” according to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, briefing the UN General Assembly

(UNGA) in November 2018. Guterres explained that the Restructuring aim to make the UN
nimbler, less bureaucratic, more transparent and accountable, and more decentralized and
effective. He told Member States that the changes will affect “every department, office, regional
commission, and field operations.

Security Council Structural Issues

The structure of the Security Council is an anachronism. It is made up of 15 members, five of
which are permanent members with a power of veto, ten elected for two-year terms by the
General Assembly. The permanent five, the countries with the power of veto in the Security
Council – the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the Russian Federation -
hold their positions because they were victorious allies at the end of World War 11. They were
the 'great powers' of their day and, in their privileged position8 in the Security Council, they took
on special responsibility for the preservation of peace and security. They are arguably no longer
an accurate reflection of the great powers of the world, as much for those that are left out as for
those that are included. They do not reflect any geographic balance. They are North and Euro-
centric. No country from Africa, the Middle East or South America is a permanent member of
the Council. The rise in wealth and strength of both Germany and Japan give each a claim to
permanent membership, although the inclusion of either or both of these countries would not
spread the geographic balance.
A number of submissions to the inquiry addressed the question of Security Council Reform. All
reflected dissatisfaction with its undemocratic structure and what were perceived to be its
unresponsive and non-transparent procedures. The Australian Peace Council suggested
a complete restructuring of the Council:
We believe that the only permanent positions on the
Security Council should be one from each of the six main
regions of the world (Europe, North America, Latin
America and the Caribbean, Asia Pacific, West Asia and
Africa) with Australia and New Zealand being part of the
Asia Pacific group. We believe that these six
representatives should be elected on a rotational basis
with a time-span to be decided by the members of the
General Assembly.

Professor Johnson proposed a similar course:

Europe should lose at least one of its permanent memberships;
and amend the Charter at article 27(3) to give a veto to six
regions
– Europe, North America, South America, Africa, Asia and
Oceania.
There was an announcement by the American Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, on 2
April 2000, that the Americans no longer insisted that the expansion be limited to 20 or 21.
Australia supports an increase in the size of the Council to 26.
The General Assembly has an Open-ended Working Group on the Reform of the Security
Council, co-chaired by HE John De Saram, the permanent representative for Sri Lanka. During
its visit to the United Nations, Mr De Saram explained to the committee that the working group
was considering a number of propositions in relation to the veto:
The veto should be abolished. This was considered an unlikely scenario. It would require
countries that have the veto to relinquish it voluntarily as they have the capacity to veto any
proposal that it be abolished. One suggestion to the inquiry was that two vetoes be required to
defeat a majority resolution.
An extension of the veto. If there are to be new permanent members, should they be given the
veto power? This proposal is perceived by some members to add to the problems the UN already
has in getting
THE STRUCTURAL REFORM OF THE UN agreement. However, to create new permanent members
without the veto would create two classes of permanent members within the Council.
Limitation of the use of the veto. It was suggested that it would be more possible to persuade
the Permanent Five to limit its use than to abolish it. It might be limited to Chapter 7
enforcement decisions only. However, there is another significant area where the veto has been
used and that is for the appointment of the Secretary General.The Permanent Five wish to keep
this option. A further suggestion was that it might be limited to international purposes, not
national interests.
Justification of the use of the veto. Germany has suggested that any use of the veto should
require an explanation to the General Assembly.

Basis for Restructuring of UN Security Council

It is essential to analyse and assess the capabilities of the countries laying claims for the
permanent seat in the UNSC. Certain criteria,
which are required to quantify this assessment and make it more objective are as listed
below:-
(a) Capability and assurance to provide their military assets to the United Nations for
universal security management when called upon to do so, without any preconditions or
reservations, especially in operations against terrorist organizations.
(b) Capability and commitment to share expenses for global security management
including expenditure in establishing a global antiterrorism infrastructure.
(c) Capability and commitment to share expenses for peace-building operations
including rehabilitation process of civilians and surrendered/captured terrorists in
affected areas where and when required.
(d) A stable democratic State with sound economy and strong clout in the
international affairs.
(e) The present anomaly of inequitable geographic representation in the Security
Council should be eliminated by ensuring just and equitable representation from all
regions of the globe.
(f) In continuation with the concept of equitable representation the Security Council
should include representatives from developed, developing and the poor countries in
order to be more democratic and have a broader representative base.

ICJ
After seven decades, the ICJ is at a crossroads as it braces to adjudicate the disputes arising in the 21st
century. Modern issues concerning environmental protection, terrorism, and human trafficking—among
many others—are global problems deserving of attention from a global court.That the ICJ is ill-equipped
to tackle modern international disputes if the jurisdictional and compositional problems outlined above
are not remedied, while also offering recommendations for Restructuring.

THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

The statute of the ICJ should be amended with a view toward making the
jurisdiction of the court mandatory and compulsory to all parties. The present situation whereby the
member states are entitled to cherry-pick the jurisdiction of the court has contributed in no small
measure to the watering-down of the prestige of the Court’s jurisdiction. As discussed above,
jurisdiction should be mandatory if the ICJ is to adjudicate pressing international issues. Of particular
concern is the current situation whereby four of the five permanent members of the Security Council
have rejected the compulsory jurisdiction of the court.85 Such a practice, no doubt, sends a very strong
and wrong precedence to other member states. As the global apex court, the ICJ deserves to command
compulsory jurisdiction in order to be better able to tackle an ever-evolving myriad of legal issues. As it
stands, the court is not well-equipped to meet increasing global expectations in the 21st century.

THE ABOLISHMENT OF ARTICLE 31 OF THE ICJ STATUTE

Article 31 of the ICJ Statute should be abolished if the ICJ must begin to regain
its full image of impartiality and fairness.86 The current provision of Article 31, which entitles a party
before the Court to nominate an ad hoc judge if none of the judges of the court is a national of the
party, immensely tarnishes the impartiality image of the apex court. The Court must command a
universally accepted image of impartiality such that any party before it must have unqualified
confidence in the ability and courage of the Court to dispense States-blind justice.87 Moreover, the
practice of ‘globalizing’ the court88 which has taken firm root in the composition of the court with a
view to ensuring representation from all the major global blocs should be encouraged.

If the original goals of Article 31 were intended to ensure fairness and reflect the reality inherent in
international relations, the same goals could be well served by a truly globalized court as is presently
composed. Perhaps, the ratio of the judges relative to the geographical bloc which they represent may
be reviewed in light of the recent demographical changes in the world population. But the additional
safety net of allowing every party to have a representative judge, particularly, an ad hoc judge,
contravenes the spirit of impartiality in the court. In making this recommendation, however, the more
compelling point is the proven case of abuse of judicial power by the ad hoc judges in the ICJ.

AN OVERHAUL OF THE SYSTEM OF ELECTION AND RE-ELECTION OF

JUDGES Political influences in the election and re-election of ICJ judges warrant an
overhaul in order to restore integrity to the ICJ. By so doing, the ICJ judges will enjoy maximum
independence which is a sine qua non for an effective administration of justice. Rather than continue
the current system, it is recommended that the coordination of the process for the election and re-
election of the judges should be the prerogative of the International Law Commission, which is an arm of
the United Nations.90 Since the ILC is composed of internationally acclaimed legal jurists and publicists,
they will be in a better position to conduct the election and reelection of the ICJ judges without undue
political influence.

General Assembly

There has been less discussion about the need for reform in the General Assembly, perhaps
because it is already a democratic forum, if somewhat powerless. The Open Ended Working
Group on Security Council reform is promoting the development of greater ties between the
Security Council and the General Assembly. Some submissions to the inquiry wished to see the
Assembly assert itself more in relation to the Security Council. In particular, it was argued that,
in elections to the Security Council, the Assembly should make judgements about the candidates
on the basis of their contributions to peacekeeping and their willingness to accept the jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice. Professor Johnson told the committee, 'I find it unbearably
hypocritical that states in the Security Council which do not submit to that law, should presume
to enforce that law on others'.He further argued that the Assembly should use its budgetary
power under Article 17 of the Charter to shift the balance of power in its favour. Criticism has
also been levelled at the General Assembly because it represents governments and that not all
governments are representative of their people. For some time there has been a suggestion that
the UN should have a Parliamentary Assembly in addition to the General Assembly. It is a
proposal supported by the Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU). The view in New York on the
proposal was that as yet it lacked structural and operational details and that, in the absence of a
solution to the problem of resources for the UN, there could be no contemplation of new
institutions.

The Secretariat Administrative Restructuring

The complaint has been made to the committee that the UN is a bloated bureaucracy. It is
acknowledged at the UN that the administration had become complex and inefficient by the
beginning of the nineties. The requirement that staff be recruited on the basis of geographical
distribution has militated against efficiency. Management skills have been lacking and training
non-existent. The structures of the various departments were uncoordinated so that duplication of
effort was common and a waste of resources. Decision-making was complicated by the
overlapping functions and by the tendency in the secretariat to delegate decisions upwards.
However, reform in the administration of the UN is much more achievable than
reform of the 'political' organs of the UN and it would seem that real reform has been
considerable over the last ten years. In 1998, Kofi Annan established a Task Force of Human
Resource Management. Its work is ongoing. Staff numbers have been reduced by 10 per cent at
UN headquarters. The reform program of the administration encompasses: processes of greater
accountability, especially the institution of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, External
Audit and the Joint Inspection Unit; human resources planning, including a skills inventory; a
performance management system; streamlined rules and procedures for work performance;
improved systems for recruitment, placement and promotion, emphasizing merit; mobility to
ensure both flexibility for the organization and varied career opportunities for the staff;
improvement in the competency of staff, and in conditions of service and the administration of
workplace justice; and simplified contractual arrangements.
Concern was also expressed about the balance of emphasis between merit and
geographical distribution of recruitment. The view was expressed to the committee that this
balance had tipped too far in favour of the requirement for geographical distribution and that
merit needed to be reasserted in order for the UN to be served by the best possible staff. Sam
Daws, in his analysis of the reform program, also noted the difficulty experienced by the UN
when member states intervened in recruitment or dismissal cases involving their nationals. This
distorts the criteria for either. He commented that: Lobbying, by States from both the North and
the South, has been the chief determinant of the placement of officials in the highest Secretariat
positions. … Member States, in turn, must recognize that a high quality, independent,
international civil service is a more important accomplishment than the placement of their
nationals in particular Secretariat posts.
Every three years, the 193 Member States of the United Nations collectively
decide on a formula – known as the “scales of assessment” – that determines
how much each country contributes to the UN regular budget and to
peacekeeping operations.

The United Nations is facing a cash crunch. At the beginning of 2019,

Secretary-General Antonio Guterres wrote to UN member states to
warn them about the deteriorating state of the UN’s core peacekeeping
and regular budgets. Together, the two budgets fund the UN’s central
activities including one hundred thousand peacekeepers and forty
thousand staff across the world. Member states are legally obliged to
pay pre-determined contributions to the UN’s regular and
peacekeeping budgets, but over recent years, payments to the UN
coffers have started to come in later and later.

The first is around ensuring there are bigger reserves for both the regular and
peacekeeping budgets. This would allow the secretary-general to have a larger
buffer against late payments from member states.

The second is flexibility to re-prioritize resources across different parts of the

regular budget and to manage the funds flowing in to individual peacekeeping
missions as a pool. Current restrictions on financing make this impossible,
and temporarily cash surpluses in one peacekeeping mission can’t be used to
bridge shortfalls in another.

The third is to streamline processes so that the secretary-general can bill

member states for a whole year of a peacekeeping mission. Right now, the UN
has to send multiple bills based on when the Security Council renews a
mandate.

The Impact of Late Payments and Withholding on UN Missions When member states do not pay their
contribution to UN peacekeeping in full or on time, it creates a potential cash-flow problem for the UN
Secretariat. A UN mission may have the budget and authority to spend but not the cash to carry out
operations in full. The cash-flow problem is compounded by prohibitions put in place by the UN General
Assembly. Unlike the UN regular budget, there is no single peacekeeping budget; instead, each
peacekeeping mission has its own dedicated account, and member states are sent separate bills for their
share of its budget. Even though the General Assembly usually decides on a mission’s budget for a whole
year, the secretary-general is only able to bill member states until the date on which the Security Council
is scheduled to renew a mission’s mandate. Member states are then billed again once the Security
Council has extended the mandate. This is true even when the Security Council has not changed the
mandate in many years.

• Create a cash reserve for peacekeeping

Consolidate peacekeeping accounts:

• Incentivize budgetary discipline:

• Encourage prompt payments: