 Trans-Asia Shipping vs. CA, GR No.

118126, March 4, 1996, 245 SCRA 260

Facts:
Respondent Atty. Renato Arroyo, a public attorney, bought a ticket from Trans-Asia Shipping for the voyage of
M/V Asia Thailand vessel to Cagayan de Oro City from Cebu City on November 12, 1991. At around 5:30 in
the evening of November 12, 1991, respondent boarded the M/V Asia Thailand vessel during which he
noticed that some repairs were being undertaken on the engine of the vessel. The vessel departed at around
11:00 in the evening with only one (1) engine running.

After an hour of slow voyage, the vessel stopped near Kawit Island and dropped its anchor thereat. After half
an hour of stillness, some passengers demanded that they should be allowed to return to Cebu City for they
were no longer willing to continue their voyage to Cagayan de Oro City. The captain acceded to their request
and thus the vessel headed back to Cebu City. In Cebu City, plaintiff together with the other passengers who
requested to be brought back to Cebu City, were allowed to disembark. Thereafter, the vessel proceeded to
Cagayan de Oro City. Petitioner, the next day, boarded the M/V Asia Japan for its voyage to Cagayan de Oro
City, likewise a vessel of defendant.

On account of this failure of defendant to transport him to the place of destination on November 12, 1991,
respondent Arroyo filed before the trial court “an action for damage arising from bad faith, breach of
contract and from tort,” against petitioner. The trial court ruled only for breach of contract. The CA reversed
and set aside said decision on appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner Trans-Asia was negligent?

Ruling:
Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, the petitioner was bound to observe extraordinary diligence in ensuring
the safety of the private respondent. That meant that the petitioner was, pursuant to Article 1755 of the said
Code, bound to carry the private respondent safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using
the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. In this case, we are
in full accord with the Court of Appeals that the petitioner failed to discharge this obligation.

Before commencing the contracted voyage, the petitioner undertook some repairs on the cylinder head of
one of the vessel's engines. But even before it could finish these repairs, it allowed the vessel to leave the
port of origin on only one functioning engine, instead of two. Moreover, even the lone functioning engine
was not in perfect condition as sometime after it had run its course, it conked out. This caused the vessel to
stop and remain a drift at sea, thus in order to prevent the ship from capsizing, it had to drop anchor. Plainly,
the vessel was unseaworthy even before the voyage began. For a vessel to be seaworthy, it must be
adequately equipped for the voyage and manned with a sufficient number of competent officers and crew.
21 The failure of a common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its vessel involved in a contract of
carriage is a clear breach of its duty prescribed in Article 1755 of the Civil Code.
 Negros Navigation vs. CA, GR No. 110398, November 7, 1997, 281 SCRA 534
Facts:
Private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros Navigation Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets.
The tickets were for Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving Manila and going to Bacolod.
Subsequently, the Don Juan collided off the Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker
owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation
(PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don Juan sank. Several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The
bodies of some of the victims were found and brought to shore, but the four members of private
respondents’ families were never found.

Private respondents filed a complaint against the Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil Company
(PNOC), and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking damages for the death.
Petitioner, however, denied that the four relatives of private respondents actually boarded the vessel as
shown by the fact that their bodies were never recovered. Petitioner further averred that the Don Juan was
seaworthy and manned by a full and competent crew, and that the collision was entirely due to the fault of
the crew of the M/T Tacloban City.

In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of it in
the carriage of passengers, both the trial court and the appellate court relied on the findings of this Court in
Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which case was brought for the death of other passengers. In
Mecenas, SC found petitioner guilty of negligence in (1) allowing or tolerating the ship captain and crew
members in playing mahjong during the voyage, (2) in failing to maintain the vessel seaworthy and (3) in
allowing the ship to carry more passengers than it was allowed to carry. Petitioner is, therefore, clearly liable
for damages to the full extent.

Petitioner criticizes the lower court’s reliance on the Mecenas case, arguing that, although this case arose out
of the same incident as that involved in Mecenas, the parties are different and trial was conducted
separately. Petitioner contends that the decision in this case should be based on the allegations and defenses
pleaded and evidence adduced in it or, in short, on the record of this case.

Issue:
1. Whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals, finding the crew members of petitioner to be grossly
negligent in the performance of their duties, is binding in this case;
2. Whether the award for damages in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals is applicable in this case.

Ruling:
1. No. The contention is without merit.

Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this Court’s policy of maintaining stability in jurisprudence.
Where, as in this case, the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties
similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is
a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.

2. No, it is not applicable.

Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case applies, private respondents should be allowed to
claim only P43,857.14 each as moral damages because in the Mecenascase, the amount of P307,500.00 was
awarded to the seven children of the Mecenas couple. Here is where the principle of stare decisis does not
apply in view of differences in the personal circumstances of the victims. For that matter, differentiation
would be justified even if private respondents had joined the private respondents in the Mecenas case.

The doctrine of stare decisis works as a bar only against issues litigated in a previous case. Where the issue
involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon by the court in the previous case,
 the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the question presently presented. The Mecenas case
cannot be made the basis for determining the award for attorney’s fees. The award would naturally vary or
differ in each case.

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 Brinas vs. People, GR No. L-30309, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 687
Facts:
"The evidence of the prosecution tends to show that in the afternoon of January 6, 1957, Juanita Gesmundo
bought a train ticket at the railroad station in Tagkawayan, Quezon for his 55-year old mother Martina Bool
and his 3-year old daughter

Emelita Gesmundo, who were bound for Barrio Lusacan, Tiaong, same province. At about 2:00 p.m., Train
No. 522 left Tagkawayan with the old woman and her granddaughter among the passengers. At Hondagua
the train's complement were relieved, with Victor Millan... taking over as engineman, Clemente Brinas as
conductor, and Hermogenes Buencamino as assistant conductor. Upon approaching Barrio Lagalag in Tiaong
at about 8:00 p.m. of that same night, the train slowed down and the conductor shouted 'Lusacan', Lusacan'.
Thereupon, the... old woman walked towards the left front door facing the direction of Tiaong, carrying the
child with one hand and holding her baggage with the other. When Martina and Emelita were near the door,
the train suddenly picked up speed. As a result the old woman and the child... stumbled and they were seen
no more. It took three minutes more before the train stopped at the next barrio, Lusacan, and the victims
were not among the passengers who disembarked thereat.

"Next morning, the Tiaong police received a report that two corpses were found along the railroad tracks at
Barrio Lagalag. Repairing to the scene to investigate, they found the lifeless body of a female child, about 2
feet from the railroad tracks, sprawled to the... ground with her belly down, the hand resting on the
forehead, and with the back portion of the head crushed. The investigators also found the corpse of an old
woman about 2 feet away from the railroad tracks with the head and both legs severed and the left hand
missing.

The head was located farther west between the rails. An arm was found midway from the body of the child
to the body of the old woman. Blood, pieces of scattered brain and pieces of clothes were at the scene. Later,
the bodies were identified as those of Martina Bool and Emelita

Gesmundo. Among the personal effects found on Martina was a train ticket. The Court of First Instance of
Quezon convicted defendant-appellant Clemente Briñas for double homicide thru reckless imprudence but
acquitted Hermogenes Buencamino and Victor Millan. On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed
the judgment of the lower court. During the pendency of the criminal prosecution in the Court of First
Instance of Quezon, the heirs of the deceased victims filed with the same court a separate civil action for
damages against the Manila Railroad Company.

Issues:
W/N the petitioner negligently committed the crime that result to instant death of two (2) people.

Ruling:

It is undisputed that the victims were on board the second coach where the petitioner-appellant was
assigned as conductor and that when the train slackened its speed and the conductor shouted "Lusacan,
Lusacan", they... stood up and proceeded to the nearest exit. It is also undisputed that the train unexpectedly
resumed its regular speed and as a result "the old woman and the child stumbled and they were seen no
more."

It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common carriers like trains and buses that before
reaching a station or flagstop they slow down and the conductor announces the name of the place. It is also
a matter of common experience that as the train or bus... slackens its speed, some passengers usually stand
and proceed to the nearest exit, ready to disembark as the train or bus comes to a full stop. This is especially
true of a train because passengers feel that if the train resumes its run before they are able to disembark,...
there is no way to stop it as a bus may be stopped.

It was negligence on the conductor's part to announce the next flag stop when said stop was still a full three
minutes ahead. As the respondent Court of Appeals correctly observed, "the appellant's announcement was
premature and erroneous."

That the announcement was premature and erroneous is shown by the fact that immediately after the train
slowed down, it unexpectedly accelerated to full speed. Petitioner-appellant failed to show any reason why
the train suddenly resumed its regular speed. The... announcement was made while the train was still at
Barrio Lagalag.

The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and erroneous announcement of
petitioner-appellant Briñas. This announcement prompted the two victims to stand and proceed to the
nearest exit. Without said announcement, the victims would have been safely... seated in their respective
seats when the train jerked as it picked up speed. The connection between the premature and erroneous
announcement of petitioner-appellant and the deaths of the victims is direct and natural, unbroken by any
intervening efficient causes.

Petitioner-appellant also argues that it was negligence per se for Martina Bool to go to the door of the coach
while the train was still in motion and that it was this negligence that was the proximate cause of their
deaths. We have carefully examined the records and we agree with the respondent court that the negligence
of petitioner-appellant in prematurely and erroneously announcing the next flag stop was the proximate
cause of the deaths of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo. Any negligence... of the victims was at most
contributory and does not exculpate the accused from criminal liability.

With respect to the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that after the heirs of Martina Bool and
Emelita Gesmundo had actually commenced the separate civil action for damages in the same trial court
during the pendency of the criminal action, the... said court had no more power to include any civil liability in
its judgment of conviction.

The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. 5978 is culpa contractual, not an act or
omission punishable by law. We also note from the appellant's arguments and from the title of the civil case
that the party defendant is the Manila Railroad Company... and not petitioner-appellant Briñas. Culpa
contractual and an act or omission punishable by law are two distinct sources of obligation.

The petitioner-appellant argues that since the information did not allege the existence of any kind of
damages whatsoever coupled by the fact that no private prosecutors appeared and the prosecution
witnesses were not interrogated on the issue of damages, the trial court... erred in awarding death indemnity
in its judgment of conviction.

It is well-settled that when death occurs as a result of the commission of a crime, the following items of
damages may be recovered: (1) an indemnity for the death of the victim; (2) an indemnity for loss of earning
capacity of the deceased; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation, and (6) interest in proper cases.