The document discusses various topics related to industrial organization and competition policy in the context of digital markets and platforms. It addresses defining relevant markets, measuring market power, antitrust investigations of large technology firms, the interplay between competition and industrial policy, and challenges in analyzing power in non-homogeneous goods markets and two-sided platforms like credit card networks.
The document discusses various topics related to industrial organization and competition policy in the context of digital markets and platforms. It addresses defining relevant markets, measuring market power, antitrust investigations of large technology firms, the interplay between competition and industrial policy, and challenges in analyzing power in non-homogeneous goods markets and two-sided platforms like credit card networks.
The document discusses various topics related to industrial organization and competition policy in the context of digital markets and platforms. It addresses defining relevant markets, measuring market power, antitrust investigations of large technology firms, the interplay between competition and industrial policy, and challenges in analyzing power in non-homogeneous goods markets and two-sided platforms like credit card networks.
Sessions 3 & 4 Lima, 31 March – 1 April 2022 Understanding the interactions of internal and external transactions and their costs in an institutional context Collaborative Economy Platform The current concern of the anticompetitive effects on the digitally intensive Collaborative Economy Economic structuralism, market structure and anticompetitive behavior The Chicago School on the interplay of market forces The Amazon Case The Amazon Group US Subsidiaries……………… ………….and the world as a battleground Biden´s Executive Order (EO) of 9 July 2021 The aim of the EO Structural concerns and the competitive process in the context of online platforms: the case of Amazon Investigation of anticompetitive conduct in the online industry Big Tech under Antitrust Scrutiny Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets Market capitalization growth during current CEO tenure Política Industrial Verde CIS compared to other corporate organizational frameworks Intellectual monopoly and knowledge predation Innovation as organized by Intellectual Monopolies Innovations as outcomes of learning processes Are network effects and digital platforms benefitial or harmful to competition? The digital economy interphase with the traditional economy From the Digital Economy to the Digitalized Algorithm Economy The broader scope of the Digitalized Economy E-Business and E-Commerce in the Digitalized Economy are based on Blockchain Cryptoeconomics What is Cryptoeconomics? A transformational revolution As of July 2021 Digital platform examples Relevance of digital platforms What is the impact on SMEs? Competition in the digital economy has evolved incorporating innovations in the use of algorithms, IT, AI, ML and BD Competition and consumer protection policies are complementary to trade and industrial policies playing an important role in achieving the SDO The dynamic view in the context of the digital economy considers both internal and external competition Rethinking traditional competition policy in the context of the digital economy Digital marketplaces have become a big opportunity for SMEs Collusion in the digital economy Competition policy must be integrated with industrial policy Main issues The case of the credit card market The credit card market in the U.S. The case against American Express Market Power (MP) and Antitrust Enforcement Definition of Market Power (MP) MD/MS paradigm MD: A most difficult problem MP and anticompetitive effects Amex´s restraints across the network services market What is the relevant market? Relevance of Amex´s rewards programs MP and product quality Are traditional tools for evaluating market power enough? Are NDPs justified? Is a restraint justified? Are rewards programs justified? U.S. Attorney General on online platforms (WSJ, 27 Enero 2020) The vote in the Supreme Court (5 to 4) Rule of reason satisfied? Minority position (Justice Breyer et al) Diverging opinions persist to date Carlton´s opinion Carlton´s vMFN Kaplow (HLR, 2010) Divergent opinions MP as measured by the Lerner Index Mergers in differentiated products markets The Hypothetical Monopolist Test (HMT) Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMG) HMG Separating active and passive competitive forces The role of industrial organization in competition policy MP from MS in non-homogeneus goods markets MP and Lerner Index The case for a non-homogeneous goods market HMT and SSNIP HHI and MP Legislation in the EU and the USA Measuring MP Liability Threshold MP>MP* and A>A* MP and profit differences The role of industrial organization MP and A MP>MP* and A>A* Two-sided platforms (Rochet & Tirole) “The fact that consumers can change search engines quickly and at zero cost restricts the ability and incentive for Google to act anticompetitively” (Robert Bork, 2012) La importancia de definir el mercado para inferir poder de mercado La racionalidad de delinear el mercado relevante Definir un mercado relevante es imposible sin haber evaluado antes si hay poder de mercado (Kaplow, 2010) Poder de mercado medido por el índice Lerner (precio-costo marginal) Delineación de mercado en casos de fusiones (The Court,1960s) El caso de fusiones en mercados de productos diferenciados El alcance óptimo hacia la colusión y el impacto de las condiciones estructurales Mercados relevantes en la narrativa antimonopolio La prueba del monopolista hipotético (HMT) Definir mercados ayuda a examinar y evaluar cómo podría afectarse la competencia, identificando de forma expeditiva aquellas fusiones no dañinas y sentando las bases para anticipar impactos competitivos Preguntas clave para definir un mercado relevante Marco Analítico para Definición de Mercados (HMT) Mercado de Producto y Mercado Geográfico en la Definición de un Mercado Relevante La Guía de Fusiones Horizontales (HMG) La Guía de Fusiones Horizontales (HMG) ¿Qué sucede en un mercado de dos lados como el de tarjetas de pago? Delineación de mercados en casos de litigio No siendo suficiente que una alta participación de mercado determine poder monopólico, el uso de la HMT asegura su significancia Fuerzas competitivas pasivas (v.g. la elasticidad de la demanda) importan pero son secundarias a las activas en el mercado relevante Delinear mercados sirve propósitos analíticos y narrativos no atendidos por otras herramientas El rol de la organización industrial en la política de competencia Infiriendo MP de MS en mercados de bienes no homogéneos Poder de mercado (MP) y el índice Lerner para el caso de una firma dominante con una franja competitiva The case for a non-homogeneous goods market La HMT y el SSNIP El umbral del HHI y el MP La legislación en la UE y los EEUU Midiendo el grado de MP El umbral de la responsabilidad (y penalidad) MP>MP* y A>A* Poder de mercado y diferencias entre utilidades El rol y la contribución de la economía de la organización industrial Tiene el Perú una visión de largo plazo? El PNCP Política Industrial Verde Industry 4.0