Social Theory of International Politics, by Alexander

Wendt
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Reviewed by Paul Skoczylas

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Social Theory of International Politics, Alexander Wendt’s first book, sets forth what is
likely to be considered the most developed version of Constructivist theory in
International Relations to date. Building on his articles, in particular the widely cited
"Anarchy is what states make of it" (International Organization, 46, 391-425), Wendt
challenges popular assumptions about states and the states system to demonstrate that the
international system is socially constructed. Rather than viewing states as inherently
egoistic and concerned primarily with security, resulting in the Neorealist "self-help"
states system, Wendt argues that there is no inherent logic of anarchy at the unit or
system level. Replacing Kenneth Waltz’s materialist definition of structure with a social,
idea-ist one, Wendt posits at least three kinds of macro-level systemic structures, "each
based on the kind of roles that dominate the system": Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian.
(p. 247)

The only role that Wendt describes as indicative of the Neorealist self-help system is the
Hobbesian culture. The Hobbesian culture entails a "distinct posture or orientation of the
Self toward the Other" in which the subject position is that of "enemy." (p. 258) In a
Hobbesian culture, adversaries observe no limits in their violence toward each other. In
the Lockean culture, the subject position is "rival," where rivals are competitors who will
use violence to advance their interests, but unlike the Hobbesian culture, will refrain from
killing each other. The Kantian subject position is that of "friend," where allies do not use
violence to settle disputes and work as a team against security threats.

Because Constructivism highlights the role of socially constructed international relations,

Wendt argues that Constructivist social theory can foresee the possibility of change
within the system that other theories, which assume axiomatically certain characteristics
in the social relations among states, cannot. Viewing the empirically prominent self-help
characteristic as an "on-going product of the system," Wendt notes that "if self interest is
not sustained by practice it will die out." (p. 369) Four "master variables" enable egoistic
identities to be undermined in favor of collective ones, leading to the Kantian culture of
the states system: interdependence, common fate, homogeneity, and self-restraint.

Aside from the his overall Constructivist argument that international relations are socially
constructed, Wendt’s book provides a cogent assessment of the state of International
Relations as a discipline. In his assessment, he highlights distinctions that will
undoubtedly spawn reassessment among scholars, even those who do not share his
Constructivist methods. For instance, he places competing theories of international
politics on a grid with Materialism to Idealism on the x-axis and Individualism to Holism
on the y-axis. (p. 32) The grid clarifies the disagreements between theories, but also
serves as a basis for Wendt’s contention that International Relations is too caught up in
empirical issues without being self-conscious enough about ontological ones. By
concentrating on ontology, scholars working in the seemingly incommensurable positivist
and post-positivist fields can engage in discussion based on their common realist
approach to researching empirical issues.*

Unfortunately, one of the key distinctions that Wendt dwells upon while describing how
international politics are socially constructed remains difficult to understand throughout
the book. While insisting that his theory is systemic (macro) and not merely unit-to-unit
based (micro) (p.1 and p. 32), he does not make clear how the three cultures of anarchy
can occur in any way other than unit-to-unit terms. For instance, he states that "Subject
positions are constituted by representations of Self and Other as particular kinds of agents
related in particular ways..." yet then states that "Roles are attributes of structures, not
agents." (p. 257) While he is clear that because roles are relational, they cannot be
reduced to any individual, the example does not argue for a system beyond the relations
between the units.

Similarly, when he states that "roles are the objective, collectively constituted positions
that give meaning to those understandings," one could think of the "West" as an example
of a system "dominated" by a Kantian culture (p. 259), but to what extent does this
transcend the individual relationships within the system? Indeed, his explanation of how
change is possible in the international structure seems to belie the role of structure as
anything but the combination of unit-to-unit relationships: "Since the social process is
how we get structure...the more that states think like ‘Realists’ the more that egoism, and
its systemic corollary of self-help, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy." (p. 368) This
difficulty potentially undermines his contention that "the structure of the international
system exerts both [constitutive and causal] kinds of effects on state identities." (p. 28)