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Liberalism's Mobility: An Exploration of Nationalism in Eastern Europe and Russia, 19th-20th centuries In his 1978-79 term at the College de France, Michel Foucault delivered a series of lectures devoted to furthering study on the art of government by way of examining the question 'liberalism' asks of governing practice; namely, what is the self-limitation of governmental reason?1 When raised in conjunction with the rise of 'population' as an increasing concern of the state during the 18th century, the question of what constitutes the defined boundaries of governmental reason and how to accurately measure both reason and boundary becomes paramount when pursuing various 'systems' designed to provide an answer to the above. According to Foucault, 'liberalism' is a practice, a means of rationalization on the exercise of government. It places 'society', instead of the 'state', at the center of governance, allowing one to ask what necessity and what ends must be pursued to justify existence. It is a tool for use in criticizing reality, thus becoming "one constant dimension of recent European phenomena of 'political life'." 2 This shift from 'state' to 'society' that liberalism proposed brought into question the difference between the two and the terms of their coexistence. In this space between 'society' and the 'state' we find the creation of a new schematization, nationalism, capable of acting as an interlocutor binding, indeed interweaving, the two elements. While Foucault focused on the role of the market in the liberalism question as an intrinsic arbiter of governmental reason from the 18th century to the present, my inquiry attempts to show how 'liberalism' also demanded a redefinition of the relation between 'state' and 'society' and brought about differing configurations of nationalism in the multi-ethnic lands of Eastern Europe
1 Foucault Birth of Biopolitics 20. 2 Ibid, 321.

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How were these configurations of nationalism assembled? The answer lies in the 'mobility' of liberalism, which I define as the inherent capacity of ideas to circulate and be filtered by 'certified agents of knowledge'. Through the process of circulation, filtration and then transmission, ideas undergo mutation, producing capacity for a wide variety of configurations on various technologies of government. As 'liberalism' circulated through Europe, existing states with absolutist regimes (in our case the Hapsburg and Romanov dynasties) sought to come to terms with questions on selflimitation of governmental reason by devising solutions that mimicked liberal form, but not content. If Foucault is correct, that 'liberalism' questioned the justification and limitation of governmental action, then formulation of nationalism policy by the Hapsburgs and the Romanovs (later Bolsheviks) in reaction to this question exemplifies the imperial solution's novel amalgamation of 'liberal' form with absolutist content, albeit with differing degrees of success. These nationalistic schemas, in turn, impacted the path ethnic minorities followed in the configuration of their own 'national forms', both in the 19th and 20th centuries. The evolution of these configurations, the construction of a nation-state, demonstrates the wide ranging 'mobility' of liberalism. While both Hapsburg and Romanov empires faced the same 'nationalist' dilemma, their novel configurations of liberal and absolutist content, an attempt to preserve authority among elites as well as subdue separatist movements, provide opportunity to study the flexibility of 'liberalism' in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Hapsburg rulers recognized their largest minority, the Magyars, as an almost equal governing partner, yet they refused to address other minority group concerns and create an empire wide

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federation. Romanov rulers only tinkered with piecemeal reform, pursuing a Russification effort that occasionally experimented with liberal forms in pockets of imperial space. After World War I these novel configurations fell apart, yet their influence persisted. New nation-states created in Eastern Europe pursued policies similar to the Austrian and Hungarian rulers before them, instituting national language requirements and generally limiting access of minority groups to centers of power. Bolshevik rule, secured after the conclusion of the Russian Civil War (1917-1921), initially endorsed a nationalities policy that favored ethnic recognition and semiautonomous rule yet ultimately sought to preserve Romanov territorial integrity while instilling a larger Soviet 'umbrella' identity. In both examples, ruling regimes across two centuries did not outright reject the question of liberalism; they instead used the inherent 'mobility' of liberalism to craft forms of nationalism suited to their larger ideological goals. To begin, this essay will establish and define concepts central to my understanding of mobility. The process mentioned above, Circulation, Filtration, Transmission and pursuant Mutation, are terms I draw from the work of Kapil Raj, and my conception on the applicability of mobility to the realm of ideas draws upon two other scholars, Philip Deloria and Laura Engelstein. Their works give guidance to what Foucault identified as, the way in which specific problems of life and population have been posed within a technology of government whichsince the end of the eighteenth century has been constantly haunted by the question of liberalism. 3 Next, I will look at how the Hapsburg and Romanov rulers dealt with the question of liberalism in terms of
3 Ibid, 323-324.

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nationalism policy in the period leading up to World War I. Focus then shifts towards the interwar period, as successor powers in former imperial lands used the same liberalism question to create new nationality content based, in part, on previous forms elaborated by the dynastic empires. My ultimate goal is to show the mobility of liberalism by outlining its flexibility across both time and governmental norms. Elaboration of Mobility Liberalisms mobility, its adaptability across a wide spectrum of governmental configurations, I believe is best illuminated by the works of three scholars; Kapil Raj, Laura Engelstein, and Philip Deloria. While Raj and Deloria do not specifically focus on the idea of liberalism, their works flesh out the principles and application of mobility to ideas in general. Engelsteins work sheds light on the active reshaping of the liberal discourse by the Russian/Soviet state, in effect bringing focus to larger themes of this essay regarding configurations of nationalism policy. Each scholars work bears elaboration, and Ill begin my brief examination with Kapil Raj. A scholar of Southeast Asian Studies, Kapil Raj work deals with colonial knowledge making interaction between European powers and indigenous peoples. Focusing on the circulation aspect of knowledge, Raj demonstrated that while the subject of knowledge may be desired, its validity could face acceptance or rejection solely on the certification of the transmitting agent involved. This is because the circulation through locality and metropole alike create mutations, each side appropriating and assimilating new concepts or ideas into their own milieu as the knowledge filters through. Thus, an empire may desire knowledge of local plants for medicinal purposes, a particular use for explorers and colonists alike, yet may reject this knowledge if it comes from an

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uncertified source, i.e. the savage. However, if that same knowledge is first collected by a field agent and then passed on to an experienced European, who in turn codifies that knowledge in a Latin text 4, there is greater chance of acceptance of that knowledge at the metropole simply because of the path of transmission filtered through a certified agent. As we shall see below, models of nationalism deemed appropriate for absolutist regimes in the 19th and 20th centuries depended heavily upon 'certified' acceptance. Philip J. Delorias collection of essays, Indians in Unexpected Places, provides a case study on the mutability of ideas, the change undergone via transmission between Indians and Whites.5 In his essay on Violence, Deloria traces the evolution of white vocabulary over the course of two decades regarding the changing forms of perceived Indian violence-potential. Before the Civil War, terms such as surround and last stand exemplified White fears of the mobile Indian, capable of enclosure and able to resist influence from White culture. After the Civil War, forced movement of Indians onto reservations made old terms/fears less applicable in context and, as a result, new conceptions arose. Focusing on the term outbreak, Deloria convincingly argues that this conception helped Whites negotiate a period in which Indians were not totally pacified/contained on reservations. It implied partial containment and near completion of the civilizing mission, interpreting forms of Indian violence as incapable of becoming autonomous and limited to pockets of the American empire. Wounded Knee, according to Deloria, represented both the apex and obsolescence of outbreak, the point at which a new conception was needed, that being passivity and later invisibility. Vocabulary
4This example is drawn from Ch. 1 of Rajs work ????? 5 Philip Deloria. Indians in Unexpected Places. University of Kansas Press. Date ???

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shifts, a result of idea circulation involving both real and perceived threats to White ideals, represented the developing trajectory of meanings that defined the possibilities of Indian violence.6 Development of these trajectory of meanings echoes similar efforts by Hapsburg/Romanov/Bolshevik rulers used to shape the liberalism question to suit their absolutist or ideological needs. The last work briefly reviewed, Laura Engelsteins collection of essays Slavophile Empire, deals precisely with the mobility and mutation of liberal ideals in Russian governance.7 Engelsteins first essay considers how the experience of Russia, an empire that combined liberal, anti-liberal and absolutist governing models, reconciled with Foucault's conception of how the liberalist 'rule of law' changed, for Western Europe at least, the apparatus of domination from compulsion to discipline as exercised by the newly empowered bourgeoisie. Engelstein interprets the contribution of liberalism to Western thought as one that replaced the, "alliance between discipline and the administrative state with a configuration that frames the operation of discipline within the confines of the law." However, in the Russian experience, the Tsarist and later Soviet rulers took this conception in a new direction. Instead of invoking a "disciplinary society limited and controlled by the authority of the law", Russian rulers created a governing framework that eschewed the validity of 'legality' and sought control of various disciplines for their own use. Across these varied scholars works lies a central theme that I hope to use in exploring the development of 'nationalism' in both Russia and Eastern Europe, that being the notion that knowledge is perfectly capable of being transmitted across different
6 Ibid, 21. 7 Laura Engelstein. Slavophile Empire: Imperial Russia's Illiberal Path.

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cultures who, upon encountering the transmitting knowledge, have an equal capacity to assimilate then transform the knowledge to suit their own particular needs. Equally, this reconfiguration of knowledge is then re-transmitted across the social and cultural fields, producing an endless cycle whereby old ideas or configurations of knowledge inspire new forms that, in turn, will produce further iterations. When analyzing how 'nationalism' developed, it is important to recognize that this notion is intimately tied to the transmission process undergone by the ideal of liberalism. For greater depth to this argument, we now turn to examining the Hapsburg and Romanov responses to the question of liberalism. Hapsburg/Romanov Empires and the Question of liberalism in the pre-WWII Period Despite their shared characteristics of rule and diversity of those ruled, the Hapsburg and Romanov empires addressed the question of liberalism's nationalistic impact with different methods. Both possessed significant numbers of minority populations who, combined, easily outnumbered the total of Great Russians and Austrians in their own states. While they might have liked to sidestep answering the question of liberalism and its pursuant demand for a reconfiguration of the state/society relationship, tumultuous events in the 19 th century forced each empire to devise a solution that satisfied unique problems faced. The central issue lay in the need for both dynasties to create a unifying national myth that, while preserving power in the hands of the traditional elites as much as possible also sought to stem any separatist feeling emanating from dissatisfied minorities.8 For both, this required an elaboration on the interaction
8 Engelstein and others

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between state and society through limited acknowledgement of liberal ideals, albeit in forms ensconced with the methods and means of absolutism. For the Hapsburgs, the Spring of Nations in 1848 as well as increasing pressure from the unification of Germany under Bismarck resulted in a series of political/military maneuvers over the course of the 19th century that ultimately culminated in national disgrace in the military defeat at Koniggratz on 3 July 1866. It was then, facing exclusion and then outright ejection from the growing German seat of power, that Hapsburg rulers came to realize the growing fragility of their own power structure. In an unprecedented move for multi-ethnic empires of the 19 th century, Austrian rulers contemplated and then offered the largest minority group, the Magyars, a nigh-equal position in what would come to be called the Dual-Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. Hungary, which only two decades previous sustained the longest independence movement of 1848, suddenly found itself accomplishing national goals only dreamed about by previous generations of Magyar aspirants. Yet other minority groups, just as vociferous and similar in their quest to achieve autonomy and national sovereignty, continued to be relegated to the background, in some cases finding previously oppressed Magyars as new masters promoting assimilation policies once solely attributed, with disgust, to Hapsburg rule. This imbalance between Hungarian ascendency and other minorities similar ambitions informs, in greater detail, the methods Hapsburg and Magyar rulers pursued in answering the liberalism question, demonstrating what Lazlo Kontler called, a network of regimes thatrepresented new types of authoritarianism. 9 Both the

9Lazlo Kontler, 261.

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Angshelus of 1867 and Hungarian national pursuits prior and post its implementation comprise the ways in which these new types of authoritarianism took hold. The Angshelus of 1867 At the beginning of the 19th century, Hapsburg rulers could look across their lands and see the development of empire over several centuries. At the beginning of the 20 th century, those same rulers, gifted with inhuman longevity for the duration of this sentence, would see the same lands albeit in a new political contrast. Pressures both external and internal brought on a legitimacy crisis for the Austrian state; no longer needed as a bulwark against an increasingly impotent Ottoman threat and forced out of control of German speaking peoples via the rise of Germany, Hapsburg rulers found themselves in need of a stabilizing force in order to preserve their lands and capacity to rule. Events of 1848 demonstrated not only the desire and willingness of minority populations to rebel against Austrian rule but also that the potential loss of the largest group, the Hungarians, would be detrimental to maintaining Hapsburg great power status. It also heralded the emergence of the liberalism question and new possible configurations of governance based upon the interweaving of state and society. Yet the perceived threat of 1848, the potential for collapse of Hapsburg rule and subsequent relegation to the background of European politics, did little to convince Austrian governing elites the necessity for outright liberal reform in terms of their nationalist policy towards minorities. Instead 1848 set the Austrian ruling elite towards a policy of, first, repression and assimilation of minority groups through elimination of territorial distinction in conjunction with standardization efforts in civil governance and language use, and second, the de jure acknowledgement of the Magyars as a nigh-equal governing partner

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over other significant minority groups. Both policies exemplify the means by which Austrian, and later Hungarian, ruling elites crafted state/society configurations that attempted to satisfy the liberalist question with absolutist forms. The shift of governing policy from 1848 to 1867 in Hapsburg rule bear closer examination, as this period defined the political and ideological shape of the empire until its dissolution at the conclusion of World War I. Take, for example, the initial attempts by Austrian rulers to, in effect, delegitimize historic territorial claims by Hungarians through elimination of intra-state boundaries in favor of re-districting that emphasized dilution of concentrated Magyar populations with large groups of non-Magyar subjects. Kontler called this pre-1867 period the Bach period, or the emergence of a neo-absolutist style of governance that included redoubled efforts at Germananization and standardization across the empire. Tariffs were abolished, weights and measures became uniform and mandatory use of German in schools and governance all marked efforts by the Hapsburgs in the post-1848 era to create a unitary state. Croatian and Serbian subjects found their limited autonomy revoked as well, replaced with a strict surveillance program that fully embodied the ideal of the polizeistaat. Combined, these policies sought to bring the interaction between state and society under the aegis of Hapsburg imperial identity by literally erasing distinction in favor of Germanized uniformity. In effect, Hapsburg rulers answered the question of liberalism by rejecting limitation on governmental rule in favor of a unitary state that sought liberal reforms 10 injected with absolutist content.

10 Abolition of Serfdom in 1848

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When these efforts failed to significantly strengthen the unifying myth of imperial rule, the Hapsburgs decided to further tinker with their governmental apparatus, opting for a dualist configuration with the Magyars instead of the more liberal federation option that would have provided autonomous rule to significant minority populations. The Angshelus, or Compromise of 1867, represents a break with other absolutist governing models then in use in Europe in that it offered generous terms of selfgovernment and quasi-sovereignty to a minority that possessed a certified historical claim in exchange for loyal patronage and support of the imperial regime. The Hungarian minority fit this new state/society configuration for several reasons. Dual-Monarchial rule with the Magyars suited Hapsburg desires to transform the empire by dividing the land into two parts, with the western portion to become a new Austrian state and the eastern portion to come under the management of a minority capable of providing both a historical claim to rule and the capacity to do so. By granting the Magyars quasisovereignty the Hapsburgs quelled a major source of separatist sentiment then beginning to grow in strength among many of the non-Austrian minorities. Recognition of Hungary as a certified agent worthy of statehood also satisfied limited demands of the liberalist question on the state/society configuration. As such, the Dual-Monarchy preserved absolutist content within liberal forms while at the same time rejecting the ideal of a civic nationalism policy in favor of an ethnic conception that, for a time, preserved the ancient regime. The Magyar elites, ever suspicious of Hapsburg intent, nonetheless accepted the terms of Dualism because they, in turn, recognized the offer as affirmation of their efforts to develop a Hungarian national consciousness in previous decades. Of course, the

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Dualist configuration, being only liberal in form, contained several absolutist strings that restricted full Hungarian autonomy. The Austrian emperor retained rights as supreme warlord and also possessed the ability to presanction laws, thus keeping undesired bills from entering the floor of debate in Parliament. Despite these limitations, Hungarian rulers were largely given a free hand in managing their own territory and the various minorities living within. Taking cue from their Austrian counterparts, Hungarian rulers instituted strict Magyarization policies designed to assimilate minority populations through both forced language instruction and exclusion from centers of power. Here, again, the concept of certified agent comes to the fore, as only the Croats achieved limited recognition by the Hungarians as a political entity due to their historic claims to self-rule, a title denied to the Slovaks who never held a recognized historic claim and were seen only as subjects of the Hungarian crown. 11 By granting the Croats rights based solely upon historic claims of previous existence, Hungarian rulers not only extended articulations of the state/society configuration used by the Austrians in the Angshelus of 1867, they also similarly precluded the possibility of pursuing civic nationalistic solutions in favor of ethnic nationalistic conceptions that preserved Magyar power and excluded those minorities not deemed certified from the sovereignty process. However, the choices made in supporting this configuration of state/society continued to haunt the newly created Austro-Hungarian Empire until its dissolution in the aftermath of World War I. Then, the Entende powers, aware of the potential fractious nature ethnic nationalization polices, pressured the newly created nation-states of Eastern Europe to

11 Kontler, 281-282, Bidelux and Jefferies, 142.

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adhere to minority protection policies that, in truth, were never enforced and thus hardly effective in diffusing ethnic tensions in the region. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------To summarize the points elaborated in this exploration of the Hapsburg experience, we see that the response to the question of liberalism on the art of government, as proposed by Foucault, resulted in a conception of the state/society relationship in terms that could be called autocratic ethnic liberalism predicated on the certification of the agent in question. Unwilling to surrender land or share power, the Austrian elites at first attempted to eliminate distinction in favor of a unitary state, a rough attempt at imperial civic nationalism that ultimately collapsed with defeat at Konnigratz and subsequent exclusion from the German confederation. Robbed of their German ascendency and facing the prospect of becoming a ruling minority in a multiethnic state, the Austrians eschewed forms of civic nationalism for ethnic conceptions that based legitimacy on certified historic claims. In this way, the Hapsburgs could split the empire into two pieces, with power shared between the Austrian west and the Hungarian east. In doing so both the Austrians and the Hungarians rejected civic nationalistic forms in favor of ethnic configurations that at once cemented their power and doomed it to eventual failure. After the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian empire at the end of World War I, newly minted nation-states comprised largely of former minority groups would pursue similar ethnic conceptions of the state/society relationship, demonstrating the influence Austrian governing models continued to hold over the region even after the empires demise. Yet before we examine this phenomena in greater detail, the focus of the essay turns to the Russian lands ruled by the Romanov dynasty.

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Much like the Hapsburgs, the Romanovs also faced problems in the 19 th and early 20th centuries regarding how to configure state/society relationships in the wake of liberalism's question on governmental reason. Unlike the Hapsburgs, the Romanovs never experimented with granting minorities equal governing status. Instead the regime focused on projecting a nationalism configuration that aimed for civic identity yet did so under increasingly very specific ethnic terms. However, while the 19 th century saw the emergence of the Russian identity formula, Nationality, Autocracy, Orthodoxy, only two of those terms, Autocracy and Orthodoxy, were clearly defined and understood. 12 Nationality would remain difficult for the Russian empire to define as several distinct groups muddled the formula stated above by calling into question applicability of using ethnic definitions to create an imperial civil identity. Due to these concerns, Romanov elites made issues of certification paramount in their quest. In turn, certification depended heavily upon interpretation by diverse populations of information circulating through the empire. While the Romanovs never shared power, a la the Hapsburgs, with other distinct minority groups, this did not preclude experimentation of liberalist reforms in pockets of Empire space- indeed, this combination of circulation, experimental reforms, and definition of identity better explains the tsarist attempts to formulate an answer to the question of liberalism. This portion of the essay will examine Romanov difficulties with establishing a Great Russian centered civic nationality in the face of certification challenges used by
12Acknowledge idea of schism in orthodoxy and the differentiation between old believers and others. Generally state saw these groups as non-orthodox, but had deeper and more complicated relationship.

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subjects and predicated on mutation of knowledge circulating through the empire. Much has been written on the debate within the intelligentsia on the Slavophile vs. Westernizer issue and, while I do not want to revisit their arguments in total, I would like to point out the inherent contradiction in trying to enforce an ambiguous identity upon a diverse population. Combined with the often hap-hazard implementation of reforms in small sections of the empire, the efforts by Romanov elites to answer liberalisms question and create a reconfiguration of the state/society relationship resulted, much like the experience of the Hapsburgs, in the further elaboration of absolutist methods of rule encased within liberal forms. To begin, I will look at the work of Laura Engelstein and her essay on the implications of a weak commitment to the rule of law on larger Russian society. Then, looking at the Caucasus region of Romanov territory, issues on the permeability of identity and the risk of going native come to the fore. In conclusion, the focus shifts to the 1897 Census where issues surrounding the difficulty encountered by Romanov authorities in enforcing universal civic identity formed within a Great Russian ethnic conception. Combined, these explorations into Russian configurations of state/society relationships provide a mosaic look at the larger problems facing the multi-ethnic empire, problems that would later shape the formulation of nationalism policy under Bolshevik rule. Tsarist Commitment to Rule of Law One of the central themes of this essay, that multi-ethnic empires addressed liberalist influences in differing manners, forms a part of the core argument in Laura

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Engelsteins collection of essays, Slavophile Empire.13 The first essay, Combined Underdevelopment, specifically addressed Russian Imperial, and later Soviet, rulers suspicion of liberalist claims that reconfigured the relation between discipline and state and placed them both under the rule of law. The illiberal tradition within Russian development questioned the egalitarian nature such a reconfiguration promised, pointing out that the rule of law merely shifted the operation of power from the autocrat to the bourgeoisie and that any promise of a more liberal government as a result only clouded the true operation of coercion upon the population. One consequence of rejecting the rule of law in favor of illiberal governing methods for Russian rulers was that the state never fully surrendered authority to the, then, growing prominence of specialists amongst the intelligentsia in exchange for an increased presence in regulation of their behavior. Instead, the regime sought cultivation of talent from within, drawing upon an ever-meager supply of statisticians, rural doctors, and land surveyors14 (to name a few) to carry out desired directives from above. This reliance on internal structures to fulfill initiatives made the regime especially concerned with issues of certification in terms of knowledge circulation within the empire. Examining two different areas of the central bureaucratic mission in the 19 th century, the military efforts in the Caucasus and the Imperial Census of 1897, one can see the ambiguity and shifting conceptions of Russian imperial identity that occurred during this period. In this regard Romanov rulers, much like their Hapsburg counterparts, instituted

13Laura Engelstein, Slavophile Empire 14See several articles on this subject- cross dressing professionals, priests, rural doctors

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forms of the state/society relationship that, later, helped establish norms for 20 th century nationalism policy in that region. Going Native As the Russian empire expanded, slowly, in the east its domain came to incorporate several distinct ethnic minority groups. This Russian frontier presented challenges to establishing an inclusive imperial identity, as the cultural exchange between diverse groups and the ruling authorities was by no means unidirectional and often produced intermixing of norms best explained by the going native phenomena in the Caucasus region over the course of the 18th through mid 19th centuries. Mikail Mamedov explained this native effect on both Russian civil and military personnel stationed in the Caucasus.15 As more and more Russians (a term Mamedov explains could encompass Ukrainians, Baltic Germans, or Lithuanians) spent time serving the state in this eastern region, their habits and customs adjusted to incorporate local norms of dress and horse riding in addition to other cultural trends with regards to conducting warfare and seeking a bride. This process of going native only exemplifies the problems Russian rulers had in articulating a civic identity rooted in ethnic conceptions. One of the reasons Russians went native was that Caucasus clothes and horsemanship better suited the climate and terrain, especially in conducting warfare maneuvers, and assumption of local cultural norms allowed Russian servicemen to continue, in form, previous methods of Cossack rule. Instead of fighting this trend and becoming preoccupied with the mixing of cultural identities, the ruling authorities instead

15 Mikail Mamedov Going Native article

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demonstrated what Mamedov called the flexibility of Russian imperial consciousness 16 and made Georgian/Caucasus dress the standard uniform of stationed troops in 1866. Even Russification policies exemplified this flexibility, as their abandonment in the Caucasus region in 1845 revealed a relative ease with which Russian elites incorporated native traditions into their own practices. Unlike their Western European brethren, who over the course of the 19th century develop an increasing sense of separateness vis a vis their colonial subjects, Russian rulers, while ultimately conceiving of imperial identity in ethnic terms, tended to regard their relationship with the numerous ethnic minorities in what Mamedov calls cosmopolitan European terms. 17 While Russian authorities certainly held an intermixing cultural relationship with ethnic minorities, evidenced by Mamedov and others 18, I believe this practice was less influenced by a desire to espouse cosmopolitan European ideals than by an acceptance of the common situation between Russian bureaucratic desire and means; with few actual central agents as compared to the native population size and area of imperial territory they lived on, many Russian policies towards minorities in the east possessed a surprising degree of flexibility. As a result, while the authorities desired to assimilate native populations and were not afraid of cross-cultural mixing, over the course of the 19 th century increasing frustrations with the bureaucracys inability to achieve the goals of imperial civic identity gave rise to a desire to simplify the identity question by placing its terms in ethnic conceptions, causing the previous goals of assimilation to mutate into one 16 Ibid, ??? 17 Ibid, ??? 18 Ibid & other articles on minority interaction

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of similarity.19 Under this framework, minorities could never supplant the ethnic Russian in terms of central identity, but they could mimic those forms around which this unattainable central identity built itself upon, like Orthodox worship or primary use of the Russian language, in order to make invisible those qualities that differed in their ethnic/religious/political character or beliefs. Russians could feel less threatened by socalled cultural contamination occurring with its servicemen in the Caucasus because, ultimately, ethnic Russians would remain ethnically distinct from the native population that could only hope for acceptance as a similar being and not as a civic equal. This similarity discourse became a tsarist legacy the Bolsheviks drew upon in formulating their nationalism policy, a process described in more detail below, and the terms of its existence crystallized over the interpretation of the 1897 imperial census results. 1897 Imperial Census Perhaps one of the best sources for establishing, then understood, conceptions of identity in multi-ethnic empires are census records. During the storied history of Romanov rule, only one census managed to be taken of the complete imperial lands in 1897. A relatively simple form, the census exemplified attitudes towards the rising nationality question while also acting as an impetus for internal debate on issues related to ethnic identity and the potential for assimilation. Statisticians working on the project represented, both, the 'internal' specialist used and preferred by tsarist authorities as well as a potential source for more 'liberal' reforms in the area of 'civil nationalism'. Taken together, the multifaceted nature of the 1897 census reveals the contradictory nature of the Romanov configuration of state/society that, on one level, attempted to foster an
19 Deloria, ???

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imperial identity intended to unite disparate populations, and, on another level, pronounced non-ethnic Russians as capable of similarity but not assimilation. This paradoxical pursuit of an inclusive civic, yet exclusive ethnic, formulation of identity is best seen through the debates on the implementation and interpretation of the census results. To begin, census takers were primarily concerned with only with the elaboration of three questions pertaining to language, estate and religion. Language claims, generally accurate, did little to help statisticians understand the 'national' content of the Russian Empire. Estate classifications also proved problematic, as respondents, knowing full well the potential benefits of being classified as a 'peasant' or other official 'estate' identity, often provided answers that did not truly reflect their situation. The estate system, once held as the defining feature of the Russian state/society configuration, suddenly found itself incapable of accounting for the increasing diversity and concern of the authorities with regards to minority populations. Reviewing the results, Romanov rulers became alarmed at the seeming fluidity the estate category provided in terms of identity and responded by defining 'Russian-ness' as an ethnic category instead of a more wide-ranging civic definition. This move de facto ended the quest in multi-ethnic Imperial Russia to create a 'unifying myth' among the disparate populations and ultimately affirmed the notion that nationality was singularly and irrevocably linked to ethnicity. ************ Having quickly surveyed the impact Liberalism's question on the state/society configuration wrought upon the the Hapsburg and Romanov empires, lets take a moment to pause and summarize the points made above. Essentially, the problem of redefining

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the relationship between state and society in a multi-ethnic empire centered on the question of identity. As Liberalist ideals spread through the Western European nations, highlighting the role of the individual and establishing the idea of a 'civil society', states such as Britain and France coalesced around a shared history and created a nation-state predicated on civic identity. Even relatively new players on the scene, like Germany, embraced a civic identity in the creation of their nation-states. However, in such diverse multi-ethnic empires as governed by the Hapsburgs and Romanovs, building an inclusive civic identity contrasted sharply with absolutist governing models that depended on exclusivity and, increasingly over the 19 th century, 'ethnic' conceptions of identity that promoted 'similarity' over 'assimilation'. These absolutist regimes, because of their relative minority 'majority' status in their own lands, sought to address the question of Liberalism and its pursuant reconfiguration of the state/society by integrating limited portions of the Liberal program into their illiberal governing methods. In the early 19th century, for both Hapsburg and Romanov, this amounted to limited attempts at instilling a unified 'civic' identity based largely on the positivist theme and promise of assimilation. When these initial efforts failed to achieve spectacular results, evidenced by the creation of the 'Dual-Monarchy' in Austrian lands and the endorsement of 'Orthodoxy, Nationalism, Autocracy' in Russian domains, policies and hopes for assimilation found replacement with more muted ambitions of simple similarity. As the late 19 th and early 20th centuries demonstrated, this shift to a doctrine that precluded ethnic minorities ascension to the level of citizens, instead of subjects, heralded the basic rejection of liberalistic value even while the forms of liberal governance were slowly expanded. At the conclusion of the First World War, when both

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Romanov and Hapsburg empires faced disintegration, this illiberal legacy left models both the newly emerging Eastern Europe nation-states and the civil-war torn Bolshevik cadres would use in the articulation of state/society relationships expressed in the formulation and practice of nationalism policy. It is this early 20 th century period, in which new actors take stage, that the second portion of this essay turns to and evaluates. ************************************* Aftermaths often prove deceptive, especially at the conclusion of war-time, in helping the historian interpret a pivotal moment. The aftermath of World War I in the lands of the rapidly defunct Austro-Hungarian empire proved no different. The Entente powers, weary and war-torn, saw in the dissolution of the multi-ethnic Hapsburg empire an opportunity to not only implement Western Liberal ideas on legitimate expressions of nationalism, evidenced by use of 'self-determination' as a certified process, but also create a 'cordon sanitare', a buffer zone between Western Europe and the newly emerged Bolshevik state taking root in the corpse of Romanov rule. It was the Entente's wish to create out of Eastern Europe a new bastion of Western Liberalism, one that would avoid the mistakes of the past Austro-Hungarian and Romanov rulers by enshrining at the core minority rights for the disparate ethnic populations, many of whom found themselves citizens of new nation-states that never before existed. Yet these policies were far from benevolent, as minority rights were believed not to be a means for preserving the integrity of ethnic distinctiveness but instead as a guarantor against disruptive separatists feeling that could occur before the ethnic populations fully assimilated into their new nation-state's culture.

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The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, isolated from the West by ideological fervor and belief in the 'future war'20, themselves had to contend with how to appropriately deal with ethnic minority populations who, traditionally, held either weak or disruptive ties to the former Imperial government. Recent historical research strongly suggests that the Bolshevik regime lifted Imperial forms of governance and organization and re-purposed them to fit their needs. In the realm of nationalist policy, the Soviet government, just like the Entente, recognized the danger of unchecked separatist feeling and sought to define this potential disruption through the implementation of korenizatsiia, or indigiousness, program. In this second portion of the essay, both the Western created nation-states of Eastern Europe and the Bolshevik korenizatsiia represent the endurance of state/society configurations created in the 19 th century. A brief survey of both systems reveals that previous 'certification' methods employed by the multi-ethnic empires in Austria-Hungary and Imperial Russia thrived in the more modern conception of the nation-state in the West, and the nation in the Soviet Union. Far from being new state/society configurations, these 20th century nations brought continuity to old forms through continuation of the circulation process described in the beginning of the essay. For newly minted nation-states, this involved ethnic demarcations of citizens and those not yet 'assimilated', prompting irridentist claims, as in the case of Hungary, and 'dualist' modes of power sharing, in the case of Yugoslavia, which nonetheless yielded more authority to one ethnicity over the other. With the Bolsheviks, initial forays into a far more 'liberal' nationality policy eventually yielded to an imperial conception of the 'Great Russian' as
20 Discuss how Bolshevik leaders had fixation on this future war, impacted choices of governance and development. Stone, Hammer and Rifle Others too.

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being the only ethnicity worthy of promotion and emulation among the other Soviet Republics. Briefly examining the initial developments in both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the 20th century reveals that so-called 'new configurations' of Liberalism, expressed in nationality policy, were little more than extensions of illiberal models conjured by the previous rulers of empire. The New States of Eastern Europe Woodrow Wilson, in his surprise declaration of the Fourteen Points, ushered in one of the grandest reconfigurations of political reality Europe had seen in the past 300 years. The specific point establishing self-determination as a means of legitimizing formulation of new states at once eschewed the old 'Concert of Europe' in favor of a far more liberal conception of the state/society relationship, while also shoehorning new states into minority protection policies designed not to facilitate tolerance but assimilation of smaller populations into the larger, 'certified', nation-states. 21 In this manner, self-determination became an extension of the certification process by which certain minority groups deemed worthy by the Western powers received the ultimate prize of a nation-state, while those groups deemed unworthy were forced to settle with either ethnic amalgamations of nation-states or outright rejection of their identity in favor of assimilationist policies. To be certain, the increased presence and ability of once minority populations, such as the Czechs and the Poles, to form their own nation state marked an increased presence of liberalism in the region, those populations not deemed
21 Of course 'certification' meant many things to the Allied powers- on one hand, they desired to implement a Western European style nation-state network on top of the populations of Eastern Europe, while on the other, they were bound by secret treaties and promises made to various factions in exchange for support against the Central Powers. The peace settlement also revealed a preference for those nations deemed 'successors' of the Western ideal, with other minority populations, such as the Slovenes or Slovaks, essentially denied a seat at the negotiation table. See Bidelux and Jefferies, 410.

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worthy or those in isolated pockets of minorities located in the territories of created nations found little consolation with the new liberal order. Perhaps most striking about the new nation-states was the use of old state/society models in establishing their own nationality policies. One of the key differences between the formation of nation-state in Eastern Europe and the rest of Western Europe was the substitution of ethnic qualifiers for membership in place of civic conceptions that would have allowed non-homogenous populations the ability to transform from subject to citizens. This, essentially, was the same process followed by both Austrian and Hungarian rulers in their previous decades of rule and when ethnic populations were given the opportunity to escape their own forced assimilation experience and allowed to develop their own sense of culture and shared history they, in turn, instituted assimilationist policies that oppressed the smaller group of minorities in their new territory.22 It should also be noted that the formulation of post-war Eastern Europe was highly influenced by the various secret agreements made by representatives of the Entende powers with the minority populations of the Austro-Hungarian empire that promised land spoils in exchange for support against the Central powers. Hence the curious situation of Romania, who managed to secure and win large territorial gains simply entering the war, very late, on the side of the West. Eastern European representatives that possessed credibility with the powers of Britain and France, like those from the Serbian exile government and Czech emigres like Thomas Masaryk, were able to both secure their 'place at the table' during the Paris peace negotiations and deny
22 Ibid, 395.

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other minorities, such as the Croats, Slovenes and Slovaks, any chance to argue their case for separate nation-states. The result was an Eastern Europe that, on face, fulfilled the forms of Western Liberalism but failed to mimic the essential content. The following decades after the First World War would see nation-states of Eastern Europe quarrel with each other over territorial disputes, economic disputes (exacerbated by both French and American abandonment of the region, politically and financially, at the conclusion of the Paris Peace talks), and ethnic disputes, as the redrawing of Eastern Europe, already a hodgepodge of peoples, left several pockets of minority ethnic enclaves in larger ethnicallydifferent 'host' states. As Joseph Rothschild and Nancy Wingfield noted in their work, Return to Diversity, But in the so-called nation-states of the interwar era, an ethnic minority seemed fated, short of war and a redrawing of frontiers, to remain disadvantaged forever, not simply in the neutral statistical sense, but also in terms of political, economic, cultural, and sometimes even civic and legal deprivations. Hence it tended to seek succor from its ethnic and cultural 'mother country' against the pressures of the 'host' state, and thus the dispute was internationalized. 23 While some states, such as Poland, envisioned giving their non-homogenous ethnic pockets greater autonomy rights, conflicts with the Soviet Union and larger border disputes eventually pushed authorities to embrace a vision of restoring pre-partion borders and an emphasis of 'nationalizing' state structures and peoples. Contested ethnic areas were settled with 'loyal' Polish citizens, a colonization attempt reminiscent of similar tactics used by both the Hapsburg and Romanov dynasties in establishing, then,

23 Joseph Rothschild and Nancy Wingfield, Return to Diversity 8.

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'loyal' imperial subjects in border areas in order to speed along assimilation and integration of the disparate populations. 24 Thus, the new nation-states of Eastern Europe found themselves implementing nationalism policies that mimicked the ethnic-centered definitions of citizenship embraced by the illiberal, absolutist empires of the 19 th century. However, unlike the Romanovs and Hapsburgs, the nation-states of Eastern Europe found some measure of legitimacy in pursuit of this old program as their content and form, on face, espoused the same liberal ideals then being advocated by the victorious Western powers. As shall be seen in the following section, the Soviet Union also attempted to embrace portions of the liberal program for legitimacy among the ethnically diverse peoples of the former Russian empire, yet they, too, failed to eschew the illiberal tendencies of the former Tsarist regime when defining the core characteristics of Soviet identity. Soviet Korenizatsiia Unlike the newly created nation-states of Eastern Europe, the Bolshevik forces had to first fight and endure four years of civil war (1917-1921) before they could address pressing nationality claims. However, once their power consolidated, the Bolsheviks could implement programs that, on face, were far more liberal with regards to minority populations. Knowing full well the failures of the Imperial regime to quell nationalist sentiment, the Bolsheviks introduced the policy of koreinizatsiia, or 'indigiousness', in an attempt to provide a state/society configuration that would prove capable of both satisfying local demands for a more autonomous role in their governance and facilitating the implementation of ambitious social consciousness identity
24 Nick Baron and Peter Gatrell, Population Displacement, State Building, and Social Identity 77-79.

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construction, i.e. creation of the new 'Soviet Citizen'. Over time, the implementation of korenizatsiia produced a schematic dichotomy that divided the USSR into West/East categories, much like those that existed during tsarist rule, and the initial desire to promote distinctiveness whilst codifying Soviet uniformity gave way to prioritization of the Great Russian identity over others. By tracing the development of 'korenizatsiia' and evaluating its ideals and goals against the that of national programs implemented in Eastern Europe and Africa, I argue that policy solutions devised by the Bolsheviks, despite its initial supra-liberal approach, relied upon tsarist conceptions of the state/society configuration- ultimately producing similar governance instabilities as experienced by the Romanov dynasty. By looking the specific example of korenizatsiia implementation in Soviet Turkmenistan, one can clearly see that the Bolshevik ideological goals did not match the reality on the ground. Much like their European counterparts, the Bolsheviks, upon realization of the disconnect between expectation and implementation, reverted to familiar patterns of behavior first expressed by the previous illiberal regimes of the 19 th century. Soviet Turkmenistan and the African Colonial Comparison One of the primary goals of korenizatsiia, according to Bolshevik ideology, was to promote class consciousness and development of Soviet identity in an attempt to defuse tribal conflicts and dismantle land holding establishments. The Turkmen, a nomadic group that used extensive kinship ties to reinforce their social system, represented for the Bolsheviks a group not suitable for autonomous rule but capable of being reshaped by social policies. The idea was to categorize the Turkmen people, who by nature did not define themselves in terms of class or nation, into western Russian

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defined groups of poor, middle, and rich (the infamous kulak). Once sifted into the various categories, the Bolsheviks could then target the 'poor' and promote them to leadership positions in an attempt to inculcate proletarian values amongst a group believed to be held down by tribal inequalities. While this plan looked impressive on paper and in discussion, implementation of the policy among the Turkmen proved the error of ideological assumptions held by the Soviet leadership, producing effects in the nomadic society contradictory to the stated goals. Take, for example, Soviet efforts at instituting new land holding practices among Turkmen tribes. The real issue behind land use in the traditional society centered on water rights and previous to the incursion in this area by Bolshevik agents there existed a complex sharing system along the Turkmen tied to kinship groupings and behaviors of social reciprocity. As the central authorities sought to extend and regulate the irrigation system they inadvertently exacerbated social divides among kinship groups, as some Turkmen deemed 'poor' or 'kulak' were either given more access or less access, respectively, to the water supply. The new arrangement, while inline with stated Bolshevik goals of promoting Soviet identity, blithely trampled on previously established networks and relationships held by the Turkmen which, in turn, promoted conflict between tribes instead of defusing previously assumed tensions. 25 Of course, one of the primary reasons the korenizatsiia policy for the Turkmen promoted more conflict than it resolved was that is defined tribal people as incapable of autonomous rule, thus necessitating direct influence by Bolshevik authorities in order to
25 There is also the example of using Turkmen to staff local, Soviet administrative offices. By assigning positions of power to those deemed class appropriate, i.e. the 'poor' Turkmen, Soviet policies ignored established lines of power and created yet another source of inter-tribal conflict. See Adriene Edgar ???

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bring about the desired societal change. This 'top-down' reform for populations deemed incapable of developing the proper identity harkens back to attitudes held by Imperial authorities with regards to non-Russian populations. While the Bolsheviks assumed that implementing land reform and affirmative action reforms would spur the Turkmen to adopt new characteristics of Soviet identity, when such developments failed to occur in a timely manner the Bolsheviks could do little more than begin to implement reforms and changes by instituting, in the Turkmen lands, ethnic-Russian agents. Whereas the Imperial regime satisfied itself with only minimal contact in the Turkmen lands in exchange for law and order, Soviet authorities sought direct engagement in shaping the content and identity of the minority population. As Adeeb Khalid states in his article on Early Soviet Central Asia, the Bolsheviks sought to integrate Central Asia into Soviet hegemonic orbit by waging a conquering war on difference. 26 The quest for 'similarity', another holdout from tsarist times, thus reemerged in the korenizatsiia program implemented in the 'backwards' Eastern lands. Indeed, many aspects of the Bolsheviks program among the Turkmen echoed similar motivations and ultimate failures encountered by the previous tsarist government in attempting to instill a 'civic' identity. Initial failure in the attempt to fabricate new social consciousness and sense of Soviet identity in the traditionally tribal Turkmen peoples resulted in direct rule via ethnic Russian agents of the Soviet government. Terry Martin states that the dilemma of the Soviet nationality policy lie in its embrace of both an extra-territorial personal definition of nationality and established definitions of territory linked with governing power tied to ethnicity of the inhabitants. Hoping to avoid the assimilationist pressures
26 Adeeb Khalid- article???

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encountered by 'minority rights' policies found in the West and the new nation-states of Eastern Europe, the Soviets korenizatsiia program actually exacerbated ethnic tensions and did little to build towards the utopian future desired by Bolshevik leaders. 27 The failure to inculcate a strong, universalist identity among the varied peoples of the Soviet Union in the 20's and 30's led to embracing of the ethnic-Russian as the desired archetype smaller groups or nations should aspire to be. This shift would, in effect, provide the backdrop to the crushing of 'alternative paths to socialism' expressed by various Eastern European nations and derided by nervous leaders in the central Soviet bureaucracy. Yet beyond portending the future, the failure of korenizatsiia to produce the desired results among minority populations found some measure of congruence with similar policies pursued by the new nation-states of Eastern Europe and the colonial powers of Africa.28 As stated above, the Western powers who dictated the terms of peace after the Second World War predicated establishment of new Eastern European nationstates upon acceptance of 'minority protection' policies. While this seemed, on face, similar to the desires expressed by the Soviet policy of korenizatsiia, namely a way to ease separatist ethnic tensions, in actual practice the two methods diverged wildly as the new masters of Eastern Europe didn't want to carve out a special space for minorities as much as they wanted to pressure the smaller populations into assimilation. Soviet

27 Terry Martin noted how korenizatsiia policies implemented, first, in the Ukraine produced debates over the role of Russian population concentrations in participation of governing now ethnically defined territorial units. While korenizatsiia was meant to defuse tensions, its reliance upon stipulating local ethnic control of government actually promoted 'us vs. them' mentalities as the establishment of a larger supra-national Soviet identity failed to take hold. National Soviets, established a crucial connection between ethnic identity and administrative control of territory. Affirmative Action Empire, 42. 28 Information for this portion of the essay comes from Peter Blitstein Cultural Diversity and the Interwar Conjecture: Soviet Nationality Policy in its Comparative Context Slavic Review vol. 65 no. 2 (Summer 2006)

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authorities, on the other hand, sought to create a minority space but one that ultimately required guidance from the Communist Party. In the case of African colonial policy, the European nations desired to implement gradual change that would produce a cadre of low-level workers (peasants, petty clerks, and laborers) suitable for work in administrative support for the West. They did not embrace ideals of self-determination or minority protection, as were espoused for the new nations of Eastern Europe, fearing the consequences transformation of Africans into 'model Europeans' would bring to the concept of European rule. Western powers also viewed African wage-laborers and other proletariat as 'detribalized' and free from traditional networks of influence (which the colonial powers co-opted to a great degree), providing both another source of paranoia and reason to avoid implementing modernization or nationalization policies in colonial territories. 29 The Soviets sought almost the exact opposite, with their korenizatsiia policy dedicated to producing a model and modern 'European' citizen, albeit one with a universalist identity couched in Soviet terms. Viewing the creation of autonomous republics, on one level, as a construct that would help 'vent' separatist/nationalist pressure and, on another level, a temporary holdover sustaining traditional cultures until proper inculcation produced a new Soviet identity, Bolshevik leaders hoped to avoid the mistakes of the tsarist past by vigorously embracing some liberalist norms in the pursuit of building a supranational identity. Yet, as the above demonstrates, the initial failures to secure this supranational ideal led the Soviet government to embrace a Russian-centered program of preferential treatment. Conclusions
29 Peter Blitstein, Cultural Diversity and the Interwar Conjecture: Soviet Nationality Policy in its Comparative Context Slavic Review 65(2): 283-288

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The rise of Nationalism, tied to but behind the rise of Liberalism, commanded attention by both Western and Eastern European powers as the very foundation of the social contract between ruler and ruled came into question. A new focus on society, instead of the state, prompted ruling powers of the day to come up with configurations of the state-society relationship that would satisfy their local needs and produce, perceived, benefits liberal economic and governmental doctrines promised. At the center of the change was the question of population, specifically who constituted a citizen of the newly established entity of the nation. While previous medieval regimes focused more on elaborations of central power as the defining aspect of identity, modern states began to see the benefits defining population as the main aspect of identity. Napoleon recognized this benefit in his pithy statement, regarding how a man will not give his life for small amounts of money or distinction, You must speak to the soul in order to electrify him. Nationalism was the soul of the population expressed. Whereas both France and Britain, with their large concentration of homogenous populations, adopted more civic forms of national identity (albeit in terms that were still largely ethnically defined, and, of course, not across their entire empire's holdings) the Hapsburg and Romanov rulers, governing territories of distinctly non-homogenous populations, came to embrace exclusive ethnic definitions of citizenship over inclusive civic ones due mainly to early failures in attempting to instill an 'imperial identity' that surmounted ethnic loyalties. Austria's failed bid for German ascendency, exemplified in the military loss at Konnigratz, led to the creation of an Austro-Hungarian dualist configuration of power that increasingly pursued ethnic-centered assimilationist policies amongst minority groups living in each section of the 'new' empire. Imperial Russia, too,

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made initial attempts at pursuing a more civic-centered definition of citizen, yet ultimately found the potential empowerment of disparate minorities to be a threat to established institutions of Imperial power. The result in both empires was an assimilationist policy that favored 'similarity' yet denied equality, all the while seeking to obliterate distinctiveness of the targeted 'foreign' populations. World War I changed the political boundaries of the empires in question, but failed to enact similar change on the models of governance handed down from the defunct ruling regimes. In both the new nation-states of Eastern Europe and the autonomous republics of the Bolshevik Soviet Union, supposedly new implementations of the liberal quest for nationalism embraced familiar illiberal configurations of the statesociety relationship.