a r e tested using a severe spectrum for the wing bending of combat
aeroplanes, it is commonly found that the scatter i n life conforms
approximately to a log normal distribution with a loglo standard
deviation of about 0.11. This scatter implies that about 1 in 1000
details would fail a t about half the mean test life.

2.1.3 For certification purposes, however, the mean life of such


details is usually estimated from t h e life achieved in a major fatigue
t e s t . Therefore, an allowance must be made for the scatter in the
test result itself. A factor must be found which, when applied to the
test result, gives the low probability of failure that is desired.

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2 . 1 . 4 I f the test life of the detail was exactly equal to the t r u e mean,
and if this was divided b y a factor of 2 to give the service life, then
a t the end of this life t h e probability of failure would rise to about 1
i n 1000. I f the test life was say 20% lower than the true mean, the
risk of failure i n service would b e nearer 1 i n 10,000. However, if the
test mean was 20% high, there would be a disproportionate increase i n
the probability of failure, which would rise to nearer 1 i n 100.
Furthermore, if the test result were 508 high the probability of
failure would approach 1 i n 10.

2.1.5 If a factor of 2' was used for this detail, i n successive


projects, then occasionally an early failure would occur because the
test airframe was stronger than the mean. Once the weakness had
been discovered, however, appropriate action would be taken to
contain the problem, and whilst there might be economic penalties
the r i s k of catastrophic failure would be less than t h a t anticipated
statistically. T h i s p r a c t i c a l a l l e v i a t i o n o f t h e r i s k of
catastrophe was recognised b y Bullen' when he proposed that the
allowance for uncertainty i n the mean need not be made to the 9 5 8
confidence level. Instead he proposed a less conservative statistical
method which is designed to ensure that the desired probability is
obtained on average. TJsing this method, the test life of the detail
considered here would need to be reduced b y a factor of 3.0 i n order
to achieve a probability of failure in service of about 1 i n 1000. The
Bullen approach forms the basis of the factors recommended i n this
leaflet.

2.1.6 If sufficient specimens could be tested under a less severe


spectrum, the detail considered would b e found to exhibit higher
scatter in life. If the severity of loading was then further reduced s o
that the mean life was on t h e relatively flat part of the endurance
curve, the scatter i n life would become so large that it would be of no
practical value. The problem is overcome by using a factor on stress.

2.1.7 It is found that the scatter in s t r e s s can be satisfactorily


analysed using a normal distribution. For metal details the coefficient
of variation i n s t r e s s would commonly be in the region of 0.09. In
these circumstances a test factor of 1.5 on service stresses ( r a t h e r
than a factor on life) would b e needed to limit the probability of
failure i n service to about 1 i n 1000.

2.1.8 Thus, there is a continuous endurance curve which differs from


the mean test performance b y a factor on life a t high loading severities
and b y a factor on s t r e s s where the severity is low. This curve
corresponds to R fixed probability of failure in service for the loading
spectrum i n question. The size of t h e factors on life and s t r e s s
depend upon the scatter, the statistical method used to set the desired
probability of failure and t h e n u m b e r of details that a r e tested to
establish the mean. If an airframe o r component contains several
nominally iden tical details which a r e subjected to nominally identical
loading, this may also need to be taken into account.

2.2 THE SAFE S-N CURVE


2.2.1 I n order to use the test factors on life and stress in estimating
a safe life, o r generating a test spectrum, it is necessary to apply them
to the estimated mean constant amplitude S-N curve for the detail and

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blend them together to form a'safe S - N curve'. The need to blend the
curves arises w h e n the shape of the S-N curve for constant amplitude
loading differs from that under t h e spectrum loading from w h i e h t h e
scatter data was derived.

2.2.2 Evidence on the scatter of structural details of aluminium alloy,


titanium alloy, NiCrMo steel and maraging steel under spectrum
loading2 suggests that factors of 3 on life and 1.5 on stress a r e likely
to be satisfactory for most details i n these materials. A n exception is
that of steel details having a relatively high ratio of fatigue to static
strength ( n o appreciable fretting and K t s 2 . 5 ) where higher values
may be required. Evidence must be presented to support the factors
that are used.

2.2.3 For metal details w i t h a low ratio of fatigue to static strength


the safe curves corresponding to the life of 3 and stress factor of 1.5
a r e often almost coincident. A s the ratio of fatigue to static strength
increases, however, and the curves become less steep, a controlled
method is needed i n order to blend them consistently.

2.2.4 The aim should be to produce a safe S-N curve that blends the
life and stress factors w h i l s t having much the same shape as the mean
S - N curve. For consistency, the safe S-N curve s h o u l d be in
accordance with the following graphical procedure:

( i ) The mean and safe curves should be of t h e usual form


where s, A, G and m a r e

constants, and should be constructed on a diagram of


linear S versus log N.

(ii) The mean S-N curve should be drawn through the half-
cycle point a t a 'static' value of S defined b y the
difference between the mean static strength of the
material and the appropriate fatigue mean stress. This
ensures that the mean static strength will never be
exceeded.

(iii) I n drawing the safe S-N curve the 'static' value of S


should be 1owered.by relating it to the safe (1 in 1000)
value of static strength instead of the mean value, so
that the safe value is n e v e r exceeded.

( i v ) I n moving u p and down the safe curve from the region


where the curve is relatively steep t h e life factor
should be retained as long as possible whilst complying
with ( v ) below.

( v ) To keep the shape of the mean curve whilst moving u p


or down the safe curve, the change in distance
between the safe and mean curves (measured normal to
t h e mean curve) must not change sign.

Examples of mean and safe S - N curves for aluminium alloy details a r e


shown in Fig. 1.

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2 . 2 . 5 Appropriate allowance must be made in adjusting the safe S-N


curve to other mean stresses.

2.3 TEST FACTORS FOR THE STRUCTURE OR COMPONENT AS A WHOLE


2.3.1 Having obtained a safe S-N curve for each structurally
significant detail it is possible to use the specified loading spectrum
( p a r a 3) and an acceptable adaptation of Miner's rule (para 5) to
calculate the test life factor that is required to demonstrate
compliance.

2 . 3 . 2 In principle, t h e test life factor used for the component as a


whole should be the largest of the factors for the individual details.
However this would be impracticable, as some details would not survive
unless they were overdesigned.

2 . 3 . 3 It is recommended that, in order to minimise any overtesting and


yet provide a meaningful substantiation, t h e loading spectrum, for
major fatigue tests should be optimised to test that detail which is
judged to have t h e lowest ratio of fatigue to static strength, for
example a bolted joint with high s h e a r t r a n s f e r t h r o u g h t h e
fasteners.

2.3.4 In order to calculate the required test life factor for the
specified loading the safe S-N curve for the chosen detail should first
be adjusted on s t r e s s , so that the safe life is equal to the specified
life. If more than one test is to be done, or there are other nominally
identical details subject to the same loading, the safe S-N curve should
be constructed using the appropriate factors of Table 1 . In all cases
it is acceptable to derive a safe value of static strength a s shown in
Fig. 1.

-2.3.5 The next s t e p is to derive the notional mean curve to which the
safe curve relates, reversing the procedure of para 2.2 above. This
mean curve gives t h e estimated performance of the test specimen
u n d e r the same s t r e s s spectrum. The ratio of the estimated mean life
t o the specified life gives the test life factor that would be needed to
demonstrate compliance using the specified loading.

2 . 3 . 6 Typically, for airframe tests on combat aeroplanes, a test life


factor of between 3 and 5 might be expected.

2 . 3 . 7 If a detail has a test life factor that is higher than the factor
used in the airframe or component test, then it must be shown that an
acceptable allowance has been made in design. This may involve a
special test on the detail concerned.

3 DERIVATION OF LOADING SPECTRA FOR CALCULATIONS AND TESTS

3.1 SPECTRA FOR CALCULATIONS


3.1.1 From the information provided in the Aeroplane Specification
and the structural/aerodynamic model of t h e aeroplane an estimate can
b e made of the most likely s t r e s s history on each structurally
significant detail.

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3.1.2 I f a continuous stress sequence is obtained, this can be broken


down into the number of occurrences of discrete stress amplitudes and
associated mean stresses using the range-mean-pairs ( o r rain flow)
method of counting.

3.1.3 Alternatively, the history may be expressed as a cumulative


frequency spectrum. This is reduced into individual cycles b y first
dividing the spectrum into a number of intervals of stress. Care
m u s t be taken that the number of intervals is sufficient to avoid
introducing inaccuracies into the estimates of fatigue damage produced
b y the spectrum. It is then usual to assume that the stresses within
each interval all have a range given b y the difference between the
average maximum and the average m i n i m u m stresses in that interval.

3.1.4 Sometimes the fatigue loading can be deduced directly from the
periodic loading sequence on the item concerned.

3.2 SPECTRA FOR TEST PURPOSES


3 . 2 . 1 For test purposes it is important to achieve a meaningful and
comprehensive result i n the shortest possible time.

3.2.2 A large amount of time can be occupied i n applying large


numbers of cycles of low amplitude, which produce a disproportionately
low contribution to the damage i n the test specimen. This problem is
overcome b y 'omitting' those cycles which a r e so low that they a r e
unlikely to produce any damage at all, and by 'accelerating' the damage
produced b y those cycles that a r e judged to be just significant.

3.2.3 I n order to make these adjustments, the spectrum used for


calculations m u s t be optimised to test 8 particular structural detail.
A s noted in para 2 . 3 . 3 , it is acceptable to base t h i s optimisation on a
metal detail with a low ratio of fatigue to static strength.

3.2.4 Those cycles which fall beneath t h e safe S-N curve for the
chosen detail (based on the number of f u l l scale tests to be done) may
be omitted.

3.2.5 If the low amplitude cycles are still disproportionately large in


number consideration can be given to representing their effect b y a
reduced number of cycles of higher amplitude. T h e relative amplitude
can be taken directly from the safe S-N curve.

3.2.6 Where test life factors of greater than 5 a r e needed, it may


sometimes be acceptable to limit the duration of t h e test b y using a
reduced life factor, of say 5, in combination with a factor on s t r e s s
applied to t h e spectrum as a whole. I n general, the use of amplified
s t r e s s e s , simply to accelerate a test should be avoided, but where a
life factor alone would be impracticable t h e appropriate amplification
factor is that which, according to a calculation using the mean S-N
c u r v e , would just cause failure of the chosen detail on completion of
testing to the reduced life factor.

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3.2.7 I n general the aim should be to restrict these acceleration


techniques so that at least 100 cycles are applied per flight, i n order
to represent the fretting effects of large numbers of cycles. The
sequence of loading used for analysis and test can have a significant
influence on the safe life that is established. For this reason the
loading should be applied i n a realistic periodic fashion.

3.2.8 However, care should be taken to avoid over-complication to


ensure a reasonable repetition of the sequence, i n order to aid
fractographic studies of damage propagation.

3.2.9 As a general rule, the aim should be to choose a realistic


sequence that will be applied about 40 times during the course of the
test.

4 ALLOWANCES FOR UNCERTAINTIES IN SERVICE LOADING

4.1 There is considerable scatter i n the severity of loading recorded in


a n y one type of sortie and since, typically, on the relatively steep part of
t h e S-N curve, damage is proportional t o the cube of the amplitude. I t
follows that to assume an average severity of loading when loads a r e
u nmonitored would be t o i n t r o d u c e a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e r i s k of
underestimating the actual damage. For example, if the actual severity
during the unmonitored period was 20% above average, the damage would
be about 75% higher than assumed. I f , on the other hand, the
severity was 20% below average the damage would be about 50% less than
a s s umed.

4.2 When the service loading of individual details is unmonitored it is


necessary to apply a factor to allow for this uncertainty. I t is customary
to use a factor of 1.50 on life, where most damage is done on the steeper
part of the S-N curve, and a factor of 1.20 on s t r e s s i n other
circumstances.

5 ALLOWANCES FOR UNCERTAINTIES IN CALCULATIONS

5.1 CALCULATED ADJUSTRIENTS OF COMPONENT TEST D A T A


5.1.1 Commonly the loading used for component tests differs from that
experienced in service. Here it will be assumed that the test loading
is realistic insofar as it represents the general sequence of the service
loading and the general shape of t h e amplitude distribution.

5.1.2 This para is concerned w i t h the allowances that m u s t be made


for uncertainties i n adjusting the endurance obtained under the test
loading to a corresponding endurance under the service loading.

5.1.3 The procedure which follows should be applied to each


structurally significant detail of a component, unless it can be shown
that a single detail has the lowest safe life (not necessarily the lowest
test endurance) a t all relevant severities of loading.

( i ) Choose an S - N curve of suitable shape for the detail


concerned.

( i i ) Adjust t h i s curve on s t r e s s b y finding a suitable scaling


factor so that when used w i t h Miner's rule it gives 1 n / N
= 1 for the test result.

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(iii) Derive a safe S-N curve

( i v ) Use t h e safe curve with Miner's rule to estimate the life


under the service loading.

5.1.4 The shape chosen for the S-N curve, s t e p ( i ) , becomes of major
importance when the severity of service loading differs markedly from
that used on test. Typically, according to the slope of the curve, life
is inversely proportional to stress raised to a power of between about 2
and 10. However, the practice of scaling the chosen curve, step ( i i )
to give 1 n / N = 1 for the test, means that in principle a curve of any
shape can be fitted to the test data. Therefore, an increase i n the
s e v e r i t y of s e r v i c e loading of o n l y 5%, for example, can be
interpreted as a reduction in life of between about 10% and 40&,
according to the curve shape that is used.

5.1.5 The factor that is needed to cover uncertainties i n curve


shape, step ( i ) , will clearly depend upon the detail concerned and the
change i n loading severity. I n general, however, no factor w i l l be
needed w h e n a conservatively 'steep' curve is used to account for
reductions i n the severity of service loading or when a conservatively
'shallow' curve is used to account for increases in severity of service
loading. If the same curve is used throughout, then consideration
must be given to the additional factors that may be required.

5.1.6 The procedure of scaling the chosen curve shape to give


agreement with the test result produces a location on the s t r e s s scale
that is dependent u p o n the validity of Miner's rule. Typically, for
metal details containing stress concentrations that a r e loaded
predominantly i n tension, the actual summation 1 n / N is often nearer 3
than the value of unity given b y Miner's rule. This is due to the
generation of cornpressive residual stresses at the root of the notch.
Typically, this factor of 3 on life corresponds to a factor of about 1 . 5
on stress, therefore t h e curve would be located b y a similar amount
above the actual curve that would have been obtained had tests been
done under constant amplitude loading. Since the size of these
compressive residual stresses depends upon the severity of loading,
and in particular on the magnitude of the maximum tensile s t r e s s in
t h e spectrum, t h e notional S-N curve will be too high for loading
severities below those used on test, so that when used with Miner's
rule the life a t these lower severities will be overestimated. The S-N
curve can be located more accurately, if the Miner summation is based
upon the local conditions a t the root of the stress concentration, since
it is commonly the period of damage growth in this region which
governs the life of t h e detail. A n acceptable approximation to these
conditions can be obtained from knowledge of the stress concentration
factor and from the assumption that the material is perfectly elastic
u p to the 0.2% proof stress and perfectly plastic thereafter3. Other
methods may be used, subject to the agreement of t h e Aeroplane
Project Director ( i n conjunction with Airworthiness Division, R A E ) .

5.1.7 In practice it is considered sufficient to consider only the


maximum tensile loading in the spectrum in o r d e r to calculate the
compressive residual stress in metal details. This is then assumed to
apply throughout the loading history. It is always necessary to
check the effects of extreme compressive loads and to make an
appropriate adjustment if these produce increments of tensile residual
stress.

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5.1.8 The factor that is needed to cover uncertainties in Miner's rule


when scaling the chosen curve shape, and in using this to estimate
the life under the new loading severity, w i l l clearly depend upon the
structural detail concerned and the change in loading severity. In
general, however, it is considered that no factor w i l l be needed for
metal details when Miner's rule is adjusted for local residual stresses
i n an acceptable manner.

5.1.9 Guidance on the factors by which the test endurance of metal


details should be divided to allow for the uncertainties discussed
above is given in Table 2.

5.2 CALCULATIONS BASED UPON ELEMENT DATA ALONE


5.2.1 This para is concerned with the allowances that must be made
for uncertainties in estimating the endurance of structural details from
constant amplitude S-N data for relevant test elements.

5.2.2 The principal additional sources of uncertainty in estimating the


fatigue endurance of a component by calculation are as follows:

(i) Identification of which detail(s) should be considered.

(ii) Choice of t h e location of an S-N curve to represent


each detail, a s well as its shape.

1
(iii) Choice of a suitable value of n/N t o use with Miner's
rule in estimating the life under the service loading.

5.2.3 N o hard and fast guide can be given to the validity of the
assumptions in choosing which structural details govern the life.

5.2.4 The location chosen for the mean S-N curve will be a best
estimate based upon evidence from a substantial number of relevant
tests. It is appropriate therefore to derive t h e safe S-N curve using
t h e factors for '6 o r more tests' from Table 1.

5.2.5 On metal details t h e allowance that must be made for values of


1 n/N of other than unity is attributable to 'elastic interaction' effects
and it must be made i n addition to allowances for residual stresses3.
Empirical evidence s u g g e s t s that elastic interaction effects a r e
important for moderately notched and plain details (those with stress
concentration factors of between about 2.5 and 1.0) for which a value
of 1 n/N = 0.2 should be used after any necessary corrections have
been made to the endurance for the effects of residual stresses.
Alternatively, a suitable value of 1 n/N may be obtained directly in
those instances where t h e endurance of relevant test elements under
well-mixed loading can be compared with the endurance estimated by
Miner's rule (after corrections have been made for residual s t r e s s
effects). In other respects the allowance which should be made for
uncertainties in Miner's rule a r e a s indicated in Table 2.

5.2.6 Overall, it is recommended that when allowances have been made


for uncertainties in Miner's rule (Table 2 and para 5.2.5 above) t h e
estimated safe life should be divided by a factor 3 to allow for other
uncertainties when estimating the endurance of a component b y
calculations.

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Volume 1 Leaflet 201/3

6 SUMMARY OF ALLOWANCES TO BE MADE IN SUBSTANTIATING FATIGUE


LIFE

6.1 Consideration has been given to the effects of scatter i n fatigue


performance, the derivation of loading spectra, uncertainties i n service
loading and uncertainties i n calculations.

6.2 If a detail is tested under a close representation of the service


loading no allowance is needed for differences i n loading when estimating
t h e mean fatigue life (para 5 ) . If the service loading on t h e part is also
monitored (para 4 ) the only factor applicable is that for scatter (para 2 ) .
I f most damage is done on the relatively steep part of the S-N curve the
t e s t life might then need to be reduced b y a factor of only 3. If more
than one major test is done a lower factor may be applicable (para 2 . 3 ) .

6.3 If the service loading differs appreciably from that used on t e s t , some
conservatism is needed to allow for the effects of curve shape and
uncertainties i n Miner's rule (para 5.1 and Table 2).

6.4 If compliance is based upon calculations alone, supported only b y


element data, additional consideration must be given to the allowance
which should be made to cover the added uncertainties, including the
validity of the assumptions made in choosing which structural details
govern the life. N o specific guide can be given, b u t a factor of 3 on the
calculated safe life is normally appropriate. Thus, t h e recommended
allowances for uncertainty i n Miner's rule (Table 2 and para 5.2.5) must
b e multiplied b y a further factor of 3 when compliance is based largely
upon calculations.

6 . 5 If a detail has a test life factor that is higher than that used for the
major test then it must b e shown that an acceptable allowance for this
higher variability has been made i n design. I n some instances the detail
may need to be tested separately.

6.6 If environmental conditions affect the fatigue-sensitive parts of the


s t r u c t u r e , and if these conditions a r e not reproduced i n the major t e s t , a
satisfactory programme of supporting tests m u s t be carried out. For
instance it might be necessary to include large and realistically complex
boxes tested 'as manufactured' to failure a t room temperature and under
cyclic environmental conditions.

REFERENCES

No. Author Title etc.

1 N I Bullen A note on test factors.


R and M 3166 (1956)

2 B EI E Perrett Fatigue endurance of structural elements in various


materials under constant and variable amplitude loadings.
Royal Aircraft Establishment, Technical Report 77162,
Nov 1977.

3 A IV Cardrick Elastic and Plastic Interactions - Their influence on the


& M L Meyer validity of t h e Palmgren - Miner hypothesis.
Presented at an I Rlech E conference on 'Designing Against
Fatigue'. London, October 9, 1974.

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Leaflet 201/3 Volume 1

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Volume 1 Leaflet 201 / 3

Factor on Factor on
Number Log mean Arithmetic
of I terns Endurance Mean strength
Tested over Steep at High
Part of Endurances
S-N Curve

1 3.0 1.50
2 2.6 1.45

3 2.5 1.43

4 2.4 1.42

6 o r more 2.3 1.40

1 3.2 1.54

2 2.8 1.49

3 2.6 1.47

4 2.5 1.45

6 or more 2.4 1.44

1 I 3.4 1 1.57 1
2 2.9 1.51

3 2.7 1.49
-

4 2.6 1.48

6 or more 2.5 1.47

4 o r 5 Items
1 3.5 1.60

2 3.0 1.54
3 2.8 1.52
i

. 6 o r more
4 2.7

2.6
1.50

1.49
2

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Leaflet 2 0 1 / 3 Volume 1

TABLE 2
GUIDANCE ON THE FACTORS BY WHICH THE T E S T ENDURANCE OF METAL
DETAILS SHOULD BE DIVIDED TO ALLOW FOR UNCERTAINTIES IN
ADJUSTING THE RESULT TO A NEW LOADING SEVERITY.

Source of Uncertainty Factor Recommended


I
I

Test Con serv- 1.0


severity ative 1y
too high steep
curve
Other
S - N CU rve 3.0*
Curve
shape Conserv-
Test atively 1.0
s eve rit y shallow
too low curve

Other
curve 3.0*

Acceptable allowances
made for residual
stresses 1.0
(elastic interaction
accounted for b y test) I
1 I
Miner’s No Test
Rule allowance severity 3.0*
made for too high
r e sidu al
stresses
fi
1.0
too low
I
*These factors are for guidance, and supporting evidence must be presented
if lower factors are to be used.
(A separate allowance must be made for the effects of scatter)

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 201/4

FATIGUE DAMAGE TOLERANCE


SUBSTANTIATION OF DAMAGE GROWTH AND ASSOCIATED INSPECTION
PROCEDURES

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Compliance with the requirements of Chapter 2 0 1 will normally be


demonstrated b y a combination of calculations and tests.

1.2 This Leaflet examines the uncertainties affecting t h e derivation of


crack growth curves for metal details and provides guidance on the
corresponding factors b y which the estimated crack growth life should be
reduced to allow for these uncertainties.

1.3 For structure manufactured from composite materials, the damage


growth curve should be determined by tests. There is no reliable method
of calculating rates of damage growth, owing to the complexity of damage
mechanisms i n composite materials.

1.4 Guidance is also given on methods of calculating residual strength and


for defining an inspection system. The paras concerned with inspection
procedures equally well apply to damage growth in composite structure.

2 DERIVATION OF CRACK GROWTH CURVES FOR METAL DETAILS

2.1 The average damage growth curve should be derived over the range
between threshold size and critical size. Guidance on t h e threshold size
from which the crack growth should b e estimated is given a t para 10.2.

2.2 The stress intensity factor solution should represent both the
geometry of the detail and the mode(s) of stress to which it is subjected
e.g., tension, tearing and/or shear.

2.3 Data on crack propagation rate should enable account to be taken of


t h e mean stress and t h e threshold stress intensity factor. A reliable
method of achieving this is to interpolate between da/dN v s A K curves
based on empirical data obtained for a range of mean stresses. Where
appropriate t h i s data should take account of environmental conditions.

2.4 T h e fracture toughness value should take account of t h e thickness and


grain orientation of the material, the mode of failure and the most adverse
temperature i n the operational envelope. Scatter in fracture toughness
affects the residual strength but usually has little effect on the total crack
propagation period, because the crack propagation rate increases rapidly
a s the stress intensity factor approaches the fracture toughness value.
Residual strength is discussed i n para 8.

2.5 Experience has shown that normally a conservative estimate of crack


growth is provided b y using a linear summation of cyclic growth for a
tensile load spectrum.

3 UNCERTAINTIES IN CRACK GROWTH CURVES

3 . 1 Two sets of circumstances a r e considered:

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( i ) Interpretation of calculated adjustments of component test


data to allow for a change i n the severity of service loading.

( i i ) Allowances for uncertainties when average crack growth


curves a r e based on calculations alone.

4 INTERPRETATION OF CALCULATED ADJUSTMENTS OF COMPONENT TEST


DATA TO ALLOW FOR A CHANGE I N THE SEVERITY OF SERVICE
LOADING

4.1 Commonly, the loading used for component tests differs from that
experienced i n service. It is assumed that the test loading is realistic in
that it represents the general sequence of the service loading and the
general shape of the amplitude distribution.

4.2 T h i s para is concerned with the allowances to be made for


uncertainties i n using the crack growth curve obtained under the test
loading to estimate the corresponding crack growth curve under the
service loading.

4.3 The relationship between applied stress and propagation rate is a


complex one even under constant amplitude loading. Under spectrum
loading interaction effects occur, and these can accelerate o r decelerate
crack propagation rates, depending on the stress amplitudes and the
sequence i n which they a r e applied.

4.4 The 'test result can be used to increase confidence in the calculated
crack growth curve under a new spectrum. The crack growth should first
be calculated for the test spectrum and compared with the test result,
bearing in mind the following points:

4.4.1 If only one test specimen is used differences of less than 50% in
crack propagation life a r e unlikely to be significant.
4.4.2 If t h e calculated crack propagation life and the test life a r e of
the same o r d e r , bearing in mind that linear summation usually gives a
conservative estimate, this increases confidence in the stress intensity
factor solution and i n the materials data. The same solution and data
can then be used i n conjunction with the service loading spectrum to
calculate the expected life under the new spectrum.

4.4.3 If the calculated crack propagation life differs significantly


from t h e test result, all parameters should be re-examined to determine
possible sources of e r r o r , e.g. :

( i ) Inadequate modelling of the geometry.

(ii) Incorrect assumption of the mode of stress.

(iii) Inadequate -
da vsAK data.
dN

( i v ) A spectrum containing a large proportion of


compressive load cycles leading to an unconservative
es timate.

I n each case consideration must be given to the additional factors


which may be required to allow for uncertainties in these areas.

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Volume 1 Leaflet 201/4

ALLOWANCES FOR UNCERTAINTIES WHEN AVERAGE CRACK GROWTH


CURVES ARE BASED UPON CALCULATIONS ALONE

5.1 A 10% error in either stress or geometrical correction for t h e s t r e s s


intensity can result in errors of u p to 50% i n the calculated life to a given
crack size. Without test data to use in comparison with calculations it is
impossible reliably to estimate the magnitude of any e r r o r s , a n d
conservative assumptions should be made at each stage. Even so, the
estimated average crack growth curve should be reduced i n life b y a
factor of at least 2 i n the absence of stress measurement and a further
factor of 2 if an approximate geometrical correction for the stress intensity
factor has been used.

ALLOWANCES FOR SCATTER IN CRACK GROWTH LIFE

6 . 1 There is considerable variability in the crack growth life of nominally


identical items w h e n they are subjected to the same loading conditions.
The variability of interest is that which is found u n d e r realistic loading.
Where sufficient tests have been done to provide information o n scatter,
t h e loads u s e d have usually related to wing bending o r fuselage
pressurisation cycles. In these circumstances the scatter obtained appears
t o be similar to that found i n the life to failure of bolted joints.

6 . 2 Therefore, if a simulation model is used (para 1 1 . 3 ) an allowance for


scatter should be made b y assuming the standard deviation in loglo
life of O. 11 that characterises bolted joints.

6 . 3 In other circumstances it is recommended that the factors on log mean


endurance given i n Leaflet 201/3, Table 1 should b e used to allow for the
scatter i n crack propagation life. For calculations it is appropriate t o use
t h e factor for '6 o r more' tests.

ALLOWANCES FOR UNCERTAINTIES IN SERVICE LOADING

7.1 When the service loading of an individual detail is unmonitored it S


necessary to apply a factor to allow for this uncertainty. It S
recommended that a factor of 1 . 5 on crack propagation life be used , a s S
customary for fatigue life (Leaflet 201/3, para 4 refers).

CALCULATION OF RESIDUAL STRENGTH AND CRITICAL CRACK


LENGTH

8.1 The residual strength of the damaged structure should not normally
b e allowed to fall below 80% of the design ultimate load.

8 . 2 The critical crack length is the maximum crack length with which the
structure can sustain 80%of design ultimate load. I t may be determined b y
classical linear elastic fracture mechanics or b y s u c h methods as R-curve
techniques. The fracture toughness value should take account of the
thickness and grain orientation of the material, t h e mode of failure and the
most adverse temperature in the operational envelope. A conservative
value based on the available data should be used.

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Leaflet 2 0 1 / 4
DEF STAN 00-970
Volume 1

PERFORMANCE OF INSPECTION SYSTEMS

9.1 I n considering the performance of structural inspection systems,


three parameters affect the detection probability level. These a r e the
probability of damage occurring, the probability of inspecting t h e detail
concerned (if a sampling technique is used) and the reliability of the
actual inspection process. The following paragraphs deal with the
probability of detecting a defect b y a repetitive inspection process before
it reaches critical size.

9.2 In order to define the requirements of structural inspections, a


particular value must be assigned to the overall probability of detection
(overall P D ) . This is normally 0.999.

DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE RANGE A N D INSPECTION RELIABILITY


1 0 . 1 A fundamental aspect of any inspection system is the determination
of the critical damage size. T h i s together with such data as the type of
detail, t h e type of damage and its location will, in most cases,
p r e d e t e r m i n e t h e inspection process to be u s e d , e . g . , v i s u a l ,
aided-visual, N D T etc. Generally, the larger the damage allowed the
easier and cheaper becomes the inspection process. For the specified
inspection process an average reliability curve should be produced from:

( i ) Field tests on specimens under conditions as representative


as possible, and/or

(ii) Results of in-service inspection processes o r laboratory tests


of similar details by an equivalent technique.

1 0 . 2 Although the data from para l O . l ( i ) and/or para lO.l(ii) will define
the reliability of the inspection process reasonably well a t PDs of 0.5 and
above, t h e data will be very sparse a t PDs approaching zero. I t will b e
necessary to extrapolate the reliability curve to the zero PD level.
Caution should be applied when assessing the shape of s u c h a curve
extension, a s a significant number of detections can be expected a t
damage sizes corresponding to the PDs i n this region. Truncation a t zero
PD is preferable to postulating an arbitrarily smooth fairing of t h e lower
end of the curve into the axis of the reliability/damage size diagram. The
damage size where the PD becomes zero is the 'threshold size', which
occurs a t the 'threshold time'. The chosen threshold size should not be
less than t h e minimum damage size for which damage growth can reliably
be forecast.

ESTIMATION OF TIME OF FIRST INSPECTION AND SUBSEQUENT


INSPECTION INTERVALS

11.1 The overall PD depends on the time of the first inspection and the
i n t e r v a l between i n s p e c t i o n s o v e r t h e period of damage growth
corresponding to the damage range detailed in para 11.3.1. A system of
repeated inspections will invariably be required because, in practice,
inspection reliability never attains the value of u n i t y .

11.2 TIME OF FIRST INSPECTION.


11.2.1 Unless it is certain that inspections will commence before the
threshold time, the average threshold time and the scatter about that

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point will need to b e estimated. In general, the threshold time can be


p u t equal to t h e safe life of t h e detail, b u t attention must also be given
to the probability of early fatigue initiation due to influences such as
accidental damage, corrosion, manufacturing defects and material
defects. The time of first inspection may affect the overall PD for
defined inspection intervals.

11.3 ESTIMATION OF INSPECTION INTERVALS USING A SIMULATION


MODEL
11.3.1 Using the inspection reliability curve and damage growth curve
together it is possible to estimate the PD of a single inspection after
any period of damage growth. The cumulative probability of
non-detection of the damage at each occasion of inspection, u n t i l the
damage size has exceeded critical size, can therefore be estimated
giving, b y inference, the overall PD. Such a result can be achieved
using a simulation’ 4 , numerical3 4 , o r graphical model4. However,
t o account for variations i n damage growth rates and threshold times,
only a simulation model’ * 4 , will provide an estimate of overall PD.
A simulation model will also allow the balance between the time of first
inspection and inspection intervals to be varied to determine an
o p t i m u m inspection system.

11.3.2 The simulation model should be based on the following:

( i ) Average inspection reliability curve.

(ii) Average damage growth curve.

(iii) Average time of damage initiation (threshold time).

( i v ) A n acceptable representation of uncertainties, including


scatter, associated with paras 11.3.2(i) to (iii).

( v ) Overall PD of not less than 0.999.


11.3.3 The simulation model used m u s t be acceptable to the Aeroplane
Project Director (in conjunction with the Airworthiness Division,
RAE).

11.4 ESTIPiIATION OF INSPECTION INTERVARLS WITHOUT THE A I D OF A


SIMULATION MODEL.
11.4.1 I n the absence of a simulation model, t h e damage growth
curve and average inspection reliability curve m u s t be used to estimate
t h e safe damage growth period from a size where a single inspection
returns a probability of detection (PD) of 0.5 to the critical size. A
PD of 0.5 is used because t h i s generally corresponds to. the mode of
detected damage sizes, and such a damage size is therefore easily
determined.

11.4.2 To allow for the absence of conservatism i n using a PD of 0.5,


the damage growth period m u s t be divided b y 2 and then b y the factor
t o allow for scatter (para 6 ) , to obtain the inspection interval.

12 NON-PROPAGATING DAMAGE

12.1 Non-propagating damage occasionally o c c u r s i n s t r u c t u r e s


manufactured from either metal or composite materials. The inspection

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intervals and inspection process used should be set such that the damage
will have a specified overall PD for a specified period of usage. The
values specified shall be acceptable to the Aeroplane Project Director (in
conjunction with Airworthiness Division, RAE).

REFERENCES

No Author Title etc

1 T J Sweeting In-Service Requirements for Airworthiness:


A Probabilis tic Analysis
Dept of Mathematics,
University of Surrey, May 1985

2 J R Kearey Inspection System Performance Assessment


Using a Simulation Method - Pilot Study.
Issue 2
MOD A i r Eng 30a(RAF) August 1984.
BR 97618.

3 ASTM Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics and Fatigue


Method Applications.
Structural Design and Maintenance Symposium
St Louis Mo 1 9 Oct 1981.
ASTM Special Technical Publication 798.

4 J W Provan Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics and


Reliability.
Martinus Nighoff (Publishers), Nettercombe
1987

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TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF FACTORS TO BE USED WHEN DERIVING CRACK GROWTH
CURVES AND ESTIMATING INSPECTION 'INTERVALS

1 DERIVATION OF CRACK GROWTH CURVES

No. Leaflet Ref. Reason for factor Reduction


factor
Para 5.1 Absence of s t r e s s 2.0
measurement

Para 5.1 Use of approximate 2.0


correction for s t r e s s
intensity factor.
Para 6.1 Scatter in crack Fatigue life
propagation rate. factor from
Table 2 0 U 3 . 1

Para 7.1 Uncertainties in 1.5


Service Loading.

2 ESTIMATION OF INSPECTION INTERVALS

No. Leaflet Ref. Reason for factor Reduction


factor

Para 11.3 With simulation Use for full


model. modelling incor-
porating uncer-
tainties in
threshold time,
damage growth and
reliability data.
Interval a s
determined.

Para 11.4 Without simulation Divide growth


model. period from
PD = 0.5 by 2.0
and then b y factor
to allow for s c a t t e r
(para 6 ) t o obtain
inspection
interval.

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 201/5

FATIGUE DAMAGE TOLERANCE

TESTING

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 A programme of fatigue and residual strength testing will need to be


undertaken to demonstrate compliance with the requirements. Where
appropriate, residual stiffness m u s t be measured. The test programme
m u s t be agreed with the Aeroplane Project Director, i n accordance with
Chapter 201. Basic to the test programme presented i n this leaflet, is the
concept of two f u l l scale major fatigue tests. The first test aims to identify
any major shortcomings in the design and to provide sufficient fatigue life
substantiation for operational usage beyond the s t a r t of t h e second test.
The second test aims to establish the fatigue life capability of the s t r u c t u r e
under loads measured i n service. These major tests are to b e supported
b y appropriate supplementary tests.

1.2 Exceptionally, with the agreement of the Aeroplane Project Director


(in conjunction with Airworthiness Division, R A E ) there may be a reduced
test programme, or possibly no need for a f u l l scale fatigue test. This
would only be expected to occur i f , for example, the aeroplane was a
development of an existing type with no changes to the main load carrying
structure and subject to a similar load spectrum, or the aeroplane was a
'one-off' demonstrator with a life limited to a few hundred hours.

DESIGN DEVELOPMENT T E S T S

2.1 The aim of the design development tests is to provide data for
material selection, t o establish data for d e s i g n a n d t o eliminate
uncertainties in analysis before the final design is established.

2.2 Unless suitable evidence is available, it will be necessary to determine


the effects of the anticipated environmental conditions on t h o s e materials
used for t h e major load carrying structure. This should be b y element or
component tests subjected to the appropriate long-term environmental
conditions including, for example, cycling of temperature and h u m i d i t y .
The programme of tests should be sufficient to determine whether the
environmental conditions will have a significant effect on fatigue life
and/or damage growth, and whether a suitable margin on the specified life
is sufficient to compensate for any such effect.

2.3 Confidence in the fatigue and damage growth data used for design
s h o u l d be obtained by a programme of element and component tests.
These tests should represent significant details and s t r u c t u r e in which
fatigue or damage growth requirements influence working strain levels.
The anticipated load spectra and environmental conditions should be
applied in a flight-by-flight or other representative sequence. Tests
should also be conducted with the anticipated spectra increased in load
severity b y a factor of 1.20, except for tests representing a single detail
where there is sufficient evidence to show that simple damage rules are
applicable.
2.4 It may not be possible to represent all of the constraints on a detail
in a relatively simple test, i n which case a major sub-assembly will have to
be used. There is also a need to consider this t y p e of test for details
which will be for all practical purposes uninspectable. This is to ensure,

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a t the design development stage, that s u c h details have an adequate basic


life and, if necessary, an adequate period of detectable damage growth.
To achieve this the insertion of artificial damage may be required, if
necessary with the assembly dismantled for that purpose and then
re-assembled.

3 PRE-PRODUCTION FATIGUE T E S T S

3.1 The principal pre-production fatigue test will generally be a full


scale fatigue test undertaken on an airframe manufactured to the
anticipated initial production standard and which has not previously been
subjected to any fatigue or strength tests. The structure tested should
include all the main load paths, and sufficient of the remaining structure,
panels and doors, to ensure that the loads can be applied to and reacted
b y the main load carrying structure i n a fully representative manner.
This test may need to be supported by supplementary tests to ensure that,
for example, major components a r e subjected to all the principal loading
actions and suitable margins a r e demonstrated for variability and for
environmental effects (see Leaflets 2 0 1 / 3 and 4 and para 2 . 2 ) .

3 . 2 It may b e more cost effective t o test the airframe as a series of major


assemblies. The test equipment may be less complex and the test duration
shorter. However this requires care in ensuring that each test assembly
is representatively supported and that all of the major load carrying
s t r u c t u r e has been tested.

3 . 3 The pre-production fatigue tests should utilise the anticipated spectra


applied in a flight-by-flight or other representative sequence (see Leaflet
2 0 1 / 3 para 3 . 2 ) . Any environmental conditions which the design
development t e s t s show cannot be catered for by a suitable margin on life
will need to be included, but this is expected to apply only in exceptional
circumstances because of the difficulties of correct reproduction of such
conditions on a full scale test. Loads from manoeuvring devices, t h e
undercarriage or other significant sources should be considered if they
influence the main load carrying structure.

3 . 4 The s t r u c t u r e should be strain-pauged in suitable locations to enable


loads and strains to be correlated with those from the static strength tests
and subsequent flight measurements. During testing the structure should
be monitored to detect the initiation of fatigue damage and to identify
areas that require modification of life Limitation. Damage growth
measurements should be taken of any damage that is found during
testing.

3.5 In accordance with Chapter 201, a major milestone will be t h e


completion of testing to three t i m e s the specified life in .the shortest
possible time. Testing beyond that stage will be agreed by the Aeroplane
Project Director (in conjunction with Airworthiness Div., RAE). It should
be noted that t h e test would need t o be continued to a factor of a t least 5
under the specified loads in order to reveal any f u r t h e r details that would
become critical if t h e loading severity in service increased by 208 above
that anticipated.

3.6 The fatigue tests should be followed by stiffness tests, where


appropriate, and residual strength tests (para 6 ) . They must be
concluded by t e a r down inspections (para 7).

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4 PRODUCTION FATIGUE T E S T S

4.1 The purpose of the production full-scale fatigue test is to determine


t h e total fatigue life capability of the main load carrying s t r u c t u r e . The
timing of this test may be critical, a s it will need to be well advanced
before the safe life obtained from the pre-production fatigue tests have
been reached by aeroplanes in service, and it must utilise maximum
information from the spectra derived from operational loads measurement.
In some instances it may need to be used to qualify modifications arising
from the preproduction test

4.2 The structural standard of the test specimen should be that of the
majority of aeroplanes in service, using a s t r u c t u r e which has not
previously been subjected to fatigue or strength tests. Subject to timing
constraints (para 4.1) it is essential that all modifications which affect the
main load carrying structure, even to the most minor extent, are
incorporated. Those which are introduced after entry into service must
b e incorporated during the test at lifetimes which, a s f a r as possible,
represent the designated time for modification embodiment in service
multiplied by the test life factor. However, care needs t o be taken to
ensure that this does not result in there being damage beyond the limit
that can be catered for by the appropriate modification. The test
specimen should be structurally complete, but excluding control r u n s and
systems. The restraint to structure which arises from any item of
equipment must be represented to avoid non-typical failures. In addition
t o the full scale fatigue test there will be a need for supplementary tests
on structural details or assemblies which cannot be adequately loaded in
the full scale test, or where it may be more economical to t e s t separately,
provided that representative support can be achieved. Structural
differences which apply to a minority of the aeroplane fleet may also be
covered by supplementary tests.

4.3 In general, the production fatigue tests should utilise load spectra
obtained from operational loads measurement and include all significant
f l i g h t and g r o u n d l o a d s , including loads on c o n t r o l s u r f a c e s ,
undercarriage and similar devices. Loads should be applied i n a flight-by-
flight or other representative sequence, with sufficient randomisation of
loads and sorties to ensure that a typical strain history is obtained (see
Leaflet 201/3 para 3.2)

4.4 The full scale fatigue test specimen and those for supplementary
programmes should be strain-gauged to ensure that the s t r u c t u r a l strains
agree, within experimental accuracy, with those measured during the
operational loads programme and the flight load measurement programme.
During testing the specimen should be periodically examined to ensure
that any failures a r e noted at an early stage. Where possible the means
and the frequency of service inspections should be the basis of the test
examinations. When structural damage is found, the damage propagation
r a t e should be measured to enable the frequency and method of the service
inspection to be confirmed. If repairs a r e necessary, they should be
done in a manner which can be translated directly to service modification
o r repair drawings.

4.5 The production fatigue tests should normally be continued for up to


five times the specified life (or an equivalent life). In general the a i m
should be to continue as long as is practicable in order to provide maximum

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information from the viewpoints of safety, economic maintenance and life


extension. The tests will need to incorporate the appropriate factors of
Leaflets 2 0 1 / 3 and 201/4. Prior to, or following, completion of t h e
required life, it will be necessary to demonstrate the damage growth
characteristics for any details which the tests and analyses have shown
the need. Artificial damage may need to be inserted to initiate the damage
growth, if necessary with the assembly dismantled for that purpose and
then re-assembled.

4 . 6 On completion of the above tests the specimens should be subjected


t o stiffness t e s t s , if appropriate, and to a residual strength test in
accordance with para 6 . The test programme must be concluded b y
t e a r down inspections i n accordance with para 7.

5 TEST ACCURACY

5.1 Close control of loading is necessary i n fatigue tests because small


changes in loads can cause large changes in fatigue life. In tests on
complete s t r u c t u r e s or systems, or on major components, the applied loads
should be accurate to within 53% of the maximum demanded load. All
applied loads should be measured periodically during the test to check
repeatedly, which should be within 2 2 % of the particular applied load or
20.5% of the maximum demanded, whichever is the greater. It is more
important to know the magnitude of the loads than to apply the loads to
t h e same level of accuracy.

5.2 Test systems may exhibit strain overshoot in the test s t r u c t u r e


whilst under perfect load control, due to the dynamic characteristics of
t h e s t r u c t u r e and system. Strain measurements should be made a t an
early stage in t h e test, during normal test running, in order to quantify
any dynamic strain effects within the structure. It is desirable that the
levels of s t r a i n accuracy and repeatability achieved are equivalent to
those required for applied loads.

6 RESIDUAL STRENGTH T E S T S

6.1 The residual strength tests should demonstrate, at the completion of


a fatigue test, the capability of a damaged s t r u c t u r e to withstand 80% of
the design ultimate load, o r such other load as may exceptionally be
specified. The loading conditions for the residual strength tests which
a r e to be applied to the fatigue test s t r u c t u r e should be agreed with the
Aeroplane Project Director (in conjunction with Airworthiness Division,
RAE).

6 . 2 The requirements of the residual strength tests should not be allowed


t o compromise t h e load accuracy of the fatigue tests. I t may therefore be
necessary to provide a different loading system for the residual s t r e n g t h
tests. Alternatively, it may be useful to represent the appropriate
damage during the static strength test programme, providing that
representative crack-tip conditions are reproduced

6.3 The test should be used to confirm critical damage sizes, where
possible. The procedure must be agreed, in detail, with the Aeroplane
Project Director (in conjunction with Airworthiness Division, RAE)

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Volume 1 Leaflet 20 1/ 5

7 TEAR DOWN INSPECTION

7.1 The purpose of a tear down inspection is' to identify any significant
damage that is present at the completion of a fatigue test that has not
been detected during the test. This should be accomplished b y completely
dismantling the main load carrying structure, including the removal of
fasteners. Extreme care is needed when dismantling in order to avoid
masking or destroying fatigue damage. The s t r u c t u r e should then be
examined using appropriate non-destructive inspection procedures,
paying particular attention to fastener holes, changes of section and
cut-outs. Structure loaded primarily in compression should be included.
A selection of those damage sites which a r e found should be t h e subject of
fractographic examination to determine the origin, t y p e and size of
damage.

7.2 For the pre-production fatigue test, the tear down inspection w i l l
give invaluable information on areas which, although not justifying prior
modification, would benefit from close examination during the production
fatigue test. For the production fatigue test the information obtained
from the tear down inspection is an essential basis of any life extension
beyond the specified life (Leaflet 201/7). Although such extension may
not be anticipated at the time of the test, the collection of the data from
t h e tear down inspection is necessary to provide for any f u t u r e need.
Also, subsequent operational loads measurement may indicate loading
actions different from those on test. Thus it may be necessary to use life
extension procedures for any detaiis more highly loaded than on the
fatigue test, in order to maximise the substantiated life of such details.

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 201/6

FATIGUEDAMAGE TOLERANCE

SER VICE MO NIT OR1 NG

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Service monitoring generally has two levels; fleetwide monitoring of a


limited range of parameters and t h e monitoring of a comprehensive range
of parameters on a small number of aeroplanes. The latter is termed
operational loads measurement, even though the fleetwide recording may
fit such a description.

1.2 The objectives of service monitoring of structural parameters are:

( i ) Fleetwide monitoring to;

( a ) enable the maximum fatigue life to be achieved


b y each individual airfame, and

( b ) accumulate data to support fleet management.

( i i ) Operational loads measurement to;

(a) identify operational techniques not accounted for a t the


design stage,

( b ) give warning of exceedances of t h e design loads and

(c) aid the design of f u t u r e aeroplanes.


1.3 These objectives are achieved b y automated airborne recording of
suitaule parameters, manual recording of other parameters on the ground,
and analysis of t h e recorded data.

1.4 Service monitoring will be supplemented by a Statement of Operating


Intent with regard to types and distribution of sorties to be flown and
their expected content.
2 FLEETWIDE RECORDING

2.1 I n order to comply with Chapter 201, each aeroplane should b e fitted
with a compact, robust and reliable recording instrument w h i c h monitors
the usage of t h e major structural components. This may record an
indirect parameter s u c h as normal acceleration, o r a direct parameter such
a s strain for each component to be monitored. Each parameter should be
chosen so that the most damaging loading actions on the component can be
determined.

2.2 The recorded data needs to be extracted after every flight in order
t o obtain the maximum benefit, in that instrumentation faults a r e quickly
noted, individual sortie variables can be accounted for economically in life
estimation and data for forward planning can be separated b y sortie type.
The means of extraction may be manual o r b y electronic transfer to
ground-based equipment. It should be possible to accomplish t h i s simply,
after every flight. It should also be possible to make a coarse check of t h e
quality of recorded data a t the operationa u n i t i n order to identify

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Leaflet 20116 Volume 1

instrumentation unserviceability .
The penalties on fatigue life of such
unserviceability a r e those for unmonitored components, given in Leaflet
201/3, and apply for the period of unserviceability plus any preceding
period for which the quality of data may be in doubt.

2.3 The instrumentation used for fleetwide recording will need to have an
adequate response bandwidth, so that the recorded data does not have
significant load contributions removed or attenuated by filtering. There
will generally need to be compression of data, but this should avoid
routines which restrict subsequent analysis to a specific method.
However, the time sequence of events within a flight need not be
retained. The amount of data that can be recorded, and the number of
components monitored, will be limited by practical constraints on
recording systems and by the volume of data that can subsequently be
analysed .
2.4 When the data is extracted after each flight, it will be necessary
manually to record additional data required for fatigue life estimation or
for usage statistics. If the data extraction is manual onto a standard form,
t h e additional data will be entered on the same form. If t h e data is
electronically transferred to ground based equipment it should be possible
t o input the additional data direct into the equipment immediately before o r
a f t e r the transfer. This additional data will include, for example, t h e
sortie pattern flown, take-off mass, fuel and stores, landing fuel and
stores, fuel received in flight, number of roller and full stop landings,
etc. The data collection is the responsibility of the Services, who will
agree the data to be recorded with the Design Authority, subject to the
agreement of t h e Aeroplane Project Director (in conjunction with
Airworthiness Division, RAE).

2.5 The data must be examined by the Services at the Operational Unit to
check for instrumentation unserviceability and to check whether the
appropriate parametric values approach or exceed the l i m i t s given in the
Release to Service. If the limit values a r e exceeded, action will then be
taken to examine the airframe in accordance with specified servicing
procedures.

2.6 The data for each flight will be added to that already held for the
aeroplane. This will enable the fatigue life used up to that time to be
calculated for each major component monitored, and it will be expressed a s
a life used in units appropriate to the usage of that component, e.g.,
number of landings for an undercarriage, or Fatigue Index units for a wing
(see para 2.8). These data will be used for establishing when the safe life
has been reached, o r when structurally significant inspections o r
modifications should be undertaken. The algorithms for calculating the life
used will b e provided b y the Design Authority and will include factors for
u s e as appropriate when recording systems a r e unserviceable. Where
simple counting is used as the basis for life usage, say in flying hours or
number of landings, the promulgated safe life must be based on an average
spectrum of usage and include the factors for unmonitored components.

2.7 The life usage data is used additionally for fleet planning purposes
and identifying in broad terms the relative damage level of various sortie
types. This can then be used for forecasting the effects of changes in
usage, providing that the sortie content does not change. The basic
recorded data provide fleetwide statistics which form the basis, in

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conjunction with operational loads measurement, of design and test


spectra. The usage of these data can be extended to new aeroplane types
o p e r a t i n g in similar roles provided t h a t d i f f e r e n c e s in a e r o p l a n e
characteristics a r e accounted for.

2.8 The Fatigue Index (FI) is a measure of the fatigue life usage of a
structure o r component, based on a cumulative damage summation. A n FI
of 100 is generally set to a damage equal to the specified life under the
anticipated loads, b u t may be set to any convenient milestone. FI is not
used where the safe life can be expressed in simple terms, such as flying
hours, without building excessive conservatism into the calculation and
t h u s wasting fatigue life. I t is generally related to the wing history and
t o those components which experience a similar load history, and it is
used as the principal measure of fatigue usage for each aeroplane.

2.9 A simple instrument for fleetwide recording is the Fatigue Meter


(Chapter 7 3 2 ) , and in some instances this may be acceptable to the
Aeroplane Project Director (in conjunction with Airworthiness Division,
R A E ) . It is only used for t h e counting of the exceedances of pre-set 'g'
levels a t the aeroplane's centre of gravity. The reading of the instrument
after each flight, and the recording and processing of the data, a r e dealt
with b y Service procedures. The meter readings a r e used, in conjunction
with recorded mass data and sortie patterns, to calculate the FI. In
providing the algorithm for t h e calculation, referred to as the 'Fatigue
Meter Formula', the Design Authority has to make basic assumptions on
the relationship between wing loading and 'g' exceedance values and on
how these values should b e interpreted. The basis and form of the
Fatigue hleter Formula should be agreed with t h e Aeroplane Project
Director (in conjunction with Airworthiness Division, R A E ) .

3 OPERATIONAL LOADS MEASUREMENT

3.1 Operational loads measurement (OLM) uses c o m p r e h e n s i v e


instrumentation to assess t h e loads on major structural components i n
operational usage, and to define in detail t h e effects of operational
techniques on those components. The measurements a r e generally
structural strains and aeroplane flight motion parameters, and they need
t o be r e c o r d e d a t a sufficient f r e q u e n c y s o a s t o d e f i n e a l l
significant peaks and troughs of load, i n t h e correct sequence and against
a real timebase. The volume of data which is necessary to be recorded
and analysed restricts OLM to a small proportion of the fleet. The
measurements should include parallel data to that being obtained from
fleetwide recording.

3.2 I t is preferable that strain sensors used for OLM a r e calibrated.


Where these a r e attached to major structural components, loading rigs
which can apply discrete or distributed loads to represent the anticipated
loading distributions will be required. Calibration loads should be applied
incrementally u p to design limit loads, provided that damage is not caused
a t loading points, as significant extrapolation of calibration data can give
rise to errors. Due to the long term nature of OLM programmes, periodic
recalibration may be necessary. The strain sensors used for OLM must be
replicated on the major fatigue tests s o that direct comparisons can be
made.

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Leaflet 2 0 1 / 6 Volume 1

3 . 3 The recorded data will need to be extracted a t the end of every flight
i n parallel with the normal fleetwide recording for each OLM aeroplane.
T h e OLM data will usually be processed at a specialist ground station.
T h e organisation undertaking the analysis will also need to be provided
w i t h a copy of each flight record from the fleetwide recording system of
t h e OLM aeroplane for the duration of the OLM programme. It is not
anticipated that OLM will be continuous during the operational life of the
fleet. Each period of recording should aim to provide an adequate sample
of each sortie type flown by each squadron. The first task of OLM will be
t o provide data for the load spectra of the production fatigue tests. It
should be undertaken as soon as possible after entry into service,
allowing time for operating patterns to stabilise. Follow-on programmes
would generally aim a t checking whether operating patterns had changed
o r investigating the implications of a knomn change. For these purposes
it would be expected that the same OLM-instrumented aeroplane would be
used, owing to the installation cost, and rotated through appropriate
squadrons during the programme.

3.4 OLL1 complements fleetwide recording, to provide the details of


operational usage. I t provides a wide range of data from a relatively small
number of flights, whilst fleetwide recording provides the statistics year
by year for a small range of data. I n loads spectrum derivation the two
records should be used i n conjunction. The OLM aeroplane motion
parameters provide a sequence of events for each manoeuvre type, and the
strain records will show which of these provide significant structural
loads. These data can be used to build u p flight-by-flight spectra of
external or internal loads for use i n test spectra or for comparison with
design data. The strain data can be directly processed to give plots of
fatigue damage against flight time, t h u s identifying periods of high
activity a n d , together with the other parameters, showing the cause of
and possibly the means of alleviating unnecessary fatigue damage or the
risk of exceeding limit loads. I n addition the accuracy of the fleetwide
recording installation can be checked and assumptions used in the service
fatigue life calculations confirmed.

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 201/7

FATIGUE DAMAGE TOLERANCE


OPERATION BEYOND THE SPECIFIED LIFE OR AN EQUIVALENT LIFE

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 T h e s t r u c t u r e will b e designed a n d s u b s t a n t i a t e d o n t h e basis of


a specified life u n d e r specified conditions. T h i s can be e x p r e s s e d as a n
e q u i v a l e n t life u n d e r o t h e r conditions, b u t w h e r e t h i s is insufficient
e x t e n s i o n s of life will b e r e q u i r e d . Consideration must be g i v e n ,
t h e r e f o r e , to t h e principles involved in s u c h extensions.

1.2 T h e structure should be a s s e s s e d to i d e n t i f y , if a p p r o p r i a t e , a n y


additional details which h a v e become critical b e c a u s e of t h e life e x t e n s i o n .

1.3 D u r i n g t h e initial design a n d certification, t h e s t r u c t u r a l l y significant


details will have been categorised as e i t h e r safe-life o r inspection-
dependent.

2 SAFE-LIFE DETAILS

2.1 T h e s e are generally:

( i ) details which are deeply buried in t h e s t r u c t u r e , a n d f o r


which t h e provision of access f o r inspection would be difficult
or not justified from economic consideration, or

(ii) components or details to which t h e application of t h e


inspection-dependent principles would b e impractical.

2.2 In g e n e r a l s u c h p a r t s c a n n o t b e allowed to exceed t h e life which h a s


been s u b s t a n t i a t e d b y test a n d / o r calculation a n d t h e y must be r e p l a c e d .
An important p u r p o s e of t h e check on s e n s i t i v i t y to i n c r e a s e s i n loading
s e v e r i t y is t h e provision of a n extra margin f o r details of t h i s kind. T h i s
margin will t h e n be available to ease t h e problems of life e x t e n s i o n .

2.3 Exceptionally, if a n acceptable inspection s y s t e m c a n be d e v e l o p e d , it


may be possible to re-qualify p a r t s as i n s p e c t i o n - d e p e n d e n t , t a k i n g d u e
a c c o u n t of loading history.

3 INSPECTION-DEPENDENT DETAILS

3.1 T h e calculations, assumptions, test d a t a a n d s e r v i c e h i s t o r y s h o u l d be


reviewed. T h e review should consider:

( i ) T h e operational statistics a n d t h e profiles flown b y t h e


aero plan e.

(ii) T h e methods employed in establishing t h e s t r u c t u r a l loads.

(iii) T h e methods a n d data used in t h e derivation of t h e


inspection t h r e s h o l d s a n d periods.
( i v ) Modifications, r e p a i r s , corrosion, a c c i d e n t a l damage a n d a n y
other relevant operational experience.

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( v ) Thresholds and inspection periods established b y service


experience.

3 . 2 Analysis used to extend the life of a structure should consider more


extensive damage models than were used i n the original crack growth
calculations. Such models should include:

( i ) The likelihood of the simultaneous development of cracks of a


size less than the detectable length i n adjacent structure
rapidly coalescing into a large crack, particularly where
several crack origins a r e possible along the line of the crack.

( i i ) The possibility of simultaneous damage occurring in


multi-element details working at the same stress levels.

( i i i ) The redistribution of load caused by a failure o r a


part-failure i n a detail, causing a higher rate of crack
propagation in other details.

3.3 The review should consider the possible advantages of structural


re-work a s a means of e x t e n d i n g t h e life of t h e detail u n d e r
consideration.

3.4 Where previous data a r e not sufficiently extensive, the need for
additional o r extended testing on details o r complete structures or
components should be considered.

4 LIFE EXTENSION DOCUMENT

4 . 1 The results of the review should be contained in an appendix to the


Fatigue Type Record and should be prepared i n accordance with DEF STAN
05-123, Chapter 333.

4 . 2 The recommendations of the document, i n the form of stricter existing


inspections together with additional inspections, should be t h e basis of
new servicing procedures to be applied to the structure b y the operator.

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LEAFLET 201/8 .
FATIGUE DAMAGE TOLERANCE

CLEARANCE OF AEROPLANES DESIGNED AND DEVELOPED TO AIRWORTHINESS


REQUIREMENTS OTHER THAN DEF STAN 00-970

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This leaflet áetails the analytical procedure to be followed for fatigue and
inspection dependent damage tolerance clearance of aeroplanes which have not been
designed to DEF STAN 00-970. (See Chapter 201 para 6 and Appendix 1 to Part 2
para 4).

1.2 The procedure is a step-by-step review of the existing design to establish the
fatigue life in relation to the requirements of Chapter 201. (See the Flow Charts at
Figs 1 and2).

1.3 Throughout the review it is essential that the Staff Requirement (Air) (SR(A)), the
Aeroplane Specification, MOD(PE) requirements, and the Certification Data as supplied
to the Airworthiness Approving Authority for the aeroplane are available. Without this
data the review cannot proceed.

1.4 A non DEF STAN 00-970 aeroplane will require, in parallel, a review of other
aspects of the design such as the Flight Envelope, Static Strength, Environmental
Spectrum etc. as these will have an impact on Fatigue.

1.5 Most civil transport aeroplanes have large 'open' easily inspectable structures,
and use materials with relatively slow crack growth properties and reasonably long
critical crack lengths. It is possible to treat the structure as inspection-dependent
rather than safe life, and it will, usually, be the inspection-dependent option of
Chapter 201 that is the criterion for assessment of derivatives of civil aeroplanes.

2 THE CLEARANCE PROCEDURE

2.1 The determination and substantiation of the fatigue life for an aeroplane is
dependent on the accuracy and validity of the design and Service spectrums and flight
profiles.

2.2 All subsequent analysis, tests and reviews are fallible unless there is factual
flight and ground measured data to substantiate the design and Service spectrum used.
This statement is relevant to every step of the review.

2.3 The final outcome of this review should be a report which comments on all aspects
connected with the fatigue life, and makes recommendations for consideration by the
Aeroplane Project Director (in conjunction with the Airworthiness Division, RAE).

3 THEREVIEWS

3.1 REVIEW DESIGN CRITERIA


3.1.1 Collect and collate the basic aeroplane documentation as follows:

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( i ) Staff Requirement (Air).

(i i ) Aeroplane Specification.

(i i i ) MOD(PE) Requirements.

(iv) Certification Data as supplied to the Airworthiness Approving


Authority.

3.2 REVIEW SPECIFICATION AND AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS TO


WHICH THE AEROPLANE WAS DESIGNED
3.2.1 List any deviations from the specification and airworthiness requirements
that have been accepted. Establish and review the substantiation provided to
permit the deviations.

3.2.2 Obtain fatigue type record where available (See DEF STAN 05-123).

3.2.3 For UK Services, operation a new spectrum will arise from the Statement of
Operating Intent (SOI). It is therefore necessary to review any deviations against
the new spectrum to confirm or otherwise, their validity. Should any of the
deviations be unacceptable the action required to eliminate them should be included
in the report to the Aeroplane Project Director.

3.3 COMPARE SPECIFICATION AND AIRWORTHINESS DATA WITH


DEF STAN 00-970 CHAPTER 201
3.3.1 In this comparison, all deviations from the documents listed in para 3.1
should be taken into account, noting the consequences of para 3.2.2. Table 1 gives
guidance on the general differences between DEF STAN 00-970 Chapter 201 and
US Mil A 87221, FAR 23 and 25, BCARs Sections D and K and JAR 25.

3.3.2 The comparison may show that further substantiation is required such as
further analysis andor testing and preparation of fatigue type record.

3.4 REVIEW DESIGN SPECTRUM AND FLIGHT PROFILES


3.4.1 Study in detail the basis for deriving the design spectrum and fight
profiles, to arrive at a safe life and/or inspection periodicity for each
structurally significant detail of the aeroplane, taking into account the Service
Spectrum. The safe life is needed for all structurally significant details, but
demonstration of acceptable economical operational consequences of inspection,
modification or replacement can lead to clearance of these details beyond safe
life.

3.4.2 Compare the Aeroplane Under Review with the MOD(PE) Specification and
SOI. As this review is likely to be carried out in the early stages of procurement
of the aeroplanes a full SOI may not be available. However, sufficient data should
be available from the SR(A) and MOD(PE) Specification together with advice from
the Service to develop an operational programme suitable for an initial comparison
to be made. Changes in gross take-off and landing weights, in performance required
and special to type operation such as tanking, receiving, air drop etc. are to be
particularly noted for consideration during this review.

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3.4.3 Identify Flight Times. Where civil life is quoted in flights, the flight
hour differences between civil and Service operations may be considerable.

3.4.4 C o n f m the Basis for the Derivation of the Design Spectrum. All the data
used to determine the design specmm should be identified, whether it is from
measured data on the aeroplane under consideration, an aeroplane of a similar
configuration or from analytical data.

3.4.5 Review the Measured and/or Analytical Data. The measured data could be
from a similarly configured aeroplane, where a certain amount of analysis would
have then been required. Analytical data would be expected if the aeroplane is of
a completely new configuration and, therefore, all conclusions would be subject to
in-flight measwmenrs.

3.5 REVIEW TEST SPECTRA


3.5.1 C o n f m , or otherwise, that the design spectrum from which the test spectra
were derived has not been changed significantly since the tests were completed. If
changes in design spectrum and/or flight profiles have occurred, due to development
of the aeroplane following its introduction into service by increases in Gross
Take-off Weight (GTOW) andor improvements in performance, then these changes
should be reviewed particularly against the new requirements.

3.5.2 Review of the truncation, grouping and random application of the loads and
frequency in the test spectra against the design spectrum, to assess the effect of
the validity of the test results for application to the new spectrum. This will
enable an accurate assessment to be made of the aeroplane’s ability to meet the UK
military requirements.

3.5.3 The design and test spectra will show, in particular for large transport
aeroplanes, an assumed or quantified payload factor for each flight included in the
spectrum. Civil aeroplanes tend to be operated on a 70 to 75% payload factor,
whereas Service military operation will almost certainly be close to 100%, with
inevitably higher gross take off and landing weights. The overall effect of this
on the fatigue/safe life of the aeroplane will be significant and will require an
assessment of its effect to be carried out.

3.6 REVIEW STRUCTURAL CONFIGURATION AND LOADING OF TEST


SPECIMEN AGAINST THAT OF AEROPLANE BEING PROCURED
3.6.1 If the aeroplane has been in service for some time, its capability would
usually have been developed or would be in the process of being developed.
Increases in performance, payload and gross weights may have been approved. The
structural configuration as well as the test loading will need to be compared with
that of aeroplane under review. All test specimens should be reviewed, including
component tests as well as full scale fatigue and damage tolerance testing.

3.6.2 Establish from the above if the test specimens, configurations and loading
are representative, or if there are deviations which are to be identified.

3.6.3 Assess the deviations listed to determine their effect on the fatigue life
by reviewing the test results. Ad-hoc testing may be necessary to substantiate the
fatigue life.

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3.7 REVIEW TEST RESULTS AND TEAR-DOWN INSPECTIONS


3.7.1 Review test results, including an assessment of each individual failure, its
extent, its life and the action taken to continue testing, such as repair,
re-design etc.

3.7.2 Review Tear Down Inspection. The review should identify all failed and/or
flawed areas which affect the fatigue life.

3.7.3 Determine Scatter Factors Used. From all the individual tests which make up
the test programme as a whole, the scatter factors used to determine the fatigue
life and/or the structurai integrity inspections should be identified.
Justification and substantiation for any shortfalls in the factors specified in
Chapter 201 and its associated leaflets will need to be reviewed.

3.7.4 Review Substantiation of Re-designed Parts. To qualify the aeroplanes to


the fatigue requirements, it may have been necessary to re-design some parts.
Substantiation of these parts needs to be reviewed, to determine if their fatigue
life is established by test and/or analysis.

3.7.5 At the completion of the test programme and tear down inspections, damage
which affects the fatigue life will have been identified.

3.8 REVIEW AIRFRAME LIFE


3.8.1 Determine the Specific Limitations of the Airframe Life. If no safe life
then fail safe and/or inspection-dependent substantiation will be available for
consideration. Compare with UK Service spectrum.

3.8.2 Review the Existing Life Monitoring Programme. Take into account
differences in flight durations, in flight refuelling if applicable, load factors
and runway roughness in its applicability to UK Service operation. Noting also
that military operations may require aeroplanes to operate from airfields at a
lower standard than normal civil airfields particularly in their surface
roughness.

3.9 REVIEW MATERIALS FOR RESISTANCE TO DETECTABLE CRACK


GROWTH
3.9.1 Review the materials used in the aeroplane for:

(i) Fracture toughness


(ii) Stress corrosion resistance
(iii) Tolerance to crack growth

Account should be taken of the environment to which the materials will be


subjected. Chapter 201 requires materials to have good resistance to the growth of
detectable damage. (See Leaflet 201/2 for material selection).

3.9.2 Review the fatigue and damage tolerance tests and the associated test
spectra and compare them with the UK Service Spectra.

3.9.3 Attention should be given to Stress corrosion resistance because military


aeroplanes are required to be in a state of readiness, with full operational
payload, on stand-by for considerable periods and with, at times, significant

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Volume 1 Leaflet 201/8

changes to environmental conditions which could well give rise to stress corrosion
particularly in under-carriages and their back up structure as well as main wing
structure with full integral fuel tanks. Additional inspection may be required, to
ensure that protective treatments in these areas is not flawed and to detect any
stress corrosion at an early stage.

3.9.4 It should be noted that there is a major difference in philosophy between


UK and US criteria for fatigue and damage tolerance. DEF STAN 00-970 Chapter
201 requires those structural details which are particularly sensitive to increase
in spectrum severity to be identified, so that precautions can be taken to prevent
them from limiting the life of the structure when such increases occur. This is
xhieved by requiring the safe life to be declared with the design (or service usage)
spectrum factored up by 1.2 on stress. DEF STAN 00-970 also specifies a
pre-production test of 3 x specified life of the design spectrum.

3.9.5 Compliance with MIL A 87221 is likely to have been by only two lifetimes of
fatigue testing followed by up to one further lifetime for demonstration of
residual strength and damage growth limits, and a tear down inspection. The
results of tests carried out in compliance with MIL A 87221, therefore, require a
detailed analysis to determine their relevance to DEF STAN 00-970.

3.9.6. US civil aeroplane manufacturers sometimes increase the seventy of the


loads towards the end of the fatigue test programme to accelerate the test. The
increased severity is sometimes then factored back to the initial loads programme
and an equivalent fatigue life is determined. Valuable information is also
obtained on airframe tolerance to weight growth. This increased loads programme
should be reviewed to determine whether the factors used are relevant, noting that
increased loading can sometimes introduce beneficial loading effects which are not
redised under the unfactored loading. (See Leaflet 201/3).

3.9.7 BCAR’s, FAR’S and JAR’S do not specifically call for testing to any
lifetime, but it is implied that to substantiate the fatigue life and damage
tolerance a certain amount of testing will be required.

3.9.8 Review the damage tolerance tests, in the light of paras 3.9.3 to 3.9.7
above, to check their compliance, or otherwise, with the requirements of Chapter
201. This review should concentrate on interpreting the test results against the
requirements and their impact primarily on inspection methods and periodicity.
Sane additional ad-hoc testing may arise from this review.

3.9.9 Complete the comparison of spectra to determine if any additional structural


tests are required, because of any significant increase in fatigue damage from
application of the UK Service Spectrum.

3.10 REVIEW UK SERVICE ’SPECIAL-TO-TYPE’ MODIFICATIONS


3.10.1 Review all ’Special to Type’ modifications needed to equip the aeroplane for
its military role, to determine the impact on the fatigue life of the aeroplane.
These modifications could include:

(i) Air to Air Refueling.

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( i i ) Infra-reá counter measure equipment.

(i i i ) Addition of radomes and/or fairings.

(iv) Rotadome for aerial surveillance radar.

(v) Airdrop equipment and systems.

(vi) Increase in AUW.

(vii) Increase in payload.

(vii i ) Overload operation for military necessity.

(i x) Freighter conversion.

(x) Armament.

(xi) Improvements in performance.

3.10.2 The review should detail any additional testing necessary to confum or
otherwise the airframe life and damage tolerance.

3.1 1 REVIEW STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY INSPECTION SCHEDULE


3.11.1 Review the existing structural integrity inspection schedule with the data
obtained from the paras 3.1 to 3.10. Inspections in relation to the test results,
test factors and design spectrum should be identified and be compared with the UK
Service Spectrum to provide for changes in the Inspection Schedule to reflect the
UK Service type of operation.

3.12 REVIEW IN-SERVICE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER OPERATORS


3.12.1 Review any In-service experience available to determine:

(i) if it has already been taken into account in the structural


integrity inspection schedule, or

(ii) if the schedule requires to be amended to incorporate the


latest in-service data.

3.13 REVIEW GUST AND MANOEUVRE LIMITATIONS


3.13.1 Review the spectrum comparison and the impact of the special-to-type
modifications with the existing gust and manoeuvre limitations. Higher operating
weights with higher payload factors or a higher number of flights than originally
assumed, resulting in an increased proportion of loads closer to limit, may well
give rise to an accelerated fatigue life consumption.

3.13.2 Civil transport aircraft operate a gust avoidance policy, Service operation
on the other hand, for military necessity, may well require penetration of
turbulence as a routine manoeuvre. Operation in severe turbulence may be
unavoidable, especially when required to reach a rendezvous during a tanking

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operation. The UK Services have additional manoeuvres above normal civil


operation, which should be considered when. assessing manoeuvre limitations, for
example:

(i) Rough Field Operation.

(ii) Missile avoidance.

(i i i ) Fighter affiliation.

(iv) Tanking.

(v) Receiving.

(vi) Rapid take off techniques.

(vii) Short field landing techniques.

The review of gust and manoeuvre limitations (including ground manoeuvres) is


required as part of the assessment of fatigue damaging loads.

3.13.3 Limitations arising from static strength requirements are not part of this
review, but the fatigue life may be strongly influenced by the operating limits
that are set. Any changes in limitations therefore arising from the static
strength review should be assessed at this stage for their affect on the fatigue
life and inspection periods.

4 STRUCTURAL COMPLIANCE

4.1 Collate the reviews and listing of deviations and differences to determine the
extent of further analysis and/or structural tests.

4.2 Confirm the SOI with the UK Services and finalise the spectrum.

4.3 Compare the final spectrum with the original design spectrum and recommend
any additionai analysis and/or testing required to show compliance with DEF STAN
00-970 Chapter 201.

4.4 Identify additional test requirements for consideration by the Aeroplane Project
Director.

4.5 Determine any tests required on first Service derivative.

5 OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS

5.1 With the confirmed SOI resulting in finalisation of flight profiles, operating
weights, flight frequency and environmental conditions, recommendations can be made
to the Aeroplane Project Director together with any ad-hoc flight testing required prior
to the OLM programme.

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6 ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS AND TESTING

6.1 Complete any additional analysis and testing required, and provide overall report
to the Aeroplane Project Director on the fatigue and damage tolerance of the aeroplane
subject to confirmation of loads from the OLM Programme.

7 OLM AND FATIGUE MONITORING PROGRAMME

7.1 Derive the OLM Programme determining from the static, fatigue and flight test
programmes the location of measurement transmitters and the data retrieval system as the
OLM programme will require to duplicate some of the locations and methods for
correlation.

7.2 Derive the fatigue monitoring programme to track the fatigue life consumption to
determine the periodicity of structural integrity inspections. Existing aeroplanes will
have some form of fatigue monitoring in some cases with AIDS equipment backed up by
Flight Log and Crew reports. Combat and some trainer aeroplanes may already have
fatigue meters. Dependent on the review just completed the additional parameters
required to be measured for service operation must be defined.

8 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY INSPECTION SCHEDULE AND FATIGUE RECORD


TYPE

8.1 Up date the structurai integrity inspection schedule with periodicities reflecting
the RAF operation.

8.2 Prepare the fatigue type record.

9 CA RELEASE DATA

9.1 Complete data and supporting documentation for promulgation of CA Release by the
Aeroplane Project Director.

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Volume 1

CHAPTER 202

SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The requirements of this chapter apply to all aeroplane types and to the aeroplane
as a whole in each case. The requirements are expressed in terms of a flight envelope,
the Co-ordinates of which are the forward speed and normal acceleration.

1.2 Refer to Leaflet 202D for defmitions.

2 FACTORS

2.1 The structure shall have proof and ultimate factors as specified in Chapter 200,
para 3, unless otherwise agreed with the Aeroplane Project Director in conjunction with
Airworthiness Division, RAE, under conditions involving steady normal acceleration and
forward speed as represented by all points within and on the boundary of the specified
flight envelope, and under specified manoeuvres involving pitching acceleration within
the envelope.

3 THE FLIGHT ENVELOPE

3.1 The structural design flight envelope is defined by Fig 1 and by the values of
n i and VD which will be given, with any necessary amplification for special types, in
the particular Aeroplane Specification. All altitudes up to the maximum operating
altitude shall be considered.

3.2 In this context level coordinated turns and wind up turns shall be considered as
symmemc manoeuvres. Any rate of roll required to minimise lateral acceleration on
entering the turn shall be allowed for. See also Chapter 203, para 7.

4 MANOEUVRES TO BE CONSIDERED

4.1 STEADY PITCHING VELOCITY


4.1.1 The condition of a steady pitching velocity shall be considered at all
points within and on the boundary of the flight envelope specified by Fig 1.
The pitching velocity shall be that associated with the appropriate value of the
normal acceleration factor at a given speed. It shall be assumed that the pitch
control motivators are deflected at a sufficiently slow rate so that pitching
acceleration effects are negligible.

4.2 PITCHING ACCELERATION


4.2.1 The loads shall be considered which arise when the aeroplane is initially in
steady level flight at the manoeuvre speed, VA1 and the pitch motivators are
moved suddenly to cause the extreme positive pitching acceleration (nose up),
except as limited by pilot or actuator effort or control system design (see para
4.2.4).

4.2.2 Consideration shall be given to the loads arising from a movement of the
pitch motivators to cause a transition from steady level flight at a speed within
or on the boundary to the appropriate extreme steady normal acceleration condition.

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The speed shall be assumed constant until the extreme value of the normal
acceleration is achieved.

4.2.3 In evaluating the loads which arise in the manoeuvres covered by para 4.2.1
and 4.2.2 consideration shall be given to:

(i) The aeroplane trimmed to a zero inceptor force condition.

( i i ) The aeroplane in any out of m m condition as agreed in


accordance with Chapter 600, para 6.1.

4.2.4 When the flight control system of the aeroplane incorporates load limiting
devices the combination of normal accelerations and pitching conditions described
in para 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 shall be determined in agreement with the Aeroplane Project
Director. See also Leaflet 202/3, and Chapter 208, para 4.

4.2.5 When the flight control system of the aeroplane is of conventional design
such that movement of the motivators is directly related to the movement of the
pilot’s inceptors use shall be made of a rational motivator motion versus time
profile when determining the loads which occur in the manoeuvres described in para
4.2.1 and 4.2.2. See also Leaflet 202/1.

5 SUPPLEMENTARY CONDITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

5.1 ENGINE POWER


5.1.1 All engine power conditions (including “engine-off” and any capability for
altering the direction of the total thrust vector) likely to occur in association
with the particular manoeuvre under investigation shall be considered. See also
Leaflet 202/3.

5.2 HIGH LIFT DEVICES, AIRBRAKES AND UNDERCARRIAGE


5.2.1 All positions of the high lift devices likely to occur in association with
the particular manoeuvre and speed under investigation shall be considered. See
also Chapter 205, para 3.

5.2.2 When airbrakes are fitted all positions that can be selected in flight shall
be considered. S e e also Chapter 205, para 4.

5.2.3 All positions of the undercarriage which can occur in association with a
particular condition shall be considered. Refer also to Chapter 306.

5.3 PITCHING MOMENT COEFFICIENT


5.3.1 The values of the pitching moment coefficient C ~ and O the position of
the aerodynamic centre shall be determined by the most accurate means available,
and subsequently checked by wind tunnel or flight tests.

5.3.2 Appropriate allowance shall be made for the effects of the following on the
pitching moment coefficient Cmo and the position of the aerodynamic centre:

(i) The limited accuracy of the method used to determine the


values of these data.

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Volume 1 Chapter 202

(ii) Tolerances in aileron setting, flap setting, wingbody setting,


wing twist, etc.,

(iii) Elastic deformation of the aeroplane under aerodynamic and


inertia loads.

5.3.3 Allowance shaíl also be made for the effects of propellers and slip-stream,
or flow through jet engines, on the pitching moment coefficient Cmo and the
position of the aerodynamic centre. This allowance shall be based, whenever
possible, on the results of wind tunnel or other tests of the particular design.

5.4 OTHER AERODYNAMIC COEFFICIENTS AND DERIVATIONS


5.4.1 The values of all relevant aerodynamic coefficients and derivatives shall be
be based on the best available data. Wind tunnel or flight test results shall be
used, wherever possible, to determine or check these values.

5.5 MASS AND MASS DISTRIBUTION


5.5.1 Consideration shall be given to all masses between:-

(i) The minimum flying mass (that is the take off mass less bombs,
ammunition and other items readily dropped or expended except
for sufficient fuel for a normal descent and 30 minutes cruise
at sea level at the engine conditions appropriate to maximum
endurance)

(ii) The maximum mass at which the aeroplane can reach the altitude
considered.

5.5.2 The design centre of gravity positions at each mass and aerodynamic
configuration shall include a tolerance beyond the actual maximum forward and
actual maximum aft positions which are attainable in that configuration. This
tolerance shall be 1.5% of the mean aerodynamic chord unless otherwise agreed with
the Aeroplane Project Director.

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-
ai
U
U
U

g+;+
O
I

L
1 -
C

Z
I /1

EQUIVALENT AIRSPEED
m
C
-n

I I
1

FIG 1 THE BASIC FLIGHT ENVELOPE

VALUES SPECIFIED FOR PARTICULAR AEROPLANE TYPES (see Leaflet 202/2 for
definitions).

VD .. .. Design diving speed (E A S)

ni .. .. Maximum normal acceleration coefficient

DEPENDENT VALUES
(Unless otherwise specified in the Aeroplane Specification)

VA is the manoeuvring speed, that is that minimum flying speed at which n i can be
achieved.

VH shall be the maximum speed attainable in level flight with the aeroplane flying at the
basic design mass, with no external stores at the maximum continuous cruise engine
condition.

n2 = 1-0.3111

n3 = -0.6(nl -1)

NOTE:
On aeroplanes designed for dive bombing or ground attack duties:
VH will be equal to v D 1 which means that n2 will be equal to n3.

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 202/0

SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

REFERENCES

ARC Reports

R and M 3001 Loading conditions of tailed aircraft in longitudinal


manoeuvres

R and M 3327 Simplified loading formulae for pull out manoeuvres of


tailed aircraft

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 202/1

SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

THE CALCULATION OF THE RESPONSE OF AN AEROPLANE TO PITCH


CONTROL INPUT AND ASSOCIATED LOADS WHEN A
CONVENTIONAL CONTROL SYSTEM IS USED

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Chapter 202, para 4 requires the use of a rational representation of the motion of
the pitch control motivator to be used to evaluate the loads which arise during a
pitching manoeuvre. The control systems of many aeroplanes are complex and it is not
possible to present a detailed analytical procedure for the load evaluation which will
cover all cases. In the more general case it is possible to give a broad outline of the
stages of the analysis required to derive the loads. For these cases see Leaflet 202/3.

1.2 Where there is effectively a direct link between the pilot’s inceptor and the
deflections of the pitch motivator it is possible to give an analytical technique.
Examples of such closed algebraic forms may be found in R and M 3001 and 3327.

2 MANOEUVRE CONDITIONS

2.1 The complete pitching manoeuvre involves the transition of the aeroplane from
steady level flight at a particular speed and altitude to a condition of steady normal
acceleration, usually at some point on the boundary of the flight envelope; and then a
return to level flight. As the manoeuvre is primarily the response of the aeroplane to
control input in the short period longitudinal mode it is rapid and it is adequate to
assume that the forward speed does not vary during the manoeuvre.

2.2 The aim of the analysis is to specify the control input which results in a maximum
increment in the normal acceleration corresponding to the desired value at the
appropriate point on the boundary of, or within, the flight envelope. It should be noted
that unless the short period response is overdamped the motion of the aeroplane will be
oscillatory, in which case the maximum incremental value of normal acceleration will
exceed the steady state value appropriate to that control input. Whilst the steady state
value is simply related to the dynamic characteristics of the aeroplane for a given
motivator deflection, the maximum value is a function of the shape of the motivator
movement versus time profile.

2.3 The final phase of the manoeuvre is conventionally analysed by assuming that the
aeroplane has achieved the steady state value of the normal acceleration and then
applying the pitch inceptor input required to return it to level flight.

2.4 From the foregoing description it will be realised that the important parameter is
the way in which the movement of the pitch motivator varies with time rather than the
motion of the pilot’s inceptor. In a complex control system, such as one using active
control techniques, it is necessary to consider the effect of all the inceptors which
contribute inputs to the longitudinal control system. Refer to Leaflet 202/3 and Chapter
208, para 4.

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3 PILOTINPUT

3.1 For those cases where the pilot’s inceptor is either directly linked mechanically
to the longitudinal control motivator, or through a power control unit having no other
inputs it is possible to specify the motivator movement in terms of the input of the
pilots inceptor. Two separate forms of motion have been used, in the past:-

(i) Unchecked, where the inceptor is moved to the appropriate deflection


and held there whilst the aeroplane responds.

(ii) Checked; where after the initial movement of the inceptor, it is


moved back towards its initial setting, sometimes after a time
delay.

3.2 The variation of the inceptor motion with respect to time generally takes a form
closely described by a ramp function, although for analytical purposes the unchecked
motion has often been represented by an exponential relationship.

3.3 The U.S. Mil-A-008861A para 3.19.2 identifies three specific movements of the
pitch inceptor, all based on ramp functions. in each case the inceptor is assumed to be
deflected through an angle, 6, such as to give the desired normal acceleration at the
end of the aeroplane response time. The class of aeroplane effects the time, t i ,
assumed to achieve the angle, 6, it varying from 0.2 seconds for highly manoeuvrable
aeroplanes to 0.4 seconds for transport types. The three conditions relate to the
movement of the inceptor after the angle, 6, has been achieved.

(i) Movement of the inceptor back to the original position in the same
time as the application, unless inceptor angle limitation requires a
dwell time, t2, at angle 6 to enable the specified normal
acceleration to be achieved.

(ii) Dwell at the angle, 6, for a time t3 determined so that the


specified normal acceleration is just achieved in a total time (2t1
+ t3), 6, being determined accordingly.
(iii) Dwell at the angle, 6, for a time, u,and then movement of the
inceptor to an angle, 6/2, in the reverse direction in a time
1.5tl. Both q and 6 are determined to enable the specified
normal acceleration to be just achieved in a total time (2.5tl +
u).
4 CALCULATION OF THE RESPONSE OF THE AEROPLANE

4.1 The first stage in the actual calculation of the loads which arise in a pitching
manoeuvre is to determine the response of the aeroplane to the specified pilot andor
other inceptor inputs.

4.2 This involves setting up the equations of motion of the aeroplane. In accord with
the assumptions of para 2 these consist merely of the Z-force equation and the pitching
moment equation (as in the approximation to the short period motion of the aeroplane).
This completes the description of the dynamic system for the class of aeroplane, for
which 6 is a prescribed function of time.

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4.3 In the more general case, it is necessary to add all the equations governing the
dynamic behaviour of the control system.

4.4 To proceed to the calculation of a control surface loading, the effective


incremental angle of incidence at the control position is required. One of the response
quantities that can be obtained from the response calculation is the incremental angle
of incidence of the aeroplane (i.e. at the cg). This quantity may then be used to
determine the incremental angle of incidence at the longitudinal controlhabiliser
surface, making due allowance for pitching velocity and rates of change of downwash
with time and wing incidence where appropriate.

4.5 In addition the variation of motivator deflection during the manoeuvre will either
have been specified or will have to be determined as a response quantity.

5 CONTROLISTABILISER SURFACE LOADS

5.1 At any time during the manoeuvre the total load is the algebraic sum of the load on
a controlhtabiliser surface due to its incidence at that time and the incremental load
due to the deflection of any part of it at that same time.

5.2 When the aeroplane having a conventional wing-tail layout is pitched from steady
level flight towards the positive normal acceleration boundary the total surface load
will pass through a maximum download in the early stages of the manoeuvre, then
through a maximum upload before reaching the steady circling flight value. It finally
passes through another maximum in the upload sense when during the second stage of
manoeuvre the input is reversed to return the aeroplane to steady level flight. In the
case of an aeroplane having a foreplane-wing layout the foreplane load passes through a
maximum upload during the f i t part of the manoeuvre as the steady circling flight value
is approached. A maximum download condition may result as the input is reversed to
return the aeroplane to steady level flight. It should be noted that in this second
configuration the critical design loads conditions are reversed. That is the critical
foreplane load is likely to arise in a steady state condition whilst the transient case
is likely to give the wing design conditions.

6 CONTROL SURFACE HINGE MOMENTS

6.1 The moment about the hinge line of the aerodynamic load acting on a control
surface is also dependent on the incidence of the control/stabiliser where appropriate
and the control surface deflection. Again this passes through maximum positive and
negative values as does the load, when the aeroplane is of conventional wing-tail
layout.

7 GENERAL REMARKS

7.1 As previously mentioned, it is possible to obtain an analytic solution in closed


form for certain aeroplanes, In such an approach it is usual to make the following
assumptions for initial analysis:

(i) variation of forward speed and the gravity component during the motion
is neglected, already mentioned.

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(ii) the contribution of the control motivator force to the total lift is
Omitted.

( i i i ) the elastic distortion of the aeroplane structure is ignored, and

(iv) the equations of motion are linearised and the aerodynamic derivatives
assumed constant throughout the manoeuvre.

7.2 Should it be considered necessary in a given case to account for any of these
effects, the equations of motion of the aeroplane must be amended accordingly.

7.3 If the data required under para 5.3.2(i) and (ii) of Chapter 202 are not
forthcoming from wind-tunnel or other tests, it is acceptable that the effects under
items (i) and (U) shall be estimated using appropriate theories, in combination with
the best available structural data in respect of item (U). Whenever possible, the
effects under para 5.3.2 (Ui) shall be based on the data from model and full-scale
tests of a closely similar design.

7.4 For aeroplanes with unswept wings and of conventional structural design flying at
low Mach numbers, in the absence of data from any of the investigations detailed above,
some allowances should be made. Changes in Cmo of i 0.0075 and a shift of f2.5% of
the mean chord in the position of the aerodynamic centre should be considered.

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 202/2

SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

DEFINITIONS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The definitions given in this Leaflet and in the British Standard Glossary of
Aeronautical Terms (BS Specification No. 185) are recommended for general use. To
avoid confusion, it is particularly important that alternative and undefined terms
should be avoided in type records, strength calculation and test reports submitted for
official approval.

2 ACCELERATION

2.1 NORMAL ACCELERATION COEFFICIENT (n)


2.1.1 For structural design purposes the normal acceleration coefficient "n" is
the resultant of the total aerodynamic force acting perpendicularly to the
aeroplane fore and aft datum, divided by the total weight. Where appropriate
allowance should be made for the effect of deflected thrust which will contribute
to the total normal acceleration experienced by the aeroplane, see Leaflet 600/6,
para 2.2.

2.2 MAXIMUM NORMAL ACCELERATION COEFFICIENT (ni)


2.2.1 The maximum normal acceleration coefficient is the value of "n" which is
accepted at the design stage as being the highest positive value for which a
particular aeroplane need be designed to cover symmetric flight manoeuvres, due
allowance being made for any component of deflected thrust. The value is chosen on
the basis of the intended use of the type, modified (if appropriate) by the
characteristics of the individual design. It is denoted throughout by the symbol
n1.
3 POWERED FLYING CONTROLS

3.1 A powered flying control system is one in which the whole or part of the power
required to move the main flying control surface (or surfaces) concerned is supplied by
an electric, hydraulic, or other non-human source.

4 SPEED

4.1 DESIGN DIVING SPEED (VD)


4.1.1 The design diving speed is the speed accepted at the design stage as being
the highest Equivalent Air Speed for which the particular aeroplane need be
designed, the value being chosen on the basis of the intended use of the type,
modified (if appropriate) by the characteristics of the individual design. It is
denoted throughout the text by the symbol VD.

4.2 MINIMUM PERMISSIBLE SPEED


4.2.1 The minimum permissible speed is defined in terms of the handling of the
aeroplane. See Chapter 603, para 1.2.3.

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LEAFLET 202/3

SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

THE CALCULATION OF THE LOADS ASSOCIATED WITH SYMMETRIC


MANOEUVRES FOR AEROPLANES HAVING CONTROL SYSTEMS WITH
LOAD LIMITING DEVICES

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The application of the techniques described in Leaflet 202/1 is inappropriate for
those aeroplanes which use an active control system incorporating load limiting devices.
In these aeroplanes the automatic system can override pilot input and result in a so
called "carefree" manoeuvring situation. For the purposes of structural load evaluation
it is usually necessary to consider cases where motion of the aeroplane occurs in six
degrees of freedom, although constant forward speed may be assumed in some
circumstances. The analysis may be further complicated by the integration of flight and
propulsion controls, as in the case of vectored-thrust aeroplanes. Reference in all
these cases should be made to Chapter 208, para 4, which deals with the airframe aspects
of active control systems design.

1.2 The use of a simple expression to specify the movement of the control motivators is
not appropriate for advanced flight control systems. The specification of the flight
envelope itself is relevant since the implied accelerations are one of the common design
features of the airframe and control system.

2 MANOEUVRE PARAMETERS

2.1 One way of proceeding with the design of both the airframe and control system is to
establish a set of "manoeuvre parameters". These include aeroplane velocities as well
as accelerations. They should be derived after consideration of the handling and
agiiity requirements of the aeroplane and in consultation with the Aeroplane Project
Director.

2.2 Design loads are calculated by balancing the aeroplane at selected points within
and on the boundaries using an assumed, appropriate control usage.

2.3 Subsequently, as the design of the flight control system becomes more fully defined
it is necessary to investigate the effect of control response on the manoeuvre
parameters and to check the load calculations in order to obtain flight clearance.

2.4 Reference should be made to Leaflet 208/4 for a further discussion of the
sinictural implications of active control systems.

3 NORMAL ACCELERATION/PITCHING ACCELERATION ENVELOPE

3.1 In the case of symmetric, or primarily symmetric, manoeuvres it is useful to


consider an envelope which describes the interaction of normal acceleration and pitching
acceleration. In practice it is convenient to use a 'modified' pitching acceleration
which includes a term consisting of the product of the roll rate, p and yaw rate, r,
then:-

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Modified pitching acceleration = (4 - pr)


.
where q is the pitching acceleration

A typical form of the envelope for a supersonic aeroplane is shown at Fig 1. As would
be expected maximum negative, nose down, pitching acceleration coincides with all
positive values of normal acceleration. Equally there is a reduction in design
positive, nose up, pitching acceleration as the maximum normal acceleration is
approached.

3.2 The value of maximum normal acceleration is defined in Chapter 202, para 3 and the
maximum pitch acceleration by aeroplane handling and agility considerations.

4 MAXIMUM COMBINATION OF ANGULAR RATES AND ACCELERATIONS

4.1 A further consideration is the combination of maximum angular acceleration, for


example, q in pitch, with angular rate, for example, q, and vice-versa. Fig 2 is an
example of an envelope which describes such a combination. In this case the maximum
angular rate applies with angular accelerations up to about 40% of the maximum and vice
versa.

4.2 It is also necessary, to specify the combinations of pitching velocity, q, with


normal acceleration. The relationship shown in Leaflet 203/2, Fig 2 for asynhnetric
manoeuvre parameters is also appropriate for combinations of q/q and
"/"l.

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Volume 1 Leaflet 202/3
n
I

FIG. 1 COMBINATIONS OF NORMAL AND PITCHING ACCELERATIONS

C
.-+O
CJ
L
Qi
aJ
V

ü
-30
L

U
C
a
+I

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 .O Angular Rate


- Max.Angu
+

lar Rate

i
FIG. 2 COMBINATIONS OF ANGULAR RATES AND ACCELERATIONS

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Volume 1

CHAPTER 203

ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

1 GENERAL

1.1 The requirements of this chapter are applicable to all aeroplanes and to the
aeroplane as a whole unless otherwise specified. The asymmetric flight-conditions
associated with side-slipping and rolling are considered, spinning being dealt with in
Chapter 207.

2 FACTORS

2.1 The structure shall have proof and ultimate factors as specified in Chapter 200,
para 3, unless otherwise agreed with the Aeroplane Project Director (in conjunction with
the Airworthiness Division, RAE), under the loads which arise in each of the following
cases.

3 MANOEUVRES TO BE CONSIDERED

3.1 When the flight control system of the aeroplane incorporates load limiting devices
the appropriate combinations of asymmetric and symmetric manoeuvre conditions to be
considered shall be agreed with the Aeroplane Project Director. The cases stated in
para 4 to 7 of this Chapter shall be considered in so far as they are applicable.
Reference shall be made to Chapter 208 and Leaflets 202/3,203/2 and 208/4.

3.2 When the flight control system of the aeroplane is of conventional design such that
the movement of the control motivators is directly related to the movement of the
pilot’s inceptors the asymmetric manoeuvres stated in para 4 to 7 of this Chapter shall
apply. Guidance on the application of the requirements is given in Leaflet 203/1.

4 YAWING MANOEUVRES

4.1 DESIGN CONDITIONS


4.1.1 The manoeuvres shall be considered with the aeroplane in initially
unaccelerated flight at zero sideslip at all attainable airspeeds up to the design
diving speed, VD, and at all altitudes up to the maximum operating altitude.

4.2 DESIGN CASES


4.2.1 The input from the pilot’s inceptor shall be such that, in the absence of
response of the aeroplane, it results in an effectively instantaneous application
of the yaw motivator(s). The deflection(s) of the yaw motivator(s) shall be
determined by the following considerations, whichever yields the critical cases for
a particular aeroplane.

(i) That corresponding to the maximum output permitted by the


flight control system for the power unit of each control
motivator.

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Chapter 203 Volume 1

( i i ) When the motivator(s) is(are) activated through the deflection


of pedais, the specified deflection(s) shall be that
corresponding to a total pedal force of 1344N (300 lbfj from
the minimum control speed, VMC, to the manoeuvre speed,
VA and 890N (2001bf) from the cruise speed, Vc, to the
design speed, VD, with linear variation between VA and
V c (Refer to Chapter 202, para 3 for the definition of
speeds VA, V c and VD).

4.2.2 The following specific phases of the manoeuvre shall be considered:

( i ) The loads resulting from the prescribed instantaneous


deflection(s) of the yaw motivator(s), before the aeroplane
responds.

( i i ) The loads in the condition of maximum sideslip angle resulting


from the aeroplane to the prescribed deflection of the yaw
motivator(s).

( i i i ) With the aeroplane yawed to the static equilibrium angle


corresponding to the prescribed deflection of the yaw
motivator(s), the loads which arise when the deflection(s)
is(are) instantaneously returned to the neutral position.

4.2.3 For all aeroplanes, other than transport types, consideration shall also be
given to pilot input such that the yaw motivator, or combination of motivators,
moves sinusoidally at the natural frequency of the Dutch Roll Motion of the
aeroplane (see Chapter 602 and Leaflet 602/1, para 3). The maximum value reached
by the deflection of the directional motivator(s) during this process shall be two
thirds of that specified in para 4.2.1 and the input shall consist of one and half
cycles of the pilot's inceptor (that is left-central-right-central-left-central).

4.2.4 Where appropriate, consideration shall also be given to the deflection of


the yaw motivatofls) which will result from inceptor inputs from the automatic
control system (see Chapter 208).

4.3 CROSS COUPLING CONSIDERATIONS


4.3.1 In those cases where inertial or aerodynamic cross-coupling results in the
aeroplane rolling or pitching during the manoeuvres described by para 4.2.1, 4.2.3
or 4.2.4, unless the aeroplane flight control system ensures that there are smaller
limited values of bank angle and normal acceleration increments, corrective action
shall be assumed as follows:

(i) Deflection of the roll motivator(s) to arrest the rblling


motion, but not until the angle of bank has reached 15' or the
maximum dynamic sideslip angle, described in para 4.2.2(ii), has
been achieved, whichever comes first.

( i i ) Deflection of the pitch motivator to reduce the pitching


response, but not until the increment in normal acceleration has
reached 0.25g.

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Volume 1 Chapter 203

4.4 LONGITUDINAL STABILISER/CONTROL SURFACE LOADS


4.4.1 Except when para 3.1 and 4.3.1 (ii) apply it is not necessary to superimpose
a manoeuvre load upon the load on the longitudind stabiliser/control required to
trim the aeroplane in the initial conditions specified in para 4.1.

4.4.2 However, in calculating the loading on a longitudinal stabiliser/control


surface the magnitude of the pitching moment coefficient, a o , shall be
increased and the resulting trim (balancing) load shall be distributed
asymmetrically so as to ensure that the effect of sideslip angle is covered. See
Leaflet 203/1 para 6.

4.4.3 Consideration shall also be given in the design to the possible effects of
asymmetrical longitudinal stabiliser/control surface loads due to buffeting which
may occur near the minimum permissable flight speed as defined in Chapter 603,
para 1.2.3.

5 EFFECTS OF ASYMMETRIC ENGINE FAILURE

5.1 Multi engined aeroplanes shall be designed to withstand the loads which arise from
the sudden failure of the critical engine.

5.2 The aeroplane shall be considered to be in level flight at any speed from the
minimum control speed, VMC, (see Chapter 602, para 4) up to the design diving
speed, VD, at any attainable altitude. The remaining engine(s) shall be assumed to be
delivering the maximum rated power appropriate to the speed and altitude.

5.3 When reverse thrust or propeller drag may occur because of automatic features,
consideration shall also be given to these effects being present on the failed engine.

5.4 Corrective action by the pilot may be assumed to be initiated at the time the
aeroplane has reached the maximum yawing velocity subsequent to the engine failure, but
not before two seconds after the engine failure. The magnitude of the corrective action
shall be based on the control forces stated in Chapter 206, para 2.2, unless it can be
demonstrated by analysis or test that lower values can control the yaw and roll which
result from the prescribed engine failure conditions.

6 ROLLING MANOEUVRES

6.1 Chapter 602, para 3 specifies minimum roll performance for handling purposes and
Leaflet 60213 gives acceptable criteria for meeting these requirements. The loads which
arise during rolling manoeuvres are covered by the Combined Rolling and Pitching cases
specified in para 7. The roll control conditions which contribute to these cases are
specified in the following sub-paragraphs.

6.2 The maximum roll inceptor input to be used for stressing purposes at a particular
speed and altitude shall be that which gives the largest steady-state deflection, or set
of deflections, of the roll control motivator, or motivators, whichever is applicable,
defined by the most critical of the following conditions:

(i) That deflection, or set of deflections, which results in one and a


third times the specified minimum rolling performance at that speed and
altitude

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(ii) The following deflection, or set of deflections:

(a) At speed VA - the full available deflection(s)

(b) At speed VC - the deflection(s) required to give the steady roll


rate which occurs in condition (a)

(c) At speed VD - the deflection(s) required to give one third of


the steady roll rate which occurs in condition (a)

(iii) The deflection, or set of deflections, given by whichever of the


following is appropriate to the particular design:

(a) that corresponding LO the maximum output permitted by the flight


control system for the power unit of the single roll motivator, or
of the individual power units for a number of roll motivators used
in combination.

(b) where the motivators are driven solely by the deflection of the
pilot’s stick or wheel, that corresponding to a control force of
267N (601bf) for a stick control of 222N (501bf) applied to the
rim of a wheel of diameter Dm (Din), resulting in a couple of
magnitude 2221) (Nm) or 50D (lbf in).

If the deflection (or any one deflection), so defined, exceeds that for
full travel, it shall be replaced by the maximum available deflection.

6.3 For transport aeroplanes, para 6.2 (iii) need not be considered.

6.4 In applying the conditions of para 6.2 (iii)(b) the accuracy with which the
actual hinge moments of each individual motivator may be predicted may sometimes be
such that doubts arise as to the magnitude of the deflections so defined. The assumed
deflections shall be increased, in such cases, by 30 per cent.

6.5 For ailerons or spoilers having differential motion, the actual angles shall be
used for stressing, but the mean of the actual angles shall correspond to the angle
given by para 6.2 (i), (ii) or (iii) as appropriate.

6.6 Regardless of which of the conditions specified in para 6.2 is critical the
following specific phases of the manoeuvre shall be considered:

(i) The loads which arise due to the rolling acceleration consequent upon
the deflection(s) of the roll motivator(s) with the aeroplane initially
in steady level flight.

(ii) The loads when the rate of roll has reached its steady value consequent
upon the prescribed deflection(s) of the roll motivator(s).

(iii) With the aeroplane in the steady rate of roll condition referred to in
(ii) above, the loads which arise when the roll motivator(s) are
returned to the neutral position(s).

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(iv) With the aeroplane in the steady rate of roll condition referred to in
. (ii) above, the loads which arise when the roll motivator(s) are moved
to a deflected position of equal magnitude of that in (i) above, but of
opposite direction.

6.7 The &flection(s) of the roll motivator(s) shall be assumed to be


instantaneous unless otherwise agreed with the Aeroplane Project Director, see
also Leaflet 203/1, para 7.2.4.

7 COMBINED ROLLING AND PITCHING

7.1 The loads arising from the combined application of the pitch and roll motivators
shall be considered for all speeds up to the design diving speed, VD, and all
altitudes up to the maximum operating altitudes for the following conditions:

( i j The deflection, or set of deflections, of the roll motivator shall


be:

(a) The critical value specified in para 6.2 for all values of normal
acceleration from -1.Og up to 0.67nlg except that for transport
aeroplanes the normal acceleration values shall be from zero to
0.67nlg, and

(b) One half of the critical value specified in para 6.2 associated
with a normal acceleration of 0.9nlg, and

(c) Linear variation between the values specified in (a) and (b) with
normal accelerations between 0.67nlg and 0.9nlg

(ii) The yaw motivator(s) shall be:

(a) Held fixed in the position(s) for trim with the aeroplane in
wings-level flight, and

(b) Deflected to reduce the sideslip angle to zero, or if this is not


possible, to minimise the sideslip angle

(iii) Air brakes shall be either open or closed, as appropriate to the speed
- see Chapter 205, para 4.
(iv) For the definition of normal acceleration see Chapter 202, para 3 and
Leaflet 202/2, para 2.

8 BOMB BAY and DOOR LOADS

8.1 The flight loading cases which arise from the conditions specified in para 4, 5 and
7 are applicable to bomb bays when the doors are open and to bomb doors, their operating
mechanisms and supporting structure when the doors are in all positions from fully open
to fully closed and locked. The aerodynamic loads on the bomb doors, and their
distribution, shall be obtained from full scale or wind tunnel tests. Consideration
shall gven to buffet effects.
f

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9 MASS AND MASS DISTRIBUTION

9.1 The range of masses to be considered and the corresponding positions of the centre
of gravity shall be as specified in Chapter 202, para 5.5.

10 AERODYNAMIC COEFFICIENTS AND DERIVATIVES

10.1 The values of relevant aerodynamic coefficients and derivations shall be based on
the best available data. Wind tunnel or flight test results shall be used wherever
possible to determine or check values. S e e also Leaflet 203/1, para 6.

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LEAFLET 203/0
ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES
REFERENCE PAGE

RAE Report
Structures 76 Dynamic fin and rudder loads in yawing manoeuvres

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LEAFLET 203/1

ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

YAWING, SIDESLIPPING AND ROLLING MOTIONS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This leaflet gives explanatory notes on the requirements of Chapter 203 and
outlines the methods of determining the critical stressing conditions arising in the
course of the manoeuvres specified therein. It is particularly applicable to those
aeroplanes where the movement of the control motivators is directly related to the
movement of the pilot’s inceptors.

1.2 As in the case of the symmetric manoeuvres of Chapter 202 and Leaflet 202/1,
present-day developments in aeroplane control systems can render past practices
inapplicable in the general case. Whilst in the past there always existed a direct
relationship between a given manoeuvring task and a control device, this is no longer
the case. The demands of improved performance in a number of directions have resulted
in an increasing trend to combine the effects of a number of control devices for a given
task. Simple examples of this trend are provided by the use of ailerons supplemented by
differentially deflected tail panels. When this is coupled with the increased
application of automatic control systems and unusual aerodynamic configurations the
consequence can be an extremely complex situation. However, there does exist a class of
conventional aeroplanes, namely those for which the pilot’s control is connected
directly, or via a power unit only, to the rudder and aileron control surfaces, that can
be catered for by simplified methods as hitherto (RAE Report Structures 76).

2 LATERAL MANOEUVRES ARISING FROM APPLIED YAWING MOMENTS

2.1 Whether a yawing moment arises from the application of the yaw motivator(s) or by
a sudden loss of engine thrust on one side of a multi-engined aeroplane, the resulting
motion has the same character, being primarily a combination of yawing, sideslipping and
rolling.

2.2 For the simple class of aeroplane mentioned in para 1.2 above the first stage in
satisfying the requirements of Chapter 203, paras 4 and 5 is the calculation of the
response of the aeroplane as the solution of the laterddirectional equations of
motion. In the more general case it is necessary to include the equations which govern
the dynamics of the control system when determining the overall response.

2.3 The inputs referred to in para 2.1 above principally give rise to yawing moments
but in certain cases there may be significant induced rolling moments and sideforces.

2.4 It has been usual for the linearised equations of motion to be used in calculating
the response of the aeroplane. Often the effect of the sideforce may be neglected in the
calculation of the overall response of the aeroplane but it does have a significant
effect upon the lateral and yawing accelerations. If the wing of the aeroplane is
unswept and of moderate to high aspect ratio it may be acceptable to neglect the rolling
i
content of the lateral motion, at least over part of the range of operating conditions.

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When this is so for the simple class of aeroplane referred to, the response of the
aeroplane is derived from a solution of the two equations which describe the lateral and
yawing motions.

2.5 For the simple class of aeroplane it is adequate to assume that there is no input
from the roli or pitch motivators during the execution of the complete yawing described
in Chapter 203, para 4.2. However, when inertial or aerodynamic cross-coupling is
present it is admissible to introduce corrective action both in the rolling and
longitudinal senses. In order to ensure that adequate allowance is made for the loads
which may arise before this corrective action is effective, Chapter 203, para 3.3
specifies minimum values of bank angle, coupled with dynamic sideslip angle and normal
acceleration which must be catered for, unless it can be demonstrated that the flight
control system ensures lower limited values.

3 YAWING CONTROL INPUTS

3.1 The inputs into the yaw channel are generally specified such that the deflection(s)
of the appropriate motivator(s) may be derived. For the simple class of aeroplane with a
more direct link between the pilot and the yaw motivator the input may be specified
directly or indirectly in terms of applied pilot force or inceptor movement. See
Chapter 203, para 4.2.

3.2 When the yaw motivator(s) is(are) sensitive or powerful the application of a
specific deflection may result in unrealistically high loads for the directional
stabilising/control surface. It may then be desirable to change the characteristics of
the motivator to reduce the load. Alternatively there may be strong reasons for
retaining the sensitivity or power of the control, in which case some reduction of the
severity of the loading case might be reasonable if there is an aeroplane characteristic
(such as high lateral acceleration on the pilot) which would act as a natural deterrent
against high pilot inceptor inputs. In such cases the Aeroplane Project Director should
be consulted.

3.3 If calculations indicate that sudden loss of lift on the vertical


stabilisinglcontrol surface is likely to occur in the specified manoeuvres, then
compliance with the requirement of Chapter 602, para 1.1 is in doubt. It may be found
necessary to adjust the aeroplane characteristics in order to satisfy this requirement.

4 EFFECTS OF ASYMMETRIC ENGINE FAILURE


4.1 The stressing case specified in Chapter 203, para 5 to cover the loads arising
following the loss of thrust or power of an engine envisages that corrective action will
be taken by the pilot. The case therefore is concerned with the response of the
aeroplane to the sudden application of a constant yawing movement. It is usual for the
loads which arise in a yawing manoeuvre case, Chapter 203, para 4, to be higher than
those consequent upon an engine failure. However, should the aeroplane characteristics
be such that the engine failure case gives more severe loads, then the implication of
the corrective action specified in Chapter 203, para 5.4 needs to be carefully
considered.

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5 THE ESTIMATION OF LOADS ON THE DIRECTIONAL STABILISER/


CONTROL SURFACE

5.1 The solution of the overall equations which govern the motion of the aeroplane, as
described in para 2 above, yields the response parameters which are required to
determine the loads acting on the vertical (directional) stabiliser/control surface(s).
These are:

(i) Sideslip angle

(ii) Sidewash angle

(iii) Rate of yaw

From these the effective angle of incidence of a location on the vertical surface(s) may
be calculated. The corresponding deflection of the yaw motivator(s) is(=) also required
to enable the total loads to be evaluated.

6 LOADS ON HORIZONTAL TAIL STABILISER/CONTROL SURFACE IN


YAWED FLIGHT

6.1 Chapter 203, para 4.4 specifies the loading conditions to be applied to the
longitudinal stabiliser/control surface in yawed flight.

6.2 It is required that the magnitude of the pitching moment coefficient, Cmo, be
increased to allow for the effect of sideslip angle. The required value should be derived
by the best available method and verified in the flight testing, but in the absence of
more precise infomation it should be assumed that the low speed value of Cmo is
increased by -0.0015 per degree of sideslip.

6.3 It is also required that the resulting trim (balancing) load be distributed
asymmetrically. The effective roiling moment on the longitudinal stabiliser/control
surface is defmed as:

E V2 St bt Kß
2

where E Vz is the dynamic pressure


2

St is the area of the surface

ót is the span of the surface

ß is the sideslip angle

K is the slope of the curve of longitudinal surface roiling moment coefficient versus
sideslip angle at the appropriate Mach number.

6.4 The value of the derivative K should, wherever possible, be verified by actual tests.
It depends upon the configuration of the aeroplane, and for instance in a conventional
aeroplane layout it is significantly affected by such factors as tailplane dihedral,

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sweepback and the position of the tailplane on the fin and also to a lesser extent by
other aerodynamic components. However, experience has indicated that, for unswept,
relatively low down tailplanes having no dihedral, a value of K of -0.025 per degree of
sideslip is conservative.

6.5 The provision of strength to meet the effects of asymmetric buffeting which may
occur near the minimum permissible flight speed has apparently been covered incidentally
on many past aeroplanes by the use of K = -0.0025 in the asymmetric flight cases. It is
important however to ensure adequate strength on aeroplanes which are designed for much
smaller numerical values of K. It will probably be satisfactory to cater for a difference
in lift coefficient between the two halves of the horizontal stabiliser of 1.0 or Q,
max, whichever is smaller. As an oveniding minimum it is suggested that the horizontal
stabiliser shear strength inboard of the pick-up points should not be less than the
strength outboard.

6.6 During asymmetric flight the drag as well as the lift on the longitudinal surface
will usually be distributed asymmetrically. This asymmetry of drag loads should be
considered in the design, although the provision of extra structure to meet it should
not normally be necessary.

I 7 COMBINED ROLLING AND PITCHING MANOEUVRES

7.1 ROLL INPUTS FOR STRESSING


7.1.1 The roll input conditions to be used for stressing purposes are defined
according to para 6.2 of the requirements of Chapter 203. That of para 6.2(i) is
expressed indirectly in terms of the specified minimum rate of roll. Since
designers will usually ensure that this rate of roll will be exceeded by some
margin, a factor of one and a third has been applied. To determine the
deflection of single roll motivator (or the deflections of individual motivators
where a combination of these devices is used) that corresponds to the rate of roll
which results after the factor has been applied, it is sufficient to use a
modified single degree-of-freedom roll equation. For an aeroplane employing
wing-mounted flap-type motivators, such as ailerons, flaperons or segmented flaps,
the modification consists of a factor applied to the rolling moment due to the roll
motivator embodying the reversal speed, to account for the elasticity of the wing
structure. The one and a third factor takes some account of the indirect effect of
the yawing and sideslipping motions that must occur.

7.2 DETAILS OF THE MANOEUVRES


7.2.1 The following assumptions are acceptable as an interpretation of the
manoeuvres defined in general terms in Chapter 203, para 7.

7.2.2 The aeroplane should be assumed to be flying in a steady pull-out or


push-over or a steady turn at the specified normal acceleration, when the
specified roll input is applied. Instantaneous application of roll input is an
acceptable simplifying assumption, but this will usually lead to higher loads in
the structure than a more realistic rate of application of the roll motivator(s).
This roll input should in general be maintained until the rate of roll has built
up to its maximum, when the roll motivator(s) is/are quickly returned to the neutral

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position. Again, instantaneous motivator movement is an acceptable, though


over-se+ere, simplification. The pitch motivator deflection should be assumed
constant throughout. Constant speed may also be assumed.

7.2.3 In the foregoing conditions, the pilot is assumed to be applying sufficient


pitch motivator deflection to produce the specified amount of normal acceleration.
When inertia cross-coupling effects are present the same motivator deflection
should be considered but this may give rise to a normal acceleration in excess of
that specified and to sideslip angles in excess of those arising from the
manoeuvres specified in Chapter 203, para 4. These increased values should be used
in strength calculations. In the application of the requirements, the pilot’s input
into the pitch plane is that which, in a steady pull-out, a steady turn or a
push-over, as the case may be, results in the specified level of normal
acceleration. It may happen that, in certain cases, inertia cross-coupling effects
are significant and the use of linearised equations of motion is no longer
justified. In such cases the same pilot input, that results in the specified
level of normal acceleration during pitching motion only, should be used.

7.2.4 The roll motivator power on some aeroplane designs may be so great that the
application of the requirements of Chapter 203, para 6.2(iii) results in unduly
high values of the rate of roll. In this case it is suggested that for the ground
attack role, the maximum rate of roll that need be considered to develop before the
specified deflection of the roll motivator (or the deflections of each
roll-motivator, where a number of these are used in combination) is removed, is the
maximum that can be achieved in rolling from a steady pull-out with zero bank into
a 90 degree banked turn, when the specified roll input is applied as rapidly as
possible, or 200 degrees/sec, whichever is less. For air fighting and evasive
manoeuvres, the maximum rate of roll that need be considered to develop before the
specified deflection of the roll motivator (or the deflections of each roll
motivator, where a number of these are used in combination) is removed, is the
maximum that can be achieved in rolling from a 90 degree banked turn in one
direction to a 90 degree banked turn in the opposite direction when the specified
roll input is applied as rapidly as possible, or 200 degrees/sec, whichever is
less. The value of 200 degrees/sec is tentatively suggested as an operationally
usable maximum for fighters. Corresponding rates of roll for other aeroplanes are
not suggested as it is possible that on these aeroplanes the maximum rate of roll
corresponding to the specified roll input may be an adequate criterion.

7.2.5 Any of the four stages of the manoeuvre, specified in Chapter 203, para 6.6
(Le., the initiation, the steady roll, the arresting of the rolling motion and
reversed roll), may give critical loads in some parts of the structure. If
instantaneous roll motivator movement is assumed, it will probably be satisfactory
to consider only the four separate cases. If instantaneous roll input is not
assumed, or if the maximum rate of roll considered is less than the steady rate of
roll corresponding to the applied roll input, then examination of the response of
the aeroplane throughout the manoeuvre becomes advisable.

7.3 CALCULATION OF LOADS


7.3.1 Solution of the appropriate equations for the overall aeroplane system,
i
yields the response quantities necessary for the calculation of the loads acting on
the Wings, their attachments to the fuselage and the directional stabiliser/control
surface(s).

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7.3.2 The load acting on the wings depends on the following:

(i) the angle of attack of the aeroplane,

(ii) the distributed effective angle of attack resulting from the


rate of roll,

(iii) the corresponding quantity associated with the rate of pitch,


and

(iv) the rate of change in the angle of attack of the aeroplane.

(v) the deflections of any auxiliary surfaces.

(vi) changes in effective angle of attack associated with any


downwash effects due to a lifting surface ahead of the wing.

Of these, the fmt two are the predominant effects.

7.3.3 The loads on the directional stabiliser/control surface follow from a


knowledge of the sideslip angle, sidewash derivative and angle and rate of yaw,
see para 5.1. They also depend upon loads on the longitudinal stabiliser/control
surface if this is mounted on the directional surface.

8 GENERAL REMARKS

8.1 Although the effects of the sideslip which occurs during asymmetric manoeuvres are
most easily calculated for the fin and rudder loads, there are noticeable effects on
other parts of the airframe which are not so amenable to calculation. Such items
include undercarriage doors, cabin hoods, radar scanning housings and externally
carried stores, in general. Special wind-tunnel tests to investigate the magnitude of
these effects are recommended whenever it is not possible to base an estimate on the
results of previous tests of a closely similar design.

8.2 The yawing velocities which occur during asymmetric manoeuvres cause a
gyroscopic pitching couple on the engine and propeller which should be considered in
the design of the engine mounting. The effect of rate of yaw on other rotating parts
within the aeroplane should not be overlooked. See Chapter 200, para 8 and Leaflet
2OO/3.

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LEAFLET 20312
..
ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

THE CALCULATION OF THE LOADS ASSOCIATED WITH


ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES FOR AEROPLANES HAVING CONTROL
SYSTEMS WITH LOAD LIMITING DEVICES

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The application of the techniques described in Leaflet 203/1 is inappropriate for
those aeroplanes which use an active control system incorporating load limiting devices.
This different design situation is discussed in Leaflet 202/3 to which reference should
be made, as well as in Chapter 208, para 4 and Leaflet 208/4.

1.2 One way of dealing with the design is to make use of Manoeuvre Parameters, see
Leaflet 202/3, para 2. These should be determined after consideration of the handling
and agility requirements of the aeroplane and in conjunction with the Aeroplane Project
Director.

2 LATERAL ACCELERATION/YAWINGACCELERATION ENVELOPE

2.1 Chapter 203, para 4 specifies the yawing manoeuvre load cases for aeroplanes with
conventional controls. In the case of aeroplanes with active control systems it is
useful to consider an envelope which describes the interaction of lateral acceleration
and yawing acceleration. In practice it is convenient to use a 'modified' yawing
acceleration defined as:-

Modified yawing acceleration = (i+pq)

where i is the yawing acceleration


p is the rate of roll
q is the pitch rate

Such an envelope is illustrated in Fig 1. The maximum negative yawing acceleration


applies at all positive values of lateral acceleration and vice-versa. However, as
would be expected there is an alleviation of the value of negative yawing acceleration
at higher negative values of lateral acceleration, and vice-versa.

2.2 The maximum value of the yawing acceleration is determined by the control system
characteristics required to meet the aeroplane handing and agility requirements. The
maximum lateral acceleration is likely to be limited by consideration of crew
tolerance.

3 COMBINED PITCHING AND ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

3.1 Chapter 203, para 7 specifies the design load cases for an aeroplane with
conventional controls in combined pitching and rolling manoeuvres. The situation is more
complex in the case of aeroplanes designed to possess 'carefree' manoeuvring
characteristics due to the need to consider all six degrees of & d o m at the same
time.

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3.2 Fig 2 is an example of an envelope which specifies the relative values of lateral
manoeuvre parameters in terms of the normal acceleration. The lateral manoeuvre
parameters covered are:-

roll rate, p as a function of the maximum value


roll acceleration, fi, as a function of the maximum value
.
yaw rate r, as a function of the maximum value
yaw acceleration, i, as a function of the maximum value
lateral acceleration, ny, as a function of the maximum value

The diagram shows that for values of each of these parameters of up to 25% of the
maximum value there is coincidence with the maximum normal acceleration. There is
then a linear variation so that 80% of the maximum value coincides with 80% of the
normal acceleration. Further linear variation of the parameters occurs so that the
maximum values coincide with 50% of the normal acceleration.

3.3 The maximum values of the roll and yaw rates and acceleration are determined by
consideration of the handling and agility requirements of the aeroplane.

4 MAXIMUM COMBINATION OF ANGULAR RATES AND ACCELERATIONS

4.1 The combination of maximum angular acceleration with angular-rate for both the
roll and yaw motions is a further consideration. A typical diagram showing this relation
can be found in Leaflet 202/3, para 4.1 and Fig 2.

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I
Yaw Accel.
+ve
( i + p q1

FIG 1. COMBINATION OF LATERAL AND YAW ACCELERATIONS


Asymmetric Manoeuvre
Parameters
"1 p Rate of roll
p Roll acceleration
r Rate of yaw
n i Yaw acceleration
+ ve ny Lateral acceleration

C
.-
c
O

-$
8
-8
E
L
I I
=O
0.- I I I I 1 I I I I
- Man. Parameter

- 0.25 01, 0.5 0.8 1.0 Max. Value of Man. Parameter

-ve -

FIG 2. COMBINATIONS OF NORMAL ACCELERATION


AND ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRE PARAMETERS

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Volume 1

CHAPTER 204

G U S T LOADS

1 GENERAL

1.1 The requirements of this chapter are applicable to all aeroplanes and to
the strength of the complete structure, when the aeroplane encounters
g u s t s normal to the flight path both in the plane of symmetry (vertical
g u s t s ) and perpendicular to the plane of symmetry (lateral g u s t s ) .

1.2 T h e aeroplane s h a l l have a d e q u a t e s t r e n g t h for a n y g u s t s


encountered from directions intermediate between the vertical and
horizon tal plane which provide critical loading conditions.

2 FACTORS

2.1 The structure shall have proof and ultimate factors not less than 1 . 1 2 5
and 1.5 respectively on the loads arising i n each case specified below.

3 DESIGN CONDITIONS

3.1 The aeroplane is assumed to be i n unaccelerated flight when g u s t s a r e


encountered. The aeroplane speed, engine operating conditions and the
associated maximum velocities of gusts a r e specified i n para 4. All
altitudes u p to the maximum altitude attainable shall be considered.

3 . 2 The required strength shall be achieved a t all masses between t h e


maximum mass a t which the aeroplane can reach the altitude considered
and the m i n i m u m flying mass (that is the take off mass less b o m b s ,
ammunition and other items readily dropped or expended except for
sufficient fuel for a normal descent and 30 minutes cruise a t sea level a t
t h e engine conditions appropriate to maximum endurance).

3.3 The trim of the aeroplane shall be assumed to be unchanged b y the


pilot during the passage of the aeroplane through the g u s t , unless it is
considered that flight control system i n p u t s will cause an additional
adverse effect on the loading, o r an active alleviating system having a
sufficiently low probability of failure is fitted to t h e aeroplane.

3.4 I n those cases where terrain following flight is specified the aeroplane
shall be designed for the case when a vertical gust of 7.6m/s (25ft/sec) is
encountered a t the same time as it is performing a manoeuvre of 60% of the
maximurn limit load factor.

4 DISCRETE G U S T C A S E S

4.1 The aeroplane shall be assumed to be subjected to the gust velocities


(EAS) stated below, unless otherwise agreed with the Aeroplane Project
Director, a t the aeroplane speeds as defined below.
4.2 SUBSONIC FLIGHT
( i ) At speed VG:the gust velocity of 20.0 m / s ( 6 6 ft/sec)
between sea level and 6100m ( 2 0 , 0 0 0 f t )
thereafter decreasing linearly to 11.6 m / s ( 3 8
ft/sec) a t 15200m ( 5 0 , 0 0 0 f t ) being constant
thereafter.

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C h a p t e r 204 Volume 1

(ii) A t s p e e d VH: t h e g u s t velocity of 15.20 m / s ( 5 0 ft/sec) b e t w e e n


sea level a n d 6100m (20,000 f t ) a n d t h e n d e c r e a s i n g
l i n e a r l y to 7 . 6 0 m / s (25 ft/sec) a t 15200m ( 5 0 , 0 0 0
f t ) , being constant thereafter.

(iii) A t s p e e d V D : t h e g u s t velocity of 7.60 m / s ( 2 5 ft/sec) b e t w e e n sea


level a n d 6100m (20,000 f t ) a n d t h e n d e c r e a s i n g
l i n e a r l y to 3 . 8 0 m / s (12.5 f t / s e c ) a t 15200m ( 5 0 , 0 0 0
f t ) , being constant thereafter.

4.3 DESIGN AEROPLANE SPEEDS FOR GUST CASES

(i) Speed VG: ( a ) Aeroplanes where speed VH i s equivalent to


a illach n u m b e r of less t h a n u n i t y , o t h e r t h a n
weapon s y s t e m a e r o p l a n e s ; VG s h a l l b e
either t h e s p e e d determined b y t h e
i n t e r s e c t i o n of t h e l i n e r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e
maximum l i f t coefficient a n d t h e 20 m / s ( 6 6
f t / s e c ) g u s t l i n e on t h e n-V d i a g r a m o r V s
Jnc
w h e r e V, is t h e s t a l l i n g s p e e d i n
l e v e l f l i g h t a n d nG i s t h e maximum load
f a c t o r r e s u l t i n g from a 15.2 m / s ( 5 0 ft/sec)
g u s t a t s p e e d VH.

( b ) Weapon s y s t e m a e r o p l a n e s a n d o t h e r s w h e r e
s p e e d V H i s e q u i v a l e n t t o a Mach n u m b e r of
u n i t y or greater; VG s h a l l b e d e t e r m i n e d
b y mission r e q u i r e m e n t s , t h e permissibility
o f r e d u c i n g s p e e d a n d t h e slow-down s p e e d s
a t t a i n a b l e and s h a l l b e agreed with t h e
Aeroplane Project Director, b u t need not b e
greater t h a n VH.
(ii) Speed VH: s h a l l b e t h e maximum s p e e d a t t a i n a b l e i n
l e v e l f l i g h t with t h e a e r o p l a n e f l y i n g a t t h e
basic d e s i g n mass, with no e x t e r n a l stores a t
t h e maximum c o n t i n u o u s c r u i s e e n g i n e
conditions .
(iii) S p e e d V D : is t h e d e s i g n d i v i n g s p e e d a t a p p r o p r i a t e
a l t i t u d e . (see Leaflet 202/2, p a r a 4.1)

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Chapter 204 Volume 1

4.4 GUST LOADS THROUGHOUT T H E SPEED R A N G E (fig. 1)


4.4.1 In addition to the loads a t the Design Aeroplane Speeds the
aeroplane shall be subjected to appropriate combinations of loads
resulting from both vertical, lateral and where relevant, intermediate
g u s t s a t all speeds above the static stall boundary. The total load
factors for speeds intermediate between the Design Aeroplane Speeds
shall be derived b y assuming linear variations i n gust velocity between
the design cases specified i n para 4.2 and 4.3. For speeds below V G
the total normal load factor shall be assumed to vary linearly between
unity a t zero forward speed and the design value a t VG except for
the static stall boundary cut off.

5 DESIGN ANALYSIS

5 . 1 -4 dynamic analysis of the response of the aeroplane to discrete g u s t s


shall be undertaken taking f u l l account of the aeroelastic properties of the
s t r u c t u r e , and varying gust gradients using an assumed gust shape
d efi n ed b y :

where Ude is the design gust velocity as specified i n paras 4 . 1 and 4.3

S is the distance the aeroplane has penetrated into the g u s t

K is the gradient distance the m i n i m u m value of which shall be


15.20111 (50 f t )

I n addition continuous turbulence analysis shall be undertaken when this is


considered to be appropriate b y the Aeroplane Project Director.

5.2 An investigation shall be carried out to estimate t h e dynamic


amplification of s t r e s s i n the discrete gust cases resulting from the effect
of s t r u c t u r a l flexibility. The shape of the gust defined in para 5.1 shall
be used w i t h the gradient distance varied to establish the peak of response
of t h e aeroplane.

5.3 I n evaluating the loading conditions on the horizontal stabiliser the


airload increment due to the specified gust shall be added to that of the
initial stabiliser load required to t r i m the aeroplane i n a balanced condition
i n steady level flight a t the specified speed. For horizontal a n d , where
appropriate, intermediate gust conditions the initial stabiliser load should
be redistributed symmetrically to an amount appropriate to the effective
sideslip produced b y the gust (see Chapter 203 para 8 ) .

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"0 ,
I
GUST LOADS THROUGHOUT THE SPEED RANGE

FIG 1 G U S T LOADS THROUGHOUT THE SPEED RANGE

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LEAFLET 204/0

GUST LOADS

REFERENCE PAGE

ARC Reports

R & &I 2308 .. .. A n analysis of the lift slope of aerofoils of


small aspect ratio, including fins, with design
c h a r t s for aerofoils and control s u r f a c e s
R & 31 2970 .. .. G u s t alleviation factor
CP3 24 .. .. The variation of gust frequency with g u s t velocity
and altitude
CP419 .. .. The distribution of g u s t s in the atmosphere. A n
integration of UK and U S data
CP498 .. .. Programme fatigue tests on notched b a r s to a
g u s t load spectrum
CP836 .. .. The chance of a rough flight
CP873 .. .. A review of information on the frequency of g u s t s
a t low altitude
CP933 .. .. A review of counting accelerometer data on
aircraft g u s t loads

NACA Reports

1206 .. .. A revised gust-load formula and a re-evaluation


of V-G data taken on civil t r a n s p o r t airplanes from
1933 t o 1950.

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 204/1

GUST LOADS

SAFE SPEEDS FOR AEROPLANES FLYING IN TURBULENT WEATHER

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 T o e n a b l e S e r v i c e flying to b e u n d e r t a k e n in all w e a t h e r , pilots m u s t


be a d v i s e d of t h e best s p e e d at which to fly i n s e v e r e t u r b u l e n c e . T h i s
Leaflet o u t l i n e s t h e t y p e of investigation which s h o u l d be made to
d e t e r m i n e t h e c o n d i t i o n s of s p e e d a n d a l t i t u d e a t which t h e r e is least r i s k
of s t r u c t u r a l damage o r loss of c o n t r o l r e s u l t i n g from e x c e s s i v e i n c i d e n c e
i n a g u s t . T h e outcome of t h i s investigation t o g e t h e r w i t h p r a c t i c a l f l y i n g
e x p e r i e n c e will form t h e basis of a d v i c e g i v e n to pilots.

2 SAFE SPEED-ALTITUDE ENVELOPE

2.1 When a n a e r o p l a n e meets a s e v e r e g u s t a t low a l t i t u d e , t h e u p p e r l i m i t


of t h e s a f e s p e e d r a n g e is t h e s p e e d a t w h i c h t h e g u s t load c a n j u s t b e
withstood w i t h o u t s t r u c t u r a l damage. The lower limit is t h e s p e e d at which
t h e i n c i d e n c e d u r i n g t h e p a s s a g e of t h e g u s t j u s t r e a c h e s that at which
loss of c o n t r o l would o c c u r as a r e s u l t of stalling or i n s t a b i l i t y , o r a t which
s e v e r e b u f f e t i n g would e n d a n g e r t h e aeroplane. Within these limits lies t h e
s a f e s t s p e e d s at which t h e s e v e r e s t g u s t c a n j u s t be w i t h s t o o d w i t h o u t
either s t r u c t u r a l damage o r loss of control. A t h i g h a l t i t u d e s , t h e load
developed i n a g u s t may b e insufficient to c a u s e s t r u c t u r a l damage
t h r o u g h o u t t h e s p e e d r a n g e of t h e a e r o p l a n e , a n d loss of c o n t r o l o r s e v e r e
b u f f e t i n g is t h e n t h e only d a n g e r .

2.2 S a f e s p e e d r a n g e s at v a r i o u s a l t i t u d e s c a n b e s h o w n o n a s p e e d -
a l t i t u d e e n v e l o p e . A s a f e speed-altitude e n v e l o p e a n d t h e s a f e s t s p e e d s
within t h e e n v e l o p e s h o u l d b e determined f o r g u s t s of 20 i n / s (66 f t / s e c )
EAS below 6100 i n (20,000 f t ) a l t i t u d e t h e r e a f t e r d e c r e a s i n g l i n e a r l y to
11.6 i n / s (38 f t / s e c ) a t 15,200 i n (50,000 f t ) a l t i t u d e , w i t h t h e a e r o p l a n e
a t t h e most adverse weight f o r t h e a l t i t u d e c o n s i d e r e d . Fig 1 s h o w s
examples f o r h y p o t h e t i c a l s u b s o n i c a n d s u p e r s o n i c fighter a e r o p l a n e s .

3 STRENGTH BOUNDARY

3.1 T h e s t r e n g t h b o u n d a r y s h o u l d c o r r e s p o n d to t h e a c h i e v e d s t r e n g t h ,
u n f a c t o r e d , r e s u l t i n g from t h e g u s t or m a n o e u v r i n g s t r e n g t h
r e q u i r e m e n t s , a n d s h o u l d b e determined f o r u p w a r d , d o w n w a r d a n d
sideways gusts.

4 CONTROL AND BUFFET BOUNDARY

4.1 T h e loss of c o n t r o l b o u n d a r y s h o u l d b e regarded o n l y as a n indication


o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s i n w h i c h c o n t r o l difficulties m i g h t b e e x p e c t e d to o c c u r
in severe turbulence.
4.2 On low s p e e d , low a l t i t u d e a e r o p l a n e s , t h e loss of c o n t r o l b o u n d a r y
s h o u l d b e a s s u m e d to c o r r e s p o n d to t h e stalling CL max. On h i g h s p e e d ,
h i g h a l t i t u d e a e r o p l a n e s , flight tests will be n e c e s s a r y to establish t h e
CL - Mach No. b o u n d a r y t h a t c a n be a c h i e v e d w i t h o u t loss of c o n t r o l ,
d a n g e r o u s i n s t a b i l i t y o r s e v e r e b u f f e t i n g . I t will u s u a l l y b e impracticable
for t h i s to b e o b t a i n e d from f l i g h t t e s t s i n s e v e r e t u r b u l e n c e , so t h e
b o u n d a r y o b t a i n e d i n manoeuvring tests will h a v e to be u s e d .

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4.3 It will generally be unnecessary to'allow for the transient increase i n


CL max o r buffet CL that occurs during the rapid change i n incidence
produced by a g u s t , a s this effect, which is difficult to determine,
provides additional safety from stalling or buffeting beyond the boundary
o b t a i n e d a s s u m i n g s t a t i c CL max o r CL max determined from
man oe u v ri n g flig h t test s .

4 . 4 I n addition to the effects of excessive incidence, control difficulties


may arise i n continuous turbulence a t high altitudes and supersonic
s p e e d s , as a result of deterioration i n damping and control effectiveness.
Control difficulties may also arise i n turbulence a t low altitudes and high
subsonic speeds because of over-effectiveness of the elevator or aileron
control. These may be particularly dangerous when attempting to fly a t
high speed near t h e ground. These effects cannot b e determined from
considerations of the aeroplane meeting an isolated g u s t . Advice on the
flight procedure to b e adopted where they a r e present will have to be
based on experience gained during flight in turbulence.

5 VARIATION OF SAFE SPEED WITH ALTITUDE

5.1 LOW SPEED AEROPLANES


5.1.1 For aeroplanes on which compressibility effects can be neglected
t h e safest speed is a constant E.A.S. a t low altitudes, and is limited a t
higher altitudes by the maximum speed of the aeroplane.

5.2 HIGH SPEED SUBSONIC AEROPLANES


5.2.1 The variation of safest speed with altitude for a high speed
subsonic aeroplane can generally b e represented b y a constant E.A.S.
a t low altitudes where the upper limit of the safe speed depends on
s t r e n g t h , and a constant Mach No a t higher altitudes where the upper
limit depends on t h e deterioration in maximum safe CL as transonic
speeds a r e approached.

5.3 SUPERSONIC AEROPLANES


5.3.1 Supersonic aeroplanes are safer both at subsonic and supersonic
speeds than in t h e transonic range, where the load produced b y a
g u s t reaches a maximum, and the CL a t which loss of control o r
buffeting occurs deteriorates to a minimum. The conditions under
which it is safer to fly supersonically than subsonically, and vice
versa, a r e an important consideration.

5.3.2 I n supersonic flight, there is generally little to b e gained in


safety from s t r u c t u r a l damage b y flying a t any particular speed u p to
a Mach No of about 2.0, a s gust loads vary little with speed due to
the decrease in lift curve slope with increase in Mach N o , and
s t r e n g t h is not appreciably reduced b y kinetic heating. Altitude is
more important than speed i n its effect on gust loads. Strength
considerations will determine a minimum altitude above which the
aeroplane is safe from structural damage over a wide range of speed.

5.3.3 Loss of control as a result of excessive incidence i n a g u s t will


s e t only a lower limit to the safe speed in supersonic flight. A t any
given altitude an aeroplane is safer i n this respect a t supersonic
speeds, once it is through the transonic range, than a t the safest
subsonic speed.

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5 . 3 . 4 The safest flight procedure for a supersonic aeroplane will


generally consist of a constant subsonic E.A.S. u p to a point A on Fig
1 corresponding to the altitude above which the safest subsonic speed
i s determined entirely by control difficulties o r buffeting. This will
b e followed b y transition to supersonic speed a t a safe altitude. O n
some aeroplanes with low gust o r manoeuvre load factors the control
and s t r e n g t h boundaries may intersect in the transonic range,
indicating no clearly defined safe speed for the g u s t specified. I n
these circumstances the recommended speeds should b e chosen on t h e
safe side of the strength boundary.
6 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

6.1 For operational reasons, it is not always practicable to fly a t the safest
speed determined from t h e foregoing considerations, and a compromise
between this and the normal operating speeds for best r a t e of climb and
desceht, o r maximum range t h e n becomes necessary. Consideration of the
speed band within which 95%of the maximum range could be obtained might
assist in reaching a compromise. On high altitude aeroplanes, particular
attention should be given to climbing and descent where turbulence is most
likely to be met. A n y special limitations which might arise from the use of
flaps or airbrakes during descent should be considered. For crew comfort
and efficiency, a speed somewhat lower than the safest speed may have to
be chosen, particularly with supersonic aeroplanes in which excessive
pitching may be troublesome a t supersonic speeds.
6.2 I t i s important that t h e speed finally recommended in Pilots' Notes
should be i n the simplest terms, so that it is easily remembered. A range
of speeds should be given covering all stages of flight, and lying w i t h i n
t h e strength boundary of t h e safe speed-altitude envelope a s near as
possible to the safest speed. If a single speed can be chosen that is a
reasonable compromise for all stages of flight, this should be quoted for
simplicity. Complicated variations of speed with altitude should be avoided
a s far a s possible.

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Leaflet 204/1 Volume 1

8
U 18
+
w
2
1s
O
in
n
=Q 12
in
3
O
29
I
w
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3 6
I-
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3

O
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.o 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 .o
MACH No.

-
F I G . 1 S A F E SPEED ALTITUDE ENVELOPE FOR FLIGHT Il SEVERE
TURBULENCE A S REPRESENTED B Y G U S T S O F 20 m/s ( 6 6 ft/sec) T O
E A S BELOW 6100 m (20,000 f t ) ALTITUDE THEREAFTER DECREASING
LINEARLY 11.6 m/s ( 3 8 f t / s e c ) at 15200 m ( 5 0 , 0 0 0 f t )

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 204/2

GUST LOADS

A METHOD OF CALCULATING GUST LOADS FOR PRELIMINARY DESIGN


PURPOSES

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This leaflet presents a method of calculating g u s t loads for


conventional aeroplanes in the absence of a rational investigation of the
aeroplane's response to gusts. I t applies only to aeroplanes with straight
o r sweptback wings and tailplane behind the wings. I t may be used a s a
preliminary design aid to more detailed f u l l response calculations. The f u l l
response calculations s h o u l d always be undertaken for aeroplanes of
unconventional layout o r abnormal stability o r when s t r u c t u r a l flexibility is
likely to be significant.
2 GENERAL

2.1 The speed and attitude of the aeroplane should be assumed to be


unchanged during t h e passage of t h e gust.

2.2 The maximum change in load on an aerofoil produced b y the gust


should b e assumed t o equal that resulting from a change in incidence of
m-l -
Fu
V
where: U is t h e design gust velocity (Chapter 204 para 4 )
V is t h e aeroplane speed
F is an alleviating factor (see para 3 )

2.3 Allowance should be made for t h e extent t o which t h e lift coefficient of


a n aerofoil, where effective angle of incidence is increasing rapidly, may
exceed the maximum value a t steady flow. In t h e absence of better
information the maximum lift coefficient assumed should be a t least 1 . 2 5
times the maximum static value corresponding to the appropriate Mach
n u m ber.
2.4 In calculating the loads on t h e horizontal tail surface t h e conditions of
Chapter 204 para 5 . 3 a r e to b e applied. Allowance should b e made for the
change in downwash produced by the gust on the mainplane.
2.5 Wing flexibility should be neglected.

3 GUST ALLEVIATING FACTORS

3.1 VERTICAL GUSTS


3.1.1 Mainplane. The alleviating factor for vertical g u s t s is given
by
0.88~
Ebbsmic flight:- F =
5.3*

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pl.03
Supersonic flight:- F =
1.03
6.95+p

2 RI
where p is a mass parameter defined as:- p = p S a
where h'i is the aeroplane mass (kg o r slugs)
S is the wing area ( m 2 o r ft2
-
c is the aerodynamic mean chord ( m o r f t )

a , is slope of t h e wing normal force coefficient/incidence curve a t


the appropriate Mach number ( p e r radian)

p is the air density (kg/m3 o r slugs/ft3)

3.1.2 Horizontal tail surface


The alleviating factor for vertical gusts acting on the horizontal
tail surface in subsonic flight should be that derived f o r the mainplane
in para 3 . 1 . 1 . In the case of supersonic flight it should be taken as
unity .
3.2 LATERAL GUSTS
The alleviating factor for lateral gusts is given by:-
O . 88pL
Subsonic flight:-
5.34-p
L

Supersonic flight:- F = 1.0

where p~ i s a lateral mass parameter defined as:-

ill is the aeroplane mass ( k g or slugs)

St is t h e reference area of the vertical tail surface (m2 o r f t 2 )

ct i s t h e aerodynamic mean chord of the vertical tail surface (m o r f t )

k, is the radius of gyration of the aeroplane in yaw ( m o r f t )

Rt i s t h e distance from the centre of gravity of the aeroplane to the


centre of lift of the vertical tail ( m or f t )

a , t is the slope of the vertical tail lift coefficient/incidence curve a t the


appropriate Mach number ( p e r radian)

p is the air density (kg/m3 o r slugs/ft3

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Volume 1

CHAPTER 205

HIGH LIFT DEVICES AND AIRBRAKES

1 GENERAL

1.1 T h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h i s c h a p t e r are a p p l i c a b l e to all a e r o p l a n e s a n d t o


t h e s t r e n g t h of h i g h lift d e v i c e s a n d a i r b r a k e s , t h e i r o p e r a t i n g mechanisms
a n d all p a r t s of t h e complete a i r f r a m e a f f e c t e d b y t h e l o a d cases s p e c i f i e d .

1 . 2 A t t e n t i o n i s d r a w n to t h e f a t i g u e a n d damage t o l e r a n c e r e q u i r e m e n t s
o f C h a p t e r 2 0 1 a n d to t h e a e r o e l a s t i c i t y r e q u i r e m e n t s o f C h a p t e r 5 0 0 .

2 FACTORS

2 . 1 T h e h i g h l i f t d e v i c e s a n d a i r b r a k e s , t h e i r o p e r a t i n g mechanisms a n d
associated a t t a c h m e n t s t r u c t u r e s h a l l h a v e p r o o f a n d u l t i m a t e f a c t o r s of
n o t less t h a n 1.125 a n d 1 . 5 r e s p e c t i v e l y i n e a c h of t h e a p p r o p r i a t e l o a d i n g
c a s e s s p e c i f i e d below u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e s t a t e d .

3 HIGH L I F T DEVICES

3.1 High l i f t d e v i c e s are d e f i n e d as t h o s e a u x i l i a r y s u r f a c e s s u c h a s


l e a d i n g a n d t r a i l i n g e d g e f l a p s a n d slats which are u s e d to a u g m e n t o r
r e d i s t r i b u t e t h e b a s i c l i f t o f t h e wing e i t h e r d u r i n g t a k e - o f f , a p p r o a c h a n d
l a n d i n g , o r w h i l s t t h e a e r o p l a n e is e n - r o u t e o r i n combat.

3.2 OPERATION DURING TAKE-OFF, APPROACH AND LANDING


3.2.1 T h e o p e r a t i n g mechanisms s h a l l b e c a p a b l e of l o w e r i n g t h e
f l a p s , a n d w h e r e u s e d , t h e slats, t o t h e f u l l y e x t e n d e d position a t a n
appropriate design speed. In p a r t i c u l a r t h e following s p e c i f i c
e x t e n s i o n positions s h a l l , w h e r e a p p r o p r i a t e , b e i d e n t i f i e d , with
c o r r e s p o n d i n g limiting s p e e d s as d e f i n e d i n p a r a 3.5.1.

( i ) Take-off position at a n y f l i g h t s p e e d u p to a n d
i n c l u d i n g a limited s p e e d f o r t h e take-off c o n d i t i o n .

( i i ) An i n t e r m e d i a t e position which s h a l l be t h a t u s e d
d u r i n g t h e a p p r o a c h to l a n d i n g or t h a t r e q u i r e d
immediately a f t e r a b a u l k e d l a n d i n g , w h i c h e v e r is more
s e v e r e at a n y f l i g h t s p e e d u p to a n d i n c l u d i n g t h e
limiting s p e e d for t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e c o n d i t i o n .

(iii) A fully e x t e n d e d position a t a n y f l i g h t s p e e d u p to a n d


i n c l u d i n g t h e limiting s p e e d for t h e f u l l y e x t e n d e d
condition.

3.3 OPERATION EN-ROUTE OR IN COMBAT


3.3.1 If r e q u i r e d b y t h e Aeroplane S p e c i f i c a t i o n , t h e o p e r a t i n g
mechanism s h a l l b e c a p a b l e of l o w e r i n g t h e h i g h l i f t d e v i c e s t o a n y
position d e f i n e d f o r u s e e n - r o u t e o r in combat, a t all s p e e d s u p to t h e
maximum required by t h e A e r o p l a n e S p e c i f i c a t i o n , o r as agreed with
t h e A e r o p l a n e Project D i r e c t o r .

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3.4 RAISING SPEED


3.4.1 The rate at wh'ich flaps a r e retracted shall be such that
excessive sinking does not occur. This requirement should be
associated with a speed of V T O , defined in para 3 . 5 . 2 ( i ) , and
maximum take off power.

3.4.2 For Class I I and Class I I I aeroplanes ( a s defined in Leaflet


600/1, Table 1) for time taken for the flaps to move from the fully
down position to the retracted position shall not be less than 1 5
seconds; in general, 15-20 seconds is a satisfactory period and quick
travel during the early stage of the movement is an advantage s o long
as the r a t e of sink is never a t any stage excessive.

3.4.3 For Class I and Class I V aeroplanes the flaps should retract a s
quickly as possible consistent w i t h no serious sinking o r change of t r i m
incompatible with the handling requirements of Chapter 6 0 4 .

3.5 DESIGN A N D LIMITING SPEEDS


3.5.1 The design speeds for each position of the high lift devices as
stated i n para 3 . 2 and 3 . 3 must be sufficiently greater than the
limiting speed quoted i n the Aircrew Manual for that position to allow
f o r probable variation i n control of airspeed and for transition from
one high lift position to another.

3.5.2 The design speed shall not be less than the following:-

For the high lift devices i n the take-off position,


V T O which shall be the greater o f , 1 . 1 5 times
the equivalent airspeed during take-off a t t h e
maximum design mass before the devices can be fully
retracted, o r 1.6 times the equivalent stalling speed
with t h e flaps in the take-off position, zero engine
power and maximum design mass.

(ii For t h e high lift devices i n the intermediate position,


V B L , which shall be t h e greater o f , the
equivalent airspeed attained i n a baulked landing a t
maximum design landing mass before the devices can
be retracted to the intermediate position, o r 1 . 8 times
the equivalent stalling speed with the devices in the
intermediate position, zero engine power and
maximurn design landing mass.

( iii) For the high lift devices i n the fully extended


positions, VFL, which shall be the greater of,
1 . 8 times the equivalent stalling speed with t h e
devices i n the fully extended position, zero engine
power and maximum design landing mass, o r 1 . 4 times
the equivalent stalling speed w i t h the devices
retracted, zero engine power and the landing mass.

3.5.3 If an automatic positioning o r load limiting system is used the


speeds and corresponding positions programmed o r allowed b y the
system may be used.

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3.5.4 When h i g h l i f t d e v i c e s a r e u s e d e n - r o u t e o r i n combat c o n d i t i o n


a p p r o p r i a t e d e s i g n s p e e d s s h a l l b e e s t a b l i s h e d which a r e e q u i v a l e n t t o
s p e e d s V A , V c , V D , VG a n d VH a s s p e c i f i e d in C h a p t e r 202
a n d 204 e x c e p t t h a t allowance may b e made f o r t h e position o f t h e h i g h
lift devices.

3.6 STRENGTH
3.6.1 When t h e high lift d e v i c e s a r e i n t h e r e t r a c t e d position t h e
s t r e n g t h of t h o s e p a r t s of t h e a i r f r a m e s p e c i f i e d i n p a r a 1.1
s h a l l b e a d e q u a t e to meet t h e c o n d i t i o n s s t a t e d i n C h a p t e r 2 0 2 p a r a
5.2.1, t h r o u g h o u t t h e f l i g h t e n v e l o p e .

3.6.2 When t h e h i g h lift d e v i c e s are u s e d for t a k e - o f f , a p p r o a c h ,


a n d l a n d i n g , t h e s t r e n g t h of t h o s e p a r t s of t h e a i r f r a m e s p e c i f i e d i n
p a r a 1.1 s h a l l b e a d e q u a t e to meet t h e load cases s p e c i f i e d i n p a r a
3.6.4 a t e a c h position a n d c o r r e s p o n d i n g d e s i g n s p e e d , f o r all
a p p r o p r i a t e c o n f i g u r a t i o n s of t h e a e r o p l a n e i n c l u d i n g t h e carriage of
wing s t o r e s .

3.6.3 T h e e n g i n e c o n d i t i o n s s h a l l b e a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h e position of t h e
h i g h l i f t devices:-

( i ) Take-off p o w e r f o r take-off a n d b a u l k e d l a n d i n g
c o n d i t i o n s (MAT o r MT as a p p r o p r i a t e - see L e a f l e t
600/6 1.

( i i ) C r u i s e p o w e r for i n t e r m e d i a t e p o s i t i o n s (CVICT - see


Leaflet 600/6).

(iii) Idling p o w e r for fully e x t e n d e d p o s i t i o n .

( i v ) Take-off p o w e r f o r e n - r o u t e o r c o m b a t p o s i t i o n s (MAT
o r MT as a p p r o p r i a t e ) .

3.6.4 For all positions o t h e r t h a n e n - r o u t e or combat p o s i t i o n s : -

( i ) T h e a e r o p l a n e s h a l l b e a s s u m e d to be s u b j e c t e d to
m a n o e u v r e s a n d gusts within t h e r a n g e : -

( a ) M a n o e u v r i n g to a p o s i t i v e l i m i t l o a d factor o f 4.0
for Class I V , a n d 2.0 for o t h e r t y p e s .
( b ) P o s i t i v e a n d n e g a t i v e gusts of 7.60 m / s ( 2 5
ft/sec) ( E A S ) normal to t h e f l i g h t p a t h w h i l s t t h e
a e r o p l a n e is i n l e v e l f l i g h t , u p to a n a l t i t u d e of
6100 m (20,000 f t ) .

(ii) With t h e a e r o p l a n e i n l e v e l f l i g h t t h e s e p a r a t e e f f e c t s
of :-

(a) P r o p e l l e r s l i p s t r e a m o r f a n / j e t e f f l u x w h e r e
a p p r o p r i a t e , c o r r e s p o n d i n g to b o t h t h e maximum
continuous power at t h e design speed a n d t h e
take-off p o w e r a p p r o p r i a t e to n o t less t h a n 1.4
times t h e s t a l l i n g s p e e d a t t h e r e l e v a n t position of
t h e h i g h lift d e v i c e s a n d a e r o p l a n e mass.

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( b ) A headyon gust of 7.60 m/s (25 ft/sec) (EAS).

(iii) A baulked landing condition where the design speed is


V B L , a s defined in para 3.5.2(ii), a t the
maximum design landing mass and with the high lift
devices a t any position between the f u l l y extended
and intermediate position. I n the case of primary,
intermediate and advanced trainers only the proof and
ultimate factors in the baulked landing case shall be
1.5 and 2.0 respectively.

( i v ) The most severe load of cases ( i ) , (ii) and (iii) above


on one side of the aeroplane w i t h 80% of this load on
the other side.

3.6.5 When the high lift devices a r e used en-route or in combat the
design load cases at the speeds specified i n para 3.5.4 shall be those
of para 3 . 6 . 4 ( i ) and 3.6.4(ii) unless otherwise agreed with the
Aeroplane Project Director.

3.7 MECHANICAL INTERCONNECTION


3.7.1 Unless the requirements of Chapter 604 can be met when full
asymmetric deployment of the high lift devices occurs the motion of t h e
individual section on opposite sides of the plane of symmetry shall be
synchronised b y a mechanical interconnection o r other approved
means.

3.7.2 When mechanical interconnection is provided to meet the


requirements of para 3.7.1, proof and ultimate factors of 1 . 0 and 1.33
shall be applied to the loads which arise following a failure which could
result i n any single surface becoming incapable of movement o r of
attempting to move in an uncontrolled manner.

3.7.3 The mechanical interconnection shall have adequate strength to


account for applicable asymmetric loads including those which arise
during flight with one or more engines on one side of the aeroplane
inoperative and the remaining engines a t take-off power.

3.8 CIRCUIT STIFFNESS


3.8.1 I t shall be shown, b y calculation o r t e s t , that the angles of
opening of corresponding port and starboard sections of the high lift
devices due to circuit flexibility or distortion of the s t r u c t u r e will not
differ b y more than 5 degrees under the limit loads of para 3.7.1 o r
3.7.2 or the maximum angle a t which the handling requirements of P a r t
6 can be met, whichever i s the lower.

4 AIRBRAKES

4 . 1 The requirements of this section apply to airbrakes and other speed


control devices wherever they a r e fitted on the aeroplane.

4.1.2 The time for f u l l extension o r retraction of the airbrakes shall be


a s short as possible consistent with the handling requirements of Part 6.
I n the case of Class I V aeroplanes the time shall not exceed 2 seconds a t
high altitude and 4 seconds at the low altitude, except under baulked
landing conditions when the retraction time should not exceed 2 seconds.

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4 . 1 . 3 The airbrakes shall be safely usable at all speeds u p to the


maximum permissible speed appropriate to any possible configuration
of the aeroplane, for example, high lift devices and undercarriage
extended where appropriate, external stores carried, etc.

4.2 STRENGTH
4.2.1 The airbrakes shall be designed to have adequate strength
under those conditions specified in Chapter 2 0 2 , para 5.2.2 and Fig 1 ,
a t the appropriate design speed defined as:-

( i ) When no limiting device is fitted; aeroplane speed


V D with the airbrake f u l l y extended.
( i i ) When a limiting device is fitted to prevent f u l l
extension above some pre-determined speed, V B :-

( a ) aeroplane speed V D with the airbrake extended


as far as permitted by the limiting device, and

( b ) 1.15 V B o r V D , whichever is less, with the


airbrake fully extended.

4.3 MEC II AN I CAL I N TERCO N N E C T I ON S


4.3.1 When mechanical interconnection is provided between separate
sections of t h e airbrakes and the requirements of Part 6 cannot be met
if the interconnection fails, the airbrake drive and interconnecting
system shall have proof and ultimate factors not less than 1 . 0 and 1 . 3 3
respectively on the loads which arise following a failure which could
result in any single section becoming incapable of movement o r of
attempting to move in an uncontrolled manner.

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CHAPTER 206

I CONTROL SYSTEMS
1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The requirements of this chapter apply to all control systems, including engine
controls, in which the position of the motivators is determined solely by the pilot
through a direct connexion from the inceptors. It also applies to those parts of the
flight control system which are not covered by the requirements of Chapter 208 for
active control systems, or of Chapter 729 for autopilot systems. The requirements
relate mainly to mechanical components, but powered controls, power operated trimmers
and devices such as Q-feel and variable stops are also included. Autostabilizers,
auto-trim and similar devices which can move the motivators independently of inceptor
inputs are not included, but are covered by Chapter 208 or 729.

1.2 The requirements shall be met over a range of temperatures (as given in Chapter
201) from that at ground level to the minimum value at the service ceiling of the
aeroplane when operating at the lightest practicable weight, and for all design speed
and acceleration conditions.

1.3 The requirements shall be considered in conjunction with other relevant chapters
including:

Chapter 200 Static Strength and Deformation


Chapter 201 Fatigue Damage Tolerance
Chapter 208 Active Control Technology
Chapter 500 Aero-elasticity

I 1.4 For piloting aspects, reference shall be made to Chapter 604.

2 STRENGTH

2.1 GENERAL
2.1.1 Each circuit shall have proof and ultimate factors not less than 1.1 5 and
1.5 respectively under the given loading conditions, unless otherwise stated.
( S e e Chapter 200, para 4.1).

2.1.2 The ultimate factor for cables shall be 2.0 and for chains shail be 3.0.

2.1.3 The loads shall be applied in each case at the point at which the pilot
would normally apply them and shall be reacted as appropriate:

I (i) by the control system with the motivator deflected to its


stops, or

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(ii) by an intermediate component specifically provided for the


purpose of reacting the input loads; such as an irreversible
mechanism locked in the most adverse position, or local
system stops used in conjunction with a load limiting device
in the circuit. When this is the case the strength
requirements for the remainder of the circuit shall be agreed
with the Aeroplane Project Director.

2.2 PRIMARY CIRCiJIT DESIGN LOADS


2.2.1 Conventional Controls

(i) Fitch Inceptor

(a) Stickcontrolcolumn 800 N (180 lbf) (two hands


together on a single hand grip)

(b) Wheel or W type lo00 N (225 lbf) (two control


column hands, 500 N (112 lbf) at each
hand grip)

(c) Wheel or W type 500 N (1 12 lbf) (one hand only)


column

(ii) Roll inceptor

(a) Stick type control 300 N (67.5 lbf)


column

(b) Wheel or W type The torque resulting from two


control column equal and opposite loads of 300 N
(67.5 lbf) applied tangentially
at diametrically opposed points
of the wheel of diameter D
metres (inches)

(iii) Yaw inceptor (see also Chapter 310)

(a) Rudder badpedals 1350 N (303 lbf) (on one side


only)
(b) Rudder bar/pedals 800 N (180 lbf) (simultaneously
on each side in the same
direction) except where overridden
by brake loads - see Leaflet 310/1,
para 10.

2.2.2 Side Stick Inceptor 665 N (150 lbf) (in any direction
in a horizontai plane)

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2.3 DUALCONTROL
2.3.1 Dual control systems shall be designed to the following conditions:

(i) Pilots acting together.


Each pilot applying simultaneously loads equal to 75% of
those specified in para 2.2.1 for each inceptor.
Note: For dual control aeroplanes which are derived from a
single pilot design of aeroplane and are intended for
opemtional conversion training, the loading may be reduced,
with the prior agreement of the Aeroplane Project Director,
to each pilot applying simultaneously loads equal to 50% of
the loads specified in para 2.2.1.

(ii) Pilots acting in opposition.


Each pilot applying simultaneously the loads specified in
para 2.2.1 for each inceptor.
Note: This case provides a design condition for the
inter-connecting circuit between the two sets of controls.

2.4 GROUND GUST CONDITIONS


2.4.1 The primary control circuits must be designed to cater for control surface
loads which arise from gusts when the aeroplane is on the ground and when taxiing
downwind.

(i) That part of the control circuit between the cockpit controls
and the control stops nearest to the surface shall be
subjected to the loads arising from a limit hinge moment, H,
defined in para 2.4.2 below but not exceeding those of paras
2.2.1 or 2.3.1 above, as appropriate.

(ii) The control system locks and the stops nearest to the
surfaces and any parts of the control circuit between these
locks and stops and the control surface final operating lever
shall be subjected to the loads arising from a limit hinge
moment, H, para 2.4.2.

2.4.2 The limit hinge moment H is defined as:

H= qcSK Nm (lbf ft)

where q is the dynamic pressure based on a speed of 41 m/s (135


ft/sec) - Nlm2 (lbflft2)
c is the mean chord of the control surface aft of the
hingeline, metres (ft)
S is the control surface area aft of the hingeline, m2 (ft2)

K= f 0.50 for the ailerons at full deflection.


= + 0.75 for the ailerons with the inceptor locked in the
central position
= f 0.75 for the elevator at full deflection, up and down
= + 0.75 for the rudder at neutral and at full deflection
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(K is positive where the tendency is to depress the


‘surface).

2.5 SECONDAR CIRCUIT DESIGN LOADS


2.5.1

(i) Crank, wheel or lever (applied only to flaps, slats, tabs,


stabiliser, spoiler or wing sweep operation)

220 (1+4OR) N [50 lbfl


2
J
2
J

where R is the radius at which the load is applied metres


(inches) but not less than 220 N (50 lbf), nor more than 660
N (150 lbf).

(ii) Twist 15 Nm (133 lbf in)

(iii) Push-pull controls. There are no specific loads.

3 CONTROL CIRCUITS - OVERALL DESIGN

3.1 EFFICIENCY AND MOVEMENT


3.1.1 Every effort shall be made to keep the efficiency of the mechanical
control circuits as high as possible. Movement shall be smooth and positive as
appropriate to the function.

3.1.2 Within the limitations of the airframe design and the overall requirements
of the control system, the routing of control circuits shall be as simple and
direct as possible and their length shall not change during operation, or due
to structural deformation or flight accelerations, such as to affect the control
of the aeoplane.

3.1.3 Control systems for essential services shall be so designed that when a
movement to one position has been selected, a different position can be selected
without waiting for the completion of the initially selected movement, and the
system shall arrive at the finally selected position without further attention.
The movements which follow and the time taken by the system to allow the required
sequence of selection shall not be such as to adversely affect the airworthiness
of the aeroplane.

I 3.1.4 Where practical, the sense of movement involved in the operation of the
inceptors shall correspond with the sense of aeroplane’s response.

3.1.5 Where appropriate the design shaU be such that each circuit will retain
any given setting and will not tend to creep under control loading or vibration.

3.1.6 Each circuit shall possess adequate stiffness to react to the operating
loads without excess deflection (see also Leaflet 5 0 / 6 , para 4).

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3.2 INCORRECT ASSEMBLY


3.2.1 Each element of each control system shall be designed so as to minimise
the probability of incorrect assembly that could result in malfunctioning of the
system.

3.22 For control systems which, if incorrectly assembled would hazard the
aeroplane, the design shall be such that at ali reasonable break-down points it
is mechanically impossible to assemble elements of the system to give out of
phase action, reverse sense of the control or unintended interconnection between
two systems.

3.3 FAILURE IMMUNITY, SAFETY (see also Leaflet 20616 and 604/4)
3.3.1 All foreseeable kinds of failure shall be considered. It shall be shown
by analysis, test or both that the aeroplane is capable of continued safe flight
and landing after any of the following failures of the flight control systems,
(including trim, lift, drag, feel and thrust systems) within the permissible
flight envelope (see Chapter 600,para 7.3) without requiring exceptional pilot
skill or strength, unless it is agreed with the Aeroplane Project Director that
such failures are acceptably improbable:

(i) Any single failure, excluding jamming.

(ii) Any combination of failures, excluding jamming.

(iii) Any jam in a control position normally encountered during any


phase of flight and any manoeuvre appropriate to the role of
the aeroplane.

I 3.32 The design and location of the inceptors shall be such as to minimise the
risk of inadvertent operation either by personnel entering or leaving the
aeroplane or by the flight crew during normal movement in the cockpit.

3.3.3 Protection shall be provided to prevent any control circuit components


from being used as a step or handhold and to prevent interference, jamming or
chafing from cargo, passengers or loose objects. There shall be means,
especially in the cockpit area, to prevent foreign objects entering locations
where they would jam the system (see also Chapter 100, para 17).
I
3.4 DURABILITY, WEAR AND BACKLASH
3.4.1 The fatigue life of the control systems shall not be less than that of the
airframe primary structure, consideration being given to all forms of inputs
expected during the design service life.
3.42 As far as possible control system elements subject to wear shall have a
wear life equal to the specified life of the aeroplane as a whole.

3.4.3 The design of the control system shall be such as to minimise backlash.

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3.5 BREAKOUT FORCE (see also Leaflet 604/2)


3.5.1 In the case of primary night control circuits the force required on the
inceptor to overcome the static friction in the relevant circuit, when measured
with a standard spring balance, shall be as low as possible and shall not exceed
the value stated in Table 1.

3.6 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS, TEMPERATURE, MOISTURE, AND ICE


3.6.1 The control circuits shall be designed to operate over the whole
temperature range specified in para 1.1 and without any deleterious effects due
to tightening or slackening resulting from differential expansion.

3.6.2 Sufficient clearance shall be provided to ensure the efficient operation


of all detail fittings, such as jacks, bearings, guides, fairleads, etc., over
the temperature range of para 1.1. It shall be demonstrated in hot and cold
temperature tests that the clearances are sufficient.

3.6.3 It shall be demonstrated that the clearances provided are sufficient to


ensure efficient operation of the controls under all conditions of humidity.
Wherever possible materials which expand appreciably with moisture should be
avoided for such parts as fairleads and washers. Component design shall avoid
pockets, traps, wells, etc., into which water, condensed moisture or other
liquids would collect; or adequate drain provision shall be made.

3.6.4 Clearances shall be sufficient to avoid the possibility of jamming due to


the accretion of ice.

3.7 COMBAT VULNERABILITY, PRIMARY, TRIM, SERVO AND ENGINE


CONTROLS

3.7.1 On all aeroplanes except trainers, consideration shall be given to the


reduction of the vulnerability of all flight and engine controls vital to the
safety of the aeroplane. The aim shall be that the failure of any single part of
the flying control system shall not leave the pilot without adequate control for
a return flight and safe landing.
3.7.2 Control circuits shall be run in those areas of the airframe where combat
damage is less probable with respect to threat and the role of the aeroplane.

3.7.3 Duplicated parts of control circuits shall be located as far apart as


possible.

3.7.4 Wherever practical the primary flight control systems and their trim
systems shall be so arranged that in the event of a primary circuit being
rendered inoperative sufficient use of the autopilot or trim circuit will be
available to provide a measure of control of the aeroplane.

3.7.5 When an aerodynamic servo control surface is fitted the control system
shall be arranged so that, in the event of the servo surface being rendered
inoperative by enemy action or other cause, it will be possible to retain some
measure of control over the aeroplane.

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Volume 1 Chapter 206

4 CONTROL CIRCUIT DETAILS-


4.1 COMPONENTS (see also Leaflet 206/6)
4.1.1 The components used in control circuits shall be compatible with one
another and their design and installation shall be such as to ensure compliance
with the requirements of para 2 and 3.

4.2 STOPS
4.2.1 The range of movement of each flight control surface, including trimming,
lift and drag devices and wing sweep shall be limited by stops. Each stop shall
be able to withstand any loads corresponding to the design conditions for the
control system.

4.2.2 Each stop shall be located so that wear, slackness, or take-up adjustments
will not adversely affect the control characteristics of the aeroplane as a
result of a change in the range of surface travel.

4.3 GUSTLOCKS
4.3.1 Where a device is used for locking a control surface whilst the aeroplane
is stationary, the locking device shall:

(i) Automatically disengage when the primary flight controls are


operated in the normal manner, or

(ii) Limit the operation of the aeroplane so that the pilot


receives unmistakable warning at the start of take-off.

4.3.2 Means shall be provided to preclude the possibility of the locks becoming
engaged in flight.

4.4 RUDDER PEDAL INTERCONNECT


4.4.1 Rudder pedals shall be interconnected to ensure positive movement of each
pedal in both directions.

I 4.5 MOTIVATOR INTERCONNECTS


4.5.1 A connecting circuit shall be provided between the port and starboard
ailerons, unless otherwise agreed with the Aeroplane Project Director.

4.5.2 The aileron connecting circuit shall have an ultimate factor at least as
great as that for the wings as a whole in all stressing cases where the ailerons
share the total load on the wings. (See also the stiffness requirements of
Leaflet 500/3).

4.5.3 Unless otherwise agreed with the Aeroplane Project Director,


I interconnecting circuits shall be provided for other motivators which are
duplicated port and starboard, such as canard, elevator/tailplane and wing sweep
and for high lift and drag devices (see also Chapter 205, paras 3.7 and 4.3).

4.6 UNCONVENTIONAL CONTROLS


4.6.1 When other than conventional pilot controls are used prior agreement shall
be obtained from the Aeroplane Project Director.

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Chapter 206 Volume 1

5 TRIM CONTROL SYSTEMS

5.1 Trim controls shail normally be provided for each of the three principal control
axes.

5.2 Trim controls shall be designed to avoid inadvertent operation or abrupt effect.

5.3 The trim inceptors shall operate in the plane and with the sense of motion of the
aeroplane. Means shall be provided, preferably adjacent to the inceptor, to indicate
the direction or inceptor movement relative to the aeroplane motion.

5.4 Trim controls shail be designed to retain any given setting and shal not creep
under control loading or vibration.

5.5 Unless the mm tab, if fitted, is appropriately balanced and demonstrated to be


free from flutter the control shall be irreversible.

5.6 If, due to failure, a power operated trim control can stop at such a position
that the piloting requirements of Part 6 cannot be satisfied then a stand-by trim
system shall be provided. The inceptor for this stand-by system, and, if applicable,
the power supply for it shall be separated from and independent of the main system.

6 POWER CONTROL UNITS AND SYSTEMS (seealso Chapter 208 and Leaflet 20611)
6.1 Power operated control systems shall comply with the requirements of this chapter
in so far as they are applicable.
6.1.2 Where appropriate the strength requirements shall be met with the system
both operative and inoperative.

6.1.3 The proof and ultimate factors shall be 1.125 and 1.5 respectively under
the maximum load which can be developed in the system under all. practicable
operating conditions.

6.2 TESTS ON POWERED FLYING CONTROL UNïïS (see also Leaflets 206/2,
206/3 and 206/5)
6.2.1 The tests required by para 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 shall be carried out in a
ground test rig.

6.2.2 Flight Clearance Test - Any new type of powered flying control unit shall
be submitted to a flight clearance test before the fxst flight test of the
unit.

6.2.3 Unit Design Clearance Test - Any prototype of any new design of powered
flight control unit shall be submitted to a ground test for design clearance.

6.3 TESTS ON POWERED FLYING CONTROL INSTALLATIONS


6.3.1 The tests required by paras 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 below may be made partly in a
ground rig but shall include adequate ground testing in the aeroplane.

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6.3.2 Installation Night Clearance Test - Any new installation of powered


control unit shall be submitted to a ground test for flight clearance before the
first flight of the installation.

6.3.3 Installation Design Clearance - A prototype of any new installation of a


powered flying control shall be submitted to a ground test for design clearance.

6.4 FATIGUE TESTS (see also Chapter 201 para 3.1)


6.4.1 Each powered flying control system shall have a safe life determined in
accordance with Chapter 201 at least equal to the specified life of the
aeroplane, unless otherwise agreed. This shall be demonstrated by a fatigue
test.

MECHANICAL G-RESTRICTORS (see Leaflet 206/4)

7.1 When it is proposed to fit a mechanical g-restrictor, the Contractor shall


discuss the proposal with the Aeroplane Project Director at an early stage of the
design.

MAINTENANCE (see also Part 8)

8.1 ACCESSIBILITY
8.1.1 Components shall be designed, installed, located and provided with access
so that inspection, rigging, repair, replacement and lubrication can be easily
accomplished, including visual inspection of fairleads, pulleys, terminals and
turnbuckles.

8.2 SAFETY
8.2.1 Systems and components shall be designed and installed to preclude injury
of personnel during maintenance and testing. WheIe positive protection cannot be
provided adequate warning and instructions shall be given.

8.3 RIGGING INFORMATION


8.3.1 The limiting breakout force established for the design in accordance with
para 3.5.1, or preferably some lower figure chosen by the designer as appropriate
to the type, shall be stated on the drawings for inspection purposes together
with the conditions of its measurements.

8.3.2 In the case of cable-operated systems, the initial tensions at which, at


no& hangar temperatures, each primary control circuit should be rigged shall
be stated on the appropriate drawings for inspection purposes. The requirements
of para 3.5.1 for static friction shall be met at the correct rigging tension.

8.3.3 The information on correct rigging dimensions, rigging tensions and


allowable static friction limits shall be included in the relevant Aeroplane
Publications.

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Chapter 206 Volume 1

TABLE 1

-
CONTROL CIRCUITS BREAKOUT FORCE

Maximum force N (lbf)


Class of aeroplane
Pitch Roll Yaw

Ail fighters, and other types up to 4,536 kg 18 (4) 9 (2) 27 (6)


(10,000 lb)

All types between 4,536 kg (10,000 lb)


and 22,6800kg (50,000lb) except fighters
and heavy bombers,

All heavy bombers, and other types over 45 (10) 36(8) 45 (10)
22,680 kg (50,000 lb).

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 206/0

CONTROL SYSTEMS

REFERENCE PAGE

RAE Reports
Aero 1972 .. Spring tab controls - Notes on development to date, with
special reference to design aspects
Aero 2232 .. Papers and proceedings of a meeting to discuss powered
flying controls
Mech.Eng. 12 .. Transitional friction effects in powered controls with
particular reference to hydraulic jacks

RAE Technical Reports


66304 .. .. An investigation into the problem of valve stiction
associated with the use of high temperature hydraulic
fluids

RAE Technical Notes


Aero 1173 .. .. Note on friction in control circuits
Aero 2026 .. .. The effect of control circuit friction on handling
characteristics of aircraft with artificial spring feel
Aero 2294 .. .. Notes on "g"-restriction
SME86 .. .. Alternative bearings for control circuits
SME247 .. .. High thermai expansion steel in aircraft control
circuits
sME349 .. .. Theoretical analysis of the response of a servo-
controlled aircraft fitted with a "g"-restrictor
SME367 .. .. The vulnerability of flying control systems in military
aircraft
Mech.Eng.2 .. .. The presence of air in oil and its probable effect on
the irreversibility of hydraulic transmission systems
Mech.Eng. 10 .. .. Tests on servodyne hydraulic control assister
Mech.Eng.77 .. .. An electro-hydraulic-powered flying control system with
automatic safeguards and variable control
characteristics
Mech.Eng.98 .. .. A contribution to the theory of servo mechanisms:
dynamic rigidity of valve-controlled hydraulic servos
Mech.Eng. 100 .. .. Free oscillations of valve-controlled hydraulic servos
Mech.Eng. 108 .. .. Impedance of idealised hydraulic valve-controlled
servos
Mech.Eng. 110 .. .. Portable hinge moment simulator for powered control
circuits
Mech.Eng. 129 .. .. Comparative rigidities of certain valve-controlled
hydraulic servos

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RAE Technical Notes (contd)

Mech.Eng.132 .. .. Valve proportionality effects in aircraft hydraulic


flying control systems
Mech.Eng. 144 .. .. Some notes on irreversible machines
Structures 58 .. .. Aircraft with automatic pilots and powered controls;
safety aspects

A & AEE ReDorts

Tech. 105 .. .. Control system requirements for military aircraft in


relation to the task of the human operator
Tech. 194 Iss.2 .. .. A further resume of pilots' experience with various
forms of feel and power control systems

RAE Specifications

AD1 15 .. 1. Control column force indicator

Scientific and Technical Memoranda

1315 1 .. .. Some studies in hydraulic servo flying controls


1515 1 .. .. An investigation of methods of duplicating
hydraulically-operated irreversible flying controls
8/53 .. .. On the stability of powered flying controls
2/54 .. .. Some problems of powered flying controls

ARC Papers

R&M3001 .. .. Loading conditions of tailed aircraft in longitudinal


manoeuvres
R&M3094 e. .. A case of longitudinal stick-force dynamic instability
of an aircraft fitted with power- operated controls,
"g"-restrictor and spring feel
cP273 .. .. Some advantages and disadvantages of variable and
non-linear gearing between the pilot's control and the
control surfaces (formerly AAEE Report Res 283)

RAeS Journal

March, 1949 .. .. Some thoughts on the use of powered flying controls in


aircraft

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 206/1
I CONTROL SYSTEMS

POWERED FLYING CONTROLS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Basic safety requirements for powered flying controls are specified in Chapter
604. This Leaflet deals with the strength of the powered flying control circuit,
mounting the control unit into the aeroplane and the control characteristics when the
controls are operated in conjunction with an automatic stabilisation device.

2 CONTROL CIRCUIT STRENGTH

2.1 The design load for a mechanical input circuit of a powered flying control system
is that applied by the pilot in the presence of a feed-back or artificial feel
mechanism: the powered control unit valve(s) input may, therefore, be loaded by the
pilot’s maximum effort, less whatever is absorbed by the feel mechanism. Hence there
is no significant difference between a mechanical input circuit of a powered control
and a manual control circuit. This part of the circuit should meet the strength
requirements of Chapter 206 which call for an ultimate factor of at least 1.5 on the
maximum effort which a pilot is capable of applying, with a jam of the powered control
unit input. The pilot’s normal effort, however, is only a small fraction of his
attainable maximum and so this part of the circuit will usually meet the fatigue
strength requirements of Chapter 201 (see para 2.4 below), when designed to the
strength requirements of Chapter 206. Reaction of the maximum effort in both
directions should be assumed at all possible parts of the circuit including an extreme
position at the power unit. As this loading implies a failure of the powered control
unit or its input valve to respond to normal effort, its application must be
considered in both directions.

2.2 Account should be taken of loads that may be induced in the parked condition when
surfaces may deflect downwards under weight or upwards and downwards due to wind
loads. Circuit loads will depend on the location of input circuit stops, possibly
artificial feel forces, and damping devices if fitted.

2.3 The design load for the output circuit should be the maximum load which the power
unit is capable of applying increased by the pilot’s effort through the feed-back or
artificial feel mechanism where this is possible. The contribution of the powered
control unit is, however, much larger than that due to the pilot and in general the
working load in this circuit is much closer to the maximum attainable load than is the
case in the input circuit. Consideration should also be given to conditions arising
in the circuit during and after change-over to any emergency system of control. High
transient peak loads may occur when the system is brought to rest rapidly e.g., by
sudden closure of a valve after movement at maximum velocity, owing to the kinetic
energy to be dissipated in a small displacement. It is important therefore in
hydraulic systems to stress for the loads then arising as these may be greater than
those due to the maximum working pressure.

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Care should also be taken -to avoid stress concentrations; testing to an approval
schedule will be necessary. The maximum load may be greater than that needed for
aeroplane control: for instance, each part of a duplicated power system may be
capable of three quarters of all of the necessary force.

2.4 The fatigue strength of mechanical powered flying control circuits should be
established in accordance with the principle outlined in Chapter 201. (Account should
be taken of the loading actions referred to above).

3 POWERED FLYING CONTROLS IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN


AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL OR WITH AN AUTOMATIC
STABILISATION DEVICE.

3.1 When the powered flying controls are to be operated by an automatic flight
control or in conjunction with an auto-stabiliser the control characteristics under
powered flying controls should be satisfactory both with and without the automatic
flight control and/or the auto-stabiliser in operation (see Chapter 604).

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 206/2
I CONTROL SYSTEMS

TESTING OF POWERED FLYING CONTROLS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 In this Leaflet, information and explanation are given regarding the tests of
powered flying controls called for in Chapter 206, para 9.

1.2 The tests are divided into two stages:

(i) the powered control unit by itself - part of the Type Approval of
the Unit, and

(ii) the powered control installation for a particular aeroplane covering


the complete system from pilot’s input to the control surface.

2 GROUND TEST RIGS

2.1 The test rig for the powered control unit should be capable of applying loads to
the output member of the unit varying at the required relationship to the displacement
and should operate the input member through the required duty cycle at any required
load, speed, frequency, and for any desired endurance period. Means should be
provided for measuring all characteristics of the control such as loadings, friction,
rates of operation, elasticity, mass, inertia, resonance frequencies, stability, and
temperatures and pressures, where applicable, at critical points in the control. The
need to apply assisting loading and not merely resistive, when this may occur
naturally in flight, should not be overlooked. A chamber should be available for
checking the operation of the unit at high and low temperatures as required by Chapter
101.

2.2 In the case of the complete control system the test rig should represent, as
closely as possible, the conditions of the aeroplane in which the powered control is
to be flight tested. All loads should be applied to the actual control surface or its
test rig equivalent and operation of the input member should be through the pilot’s
input. A local rig ‘structure to represent aeroplane stiffness for stability and
resonance tests is normally essential. For check testing of the complete system when
installed in the aeroplane, some form of control surface loading rig should be
available.

3 TESTS OF THE POWERED CONTROL UNIT

3.1 PROTOTYPE CONTROL UNIT - FLIGHT CLEARANCE TEST


3.1.1 During the development stages of a new design of control unit some testing
of the prototype unit will be necessary before the unit reaches the test stage of
para 3.2. In order to ensure a reasonable standard of safety in flight, before
any flight testing is done the prototype control unit should be submitted to a
Flight Clearance Test in a ground rig as required by Chapter 206. This test may

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be either separate from, or included in, the Flight Clearance Test of the
installation in which the unit is to be flight tested, described in para 4.1
below. An endurance test, followed by an inspection and performance check,
should be carried out before flight.

3.2 THE CONTROL UNIT - UNIT DESIGN CLEARANCE E S T


3.2.1 The development of a new design of control unit to the stage when it is
ready for production may involve much rig and flight testing. Before production
is started, however, approval of the type should be obtained and for this purpose
a prototype/typical production unit should be subjected to the Unit Design
Clearance Test called for in Chapter 206. This should be an extended test
covering all aspects of performance, endurance, stability and functioning of
safety devices under all reasonably forseeable types of simulated failures.
During the test the unit should demonstrate that it gives its declared
performance, that it functions within its declared temperature conditions and
also when subjected to negative 'g' and sustained inverted flight.

3.2.2 For endurance testing, the input member should be operated through a 'duty
cycle' repeating it continuously for an adequate total running time. The
composition of this duty cycle should be decided on before the start of the test
to suit the particular control and the type of aeroplane for which the control is
intended, in accordance with Leaflet 206/3.

3.2.3 The aim of the complete test should be to establish that the performance
of the unit is maintained over the specified flying hours between scheduled
removals. Should unit design clearance testing be included in Installation
Design Clearance testing only sufficient testing to give confidence for
development flying need be done.

3.2.4 No modifications or major adjustments should be made during the test and
on completion there should be a complete strip and examination of the unit. The
unit will not be deemed to have passed the test unless the strip and examination
is satisfactory, the standard to be that its condition is such that the unit
would still be satisfactory for safe use in the aeroplane.

3.2.5 If it is necessary to modify an approved control unit to suit a particular


aeroplane type, a full test of the modified version is unlikely to be necessary
but a test to cover the revised design requirements and modifications to the unit
should be made.

4 TESTS OF THE POWERED CONTROL INSTALLATION

4.1 THE POWERED CONTROL INSTALLATION - FLIGHT CLEARANCE


4.1.1 Before any powered control unit is fiight tested either in an established
type of aeroplane or in a new prototype, the complete powered control system,
including control runs andor circuitry and control surface actuators is required
by Chapter 206 to undergo a Flight Clearance Test, partly in a ground test rig
and partly when installed in the aeroplane in which flight tests are to be made.

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4.1.2 The rig test should be carried out on a prototype of the complete system
to a test schedule which should be representative of the test flying intended.
The test schedule should cali for an endurance period but this need not be
extensive if the unit is already cleared for flight since the aeroplane controls
themselves do not usually require long endurance testing. If the control unit is
not already cleared for flight by either of the tests at paras 3.1 or 3.2
adequate endurance testing should be included in the schedule. All other
characteristics of the system such as performance, stability, resonance and
functioning of safety devices under all required conditions should be thoroughly
investigated. (For resonance testing, see Chapter 500 and Leaflet 500/8).

4.1.3 Tests should be made to demonstrate that the safety requirements of


Chapter 604, para 4 are met and that the operation or malfunctioning of other
powered systems in the aeroplane has no adverse effects on the powered control
system under both nomal and emergency conditions.

4.1.4 The aeroplane ground test may be made on the actual installation which is
to be flight tested. This installation should be identical with that tested in
the rig. If both rig and aeroplane ground tests are satisfactory and meet the
standards declared in the pre-test declarations, flight testing may proceed.

4.1.5 It is possibie that the rig test may reveal that flying time should be
restricted until further ground tests have proved the reliability of the system.

4.2 INSTALLATION - DESIGN CLEARANCE


4.2.1 Further development of the system involving modifications may prove
necessary as a result of ground and flight tests, and when the complete control
system has reached the stage when it is considered satisfactory for production it
should be submitted to its Final Installation Design Clearance Test as required
by Chapter 206. This test should be carried out on the fimal version of the
prototype installation. It should be similar to the Flight Clearance Test except
that the endurance test should be sufficient to establish the satisfactory
continued functioning of ail working parts not already tested and approved. It
should be followed by a strip and examination of all working parts, unless agreed
by the Aeroplane Project Director that an extended endurance test be carried out
to establish a satisfactory Functioning life without strip examination. This
should be considered if it is required to leave the test rig in a life consumed
condition for further reliability or life extension testing.

4.2.2 In cases where the control unit employed in the installation has not
already been tested and approved separately, the Installation Design Clearance
Test may be extended to cover the Control Unit Design Clearance Test of para
3.2.

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 206/3

I CONTROL SYSTEMS

TEST SCHEDULES FOR POWERED FLYING CONTROLS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 In this Leaflet, specimen test schedules for the testing of powered flying
controls, as called for in Chapter 206 and as described in Leaflet 206/2, are given in
detail. These schedules are intended to show the general form that the testing
procedure should take and should be modified where necessary to suit any particular
design of control.

2 PROTOTYPE CONTROL UNIT - FLIGHT CLEARANCE TEST (see Leaflet


206/2, para 3.1)

2.1 PRE-TEST DECLARATIONS


2.1.1 The following, each at the appropriate power supply conditions, need to be
decided before commencement of the test:

(i) the composition of the "duty cycle" appropriate to each


portion of the test,
(ii) the maximum and minimum rates of operation with the
corresponding maximum loads at the control unit output
member, and the maximum rate at zero load,

(iii) the maximum loads at the control unit output with the
corresponding maximum rate, and

(iv) temperature and pressure limitations where applicable.

2.2 ENDURANCETEST
2.2.1 With the power supply, if engine driven, at conditions corresponding to
continuous cruising, operate the input member of the unit, repeating the
appropriate duty cycle for a total running time of 25 hours.

2.2.2 Every 5 hours approximately, carry out full cycles of the input member
(full cycle comprises movement from the neutral to one extreme position, return
through neutral to opposite extreme and return to neutral) as follows:

(i) 10 full cycles at the declared maximum rate and corresponding


maximum load,

(ii) 10 full cycles at intermediate load and rate,

(iii) 10 full cycles at declared maximum load and corresponding


maximum rate and

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(iv) operate safety device and allow 10 full cycles in the


emergency condition. Where a means of change-over from
emergency control back to normal is provided, check that this
operates satisfactorily.
Note: In special cases where the change-over from the duty cycle
to the full cycle involves undue time and labour, the total
of 200 full cycles may all be canied out at the end of the
endurance test.
2.2.3 The temperature rise at critical points in the control unit, (e.g.,
electric motor cooling air, fluid in hydraulic pumps, motors and jacks, etc.),
should be recorded during the test.
2.2.4 At some suitable time during the test, check under low temperature
conditions sufficient to clear the unit for the experimental flying intended and
under negative 'g' conditions sufficient to clear the unit for operation under
negative 'g' or inverted flight as applicable.
2.3 STRIP EXAMINATION
2.3.1 Strip and examine working parts.
Note: Performance testing is included in the Flight Clearance Test of
the installation at para 4.
3 CONTROL UNIT DESIGN CLEARANCE TEST (see Leaflet 206/2 para 3.2)
3.1 PRE-TEST DECLARATIONS
3.1.1 The following, each at the appropriate power supply conditions, need to be
decided before commencement of the test:

(i) the composition of the "dutycycle" appropriate to each


portion of the test,
(ii) the maximum and minimum rates of operation with the
corresponding maximum loads at the control unmitput
member, and the maximum rate at zero load,
(iii) the maximum loads at the control unit output with the
corresponding maximum rate, and

(iv) temperature and pressure limitations whereapplicable.


3.2 PRELIMINARY FUNCTIONING TEST
3.2.1 This test, comprising about 20 cycles at varying loads and rates, should
precede all performance and endurance testing. Checks on the operation of the
safety device should be made by simulating a failure in various positions of the
control output member allowing a number of cycles in the emergency condition in
each case. This should be repeated for all agreed possible types of failure
including runaway, freeing or seizure of the control. Where a means of
change-over from emergency control back to normal is provided, this should be
checked in each case. The time to change over to the emergency condition, and
back again, when appropriate, should be measured in each case.
3.3 PRELIMINARY PERFORMANCE CHECK
3.3.1 This test should precede the endurance test in order to establish the
performance of the unit in the new condition. It should include the following:

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(i) sensitivity tests, including backlash and overshoot


measurements,

(ii) measurement of input friction,

(iii) measurement of maximum load developed by the output


member,

(iv) measurement of maximum rate of operation a t various


loads from zero to maximum, applied to the output
member, and

(VI frequency response t e s t s to establish stability


criteria.

3.3.2 The above should be repeated over a range of power si PPlY


conditions from the minimum emergency conditions t Ö the maximum.

3 . 4 ENDURANCE TEST
3.4.1With t h e power s u p p l y , i f e n g i n e d r i v e n , a t conditions
corresponding to continuous cruising, operate the input member of the
unit, repeating the appropriate endurance duty cycle, for a total
running t i m e of approximately 200 hours (see Leaflet 2 0 6 / 2 para
3.2.4).

3 . 4 . 2 Every 10 hours approximately, carry out f u l l cycles of the input


member (full cycle comprises movement from neutral to one extreme
position, r e t u r n through neutral to the opposite extreme and r e t u r n to
neutral) as follows:

(i) 1 0 full cycles a t declared maximum rate and


corresponding maximum load,

(ii> 1 0 f u l l cycles at intermediate load and rate,

(iii) 10 full cycles a t declared maximum load and


corresponding maximum rate, and

(iv) operate safety device a s at para 3.2 allowing 1 0 cycles


in the emergency condition.

Note: In special cases where the change-over from the d u t y cycle


to t h e f u l l cycle involves undue time and labour, the 10 hour
interval between t h e sets of full cycles may be increased to
not more than 50 hours with the number of cycles a t each
interval adjusted t o make the same total of 800.

3 . 4 . 3 The running times should be arranged to include at least one


continuous endurance period equivalent to the endurance of the
particular aeroplane for which the unit is designed, or in the case of a
unit not associated with a particular aeroplane, a period of twelve
hours.

3 . 4 . 4 The temperature rise a t the critical points in the control unit,


(e.g., electric motor cooling air, fluid in hydraulic jacks, e t c . ) ,
should be recorded during t h e test.

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3.4.5 At some suitable time during the test, check under the
temperature. conditions of Chapter 101, as appropriate t o the particular
case under consideration. Record time taken to reach satisfactory
functioning condition from starting. Check safety device.

3 . 5 FINAL PERFORMANCE CHECK


3 . 5 . 1 Repeat preliminary performance check at para 3 . 3 and note
changes.

3 . 6 STRIP EXAMINATION
3 . 6 . 1 Strip and examine working parts.

4 INSTALLATION FLIGHT CLEARANCE T E S T (see Leaflet 206l2, para


4.1)

4 . 1 PRE-TEST DECLARATION
4 . 1 . 1 The following, each at the appropriate power supply conditions,
need to be decided before commencement of the tests:

( i ) the composition of the d u t y cycle appropriate to each


portion of the t e s t ,

(ii) the maximum and minimum rates of operation with the


corresponding maximum loads at the control surface,
and the maximum rate at zero load,

(iii) the maximum loads at the control surface and the


corresponding maximum rate, and

(iv) temperature and pressure limitations, where


applicable.

4.2 PRELIMINARY FUNCTIONING TEST


4 . 2 . 1 The complete powered control system should be installed in the
ground test rig under conditions similar to the installation in the test
aeroplane. About 20 duty cycles a t varying loads and rates should be
made. Checks on the operation of the safety device should be made by
simulating a failure in various positions of the control surface allowing
a number of cycles in the emergency condition of each case. This
should be repeated for all agreed possible types of failure including
runaway, freeing o r seizure of the control. Where a means of change-
over from emergency control back to normal is provided, this should be
checked in each case. The time to change over to the emergency
condition and back again, when appropriate, should be measured in
each case.

4 . 3 PRELIMINARY PERFORMANCE CHECK


4 . 3 . 1 This test should be made w i t h the complete control system in the
test rig and should precede the endurance test in order t o establish
the performance of the system in the new condition. It should
include:

(i) sensitivity t e s t s , including backlash and overshoot


mea s u r em en t s ,

(ii) measurement of input friction,

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(iii) measurement of maximum torque developed at control


surface,

(iv) measurement of maximum rate of operation at various


loads from zero to maximum, applied to the control
surface, and

(VI resonance tests (see Leaflet 500/8) applied to the test


rig.

4 . 3 . 2 The above should be repeated over a range of power supply


conditions from the minimum emergency conditions to the maximum,
including that appropriate to the all engine failure case. The tests
using the emergency power supply appropriate to the all engine failure
case should check that the performance is adequate and that the system
will function for a sufficient length of time to meet the requirements of
Chapter 100, para 9.2 appropriate to the particular aeroplane
concerned.

4 . 3 . 3 T e s t s should b e made to demonstrate t h a t t h e s a f e t y


requirements are met and that operation of all other powered systems
supplied from the same power source, does not materially affect the
performance of the powered control.

4 . 4 ENDURANCE TEST
4 . 4 . 1 With the system in the test rig and with the power supply, if
engine driven, at cruising conditions, operate the pilot's control
through the declared endurance duty cycle for a total running time
of:

(i) 5 hours, if the control unit is already cleared for


flight, or

(ii) 25 hours with the full cycles of para 2 . 2 if the control


unit is not already cleared for flight.

4 . 4 . 2 Carry out 600 full cycles of the pilot's control (full cycle defined
at para 3 . 4 . 2 ) as follows:

(i) 200 full cycles at declared maximum rate and


corresponding maximum load,

(ii> 200 full cycles at intermediate loads and rates, and

(iii) 200 full cycles at declared maximum load and


corresponding maximum rate.

4 . 4 . 3 After every 50 cycles and at same load and speed, operate safety
device as in para 4 . 2 . 1 and allow five cycles in the emergency
conditions in each case.

4 . 4 . 4 T e m p e r a t u r e and p r e s s u r e measurement should be t a k e n


throughout as applicable.

4 . 5 FINAL PERFORMANCE CHECK I N TEST RIG


4 . 5 . 1 Repeat preliminary performance check at para 4 . 3 and note
changes.

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4.6 STRIP EXAMINATION


4.6.1 Strip and examine all p a r t s not already tested a s part of the
control unit.

4.7 AEROPLANE G R O U N D TEST


4.7.1 Install a complete powered control system identical to that tested
a s above, in t h e t e s t aeroplane, and c a r r y out the performance t e s t s
of para 4.3 a s far as practicable on the ground using a control surface
loading device.

4.7.2 Carry out the resonance t e s t s (see Leaflet 500/8).

5 INSTALLATION DESIGN CLEARANCE TEST (see Leaflet 206/2, para


4.2)

5.1 PRE-TEST DECLARATION


5.1.1 As in Flight Clearance Test at para 4.1.

5.2 PRELIMINARY FUNCTIONING TEST


5.2.1 As in Flight Clearance Test a t para 4.2.

5.3 PRELIMINARY PERFORMANCE TEST


5.3.1 A s in Flight Clearance Test a t para 4.3.

5.4 E N D U R A N C E TEST
5.4.1 With the system in the test rig and with power supply, if engine
driven, at cruising conditions, operate the pilot's control through the
declared endurance d u t y cycle f o r a total running time of:

(i> 50 hours if t h e control unit employed is a type tested and


approved unit, or

(ii) 2 0 0 hours if the control unit employed is not a type


tested and approved unit.

5.4.2 Every 1 0 hours c a r r y out full cycles ( f u l l cycle defined a t para


3.4.2) making a total of 3000 cycles, a s follows:

(i> in a 50 hour t e s t :

( a > 200 f u l l cycles a t declared maximum r a t e and


corresponding maximum load,

( b ) 2 0 0 full cycles a t intermediate loads and r a t e s ,


and

( c l 200 full cycles a t declared maximum load and


corresponding maximum rate, and

(ii) in a 200 hour t e s t , the number of full cycles a t ( a ) , ( b )


and ( c ) above should b e reduced to 50 so that t h e same
total of 3000 cycles is achieved in the complete test.
Alternatively, t h e time interval between t h e s e t s of f u l l
cycles may be increased from 1 0 to a maximum of 50
hours with t h e number of full cycles in each s e t
adjusted accordingly.

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5.4.3 After every 50 full cycles and at same load and r a t e , operate
safety device a s at para 4.2 and allow five cycles in the emergency
condition in each case. When a means of change-over from emergency
control back to normal is provided, this should be operated in each
case.

5.4.4 Tenperature and pressure measurements should be taken


throughout a s applicable.

5.5 FINAL PERFORMANCE CHECK


5.5.1 Repeat preliminary performance check and note changes.

5 . 6 STRIP EXAMINATION
5.6.1 Strip and examine all working parts.

5.7 AEROPLANE G R O U N D TEST


5.7.1 Install the same prototype powered control system, or an
identical one, in either a prototype or a production version of the
aeroplane for which the systein is intended, and c a r r y out the
performance tests of para 4.3 u p to about 30% maximum load, using a
control surface loading device, and check results with the rig test
result s.

5.7.2 Carry out resonance t e s t s (see Leaflet 5 0 0 1 8 ) .

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LEAFLET 20614

I CONTROL SYSTEMS

USE OF MASS-SPRING UNITS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The purpose of this Leaflet is to draw attention to certain airworthiness aspects
which should be considered when bob-weights or similar mass elements are incorporated
in conjunction with springs in flying control systems.

1.2 Cases have a c c d in the past where such devices have been introduced into
flying control circuits in order to improve the stick force/g characteristics or to
achieve some measure of g restriction. A device of this type is sensitive to the
normal acceleration, the angular acceleration in pitch, the longitudinal acceleration
or any other response quantity of the disturbed longitudinal motion of the aeroplane,
or to a combination of such quantities; in turn it moves the pitch control surface
and so controls the normal acceleration of the aeroplane.

1.3 It may sometimes happen that an element such as an unbalanced link may be
unintentionally included in a control system in such a way as to act as a bob-weight
and so introduce a coupling between pitching of the aeroplane and motion of the
control circuit. Such a case should be treated as if the mass-spring unit had been
deliberately included, and the following recommendations should be taken as
applicable.

2 RECOMMENDATIONS

2.1 In all cases where a mass spring system of the general type described in para 1.2
is to be installed, a full analytical investigation should be made of the stability of
the aeroplane-control system combination.

2.2 For such investigations the following points should be borne in mind:

(i) in cases where power units are incorporated in pitch control


circuits, the dynamic properties of these units (i.e., their
transfer functions and time constants) should be taken into
account,

( i i ) dry fiiction in the elevator control circuit may adversely affect


the stability of the g-restrictor-aeroplane combination, and should
therefore be also taken into account,

( i i i ) neither the numerical value of the ratio of the natural frequency of


the g-restrictor unit to that of the short period mode of the
aeroplane, nor the stability characteristics of the g-restrictor and
the aeroplane taken separately give any prior indication as to the
behaviour of the combined system, and

(iv) the forward speed may be an important parameter, and its whole
practical range should be covered in the analytical investigation.
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2.3 The abo.ve recommendations apply also to any devices having dynamic properties
similar to those of the g-restrictors considered, and in particular to devices
intended to improve stick forcelg characteristics.

2.4 Some g-restrictors of the general type considered, though efficient and otherwise
satisfactory, may induce excessive control surface loads. The magnitude of these
loads should be assessed by appropriate response calculations embracing both the
initiation of an unduly severe manoeuvre and the checking movement of the control
surface as induced by the g-restrictor. For this part of the investigation R.A.E.
Technical Note No. SME 349 may be of assistance.

2.5 The effect of accelerations on unbalanced control circuits controlling other axes
should also be considered.

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LEAFLET 206/5

CONTROL SYSTEMS

FATIGUE TESTING OF HYDRAULIC POWERED FLYING CONTROLS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This Leaflet contains details of the fatigue testing of hydraulic powered flying
controls required by Chapter 206. The tests aim to ensure that hydraulic powered
flying controls have adequate fatigue life under conditions of varying pressure stress
to which they will be subjected in service. Included in the tests are screw jacks
driven by hydraulic motors and, where applicable, automatic flight control system
actuators and artificial feel simulators.

2 STANDARD DUTY CYCLE FOR CONTROL SURFACES

2.1 The duty cycle for the control surfaces should be specified by the airframe
designer who should state clearly whether the additional factor of Leaflet 201/1 para
6 has been taken into account. In the absence of such a specification the standard
duty cycle in Table 1 should be used, in which case the factor specified in Leaflet
201/1 para 6 is not required. Tests should then be applied in accordance with paras 3
and 4 below.

2.2 Due to the wide variation between the pexformance characteristics of various
types of hydraulic powered fíying control, standardisation of test conditions is based
on flight duty cycles as applied to the control surfaces rather than the fluid
pressures in the hydraulic powered control circuits. In the case of small amplitude
high frequency control surface movements, the internal jack pressures in a throttled
valve servo will be entirely different from the pressures in a variable delivery servo
pump. Similarly, for identical output conditions, the internal pressure will depend
upon the precise nature of valve overlaps or underlaps, and in duplicated jacks, upon
the inter-jack mechanical stiffness.

2.3 In addition to the standard duty cycle, which is based on aerodynamic hinge
moment, fatigue loading on a powered control component may arise from other sources,
and in many cases these may constitute the heaviest fatigue loading. These sources
include ground testing cases, operation of other surfaces both on the ground and in
flight, pump ripple and parking locks. The conditions controlling the above factors
must be given full consideration in addition to the effects of the standard duty
cycles.

3 CONVERSION OF DUTY CYCLE INTO TEST PRESSURE


3.1 Although the external loads applied to hydraulic powered flying control jacks
will be broadly similar to those applied to the local aeroplane structure, the
internal jack pressures will be determined by other considerations. In each case,
therefore, it wilí be necessary to determine experimentally the internal pressure
fluctuations at critical points throughout the powered flying control system resulting
from the duty cycles. The test should be carried out on a test rig representing as
closely as possible the aeroplane installation and special instrumentation may be
necessary at this stage to ensure that local peak pressures are recorded.
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3.2 Factors influencing the pressure variations are given below, but it is emphasised
that this list does not necessarily include all the parameters significant to the
performance of a powered flying control:

(i) inertia of the system,

(ii) stiffness of the system,

(i i i) aerodynamic damping,

(iv) control valve damping characteristics,

(v) phasing of control valve ports (the smallest variation in port


position can cause large pressure differences particularly in
duplicated jacks, thus the magnitude of pressures applied in fatigue
testing should be adjusted to include the most adverse conditions),

(vi) peak pressures imposed on the system by resonant tendencies at a


control surface, and

(vii) actual control velocities and frequencies experienced in flight.

4 METHOD OF TEST

4.1 The tests should be carried out under any one or a combination of the following
conditions, or by any other approved method:

(i) By simple pressure pulse applications to units with output members


locked or unlocked according to whether or not the load is
transferred through these members during the particular duty cycle
case. The jacks should be stationary, externally restrained and the
output member locked in the position given in Table 1, and the
relevant fluid pressures applied to the various pressure chambers.
This method offers the advantages of allowing greater acceleration
of the test cycle and reduction of test time (this can be lengthy
when, for instance, clearance for loo0 hours is being sought and a
scatter factor of 5 is to be applied).

(ii) By stroking the units in the normal manner (i.e., by an extension of


the normal endurance tests called for in Leaflet 206/2) with the
jacks moving against externally applied loads. In this condition
the normal supply pressure should be provided at the powered control
inlet and the internai jack pressure will be developed
automatically. When using this method, any reduction in the test
time by acceleration of the flight duty cycIe is liable to modify
the internal jack pressures and due allowance should be made for
this.

(iii) With the jack and fittings uncoupled, in particular cases where the
simulated internal pressure conditions could impose loads on the
external attachments of the jacks in excess of those experienced in
flight. in this condition, pressures on opposite sides of the jack
piston should be suitably balanced.
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5 TESTFACTORS
5.1 Fatigue test factors should be derived in accordance with Chapter 201.

TABLE 1

STANDARD FLIGHT DUTY CYCLE

(i) All aeroplanes other than transports:

Hinge Moment Displacement Number of


Loading condition (% of maximum) (% of maximum) cycles per
hour

Extreme 100 100 approx. 20


Manoeuvre (Just clear of
jack stops)
~~

Normal
Manoeuvre
30
I 30

Continuous
residual 10 2 3600
displacement (see Note) (see Para
(straight 3.2 (vi))
and level)

(ii) Transport aeroplanes:

Hinge Moment Displacement Number of


Loading condition (% of maximum) (% of maximum) cycles per
hour

Extreme 100 100 approx. 10


Manoeuvre (Just clear of
jack stops)

Straight and 10 2 1800


level (see Note) (see para
3.2 (vi))

Note: For control systems without autostabilisation the jack stroke may be
insignificant in the standard duty cycle at 10%hinge moment.

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 206/6

1 CONTROL SYSTEMS

DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The leaflet presents supplementary information with respect to the design of
mechanical components in control systems. The aim is to amplify the requirements of
Chapter îû6 for particular detail design considerations. In many cases the adoption
of the recommendations of this leaflet will be found to be necessary to meet the
specified requirements.

2 DETAIL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

2.1 GENERAL,
2.1.1 Chapter 206, para 3 requires that a control system shall be designed to
tolerate the possibility of jamming, chafing and interference from personnel,
cargo, loose objects and freezing of moisture. These overall considerations
shoufd be applied to each detail component.

I 2.2 PREVENTION OF JAMMING; CLEARANCES (see also Chapter 100,


para 17 and 18)
2.2.1 Each control run should be arranged with adequate local clearances to
minimise the possibility of jamming by loose objects. Control runs should not be
too close to horizontal surfaces, or have levers designed to operate in local
pockets. Multiple levers on common spindles should not have lightening holes, or
inward facing flanges. Chains with sprockets having a horizontal pivot are
undesirable and pulley guards should be sufficiently close to prevent the ingress
of small parts.

2.2.2 As a guide the minimum clearances should be:

(i) 3 mm between elements which move in relation to one another


but which are guided or connected to the same component.

(ii) 6 mm between elements which move in relation to one another


and which are guided or connected to separate components.

(iii) 12 mm between elements and aeroplane structure or equipment


to which they are not attached, unless structural flexibility
requires a greater clearance to be provided.

2.3 JOINTS
2.3.1 All adjoining parts should be secured in a manner that will prevent
loosening when subjected to internal, external and vibration loads. All pins,
etc., subjected to load or motion should be positively secured and locked using
slotted nuts and split pins together with additional means of retention where
possible. Clevis pins retained only by split pins are not acceptable.

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2.3.2 Control system joints in push-pull systems that are subjected to angular
motion, except those in ball and roller bearing systems, should have an ultimate
factor of safety of not less than 3.33 with respect to the ultimate bearing
strength of the softest material used as a bearing. The approved ratings of ball
or roller bearings may not be exceeded.

2.4 PRECAUTIONS AGAINST FAILURE OR DISCONNECTION


2.4.1 If it is assumed that any failure or disconnection is extremely remote
then the design should be such that no failure or disconnection could be foreseen
under practical circumstances, including errors of operation, assembly or
maintenance, for such an assumption to be acceptable. The following
considerations should be given:

(i) Choice of materials to avoid undue notch sensitivity or stress


corrosion cracking.

(ii) Adequate robustness to cater for all conditions arising,


including those due to errors in operation, assembly or
maintenance.

(iii) Avoidance of design features which tend to give rise to


fatigue effects, including sensitivity to vibration.

2.5 CABLES AND CHAINS


2.5.1 The choice of pulley diameter for use with cables should be such as to
preclude the possibility of fatigue arising from bending of the cable and local
rubbing together of individual wires in the cable.

2.5.2 Pulleys should not be arranged so that a reverse bend in the cable arises
as it traverses from one puiley to another, and the pulleys should be in the
plane of the cables so that the cable does not rub against the pulley flange.

2.5.3 The wrap angle of the cable round the pulley should be adequate and
pulleys and sprocket should be guarded to prevent any cable or chain jamming or
coming off when slack and re-engaging correctly after slack has been taken up.

2.5.4 Each kind and size of puiley should correspond to the cable with which it
is used, to ensure that the minimum bend radius of the cable is equalled or
exceeded.

2.5.5 Fairleads should be installed so that they do not cause a change in cable
direction.

2.5.6 Where turnbuckles are attached to parts having angular motion they should
be arranged so that fouling is positively prevented throughout the range of
travel.

2.6 ANTI-FRICTION BEARINGS


2.6.1 Bearing installations should be arranged in such a manner that failure of
the rollers or balls will not result in a complete separation of the control.
Where direct axial control force application cannot be avoided a faikafe feature
should be provided.

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2.7 PUSH-PULL AND TORQUE TUBES


2.7.1 The tubes used in push-pull and torque control systems should be
adequately vented and drained, or completely sealed, to prevent the accumulation
of condensed vapours.

2.7.2 Joints incorporated in torque tube control systems to enable axial


movement should have sufficient engagement to ensure that disengagement will not
occur and positive drive will be retained under the most adverse set of
manufacturing and installation tolerances and structural flexibility. Minimum
engagement should not be less than one diameter. A means for inspection of the
amount of engagement should be provided.

2.7.3 Ali torque tubes should be mounted on anti-friction bearings with


supported couplers spaced at close enough intervals with sufficient misalignment
capability to prevent undesirable bending or whipping of the tubes.

2.7.4 Each torque tube in a link system should be removable and re-installable
in the aeroplane without having to disturb the support, component, or other
interfacing system elements at either end of the tube.

2.7.5 The rated operating speed of a torque tube system should be no greater
than 75% of the critical speed unless a supercritical design has been agreed with
the Aeroplane Project Director.

2.7.6 Where a broken tube could cause damage to other components an adequate
guard should be provided.

3 CONSIDERATION OF FAILURES

3.1 The failures to be considered include those of mechanical, hydraulic and


electrical devices in the primary and secondary control systems. Failures of
Q-actuated mechanisms (including devices such as Mach-trim and Q-actuated gearing, if
not covered by Chapter 208 or 729) are also to be considered.

3.2 Failures in power operated trimming systems can be particularly serious.


Creeping or runaway can lead to a dangerous situation from which it may be difficult
to recover once the failure has been detected. Evidence that a pilot can override any
out-of-trim force is not sufficient to ensure safety under all conditions, in an
instrument approach for example.

3.3 Any kind of interlock between main and standby trimmers should be avoided.
Systems which, when the console switch is used, automatically render the main system
dead until it is reset, should not be used.
3.4 When pitot and static pressures are used to operate mechanisms in the flight
control system the consequences of failure of the Pitot-static system by blockage or
breakage shall be considered.

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3.5 Control system sensors such as probes, vanes and other mechanical devices should
be installed at locations which minimize exposure to conditions which could result in
inaccurate output signals or failures.

3.6 When pilot intervention is necessary to recover from a failure in the control
system or to change to a reversionary mode, a realistic time delay should be allowed
for. See Leaflet 604/4.

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CHAPTER 207

S P I N N I N G AND S P I N RECOVERY

1 GENERAL

1.1 This c h a p t e r s t a t e s design and s t r e n g t h requirements for spinning,


including e n t r y to and recovery from the steady condition. C h a p t e r 603,
para 4, specifies t h e aeroplane handling requirements for post stall
gyration and s p i n s .

1.2 It is applicable only to those aeroplanes where r e c o v e r y from a post


stall gyration or s p i n is called for i n the Aeroplane Specification and it
applies whether t h e e n t r y to the post stall gyration o r s p i n is intentional
o r inadvertent.

1.3 If s p i n prevention devices having sufficiently low probability of


failure a r e used t h e spinning requirements which then a p p l y shall be
a g r e e d with the Aeroplane Project Director.

1 . 4 Guidance on Design Criteria for S p i n Resistance and Spin Recovery is


given i n Leaflet 2 0 7 / 2 .

2 STRENGTH REQUIREMENTS

2.1 FACTORS
2.1.1 T h e ultimate factor i n Chapter 200, para 4 of a t least 1 . 5 shall
a p p l y to the whole aeroplane u n d e r the loads arising d u r i n g a s p i n and
d u r i n g e n t r y and recovery therefrom. The proof factor i n C h a p t e r 200
para 4 of a t least 1.125 shall also be met i n the c a s e of aeroplanes i n
Class I a n d Class I V a s defined i n Chapter 6 0 0 , para 3 , b u t need not
b e met o n o t h e r types.

2.2 DESIGN C O N D I T I O N S
2.2.1 T h e spinning conditions u s e d for s t r e n g t h calculations shall be
those w h i c h give t h e most a d v e r s e combination of t h e yaw, pitch and
roll components of t h e rotation. T h e effect of u n s t e a d i n e s s shall be
considered. Leaflet 2 0 7 / 1 gives an acceptable means of estimating t h e
r a t e of rotation for design purposes i n t h e a b s e n c e of o t h e r
information.

2.2.2 Departure from controlled flight a t point A on t h e flight


envelope as defined i n C h a p t e r 202 para 3 with t h e a p p r o p r i a t e
combination of angular rotations shall be considered.

2.2.3 To cover roll during recovery from a spin o r post stall gyration
t h e most a d v e r s e r a t e of rotation about a longitudinal a x i s , assumed to
b e vertical, m u s t be used, s e e also Leaflet 207/1.

2.2.4 Full scale spinning t e s t s shall be made a t t h e earliest


opportunity in accordance w i t h t h e requirements of C h a p t e r 910. The
r a t e s of roll, pitch and yaw, and t h e normal a n d longitudinal
accelerations measured during these t e s t s shall b e checked against
those used for design, and if they a r e g r e a t e r a r e p o r t shall be made
to the Aeroplane Project Director so that a p p r o p r i a t e action can be
taken.

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2.3 ASSOCIATED CONDITIONS


2.3.1 I n the d e p a r t u r e phase of an inadvertent s p i n t h e engine
conditions i n the r a n g e of engine off to maximum power, including
maximum rotational s p e e d , shall be assumed.

2.3.2 I n o t h e r phases of the s p i n and recovery, the engine condition


assumed shall be t h a t appropriate to the manoeuvre.

2.3.3 When the aeroplane is designed to c a r r y external s t o r e s the


most s e v e r e combinations of mass, moments of inertia and aerodynamic
d r a g shall be considered a t each phase of t h e manoeuvre.

3 RECOVERY STANDARD

3.1 When available flight test results will be regarded a s t h e final


evidence of the aeroplane's characteristics a s regards spinning and
r e c o v e r y . However, to e n s u r e a reasonable probability of satisfactory full
scale behaviour advance information shall be derived b y appropriate model
t e s t s a n d / o r calculations as agreed with the Aeroplane Project Director.

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LEAFLET 207/0

SPINNING AND S P I N RECOVERY

REFERENCE PAGE

ARC R e p o r t s

C P 195 .. .. A c r i t e r i o n f o r t h e p r e d i c t i o n of t h e r e c o v e r y
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of s p i n n i n g a i r c r a f t .

AGARD P r o c e e d i n g s

CP No. 1 9 9
CP No. 235
..
..
..
..
S t a l l / s p i n p r o b l e m s of m i l i t a r y a i r c r a f t
Dynamic stability p a r a m e t e r s
( P a p e r s 19 a n d 29)

O t h e r PaDers

A I A A 80-1564 .. .. Spin Prediction Techniques (Bihrle J)


XIXA 80-1580 .. .. O v e r v i e w of s t a l l / s p i n t e c h n o l o g y ( C h a m b e r s J R )
J o u r n a l o f A i r c r a f t Vol. 2 0 ,
No. 2 .. .. Spin Prediction techniques (Bihrle J a n d
R a r n h a r t tu)
J o u r n a l o f A i r c r a f t V01.21,
No. 1 2 .. .. E s t i m a t i o n o f A e r o d y n a m i c forces a n d m o m e n t s o n
a s t e a d i l y s p i n n i n g a e r o p l a n e ( P a m a d i BN a n d
T a y l o r LW)

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 207/1

SPINNING A N D S P I N RECOVERY

DESIGN RATES OF ROTATION

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Chapter 207 para 2 prescribes that the spinning conditions used for
strength calculations shall b e those which give the most adverse
combination of the yaw, pitch and roll components of the rotation, with
adequate allowance for unsteadiness. This leaflet outlines t h e means which
may be used to derive the design r a t e of rotation in t h e spin.

2 DESIGN RATES OF ROTATION

2.1 The design rate of rotation may be derived b y one o r more of the
methods outlined below.

2.2 Use of semi-empirical formula.

Qs=
- K r;X ,
18.57 ~ 1 4 rads/sec

where v is the tail volume coefficient

C is the wing mean chord, m

KZ and K X a r e the radii of gyration about t h e Z and X aeroplane


axes of stability, respectively, m.

9s is the steady rate of rotation about a space vertical associated


with an aeroplane incidence of 600 as defined by t h e inclination of the
aeroplane longitudinal axis to the space vertical with the aeroplane lateral
axis horizontal. The equation has been derived from a consideration of
the pitching moment equation in t h e steady spin. The value of the
constant was derived b y consideration of measured rates of rotation on a
series of models with a standard yawing moment applied. Good agreement
was obtained between the measured model rates of rotation and the
prediction of the formula and there was fairly good agreement w i t h the
average rates of rotation measured f u l l scale during incipient spinning
tests. The formula applies only to aeroplanes of conventional layout and
moderate aspect ratio. It is suggested that a factor of a t least 1.15 be
applied to S2s to allow for unsteadiness during spin.

2.3 MODEL TESTS


2.3.1. Various model test techniques a r e available ( s e e for example
AGARD CP 199 Paper 1 3 ) . Model scaling is extremely important and it
is especially necessary for the model Reynolds number to be as
representative of full scale a s possible. Where the steady rate of
rotation has been evaluated from model tests it is necessary to
compare it with that given b y the formula of para 2.2 above and if
less the procedure to be adopted shall be discussed with the
Aeroplane Project Director. The factor of 1.15 should be applied to
the agreed steady rate of rotation to cover unsteadiness.

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2.3.2 Model test techniques which will be acceptable for providing


evidence of spin characteristics include: -

( i ) Wind tunnel free-flight techniques, which can provide


valuable information on spin e n t r y .

( i i ) Vertical w i n d tunnel t e s t s which can be u s e d to obtain


data on t h e steady developed spin and r e c o v e r y , b u t
usually r e q u i r e careful interpretation because of t h e
disparity in t h e Reynolds number.

(iii) Free-flight t e s t s with model dropped from a


helicopter, with either pre-programmed control
s e t t i n g s o r radio control.

( i v ) Wind tunnel r o t a r y balance t e s t s , which may be used


to obtain the basic aerodynamic characteristics of t h e
aeroplane whilst i n the spinning mode and hence t h e
rates of rotation b y solving t h e equations of motion of
t h e aeroplane ( s e e for example A I A A Paper 80-1564).

2.4 SIMULATOR STUDIES


2.4.1 Simulator s t u d i e s demand t h e availability of a valid mathematical
model of t h e aeroplane and for t h i s reason the application to t h e spin
regime may be limited. However, the technique has value i n
investigating the conditions from w h i c h a spin may develop.

3 ROLL DURING RECOVERY

3.1 I n the absence of o t h e r information a r a t e of rotation of 5 r a d / s e c


about the longitudinal a x i s , assumed to b e vertical, should b e u s e d to
cover t h e condition of rolling during recovery from a s p i n o r post stall
gyration.

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 207/2

SPINNING AND SPIN RECOVERY

DESIGN CRITERIA FOR SPIN RESISTANCE AND SPIN RECOVERY

1 GENERAL

1.1 I n the case of training aeroplanes i n Class I and Class I V (see


Chapter 600 para 3 ) it is necessary to establish the spinning and spin
recovery characteristics of the aeroplane (see Chapter 603 para 4 and
Leaflet 6 0 3 / 3 ) .

1.2 The Aeroplane Specification may state that aeroplanes i n other


categories, especially highly manoeuvrable combat types in Class I V , have
to b e designed to meet spin conditions, although they should also be
resistant to departure from controlled flight and to post stall gyrations and
spins i n accordance with Chapter 603 para 4 . 4 . However, if an automatic
spin prevention device with a sufficiently low probability of failure is used
Chapter 207 para 1 . 3 states that the spinning requirements to be applied
must be agreed with the Aeroplane Project Director. If such a device is
p a r t of an automatic flight control system reference should be made to
Chap t e r 208.

2 SPIN RESISTANCE
(see for example A G A R D CP-199 Paper 5, and CP-235 Paper 1 9 ) .

2.1 The aim of s p i n resistance is to incorporate characteristics in the


aeroplane which result in resistance to departure into spin type motions
subsequent to a stall.

2.2 Design criteria suitable for use during the design stage have been
developed, but must be substantiated b y subsequent model and f u l l scale
testing a s prescribed by Chapter 207 para 3. The full attainable incidence
range should be investigated.

( i ) Directional Departure Parameter - (NvDyN)


The parameter is defined as:-

N =N cosa - I-
Z i,
V
sina
V~~~ I,

This is derived from a consideration of the lateral directional equation of


motion of the aeroplane. I t i s a measure of the stability of the
aeroplane about the flight path and predicts departure from
long it u d i na1 control i n p ut s. Essen tially N V D y N should be

greater than zero i n all conditions to avoid the possibility of


departure in yaw.

( i i ) Lateral Control Departure Parameter - LCDP.

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Various versions of this criteria have been proposed. They


have been developed from a consideration of t h e simplified
rolling and yawing moment equations assuming t h e aeroplane to be
laterally and directionally trimmed. Essentially t h e criterion
predicts the point where the rolling moment due to sideslip,
resulting from a d v e r s e yaw, overcomes the rolling effect of t h e
ailerons a n d , where appropriate, r u d d e r .

where K = -
C and r e p r e s e n t s the a i l e r o n / r u d d e r interconnect
5
Again LCDP should be positive to avoid d e p a r t u r e .

( i i ) Combined yaw and roll criterion.

Criteria have been proposed which combine both


.and LCDP.
N~~~~
One such is the (ß-1 axis stability indicator

> “6 and a + L v <o

w h e r e = -ß -=-tan-l
-
t)
(Nt

which implies t h a t N v D y N has to be positive and LCDP

will b e zero for =JI = “6

( i v ) The damping of t h e lateral oscillation should b e positive.

( v ) Some evidence s u g g e s t s that t h e value of t h e pitching


moment d u e to sideslip C m l v l should be zero o r

slightly nose down to avoid u ndesirable directional-lateral


coupling effects. A method of predicting couple pitch-yaw
d e p a r t u r e has been suggested which is based on analysis of
the non-linear static equation of t h e aeroplane in angle of
attack and sideslip. (see A G A R D CP235 Paper 2 9 ) .
However, f u r t h e r substantiation of t h i s technique i s
required and it is not recommended.

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Volume 1 Leaflet 207/2

3 SPIN RECOVERY

3.1 The design of an aeroplane for spin recovery is complicated by the number of
design parameters which influence the problem. The most important of these are:-

(i) The relative moments of inertia of the aeroplane about its three
reference axes in all appropriate configurations including with
stores.

(ii) The wing geometry, particularly on the outer parts of the


mainplane.

(iii) The fuselage shape, especially in cross section and nose shape.

(iv) The relative position of the horizontal and vertical stabilising


surfaces, including the degree to which the fin and rudder are
shielded by the tailplane in spin attitudes.

(v) The effectiveness of the motivators and their cross axis effects.

(vi) Store configuration, especially when asymmetric.

3.2 A relatively simple criterion known as the Tail Damping Power Factor (TDPF) was
used for many years. This basically relates the product of a so called tail damping
ratio and the 'unshielded' rudder volume coefficient to the difference between the
moments of inertia in roll and yaw. More recent work has shown clearly that it is not
a satisfactory criterion as it does not describe either a necessary or sufficient
characteristic for satisfactory spin recovery. This is not surprising in view of the
limited parameters covered.

3.3 A more comprehensive criterion is that given in ARC CP No. 195. This method
predicts an overall unbalanced (anti-spin) rolling moment coefficient (URMC) and
relates it to the moment of inertia parameter

The unbalanced rolling moment coefficient is the sum of three separate quantities:-

(i) that due to the body damping coefficient, LB, which makes
allowance for body shape - Fig la. The effect depends upon the
width of the Strakes, if present, which are horizontal extensions to
the fuselage forward and in the plane of the tailplane.

(ii) that due to the unshielded rudder volume coefficient, LRV Fig
lb. The elevator position used should be that which results in the
minimum unshielded rudder area.

(iii) that due to the mainplane, LM, Fig 2.

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The boundaries for satisfactory spin recovery are shown in Fig 3. The technique has
shown good correlation with fiight tests for aeroplanes of conventional layout with
wings of moderate aspect ratio. The parameter

represents a simplification which effectively assumes that the second moment of mass in
the z direction is negligible. This may introduce errors when Ix is approximately
equal to Iy. However, the method considers only finkudder recovery effect and is
thus limited to aeroplanes of conventional layout. AGARD CP 199 Paper 7, Fig 10
suggests a criterion for roll control which may be dominant on slender configurations.
4 NOTATION
AR Wing aspect ratio
b Wing span

bl (Iz-IxY[ pS(b), 1
-2
pitching moment derivative due to sideslip
CmIv
h local height of body (Fig la)
moments of inertia about body axes in roll, pitch and yaw respectively
ratio of rudder deflection to aileron deflection
rolling moment coefficient due to body damping - Fig l a
rolling moment coefficient due to wing effect - Fig 2
rolling moment coefficient due to unshielded rudder volume
coefficient. Fig l b
dihedral effect derivatives - body axes
aileron rolling moment derivative
rudder rolling moment derivative
directional stability derivative - body axes
directional departure parameter

aileron yawing moment derivative


rudder yawing moment derivative
Wing area

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t/c wing thickness chord ratio (Fig 2 )

V t r u e r a t e of descent in spin
a angle of attack

“6

E weighting factor i n body damping coefficient (Fig i a )

x (&.)& = 2
2v

P air density

Q rate of rotation about spin axis ( r a d / s e c )

LCDP lateral control departure parameter

TDPF tail damping power factor

URMC uns hielded r u d d e r moment coefficient

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BODY CROSS-SECTION C AT X -45

CIRCULAR + 0.6
RECTANGULAR + 1.5 * D e p e n d s on t h e
ELLIPTICAL + 2.1
w i d t h of s t r a k e .
ROUND TOP, FLAT BOTTOM + 1.1
The values q u o t e d
ROUND TOP, FLAT BOTTOM + STRAKES + 1.7*
are f o r a w i d t h
ROUND BOTTOM, FLAT TOP + 2.5
of 0.014 R where
ROUND BOTTOM, FLAT TOP + STRAKES + 3.5"
(FREE + 1.5 R = d i s t a n c e from
t h e c.g. t o the
FIN (UNDER TAILPLANE + 3.0
rudder p o s t
(ABOVE TALLPLANE - 0.4
(FREE + 1.5
RUDDER (UNDER TAILPLANE + 2.0
( I N TAILPLANE WAKE - 0.25

t =
+ 1.5.

F I G 1A BODY DAMPING C O E F F I C I E N T &hx2dx


LB- cbz

AR - Shaded A r e a

R - Distance b e t w e e n
C e n t r o i d of Shaded
Area and cg of
Aeroplane

- ARP.
F I G 1 B UNSHIELDED RUDDER VOLUME C O E F F I C I E N T LRV -
Sb

F I G 1 BODY DAMPING & UNSHIELDED RUDDER VOLUME C O E F F I C I E N T S

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-
= 10% 12'10 14'/0 16'10 18'10

FIG 2 A N ESTIMATION O F T H E WING ROLLING MOMENT COEFFICIENTS


(WIND A X E S ) I N THE SPIN

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F I G . 3 THE CRITERION FOR THE PREDICTION OF THE RECOVERY


CHARACTERISTICS OF SPINNING AEROPLANES

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Volume 1

CHAPTER 208
ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS
1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS (see also Leaflet 208/1)
1.1 INTRODUCTION
1.1.1 This Chapter contains the requirements relating to flight with active
controls. Active Control Systems (ACS) a~ systems in which commands to the
motivators are computed from sensor inputs with or without inceptor inputs.
Thus, although the term is normally applied to systems which must operate
continuously and without whose correct operation safe flight cannot be
maintained, it also includes all forms of autostabilizer and other systems which
can command motivator position independently of inceptor units. Definitions of
terms are given at para 8.
1.1.2 The requirements of this chapter are concerned primarily with the most
critical systems, those. which operate continuously (full-time). The extent to
which they apply to other flight control systems will be stated in the Aeroplane
Specification. All flight control systems, including ACS, must satisfy the
requirements of Chapter 206. Requirements for autopilots are stated in Chapter
729. For piloting aspects, handling qualities are dealt with in Part 6, and,
in particular, the reaction of the pilot to mode changes and failures, in Chapter
604.
1.1.3 ACS may be provided for purposes other than flight control. In all cases
the requirements of this chapter will apply if maintenance of safe flight is
involved. Fig 1 shows the fundamental features which constitute an ACS. The
Categories A and B outlined define those functions which are respectively purely
automatic and those which involve manual inputs. Table 1 lists representative
control functions in Categories A and B.
1.2 INTEGRAïED SYSTEMS
1.2.1 If a full-time active flight control system is required the aeroplane
designer m a y elect to integrate a number of other control functions, e.g.,
structural mode and secondary controls, thrust and thrust vectoring, within that
one system. Such an integrated system would not necessarily replace the need
for, say, a dedicated engine control system but could certainly perform the
necessary thrust command computations.
1.2.2 Further integration is possible and arises from the fundamental high
integrity implicit in the Full-time ACS.
1.2.3 In determining the integrity of a Full-time ACS all inputs to that system
and the effects of associated systems must be taken into account. These effects
and their influence upon integrity must be identiñed during qualification.
1.3 APPLICATIONS (see also para 7 and Leaflet 208/1)
1.3.1 Full-time Active Flight Control systems must provide vehicle control and
where necessary stability augmentation. They may also provide structural mode
control, either through the conventional control surfaces or by means of
additional specially located surfaces or other motivators. However some
structural mode control systems may be designed as discrete autonomous active
control systems and may even not require to be full-time.

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Chapter 208 Volume 1

1.4 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS


1.4.1 The designer must provide performance, to the levels stated in the
aeroplane specification. An ACS may be required to provide performance at the
following levels of integrity:

(i) Full-time

(ii) With reversion to equivalent performance.

(iii) With reversion to degraded performance.

(iv) Fail-safe (for systems other than primary flight control).

1.4.2 For systems involving reversion, as in 1.4.1 (ii) and (Ui) above, the
integrity of the reversionary system and the ability to make the essential
transition to it shall be considered to be flight safety critical.

1.5 REFERENCE TO OTHER AREAS

(Categories of Status, Performance, Flying Qualities, Handling Qualities


to be added later).

2 SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS (See also Leaflet 208/2)

2.1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS


2.1.1 In considering the design of an ACS it is important to understand that
effective operation will depend upon the compatible interactions of pilot,
airframe, ACS and the total possible environment.

2.1.2 A fully integrated ACS will include some or all of the following
features:

Pilot’s inceptors, switches, and indicators required for operating the


ACS.
Motion sensors, e.g., rate gyros, accelerometers, airstream direction
sensors.
Transducers and sensors required for command and measurement of outputs.
Structural strain sensors.
Air data sensors.
Computers and system management logic.
Status data storage.
System power supply conditioning.
Dedicated power supplies.
Actuators.
Environmental control system.
Electrical power supply.
Hydraulic power supply.
Aerodynamic interfaces: control surfaces, spoilers (motivators).
Engine functions: thrust and vectoring (motivators).
Signalling elements: mechanical, electrical, optical etc.
Guidance sub-system.
Intake controls.
Software.

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Volume 1 Chapter 208

2.2 INTEGRITY
2.2.1 The system shall be designed to meet the specified levels of integrity to
be agreed with the Aeroplane Project Director.
2.2.2 A detailed analysis of the System Design in respect of integrity shall be
presented to show the basis upon which the Aeroplane Specification is to be met.
In particular the philosophy for treating common-made failures shall be stated
and shall be to the approval of the Aeroplane Project Director.
2.2.3 Where redundancy is used to meet integrity targets, care shall be taken
that performance after failure is acceptable. This may require testing of
simulated failure modes.
2.3 RELIABILITY
2.3.1 The system shall be designed to meet the specified levels of reliability,
to be a p e d by the Aeroplane Project Director.
2.3.2 A full reliabilis. development plan shall be prepared to show how the full
reliability potential of the design is to be realised, to establish compliance
with the requirements and to specify how the reliability achievement will be
maintained throughout production and service. ( S e e DEF STAN 00-40(Part 1)
(NATOARMP-1)).
2.3.3 The ACS design shall take account of maintenance requirements under all
anticipated environmental conditions.
2.4 I " E R A B I L l ï Y (see also Chapter 112)
2.4.1 The system shall be designed to survive all threats defined in the
specification. The susceptibility levels for all environmental influences shall
be determined, and all practical limitations affecting effectiveness and
survivability shall be declared to the satisfaction of the Aeroplane Project
Director as early as possible in the design and development process.
2.4.2 The system design shall take full account of its installation in the
airframe, variations in the operating environment including the effects of
failures of and within other on-board systems, the potential for maintenance
e m , flight crew error, enemy action and flight in lightning conditions.
2.4.3 Wherever possible survival shall be achieved by providing inherent passive
resistance to the influencing factors.
2.4.4 In the event of the aeroplane sustaining damage, the probability of the
ACS providing less than Level 3 flying qualities shall be to the satisfaction of
the Aeroplane Project Director (ref Chapter 600, para 5).
2.4.5 Where parallel processing or control paths are provided to ensure
redundancy, they should be physically separated as far as possible, so that minor
accidental or battle damage does not cause failure of the active control system.
2.4.6 In designing resistance to Electromagnetic Interference (EM) consideration
shall be given, in particular, to the following:

(i) An Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)test and EMI avoidance


philosophy must be stated by the designer.
(ii) Effects on performance, the physical and operational effects,
must be considered during system design.

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(iii) The designer must show that his design meets the specified
threats as part of an overall system safety analysis (ref
para 2.2.2).

(iv) The effect of the requirements on choice of system must be


clearly indicated to the Aeroplane Project Director early in
the design stages.

2.4.7 The ACS and its installation, together with all other installed
equipments, shall be mutually electromagnetically compatible when installed in
the aeroplane; and demonstration of their satisfactory integration into the
total aeroplane is required.

2.4.8 Maintenance of essential screening and bonding effectiveness must be


considered and means of in-service testing incorporated into the design.

2.4.9 Exceptionally, where compliance with requirements for invulnerability


proves impracticable, it shall, with the Aeroplane Project Director’s approval,
be permissible to adopt such strategies as shut-down and reinstatement to achieve
survivability.

I 2.4.10 To avoid ACS failure due to maintenance error, the system shall be designed
so that it is impossible to install or connect any component part improperly.

2.5 POWER SUPPLES


2.5.1 Hydraulic, pneumatic and electrical power shall be provided for the system
with characteristics, levels of integrity and reliability compatible with system
requirements.

2.5.2 Power transients shall not degrade the performance of the ACS.

2.5.3 Suitable means of sustaining sufficient power to maintain control of the


aeroplane for recovery from engine failure shall be provided.

2.5.4 Essential flight controls shall be given priority over non-flight phase
essential controls in apportioning the use of power supplies.

2.6 COMPUTERS
2.6.1 The response of the ACS to both pilot commands and external disturbances
will be determined by signal computation effected by computers. Feedback signals
from specially provided sensors will enable the computers to take account of the
motion of the aeroplane, changes in configuration and, where incurred, flexure of
its structure.

2.6.2 ACS computers shall be designed to provide speed of operation and levels
of discrimination fully compatible with the intended performance of the control
laws, and they shall enable all management functions to be effective without
incurring significant penalties arising from time delays.

2.6.3 The designer shall aim to ensure that ail functions embedded in a
processor or computer are identified and fully understood with respect to their
possible influence upon correct functioning of the ACS, whether or not these
functions are intentionally employed during normal ACS operation.
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2.6.4 Each ACS computer, as an LRU and its interface, shall be uniquely
identified such that its correct function when installed in an aeroplane system
is assured.
2.6.5 The ACS computer design and its interfaces shall have sufficient reserve
or be capable of growth, to meet later expansion requirements to be agreed with
the Aeroplane Project Director.
2.7 SENSORS
2.7.1 The locations of primary sensors in an aeroplane shall be chosen making
due allowance for rigid and flexible body motions, and the achievement of
adequate protection from birá-strike, accidental and battle damage. Furthermore,
the location of akdata sensors, and the processing of their signals shall take
account of normal disturbances (eg sideslip, effect of asymmetric manoeuvres).
~

Any necessary compromise shall be to the satisfaction of the Aeroplane Project


Director.
2.7.2 Where use is made of sensors already provided for other systems any
resulting compromise in the ACS aeroplane performance shall be to the
satisfaction of the Aeroplane Project Director.
2.8 INCEPTORS
2.8.1 The design of inceptors shall meet the performance, reliability and
integrity requirements specified for the system. For novel inceptors, operating
characteristics shall be to the approval of the Aeroplane Project Director. The
operation of control switches etc., mounted on flight control inceptors shall be
shown to produce minimal interference with inceptor output signals.
2.8.2 Where appropriate, upon failure of a feel system, reversion shall be made
to, at worst, the least acceptable breakout force and gradient defined in Part
6.
2.8.3 Dual Control Inceptors

(i) Where mechanical interconnection between inceptors is


impracticable, e.g., between force sensors, the designer
shall advise the Aeroplane Project Director, as early as
possible of the method of interfacing inceptors with the
control law computing.
(ii) The interface logic shall whenever possible avoid the use of
manually operated inhibiting switches.
(iii) Inhibition of primary inceptors shall be avoided, (for example
the instructor’s).
(iv) The effects of dual command upon control law authority and
stability shall not lead to over controlling or system
instability.
2.8.4 The effects of pilot-coupled mass shall be shown not to degrade precision
control during rapid manoeuvres and flight in turbulence.
2.9 ACTUATORS
2.9.1 The actuators shall meet the requirements of the specification which
should at an early stage be amplified by an interface document to ensure
J
compatibility of all mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic, electrical and electronic
interfaces.
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2.9.2 Demonstration of actuator performance shall be carried out in a rig which


is fully representative of control and installation parameters.

2.9.3 Particular attention shall be given to the maintenance of performance with


service life and to the accommodation of the duty cycle expected to result from
the control laws in use.

2.9.4 The requirements of paras 2.11,3.2.4 and 3.2.5 shall also be noted.

2.10 COMMUNICATION SYSTEM


2.10.1 An ACS typically makes use of non-mechanical signalling between inputs
and outputs.

2.10.2 The forms of signalling adopted, e.g., electrical or optical, shall be


shown to provide the required integrity and invulnerability.

I 2.1 1 FAILURE MANAGEMENT (see also Leaflet 604/4)


2.11.1 Where redundancy is employed special care shall be taken to eliminate
sources of common-mode failure. This provision does not prohibit the use of
interlane transfer of information, but it does mean that devices implemented to
achieve this shall be designed and implemented to meet identified integrity,
reliability and performance levels.

2.11.2 Interlane tracking errors and voting transients shall be kept to a


minimum; in particular, errors between sensors measuring the same parameter
shali not compromise required maximum allowable failure transient levels.

2.11.3 Where degradation of performance due to failures is unavoidable, the


designer shall aim to achieve regression in flying qualities between normal and
emergency characteristics.

2.11.4 The effects of failures upon the motion of the aeroplane shall be
minimised and shall not exceed the levels stated in the Aeroplane Specification.
It is important that first failures shall incur minimum disturbance; subsequent
failures may be permitted to give rise to greater transients, but these shall be
to the satisfaction of the Aeroplane Project Director.

2.11.5 The means whereby failures are detected and isolated shall be designed so
that the compromise between failure transient level and nuisance disconnect
frequency is acceptable to the Aeroplane Project Director.

2.11.6 The designer shall ensure that nuisance disconnects do not compromise
system integrity and performance.

2.11.7 Consideration shall be given in the design and in the failure analysis to
air-data and other sensors which may lack coherent physical input and for which
cross-monitoring is difficult. See Leaflet 208/2, para 3.

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2.12 INTERACTION WITH OTHER SYSTEMS


2.12.1 Interaction with other systems may form part of the overall aeroplane
avionics strategy. Any interaction with the ACS shall be fully defined and
restricted in respect of any data imported by the ACS.

2.12.2 Data acquired by the ACS must be controlled by the ACS to render its use
fully compatible with the ACS integrity requirements.

3 CONTROL LAWS AND SOFTWARE

3.1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS


3.1.1 The control laws incorporated in an ACS shall provide the levels of
performance stated in the Aeroplane Specification. In respect of flying
qualities and operational performance, when operating in turbulence these shall
be at least to the standard of Part 6.

3.1.2 Where control laws (mode) can compete for control authority a clear
protocol shall be established to prevent essential control laws suffering
premature saturation. (See also para 7.1.4).

3.1.3 The designer must treat Control Laws and common software as common-mode
elements in design and proving.

3.2 CONTROL LAWS


I 3.2.1 The control laws shall use the minimum number of sensor derived feedbacks,
in particular the most rugged sensors shall be employed for primary feedbacks
essential to continued safe flight.

3.2.2 Control laws essential to initial flights of any new configuration shall
be robust in that they shall be insensitive to those aeroplane characteristics
which may be subject to uncertainty prior to flight validation.

3.2.3 Gain and phase margins or equivalent measures relating to all modes shall
be maintained at acceptable levels for all predictable variations in system
operating conditions and aeroplane configurations throughout the specified life
of the system.

3.2.4 Residual oscillations and quantisation effect shall not exceed levels
which significantly affect the piloting task or pilot subjective acceptance, or
which can result in significant wear of the system and airfame components.

3.2.5 The probability of loss of gain or phase margins which results in an


unrecoverable aeroplane condition shall be significantly less than the required
probability for loss of the aeroplane due to control system failure.

3.2.6 Mode compatibility logic shall provide flexibility of ACS operation and
ease of mode selection by the pilot. Where changes of control law (mode) can
occur in flight, either automatically or by pilot selection, they shall incur
minimum disturbance to controlled flight. The need to manually re-trim following
a mode change shall be avoided by design.

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3.2.7 The designer shall ensure that control laws permit the aeroplane to make
safe and controlled entries into and departures from conditions of full and
partial constraint (e.g., undercaniage restraint).

3.2.8 Where control laws involve a trimming or integral function, which can
result in motivators moving progressively towards authority limits during normal
operations, such conditions shall be fully identified and appropriate pilot
warnings introduced.

3.2.9 Recovery from unusual attitudes, particularly beyond the stall, or from
intentional manoeuvres which involve transition through a period of low or
negative airspeed shall be considered and appropriate control law strategies
implemented to ensure safe and controlled behaviour.

3.2.10 The Flight Control Laws shall be defined in an unambiguous Flight


Requirements Document (FRD)or Software Requirements Statement (SRS). These
documents shall be revised and corrected throughout the ACS development.

3.2.1 1 The data describing the mathematical model of the aeroplane and ACS shall
be defined in Master Data Sets which shall be revised and corrected with the
SRS.

3.3 SOFTWARE (The overall standards for software in Critical Systems are given in
Interim Defence Standard 00-31. The requirements of this chapter are not
intended as replacements for, nor do they invalidate, the above DEF STAN.
However, they shall be read as enlargements which emphasise the needs of this
critical software application).

3.3.1 The FRD or Software Requirements Statement shall include definitions of


system redundancy and failure management algorithms, built in test functions,
pre-flight test, and all other functions to be written in software terms. A
method by which the structure and algorithms of Flight Safety Critical Software
shall be evaluated to eliminate design errors arising from Control Law
Specification ambiguity or lack of definition shail be agreed with the Aeroplane
Project Director.

3.3.2 Every reasonable effort shall be made to ensure that the software is free
from errors and is wholly compatible with Safety Critical function.

3.3.3 The Software shall be specified, designed, verified and validated in a


rigorous and controlled process which shall be defined to the satisfaction of the
Aeroplane Project Director.

(i) The Software Design Process shall facilitate software


assessment and Certification of the ACS.

(ii) Aii Software associated with the ACS development shall be


identifiable, separately deliverable, and appropriately
documented.

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3.3.4 The software shall be structured so that its functions are visible and
discrete changes permissible, without involving large areas of code.

3.3.5 At least one completely independent software audit shall be carried out to
assess correct functioning of the software. Independence may be achieved by the
employment of a separate and different team for this purpose from that designing
the software.

3.3.6 A listing of the techniques to be employed in the software audit shall be


submitted for the approval of the Aeroplane Project Director.

3.3.7 All software anomalies or related anomalies which arise during software
development and testing shall be recorded together with the details of changes
arising therefrom.

3.3.8 The Flight Resident Software (FRS) or In-Flight Software, shall be tested
on the CS rig (ref: para 6.2.1 and Leaflet 208/6).

3.3.9 These FRS rig tests shall be carried out using the ACS flight standard
hardware.

3.3.10 FRS rig tests shall cover all modes of operation and shall explore the
full context of conditions to be met in the required flight envelope.

3.3.11 Where software other than the FRS is required to facilitate testing the
ACSD hardware, e.g., during environmental testing, such SOfhVare shall be
rigorously tested to show that as far as is possible it is free from anomalies
which could reduce the effectiveness of the hardware test.

3.3.12 Automatic test software shall be shown to be free as far as is possible


from anomalies which could hazard the ACS, and with which the Automatic Test
Equipment has been designed to be used.

3.3.13 Each FRS programme shall be clearly and uniquely identifiable.

3.3.14 A Software Plan or Control Statement shall be prepared and shall cover
all aspects of the software development life cycle.

3.3.15 All changes to programmes during development and service shall be


rigorously recorded and uniquely identified.

3.3.16 Ali changes shall be subject to the FRS audit and rig test procedures,
unless specifically identified and excluded by agreement with the Aeroplane
Project Director.

4 AIRFRAME ASPECTS (see also Leaflet 208/4)

4.1 GENERAL
4.1.1 Interaction will occur between the overall airframe design and ACS design.
The resulting performance, reliability and integrity will depend upon an
optimisation of such features as motivators, airframe configuration, and ACS
control laws.
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4.2 STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS


4.2.1 SCOPE

(i 1 The aim of these requirements is to ensure that an aeroplane


with an ACS system exhibits the same level of structural
integrity as an aeroplane designed to fulfil a similar role
without an ACS system.

(ii) In the assessment of structural integrity consideration shall


be given to all ACS modes, including those degradations and
failures from which the aeroplane can reasonably be expected
to recover.

(iii) In demonstrating compliance with the static strength


requirements of Chapter 200 the designer shall examine the
sensitivity of the loads on significant items to their
dependent variables (dependent variables could embrace
flight/aeroplane conditions, control surface inputs, response
parameters, gust velocities) to ensure that sufficient safety
margins exist.

When assessing design loads consideration shall be given to


the loads due to manoeuvres, gusts and combinations of
manoeuvres and gusts. It must be shown that sufficient
control authority is available for adequate ACS system
performance under all foreseen circumstances, and in
particular that the ACS system shall have the capability to
function throughout the duration of severe turbulence
encounters. The loading assessment shall consider those
loading conditions which would exist following the occurrence
of reasonable combinations of structural damage and system
degradation from which recovery is expected, for example that
which might be caused by a birdstrike or minor battle
damage.

Where recovery of the aeroplane following failure of the ACS


is possible the load spectrum used to establish the Design
Limit Load (Chapter 200, para 1.8) shall be reviewed and
limitations (Leaflet 900/1) defined, if necessary, to
establish an acceptable level of risk.

Where intervention on the part of the pilot is required after


the failure of an active control system, in order to prevent
a potentially catastrophic situation from developing, an
unambiguous failure warning shall be provided for the pilot
in accordance with Chapter 105, para 12.

(vii) These requirements are subject to the agreement of the


Aeroplane Project Director, in consultation with
Airworthiness Division, RAE.

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4.2.2 INTEGRITY OF THE ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEM


(i) In cases where there would be a significant structural
penalty, if the structure was designed to sustain the
critical loads arising from a malfunction of the active
control system, attention shall be given to the possibility
of improving the integrity of the ACS.

4.2.3 DESIGN CASES

The critical design cases for aeroplanes incorporating ACS


may be more difficult to determine than those for
conventional aeroplanes, consequently many more flight
conditions must be investigated at the design stage and in
flight test.

Critical design cases will be dependent not only on aeroplane


category and role but also on the actual application of ACS
in a given aeroplane design.

Non-linearity effects which arise due to system dwells,


motivator rate limits and system authority limits must be
accurately or conservatively represented in the design loads
analysis.

The principles to be used in the derivation of critical


design cases for aeroplanes incorporating ACS are given in
Leaflet 208/3 and 4.

4.2.4 LOADS MEASUREMENT

(i) Prototype, Development and Pre-production Aeroplanes

A sufficient number of aeroplanes in these categories engaged


in either manufacturer’s or MOD(PE) flight trials shall, as
required by the Aeroplane Project Director, be fitted with
comprehensive instrumentation to enable fatigue and static
loads to be measured and critical loading actions to be
defined. The data so obtained must be analysed to assess the
validity of design loads and to determine whether any
additional critical loading actions could occur if the
relative phasing of manoeuvre and gust loads was altered.
When critical loading actions are identified which have not
been envisaged by the designer early action must be taken to
ensure that the structure has sufficient strength to sustain
the new loads (for example: an increase in structural
strength, a control system re-design, a structural integrity
substantiation by calculation, or the use of a static test
airframe).

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(i i ) In-Service Aeroplanes
In-service aeroplanes incorporating ACS shall, as required by
the Aeroplane Project Director, be fitted with
instrumentation to enable defined critical fatigue loads (as
defined by actions taken to comply with para
4.2.4(i)) to be measured and assessed, so that consumption of
structural life can be quantified. In addition, a
representative sample of in-service aeroplanes shall be
fitted with a comprehensive load measurement system, which
although not necessarily as comprehensive as that fitted to
prototype and development aeroplanes, shall be sufficient to
enable defined critical static and fatigue loads to be
monitored and to allow any new critical loading actions
(caused for example by differences between actual aeroplane
usage and that assumed during design and development flying)
to be identified. In cases where such new critical loading
actions are identified there must be a reassessment of the
structural substantiation for the aeroplane to determine
whether any remedial action is required. If a re-design or
developemnt of in-service ACS software is necessary, either
to ensure that the structure has sufficient strength to
sustain newly identified critical loading actions or to
modify aeroplane performance characteristics, then flight
trials must be repeated to reassess all critical loading
actions.
4.2.5 MODIFICATIONS TO SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE

(i) Before approving any modifications to either the ACS software


or hardware the design authority shall ensure that the
proposed changes do not alter the characteristics of the
flying control system sufficiently to invalidate the
structural substantiation of the aeroplane. In those cases
where the structural substantiation would be invalidated by
the proposed changes this must be stated on DEF STAN 05-123
Form 714, and the design authority must ensure that the
necessary resubstantiation of the structure is completed,
preferably before approving the associated modification.
Until the completion of the resubstantiation, flying
limitations shall be applied which shall ensure that the
loads applied to the structure do not exceed 80% of the
unfactored limit load.
5 OPERATIONAL AND PILOTING ASPECTS (see also Leaflet 20815)
5.1 GENERAL,CONDITIONS
5.1.1 The ACS shall be designed to function within a specified time, to include
gyro run-up, Pre-flight (PF) test etc., following the application of power. This
time shail be defined in the Aeroplane Specification.
5.1.2 The system shall be designed so that the pilot is kept informed of any
change of status or failure which requires pilot action to maintain performance
I or to safeguard airworthiness. See also Leaflet 604/4.
5.1.3 The pilot shall be given clear indication of any modes which are engaged
whether by manual or automatic selection.

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5.1.4 All otherwise undisplayed status information shail be made available on


demand during flight, wherever possible.

5.1.5 All system performance aspects must be considered in the context of normal
service and battle damage deterioration of components and due allowance made for
these effects. The method whereby the designer takes account of these
deteriorations must be to the satisfaction of the Aeroplane Project Director.

5.1.6 Indication of normal ACS functioning at those times where no operating


limitations are implied shall not be distracting to the pilot.

5.2 PRE-FLIGHT TEST


5.2.1 The installed ACS shall incorporate an automatic, and where unavoidable
pilot-interactive, pre-flight test function to ensure that all redundant
elements, failure detection and signal selection algorithms, etc., are correctly
functioning.

5.2.2 The level of testing provided in the pre-flight test shall be sufficient
to determine whether the ACS is flight-worthy.

5.2.3 Normally it shail be mandatory for the pre-flight test to be


satisfactorily completed before flight. The actual fault status of the system
shall determine the ability to proceed to take-off.

5.2.4 The fault status for take-off under normal conditions shall be specified
by the aeroplane designer. Special operational cases where take-off will be
required to be made at lower levels of integrity will be d e f i e d by the Aeroplane
Project Director.

5.2.5 System status, as detected by the pre-flight test and interruptive and
continuously operating BIT, shall be presented to the pilot during pre-flight
tests.

5.3 IN-FLIGHT TEST


5.3.1 Any automatic In-flight system self-tests incorporated as part of ACS
failure detection and management shall not give rise to levels of disturbance
which may affect the pilot’s ability to perform precision tasks.

5.3.2 Essential elements of an ACS which are only required to operate in


discrete parts of the flight envelope (modes) shall be monitored to ensure that
they are fit for use.

5.3.3 Where an ACS includes a number of subsystems or mades with significantly


degraded performance and handling levels, a training facility shall be provided.
This shall enable the pilot to select the otherwise naturally occumng degraded
modes for training purposes. This provision must not compromise the status of
the failure detection and monitoring of functions involved with these modes.
Selection of failed sub-systems or modes shall not be possible.

5.4 FAILURE MONITORING


5.4.1 Status data derived from the system shail be made available for fault
diagnosis purposes. These data shall be accessible after flight and shall
survive removal of main bus and external electrical power from the system.
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5.4.2 If pilot action is required in response to a failure, then an appropriate


indication shall be automatically generated in the cockpit. Information
regarding system status which may affect flight management shall be accessible by
1 the pilot. See also Leaflet 604/4.
5.4.3 Where the design requires failed signals to be automatically rejected by
the system, these signals shall be identified and their rejection recorded with
time and other appropriate context data for maintenance purposes, in any
appropriate recorder.
5.4.4 Fault location to at least Line Replacement Unit &RU) level shall be
automatic and to a confidence level to be agreed with the Aeroplane Project
Director.
5.5 COCKPIT INSTRUMENTS
5.5.1 Ali displays, indicators, selectors and switches providing essential
functions for an ACS, shall be demonstrated to have the necessary levels of
integrity.
6 AEROPLANE AND SYSTEM PROVING (see also Leaflet 208/6)
6.1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
6.1.1 While the design is being developed, and on completion, every effort shall
be made to identify all possible faults and to determine the consequences in
order to eradicate all identifiable design errors, in order to meet the design
specification. A record of this proving process shall be kept.
6.1.2 All Flight Resident Software (FRS) shall be subject to a full independent
audit.
6.1.3 All flight control laws shall, during design and development, be subject
1 to piloted simulator assessment to establish both quantitative measures of
performance and qualitative acceptability.
6.1.4 An Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Philosophy Statement and Test
Plan shall be written to precede design and development.
6.1.5 A Reliability Demonstration Plan for System and LRU’s shall be prepared
before testing commences.
6.1.6 A Common-Mode Analysis shall be made to justify the design.
6.1.7 All identifiable hardware faults shall be apportioned probabilities of
occurrence which together with the effects upon performance shall be shown to be
compatible with the requirements.

6.1.8 A total system safety statement shall be prepared by the aeroplane


designer.
6.2 RIGTESTING
6.2.1 The complete ACS shall be tested in a working rig in which all the flight
hardware is installed and provided with suitable power supplies, cooling and
motivator loads. The inclusion of, or representation of, engine based functions,
e.g., bleed air servos, thrust vectoring, etc., shall be to the satisfaction of
the Aeroplane Project Director.

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6.2.2 R i g t e s t i n g s h a l l i n c l u d e m e a s u r e m e n t of p e r f o r m a n c e , b o t h as
a f a u l t free s y s t e m a n d f o r all classes of failure.
6.2.3 A s c h e d u l e of tests to be p e r f o r m e d detailing all p e r f o r m a n c e
a n d f a i l u r e m e a s u r e m e n t shall b e p r e p a r e d a n d agreed with t h e
A e r o p l a n e Project D i r e c t o r p r i o r to t h e commencement of rig t e s t i n g .

6.2.4 T h e r i g tests w i t h hardware-in-loop s h a l l i n c l u d e piloted 'flight'


testing. T h e s e tests s h a l l c o v e r all a s p e c t s of f l i g h t a n d g r o u n d
operations.

6.2.5 A period of f a u l t - f r e e e n d u r a n c e t e s t i n g of t h e f u l l s y s t e m i n
t h e ACS rig with pilot i n t h e loop, s h a l l p r e c e d e f i r s t f l i g h t . T e s t i n g
time s h a l l be k e p t a h e a d of f l i g h t time d u r i n g initial d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e
d u r a t i o n of t h e t e s t s h a l l b e agreed with t h e A e r o p l a n e Project
Director.

6.3 AEROPLANE-ON-GROUND TESTING


6.3.1 T h e complete ACS s h a l l be c o r r e c t l y installed i n t h e a e r o p l a n e
f o r which i t h a s b e e n designed a n d t e s t e d t o p r o v e c o r r e c t f u n c t i o n i n g
a n d compatibility with t h e a i r f r a m e ( s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g ) a n d all o t h e r
systems.

6.3.2 S p e c i a l e n v i r o n m e n t a l compatibility tests s h a l l b e p e r f o r m e d o n


t h e i n s t a l l e d s y s t e m as may b e r e q u i r e d b y t h e A e r o p l a n e P r o j e c t
Director.

6.4 FLIGHT TESTING


6.4.1 F l i g h t tests s h a l l b e c o n d u c t e d to e s t a b l i s h v e r i f i c a t i o n of t h e
p e r f o r m a n c e of t h e ACS.

6.4.2 E a r l y f l i g h t t e s t s s h a l l b e carried o u t to v e r i f y t h e a e r o d y n a m i c
data u s e d for t h e ACS d e s i g n .

6.4.3 A n y s p e c i a l f u n c t i o n s r e q u i r e d f o r t h e p u r p o s e s of f l i g h t t e s t
(e. g., f a u l t simulation) shall be d e s i g n e d a n d tested i n compliance with
t h i s c h a p t e r . S u c h f u n c t i o n s m u s t be identified e a r l y i n t h e s y s t e m
d e s i g n a n d t h e i r p r o v i s i o n made as p a r t of t h e o v e r a l l ACS D e s i g n .

6.5 IN-SERVICE CHANGES


6.5.1 All c h a n g e s which may affect a n ACS s h a l l b e s c r u t i n i s e d a n d
implications i d e n t i f i e d . All c h a n g e s to a n ACS which arise d u r i n g
d e v e l o p m e n t a n d i n s e r v i c e u s e s h a l l be s u b j e c t to t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of
t h i s c h a p t e r u n l e s s specifically e x c e p t e d b y t h e A e r o p l a n e P r o j e c t
Director.

7 APPLICATIONS (See also Leaflet 208/1)

7.1 INTRODUCTION
7.1.1 A p a r t from t h o s e A c t i v e C o n t r o l a p p l i c a t i o n s d i r e c t l y a f f e c t i n g
stability augmentation a n d flight control, t h e r e are specific
a p p l i c a t i o n s w h i c h affect s t r u c t u r a l b e h a v i o u r a n d a e r o p l a n e
configuration. T h e s e a p p l i c a t i o n s may be d i s c r e t e l y implemented or
i n t e g r a t e d within, f o r example, a Full-Time Active F l i g h t C o n t r o l
System.

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7.1.2 Systems whose failures could lead to imminent loss of the


aeroplane shall be shown to provide saturation characteristics which
a r e compatible with reasonable margins of exceedence of the maximum
gust or manoeuvre levels stated i n the design specification (see para 4
and Leaflet 2 0 8 / 4 ) .

7.1.3 All such systems must be mutually compatible w i t h other ACS


functions, i.e., flight control and stability, present i n the same
aeroplane.

7 . 1 . 4 Where a choice exists of control mode to be engaged, whether b y


automatic o r manual selection, the designer shall ensure that the use
of the selected mode does not cause an otherwise avoidable loss of
essential control. If t h e rejection, inhibition or limitation in the
authority of an engaged mode can lead to a significant loss of flying
qualities and/or mission performance then suitable means of warning
the pilot shall be provided.

7 . 1 . 5 For all modes an ultimate subservience to pilot demand shall be


ensured, unless it can be shown that priority is essential for a specific
alter nativ e mode.

7 . 1 . 6 Where necessary for reasons of safety, consideration shall be


given to providing the facility for the pilot to override specific ACS
modes (e.g., !gr limiting) whilst remaining within structural limits to be
agreed with the Aeroplane Project Director.

7.2 ACTIVE FLUTTER CONTROL (AFC)


7.2.1 Objective: To widen the Operational Flight Envelope b y
automatic enhancement of the stability of a particular flutter mode.

7 . 2 . 2 Special Requirements. The system shall provide stability with


the integrity and reliability levels specified i n the Aeroplane
Specification.

7.2.3 Where applicable the ability to recover to a safe flight envelope


following failure or degradation of the AFC, shall be shown to be
compatible with the Integrity Requirements.

7.2.4 AFC may require t h e provision of specially located motivators.

7.3 MANOEUVRE LOAD ALLEVIATION (MLA)


7 . 3 . 1 Objective: To redistribute absolute loads during manoeuvres,
to increase structural life, and to permit more efficient s t r u c t u r a l
design.

7.3.2 Special Requirements. The system shall not compromise overall


s tr uct ural integrity.

7.3.3 MLA may require the provision of specially located motivators.

7.4 GUST LOAD ALLEVIATION ( G L A )


7.4.1Objective: To enhance structural life.

7 - 4 . 2 Special Requirements. ( T o be completed).

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7.5 WING CAMBER CONTROL (WCC)


7.5.1 Objective: To optimise l i f t a n d d r a g ( e s p e c i a l l y a t h i g h l i f t
c o n d i t i o n s ) t h r o u g h o u t m a n o e u v r i n g e n v e l o p e , a n d to e f f e e t h i g h d r a g
for braking.

7.5.2 Special Requirements. R e v e r s i o n to r e c o v e r y a n d l a n d i n g


c o n f i g u r a t i o n m u s t b e a c h i e v a b l e to specification.

7.6 STALL AND SPIN PREVENTION ( S S P )


7.6.1 Objective: To automatically d e t e r t h e pilot a n d airframe from
i n i t i a t i n g a d e p a r t u r e from c o n t r o l l e d f l i g h t a n d to p r o v d e r e s i s t a n c e
to p o s t stall g y r a t i o n a n d s p i n s .
7.6.2 Special Requirements. P a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n mus b e g i v e n to
e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e r e q u i r e d levels of m a n o e u v r e a n d g u s t to b e m e t i n
combination.

7.6.3 If full-time o p e r a t i o n i s not involved a n d d e p a r t u r e s e x p e c t e d ,


post d e p a r t u r e a n d recovery characteristics must be defined a n d a n
optimum r e c o v e r y mode p r o v i d e d w h e r e a p p r o p r i a t e .

7.6.4 C o n s i d e r a t i o n s h a l l b e g i v e n t o implementing S S P i n s u c h a
manner t h a t t h e pilot may c h o o s e to e x c e e d t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s i n a n
emergency.

7.7 STRUCTURAL LOAD LIMITING (SLL)


7.7.1 Objective: T o p r e v e n t d e f i n e d c r i t i c a l loads e x c e e d i n g s p e c i f i e d
limits (see p a r a 7.6.2).

7.7.2 Special Requirements. SLL s h a l l be implemented i n s u c h a


m a n n e r t h a t t h e pilot may c h o o s e to e x c e e d t h e s e limits i n e m e r g e n c y .

7.8 VARIABLE CONFIGURATION CONTROL (Wing s w e e p etc. ) ( V C C )


7.8.1 Objective: To automatically c o n f i g u r e a i r f r a m e to a c h i e v e most
efficient p e r f o r m a n c e for a n y o p e r a t i o n a l f l i g h t c o n d i t i o n a n d / o r
mission p h a s e etc.

7.8.2 S p e c i a l R e q u i r e m e n t s . Fail-safe r e v e r s i o n to m a n u a l c o n t r o l for


r e c o v e r y s h a l l b e p r o v i d e d f o r non full-time s y s t e m s .

7.8.3 T h e pilot s h a l l b e p r e s e n t e d with c o n f i g u r a t i o n data a t i n t e g r i t y


l e v e l s compatible with t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of s a f e f l i g h t .

7.9 RIDE CONTROL ( R C )


7.9.1 Objectives: To p r o v i d e r i d e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s c o m p a t i b l e with
mission r e q u i r e m e n t s .
7.9.2 Special Requirements: RC may n e e d s p e c i a l l y l o c a t e d
motivators. Particular a t t e n t i o n s h a l l b e given to a c h i e v i n g s t r u c t u r a l
life compatibility.

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8 DEFINITIONS

8.1 ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEM (ACS)

A n ACS is a system i n w h i c h commands to the control motivators a r e


continuously computed from s e n s o r inputs both w i t h and without pilot
inceptor inputs. A full-time ACS m u s t operate continuously a n d without
i t , safe flight cannot be maintained.

8.2 ACTUATOR

A device, usually powered b y electrics or hydraulics which amplifies t h e


command from an ACS computer to move t h e motivator(s).

8.3 AUTOMATIC TEST EQUIPMENT (ATE)

A n y test equipment which uses automatic methods of testing which may be


controlled by computer, stored data o r hard wired forms of controller.

8.4 AVAILABILITY

Availability is t h e probability t h a t t h e item will be available for use.

8.5 BUILT-IN TEST ( B I T )

The facility integrated into an aeroplane Equipment or L R U to measure and


check out its serviceability.

8.6 CONTINUOUS BUILT IN-TEST (CBIT)

A n on-aeroplane test f e a t u r e , whereby the correct functioning of t h e


equipment is determined by continuously monitoring t h e modules within t h e
equipment o r by continual t e s t s w h i c h do not interfere w i t h t h e normal
operation of t h e equipment.

8.7 DEFECT

The non-conformance of an item to a n y one o r more of its required


p a r a m e t e r s w i t h i n t h e i r limits as e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h e c o n t r a c t u a l
requirements.

8.8 DEFECT DETECTION PROBABILITY

The ratio of t h e number of defects detected, b y in-built t e s t f e a t u r e s , to


t h e total number of defects occurring, expressed a s a percentage taken
over a statistically significant period of time.

8.9 DEFECT LOCATION PROBABILITY

The ratio of t h e n u m b e r of defects located to LRU/module level, by in-built


test features, to t h e total number of defects occurring, expressed a s a
percentage taken over a statistically significant period of time.

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8 . 1 0 DEFECT, DORMANT

A defect, the effect of which is not apparent immediately it occurs, and


which may remain undetected until a specific function is required, a
subsequent defect occurs or a servicing procedure/functional check is
carried out which identifies the defect.

8.11 DEFECT, PRIMARY

A defect which is attributable to the items and not caused b y user


maintenance o r personnel factors, defect of related components, o r foreign
object da mage.

8 . 1 2 FAILURE, PRIMARY

The termination of the ability of a previously acceptable item to perform its


required functions on the aeroplane, within their l i m i t s a s established i n
the Contractual Specification, and which is attributable to the item and
not caused b y user maintenance or personnel factors, failure of related
components o r foreign object damage.

8 . 1 3 FLIGHT RESIDENT SOFTWARE (FRS) ( I n Flight Software)

FRS forms the software programme to be implemented within the ACS and
which is to fly.

8.14 FULL-TIME

A s i n Full Time System, a system which m u s t continue to operate a t all


times i n order to ensure continuation of safe flight.

8 . 1 5 HAZARDOUS SITUATION

A situation where conditions arise which threaten the safety of the crew
and/or the aeroplane.

8.16 INCEPTORS

The means by which the pilot's demands a r e input to the system, e . g . ,


control column, rudder pedals, etc.

8.17 INTEGRITY

The probability that the system will provide a specified level of safety.

8.18 INTERRUPTIVE BUILT-IN TEST (IBIT)

A n on-aeroplane test sequence, initiated b y a stimulus which will n terfere


with the normal operation of the system.

8 . 1 9 LRU BUILT-IN TEST (LBIT)

The facility integrated into an LRU to measure and check out its
serviceability to module level.

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8.20 LINE REPLACEMENT U N I T ( L R U )

A n y readily accessible aeroplane u n i t normally consisting of sub-assemblies


or modules, designed for ease of replacement and capable of being handled
and changed, preferably b y one man, w i t h i n the time laid down and a s
identified by the equipment specification.

8.21 RIAINTAINABILITY

The economy in time, manpower, equipment and necessary materials w i t h


which potential o r actual failures can be detected, diagnosed, prevented or
corrected, and w i t h which routine handling, replenishment and servicing
operations can be carried out. I t may be measured as the ability of an item
under stated condition of use to be retained i n or restored to a specified
condition , when maintenance is performed by personnel having specified
skill levels under stated conditions and using prescribed procedures and
resources.

8.22 RIODE

A discrete and selectable control law (function). A mode may be


automatically a n d / o r manually selected and deselected w i t h i n an ACS. (cf
A u to- pilot modes ) .
8.23 MOTIVATORS

The devices which produce forces or moments which affect the aeroplane
motion, e. g. , control s u r f a c e s , nozzles, etc.

8.24 NUISANCE DISCONNECT

A n undesirable condition not due to a component defect, which is identified


b y a monitoring system a s if it were a defect. The condition may o r may
not persist.

8.25 RELIABILITY

The probability that the system will achieve a specified level of


per forman ce.

8.26 SENSORS

Detecting devices ; e. g . , gyros, accelerometers, windvanes, displacement


pickoffs etc.

8.27 SYSTEM FAILURE

A n occurrence in which essential system function is lost and i n the


context of full-time ACS may lead to loss of the aeroplane o r termination of
mission.

8.28 TESTABILITY

Testability is an element of both producibility and maintainability.


Therefore testability r e f e r s to the ability of both equipment manufacturer
and the maintainer to establish the correct performance characteristics of
the system/equipment.

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8.29 TRANSDUCERS

A subset of s e n s o r s which are mostly linear a n d r o t a r y displacement


s e n s o r s applied to a c t u a t o r s , inceptors a n d motivators.

TABLE 1

ACTIVE CONTROLS

Categories of function

A Automatic Flight and S t r u c t u r a l B Augmented Flight Control


control

AFCS (Autopilots) integrated FBW/FBL Flight C o n t r o l


Yaw Dampers ;SAS (Conto1 a n d Stability
Pitch Dampers A u gmen ta tio n Sy stem )
T e r r a i n Following !lanoeuvre Demand
Manoeuvre Load Control 'Ja n oe u v re Li m it at io n
Gust Load Alleviation Stall Prevention
S t r u c t u r a l Mode Control (Damping' S p i n / D e p a r t u r e Prevention
F l u t t e r Mode Control (Damping) Post Stall Control
External S t o r e Stabilisation S p i n / D e p a r t u r e Recovery
Ride Control i4ea pon aim i n g / f u sela g e poi n t i n g
'Auto Pilot' modes in i n t e g r a t e d Win g co n fi g u rat i o n co n t r o1
FCS ( cam b e r / sweep o p t imi s i n g )
T e r r a i n Avoidance
VSTOL Control

Plus all functions c a t e g o r y A

fl

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- f

1
Control
Laws
1

A
'
.
* Actuator Moti va t o r
1
m

b.

t
Sensor ~ Airframe
and
I Flight
Dynamic c
A
w

?xt e r n a 1
Inputs
i
B A

Categories:

A: Automatic Flight and S t r u c t u r a l Control functions

B: Flight Control (Augmented)

FIG. 1 ACTIVE CONTROLS

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ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS

REFERENCE PAGE

MIL-F-9490D .. .. Flight c o n t r o l s y s t e m s - d e s i g n , i n s t a l l a t i o n a n d
test of piloted a i r c r a f t , g e n e r a l s p e c i f i c a t i o n f o r
AFFDL-TR-74-116 .. J.L.Townsend a n d E.T.Raymond - B a c k g r o u n d
information a n d user g u i d e f o r MIL-F-9490D, J a n .
1975

RTCA/DO-l78A .. Software considerations in a i r b o r n e systems a n d


e q u i p m e n t certification

I n t e r i m DEF STAN 00-31 T h e development of s a f e t y critical s o f t w a r e


for a i r b o r n e s y s t e m s .

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LEAFLET 208/1

ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS AND APPLICATIONS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Where t h e aeroplane designer, in order to meet the performance


requirements, accepts reductions in the natural stability and control
characteristics to an extent which demands artificial augmentation i n order
to restore acceptable levels of airworthiness, then he must provide such
augmentation with integrity a t least a s high as that achieved with previous
generations of primary control systems.

1 . 2 Such an aeroplane design, which may be inherently unstable, demands


restoration of stability by means which are viable throughout the full
flight envelope. To achieve t h i s , full control authorities may be required,
indeed the absolute limits of control authority may well need to be
re-assessed in the light of the degree of instability.

1.3 To effect both stability augmentation and to provide full flight


control to t h e pilot, it is desirable to provide an efficient and airworthy
integration of these functions in one continuously active control system.

1.4 Having taken t h e decision to adopt active controls for a new


aeroplane, the designer is then free to develop interactively the airframe
and active control system fully to optimise performance.

2 APPLICATIONS

2 . 1 RELATED APPLICATIONS
2.1.1 An ACS can offer the potential for providing facilities to
support a number of other airframe systems.

2.1.2 If t h e ACS comprises dedicated motion sensors, t h e n various


computed data may readily be made available for instrument display
purposes and as reference data for other systems.

2.2 Although it i s not envisaged that inner-loop engine control i s likely to


be incorporated in an ACS it is probable that in combat and V/STOL
aeroplanes quite complex t h r u s t and thrust vector commands will be
computed by t h e ACS. The need for careful treatment of commands a t the
ACS/Engine CS interface is evident. The essential engine protection and
optimum performance controls may be assumed to be provided b y the
engine control designer. However, h e will require to be aware of any
intended extension of engine utilisation arising from its inclusion i n ACS
control loops. A s a consequence some protective shaping of t h r u s t and
vectoring commands may require to be incorporated within the ACS.

2.3 Other systems which may be expected to interface with an ACS


include:

- Fuel system; mass distribution/configuration.


- Weapon system ; special aiming/weapon modes.
- Radar ; terrain following/avoidance modes.
- Stores management ; configuration.
- Guidance.

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LEAFLET 20812
ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS
SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
1 INTEGRITY
1.1 Two of the most dominant problems in the development of an ACS are the selection
of the means to achieve a very low probability of catastrophic failure and to
demonstrate that this has been achieved.
1.2 Designers may be asked to aim for a risk of loss of the aeroplane due to ACS
failure in the order of 10-7 per flight hour. For this reason, systems employing
redundancy are necessary.
1.3 Single lanes using electronic control may exhibit failure rates exceeding 1 in
loo0 flying hours, it follows that a simple cross-compared redundant system of this
1 quality may require four independent lanes of control.
1.4 Fewer lanes may be utilised if adequate methods of self-monitoring can be
satisfactorily demonstrated.
1.5 Use of redundancy introduces the prospect of having to transfer data between
otherwise isolated lanes.
1.6 Where such intercommunication is utilised great care should be taken to avoid all
sources of common-mode failure.
1.7 Use of similar redundancy is attractive to the designer because of the ability to
thereby secure good identity of data. It does, however, present another source of
common-mode failure.
1.8 The natural distribution of random defects or failures amongst similar hardware
components results in a low probability of simultaneous failure, but there
nevertheless remains the possibility of an unidentified common susceptibility to
undefined influences arising from the inherent commonality of design and manufacture.
For this reason great care should be exercised in the selection of components for use
in redundant systems.
2 SENSOR CONFIGURATIONS
2.1 Conventionally, in redundant systems, there are three choices of primary motion
feedback sensor configurations, which may be summarised as follows:
(i) Orthogonal, single axis packs.
Measuring axis close to aeroplane body axis and packaged in packs of redundant
similar sensors.
(ii) Orthogonal, multi-axis set.
Measuring axes close to body axes but with a group of, say three axis sensors in
each set, one set per lane.

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(iii) Skewed axis, redundant sets.

This configuration permits a reduction in the total number of sensors


needed to meet the integrity and reliability requirements.

2.2 The disadvantages of the skewed axis system lie in the extra computing required to
resolve the skewed sensor signals into the required axis and that necessary to handle
the failure management, together with the architectural complications associated with
this computing and its power supplies.

2.3 A trade-off exists between the minimum number of sensors and the magnitude of
failure transients and nuisance warnings.

2.4 There are inevitable compromises which arise from the co-located sensors and the
fact that there may need to be at least two redundant sets located apart.

2.5 Each sensor and each set may sense variable mixes of structural mode responses,
the eradication or resolving of which demands special attention.

2.6 The optimisation of management of a skewed axis sensor configuration can lead to
this being implemented as a discrete sub-system with a different level of redundancy to
that of the ACS proper. In this case the choice of method by which essential sensor
data is transferred to the control computers needs special care, in order to ensure
that the required levels of integrity are met.

3 AIR-DATA SENSORS

3.1 Air-data sensors (Pitot-static probes and airstream direction sensors) present
special difficulties. The spacial separation needed to ensure that two or more sensors
are not damaged by the same event (eg bird strike) causes inevitable differences
between their signals, especially at low speeds or at extreme attitudes. To avoid
unacceptably frequent rejection of their signals when no fault has occurred,
cross-monitoring has to be compromised with the risk that some faults remain
undetected.

3.2 In some systems (eg Q-feel) the air-data signal only affects the characteristics
of the inceptor in some way and does not affect the position of the motivator. In
others the signal is fed into the system and automatically applies motivator movement.
Both cases should be considered, but for the second type some form of "fail safe" in
the design is essential.

4 CONTROL AUTHORITIES

4.1 Two levels of control displacement authority may exist in an ACS:-

(i) Motivator (or actuator) authority, which normally represents the


maximum usable geometric output.

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( i i ) Mode authority, or internal signal authority. This is a flexible


parameter which may be fixed or variable, and which is usually
established with an integrity of similar order to that of the system
itself.

4.2 Finite motivator authorities have a profound effect upon the behaviour of an
aeroplane which relies upon an ACS to provide essential performance. The choice of
displacement and rate authority for a given function has to be made in the light of
both specified performance and malfunction requirements and the nature of
circumstances expected to be met at and beyond control saturation.

4.3 Other levels of displacement authority exist in an ACS in association with


mechanical implementation and are concerned with the provision of a finite tolerance
between electrical transducer operating authority and mechanical, absolute, authority.
These authorities are not usually relevant to overall control performance.

Page 314

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 208/3

ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS

CONTROLLAWS AND SOFTWARE

1 MATHEMATICAL MODEL

1.1 I n order that the overall aeroplane performance objectives may be


addressed, it is necessary to acquire a thorough understanding of all the
aeroplane and system dynamics. From these a mathematical model of the
total aeroplane and system should be built u p .

1 . 2 This model should be as complete as possible. Airframe s t r u c t u r a l


modes and the effects of variable mass configuration such as disposable
and consumable stores, fuel and its dynamics should be considered
together with detailed non-linearities and time dependent phenomena such
a s transport and iteration delays and quantisation effects.

1.3 The efficient design of control laws will depend upon the accuracy of
the model.

2 COMMONALITY OF SOFTWARE

2 . 1 If the designer chooses to utilise one common software interpretation


of control laws for use i n all lanes of a redundant system, then he should
recognise the implications of this in respect of common-mode failure
susceptibility.

2 . 2 This element of commonality is difficult to assess i n terms of reliability


and attention is drawn to various methods of establishing confidence i n
the design of such software. Ref Interim DEF S T A N 00-31.

2.3 Confidence is currently established b y ensuring that all software


paths and functional elements a r e adequately exercised during rig
testing.

2.4 There is however, to date, no practical method for establishing a


quantitative measure of software confidence.

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 208/4

ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS

STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF ACS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This Leaflet provides guidance on acceptable means of compliance with


the structural requirements of Chapter 208 and related requirements such
a s those for static strength (Chapter 2 0 0 ) , fatigue and damage tolerance
(Chapter 201) and aero-elasticity (Chapter 5 0 0 ) .

1.2 The procedures used for static 8.nd fatigue design of aeroplanes
incorporating ACS a r e similar to those for conventional aeroplanes.
However, critical design cases may be more difficult to determine, and the
design process will necessitate integration of the procedures used for
structural, aerodynamic and active control system design.

2 GENERAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

2 . 1 From a structural point of view Active Control Systems (ACS) may be


grouped into two categories;

( i ) Those whose prime purpose is to enhance performance


characteristics such as agility and weapon platform stability
and,

(ii) Those whose prime purpose is to alleviate loading actions so


as to permit reductions i n structural weight, size o r
stiffness.

2.2 ACS i n the first category might include, for example, carefree
manoeuvring ( t o p r e v e n t d e p a r t u r e from controlled f l i g h t ) , r i d e
improvement, weapon platform improvement, relaxed stability, manoeuvre
enhancement, direct lift control.

2 . 3 ACS i n the second category might include, for example, g u s t load


alleviation, manoeuvre 'g' limiting, flutter margin improvement, flutter
suppression.

2.4 For systems in the first category and, for those systems in t h e second
category which as a secondary effect enhance performance (e.g., flutter
suppression), loading actions a r e usually of a different form to those for
conventional aeroplanes.

2.5 For ACS aeroplanes it is likely that design requirements alone a r e


insufficient to define all critical static loading cases. Therefore the
intended aeroplane usage should be probed for potentially critical o r
hazardous loading actions due to pilot i n p u t o r particular gust p a t t e r n s ,
separately or in combination. The effects of augmentation s y s t e m
disconnects, degrades and failures should be evaluated.

2.6 I n particular, attention should be given to the flight and ground loads
which arise when the active control system is:

( i ) Fully serviceable.

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Lea flet 20814 Volume 1

( i i ) T r a n s i e n t between the serviceable and degraded state.

( i i i ) Degraded e i t h e r actively (producing undemanded a n d / o r


excessive control surface movements) or passively
(producing either no control s u r f a c e movement or control
s u r f a c e movements i n t h e correct s e n s e but of inadequate
authority).

2.7 When identifying those loads which a r e likely to occur during flight i n
t h e degraded state t h e designer should consider whether t h e pilot could, if
he was aware of t h e degradation, r e d u c e t h e severity of the loads which
a r e likely to be encountered by taking appropriate measures such as:

( i ) Limitation of maximum speed.

( i i ) Limitation of maximum Ig'.

( i i i ) Reduction of a d v e r s e s t r e s s e s b y jettison of stores o r fuel.

( i v ) Restoration of flutter stability by jettison of stores.

I f , to cope w i t h a particular degradation of the A C S , the designer chooses


to maintain t h e s t r u c t u r a l integrity of t h e aeroplane b y requiring the pilot
to observe a flying limitation, then t h e margin between t h e maximum load
predicted to occur following t h e implementation of the limitation and the
limit load capability of the degraded aeroplane should comply with the
guidance given in Leaflet 900/1.

2.8 A n aeroplane s t r u c t u r e possesses a safety margin i n terms of load


bearing capability because a structure is required to withstand Design
Ultimate Load (DUL), which is Design Limit Load (DLL) multiplied b y a
factor of safety of 1.5, without collapse. I n the case of an ACS aeroplane
control s y s t e m saturation a n d other non-linearities may mean t h a t operating
margins, s u c h a s t h e increment in input function required to generate an
increase in load from say DLL to DUL, may be smaller than for a similar
conventional aeroplane of w h i c h there is knowledge. T h u s for an ACS
aeroplane t h e designer should examine t h e variation of s t r u c t u r a l loading
w i t h input function i n respect of multi-axis input and g u s t s , separately
a n d i n combination, and should establish t h a t t h e loading gradients a r e not
s o s e v e r e t h a t a small increment i n i n p u t function could produce such a
l a r g e increment i n load that t h e r e would be a high probability, if Service
Release conditions were slightly exceeded, of DUL being approached and
exceeded.

2.9 ACS aeroplanes which feature either carefree manoeuvring or


manoeuvre Ig1 limiting m a y fly to t h e extremes of their flight envelope
more frequently t h a n conventional aeroplanes. Providing the ACS is
sufficiently reliable and DLL is adequately defined, it is unlikely t h a t an
ACS aeroplane will exceed DLL more frequently than an equivalent
conventional aeroplane i n which the pilot m u s t observe flight limitations to
p r e v e n t exceedances of DLL. Nevertheless, the use of Ig' limiting system
does not g u a r a n t e e t h a t critical loads will not be exceeded a s it may only
limit one of t h e components of load i n a particular s t r u c t u r a l item.
Consequently, to enable the Service Release levels i n respect of static
loads to be a s s e s s e d , t h e proposed aeroplane usage should be probed to
identify possible exceedance of DLL and the ease w i t h which DLL can be
approached.

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2 . 1 0 Aeroplanes incorporating ACS are likely to exhibit increased control


activity, i n particular more high frequency small amplitude motions, and
t h e designer should pay special attention to the fatigue design of the
actuators, the motivators, the mechanical interface between the motivators
and the actuators, and the associated support structure.

2.11 The ACS should be designed to avoid inertia instability of the


control system occurring when the aeroplane is undergoing system testing
on the ground.

2 . 1 2 There can be no guarantee that the loads analysis can identify all
critical combination of possible loading actions. Consequently, Chapter
2 0 8 , para 4.2 contains requirements for the in-service confirmation of t h e
load levels deduced from the analysis.

2 . 1 3 Where an ACS is used to contain structural loads within limits, the


system capabilities and performance derived from calculation must be
substantiated b y direct strain measurement during development flying.

2.14 Special structural implications arise from the application of Active


Controls to combat aeroplanes and transport aeroplanes and these a r e
examined separately in the following para.

3 COMBAT AEROPLANES

3.1 Aeroplanes which feature either a carefree manoeuvring or a


manoeuvre lgl limiting facility will probably experience more frequent
medium to high lgl manoeuvre than conventional aeroplanes. Therefore,
special attention should be given to the definition of fatigue load spectra.

3 . 2 The calculated flutter speed of an aeroplane with a f u l l y serviceable


ACS should be a t least 1 . 1 5 V ~a t any point i n its flight envelope for any
authorised mass/stores configuration. Also, a n aeroplane with ACS
inoperative should be flutter free to V D a t any point in its flight
envelope for any store/mass configuration. However, it may be acceptable
to design an aeroplane employing an active flutter control system to be
flutter free with that system inoperative to a speed less than VD w h e n
carrying external stores if:

( i ) Following a failure of the flutter suppression system an


adequate flutter margin can be restored safely b y jettison of
external stores o r b y a reduction i n airspeed, and

( i i ) The pilot can be given the necessary warning to enable him


t o perform the actions detailed i n para 3 . 2 ( i ) .

Note: A requirement to be flutter free to V D gives a small margin


on flutter speed compared w i t h requirement to be flutter free
to the Service Limit Speed V m x. This margin allows
for variations in those physic3 parameters which affect
flutter and which may change during the service life of t h e
aeroplane.

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4 T R A N S P O R T AEROPLANES

4.1 It is permissible, providing the requirements specified i n Chapter


2 0 8 , para 4 . 2 . 1 a r e met, to take full advantage of the amount of load
alleviation provided b y a Gust Alleviation System when designing the
s t r u c t u r e to the loads corresponding to the gust cases specified i n
Chapter 2 0 4 .

4.2 The use of load alleviation systems to achieve lighter and smaller
s t r u c t u r e s may result in reduced structural stiffness and reduced flutter
stability. Consequently, ACS aeroplanes may feature unconventional sizing
of s t r u c t u r a l items, for example wing skin thicknesses may be greater a t
the tip than at the root to achieve maximum torsional stiffness o r vary
across the chord to achieve an optimum position of the flexural axis.

4 . 3 Notwithstanding the use of flutter suppression systems, the flutter


speed w i t h the flutter suppression system inoperative should never be less
than V D .

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 208/5

ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS

OPERATIONAL AND PILOTING ASPECTS

1 INTRODUCTION

1 . 1 Experience has shown that agile military aeroplanes equipped w i t h ACS


may be subject to increased manoeuvre frequency and magnitude i n
service, compared with conventionally controlled combat aeroplanes. It is
recognised that if high levels of manoeuvring a r e frequent then reduced
airframe life will ensue, if not allowed for i n the design.

1.2 Two possible options which may be considered are:

(i) Design for maximum performance and allow for airframe life
consumption b y investing i n a more resistant airframe ( a t
possible weight cost).

(ii) Design for two levels of performance; maximum performance


which could be termed 'Wartime' Performance and a lower
level, perhaps termed 'Peace-time' Performance, either of
which could be selected for use b y the pilot. Carefully
regulated service use of these alternatives could ensure a
reasonable rate of consumption of airframe life.

The latter option has system design and training implications in that a
lower level performance has to be defined and appropriate mode selection
provided, with possibly instinctive override available to the higher level of
performance.

1 . 3 NUISANCE WARNINGS
1.3.1 Redundant Systems with voting incur a finite probability of
nuisance failure warnings, although with careful design these may be
minimised. When apparently 'nuisance' failures occur t h e conditions
leading to the event can, if known, enable confirmation a n d / o r
rectification to be carried out to avoid repetition and investigatory
loss of aeroplane availability. I t is therefore desirable for context
data to b e recorded for each 'failure' incident.

1.3.2 Experience has shown that incidents of this nature prove


difficult to resolve if no specific information, other than aircrew
reports, is available.

1.3.3 U s e f u l context data would include:

- Failed item
- Relative errors (redundant items)
- Control system status
- Dynamic data ( 3 axes)
- Flight case (speed, height, mach no.)

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 208/6

ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS

AIRFRAME AND SYSTEM PROVING

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 I n order to develop the ACS to flight standard, a rig is required i n


which the complete system hardware can be fully functioned. A
comprehensive real-time flying simulation which permits all operational
performance to be assessed should form part of the rig.

1.2 The rig simulation should also be utilised to enable test pilot
assessments to be carried o u t with particular reference to system
management including the effects of failures. The tests should also allow
impromptu pilot investigations which explore off-design cases and any
other points of curiosity.

1.3 This facility should provide the basis for system performance proving
prior to first flight. A detailed schedule of failure cases should be
assessed.

1 . 4 This testing should precede installed system testing in the aeroplane


and enable installed testing to be restricted to essential items.

1.5 Endurance testing on this rig may be restricted to whole system


operating with a pilot i n the loop o r may be i n part automated. Sequences
of start-up, pre take-off checks, taxy, take-off, climb, through
representative flight conditions and manoeuvres covering all operational
roles etc., to return to circuit, landing, post-flight checks and shut-down
should b e included.

1 . 6 These tests a r e all to be completed to an agreed equivalent number of


flying hours before first flight.

1.7 The required number of hours before first flight a r e to be conducted


with f u l l flight standard ACS equipment and a r e expected to exhibit
defect free operation.

1.8 Subsequent to first flight, rig tests should continue to back-up flight
development.

1.9 A separate life test programme is necessary for individual ACS items
and these life tests are conducted b y the suppliers prior to delivery for
installation i n the aeroplane.

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Volume 1

LEAFLET 208 /7

ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS

PART TIME SYSTEMS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The provisions of Chapter 208 are specifically for those control
systems where correct operation of the system i s essential for continued
safe flight, so called 'full-time' systems. (Refer Chapter 208, para
1.1.2). A 'full-time' system may be understood to include those systems
where there is automatic reversion to an alternative active mode in
appropriate circumstances. When an active control system i s employed in
such a way that continued safe flight is possible a f t e r a n incorrect
operation of the system by reversion to some form of direct control b y the
pilot it may be referred to as a 'part-time' active control system. The
extent to which the provisions of Chapter 208 then apply will be related to
the required flight envelope and has to be defined in conjunction w i t h the
Aeroplane Project Director. This Leaflet i s intended a s a guide in making
this definition.

1.2 Examples of ACS which may be defined as part-time a r e :-

(i) Where there is provision for reversion to direct control


input, the reversion mode not being part of the full-time
active control system, and resulting in degraded
performance.

(ii) An auto-stabilisation system used to improve handling, b u t


where continued safe flight is possible after ACS failure
with a degradation in flying qualities (see Chapter 6 0 0 ,
para 3 , 4 and 5 ) .

(iii) A dual control aeroplane where the operation of the ACS is


limited to the inceptors of a single pilot station: the second
'safety pilot' being provided with a means of controlling the
aeroplane which is not affected by failures of the A C S .

(iv) An aeroplane which employs an ACS mode to enhance the


overall performance, b u t where failure of that mode is not
flight critical: e.g., some applications of wing camber
control (para 7.5) and gust load alleviation (para 7.4)
where failure may result only in reduced fatigue life.

2 SAFE DESIGN PHILOSOPHY OF PART-TIME A C S

2.1 In the case of a part-time ACS system the application of the


requirements of Chapter 208 may be limited to those components of the
system which affect overall safety of the aeroplane.

2.2 In the event of an incorrect operation of the ACS being detected


there should be an automatic reversion to the back-up mode, and there
should b e a n indication t o t h e p i l o t ( s ) of t h e r e v e r s i o n . The
requirements of Chapter 208 therefore apply to those components which
sense the failure condition and initiate reversion to the back-up mode.

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2.3 Whilst t h e ACS system i s i n operation, including any incorrect


operations and reversion t o the back-up mode, it should not introduce
a n y situation which i s likely to put safety of the aeroplane i n jeopardy.

3 APPLICABILITY OF ACS REQUIREMENTS

3.1 In general, some aspects of all t h e main paragraphs of Chapter 208


may b e applicable to part-time ACS.

3.2 Specific paragraphs of Chapter 208 which may need to b e considered


are:

(i) 1 . 4 . 1 - Reversion.

(ii) 2.2 to 2.10 - All aspects of systems requirements which


e n s u r e safe flight.

( K I 2 . 1 1 - Nuisance reversion to the back-up mode, and


especially failure transients ( p a r a 2 . 1 1 . 4 ) .

( i v ) 2 . 1 2 - Interaction with other systems.

( V I 3 . - Control laws and software generally insofar they affect


safe flight whilst t h e ACS i s in operation, and during
reversion t o t h e back-up mode.

(vi) 4. - Airframe s t r e n g t h Whilst t h e ACS i s in operation,


including limitations automatically introduced by t h e ACS
including reversion to the back-up mode, see Chapter 208,
para 7.7.

(vii) 5. - Operational and piloting aspects generally i n a s much


a s t h e continued safe operation in the system i s involved.

(viii) 6 . - Aeroplane and system proving, again related to those


components which e n s u r e continued safe flight.

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CHAPTER 209

AIRFRAME DESIGN TO RESIST BIRDSTRIKE DAMAGE

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This chapter specifies the minimum requirements for t h e resistance of


airframes of aeroplanes (other than derivitives of civil t y p e s ) to damage
caused by birdstrike, and relate to the European theatre of operation.
Requirements for engines and weapons a r e not included.

2 BASIC OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

2 . 1 FLYING QUALITIES
2.1.1 The effect of a single birdstrike under the conditions defined in
para 3 shall not degrade the flying qualities of the aeroplane below
Level 2 in all flight categories (see Chapter 600 paras 4 and 5 ) .

2.2 MAINTENANCE
2.2.1 Consideration shall be given during the design stage to the
provision of adequate access to internal s t r u c t u r e and other features
t o minimise the cost of repairing birdstrikes in the area defined in
para 3 . 4 .

2.2.2 Acceptable repairability shall be demonstrated during the


development of the aeroplane type. Repair by replacement of
assemblies or sub-assemblies may be acceptable, subject to the
agreement of the Aeroplane Project Director.

3 THETHREAT

3 . 1 The maximum threat, for the purposes of these requirements, is a


single strike by a bird of 1.0 kg mass on the structural areas defined in
para 3.4; birdstrike resistance is defined in this Chapter in terms of the
relative speed of bird and aeroplane at impact.

3.2 v M is the normal sustained speed required by the basic missions in


t h e Aeroplane Specification for segments operated a t u p t o 762 m (2,500 f t )
above sea level (ASL) but shall not exceed 480 knots ( t r u e air speed
(TAS) 1

3.3 I t should be assumed that the forces acting on t h e s t r u c t u r e a r e a


function of mass, (velocity) *,
bird density and impact footprint.

3.4 The frontal aspects of the following areas shall be considered a t risk
from birdstrikes:

(i> Windscreen, canopy and other forward facing transparencies


including fuselage mounted transparencies associated w i t h
navigation or weapon system sensors and serving a structural
function

(ii) Front fuselage s t r u c t u r e , including radomes, and forward


facing structure forming the boundaries of the crew enclosure
unless shielded by other components covered by t h e
requirements of this chapter.

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(iii) Engine air intakes (lips and sidewalls).

(iv) Leading edges of flying surfaces (including canards).

(v) Aerodynamic devices mounted on the flying surface leading


edges.

3 . 5 In the detailed requirements that follow, it shall be assumed that the


birdstrike is on the frontal aspect. The frontal aspect is to be taken as
indicating the portions of structure exposed to birdstrike when :

(i) the aeroplane is in straight and level flight, and also:

(ii) the aeroplane is at the maximum angle of yaw and pitch


relevant to the flight conditions defined in para 3 . 2 .

4 DETAILED REQUIREMENTS

4 . 1 TRANSPARENCIES AND THEIR SUPPORTING STRUCTURE


4.1.1 This section applies to windscreens, canopies, quarter-lights
and all other transparencies with a significant frontal aspect when the
aeroplane is in a normal flying attitude.

4 . 1 . 2 Transparencies shall exhibit :

(i) Optical qualities after impact which permit continued


flight without degrading the flying qualities of the
aeroplane below Level 2.

(ii) No cracking, delamination or other defects which would


degrade strength below limit load after impact at speeds
Up to 1.0 VM.

(iii) Adequate stiffness or clearance so that impact at speeds


u p to 1 . 0 V ~does not cause the deflecting
transparency to come into contact with either the
occupants or cockpit equipment.

(iv) Additionally, windscreens shall exhibit no penetration


or shattering on impact at speeds u p to l . l V ~ ,apart
from a fracture of a non load carrying laminate (e.g., a
thin facing glass) providing that the resulting standard
of vision is satisfactory.

4 . 1 . 3 Frames, arches and other structure supporting transparencies


shall be so designed that:

(i) Impact, either directly on the structural part or on the


transparency, at speeds up to 1.OVM shall not
generate debris which could be swept into air intakes.

(ii) There is no permanent deformation of the supporting


structure at speeds up to 1 . 0 V ~unless the resulting
damage does not affect airworthiness and complies with
the requirement specified in para 2 . 2 .

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(Ci> Transitory deformations on impact at speeds u p t o


1.OVkl do not cause t h e deflecting supporting
structure to come into contact with either the occupants
o r cockpit equipment.

(iv) Liquidized remains of impacted birds shall not penetrate


into the cockpit.

4 . 2 FRONT FUSELAGE
4.2.1 The front fuselage s t r u c t u r e is to be taken a s including, where
appropriate, the boundaries of the cockpit and front mounted radomes.
Following birdstrike, t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e front fuselage shall exhibit:

(i) No damage, on impact at speeds u p to 0 . 7 V ~ , beyond


limits that would be acceptable for indefinite future
service without repair.

(ii) No penetration a t speeds up to 1.0 VM.

4 . 3 E N G I N E AIR I N T A K E S
4 . 3 . 1 Engine air intakes shall provide resistance to birdstrike as
follow s :

(i) No damage to the duct walls o r intake lip at speeds up


t o 0.7 V,M which is beyond that acceptable for
indefinite continued operation.

(ii) No damage sufficient to prevent operation of ramps,


doors or similar air-flow modifying devices at speeds u p
to 1.0 VM.

(iii) No deformation of the intake s t r u c t u r e likely to cause


significant deterioration in engine performance at
speeds to to 1.0 V,ZI.

(iv) N o penetration of intake w a l l s , or separation into the


intake airflow of portions of intake s t r u c t u r e that
exceed engine ingestion l i m i t s up t o 1.0 Vh1.

4 . 4 FRONTAL ASPECTS OF FLYING SURFACES


4 . 4 . 1 Structure forming the frontal aspects of flying surfaces shall,
on impact at speeds up t o 1.0 V ~ I , not suffer damage likely to
degrade flying qualities below Level 2.

4 . 5 AERODYNAMIC DEVICES ON LEADING EDGES OF FLYING SURFACES


4.5.1 The effects of birdstrike upon the performance of any forward
facing aerodynamic device and its operating systems shall be
considered during the design stage for both fixed or movable devices.
Impact w i t h movable devices may occur when they a r e closed, extended
o r in travel. The required resistance to birdstrike varies with the
effect of malfunction or deformation upon flying qualities in any of the
three flight phase categories specified in Chapter 600 para 4 . 2 .
Thus :

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(i> If t h e effect of malfunction is to reduce the flying


quality t o Level 2, then the devices and any operating
system shall withstand impact u p to the following
speeds :

( a ) Closed - 0.9 'M.

(b) Open - limiting speed for operation, or - V ~ I


whichever is t h e lesser.

(ii) If the effect of malfunction is to reduce the flying


quality t o Level 3, then the devices and any operating
system shall withstand impact up to the following
speeds:

(a) Closed - 1.0 vM.

( b ) Open - limiting speed for operation, o r - V M


whichever is the lesser.

4.6 SYSTEMS
4 . 6 . 1 On impact at speeds u p to 1 . 0 V ~there shall be.

(i) No interference with flight instruments or flying


control operating systems, or other sensors, likely to
hazard the safety of the aeroplane from either primary
or secondary impact or structural deformation.

(ii) N o damage to fuel systems.

(iii) N o damage likely to cause fire.

(iv) No damage likely to affect the safe operation of the


landing gear.

(VI No damage to the crew or passenger escape system.

5 TESTING

5.1 Mode and extent of testing required to demonstrate compliance w i t h


t h e requirements shall be established by agreement between the Aeroplane
Project Director and t h e Contractor.

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Volume 1

CHAPTER 210
RADOMES

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 The general requirements for radomes are given in Chapter 708 'Radio and Radar
Installations'. These include, in para 5.1, specific requirements relating to
aerodynamic and structural considerations, including, resistance to erosion, impact
damage and lightning strike.
1.2 It is accepted that good radome design will involve a trade-off between electrical
and structural properties and the purpose here is to draw attention to the procedures
that shall be followed in supporting any deviation from the structural standards that
normally apply.
2 REQUIREMENTS
2.1 The structural requirements include those for static strength and stiffness,
fatigue performance, impact from hail and resistance to bird impact and lightning
strike.
2.2 In each design case where it is found to be impractical to achieve these standards,
the reasons for compromise and the basis of the trade-off between structural and
electrical properties shall be referred by the Design Authority, to the Aeroplane
Project Director for a concession before proceeding with the design. This supporting
evidence shall include a failure analysis, containing descriptions of failure modes and
consequential effects, including those on flight aerodynamics and engine(s).
2.3 For those design cases which result in a likelihood of structural failure of the
radome, it shall be shown that the integrity of the aeroplane is not impaired to an
extent unacceptable to the Aeroplane Project Director.

2.4 It is recognised that a best compromise between structural and electrical


properties may sometimes be achieved by designing for replacement rather than repair. In
such instances the economic and maintenance implications shall be drawn to the attention
of the Aeroplane Project Director; normally for 'disposable-type' radomes the
mean-time-between failures must not be less than 500 flying hours.

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LEAFLET 210/0
RADOMES
REFERENCE PAGE

MIL-A-87221 ( U S A F ) , Aircraft Structures General Specification for


Section 3.2.22.3
MIL-R-7705 General Specification for Radomes

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PART 2 APPENDIX No 1

STRUCTURAL STRENGTH AND DESIGN FOR FLIGHT

MILITARY DERIVATIVES OF CIVIL AEROPLANES

INTRODUCTION

1.1 This Appendix covers structural strength and design for flight requirements for
military derivatives of civil aeroplanes.

1.2 Each Appendix para consists of a table and amplifying notes comparing military and
civil requirements for individual chapters from Part 2 of DEF STAN 00-970 Volume 1.
Only those parts of the DEF STAN in which military and civil requirements differ are
included in the Appendix and where no reference is made to DEF STAN chaptedpara
numbers it is considered covered by the military requirements (unless explained
otherwise with amplifying notes).

1.3 The issue or change number of the civil airworthiness requirements referred to i n
this Appendix are recorded in paragraph 8.5 of the main introduction to DEF STAN
00-970 Volume 1.

COMPLIANCE CHECKS/ASSESSMENTS

2.1 Throughout this Appendix reference is made of the need for ’Compliance Checks or
Assessments’ of the existing aeroplane against the military requirements of DEF STAN
00-970. A full explanation of the aims of these ’compliance checks or assessments’ is
given in para 8 of the main introduction to DEF STAN 00-970 Volume 1.

STATIC STRENGTH AND DEFORMATION

3.1 MILITARY AND CIVIL REQUIREMENTS

DEF STAN 00-970 BCAR’S FAR’S JAR


CHAPTER 200
Section Section
Para Item D K 23 23 25 25

3.1 Factors 3-1,4.3 3-1’3.1 303 303 303 303


3-2,2.1 3-2’3.2

3.2 Deformation 3-1’4.4 3-1’3.2 305 305 305 305


(a) (a) (a> (a>
5.3 TestFactors - - - - - -
I I

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3.2 REQUIREMENTS .
3.2.1 DEF STAN 00-970 Chapter 200 para 3.1 states that generally the Ultimate
Factor shall be 1.5 and the Proof Factor shall be at least 1.125. The
corresponding civil requirements in BCAR’s FARs and JARS, specify an Ultimate
Factor of 1.5 and quote a Proof Factor of 1.0 except that BCAR 23, FAR’Sand JAR
25 do not quote a Proof Factor. (The loading cases relevant to the factors are
defined within the requirements, and comments on these are included at the
appropriate references.)
3.2.2 DEF STAN 00-970 Chapter 200 para 3.2 states that until the design proof
load is reached, no grade A items shall sustain deformation detrimental to safety.
The civil requirements however state that up to proof (limit load x 1.0 factor)
load where quoted or limit load, that deformation may not interfere with safe
operation. In assessing the design of the civil aeroplane for compliance with DEF
STAN 00-970 the Proof Load conditions will need to be assessed in relation to the
1.125 Proof.
3.3 COMPLIANCE
3.3.1 Whilst both the civil and military requirements specify an Ultimate Factor
of 1.5, it is important to consider whether the proposed military usage will
increase the frequency of occurrence of higher loads so that the chance of
reaching or exceeding limit load is increased. In effect, such usage reduces the
margin of strength implicit in the factor of 1.5 and for this reason there is less
room for uncertainty in the compliance procedure. Due emphasis must also be
placed on establishing the real proof strength or ’structural airworthiness
limit’. Therefore, if the military derivative is to be operated very differently
to its civil counterpart. or at a higher AUW, or is a new design incorporating
novel features, then a detailed compliance check of the proof strength of the
structure may be required in accordance with Chapter 200.
3.3.2 The need for a compliance check of the static strength of a military
derivative of a civil aeroplane should be discussed with the Aeroplane Project
Director. (In conjunction with Airworthiness Division RAE).
4 FATIGUE DAMAGE TOLERANCE
4.1 MILITARY AND CIVIL REQUIREMENTS

DEF STAN 00-970 BCAR’S FAR’S JAR


CHAPTER 201
Section Section
Para Item D K 23 23 25 25
2.1 Safe Life 3-1,5.2 3-1,3.4 572
+APP +App.2
3. Inspection 3- 1,5.2 3- 1’3.4 572
Dependent (b) (b)
Details
4. Servicing
Monitoring

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4.2 DEF STAN 00-970 Chapter 201 does not refer directly to the pressure cabin but the
interaction of this with the airframe structure and vice versa, must be taken into
account in the fatigue damage tolerance analysis and testing. Pressure cabin
requirements are specified in Chapter 7 16 and Appendix No. 7

4.3 REQUIREMENTS
4.3.1 In general, the military and civil requirements for fatigue strength are
compatible. However, it is important to recognise that DEF STAN 00-970 is
primarily concerned with compact structures whereas BCAR’s, FAR’S and JAR’S
address the large open type of structure, which is usually much easier to inspect.
Military requirements specify that the residual strength of an
inspection-dependent structure shall not fall below 80% of UL. Civil requirements,
however, specify that a fail safe structure should be expected to withstand only
limit load once it has failed.

4.4 COMPLIANCE
4.4.1 DEI= STAN 00-970 specifies that compliance with the fatigue strength
requirements shall be demonstrated by test; BCAR’s FAR’S and JAR’S, however,
place the onus on analysis supported by tests where necessary. In compact
structures it is important to check safe life compliance by tests using realistic
loading. In open structures compliance is adequately defined in the civil
fail safe requirements.

4.4.2 Because of the vital importance of establishing the correct fatigue life of
a military derivative it will be necessary:

(i) For newly built aeroplanes, to effect a comparison between the


aeroplane as designed to civil requirements and the military
fatigue requirements and usage and to establish safe lives,
inspection periods and recording techniques appropriate to
the military role(s).

(ii) For aeroplanes which have been used in civil operations, to


carry out a procedure, similar to that in (i), to establish
the equivalent military fatigue life consumed and remaining,
with recording techniques for monitoring the latter.

4.5 DEF STAN 00-970 Chapter 201 Leaflet 201/8 details an analytical procedure to be
followed for fatigue and damage tolerance clearance of aeroplanes which have not been
designed to DEF STAN 00-970. The need for and the extent of the application procedure
will be as detailed in the Aeroplane Specification, or as directed by the Aeroplane
Project Director.

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5 SYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

5.1 MILITARY AND CIVIL REQUIREMENTS

DEF STAN 00-970 BCAR'S FAR 'S JAR


CHAPTER 202
Section Section
Para Item D K 23 23 25 25

2.1 Factors 3-2,2.1 3-2,2.1 303 303 303 303


(see also 3-2,2.1 3-2,3.2
para 3.2
above)

3.0 TheFlight 3-2,2.2 3-2,2.2 333 333 333 333


Envelope

Fig Values 3-2,2.7 3-2,2.7 335 335 335 335


1 specified
for
particular
aeroplanes 7-2 and 7-2,2 337 337 337 337
APP 1505 1503
1507 1505
1507

5.2 Comments on proof and ultimate factor requirements are covered in para 3.2 above.

5.3 The flight envelopes, in the form of Vn diagrams from civil and military
requirements are generally similar. Particular values of n and V will have been
employed in the design of the military derivative of the civil aeroplane. A compliance
check between the required values of "2, n3 and n4 etc, relative to maximum
positive normal acceleration n1 will be required.

5.4 It should be noted that, even when the values of normal accelerations and speeds
coincide, the effects of the different proof and ultimate factors (para 3.2 above)
between civil and military aeroplanes will have to be considered in parallel with the
checks of para 5.3 above.

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6 ASYMMETRIC MANOEUVRES

6.1 MILITARY AND CIVIL REQUIREMENTS

DEF STAN 00-970 BCAR’S FAR’S JAR


CHAPTER 203
Section Section
Para Item D K 23 23 25 25

2.1 Factors 3-2’2.1 3-2’2.1 303 303 303 303


(see also
para 3.2
above)

4. Yawing 3-2,4.2 3-2 35 1 351 351 35 1


manoeuvres and 4-2.2 397 397 397 397
APP 4-8
5. Effects of 3-2’5.2 3-2,5.2 367 367 367 367
Asymmetric and
Engine APP 4
Failure

7. Combined 3-2’4.1 3-2’4.1 349 349 349 349


Rolling 3-2’4.2 3-2’4.3 427 427 427 427
and
Pitching

8. Bomb Bay
and Door
Loads - -

6.2 Comments on proof and ultimate factor requirements are covered in para 3.2 above.

6.3 DEF STAN 00-970 Chapter 203 para 8 states that the flight cases are applicable to
bomb bay and doors and their supporting structure and operating mechanisms etc. Civil
requirements contain no reference to bomb bay and doors. However, cover doors, similar
in principle and function to bomb bay doors may be required for military derivatives and
the relevant requirements from DEF STAN 00-970 should apply to such items.

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7 GUST LOADS

7.1 MILITARY AND CIVIL REQUIREMENTS

DEF STAN 00-970 B CAR ’S FAR’S JAR


CHAPTER 204
Section Section
Para I tem D K 23 23 25 25

2.1 Factors 3-2,2.1 3-3,2.1 303 303 303 303


(see also
para 3.2)

3 Design 3-3,3.2 3-3,3 33 1 331 331 33 1


Conditions to to to to
34 1 341 343 343

5 Design 3-3,3.1 - 341


Analysis
(see para
7.3)

7.2 Comments on proof and ultimate factor requirements are covered in para 3.2 above.
The effects of the different proof and ultimate factors should be assessed in
conjunction with para 7.3.

7.3 The design conditions as typically outlined in DEF STAN 00-970, Chapter 204
and in the civil requirements are basically similar, however, where the dynamic
response analysis in Chapter 204 and BCAR Section D.3 is mandatory no such
requirement is specified in BCAR 23 or FAR’S. A compliance check into the detailed
compatibility of a military derivative with the DEF STAN 00-970 will be required.

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Volume 1 Part 2 Appendix No 1

8 HIGH LIFI’ DEVICES AND AIRBRAKES

8.1 MILITARY AND CIVIL, REQUIREMENTS

DEF STAN 00-970 BCAR’S FAR’S JAR


CHAPTER 205
Section Section
Para Item D IS 23 23 25 25

2.1 Factors 3-2,2.1 3-3,2.1 303 303 303 303


(see also 3-6,l 4-8,l
3.2 above)

3.5 Design and 3-2 3-2 345 345 345 345


Limiting 7-2 7-2 335 335 343 335
Speed

3.6 Strength 3-3,3.1 - 457 457 457 457


(High Lift 1-3 1-3
Devices)

4.0 Airbrakes 3-2 - 459 459 459 459


3-3 373

8.2 Comments on proof and ultimate factor are covered in para 3.2 above.

8.3 The Aeroplane Specification may require the High Lift Devices and airbrakes to be
used en-route (including air to air refuelling) and in combat. A detailed assessment
of the limitations imposed on these items and their operating mechanisms will be
required to determine compliance with DEF STAN 00-970 and the Aeroplane
Specification.

8.4 The retracting times for landing flaps are quoted in DEF STAN 00-970 Chapter 205
para 3.4. For a military derivative such retracting times will have been established
and normally would be quoted in the Civil OperatingMaintenance manuals for the type.
A comparison with the military requirements from DEF STAN 00-970 to determine the
acceptability of the retraction times in the proposed role of the derivative will be
necessary .

8.5 The comments in para 3 will apply to the strength requirements for the High Lift
Devices. For mechanical interconnection of the systems in port and starboard wings the
military requirements call for proof factor 1.0 and ultimate factor 1.33 for the
mechanical interconnection system with a single operating unit jammed. A military
derivative will have to be checked for compliance against this requirement which will
apply to the High Lift Devices and Airbrakes.

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8.6 The stressing cases for airbrakes are given in DEF STAN 00-970Chapter 205 para 4
and the comments in para 8.5 above are relevant.

9 CONTROL SYSTEMS

9.1 MILITARY AND CIVIL REQUIREMENTS

DEF STAN 00-970 BCAR’S FAR’S JAR


CHAPTER 206
Section Section
Para Item D K 23 23 25 25

2. Strength 3-6,l 4-8,l 391 391 391 391


(see also to to to to
3.2above 409 409 409 409
re-factors)

3. Control 3-6 4-8,2 671 671 671 671


Circuits 4-8 343 335
overall
design

3.7 Combat - -
Vulnerability

4. Control 3-6 4-8,2 673 675 673


Circuits - to to to
Details 701 703 703

5. Trimcontrol 3-6,3.3 4-8 677 677 677


Systems 2.2.3
6. Power 3-6,2 4-8 671 671 671 671
Control 672 672 672 672
Systems and
Tests

7. G Resmctors - - - - - -

8. Maintenance 4-1,6 611 611 611

9.2 Comments on proof and ultimate factor are covered in para 3.2 above, noting
however that in this Chapter different ultimate factors are required in particular
design cases.

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9.3 For a military derivative the DEF STAN 00-970 Chapter 206 requirements should be
met by the existing design, subject to compliance checks.
9.4 The civil requirements of BCAR’s and FAR 23 relate to pilots effort linearly with
aeroplane weight resulting in requirements of para 2 Chapter 206 being higher or lower
than the civil requirements over the weight range. A detailed assessment of the
differences in the requirements will be required to determine the effect on military
capability.
10 SPINNING AND SPIN RECOVERY
10.1 MILITARY AND CIVIL REQUIREMENTS

DEF STAN 00-970 BCAR’S FAR’S JAR


CHAPTER 207
Section Section
Para Item D K 23 23 25 25
I

2. Factors 3- 1,4.3 3- 1,3.1 303


(see also
3.2 above)
2.2 Design - 2-12,3 221
Conditions and
APP.
3. Recovery

10.2 Comments on proof and ultimate factor are covered in 3.2 above.

10.3 DEF STAN 00-970 Chapter 207 is primarily concerned with Class 1 - Light
Aeroplanes and Class IV - Highly Manoeuvrable Aeroplanes and the Aeroplane
Specification should defiie the military derivative classification.
10.4 Civil requirements, BCAR Section D, FAR 25 and JAR 25 define that the aeroplane
shall not display any undue spinning tendency and a safe recovery can be made with
normal pilot skill from any stall. DEF STAN 00-970 Chapter 603 and its Appendix No 1
deals with stalling and post stall behaviour for all classes of aeroplane.
11 ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS
11.1 MILITARY AND CIVIL REQUIREMENTS

DEF STAN 00-970 BCAR’S


CHAPTER 208
Section Section
Para Item D K 23

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11.2 Active Control Systems (ACS) are provided not only for flight control but also to
enhance structural life by manoeuvre and gust alleviation. It should be noted
therefore that ali other chapters of DEF STAN 00-970 Part 2 are structurally
inter-dependent with Chapter 208 diagrammatically shown in Figure 1. All strength
factors, where appropriate, specified throughout Part 2 are applicable to the
requirements of Chapter 208.

11.3 Civil requirements do not have a sectiodparagraph entitled "Active Control


Systems". FAR 25 and JAR 25 Section 1 para 672 reads "Stability augmentation
and automatic and power operated systems" and BCAR Section D sub-section D1-3 with
Appendix - "The Safety Assessment of Systems" which if complied with should ensure
compliance with DEF STAN 00-970 Chapter 208. It will be necessary to consider
combat and military necessity operations when assessing the compliance of an
existing system in the miiitary derivative.

11.4 For military derivatives of aeroplanes certificated to JAR 25 account must be


taken of the relevant requirements in JAR AWO which is deemed to be part of JAR25.

11.5 DEF STAN 00-970 Chapter 208 makes reference to MIL-F-9490D and this
specification may be used by USA aeroplane manufacturers in complying with civil
requirements.

12 AIRFRAME DESIGN TO RESIST BJRDSTRIKE DAMAGE

12.1 MILITARY AND CIVIL REQUIREMENTS

DE9 STAN 00-970 BCAR'S FAR'S


CHAPTER 209
Section Section
Para Item I D K 23 23 25

Complete 4-1,1.2 4-2 775 775 631


Chapter 4-2, 3.2.2 (g)
3.2.2

13 RADOMES
13.1 MILITARY AND CIVIL REQUIREMENTS

DEF STAN 00-970 BCAR'S FAR'S JAR


CHAPTER 210
Section Section
D K 23 23 25 25

Complete 4.1 4.1 603 603 603 603


Chapter 605 605 605 ACJ
603
605

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Volume 1 Part 2 Appendix No 1

FIG 1 STRUCTURAL INTERDEPENDENCE WITH ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEM -


CHAPTER INTERFACE

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Volume 1 Part 2 Appendix No. 2

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P a r t 2 A p p e n d i x No. 2 Volume 1

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COPYRIGHT MODUK British Defence Standards


Licensed by Information Handling Services
HAND WRIITEN AMENDms.

To be checked when amending Volume 1 of Def Stan 00-970 prior t o issue.

Vol 1 Book 1.
Leaflet 101/3 ra 3.2
-
m2 OK

(87)
Leaflet 102/1 para 3.1 l i n e 4
AL/1 i n "5.4" delete 4 insert 2

Leaflet 102/2 para 1.1 l i n e 2


&/1 i n "para 11" delete 11 i n s e r t 9
para 4.3
AL/6 delete para 4 . 3

Leaflet 102/3 para 2.3 l i n e 9


AL/^ i n "para 11.3" delete 11.3 and insert 9.5
para 5.2
AL/l a ) l i n e I, i n "para 11" delete 11 and insert 9
b) l i n e 3, delete "devised" and insert ''approved"
ara 9.1
%./l l i n e 3, i n "para 11.2.2" delete Il and i n s e r t 9
Leaflet 102/6 para 8.2.1
AL/^ l i n e 2, i n "para 8" delete 8 and insert 6
ara 8 . 4 ( i v )
AL/1 l i n e 3, i n "para 8" delete 8 and insert 6
Chapter 105 para 9
AL/4 delete para 9.1 i n toto and i n s e r t "See Chapter 1 1 4 "
para 13
AL/2 A t end of heading "INDICATüñS" insert

Chapter 109 T a b l e 1
AL/4 i n "Chapter 801" delete 801 and insert 409
Leaflet 200/4 para 4.1
AL/i l i n e 6, delete "through" and insert "in conjunction with"
ara 5.1
%/2 ( i )l i n e 3, delete "the"
AL/l ( i i ) l i n e 4 , delete "following" and insert "followed"
( i i )Notes 2 l i n e 5, delete ''through" and insert "in conjunction with"
ara 6.1
L/l l i n e 1 0 , delete "degredation' and insert "degradation"

w n e 5, delete "through" and insert "in conjunction with"


Chapter 206 para 5.4
AL/9 l i n e 3 , i n s e r t " , " a f t e r range
Leaflets 206/0,206/1,206/2,206/3, and 206/4,
AL/6 amend heading t o read " m L SYSTEM+EC"ECAL c O M p 0 " T S "

COPYRIGHT MODUK British Defence Standards


Licensed by Information Handling Services

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