UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW Law 122

E2024 Professor Loanzon

Legaspi v. City of Cebu
G.R. No. 159110 – December 10, 2013
En banc | Bersamin, J.

Article/s Invoked:
Sec. 458, Local Government Code – Powers, Duties, Functions and Composition. (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the
proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic services and
facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities, shall:

(v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, park and other public places and approve
the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of the same; establish bus and vehicle stops and
terminals or regulate the use of the same by privately owned vehicles which serve the public; regulate garages
and the operation of conveyances for hire; designate stands to be occupied by public vehicles when not in use;
regulate the putting up of signs, signposts, awnings and awning posts on the streets; and provide for the
lighting, cleaning and sprinkling of streets and public places;

(vi) Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments or obstacles thereon and, when
necessary in the interest of public welfare, authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal constructions
in public places.

Sec. 16, Local Government Code – General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.

Case Summary:
Petitioners got their vehicles immobilized in accordance with Cebu’s ordinance. They challenged the
constitutionality of the ordinance as violative of their rights to due process. Court said it was within the power
delegated to the LGU by the LGC, and a reasonable exercise of its police power to address traffic congestion.

FACTS OF THE CASE

• January 27, 1997 – the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted an ordinance authorizing
their traffic enforcers to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions and
prohibitions defined in the Traffic Code of Cebu City. Said immobilization was done by clamping any
tire of the violating vehicle with a denver boot vehicle immobilizer, or any other special gadget.
o The owner/driver shall be penalized for all traffic law violations, plus an administrative penalty
of P500 to be paid to the Traffic Violations Bureau, before the vehicle immobilizer may be
removed.
o Tampering with the clamp shall be liable for the loss or destruction of the vehicle immobilizer
and prosecuted for such under pain or penalty under the RPC and any other existing Cebu city
ordinance, provided that the act may not be compromised nor settled amicably extrajudicially.
o An unattended immobilized vehicle which constitutes an obstruction to the free flow of traffic
shall be towed to the city government impounding area.
o Any person who violates any provision of this ordinance. Shall be penalized with an
imprisonment of not less than 1 month nor more than 6 months and a fine of not less than
P2,000, nor more than P5,000, or both, at the discretion of the court.
• July 29, 1997 – Petitioners Jaban, Sr. and Jaban, Jr., challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance
for being in violation of due process and for being contrary to law, and damages. The complaint alleged
the following:
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o On June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had properly parked his car in a paying parking area on Manalili
Street to get certain records and documents from his office; after 10 minutes, he returned to his
car to find that it has been immobilized, with a notice posted on the car saying that it would be
a criminal offense to break the clamp. He was unable to meet a client. He had to pay P4,200 to
the City Treasurer for the release of his car, a fine imposed without any court hearing and
without due process of law, for he was not told why his car had been immobilized. Similar
incidents happened on November 20, 1997 (?) while his car was properly parked, and
compelled to pay P1,500, and on May 19, 1997, when his son parked in a very secluded place
with no sigh prohibiting parking, and compelled to pay P1,400.
• August 11, 1997 – Petitioner Legaspi likewise sued in the RTC to demand delivery of personal
property, declaration of nullity of the Traffic Code of Cebu City, and damages.
o Averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he had left his car on a portion of the sidewalk
and the street outside the gate of his house to make way for the anay exterminator who had
asked to be allowed to unload his things from the front of the residence, as his daughter’s car
had been parked in the carport, with the assurance that the unloading would not take too long;
that while waiting for the unloading to finish, Legaspi had to answer the phone in his house;
that after a short while, his son-in-law informed him that the front wheel of his car had been
clamped; that he rushed outside and found a traffic citation; and that in the late afternoon his
car was towed even if it was not obstructing traffic flow.
• The City Attorney of Cebu’s defense stated that the traffic enforces only upheld the law by clamping
their vehicles, and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality and validity.
• RTC consolidated the cases. On January 22, 1999, it declared the ordinance null and void, as the owner
of the immobilized vehicle is deprived of his right to use his/her vehicle and penalized without a
hearing by a person who is not legally or duly vested with such rights, power or authority.
• On June 16, 2003, the CA overturned the RTC decision, deeming that the ordinance is a legitimate
exercise of the police powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, and the measure used to address the
problem comes within the parameters of being reasonable, consonant with the general powers and
purposes of the corporation, consistent with national laws and policies, and not unreasonable or
discriminatory.
• Upon the denial of their MFRs on August 4, 2003, petitioners filed for review on certiorari.

ISSUE/S & RATIO/S

1. W/N Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted within the ambit of the legislative powers of the City of Cebu—
YES.
• The ordinance complied with the formalities of the test of a valid ordinance. The LGC delegated police
power, power of eminent domain, and the power of taxation to LGUs, and was fashioned to delineate
the specific parameters and limitations to be complied with in the exercise of these delegated powers
with the view of making each LGU a fully-functioning subdivision of the State, subject to
constitutional and statutory limitations.
• Vesting cities, like Cebu, with the legislative power to enact traffic rules and regulations was expressly
done through Sec. 458 of the LGC, and also by virtue of the General Welfare Clause in Sec. 16. The
delegation reflected the desire of Congress to leave to the cities the task of confronting the problem of
traffic congestions, and the LGUs are in the best position to craft their own traffic codes.
• Their traffic regulations must be held valid and effective unless they infringed the constitutional
limitations and statutory safeguards.

2. W/N Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the requirements for validity and constitutionality,
particularly the limitations set by the Constitution and the relevant statutes—YES.
• First substantive requirement is the adherence to the constitutional guaranty of due process of the law
(Sec. 1, Art. III, Const.).
o Judged according to the enunciation of the guaranty of due process of law, the contentions of
the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny review, the ordinance met the
substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under
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the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and
its consistency with public policy.
o The terms encroachment and obstacles used in Sec. 458 were broad enough to include illegally
parked vehicles or whatever else obstructing the streets, which were precisely the subject of
the ordinance. The plain objective of the ordinance was to serve the public interest and advance
the general welfare in the city.
• Any driver or owner whose vehicle was immobilized could protest such action of those enforcing it,
as Sec. 3 of the Ordinance textually afforded an administrative escape upon a protest directly made to
the CITOM Chairman, or to the Chairman of the Committee on Police, Fire and Penology, or to the
Asst. City Prosecutor. The release could be ordered even without the payment of the stipulated fine.
o The immobilization by clamping was not necessary if the driver/owner were around at the time
of the apprehension for illegal parking or obstruction. If they were, the enforcer would simply
require the driver to move the vehicle or issue a traffic citation should the latter persist. The
clamping is only to prevent the transgressor from using the vehicle itself to escape the due
sanctions.
o The towing away of the vehicle was not equivalent to a summary impounding, but designed to
prevent the vehicle from obstructing traffic. The owner would not be deprived of his property.
o Hence, the ordinance complied with the elements of fairness and reasonableness.
• On procedural due process: notice and hearing are essential requirements, yet there are many
instances in which the absence of one or both is not necessarily a denial or deprivation of due process.
(Arrest of a person in flagrante delicto, preventive suspension of a civil servant facing administrative
charges, etc.) The clamping of the petitioners’ vehicles was of the same character dispensing with
notice and hearing.
o Immobilization necessary because transgressors were not around at the time of the
apprehension. A notice and hearing would be superfluous. The lack of a trial-type hearing prior
to the clamping does not constitute a breach of procedural due process, for giving the
transgressors a chance to reverse the apprehensions through a timely protest equally satisfies
the need for a hearing.
o The prior intervention of a court of law was not indispensable to ensure a compliance with the
guaranty of due process.

RULING
Court DENIES the petition for their lack of merit, and affirms the CA decision. Orders petitioners to pay
costs.

NOTES
• Test of a valid ordinance - substantive requirements:
o Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
o Must not be unfair or oppressive
o Must not be partial or discriminatory
o Must not prohibit but may regulate trade
o Must be general and consistent with public policy
o Must not be unreasonable
• Formal requirements
o Within the corporate powers of the LGU
o Passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law
• Procedural due process - the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person
of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with that kind of notice
and what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action.
• Substantive due process - asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a
person's life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is
sufficient justification for the government's action.