GR No.

127255, 1997-08-14
JOKER P. ARROYO v. JOSE DE VENECIA,
Facts:
Challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240... charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners
claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48
a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his
sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated.
He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum,...
although until the end of his interpellation he never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate
and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of
Representatives and by the Senate on November
21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
etitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of
the House; that these rules embody... the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, §16(3) that "each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the
Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was... properly passed is
false and spurious.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill
certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a
quorum and asking for a reconsideration.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is false and
spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred.
This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996 over the lone... objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman.[8]
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session adjourned until four o'clock in the
afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)
This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval except Rep. Lagman.
Issues:
Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was "railroaded." They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still
making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's motion approved.
Ruling:
"When it appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to asce... n this case no rights of private
individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer
the dispute to this Court
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano's motion for the approval of the
conference committee report should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the Members
should have been taken. They say that the method used in... this case is a legislator's nightmare because it suggests
unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as this
involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or
nominal voting.
It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of submitting the proper
motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to
the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's... question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or a question of
privilege entitled to precedence.[30] And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's motion to adjourn
would have precedence and would have put an end to any further... consideration of the question.[31]
To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum.
Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the
existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously
present for the purpose of delaying the... business of the House. Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued
interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum.
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the
Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996
are conclusive of its due enactment. Much... energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno,
joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the
EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a... conclusive presumption. In one
case[38] we "went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a
statute had been approved by the Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the presiding
officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims
that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a... proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained,
because "a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts."[39] This Court
quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good,... if old-fashioned, democratic
theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings of
Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a second
and higher Legislature. But they aim in the... wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an
inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend
casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities... with the Constitution; but
to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll
may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.[40]
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President contained provisions
which had been "surreptitiously" inserted in the conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have no more
basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it
had prepared, we should decline... the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled
bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government.[41]
It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in violation of Art.
VI, §26(2) of the Constitution that "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed." [42]
In other cases,[43] this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by the
presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text writers here and
abroad.[44] The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations:
    . . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of
the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the
President of the
Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws,
that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to... coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so...
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.[45]
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and overthrow
an established rule of evidence.
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule, except to say that, with a
change in the membership of the Court, the three new members may be assumed to have an open mind on the
question of the enrolled bill rule. Actually, not three but four
(Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since our decision in the EVAT cases and
their places have since been taken by four new members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.)
Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the... membership of the Court.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of
November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No.
8240, was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is... required by the Constitution. Art. VI, §16(4)
provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as
may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth
of the Members present, be... entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded
therein.[46] With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been
accorded conclusive... effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons,[47] this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy
for regarding the Journals as "public memorials of the most permanent character," thus: "They should be public,
because all are required to conform to them;... they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of
what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting
only in the memory of individuals." As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240... is shown in the
Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a
legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow
those defeated in the political arena to seek... a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy
in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real
or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and... would itself be guilty of
grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case[48] may instead appropriately be made
here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence...
of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief
that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.[49]
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.