The End of Sasanian Rule:

The Center and Periphery of Ērānšahr

in the Seventh Century
khodadad rezakhani
Princeton University

The loss of Sasanian territories between 636 and 720’s to the Muslims
is considered a pivotal moment in the history of West and Central
Asia. Many justifications have been presented, based on schematic
impressions and ideological or nationalistic takes, on why such a
mighty empire collapsed in front of a seemingly inexperienced state
and its armies. Reasons ranging from institutional shortcomings to
military exhaustion to popular dissatisfaction with a “theocratic rule”
have been presented by subsequent generations of scholars.1
What is less noticed is the late antique context of the loss of power
in the late Sasanian period and the changes within the geographical
context of the Sasanian domain that preceded the early Islamic cam-
paigns.2 In what follows, an attempt is made to provide a more inclu-

1
See Zarrinkoub 1975 for a presentation of these various explanations. Medieval
Muslim historians, naturally, assigned these successes to divine intervention and
considered them the results of the religious zeal of the early conquerors, an
opinion which is perhaps best expressed in many modern study of the conquest
period, eg. Donner 1981, but see Hoyland 2014 for a dismissal of this idea. Also
Daryaee 2010 for a historiographical review of this and other opinions on the
matter, some of which are quite political poignant.
2
Studies considering this context within the Sasanian social structure, particularly
that of its elite, can be exemplified by Pourshariati 2008 and those that use
its framework, such as Banaji 2015: 178-203. But the top-down focus of this
and the agency they extend to the aristocracy, emulating similar studies of the
late Roman society (eg. Geary 1998) without profiting from the same level of

229
sive context for the loss of power by the Sasanian dynasts, the position
of the Sasanian military, and the entry of the Muslim conquerors in
the affairs of the third century Iraq and Syria. While no definite solu-
tions are offered, the following should be seen as a position paper, re-
peating some of the arguments made by the same author before3 and
foreshadowing forthcoming detailed studies of the trial of Khosrow ii
as well as the position of the Sasanian army after 630 CE.

Sasanians in the West

The reign of Khosrow ii Aparvez (590/91-628 CE) is known for be-
ing that of constant warfare, aggressive expansionism, including the
control of the entire eastern Mediterranean and Egypt, and its igno-
minious end as the result of a palace led coup d’etat.4 In the records
of the trial that proceeded the execution of Khosrow ii, his son and
successor, Kavad ii Shīrōy, accuses his father of mistreating his nobles,
harsh treatment of prisoners, and aggressive extraction of taxes from
the populace.5 The aggression and heavy-handed policies are also used
by modern historians to justify the weakening of the Sasanian grips
on their territories and their eventual capitulation to the incoming
Arab Muslim armies.6
These aggressive policies, however, can be seen as continuations
of a hundred years old political strategy, part of a Sasanian grand
strategy.7 This grand strategy aimed at disengaging from the affairs

primary sources and secondary studies, makes them too apologetic to the point
of inaccuracy.
3
Rezakhani 2017.
4
A basic outline is provided in Daryaee 2009: 32-33. See al-Tabari i. 995-1062
for a basic narrative, with extensive commentaries by Bosworth/Tabari 1999:
905-999.
5
The trial is detailed in al-Tabari i. 1045-1061.
6
Daryaee 2010 provides a great review of the classical and recent works on the
subject and the bewildering variety of theories expressed.
7
See Howard-Johnston 2016 for the use of the term, although not necessarily in

230
of the east, the traditional basis of Sasanian power, and establishing
themselves as a power in the western end of their domains. With the
defeat and death of Pērōz (r. 459-484) at the hand of the Hephthalites
in 484 CE, the Sasanian control of the area to the east of Abarshahr
was effectively lost for at least 80 years. Furthermore, the succession
crisis of 484-496 between the pro- and anti-Hephthalite forces at the
Sasanian court, and the final success of the latter, translated into a
clear disengagement of the Sasanian politics from the East.8 Instead,
from 502 CE and with the start of the so-called Anastasian Wars, the
Sasanians entered a 100 years period of war with the Byzantines,
mostly fought on the Syrian, but also the Armenian and the Arabian,
frontiers.9
While at the beginning, the Sasanians activities on their western
borders were concentrated on securing the control of the border re-
gions, particularly defensive lines and structures, this quickly turned
into more expansionism policies. With the loss of the east, particu-
larly the access to trans-Hindu-Kush trade routes, the Sasanian state
was more concerned with extracting taxes from the region around
their capital city of Ctesiphon, known as Asuristan.10 Increased set-
tlement activities in the regions immediately to the north and east
of the capital complex area11 are clear indications of such activities,

the same way as I am doing here.

8
For details of the rule of the Hephthalites and the Sasanian reaction to it, see
Rezakhani 2017a: 125-146.
9
Greatrex and Lieu 2015: 62-81 and later for the history of the various wars and
peace treaties between the two empires throughout the sixth century CE.
10
MP Āsōrestān. This is the Sasanian name of Mesopotamia, or what comes to
be known as al-‘Iraq in the Muslim period. The name itself is rooted in the
name of Assyria (Asuristan literally meaning “the land of Assur/Ashur”. Here,
I will use Asurestan and al-‘Iraq – depending on the period of discussion – for
Mesopotamia. See Gyselen 1989: 78-79 for the basic administrative geography
of this region.
11
Adams 1965: 69-83 for the increased, in fact to the point of saturation,
settlement and agricultural expansion in this region.

231
aiming to increase the taxation basis of the empire in the west. The
Sasanian imperial investments in the Khuzistan region, including the
establishment of several new urban sites, are further indications of the
need to develop the central regions of the empire.12 We can observe
similar foundations and developments in marginal areas such as the
Deh Luran plain, between Khuzistan and Mesopotamia.13 Archaeo-
logical records for increased settlements can perhaps be supplemented
by textual references to population movement and settlements from
Syria to Asuristan and other places within the Sasanian domains.14
A treaty of 562 CE between Khosrow i and Justinian, detailed in
Menander Protector’s History shows another aspect of the increasing
Sasanian concern with Mesopotamia/Asuristan and the rest of their
empire.15 The treaty, born out of negotiations between seasoned Sasa-
nian and Byzantine diplomats, aims to end several decades of war
between the two empires that had in fact resulted in no significant
gains for either side. The terms of the treaty focus on several local
aspects, many of them indirectly pointing out economic concerns.
Chief among these is the issue of the trade cities of northern Syria and
Armenia, already designated in the law of Justinian as the only legal
points of trade between the two empires. While in the Justinianic law,
(CJ 4.36.4) the cities are Callinicum, Nisibis, and Artaxata, in the
treaty of 562, either Callinicum or Artaxata were replaced by Daras,16
a short distance from Nisibis and inside the Roman territories.17 In

12
Wenke 1975 and 1987 on the Khusiztan plain and Adams/Hansen 1968
specifically on the site identified as Gundi-Shapur.
13
Neely 1974 and 2011; Wenke 1987 puts Neely’s results in the larger context of
settlement activities in southwestern Iran.
14
Morony 2004 presents a comprehensive overview of these population
movements and their possible implication for the economy.
15
Greatrex and Lieu 2005: 132-134.
16
Menander Protector 6.1, Blockley 1985: 73.
17
Blockley suggests that Daras is replacing Callinicum (Blockley 1985: 256,
n. 51). Considering that Artaxata at this point was well within the sphere of
Sasanian control, the designation of Daras, Nisibis, and Artaxata suggests a

232
fact, the focus of the first five items of the treaty is on trade, including
a great concern with the activities of the Saracen (Arab) clients of
both empires and their violation of border regulations.18
The fruits of Sasanians efforts to develop the economy of these
western territories eventually came to bear in the form of taxes. Most
early Islamic sources mention a large-scale land measurement and
survey effort starting late in the reign of Kavad i and completed dur-
ing the reign of Khosrow i.19 This survey evidently changed the struc-
ture of Sasanian land taxation, switching from post-harvest product
assessment to pre-cultivation estimates based on cultivated land. This,
along with a poll tax imposed on the urban population, allowed the
Sasanian state to devise an annual budget, thus preparing for fur-
ther investment, as well as more efficient military operations.20 While
the taxation reforms applied to the entire Sasanian territories,21 our
sources focus on Asuristan and Khuzistan and give the idea that the
income of Mesopotamia far exceeded the taxation income of all other
regions.
The development of the western provinces of the Sasanian Empire
in the sixth century, a direct outcome of their defeat by the Hephthal-
ites in the late fifth century, helped to intensify a western focus for the
empire. Even the partial recovery of the east in 570’s, more as a result
of the expansion of the Western Türk Empire,22 did not diminish this
western focus. The increased involvement of the Sasanian court with

shifting of the focus of trade toward the Sasanian cities of the region, and a
withdrawal from the desert frontier represented by Callinicum, for which, see
further.
18
Menander Protector 6.1: Blockley 1985: 72-73.
19
Ibn Khurradadbih 1889: 9-12 (Khurradadbih (Persian) 1370, pp. 7-10).
20
On the effects of the tax reforms and their reflection in the Islamic sources, see
Rubin 1995.
21
See Gyselen 2007: 42-43 on seals of Āmārgars (“Accountans”) from Herat,
Marv, Balkh, Zawulistan, Abarshahr, Gurgan, Sind, Frashwargar, as well as
Khuzistan, Armin, Mughan, and Adurbadagan.
22
Felföldi 2001 and a discussion of sources in Rezakhani 2018.

233
the affairs of the Asuristan and Syria, including their confrontation,
engagement, and finally patronage of the Christian Church of the
East further demonstrates this western, and progressively Syrian, fo-
cus.23
Apart from Asuristan, and partial recovery of Balkh/Tokharistan,
the sixth century saw the first signs of Sasanian expansionism in al-
most all directions. Sometimes during the reign of Khosrow i, perhaps
in 574-575,24 the Sasanians invaded Yemen in support of Sayf b. Dhi
Yazn who was removed from the throne of Himyar by invading Abys-
sinian forces.25 The subsequent Sasanian presence in south Arabia in
face created the first time that Sasanians had a presence in a territory
that was not connected to the rest of their domains.26 Additionally,
the previous Sasanian presence in Oman and eastern Arabia as well as
the control of the ways from the Arabian Desert into Asurestan meant
that the Sasanians controlled most of the Arabian Peninsula and its
surroundings.27

The Wars of the Seventh Century: Khosrow ii and Byzantium

The inauspicious beginnings of the reign of Khosrow ii in 590
marked a major change in Sasanian royal and administrative affairs.
Confronted and deposed by a non-Sasanian, the Mihranid Wahram
Chobin, Khosrow ii Aparvēz (590-628) had to flee to Byzantine Syr-

23
For the Sasanian engagement with their Christian population, a field of much
recent interest to scholars mainly trained in the study of Byzantium or Early
Christianity, see Walker 2006, Wood 2010, 2013, and Payne 2015.
24
Bosworth 2014.
25
Al-Tabari, i.946-949.
26
On the background and outcome of these wars, see Bowersock 2013; for the
Sasanian naval activities, see Dmitriev 2017: 733.
27
See Kennet 2002 for the archaeological evidence of the Sasanian presence in
Arabia, as well as Ulrich 2011. Kennet 2007 revisits some of the evidence and
through re-dating them, casts doubt on the matter of the Sasanian hold of
eastern Arabia. A counterbalance might be provided by Morony 2002.

234
ia. He most likely travelled up the river Euphrates toward Khabur
and then entered Syria and continued until Antioch.28 It was from
here that Byzantine troops, most likely local legions ordered by the
emperor Maurice (582-602), helped the deposed king to regain his
throne.29 Khosrow’s regaining of his throne put him at odds with
various forces in the Sasanian court, including both of his maternal
uncles, Wistahm and Windoy.30 By the start of the seventh century,
Khosrow managed to remove all opposition and was in firm control
of the Sasanian territories, enjoying a relatively peaceful reign.
By 602, however, the Sasanians entered into a series of affairs re-
garding the rebellion of Phocas and his murder of Maurice and his
family.31 Theodosios, son of Maurice, escaped and took refuge with
Khosrow, who then had him crowned by the Catholicos of the Eastern
Church, Mar Sabrisho‘ I.32 Phocas decimated an army given to The-
odosios by Khosrow in order for him to claim the Byzantine throne.
In 604, Khosrow himself undertook a campaign against Daras and
conquered the Roman border town.33 This started a long war that
lasted until 628 or in fact 630 and determined the fate of both Byz-
antium and the Sasanians.34 During the course of the war, Khosrow
seems to have relied in a great part on the local Christian population
of Asurestan and their connections to the rest of the Syriac speaking
population of greater Syria.35 His reliance on a courtier called Yaz-

28
Al-Tabari i. 999 and Bosworth/Tabari note 728 for a discussion of the date (late
Spring 590) and the route taken by Khsorow.
29
Chr. Anon. 14, al-Tabari i. 999-1000.
30
Dinawari 88-105, Theophylact Simocatta v. 15.
31
Chro. Seert, 517-518; al-Tabari i. 1001.
32
Ch. Anon., 14 (Greatrex & Lieu 2005: 232; Dinawari 105 considers Thiādūs
(Theodosios) to be the brother of Maurice.
33
Ch. Seert 519-520; Al-Tabari 1002.
34
On the details of the campaigns, see Kaegi 2003: 156-228 as well as Greatrex
and Lieu 2005: 182-197 where the primary sources are presented and discussed.
35
See Greatrex 2008 for the relationship between Khosrow and the Christians.

235
din, evidently an important member of the Christian community of
Asurestan, as well as the communal connections of his wife Shirin,36
seems to indicate a well-developed understanding of the power of this
community in stabilizing the conquered territories.37
By 615, Khosrow and his commanders controlled the entire east-
ern Mediterranean, including much of Anatolia. The most famous of
these commanders were Shahrbarāz who led the army of the north
into northern Syria and Anatolia and Shahin, who commanded the
armies in southern Syria.38 Shortly after, the Sasanian offenses against
Byzantine Egypt intensified, resulting in major campaigns and finally
the complete control of Egypt by 619.39 With the addition of Yemen,
already controlled by the Sasanians since the time of Khosrow i, the
Sasanians were in complete control of Egypt, Eastern Mediterranean,
and Anatolia.
Here, we should consider what implications this dominance, aside

36
The Chronicle of Khuzistan gives the idea that Khosrow did not clearly prefer
one or the other sect of Christianity, easily favouring Jacobites over Nestorians
when he saw the need. Shirin, evidently a Jacobite, alongside the court doctor
Gabriel of Singar (on whom also see Chr. Seert 534-535) appears to have
been more involved in the machinations between the two churches and is not
spared any unkindness by Nestorian sources like the author of the Chronicle of
Khuzistan. On Jacobites, see Chr. Seert 542-545.
37
On the attitude of the Christian community toward the war, see Wood 2013:
176-220. The story of Isho’yabh iii, the patriarch of the church and Khosrow’s
dissatisfaction with him probably shows a more complicated relationship
between the Christians and the church (Chr. Anon. 15-16). Equally noteworthy
is Khosrow’s removal of the True Cross from Jerusalem and depositing it to the
care of the Nestorian patriarchate; see Mashayekh 2017 for a discussion of the
fate of the cross and Stoyanov 2011 for an assessment of the available sources
regarding the use of the Christian dogma in the wars.
38
Greatrex and Lieu 2005: 182-193. Jerusalem had fallen in 614 and by
615, Shahrbarāz was already in Chalcedon, across the Bosphorus from
Constantinople itself.
39
Greatrex and Lieu 2005: 196-197.

236
from the Byzantine context in which it is often studied,40 would have
on the history of the region, particularly for the local Syrian popula-
tion and in the context of Arabia and the rise of Islam. Parallel with
the increasing Sasanian gains in Syria, Muhammad was starting to
preach his message in Mecca. The synchronism of the Hijra from
Mecca to Medina with the start of Heraclius’ counter-offensive has
also been pointed out.41 Perhaps more importantly, the shift in power
and the control of Syria meant that Hijazis, and particularly Meccans,
part of the Believers or not, were at this time trading with a Sasanian
controlled Syria, and soon with Egypt.42 Consequently, the supplies
provided by the Arabian trade at this time would have had a Sasanian,
or Sasanian controlled, demand.43
In South Arabia, another focal point of Hijazi life, the Sasanians
were also in complete control of the politics and presumably the com-
mercial life as well.44 In this sense, the early connections of the early
Muslims were entirely dependent on getting through Sasanian zones
of control depriving them of any competition in any activities. Per-
haps this can be better contextualized when we consider that the first
“foreign relations” of the nascent Islamic community was with the
Aksumite Abyssinia, the enemy of the Sasanians in the war to control
South Arabia.45

40
See the many contributions of Howard-Johnston to this discussion, conveniently
presented in Howard-Johnston 2006.
41
Lecker 2015, although here we could also see the increasing ties between the
Arabs of Hijaz with those of Syria, providing a better context for the later raids,
for which see below.
42
The classical study of this is Crone 1987, perhaps with a corrective by Simon
1989. Ibrahim 1982 makes several important arguments regarding the situation
in Mecca.
43
Crone 2007 on one of these possible commodities, leather, mostly used for the
soldiers and army supplies.
44
Bosworth 2014. Rubin 2008 on the references in the Islamic sources to this
event and its outcome.
45
See Munro-Hay 1991: 133-134 for a basic outline of Aksumite commercial

237
 The attitude of the early Islamic state in Medina, or what we can
know of it, has been studied and re-interpreted through a famous
reference in the Qur’an 30: 2-7.46 Whatever the actual meaning and
attitude of these famous lines are, one can surely conclude from them
that the Muslim community were well aware of the Byzantine-Sasa-
nian wars and that they presumed it to have consequences for their
nascent state and religion.47 We should then consider putting the
eventual campaigns on behalf of the government of Medina, the ear-
ly Islamic conquests, in this context and as a response, or perhaps
by-product, of the larger regional conflicts.

The Turning Tides of War

The fall of Egypt in 619 CE forced the Byzantine Empire into a tight
corner, having lost all of its territory in Asia and Egypt and being
dependent on the Balkans and Italy, and parts of North Africa, for
its daily bread (Cura Annonae/Civica). The main source of grains for
Byzantium prior to this was Egypt, and the fall of Egypt in 618 forced
the government to raise the price of bread to an impossibly high level
and later to abandon the free distribution, in place since the time of
Constantine, all together.48 This eventually changed the entire grain
supply chain following the permanent loss of Egypt to the Muslims
two decades later.49 The gridlock was further tightened by the Avar

interest in South Arabia and Mecca. Morley 2017: 268-283 also provides a
deeper discussion of the Sasanian interests in South Arabia.
46
For an example, and also the study of medieval opinions on the interpretation
of these lines, see El Cheikh 1998. Newer take on the issue, based on an
exhaustive review of the various interpretations, is offered by Tesei 2018 whose
take on the matter is quite different.
47
See Bowersock 2012: 55-77 for a larger historical take on this attitude and its
reflection in Byzantine, Syriac, and Arabic sources.
48
Chr. Pasch. 164 and note 449 for the abandonment of the ration following the
invasion of Egypt in 616.
49
Teall 1959, 91-96 for the situation before 619 CE and 97ff for the changing
situation after 619 CE and the start. In turn, Banaji 2002 discusses and

238
activities, perhaps in concert with the Sasanians, in Thrace, limiting
the empire’s choices.50
The solution sought out by Heraclius was to strike at the Sasanian
gridlock directly and try to create a cleavage in the Sasanians forces,
as well as sew discontent among the ranks of the nobility and the
soldiers. A meeting with Shahrbarāz, the commander of the north-
ern forces, probably provided for the realization of this plan51 giv-
ing the emperor an opportunity to take his forces to the far end of
Anatolia and Armenia without being worried about his return path
to be blocked by the Sasanian forces. It seems superfluous, although
it has not been pointed out clearly, that Heraclius must have been
assured of his return path through Asia Minor, which was through
the northern shore of Anatolia and through the Gulf of Iskanderun
on the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean.52 The return path,
and presumably his supply line, could have easily been cut off by
the Sasanian forces simply moving northwards across Anatolia and
reach the Black Sea, blocking Heraclius’s return, unless Heraclius was
assured of its safety.53 Heraclius’ forces in this way reached Armenia
and after several more or less successful battles, managed to establish
direct contacts with the “Khazar” (most likely Western Türk) forces.54

establishes the institutional issues lying behind the Egyptian economic

production and its problematic relationship with Constantinople.
50
On the Avar siege, see Howard-Johnston 1995.
51
The Chronicle of Seert presents a compelling version of the story of why
Shahrbaraz (Shahryōn there) was motivated to switch sides against Khosrow
(Chr. Seert, 540-541). On the meeting of Heraclius and Shahrbarāz and the
later narrative of it, see Kaegi and Cobb 2008.
52
contra Bowersock 2012: 55.
53
The military history of the campaigns and the dates of the events have been
studied by many scholars, the latest opinions being presented by Howard-
Johnston 1999 and an upcoming volume on the subject.
54
Greatrex and Lieu 2005: 198-225 provide all the primary sources for the events.
Heraclius conducts a parlay with the “Khazar” Xak‘an Jebu when the Khazars
come down to Albania (Dasxuranci 1961, 87) for their raids. For a general

239
 The campaigns initially were a stalemate and once in 623-24, Her-
aclius had to abandon the front and return to Constantinople to de-
fend the city against a siege.55 Starting in 626, the campaigns started
to bear fruit for Heraclius. With the help of the Western Türk (or
Khazar?) army, Heraclius broke through the Caucasus and headed
toward Adurbadegan.56 Another siege of Constantinople forced Her-
aclius to return to Constantinople, but by early 627, he was back in
the region and this time managed to capture Ganzak, south of Lake
Urmia, and make it his base.57 After a foray into northern Asurestan/
Mesopotamia,58 as he had planned before,59 he managed to make con-
tacts with a group of conspirators, perhaps aided by Shahrbarāz, who
planned to remove Khosrow ii from the throne and execute him.60
The putsch of 23-24 February 628 was indeed successful and it
managed to bring Khsrow’s eldest son, Shīroy, to the throne for a
short rule as Kavad ii.61 The conspirators brought a series of charg-
es against Khosrow, mainly accusing him of mismanaging the funds
and also of taking the True Cross captive.62 Khosrow’s defences were

history of the Khazar/Türk raids, see Dasxuranci 1961: 81-87.

55
Greatrex and Lieu 2005: 199-200.
56
Greatrex and Lieu 2005: 205-209.
57
He had previously burnt the fire temple there (Greatrex and Lieu 2005: 200) but
by 627 had retreated back there after invading northern part of Mesopotamia
and was receiving emisseries there (Greatrex and Lieu 2005: 213).
58
Al-Tabari i. 1004 talks about Khosrow’s personal estate, Dastkirt of the King,
as having been invaded by Heraclius.
59
«I shall not cease to fight the king of Persia and menace and harass his land and
people, and I shall arrange things so cunningly that he will be slain by his own
subjects.» (Dasxuranci 1961: 86).
60
The chronicle of Seert makes this a personal fight between Shahrbarāz and
Shamtā, son of Yazdin, and Khsrow’s bad handling of the situation, Chr. Seert
540-541.
61
Al-Tabari i. 1045.
62
Al-Tabari i.1046-1060. See Rezakhani, the Trial of Khosrow II Aparvez
(forthcoming) for a detailed discussion of the charges.

240
considered inadequate and he was executed/murdered on 27th or 28th
of February. Kavad ii and his son Ardashir iii managed to rule for
less than two years together before the latter was removed and mur-
dered by Shahrbarāz, the second time a non-Sasanian had claimed the
throne. The rest of Sasanian history is in fact a tale of internal fights
between various claimants to the throne, culminating in the nominal
succession of Yazdgerd iii, a grandson of Khosrow ii, in 632.

The End of the Sasanian Rule

Barely two years after Yazdgerd’s succession, we hear of the first Arab
campaigns in the southern end of Mesopotamia as part of the Battle
of the Bridge, Ma‘rikat-aj-Jisr, in October 634.63 The Battles of Yar-
muk, the initial foray into Syria, and Qadisiyya, the invasion of Mes-
opotamia/Asurestan, took place two years later in 636. Despite re-
gaining some nominal control over the conquered territories in Syria,
it is safe to assume that Heraclius never really managed to re-establish
Byzantine control over the region and that Egypt most likely passed
directly from the Sasanian occupation to the Islamic one.64 The size of
the Arab armies, indeed, seems to have been too small to be expected
to wrestle with both the Sasanian and the Byzantine armies.65 The fact
that two years after Khosrow’s death, Shahrbarāz’s army moved, from
the border in Syria,66 toward Ctesiphon to take over the throne is

63
Al-Baladhuri 1916: 404. At this time, Arab Muslims had already made it to
Palestine, as Bishop Sophronius acknowledges in his Christmas Sermon of 634
(Hoyland 1997: 67-73).
64
See Bowersock 2012: 55-77 for a characterization of this as the gift of Heraclius
to the Arabs.
65
Canard 2016 (1965) provides a study of the Arab military, particularly their
numbers, which makes it quite clear that the military explanation by itself is
not enough. Jandora 1990 is among the modern studies that try to apply a
military history framework to the entire set of events, although there seems to
be an uncritical approach to the sources and the way they fit the entire narrative
of the conquests in to a convenient framework.
66
Al-Tabari i. 1062.

241
perhaps an indication that Sasanian generals were still in the fighting
mode on the front.
In the meantime, Yazdgerd’s rule does not seem to have really ex-
panded into Asurestan. Al-Tabari tells us that Yazdgerd was raised
to the throne in Istakhr in Fars and was crowned there in a temple
called the Fire Temple of Ardashir, presumably at Gūr or Fūrūzābād
in Fars.67 The conspiring nobles, and the people of al-Mada’in (Ct-
esiphon) rebelling against Farrukhzādh Khusraw, the previous pre-
tender, do not appear to have been too successful or eager in bringing
Yazdgerd to the capital either, and al-Tabari passes surprisingly quick-
ly over the episode.68
It is safe to assume here that the Sasanian control over much of
their territories was already lost after the aforementioned execution of
Khosrow ii. The remaining years of the dynasty’s rule were spent in
trying to re-establish some means of control over what was probably
still considered a legitimate, and perhaps sacred, kingship.69 In reality,
however, the Sasanian domains, at least in Asurestan, and their con-
quered possessions in Syria and Egypt, were left without any central
control.70 In this environment, the incoming Arab Muslim armies
appear to be filling out a vacuum, one that has been left open by both
the eradicated Sasanians, but also the much weakened Byzantines.

67
Al-Tabari i. 1067 and Bosworth translation, 410, n. 1015.
68
Perhaps we should consider here that Ctesiphon most likely had the same status
as a capital as any of the cities founded by the earlier Sasanians in Fars and
Khuzistan; c.f Shenkar 2019.
69
Choksy 1998 for the idea of Sacral Kingship. In a recent conference, Stuart
Sears argued for the endurance of Sacral Kingship in the Sasanian lands based
on the legends of early Arab-Sasanian coins.
70
While Bowersock 2012: 75 correctly points out that Heraclius’s actions
and campaigns handed over the administration of Asurestan/al-‘Iraq to the
incoming Muslim Arabs, he does not provide an equally compelling reason for
why Syria and Egypt fell as easily to the same armies. The logical reason, one
might think, is that the entire region from al-‘Iraq to Egypt, was left without a
master or any defences.

242
 Within this, the narratives of the Muslim conquests describing a
seemingly concerted programme of conquests, appear as later com-
pilations71 of various accounts regarding piecemeal campaigns, later
fitted within the rubric of a conquest programme.72 The invading ar-
mies most likely did not all originate from the area around Mecca and
Medina and probably were supplemented by the tribesmen and mer-
cenary troops – perhaps the remainders of the Sasanian army already
in the southern part of Mesopotamia and Syria. The decentralised
state of affairs, and perhaps and account of the cross-border relations
of the local population can be gazed from the tale of the conquest
of al-Hira as told by Ibn A’tham. As the famous commander, Khalid
bin Walid, reaches the walls of al-Hira, the capital of the Lakhmids
in southern al-‘Iraq, he asks the locals to send their most intelligent
and erudite leader for a parlay. The Hirans then chose Abdul-Masīh b
Bughaila al-Ghassani,73 a descendants of the Ghassanids of Syria, who
sings praises of the Ghassan and their lands, which supersedes that
of the Lakhmids.74 Here, the fact that borders between al-‘Iraq and
Syria had become meaningless and that a Ghassanids was presented
as a leader of al-Hira might provide the best example of the state of
the affairs after the wars of 602-630 and the actual makeup of the
population.
The accounts of early wars such as the Battle of the Bridge or the
conquest of al-Hira, as well as the larger campaigns of Yarmuk and
Qadissiya are peppered with re-enforcements being sent from around

71
The seminal study of this is Noth 1973, as well as various studies in Cameron
et al. 1992.
72
The standard narrative, and contextualization, of the early Islamic conquests
is Donner 1981 who relies on the available sources to reconstruct the course
the conquests. The more skeptical work of Hoyland in fact provides a better
context for the conquests as part of a larger imperial effort well situated within
the late antique world, including the Sasanian expansionism which is not
explicitly mentioned, Hoyland 2014, particularly chapter 2 (pp. 31-65).
73
Abdul-Masīh, of course, means “the Servant of Christ”.
74
Ibn A’atham, 51.

243
Arabia, Syria, and Southern Mesopotamia to aid in the conquests.75
It is not inconceivable to imagine that mercenaries from among the
local population, perhaps Arab tribesmen, employed by the Sasanians
during their conquests of Syria were left without a central command
after the demise of the latter. These mercenaries, such as Muthana
b. Haritha al-Shaybanī mentioned before, were the initial marauders
in campaigns such as the Battle of Bridge or in sack of Palestine in
634, before being employed and used in the conquests of 636 and
beyond. An example of these surviving mercenaries can be seen in the
remains of the Mardaites in western Syria who later participated in
the skirmishes between Contantine iv and the Caliphal power in Da-
mascus76 and who might have also left us with some coin evidence.77
The Sasanian dream of unifying Asurestan with Syria had, by this
time, come true, despite the fact that the Sasanians themselves did
not exist anymore.78

Conclusion
The fall of the Sasanian Empire is often portrayed as a direct out-

75
Ibn A’tham 1392: 46-58 on the conquests of the time of the first caliph, Abu
Bakr. The earliest conquests in al-‘Iraq seem to have been initiated by Muthana
b. Haritha al-Shaybanī in Iraq itself (Ibn A’atham 1392, 46-47) and later aided
by Khalid b. Walid on Abu Bakr’s orders.
76
Howard-Johnston 2012, where on page 35 he acknowledges the preservation of
a Mardaite identity in the region through several generations, even as late as the
early 10th century. However, on page 37 he contends that «dispatch of a Persian
armed force into former Roman territories makes no sense, if the aim of the
venture was to stir up the provincials against the new Arab regime…» as a way
of dismissing Schindel and Hahn 2010 in connecting the group to the Persian
forces. The answer might easily lie in the origins of this multi-generational
identity in the Sasanian occupation of western Syria a few decades earlier.
77
Schindel and Hahn 2010 for the possible reading of a group of silver coins with
the title of mrt’n MLK’ “King of the Mardaites” on them.
78
For an example of this unification, see Heidemann 1998 and the merger of
the Byzantine and Sasanian monetary zones during the reign of Abdul-Malik.

244
come of the Arab Muslim conquests of 636 and afterwards. Despite
the oft-expressed astonishment at the speed of these conquests and
their incredible success,79 they rarely are put within the context of the
Sasanian-Byzantine wars of 602-630. Instead, the wars are assumed
to have ended with the victorious campaigns of Heraclius in 627-628
and the removal and murder of Khosrow ii in February 628. If any
role or agency is extended to these wars, it is for them to have con-
tributed to a structural weakening of the Sasanian administration and
military, which then allowed for quick and decisive victories by the
armies of the nascent Islamic state.
If we consider that the same weaknesses can be assigned to the
Byzantines who, save their imperial centre, also lost the majority of
its domains,80 structural weaknesses do not offer a satisfactory expla-
nation.81 Instead, we should consider the loss of authority and control
by the Sasanian house as a separate matter than the loss of control
over territories by the Sasanian administration.
The collapse of Sasanian dynasty is indeed a direct outcome of
Heraclius’ successful campaigns, opening of a new front in the north-
east, sewing confusion into the Sasanian army, and encouraging the
removal of Khsorow ii. The loss of authority over their domains,
however, is contingent on identifying sources of power and authority
on the ground and within the administration. The Sasanians, aiming

79
Canard 2016 (1965): 63.
80
For this, which is correctly called a second fall of Rome, see Wakely 2018.
81
In a forthcoming article, presented at a conference on Ērānšahr in Transition,
10 May 2019, I will argue that the Sasanian treasury was indeed filled with
monetary resources for the support of the army, something clearly expressed by
Khsrow ii in his answer to Shīrōy’s accusations of the appropriation of funds.
Further, the continued strength of the Sasanian army perhaps can be gaged
by Heraclius’s caution in advancing further toward Ctesiphon or any attempt
at conquering Asurestan. Further evidence can be provided by the continued
presence of the Sasanian army in Syria under Shahrbarāz, two years after
Khsrow’s death and the effective end of the war. Shahrbarāz’ troops appear to
be in Syria without much opposition (al-Tabari i. 1063).

245
to unite the eastern Mediterranean with their western territories in
Mesopotamia, proved incapable of forging a new administration to
solidify their newly conquered territories. The successes of the Sasa-
nian military in this sense did not translate into a successful adminis-
tration, capable of managing means of production and extraction of
wealth from the conquered territories. Evidence of the booty extract-
ed and their shipment to Ctesiphon demonstrates that the invading
armies could not establish a lasting presence, or most likely did not
have the time to do so.
On the other hand, the Islamic conquests in Syria and al-‘Iraq
were immediately followed by a transition of the administration, with
responsibility often held by the same Byzantine and Sasanian admin-
istrators under the caliphal authority.82 In Syria, until 630 under Sasa-
nian occupation, the control passed from the Sasanian commanders
to a period of vacuum before being overtaken by the Muslims. Mus-
lim armies, and the state, in fact provided the needed administration
and control that the scattered armies and forces needed to consolidate
their conquests to a functioning system. This is at the root of the
lightning speed and spectacular success of the early Islamic armies,
taking full advantage of a job half-done and effectively turning it into
a successful system, one later presented as part of the narrative of
concerted campaigns of conquest. Perhaps, in a fanciful sense, one
could say that the Sasanian Empire, which had lost its dynastic rulers,
survived as the nucleus of the awesome power that came to be known
as the Islamic Empire.

82
This is, of course, previously suggested and extensively studied in Morony 1984.

246
Riassunto:
La rapidità con cui gli eserciti arabi – accomunati dalla nuova fede nell’Islam – era-
no stati in grado di espandersi tanto a occidente quanto a oriente e di impiantarsi
stabilmente nei nuovi territori conquistati è da sempre motivo di grande interesse
tra gli storici. Alla base dell’incapacità tanto da parte bizantina quanto da quella
sasanide di contenere lo slancio arabo-islamico, si prefigura quale causa principale il
lungo ed estenuante conflitto scatenato da Khosrow ii Aparvez agli inizi del vii se-
colo contro Costantinopoli e le sue province orientali. Un’attenta analisi delle fonti
islamiche, classiche e siriache può contribuire a comprendere meglio le motivazioni
della completa disfatta sasanide e dell’impossibilità da parte bizantina di rientrare in
possesso dei territori perduti contro i persiani quali Siria, Palestina e Egitto.

Abstract:
The speed by which arabian armies, united by their new faith in Islam, had been
able to spread as in the east as in the west, and to stably settle in the new conquered
territories, has always been considered greatly interesting among historians. The
main cause at the root of the inability to contain the arabian-islamic outburst, both
by the byzantine and the sasanian side, is to be found in the long and exhausting
conflict instigated by Khosrow ii Aparvez in the beginning of the 7th century
against Costantinople and its eastern provinces. An accurate analysis of the islamic,
classic and syrian sources can contribute to better comprehend the reasons of the
Sasanian total defeat and, by the byzantine side, of the impossibility to recover the
territories lost against the Persians, namely Syria, Palestine and Egypt.

Parole chiave/Key–words:
Sasanian Empire, Khosrow ii Aparvez, Heraclius, Arabs

247
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