How Buddhist Philosophy is Unique: Content, Orientation

and Paradox*

Soraj Hongladarom
Department of Philosophy
Chulalongkorn University
hsoraj@chula.ac.th

ABSTRACT

This paper will address the question of whether there is anything distinctive about Buddhist
philosophy that merits its status as a subfield within philosophy. Apart from the obvious point
that Buddhist philosophy takes its starting point from the teachings of Buddha as recorded in
the canonical texts, I will argue that what is distinctive about Buddhist philosophy is in the
content of the Buddha’s teaching itself. It is well known that the teachings on Emptiness and
Non-Self appear to be distinctive of Buddhism, and the philosophy in Buddhism emerges when
one tries to construct arguments purporting to argue for these points. Against this some might
argue that Emptiness and Non-Self are not unique to Buddhism, as this can be found in the
works of bundle theorists or in post-modern Western philosophers who are intent on
decentering the Subject. However, what distinguishes Buddhism from these philosophies is the
former’s soteriological character. One attempts to see the truth of Emptiness in order to get rid
of all suffering and realize Nirvana. The view that truth is realized for soteriological purpose is
not found in any philosophy that merely argues for decentering the Subject or for a view that
the self is composed of many disparate elements only. In short, I would like to argue that it is
the content and the soteriological orientation of the doctrines of Emptiness and Non-Self that
are necessary in giving Buddhist philosophy its unique character.

But these alone are not enough. The view to be argued for must be accompanied by a
realization that truth is not sought for its own sake, but for realizing the Ultimate Goal.
Furthermore, one also needs to include the necessarily paradoxical nature of Buddhist
philosophy. As Nagarjuna has famously said, the (paradoxically) ultimate view is that one
should relinquish all views.Thus it is not enough for Buddhist philosophy to contain its unique
subject matter and its soteriological orientation; it must also include the view that ultimately
speaking no philosophical view at all can be ultimately upheld as the truth. This, by the way,
should not be taken to mean that Buddhism espouses no truth at all.

* Paper to be presented at the meeting of the International Society for Buddhist Philosophy (ISBP) at the
Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division, Atlanta, Georgia, December 27
– 30, 2012

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 There is no question whether Buddhism presents a system of thought and argument that

qualifies as philosophy or not. The Buddha himself talks about characteristics of things in

general; he also talks about the mind, its identity and its relation to the external world in great

detail. The scholarly tradition that developed in India after the Buddha’s death presented very

sophisticated systems of thoughts and theories that could hardly be regarded as anything else

but philosophical. Buddhist masters such as Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu and Dharmakirti, to name

only a few, developed richly detailed arguments on a variety of topics that would easily find

their home in a modern department of philosophy. These masters and scholars made a number

of original contributions in metaphysics, epistemology and logic, and there were very serious

and sometimes acrimonious debates between these Buddhist masters and philosophers and

their Hindu opponents. Out of these debates came very sophisticated systems of logic and

issues in identity theory, philosophy of mind, logic and epistemology which would qualify

easily with current issues being debated by today’s philosophers.

However, if we are ready to accept that Buddhism has a philosophy, another question is

what kind of philosophy that is. If we grant that Buddhist philosophy offers a set of original

contributions to the philosophical enterprise as a whole (which I strongly believe to be the

case), in what way are these contributions presented? There are some notable Buddhist

logicians, Dignāga and Dharmakirti being some of the most famous ones, but the Buddha

himself says in the Kalama Sutta that reasoning is not to be trusted as a means toward realizing

the Truth.1 Furthermore, there are traditions within Buddhism that actively shun cogitation and

argumentation, preferring instead to communicate by means of non-words or apparently

1 See http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/soma/wheel008.html [retrieved November 4, 2012].

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meaningless pronouncements as in the Zen tradition. So is there a unique method to Buddhist

philosophy? Is there, in other words, a uniquely Buddhist method of philosophizing? In what

way is Buddhist philosophy qualified as a field within philosophy itself, so that it merits a

place in the APA meeting, for example?

I would like to argue that there are three factors that make Buddhist philosophy unique

as a subfield of the discipline, namely content, orientation and paradox. The doctrine of

Non-Self and Emptiness, as I shall show, is unique to Buddhism, a highly original contribution

to philosophical activity as a whole. Moreover, as a religious philosophy, broadly speaking, the

orientation of Buddhist philosophy is such that it not interested merely in knowing the truth or

in satisfying intellectual curiosity, but knowing the truth is valued because it leads to the

soteriological goal, which in this case is the eventual liberation of oneself from the bondage of

samsara. This distinguishes Buddhist philosophy from many strands in Western philosophy

which may talk about the same kind of content as Buddhism. Lastly, Buddhist philosophy is

unique through its paradoxical character. Nāgārjuna famously said toward the end of the

Mūlamadhyamakakārikā that one should relinquish all views.2 Thus one should also relinquish

the view that all views are to be relinquished too. The paradox is fully embraced and taken as

its face value. In the end, I would like to argue that what Nāgārjuna is exhorting us to do here

is to realize that language and argumentation is inescapably paradoxical, and it is through the

letting go of these as well as conceptualization that the Goal is ultimately achieved. This,

however, should by no means be taken to mean that Nāgārjuna or Buddhist philosophy in

general eschews rigorous use of arguments and clarity in understanding. This is precisely

2 The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna, Chapter 27, Verse 30. See Nāgārjuna, The Fundamental Wisdom
of the Middle Way, Jay Garfield, transl. (Oxford University Press, 1995).

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where the paradox lies.

Content

First of all, I would like to say that Buddhist philosophy does qualify as a field with its

own meeting in the APA annual meetings because it contains unique subject matter, one that

cannot be found in any other traditions. The teachings on Non-Self or on Emptiness are unique

to Buddhism; no other religious tradition in the world teaches that the individual soul does not,

strictly speaking, exist; no other tradition maintains a very thorough reductionistic attitude

toward the self in such a way that what is understood to be the self is nothing more than a

collection of physical and mental elements and episodes that together make up our illusion that

there is a self that, for example, answers to our names and maintains our identities as persons.

Such reductionistic attitude is by no means absent in western philosophy. Hume is well

known for his argument that the self does not exactly exist because no empirical basis for any

impression of the self cannot be found. When we look for the self, all we find are episodes of

mental events none of which actually qualifies as the self. This is quite similar to the Buddha’s

teaching in general structure. However, the big difference between the Buddhist viewpoint and

Hume’s is that the Buddhist does not deny the existence of the individual self; it is true that the

self is composed of layers of mental and bodily episodes, but it has to be there otherwise the

theory of Karma will not work. There is a continuity that binds the mental and physical

episodes of a person together; no physical basis for the continuity can be found, but that does

not imply that there is no continuity. This idea is central to Buddhism, but is not found in

Hume.

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 Furthermore, the idea that the self does not exist is also found in post-modern

philosophies, those that try to “decenter” the subject. The general view here seems to be that

the self is considered to be the key in maintaining epistemological certainty—this is the

familiar Cartesian argument. However, many post-modernists argue against the Cartesian

argument, saying in effect that no epistemological certainly can be found because meaning

cannot be objective. Any certainty that can be found has then to be sociological, such as when a

belief is held by a large enough number of people or through the use of commonly accepted

method such as the scientific one (or both, in most cases). In any case the certainty in question

can only be temporary and depends upon changing contexts. Since both the Cartesian and the

Kantian arguments make necessary use of the individual self as the Cogito or as the

autonomous knowing agent whose pure concepts make up the objective world, so to speak,

problematizing the epistemological certainty would be tantamount to calling the whole idea of

there being an autonomous self into question. Hence the idea that the subject, or the knowing

self, is “decentered.”

The difference between the general post-modernism presented here and Buddhist

philosophy is again that the latter does not aim merely at “decentering” the subject. The main

question for Buddhism is not whether absolute epistemological certainty can be found, but

whether one can be relieved of suffering. Since it is the mistaken belief that there is an ego that

is the root cause of all the sufferings, then the Buddhist would be glad if such a belief is

discarded. However, this does not mean that one is then cast adrift and faces up with one’s

own naked existential condition with nowhere to go. Again, realizing that there is no ego does

not mean that one is cast adrift in that way. It does not mean that everything is lost. On the

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contrary, realizing that there is no ego means that one sees the total interconnectedness of

everything (since there is now no wall separating oneself and others). It is a deeply spiritual

perception, one that is lacking in post-modernism.

Orientation

The foregoing points to the importance of the orientation of Buddhism as a type of

religious philosophy. Much has been discussed in the literature on the question whether

Buddhism is a religion or not. I will not enter into that topic. What I would like to say is only

that, even if one focuses on the philosophical aspect of Buddhism, one still has to include the

soteriological dimension of Buddhism. This is so because the whole orientation of Buddhism is

not only to find out the truths about the external world, but to find ways to get rid of the

suffering that afflicts all of us. In fact the idea that the purpose of philosophy is more than to

know more about the world is also there in western philosophy from the beginning. According

to Plato, the whole idea of contemplating the heavenly Forms is not just that, but through the

contemplation one becomes a better person. This view of philosophy as a means toward

changing oneself is also found in the Stoics; it is not enough just to know something, but one

changes oneself through the process of knowing. The Buddha would completely agree.

Furthermore, Wittgenstein famous said that the purpose of philosophy is to show a fly the way

out of the fly-bottle3—I would say that this finds reverberations in Buddhism also. The whole

purpose of philosophy, according to Wittgenstein, the Stoics, Plato and the Buddhist, is not

merely to arrive at truth, but to change oneself, to become a new person; the knowledge has to

3 According to Wittgenstein, “a philosophical problem has the form: ‘I don’t know my way about.’” (§123),
and hence the aim of philosophy is “to shew the fly out of the fly-bottle” (§309). Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations, G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, eds., G.E.M. Anscombe, transl., (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1953).

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be infused totally with all other areas of life. This, of course, does not mean that knowledge is

not relevant. It is centrally relevant, but to have an attitude that is typical of much of what

passes as philosophy nowadays, one that posits merely arriving at the truth as the goal, is to

make knowledge and truth irrelevant, at least to our lives.

Paradox

The discussion above leads to the third component of the uniqueness of Buddhism as a

philosophy, that a deep epistemological paradox underlies the very essence of Buddhist

philosophy itself. According to Nāgārjuna, as we have just seen, the ultimate view in Buddhist

philosophy is that one should relinquish all views. This is patently paradoxical. For to

relinquish all views is the same as not to holding any view at all, but we are urged to hold this

as the ultimate view, indeed the central tenet of Buddhist philosophy itself. Nāgārjuna urges

Buddhists to relinquish all views because to hold on to any view at all means that one still has

attachment to that view. When one is attached to a view, one is prepared to defend it and one

reifies the view so one becomes identified with the view and so on. All this is inimical to

realizing the Path because that would mean the ego is there because it is the ego that does the

attaching and identifying. However, one also has to be cautious of the other way. When one

attempts not to attaching oneself to a view (or to anything for that matter), one has to be careful

not to become attached to the nonattachment itself. Here the nonattachment becomes just

another thing that is being attached to, and this foils the whole attempt. This is the Buddha’s

Middle Way teaching, which is greatly elaborated by Nāgārjuna. The correct attitude is not to

become attached to anything including nonattachment; here is where the paradox lies. One is

advised not to become attached, and one should not get attached to the attempt of not attaching

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oneself to anything either. In the same vein, one is advised to relinquish all views, including the

view that one should relinquish all views too. The only way to do this is to acknowledge that

language and conceptualization alone are not enough for realizing nirvana; one needs a way of

getting in touch with reality, so to speak, without conceptualization. This does not mean that

there is a higher level of reality which is accessible only through mystical vision. It is still the

same reality with which we are familiar with, but now it is perceived and related to with the

understanding that any attempt at conceptualizing it is inadequate, and that a source of

suffering lies in such an attempt. The ego is there because it is conceptualized. Without

language or conceptualization, then, the ego disappears.

Many philosophers view this emphasis on non-conceptualization as anti-philosophical.

After all, what does doing philosophy consist in if not conceptualizing? There seem to be two

conflicting strands within Buddhism as a whole. On the one hand, there is a strong emphasis on

learning and scholarship and debate, as seen not only in Tibetan monasteries but also in

temples in other traditions, both Mahayana and Theravada. On the other, the texts are clear in

supporting the paradoxical view that language and conceptualization are not enough in helping

one realize the Goal; highly skillful meditation is also required. Perhaps it may seem that only

the debating, conceptualizing part of Buddhism could be considered philosophical, but this

seems to me to be a mistake. Conceptualization alone is never enough, as I have tried to show

earlier in this paper; it needs to be supplemented with the right attitude or orientation (sammā

sankappa) which puts the conceptualization into its proper context. In fact conceptualization

corresponds to the right view (sammā-ditthi), which is the first step in the Eightfold Path. Since

the aim is not merely to entertain the right view only, to consider having it alone as sufficient

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for philosophy would be somewhat defective, at least as a full understanding of the Buddhist

philosophy seems to require.

Conclusion: Contribution to Metaphilosophy

There might at first sight be a contradiction in the three components of the uniqueness

of Buddhist philosophy that I have just presented. I proposed that Buddhist philosophy is

unique because of its content and of its paradox. But the two seems to contradict each other.

The seeming substantive content of Non-Self and Emptiness seems to belie the proposal that

Buddhists relinquish all views and the ultimate paradoxical character of the Buddhist teaching

as I have presented. However, we could see how the two are interrelated by seeing that, deep

down, paradoxes are built into the very nature, the very essence one might say, of Buddhist

thought itself. This is why, in the Kaccānagotta Sutta,4 when the Buddha was asked to

propound the contet of his samma-ditthi, or right view, he said that it consists in the doctrine of

Dependent Origination. Having told his interlocutor that one should not hold either a positive

or a negative view of things (i.e., one should hold neither that this thing exists, nor this thing

does not exist), he goes on to say that one should hold instead that because this exists, that

exists, and so on. In other words, the Doctrines of Dependent Origination and Emptiness are

essentially one and the same. This is the heart of the Buddhist teaching. The content is there—

one should hold the view that because this exists, that exists, but this is a unique kind of

content. It does not contain any substantive content in the sense that there is a God and God is

of such and such character, nor that the nature is made up of either physical or mental stuff. On

the contrary, the putatively substantive view that the Buddha gives us consists only in the

4 The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Samyutta Nikaya, Bhikkhu Bodhi transl.
(Somerville, MA: Wisdoms Publication, 2000), p. 544.

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relation among things—if this thing exists, then it is so because of a number of causes and

conditions, and so on and on. He does not mention what kind of thing the thing that is said of

exist really is, nor does he say anything about the exact nature of those causes and conditions

either. Thus, in a way of speaking, there is content, but the content consists only in the relation

of one being depending on others, namely its causes and conditions, and each cause and each

condition is also dependent for their being on further causes and conditions, and so on. This is

exactly the paradox that I mentioned in the paper. In a way Buddhist philosophy holds a view,

that all things are interdependent, but in another way it does not hold any view, because when

one says all things are interdependent, one is silent as to the nature of those things that are said

to be interdependent. This is the paradox.

Consequently, we can build a case for an important way in which Buddhist philosophy

can contribute to the task of philosophy as a whole. Apart from offering original contributions

to debates on specific issues in metaphysics, epistemology or ethics, I think what Buddhist

philosophy can contribute to metaphilosophy is that it offers a critique of the standard way of

doing philosophy that emphasizes solely the role of argumentation. More specifically, since in

philosophy we cannot get rid of all reasonings—in fact the Buddha did not advise us to do that

at all, what we can do is to use reason itself to critique reason, in order that we recognize that

reason alone is not enough in achieving our aim in doing philosophy. Moreover, the very aim

of doing philosophy can also be called into question as a result of the contribution from

Buddhist philosophy. Here the later Wittgenstein is on the right track as far as the Buddhist is

concerned; the purpose of philosophizing is not to arrive at “the truth,” considered as a kind of

statement that corresponds to external reality, but the purpose should be broader and include

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discussions on how to transform oneself too. In Buddhist terms this of course would refer to

how one practices in order eventually to become liberated from samsara. It also refers to the

belief that paradox is structurally inherent in all attempts at philosophizing and conceptualizing

(which is all philosophy can do anyway).

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