Vincent V.

Hilldrup
Tufts University History and German Major

The Reasons for Japanese

Imperialism
(1895-1910)

By Vincent V. Hilldrup

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 Vincent V. Hilldrup
Tufts University History and German Major

Contents
I. Timeline of key events: ............................................................................................ 3
II. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 3
III. Japanese Modernization ........................................................................................... 4
IV. Japanese aspirations for expansion into Korea......................................................... 5
V. Conflicts with China and the Sino-Japanese War 1894-1895 .................................. 6
VI. Japanese troubles in Korea ....................................................................................... 7
VII. The Boxer Rebellion of 1900 ................................................................................... 7
VIII. Conflicts with Russia................................................................................................ 8
IX. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 .............................................................................. 9
X. Towards Korean Annexation 1905-1910 ................................................................. 9
XI. Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 10

Electroniccopy
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 Vincent V. Hilldrup
Tufts University History and German Major

I. Timeline of Key Events

1871 – The Iwakura Mission

February 26, 1876 – Kanghwa Treaty
July 29, 1894 – Japan declares war on China
October 1895 – Coup d’Etat in Korea leads to the death of the Korean Queen.
April 1898 – Nichi-Rosen Agreement
May 1900 – Boxer Rebellion
January 1902 – Anglo-Japanese Alliance
February 10, 1904 – Japan declares war on Russia.
August, 1905 – The Russian defeat signed in the Treaty of Portsmouth
August 1910 – Korea is annexed

II. Introduction

In 1850, since Japan was an economically backward feudal society, it was an easy
prey for the imperialist aspirations of powerful world powers, such as Britain and the
United States, which placed legal and commercial disabilities on Japan in order to fulfill
their own needs. 1 This subordinate position was enforced upon Japan by the United
States in 1854 with the treaty port system that obliged her to open her ports for foreign
trade and residence. Other Western nations, such as Britain and Russia, were soon to
follow in this semi-colonial approach.2 This was important for the development of
imperialism within Japan because not only did it condition the Japanese to emulate the
Western set model as well as give rise to Japan’s own international ambitions, but it also
provided a context for action.3 The Japanese reaction took form under the Meiji
Restoration of 1868 which saw a group of leaders emerge in power. They were
determined to strengthen Japan and within a generation, they had created a modern army
and navy, industrialized the nation, dismantled feudalism while setting up an elaborate
state bureaucracy which centered on the emperor. With these achievements, the oligarchs
believed that they would be able to negotiate more equal treaties with the World powers
that had imposed such disadvantageous treaties during Japan’s opening to trade.4
The first question which comes to mind is the nature of imperialism and what incites
countries to become imperialist nations. Hobson identified imperialism as being caused
by the overproduction of industry that eventually led to a surplus of capital seeking
investment while Lenin considered imperialism to be the monopoly stage of state
capitalism.5 Lenin claimed that capitalism ceased to be dynamic when the domestic
markets could no longer absorb industrial production. According to Lenin, this created
monopolies that had surplus capital with which to invest. Since Western capitalists found
it more profitable to export the investment abroad instead of investing it locally in order
to increase the standards of living of the domestic population, capitalists moved to areas
where capital was lacking but where labor and raw material were cheap. However, it was
soon proven that political domination by the investor’s nation helped secure the
investment within the regions through the development of railways and ports, as well as
law, order and financial stability.6

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 Vincent V. Hilldrup
Tufts University History and German Major
For Japan, this was even more problematic because the bureaucrats of the new Meiji
Regime, despite modernizing Japan, had not done away with the medieval structure of
agriculture. This meant that the purchasing power of Japanese people was low and that
consequently, Japanese industry needed to seek out foreign markets in order to profit.7
The zaibatsu (such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi) also had much to gain from foreign
expansion because they were bankers and leaders of heavy industry which meant that it
would be more profitable for them if they could export their silk and cotton goods
abroad.8 In addition, since these entrepreneurs also derived their profits from military
expenditures, military expansion became not only a way to secure foreign markets but
also to acquire profits from military contracts. This in effect, created an alliance of
convenience between the military leaders and the zaibatsu.9
Tokutomi Soho (1863-1957), a famous Japanese writer, justified Japanese expansion
by the fact that the West still refused to revise the unequal treaties. The victories over
China in the Sino-Japanese war proved to be more successful at gaining Japan respect
from the Western powers than any peaceful method.10 In July 1894, Britain was the first
to revise the treaty and sign a reciprocal foreign treaty with Japan.11

III. Japanese Modernization

It had been the Tokugawa Shogunate’s inability to deal with the American intrusion in
1953 and the forced acceptance of the unequal treaties which had undermined the
Shogunate and caused the Meiji Restoration. Meanwhile, the role of the emperor was to
validate the legitimacy of the oligarchs while remaining the focus of national unity since
he was associated with tradition.12 Nonetheless, Meiji Japan’s primary desire was the
search for security, so Japanese leaders sought to strengthen military and economy
power.13 During the Iwakura mission, Japanese officials had observed the West and by
1873, they used the French and German army as a model for their own, going so far as to
have the French military mission train Japanese NCOs. Furthermore, the rapid increase
in the efficiency in the Japanese army was due to the creation in 1978 of an Army
General Staff which was based on the German model. 14 However, the Japanese
government also remained very concerned with the events occurring on the Asian
mainland because they believed that it was essential for their security.15 Japan was
convinced that it could not let Korea become the protectorate or colony of another power
because it would represent a threat to Japan’s national security since Korea was Japan’s
nearest neighbor.16
In addition, although Japan initially sought recognition, respect and territorial integrity,
these traits later developed into a movement for influence, territorial aggrandizement and
domination which ended up being directed towards the Asian mainland.17 Korea was a
vulnerable neighbor and despite being a vassal state of China, Japan made conscious
efforts to increase its economic, strategic and political influence over it. By 1881, Japan
had begun to help modernize the Korean army while in 1884, a pro-Japanese coup,
dedicated to the independence of Korea from China, seized power for a short period of
time.18
Ultimately, Japanese imperialism was encouraged by industrialization which pressured
for oversea expansion and the opening of foreign markets, as well as by domestic politics
and international prestige. Expansion was therefore not only an indicator of World power

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 Vincent V. Hilldrup
Tufts University History and German Major
status, thusly set up by the Western powers, but also a way to distract the population from
domestic difficulties; while economic consideration shaped Japan’s foreign policy. 19
Furthermore, Japan believed that its survival as an independent state relied on its ability
to conform to imperialism and capitalism which dominated the world.20

IV. Japanese aspirations for expansion into Korea

Since the beginning of the Meiji era, Japan had harbored imperialist ambitions about
Korea. In 1871, the government officials of Iwakura mission departed for the United
States and Europe in order not only to observe Western societies directly, study the legal
and political institutions, but also to revise the unequal treaties imposed on Japan by the
Western Powers.21 At the time, Saigo Takamori was a government official and former
samurai who remained in the Japanese government. He was in favor of a military
dictatorship founded on the lower-class samurai like himself so he took advantage of the
absence of his colleagues and planned to provoke Korea into attacking Japan, thereby
justifying a Japanese invasion of the country. He was essentially motivated by zealous
patriotism and the belief that a Korean conquest would further glorify the former
samurai.22 Though the invasion did not take place and he was ultimately forced to resign,
this is an early example of Japanese imperialism taking place already in the 1870’s as
well as a foreshadowing of Japan’s future territorial ambitions on the Asian mainland.
In 1873, however, the idea of an armed confrontation with Korea was still present in
the minds of the Japanese officials as a means to divert domestic civil unrest and as an
outlet for the ambitions of the disposed samurai. A war party emerged but the Japanese
government still did not want to venture itself and incur the possibility of displeasing the
Western powers.23 Nonetheless, Japan did provoke Korea into starting hostilities by
sending Japanese surveying vessels that ended up clashing against coastal batteries in
September of 1875. Japan demanded an apology and, in much the same way as they had
been forced to accept the port treaty system through American military strength, Japan
imposed the Treaty of Kanghwa on 26 February 1876.24 This treaty opened three Korean
ports to trade and recognized Korea as an independent state even though China still
considered it to be her vassal.25 This meant that Japan could now begin incorporating
Korea into its sphere of influence.26
When uprisings against the imperial family broke out in 1882, they took an anti-
Japanese attitude. The Korean soldiers resented that the Korean government was
reforming the army by hiring Japanese officers and the population blamed Japanese
merchants for the rice shortage and inflation.27 The rebel forces attacked the Japanese
legation but before the Japanese war faction, led by Yamagata, could intervene and gain
territorial concessions, Chinese troops subdued the rebellion and Japan only received
indemnities. Nonetheless, the Japanese army was expanded in anticipation, should
further troubles with Korea arise as well as in preparation for a potential conflict with
China. In 1885, a ten year plan to expand the army was put into effect in an effort to
protect future Japanese interests in Korea.28
The presence of Chinese troops in Korea strengthened their position and in December
1884, the Korean reformers Fukuzawa and Goto Shojiro staged a coup against the Min
faction with the support of the Japanese legation in Seoul. Chinese forces crushed the
coup and the Japanese Minister was forced to flee.29 Japanese public opinion wanted

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 Vincent V. Hilldrup
Tufts University History and German Major
Japan to take a strong stand against China and Korea so a Japanese military force was
sent to demand apologies and indemnities, despite the fact that the Japanese legation was
itself at fault. 30 Nonetheless, Japan settled the matter peacefully in the Li-Ito
Convention because it was not ready for war. In this convention, Japan and China not
only agreed to withdraw their military units from Korea, but also to notify each other the
next time they intended to dispatch troops to Korea.31

V. Conflicts with China and the Sino-Japanese War 1894-1895

Commercial activities between Japan and Korea continued despite Korean civil unrest
which brought support to conservative anti-foreign and anti-Japanese religious cults such
as the Tong Hak Society. By 1894, the Korean government had been forced to ask for
Chinese assistance when the Tong Hak Society caused uprisings in the southern
provinces.32 Upon hearing this, on June 2, the Japanese government invoked the 1885
agreement and sent troops to quell the rebellions on June 7, 1894.33 After the rebellion
was suppressed, both nations refused to withdraw their troops and Japans’s Foreign
Minister, Mutsu Munemitsu, was pressured not to compromise.34
General Kawakami Soroku (the vice-chief of staff of the army) and Mutsu Munemitsu
were to be the main architects in causing the war between China and Japan. First,
however, Mutsu needed to find a pretext in order to free himself from a foreign
intervention, such as from Russia or England, so he openly called for a Sino-Japanese
intervention in Korea in an attempt to implement reforms. Since China refused, clashes
between the Chinese and Japanese forces began to occur. On July 25, there was a naval
clash between Japanese warships and Chinese reinforcement ships off the Inchon coast
and on July 29, 1894, Japan formally declared war on China. Japan was able to defeat
China easily and drive them out of Korea because of the superior training and equipment
of Japanese troops.35
Intoxicated by the multiple victories and the belief that they were fighting for Korea
against the oppression of China, the united Japanese public supported the war effort.
However, the Japanese government recognized its limitations and realized that if the
Chinese government collapsed due to a crushing defeat, not only would they have no one
to negotiate with, but the Western powers would surely intervene to seize parts of
Chinese territories for themselves. Therefore, the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which was
signed in March 1895, was a very calculated move on the part of Japan. The treaty
included the acquisition of large former Chinese territories such as Formosa, the
recognition of Korean independence as well as large indemnities and commercial
privileges for Japan in Chinese ports.36
The Sino-Japanese war marked the successful beginning of Japan’s imperialist
ambitions because it demonstrated its power and increased its influence in Korea.37
However, Russia had its own aspirations in China and Korea and protested against the
acquisition of the Liaodong Peninsula by Japan.38 Other European nations began to see
Japan as a threatening trade rival so they offered to help China resist Japanese demands.39
As Russia’s ally, France supported Russia while Germany supported Russia because it
wished to divert Russia’s attention from Europe. This Triple Intervention forced Japan to
relinquish the Peninsula and ask for extra indemnities instead.40

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 Vincent V. Hilldrup
Tufts University History and German Major
The Triple Intervention reminded Japan that even though she was strong enough to
impose her will on the other Asian nations, she could not resist the pressure of the
Western powers. This convinced the Japanese government that it needed to increase
military expenses and strengthen the economy in order to attain complete autonomy. 41

VI. Japanese troubles in Korea

After the Sino-Japanese war, Russia began to intervene more readily in Korea while
the Japanese Foreign Minister, Miura Goro, got involved in a badly handled coup d’état
attempt which resulted in the murder of the Korean queen in October 1895. The King,
however, managed to escape and take refuge in the Russian legation in February 1896.42
Nonetheless, Koreans resented Russian interference also and when the king returned to
Seoul in February 1897, this weakened the Russian influence in Korea. In April 1898,
Russia and Japan signed the Nishi-Rosen agreement by which they would consult each
other before nominating military or financial advisers. Furthermore, Russia promised no
longer to hinder Japanese commercial interests in Korea.43 By now, Japanese banking
could assert its superiority, thereby financing Japan’s trade with Korea and allowing
Japan to adopt the gold standard in 1897.44 This dominance of trade was also due in part
to the Japanese ownership of the railway rights of the lines which connected Seoul,
Inchon and Pusan.

VII. The Boxer Rebellion of 1900

In May 1900, the Boxers revolted in China and attacked Tientsin where they burnt the
railway and killed many workers as they moved on Peking. The Europeans in the capital
were now in danger of being cut off isolated and a British Admiral was dispatched to
defend them but, after meeting heavy resistance, he was forced to retreat. Peking was
placed under siege and on June 10, the German Minister and a Japanese official were
killed.45 The European powers were very concerned with the developing situation in
China while Japan, despite wanting revenge, remained cautious because it did not wish to
arouse the suspicion of Western powers over its territorial ambitions on the mainland.
Therefore, the Japanese Prime Minister Yamagata proposed to make troops available if
requested by the Western powers.46 Having very few options, the Western powers
solicited military assistance from Japan and a combined Russian, American, French,
British and mainly Japanese force raised the siege.47
By now, the Japanese government was convinced that in order to expand, they needed
the cooperation of the major powers. This meant that they would need to make a choice
in their allies between who they needed to side with in order to achieve their own
ambitions. 48 British holdings lay in the South of China so British interests would not
conflict with those Japan had in the North, while Britain saw Japan’s rapidly increasing
naval strength in the region as a blessing which offered protection to their assets against
Russian imperialism.49 Furthermore, the large number of troops Russia had dispatched in
order to secure their interests in China convinced Japan that Russia wanted to occupy the
region permanently.50

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 Vincent V. Hilldrup
Tufts University History and German Major
VIII. Conflicts with Russia

The Japanese territory of Formosa was extremely volatile at this time, refusing
Japanese rule and declaring its independence in May 1895. This forced Japan to send
troops in order to re-establish order but forceful pacification was a failure. As governor-
general of Formosa, General Kodama Gentaro was convinced in 1898 that less repressive
measures and promotion of civil welfare would win over the population. His intuition
proved to be correct and the colonization of Formosa was a success.51
Meanwhile, in Korea, such attempts to introduce reforms had failed and instead, Japan
got caught up in Korean politics and rivalry between Russia and Japan increased.52 It
seemed that the Russians were more influential in Korea as they emerged as the
defenders of the king of Korea. By 1896, an agreement which provided financial
assistance to Korea and limited the number of troops that could be stationed in Korea was
signed between Russia and Japan but Russia appeared to be more interested in Manchuria
than Korea. The reason for this was that Russia wanted a port in the East which would
not freeze over during the winter.53
In May 1896, the Li-Labanov alliance was signed between Russia and China, where
Russia agreed to protect China against Japanese attacks if China agreed to open all her
ports to Russian ships in the events of a conflict with Japan. Russia also managed to
acquire the Liaodong Peninsula and Port Arthur for a twenty-five year period thus
providing a Russian access to an ice free port. When the Boxer Rebellion erupted, the
Russians seized the occasion to demand further concessions from China in return for the
withdrawal of Russian troops but China resisted these demands with the diplomatic
support of Japan.54
Prime Minister Katsura concluded the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in January 1902,
through which both countries promised to remain neutral in the event of an armed
conflict with a third power. Both countries also promised each other assistance in case
war broke out with more than one nation.55 This alliance strengthened Japan’s position in
international politics and allowed them to adopt a firmer stance against the Russian
refusal to evacuate their military units from Manchuria which posed a threat to Japan’s
position in Korea.56 This alliance also improved Japan’s commercial credit and gave her
access to British financial resources since British colonies became open to Japanese
trade.57
Therefore, Japan’s support for an open policy in China had obtained British support in
return for Japan’s emerging sphere of influence in Asia against Russian imperialism. The
alliance permitted Japan to deal with Russia without the fear of another Triple
Intervention.
In 1902, when the Russians were about to sign an agreement whereby they would
withdraw their troops from Manchuria and return the railways to China, they suddenly
made the withdrawal conditional, demanding that the Chinese government award railway
and other commercial concessions in Manchuria only to the Russo-Chinese Bank.
However, when Li, the Chinese Prime Minister, died on November 4, 1901, the Russians
lost their main supporter in the Chinese court and were thus forced to reach an agreement
with China on April 8, 1902, which committed Russia to withdrawing her troops in three
stages over a period of eighteen months and returning most of the railways to China.58

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 Vincent V. Hilldrup
Tufts University History and German Major
IX. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905

At this point, Ito tried to settle Russo-Japanese differences through negotiations. The
Anglo-Japanese Alliance in January 1902 reinforced Japan’s position but Russia did not
cease her Korea and Manchuria aspirations.59 By 1902, Russia had completed the first
stage of her withdrawal but additional demands were made on China before the next
stage in February 1903. Though the Japanese government wanted to avoid a war which
it did not think it would win, it finally decided on war on February 4 because negotiations
were unfruitful and the Russians refused the final proposals Japan had submitted in
January 1904.60 Japan declared war on Russia on February 10, after a minor naval
skirmish on February 8. Japan won the war not only because she was fighting close to
her home base, but also because of Russian difficulties in transporting troops to the areas
needed for reinforcement.61
The U.S president, Theodore Roosevelt, pressed for negotiations between the two
nations because he feared that the balance of power in the East would be destroyed if
Russia was to be ousted from the region. Russia refused to negotiate until her Baltic fleet
was destroyed whereas the Japanese population was enthusiastic about the war and
overwhelmingly nationalistic and patriotic.62
After the destruction of the Baltic fleet, Russia accepted to negotiate with Japan
through American mediation. In August 1905, both Japan and Russia met in Portsmouth
to negotiate a peace treaty. Russia recognized Japanese interests in Korea and ceded the
south of the Sakhalin and the south of Manchuria. The Liaodong Peninsula and Port
Arthur were transferred to Japan. 63 This was a very important victory for Japan because
it was the first time an Asian nation had defeated one of the world’s great powers.
However, the failure to obtain better terms in the Treaty of Portsmouth convinced Japan
that it was still vulnerable and needed to strengthen its military further.64 This can be
considered the turning-point for Japan as it transited from a pre-modern feudal stage to a
more modern capitalistic form of imperialism.65
The Japanese population was intoxicated by the enthusiasm for war and the population
did not know that Japan could not have pursued the war much longer.66 Not only could
the army not sustain further losses, but the government was increasingly concerned about
the increase of the international debt,67 especially since America and Britain had helped
finance the war.68 They reacted in violent opposition to the treaty and the rioting which
broke out in Tokyo on September 5, forced the government to call for martial law.69 In
1907, Japan and Russia signed a secret agreement whereby they divided Manchuria into
Japanese south and Russian north spheres of interest. 70

X. Towards Korean Annexation 1905-1910

Japan had already decided on annexing Korea in 1904 under the Katsura
administration but the annexation was to be implemented over a period of time so that the
Western Powers would not be offended.71 American and British opposition could deny
Japanese access to international credit as well as the Chinese markets. Therefore, Japan
started by claiming that the Japanese authority in Manchuria and Korea was intent on
ensuring stable trade conditions, maintaining peace in Asia and a guarantee for Japan’s

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 Vincent V. Hilldrup
Tufts University History and German Major
security. Furthermore, Japan aimed at creating a political and military core from which
she could ensure her defense and economic interests.72
Already in February 1904, the Japanese Minister in Seoul, Hayashi Gonsuke, had
acquired certain political privileges in Korea in return for Japanese guarantee for Korean
territorial integrity and independence. At first, Japan supervised the countries foreign
relation and controlled Korea’s communication and transportation system while the
financial adviser reduced the expenditures on the Korean army.73 Japanese emigration
was facilitated into Korea in order to stimulate production and solve Japan’s
overpopulation. In December 1904, Japan seized control of the Korean police.74
Since Russia was no longer a rival in Korea, Japan could concentrate on turning Korea
into a protectorate and eventually a colony once it received the consent of the major
power. In July 1905, the U.S recognized Korea as Japan’s sphere of interest in return for
Japan’s recognition of the Philippines as being a U.S. sphere of influence, under Taft-
Katsura memorandum. Also, since the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was renewed, Britain
recognized Japanese interests in Korea.75
In November 1905, Ito Hirobumi left for Korea and became resident general in
February 1906, where his task in the management of foreign affairs was to introduce
reforms which would inspire Korean loyalty to Japan. In July 1907, Ito had isolated the
king and forced him to abdicate in favor of his son who agreed to extend Ito’s power in
Korea. With his new administrative powers, Ito dissolved the army while rebels began to
organize in an effort to resist the Japanese presence. Therefore, Ito used Japanese troops
to put down the rebels but on October 26, 1909, he was assassinated. This provided
Japan with the necessary excuse to annex the nation in August 1910 as well as impose
very oppressive measures.76

XI. Conclusion

After 1894, Japanese expansionism initially derived from samurai desire to resist the
‘white’ imperialism by extending the influence of Japan to the Asian mainland.77 After
all, one can observe that almost all of Japan’s territorial acquisitions were obtained
through deliberate decision of the central government to use force in securing those
territories deemed strategically essential for Japan’s security.78 Japan also expanded
through invading and colonizing neighboring, well-populated nations and colonies of the
Western powers that generally had a lot in common with Japan, thereby creating a more
homogeneous empire in comparison to those of the Western powers who annexed
scarcely populated regions whose people they had little in common with.79
After 1905, despite the fact that capitalism motivated Japanese imperialism, one should
observe that its social base was still in common accord with the alliance between the
emerging bourgeoisie and the military.80 Therefore, imperialism became a method of
securing foreign markets by military intervention and control which in turn, allowed
capitalists to profit from trade as well as military contracts. Ultimately, this gave Japan
world prestige as it defeated other nations, including the Russian world power which
incited the Western powers to revise the unequal treaties they had forced Japan to sign.
1
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 14
2
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 23
3
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 14

10

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2352281

 Vincent V. Hilldrup
Tufts University History and German Major

4
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 6
5
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 2
6
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 2
7
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 7
8
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 39
9
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 8
10
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 31
11
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 33
12
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 35
13
Montgomery, Michael. Imperialist Japan, The Yen to Dominate. St Martin’s Press, New York, 1987. Page 206
14
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 35
15
Takao Matsumura and Benson John. Japan, 1868-1945. Pearson Education Limited, London, 2001. Page 56
16
Takao Matsumura and Benson John. Japan, 1868-1945. Pearson Education Limited, London, 2001. Page 61
17
Takao Matsumura and Benson John. Japan, 1868-1945. Pearson Education Limited, London, 2001. Page 58
18
Takao Matsumura and Benson John. Japan, 1868-1945. Pearson Education Limited, London, 2001. Page 59
19
Takao Matsumura and Benson John. Japan, 1868-1945. Pearson Education Limited, London, 2001. Page 60
20
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 8
21
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 97
22
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 121
23
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 44
24
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 44
25
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 169
26
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 44
27
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 169
28
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 169
29
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 170
30
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 170
31
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 170
32
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 170
33
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 171
34
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 47
35
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 171
36
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 172
37
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 172
38
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 173
39
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 64
40
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 173
41
Takao Matsumura and Benson John. Japan, 1868-1945. Pearson Education Limited, London, 2001. Page 63
42
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 72
43
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 73
44
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 73
45
Montgomery, Michael. Imperialist Japan, The Yen to Dominate. St Martin’s Press, New York, 1987. Page 166
46
Montgomery, Michael. Imperialist Japan, The Yen to Dominate. St Martin’s Press, New York, 1987. Page 166
47
Montgomery, Michael. Imperialist Japan, The Yen to Dominate. St Martin’s Press, New York, 1987. Page 206
48
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 76
49
Montgomery, Michael. Imperialist Japan, The Yen to Dominate. St Martin’s Press, New York, 1987. Page 179
50
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 76
51
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 173
52
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 174
53
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 183
54
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 184
55
Takao Matsumura and Benson John. Japan, 1868-1945. Pearson Education Limited, London, 2001. Page 63
56
Takao Matsumura and Benson John. Japan, 1868-1945. Pearson Education Limited, London, 2001. Page 64
57
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 77
58
Montgomery, Michael. Imperialist Japan, The Yen to Dominate. St Martin’s Press, New York, 1987. Page 181
59
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 185
60
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 186
61
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 187
62
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 189
63
Takao Matsumura and Benson John. Japan, 1868-1945. Pearson Education Limited, London, 2001. Page 64
64
Takao Matsumura and Benson John. Japan, 1868-1945. Pearson Education Limited, London, 2001. Page 64

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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2352281

 Vincent V. Hilldrup
Tufts University History and German Major

65
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 8
66
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 190
67
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 84
68
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 95
69
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 190
70
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 191
71
Montgomery, Michael. Imperialist Japan, The Yen to Dominate. St Martin’s Press, New York, 1987. Page 206
72
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 85
73
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 86
74
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 87
75
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 192
76
Mikiso, Hane. Modern Japan, A Historical Survey. Third edition. Westview Press, Colorado, 2001. Page 192
77
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 7
78
Takao Matsumura and Benson John. Japan, 1868-1945. Pearson Education Limited, London, 2001. Page 59
79
Takao Matsumura and Benson John. Japan, 1868-1945. Pearson Education Limited, London, 2001. Page 61
80
Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. Page 7

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