Lecture Notes-6

Mearsheimer -2001
- There is no international authority to reign above states, there fore great powers invariably seek
to gain power at each others expense and to establish themselves as the dominant state.
- States must be ready for danger at any given time and from any quarter. (Is my neighbor my
friend? Will today’s friend become tomorrow’s enemy? Am I strong enough to stave off an
attack?)
In a world where no state can be sure that others will not have hostile intentions( States live in
uncertainty of others intentions), great powers must protect themselves by acquiring as much
power as possible in case another state becomes aggressive.
- States will shift the burden of preserving the balance of power onto both allies and rivals. The
USA has taken on this burden a couple of times when there has been crisis in Europe (WWI and
II).
- Offensive realism rests on the assumption that great powers ‘are always searching for
opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal’ (p. 29). And that
hegemony is the only thing that can stabilize international affairs.
- This perspective contrasts with defensive realism, which posits that states seek security rather
than power, making the international system less predatory and less prone to conflict.
According to Mearsheimer, the disposition to aggression is not intrinsic to states, but is instead
the product of the constant search for survival in a world of uncertainty, offensive military
capability, and a changing distribution of power.
- While Mearsheimer succeeds in demonstrating the utility of offensive realism, he falls short of
demonstrating that his theory has as much explanatory power as he claims. Mearsheimer fails
to address how offensive realism explains peaceful change. The friendship between Britain and
the United States at the turn of the twentieth century and the success of the European Union in
transforming Europe’s geopolitical landscape both cast doubt on the notion that balancing and
destructive rivalry are inescapable features of international life.
Morgenthau- 1993
- Morgenthau in his work Politics Among Nations sketches what he sees as the six essential
features or principles of the realist approach to international relations. Morgenthau writes,
“What are the tenets of political realism?
- The first principle is, “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed
by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.” Morgenthau goes on to write,
“Realism, believing as it does in the objectivity of the laws of politics, must also believe in the
possibility of developing a rational theory that reflects, however, imperfectly and one-sidedly,
these objective laws.”
- After defining the first principle, Morgenthau moves more deeply into the international
spectrum with the second principle. “The main signpost that helps political realism to find its
way through the landscape of international politics is the interest of power. This concept
provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be
understood.”
- Morgenthau also stresses that the ways in which international relations should looked at is in
terms of power
- Morgenthau writes, “What is important to know, if one wants to understand foreign policy, is
not primarily the motives of a statesman, but his intellectual ability to comprehend the
essentials of foreign policy, as well as his political ability to translate what he comprehended
into successful political action.” When Morgenthau wrote the previous statement, the definition
of a “concept of power” becomes much more pointed and clear. The two main facets of power
within such a definition are “intellectual ability to comprehend the essentials of foreign policy”
and the “political ability to translate what was comprehended into successful political action.”
- The third principle of political realism is, “Realism assumes that its key concept of interest
defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that
concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all.
- Political realists believe that power is a universally held notion and that the accumulation of
power is central to politics.
- The fourth principle that Morgenthau outlines is, “Political realism is aware of the moral
significance of political action.”
- The fifth principle of Morgenthau’s is, “Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations
of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.” Morgenthau here believes
that a sort of universal homogeneity amongst the moral aspirations of one nation cannot be
accepted as the doctrine of all of the nations of the world. Rather, it seems as though
Morgenthau would rather support a notion of each nation adhering to their own moral
aspirations rather than trying to adopt an ethos that is adhered to by all nations on earth.
- The sixth principle that Morgenthau writes about dealing with his principles of political realism
within international relations is, “The political realist maintains the autonomy of the political
sphere, as the economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs.”
Waltz – 1979
Anarchy and Balance of Power
Anarchy
- The distinction between international and domestic realms of politics is not in the use or nonuse
of force but in the different modes of organization for doing something about it. The
international system is one of self-help. Although states are like units functionally, they differ in
their capabilities. The structure limits cooperation in two ways: (i) each unit spends a portion of
its effort, not in forwarding one's own good, but in providing the means of protecting itself
against others because of the condition of insecurity (uncertainty about the other's future
intentions and actions) - concern with relative gains; and (ii) a state worries lest it become
dependent on others through cooperation because the more it specializes, the more it relies on
others; it will seek either to control what it depends on, or lessen the extent of dependency -
imperialism and autarky (p.106).
- Structure causes actions to have unintended consequences. So long as one leaves structure
unaffected, it is not possible for changes in the intentions and actions of particular actors to
produce desirable outcomes or avoid undesirable ones. The problem is that rational behavior,
given structural constraints, does not lead to the wanted results (p.109). Hence, awareness and
purpose cannot change the quality of international life.

- Virtues of anarchy: (i) hierarchic organizations spend a good portion of their effort toward
maintenance and struggle for dominance within - the more powerful the states, the more power
lodged in the center must be, the stronger the incentive for states to struggle to control it; (ii)
organizations that establish relations of authority and control increase security but decrease
freedom - in their absence, states are able to concentrate on the politics of the problem and aim
for minimum agreement that will permit their existence rather than maximum agreement for
sake of unity; (iii) weak states may enjoy considerable freedom if the strong are not bothered by
the marginal increases in their capabilities; (iv) the possibility of use of force has sobering effects
in that it causes states to face difficult issues, try to understand each other's problems, and work
hard to find accommodations (p.114).

Balance of Power

- Realpolitik: (i) state's interest provides the spring for action, (ii) necessities of policy arise from
unregulated competition among states, (iii) calculations based on those necessities can discover
policies to best serve the interests, (iv) success defined as preserving and strengthening the
state, is the ultimate test of policy (p.117). Structural constraints explain why these methods are
repeatedly used despite differences in the people and states that use them
- Balance of Power Theory: assumes that states are unitary actors who, at minimum, seek their
preservation and, at maximum, drive for universal domination. States use (a) internal efforts
(increase in capability, military strength, clever strategies) or (b) external efforts (strengthen
own alliance or weaken opposing one) to achieve their aims. They exist in a self-help system
with no one to come to their aid or deny them the use of whatever instruments may serve their
purposes. From the assumed motivation of states and the actions that correspond to them, this
theory describes the constraints of that arise from the system these actions produce and the
expected outcome, namely, the formation of balances of power. The theory requires no
assumption of rationality or of constancy of will. The expectation is not that a balance, once
 achieved, will be maintained, but that a balance, once disrupted, will be restored one way or
another.

- Balance of power prevails whenever two, and only two, conditions are met: (i) that the order be
anarchic, and (ii) that it be populated by units wishing to survive (p.121). No requirement as to
the number of participating units, pace of technological change, or the existence of a balancer.
Also, unlike Morgenthau, it is wrong to assume correspondence of motive and result, and to
infer rules for the actors from the observed results of their actions.

- The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the
system. Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side, for it is the
stronger side that threatens them. Bandwagonning and balancing depend on the system's
structure (p.127).

Structural Causes and Their Effects :Military Effects: Why Bipolarity is Best

- Stability - means (i) the system remains anarchic, and (ii) no consequential variation (one that
leads to different expectations about the effect of structure on units) takes place in the number
of principal parties (p.162).
- Where two powers contend, imbalances can be corrected through internal efforts. With three,
two can gang up on the third and destroy it, returning to a bipolar world. Four is the lowest
number that permits external alignment. Five allows for a balancer (requires special
circumstances). No threshold beyond five, or four, really (p.163).

- Uncertainty - flexible alliances have doubtful advantages: uncertainty about who threatens
whom, who will oppose whom, who will gain or lose from the actions of other states. Flexibility
increases with numbers, which also increase complexity and uncertainty. Strategy is necessary
for making and holding allies. States alter their appearances and adapt to make themselves
more eligible. If pressure strong enough, they will deal with almost anyone. Once made,
alliances have to be managed. In a multipolar system, one's ally may edge toward opposing
camp. Cohesion of blocs is achieved only through expert management, which is exceedingly
difficult among near-equals since it must be cooperative. In a moment of crisis a weaker, or
more adventurous, party is likely to determine its side's policy. Far from making states more
careful, uncertainty increases the risk of war (p.168). In a multipolar world, dangers are diffused,
responsibilities unclear, and definition of interests easily obscured. A skillful foreign policy can
be designed to gain advantage without antagonizing others and frightening them into united
action. Statesmen could hope to push the issue to the limit without causing all potential
opponents to unite (p.171) Miscalculation is the greatest danger.

- In a bipolar world, balancing is internal and, therefore, easier and more precise. The major
constraints arise from the main adversary, not from one's own associates. It is never in doubt
who the danger is coming from. Every gain is the other's loss, therefore the two powers
promptly respond to unsettling events. Overreaction is the greatest danger (lesser than
miscalculation because it only costs money and limited wars). With time, ideology becomes
subordinated to interest, the two powers become accustomed to one another, learn how to
interpret each other's moves, how to accommodate and counter them, life becomes
predictable, and peaceful coexistence possible (p.173).
- Considerations - (i) insufficiency of nuclear weapons to make a state a great power today -
states, except superpowers, can no longer enjoy economies of scale militarily, too costly, even
for conventional weapons (p.183); (ii) the usefulness of nuclear weapons for maintaining peace -
not using force is a sign of strength, better that the weapons they use to cope with the ``security
dilemma'' are ones that make waging war most unlikely (p.187); (iii) the illusion that weaker
states can do whatever they please because the two great powers are stalemated - this freedom
is freedom of the irresponsible, their security provided by others, see previous point (p.185); (iv)
inability to exercise political control over others does not betray military weakness - dissuasion
easier than compellence, especially if faced not only with task of compelling a political faction
but prompting a political order (p.189).