China’s foreign trade in

metal minerals

Performance and prospects

Marian Radetzki

This paper examines China’s mineral The year in which Mao Zedong and Chou En-Lai died, 1976, also
trade and notes a widespread enthu- marked the downfall of the Gang of Four. The administration that took
siasm about that country’s potential to
supply minerals to the rest of the world.
over soon launched a new lo-year development plan for the 197685
It is felt that this enthusiasm is mis- period. This plan was ambitious. As with earlier development efforts in
placed since the balance of China’s China, there was a strong emphasis on heavy industry, including
trade in metals is in deficit and the
quality of its reserves far from excep-
minerals and metallurgy. A novel feature was that for the first time since
tional. It is concluded that China is the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949 implementation of
likely to remain a major metals importer the huge investment effort was to rely heavily on imports of equipment
for the rest of this century.
and technology and on foreign borrowing.’
Keywords: China; Mineral reserves; In 1977 and 1978, after announcing that China’s identified deposits of
Chinese mineral trade 17 minerals, including bauxite, copper, iron, tin and zinc, were among
the largest in the world,* the government launched a huge programme
The author is with the Institute for Interna-
tional Economic Studies, S-l 06 91 Stock- of mineral investments. In early 1979, rough estimates of only those
holm, Sweden. projects that were to be developed with foreign participation added up
to the anticipated expansion in capacity for some metal minerals in the
The author wishes to thank Jdrgen Appel-
qren, Phillip Crowson, Christopher Findlay, course of the 1980s shown in Table 1. The percentage figures in brackets
%u Tao, Jdhn Tilton and the participants at relate to the envisaged expansion of estimated overall 1978 production
IIASA’s Workshop on East-West Mineral
Trade in March ‘1983 for valuable com-
in China.
ments on an earlier draft and Meng Jian These announcements and efforts aroused considerable enthusiasm in
Hua for constructive assistance in collect- the West about China’s role as supplier of metal minerals to the rest of
ing data from Chinese sources.
the world. Future production capacity was seen to exceed anticipated
domestic needs by substantial amounts in many cases. The optimistic
‘IMF, China Report 7987, IMF, Washing-
ton, DC, p 28. export prospects related not only to the country’s traditional export
2Mining Annual Review, 1979, p 410 and metals, antimony, mercury, tin and tungsten, but also to the major base
1980, p 435.
metals just listed” as well as to a number of strategic minor products like
‘The total capacities for iron ore, steel,
aluminium, copper and zinc after comple- molybdenum, niobium, titanium and vanadium.4 China’s importance as
tion of the then current expansion plans an international supplier of a large group of metal minerals was widely
would have substantially exceeded pro-
expected to increase substantially in the course of the 1980s.
jected Chinese consumption needs in the
late 1980s. See W. Malenbaum, World In 1979, however, there was a profound change in China’s economic
Demand for Raw Materials in 1985 and strategy. The whole lo-year development plan was shelved. The
2000, McGraw Hill, New York, 1978.
investment ratio was sharply reduced. While efforts to expand agricul-
‘%Vor/d Mining, October 1979 (special
China issue); Economist, 2 May 1981. ture, light industry, energy and transport continued, the role of heavy
continued on page ,270 industry, including mining and metallurgy, was de-emphasized.5 The

0301-4207/86/030269-l 7$03.00 0 1986 Butterworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd 269

China’s foreign trade in metal minerals

Table 1. Anticipated Chinese expansion for some metal minerals in the 1980s.

Iron ore 50 million tons (+ 71%)

Steel 30 million tons (+97%)
Aluminium 400 000 tons (+133%)
Copper 300 000 tons (+150%)
Lead 200 000 tons (+200%)
Zinc 200 000 tons (+160%)
Source: Mining Annual Review, 1979, p 411.

foreign supported expansion programme in the metal mineral sector was

virtually halted. Contracts with foreign suppliers of technology and
equipment were cancelled or frozen.6 Ongoing negotiations about
investment collaboration were discontinued. It became clear that the
expectations about rising export supplies of metal minerals from China
would not be fulfilled.
The purpose of this paper is to put these expectations and ensuing
disappointments into perspective. The next section explores in some
detail China’s current performance as an exporter and importer of metal
minerals. A somewhat less detailed historical record of the country’s
foreign trade position in this field, covering the period since 1960, is
then provided before attempting to explain Chinese achievements in
metal mineral foreign trade in terms of the country’s resource base,
economic policies and expanding domesic needs. I finally discuss the
future prospects for China’s exports and imports of metal minerals on
the basis of what was learnt earlier in the paper.
For simplicity, the term ‘minerals’ as used in the rest of the paper
includes both metallic minerals and finished metals, but excludes fuels
and other non-metallic mineral products.
Until the early 1980s most information on China’s mineral reserves,
production and consumption at the national level as well as on its
foreign trade in these products was classified. Traditionally only a few
selected data series have been published by the Chinese authorities. The
situation is changing, however, and more data are being released year
by year. Part of the following analysis is based on the official statistics
that have been published. The data are supplemented by information
obtained through interviews with a variety of relevant government
institutions, undertaken during a three-week visit to China in June 1983.
Despite the increasing Chinese openness, the available official informa-
tion is completely inadequate for the task at hand. Hence, the analysis
that follows is based mainly on necessarily imprecise but (I hope)
reasonably correct assessments and guesses by acknowledged author-
ities in the field such as the US Bureau of Mines (USBM) and
Metallgesellschaft.
For the purpose of this study, it would have been valuable to
distinguish China’s trade in metal minerals with COMECON from that
with the non-socialist countries. This is not possible, since there are
hardly any data of the required detail on the direction of China’s trade.
One can only conjecture that there was a strong shift towards
non-socialist countries after 1960, when the political relations with the
USSR deteriorated.
Only summary data are presented in the text. To facilitate reading,
continued from page 269
‘Economic Readjustment and Reform,
the detailed data compilations have been relegated to an appendix. The
China Today (3), Beijing Review, Beijing, sources from which the figures have been taken are documented in the
1982, pp 31-38; Ma Hong, New Strategy. appendix.
for China’s Economy, New World Press,
Beijing, 1983, p 11.
To provide a context for the following discussion, Table 2 presents a
61MF, op tit, Ref 1. few general figures on China’s role in the world economy. The numbers

270 RESOURCES POLICY September 1986

 China’s foreign trade in metal minerals

Table 2. China in the world economy, 1990.

World China China’s share (%)

Population (million) 4 380 977.0 22.3

Area (million km*) 130 9.6 7.3
GDP ($ billion) 11000 260.0 2.4
Value-added in
Source: World Development Report 1982, World industry ($ billion) 4 600 121 .o 2.6
Bank, Washington, DC. Exports ($ billion) 1 994 18.3 0.9

show that the country’s population density is about three times the
world average. China’s GDP and industrial value added, about 2.5% of
the world total, demonstrate the country’s economic underdevelop-
ment. On a per capita basis, Chinese output is only about one-tenth of
the world average. As in other large countries, foreign trade plays a
quantitatively insignificant role in China’s economy. Exports corres-
pond to only 7% of GDP and account for less than 1% of global foreign
trade.
The major conclusions of the paper are easily summarized:

0 Although China is a very important exporter of some minor

minerals, overall it has a substantial deficit in its mineral trade with
the world.
0 This deficit has grown considerably over the past two decades.
0 China’s increasing net import dependence in the mineral field is
explained by its comparative advantage in labour-intensive activi-
ties, the limited economic potential of its current mineral reserve
base and the fast growth of its domestic mineral consumption.
0 There are no signs that the past trend towards increasing import
dependence in the mineral field will be reversed over the rest of
the present century.

Current metal mineral exchanges with the rest of the world

Tables 3 and 4, summarizing Tables 10 and 11 (in the appendix), list the
important minerals in China’s foreign trade. Importance can be
measured in at least two ways. Trade in a particular mineral can be
important either because it constitutes a significant share of total trade in
the country studied or because it accounts for a significant share in
global trade or production of that mineral. The tables list only those
minerals which either account for 1% or more of China’s exports or
imports, or for 1% or more of global exports or production of the
mineral under scrutiny. Overall values for China’s mineral exports and
imports, based on the fuller appendix compilations, are also provided.
Mineral exports are not very important in China’s foreign trade. In
total, they constituted no more than 3.4% of the country’s overall
exports in 1980. Among the individual products listed in Table 3, only
tungsten accounted for more than 1% of national exports.
All the export products specified in Table 3 are important in that they
account for at least 1% of global production or trade. China has for a
long time been a prominent international supplier of antimony, mercury
and tungsten, with exports corresponding to more than 10% of world
output. More recently vanadium has been added to the group of
materials in which Chinese sales account for a substantial share of the
world market.
Despite its importance in the four minor metal markets, China

RESOURCES POLICY September 1986 271

China’s foreign trade in metal minerals

Table 3. Some important minerals in China’s exports, 1980.

Quantity Value % share of China’s China’s exports China’s

total commodity as percent of: production
export value (tons)
(18 270 $ million) world world
(tons) ($ million) export production

Antimony 8 900 29.0 0.2 22.3 14.7 10 000

Bauxite 452 000 18.6 0.1 1.2 0.5 1 700 000
Cadmium 226 1.2 negl na 1.2 220
Magnesite 140 000 28.0 0.2 na 1.3 2 000 000
Mercury 985 11.5 0.1 600
Tin 4 200 67.0 0.4 21; 14.9
1.0 16000
Titanium metal 1 400 17.0 0.1 6.1 1.7 2 700
Tungsten (W content) 16 300 195.0 1.1 40.8 30.8 13 500
Vanadium 4 000 32.0 0.2 20.0 11.2 4 500

Total for all identified

minerals 620.8 3.4
Source: Summary of Table 10.

Table 4. Some important minerals in China’s imports, 1980.

Quantity Value % share of China’s China’s imports China’s

total commodity as percent of: production
export value (tons)
(19 550 $ million) world world
(tons) ($ million) export production

Aluminium metal 110000 192 1.0 2.7 0.8 350 000

Copper metal 126 000 273 1.4 2.5 1.6 165 000
Iron ore (actual
weight) 7 253 000 102 0.5 1.9 0.8 113OOOONl
Lead metal 39 000 35 0.2 2.0 1.1 160 000
Magnesium 4 650 12 0.1 1.5 6 500
Steel 5000000 2240 11.5 21: 0.7 34 000 000

Total for all identified

minerals 2 895 15.0
Source: Summary of Table 11.

remains an overall insignificant exporter of minerals. Its total foreign

7Sum total of SITC 28, 67 and 68, as
reported in lMonth/y Bulletin of Statistics,
United Nations, New York, May 1983.
‘Handbook of International Trade and De-
velopment Statistics, 1981 Supplement,
UNCTAD, Geneva, Table 4.2.
sales in 1980, $620 million, amounted to less than 0.4% of the $157 500
million at which global mineral trade was valued in that year.’
While Table 3, listing the important exports, is composed in the main
of minor metals, the import products contained in Table 4 consist almost
exclusively of the major base metals. The dominance of steel (77% of
the overall value) is especially noteworthy. Chinese mineral imports in
1980, $2 900 million in total, constituted 15% of the country’s overall
import value and corresponded to about 1.8% of global mineral trade.
In no individual mineral market did the Chinese imports exceed 3% of
global trade.
The country’s foreign trade deficit in minerals in 1980 amounted to
$2 270 million, 12.5% of total national exports and 1.4% of global
mineral trade.
Many countries are more dependent on mineral exports, and supply
far more to the rest of the world, than China (see Table 13). There are
many countries whose mineral imports are far larger than China’s. In
one respect, however, China appears exceptional. In only one of the 161
countries (Mozambique) for which UNCTAD provides data’ is the
mineral share in national imports higher than the 15% recorded by
China.
Two decades of metal mineral production and trade
Tables 5 and 6, summarizing Tables 14 and 15, provide a historical
perspective on the current foreign trade position discussed in the

272 RESOURCES POLICY September 1986

 China’s foreign trade in metal minerals

Table 5. China’s major export metals, production and exports 1960-80 (tons).

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Antimony
Production 15000 15 000 14 000 II 000 10 000
Exports 7 400 5 100 2 400 8 100 8 900

Mercury
Production 850 900 900 800 600
Exports 1 697 347 118 357 985

Tin
Production 30 000 25 000 22 000 20 000 16 000
Exports 26 200 10 100 7 700 15 200 4200

Tungsten (W content)
Production 10 850 8 080 6 080 9 000 13520
Exports 20 160 16 720 6 560 11440 16320
Source: Summary of Table 14.

Table 6. China’s major imported metals, production and imports 1960-80 (tons).

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Aluminium metal
Production 70 000 90 000 180 000 300 000 350 000
Imports 22 000 4 200 91 600 287 100 110200

Copper, refined
Production 90 000 90 000 120 000 230 000 270 000
Import- 110 100 67 000 132 000 112500 128 300

Lead metal
Production 70 000 100 000 110000 140 000 175 000
Imports 0 24 000 51 200 52 300 38 800

Steel (tons x 103)

Production 18 450 15000 18000 29 000 37 100
Imports 870 760 2 700 4 000 5 000
Source: Summary of Table 15.

preceding section. Only the products that have been important in

qhis point was made in my interview with
the Ministry of Metallurgy.
‘The official figures used in this study
have been extracted from Almanac of
China’s Economy 1982. They do not tally
with the equally official figures of tungsten
exports published in UNCTAD’s Tungsten
Statistics, October 1983. Neither of the two
series can be reasonably reconciled with
the production figures in Table 5.
China’s exports and imports since at least 1970 are included, so the
picture is admittedly incomplete. The figures suggest that the deficit in
China’s metal mineral trade has been growing.
The traded volumes of the four export metals displayed in Table 5
have had a highly unstable development with surprising jumps between
the years shown. For three of the four, the trend over the period
covered is clearly declining. Only in antimony have exports indubitably
grown from the beginning to the end of the period, even though there
was a sharp fall in between.
Falling or stagnant production is the major factor explaining the weak
development in the foreign sales of the export metals. Production of
antimony, mercury and tin in China has contracted in absolute terms
over the period covered. In the case of mercury, Chinese output has
fallen in line with reduced world production. In the three other metals,
China’s share of the world total has experienced significant declines.
With the exception of tin, it is hard to detect a consistent link between
the quantity exported and total production. In tin, the exported share
appears to have shrunk in consequence of falling output. This would
suggest that satisfaction of domestic needs has had priority over sales
abroad.’ In the case of tungsten, the official Chinese export figures are
persistently higher than the foreign estimates of production.l’ I have not
been able to disentangle this discrepancy. In antimony and mercury the
exported shares have experienced violent fluctuations without any
significant upward or downward trend. The data do not support the

RESOURCES POLICY September 1986 273

China’s foreign trade in metal minerals

hypothesis that export shares are related to real price levels. Given the
small export revenue earned from each of the four metals, it is unlikely
that the export shares would be consciously adjusted to the variations in
the country’s export revenue requirements.
The production and imports of the four major import metals is shown
in Table 6. Further details are given in Table 15. Imports through the
1970s do not show any clear upward or downward trend, but for all four
metals the imported quantities in the 1970s are substantially higher than
in 1960.
China’s production of aluminium, copper and lead has been growing
faster than world production. The same is true for steel from 1965 and
onwards. The elevated steel production figure for 1960, however,
corresponded to 5.3% of world output, a proportion even greater than
that reached in 1980 (5.2%).
Domestic consumption of the four metals must have grown at
impressive rates: despite the relatively speedy expansion of domestic
output, there has not been any tendency towards falling import
dependence. Imports as a share of production have a clear-cut upward
trend in the case of steel and show sharp but erratic variations for the
other three metals. As with the export metals, it is not possible to detect
any consistent relationship between real price levels on the one hand
and import volume or import share on the other.
One way of summarizing the message conveyed by Tables 5 and 6 is
by providing export and import values in constant money for the eight
metals listed. Expressed in 1981 dollars,” the 1960 figures work out at
$410 million for the exports and $620 million for the imports, with a
deficit of $210 million. In 1980, the constant 1981 dollar figures work out
at $310 million for the exports and $2 740 million for the imports, with a
deficit of $2 430 million. The stagnant export performance contrasts
sharply with the explosive import growth. The 13-fold increase in the
deficit over the 20-year period studied can be compared with the
(constant money) value of China’s production of the eight metals, which
grew by a factor of 2.5, and with the country’s GDP which trebled
between 1960 and 1980.
It may be interesting to probe behind the finished metal figures
displayed in Table 6, and study the production trends and degree of self
sufficiency in China for the raw materials from which the four major
import metals are produced. The degree of self sufficiency will be
blurred by the fact that a proportion of the primary raw material is
typically lost in the production process and that part of the total raw
materials used will consist of old scrap.
Figures on bauxite output (see Table 15) suggest complete self
sufficiency in the 1960s but some inadequacy through most of the
1970s.‘* The export surplus in bauxite in 1980, noted in Table 3 above, is
of very recent origin. In the case of copper, the primary raw materials
produced in China remained around 20 000 tons of copper content less
“The World Bank’s US dollar Manufac- than refined output until 1970. In 1975 and 1980, however, the raw
tured Exports Unit Value Index has been material deficit increased to about 100 000 tons. Chinese refined
used as deflator. The index can be found production in this period must have relied in some degree on imports of
inter alia in Commodity Trade and Price
Trends, annual, World Bank, Washington, copper concentrates or blister. In lead, the discrepancy between mine
output and production of finished metal has remained small through the
‘E’ should be noted, however, that a period studied. Finally, for iron ore/steel, the data show a falling ratio
significant proportion of China’s bauxite
output is of refractory grade and not between iron ore and steel output, from 1.6 in 1960 to 1.2 in 1980. In
suitable for metallurgical purposes. addition to its use as a raw material in steel production, iron ore is also

274 RESOURCES POLICY September 1986

 China’s foreign trade in metal minerals

used in making cast iron. No data on Chinese cast iron production are
available. As already noted (Table 4), China imported about seven
million tons of iron ore (actual weight) in 1980. Given the higher ratio
between domestic iron ore and steel production in the 196Os, one can
conjecture that iron ore imports on a large scale emerged only during
the 1970s. In aggregate, the above suggests an increasing Chinese
import dependence for the four raw materials discussed in this
paragraph.

The growing mineral trade deficits explained

The structure and importance of China’s current foreign trade in
minerals has been established above. One of the major findings was that
China has a substantial deficit in its foreign trade in mineral products.
The conclusion of our survey of China’s mineral trade since 1960 is that
the mineral trade deficit has grown. The present section will identify the
major factors that explain the current situation and past developments.
The mineral sector in China has been completely subject to central
government dispositions. Investments in mining and mineral processing
have been under the direction of government authorities. Internal prices
paid to the mineral enterprises have been centrally determined and
unrelated to the foreign trade prices. Foreign trade in minerals has been
almost exclusively handled by corporate arms of central government
ministries. l3
With such a key role being played by the national government, one
would like to know its aims and the content of its policies in the minerals
field before trying to explain past foreign trade performance. Given the
dearth of information on China’s internal economy, very little can be
said about this issue. One can conjecture that, as in other socialist
countries, the government’s economic actions have been aimed at
achieving self sufficiency and independence from an outside world that
was regarded as generally hostile. One can likewise conjecture that the
need to finance indispensable imports led to policies that encouraged
exports of minerals that were easy to sell in terminal international
markets without the need for longstanding seller-buyer relations or
elaborate marketing arrangements. A precedent to this type of
approach is found in the longstanding export sales of gold and diamonds
by the USSR. Whatever their content, the policies pursued by China
were undoubtedly disrupted by the social upheavals resulting from the
Great Leap Forward and later from the Cultural Revolution. Attempts
to identify uniform and long lasting patterns with regard to China’s
mineral trade policies may therefore prove futile.
Instead of probing further into this difficult area, I will adopt a more
basic and general presumption for the purpose of the following analysis.
Thus, I will take it that the policy decisions pertaining to China’s foreign
trade in minerals have been influenced throughout the period under
scrutiny by the country’s comparative advantage vis-ci-vis the rest of the
world. Resources have been allocated to promote export production
only if the anticipated export revenue has been valued higher than the
required resource input. Imports have been favoured only if the
domestic social cost, however- measured, for producing corresponding
‘%terviews with the Ministry of Metallur- items at home has been higher than the value of the foreign exchange
gy, the Central Planning Committee and
the Institute for Quantitative and Techno- expended on buying abroad.
logical Economics. This presumption is obviously no more than a generalization. Political

RESOURCES POLICY September 1986

China’s foreign trade in metal minerals

convenience may have superseded comparative advantage in periods of

political crisis. With the managed price system serious difficulties must
have been encountered even in determining comparative advantage.
Many potential mineral projects with promising returns at international
costs and prices may have remained undeveloped because of the
suppressed relative mineral price levels in the Chinese price system in
past decades. l4 As a tendency, however, the presumption that consid-
erations of comparative advantage have played a significant role in
China’s mineral trade policies, appears to be both justifiable and
defensible.
In my view, the large and growing deficits in China’s mineral trade
have been primarily caused by three factors characterizing this country:

0 a comparative advantage in labour-intensive activities;

0 a mineral reserve base that has not offered especially favourable
economic opportunities for exploitation; and
0 fast increase in domestic mineral consumption.

In the rest of this section I will try to justify these assertions.

14P. Aguinier, L’lndustrie
Chine, Centre d’Etude des Ressources
Naturelles, Ecole des Mines, Paris, 1983.
‘?MF, op tit, Ref 1, pp 40-41.
The claim that China has a comparative advantage in labour-intensive
activities follows from the general observation that capital is scarce and
wages are low in low income countries. The latter is indeed true in
China. l5 Even if one were to assume that the opportunity cost of capital
in China equals the rate of interest in international financial markets,
the country’s low wage levels would still give it a comparative advantage
in labour-intensive production. The maximization of national social
benefit would therefore typically require high labour intensity in
domestic production and exports and high capital intensity in imports.
Given China’s factor endowments and factor prices, its mining and
mineral processing activities are bound to be less capital-intensive than
in industrialized countries, especially so since small underground
operations dominate its tin and tungsten production. But as in other
countries, the mineral industries in China have a high ranking in terms
of capital intensity in a comparison with other sectors of the economy.
Therefore, all other things being equal, mineral production and exports
will not have a strong priority when comparative advantage is a guiding
criterion.
All other things are not equal, however, and there are many
exceptions to the above rule. A low income country may have a strong
comparative advantage in a capital-intensive activity if that activity
requires large inputs other than capital and labour, of which the country
has ample and cheap supplies. Highly economical mineral reserves are a
case in point. Thus, maximization of national social benefit in China
may warrant emphasis on minerals despite the capital-intensive nature
of mineral production, provided that the mineral reserve base is rich
enough, suitably located, and endowed with the appropriate infrastruc-
ture to afford the country a comparative advantage in this field.
Unfortunately, little information is available on the economics of
China’s mineral deposits. Table 7 gives western and Chinese estimates
of the country’s reserves for a group of minerals. The western figures
indicate that China’s reserves of antimony, magnesium, mercury, tin
and tungsten constitute substantial shares of the world total. According
Mini&e en to western estimates, Chinese reserves of antimony, cadmium, magne-
Gum, mercury, molybdenum, tin, tungsten and zinc are ample in the
sense that they account for a larger share of the world total than the

276 RESOURCES POLICY September 1986

 China’s foreign trade in metal minerals

Table 7. Alternative estimates of China’s mineral reserves, 1980.

Western estimates Chinese estimates

(tons x 103) (percent (tons x 103)
of world
total)

Bauxite (actual weight) 150 000 0.6 4 800 000

Antimony 2 400 53.0 1 200
Cadmium 20 3.1
Copper cl 1 000 ~2.3 50 400
Sources: Western estimates: Vanadium, Iron ore (Fe content) 2 700 000 2.9 14 600 000
Deutsches lnstitut fiir Wirtschaflsforschung, Lead 3 000 2.4 20 000
Vanadium, Berlin, 1981; all others, P. Crowson. Magnesium 745 000 29.5
Minerals Handbook 198243, Macmillan, Manganese 14 000 1.o
London, 1982; Chinese estimates: Zhang Fumin, Mercury 16 11.1
Chief Engineer of Beijing Central Engineering Molybdenum 225 2.3 4 080
and Research Institute for Non-ferrous Nickel na na 7 630 (equal to Canada’s)
Metallurgical Industry, ‘Brief Introduction of Metal Tin 1 500 15.2 2 880
Mines in the People’s Republic of China’, paper Tungsten 1 360 52.4 3 200
for the Fourth Joint Meeting MMIJ-AIME, Tokyo Vanadium 135 0.8
1980. (The figures given are for proven Zinc 5 000 3.1 53 000
reserves).

Chinese share of world output. l6 There is little correspondence between

the western and Chinese reserve estimates. For several minerals, the
Chinese figures are many times larger than the western ones. It is
unclear how these wide discrepancies should be interpreted.
Size of reserves by itself says little about comparative advantage. To
determine the latter one would also need information about the
economic quality of reserves. My thesis that China’s reserve base in
most minerals is not of outstanding quality and does not give the country
a substantial comparative advantage in mineral production and exports
rests on several scattered observations.
One observation relates directly to the mineral reserve quality.
During my visit to the Anshan iron ore/steel complex I learnt that the
mines surrounding the steel mill produce iron ore with about 30% Fe
content. This has to go through a complex beneficiation process before
use. Even though the proximity of mines and mill (lO--20km) improves
the overall economics, it would be hard to claim that the natural
resource wealth provides China with an important comparative advan-
tage in this case. At a more general level, Zhang Fumin notes that 86%
of China’s iron ore reserves are ‘lean ores’ and that the average grades
in existing production are no higher than 33%. ” This can be compared
with the 60-65% Fe content that is normal in Australian, Brazilian and
Venezuelan deposits under exploitation. Statements by Chinese author-
ities in the course of my interviews’s revealed that the reserves of
bauxite and copper, although large in size, are also of relatively poor
quality, while those of molybdenum are not very substantial.
Another observation, also based on information obtained from my
interviews, l9 is that the Chinese output of antimony and tungsten in
‘eP Crowson, Minerals Handbook 1982- 1982-83 remained substantially below production capacity, on account
83,‘Mactnillan, London, 1982. of the weak international demand. A speculative but reasonable
‘??!hang Fumin, Chief Engineer of Beijing conjecture derived from this statement is that mines which were closed
Central Engineering and Research Insti-
tute for Non-ferrous Metallurgical Industry,
had variable social costs, however measured, that were higher than the
‘Brief Introduction of Metal Mines in the social benefit of the foreign exchange earnings at prevailing inter-
People’s Republic of China’, paper for the national prices. This would suggest that China’s antimony and tungsten
Fourth Joint Meeting MMIJ-AIME, Tokyo,
1980.
deposits under exploitation are not good enough to place the country
“Central Planning Committee and Non- among the lowest cost producers in these two commodities.
ferrous Industry Corporation. The discussion up to now should not be taken to mean that China’s
%hina National Metals Imports and Ex-
ports Corporation and Central Planning
geological potential for metal minerals is weak. A more reasonable
Committee. interpretation of the low quality of reserves in many minerals, noted

RESOURCES POLICY September 1986 277

China’s foreign trade in metal minerals

above, is that this country, like most other developing countries,

remains underexplored. It is possible, indeed even probable, that a
greater, efficiently organized exploration effort, using the most modern
tools and techniques, would significantly improve the quality of the
reserve base.
Quite separate from the geological quality of deposits is their
geographical location and the availability of appropriate infrastructure.
Geographical location is particularly important for low cost minerals
like iron ore and bauxite. Even geologically outstanding deposits would
have a weak economic potential if their exploitation required the
construction of overland transport facilities of 1 000 km or more.
It is common knowledge that infrastructural installations absorb a
substantial proportion of total investment costs when mineral deposits
in virgin territories are developed into mines. To make such develop-
ments economically justifiable, the quality differential between the new
deposit and inferior deposits in old and established mining areas must be
sufficient to compensate for the higher infrastructural expenditure.
The geographical location and weak infrastructural facilities are likely
to be a contributory factor to the weak economic potential of many of
China’s mineral reserves. The limited information that is available
suggests that the identified deposits are geographically scattered.
Infrastructural facilities such as transport and energy are widely
professed to constitute bottlenecks in the economy, even in the more
developed areas of the nation.20 One can infer, therefore, that new
mineral projects would require very large investments in infrastructure,
especially if they were located outside the traditional mining and
mineral processing centres.
Yet another factor supporting the view that China’s present mineral
reserve base does not offer especially favourable economic opportuni-
ties is the revealed preference of the Chinese authorities as reflected in
the actual production and trade performance of the mineral sector.
Chinese production and exports have lagged behind domestic needs and
world market growth respectively, and the import dependence has
increased, simply because it was realized that the country’s mineral
reserve base was not economical enough to warrant a faster expansion.
Greater social benefit could be derived if the inputs needed for faster
mineral development were allocated to other sectors of the economy.
The argument of the preceding paragraph may appear circular. One
cannot make inferences about the inadequate economic quality of
China’s mineral reserves simply by pointing to a general lack of interest
in expanding the mineral sector. But the circularity is broken when one
considers that China has in fact energetically expanded its mineral
output in certain fields. This is true of petroleum, where both
production and exports experienced an explosive growth in the course
of the past decades. Another instance is that of vanadium, where large
scale export-oriented production was initiated in the late 197O~.~l It is
hard to explain the differential performance of oil and vanadium on the
one hand and of most other metal minerals on the other, unless one
assumes a corresponding differential in the comparative advantage of
“Ma Hong, New Skaregy for China’s
China’s reserve base for the two groups of materials. If advantageously
Economy, New World Press, Beijing, located, large scale deposits of exceptional quality containing, say, iron
lg83; ‘The Sixth Five-Year Plan’. W4l ore, copper or tin, had been available for exploitation, then, as with
Review, 23 May 1983.
2’ Vanadium, Deutsches lnstitut fib Wirt- petroleum and vanadium, we would undoubtedly have seen a sharp
schaftsforschung, Berlin, 1981. increase in China’s net exports over time.

RESOURCES POLICY September 1986

 China’s foreign trade in metal minerals
Sources: Production: 1960, UN Statistical
Yearbook. 1968: 1965-80. BP Statistical Review Table 8. Chinese production and exports of crude oil (tons x 103).
of World her& (annual): BP, London, several
issues; exports: Almanac of China’s Economy 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
1982, published in Chinese by Economic
Management Journal Editorial Board, printed in Production 5 500 10000 28 200 74 300 105 800
Hong Kong, by Hong Kong China Economic Exports negl 196 195 9 877 13 309
Almanac, August 1982.

A third explanatory factor for the rising mineral trade deficit is the
fast growth of China’s internal mineral consumption. This is partly a
consequence of the impressive expansion of the Chinese economy.
From 1960 till 1981, the period for which comparative data are
available 22 China’s GDP has grown at substantially higher rates than
the average for a broad group of low income countries. More important,
however, is this country’s high income elasticity of mineral demand.
Since consumption figures have not been published, the only means to
quantify the growth of consumption or demand in a very rough way is by
adding imports to or subtracting exports from the production figures.
Using this method for China and other developing areas, and more
refined computations for industrialized countries, Malenbaum has
estimated the income elasticities of demand for three minerals. These
are given in Table 9 below.*” The generally higher elasticities in low
income countries are explained by the heavy mineral needs to establish
basic infrastructure at the early stages of industrialization. Additional
explanations of the exceptional Chinese figures include the very low
initial demand levels and the development strategies pursued through
the first decades of the People’s Republic. Thus, the industrial sector
was given a strong emphasis in the overall development effort. In the
1960s and 1970s GDP grew annually by 5.2% and 5.8% respectively,
while industrial value-added expanded by 11.2% and 8.7%. The result
was an increase of industry’s share in GDP from 33% in 1960 to 47% in
1980.24 Furthermore, the strategy gave strong emphasis to the heavy
industry sectors2” which are particularly large users of minerals.
Under these circumstances, the rates of growth in China’s output of a
broad range of minerals, although in several cases substantially above
the world average, were insufficient to keep in line with domestic
requirements, with a resultant increase in the country’s mineral trade
deficit.

Future prospects
In the preceding section I argued that the growing deficit in China’s
mineral trade was a result of the country’s comparative advantage in
“World DeveloDment ReDort 1983. World labour-intensive activities, of the mediocre quality of its mineral
Bank, Washingion, DC. ’ resources and of the fast growth of domestic mineral consumption. In
23Malenbaum,-op tit, Ref 3. the present section I will try to establish the likely developments over
24 World Development Report 1982 and
7983, World Bank, Washington, DC. the next 10-15 years.
25Ma Hong, op tit, Ref 5. For reasons to be spelled out below, it is unlikely that the trend

Table 9. Income elasticities of demand, 1951-55 - 1966-69.

Iron ore Aluminium Zinc

USA 0.38 2.60 0.58

Western Europe 1.26 2.38 0.82
Japan 5.04 4.70 1.64
Latin America 5.09 4.87 1.89
Source: W. Malenbaum, War/d Demand for Raw
Materials in 7985 and 2000, McGraw Hill, New Non-socialist Asia 2.39 13.52 4.54
York, 1978. China 10.90 53.50 19.29

RESOURCES POLICY September 1986

China’s foreign trade in metal minerals
towards increasing mineral import dependence will be reversed in the
foreseeable future. By the end of the century, China will still belong to
the low income country group, even if it succeeds in maintaining the
impressive GDP growth attained in the past two decades. At that time,
this country will therefore continue to have a comparative advantage
v&&v& the rest of the world in labour-intensive activities. Mineral
extraction and mineral processing being highly capital-intensive, and
not based on mineral reserves of a very high quality, will continue to
offer only limited benefits to China in return for its low cost labour
inputs.
Current development efforts in China put great emphasis on widening
existing infrastructural bottlenecks, especially in energy and transport.
Completion of these efforts will indirectly improve the economic
prospects of potential mineral projects. Future exploration may also
uncover unexpected mineral wealth that would make it worthwhile for
China to accelerate the past trend of mineral production and exports.
However, given that the time lag between discovery and production
normally extends over more than a decade,26 large scale production
increases in the 1990s from ore bodies not yet identified are somewhat
unlikely.
A further factor determining China’s comparative advantage in
mineral production will be the longer run level of mineral prices in
international markets. Maintenance of the low price levels of the early
1980s through the decade will undoubtedly constitute a strong dis-
couragement to further mineral expansion efforts in China.
A final factor from which China’s future mineral trade position can be
inferred is the recent change in development strategy, initially
announced in 1979, and codified more recently in the country’s Sixth
Five-year Plan (1981-85) adopted in December 1982. As already noted
in the introduction, the change has involved a lowering of the
investment ratio, a smaller stress on heavy industry and a greater
emphasis on the production of consumer goods.27 The change in
strategy has two opposing implications for China’s mineral trade
balance.
The first implication is a reduction in the domestic mineral demand
growth. The lowered investment ratio and reduced stress on heavy
industry will obviously decrease the additional mineral requirements to
attain a given GDP growth. On this count, therefore, the new signals
suggest that the lower intensity of domestic mineral absorption will
reduce the existing mineral deficit in China.
The second implication follows from the strong de-emphasis of the
mineral sector itself in China’s current economic development efforts.
For instance, as a result of the strategy change, gross investments in
26R. Bosson and B. Varon, The Mining basic metallurgy and metal mining fell from $2.8 billion in 1978 to $1.6
Industry and the Developing Countries, billion in 1981, or from 17.0% to 12.7% of overall gross investment in
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977. the country. 28 Domestic production of mining equipment declined from
“Ma Hong, op tit, Ref 5.
‘*World Bank, China, Recent Economic
243 000 tons in 1978 to 158 000 tons in 1982. For metallurgical
Trends and Policy Developments, Report equipment, the corresponding reduction was from 68 000 tons to 38 000
No 4072, 31 March 1983 (for official use tons.29 While overall industrial production recorded an increase of 23%
only).
29Almanac of China’s Economy, published
between 1978 and 1981, the metal minerals industry itself expanded by
in Chinese by Economic Management no more than 13%. 3o It is significant that the Sixth Five-year Plan
Journal Editorial Board, printed in Hong allocates about $7 billion for a large scale capacity expansion in the
Kong by Hong Kong China Economic
Almanac, August 1983. iabour-intensive textile industry, but no more than $9 billion for
3a/bid. investment in the capital-intensive metal mineral sector. Output growth

280 RESOURCES POLICY September 1986

 China’s foreign trade in metal minerals

for steel between 1981 and 1985 has been set at 3.5% per year, and for
all non-ferrous metals at 2.4%. For copper the figure is less than 1% per
year. This can be compared with a planned overall expansion of
agricultural and industrial production of 4% per year.“’
The current mineral deficit of China is heavily dominated by the
import needs of steel. The key variables to watch for those interested in
the aggregate development of this deficit, therefore, are the trends of
steel production and consumption in the country. The works just quoted
do not offer much enlightenment on the future movements of these
variables.
On balance, it is probable that the strategy shift described in the
preceding paragraphs will have a greater impact on domestic supply
than on domestic demand for minerals. The ultimate consequence
would therefore be a further increase in the mineral import dependence
“Zhao Zi Yang Prime MinisW, A RePoH of China. In conclusion, the factors surveyed in the present section do
on the Sixth five-Year Wan, Beijing, 1981;
Befing Review, 23 May 1983. not suggest any impending change in the past Chinese trends towards
321MF, op n’t, Ref 1. increasing mineral trade deficits.

Appendix
A wide variety of sources have been claims that fuels, minerals and metals assessment of Table 11 ($2 895 mil-
used to compile the figures contained constituted 13% of China’s 1978 ex- lion). The discrepancy may be due to
in the following tables. Only two of ports. This implies that mineral ex- differences in dates on which trade
them are official Government of ports other than oil accounted for values are reported. For instance, it
China sources. 3.2% of total Chinese exports in 1978, may be that some minerals delivered
Tables 10 and 11 contain my a figure reasonably close to the 3.6% in 1980 were already paid for in 1979,
attempts to establish China’s exports total derived in Table 10. thus explaining the high import figure
and imports of metal minerals and Further evidence of the reasonable in 1979 given in Table 12.
finished metals in 1980. The trade completeness of Tables 10 and 11 Table 13 offers further evidence for
values have been obtained in most emerges from Table 12, summarizing the insignificance of China in Third
cases by multiplying the quantities special UN trade statistics studies. The World and global exports of seven
traded by international price quota- upper portion of that table showing major metal minerals.
tions, even though it is not known total trade for socialist Asia (China, Tables 14 and 15 provide estimates
whether Chinese purchases and sales Mongolia, North Korea and Vietnam) for Chinese production and foreign
had actually been made at these and for China separately, reveals that trade in metal minerals between 1960
prices. the latter accounts for about 90% of and 1980. Only the products that have
Although Chinese trade may have the total. The lower portion depicts been important in China’s exports and
included products additional to the socialist Asia’s mineral trade. Sepa- imports since at least 1970 are in-
ones listed, indirect evidence suggests rate figures for China are not avail- cluded. China’s share of world pro-
that the tables provide a reasonably able. The total mineral export figure duction, the relationship between this
complete picture. For instance, for socialist Asia in 1980, $990 million, country’s foreign trade and total out-
according to IMF data,l* total Chinese tallies reasonably with the Chinese put as well as the international prices,
exports in 1978 amounted to $9 745 export figure of $620 million in Table in nominal and real terms, are also
million, of which $958 million (9.8%) 10. Total socialist Asia mineral im- given.
consisted of oil. The World Bank’s ports, $2 780 million, are slightly
World Development Report 1981 smaller than the Chinese import

RESOURCES POLICY September 1986 281

China’s foreign trade in metal minerals

Table 10. Chinese exports of metal minerals and metals, 1980.

Chinese
exports as
% share of overall percent
China Export Chinese exports World of world
Exports Price value (1980:18 270 $ million)m Production Exports Production Exports Production
(tons) ($ ton) ($ million) (tons) (tons) (tons)

Aluminium
Bauxite 452 OOOa 412b 18.6 0.1 1 700 000’ 37 460 OOOd 92 620 OOOd 1.2 0.5
Alumina 33 oooa 200b 6.6 negl 700 oooc 7 980 oood 35 000 OOOd 0.4 0.1
Aluminium metal 11 300a 1 746b 19.7 0.1 350 oooc 4 100 oood 13 130 OOOd 0.3 0.1
Antimony 8 900e 3260 29.0’ 0.2 IO oooc 40 000’ 63 300’ 22.3 14.7
Cadmium 226a 5 100’ 1.2 negl 22oc 18 660’ 1.2
Manganese ore 10 oooa 157b 1.6 negl 350 oood 4 700 00s 10 100 oood cz 0.1
(Mn content)
Magnesite 140 000’ 200‘ 28.0 0.2 2 000 000’ na 11 000 000’ na 1 3
Mercurv 985’ 11 700‘ 11.5 0.1 600’ 6 633’ 14.9
Steel ’ 400 oooe 466b 186.0 1.0 37 100 OOOe 178 000 00: 713 000 OOOd :; 0.1
Tin 4 200e 15 950 67.0’ 0.4 16 000’ 197 OOOd 235 000’ 2.1 1.8
Titanium metal 1400a 12 130’ 17.0 0.1 2 70@ 23 000” 85 000’ 6.1 1.7
Tungsten (W content) 16300e 11 960 195.0’ 1.1 13 5ooc 40 000’ 53 000’ 40.8 30.8
Vanadium 4 000” 8 000’ 32.0 0.2 4 5oOr 20 000’ 35 600’ 20.0 11.2
Zinc IO 0003 760b 7.6 negl 155 oooc 1 880 oood 6 200 OOOd 0.5 0.2

Total above minerals 620.8 3.4

Sources: “US Bureau of Mines, The Mineral lndustfy of China, preprint from Minerals Yearbook 1987; bWorld Bank, Commodity Trade and Price Trends,
1982/83; CMetallgesellschaft, Metal Statistics, annual, several issues; dWorld Bank, Price Prospects for Major Primary Commodities, for official use only,
July 1982; eAlmanac of China’s Economy, 1982; ‘P. Crowson, Minerals Handbook l982/3, Macmillian, London, 1982; sUS Bureau of Mines, Mineral Facts
and Problems, 1980; “The Economist, 2 May 1981; ‘Deutsches lnstitut fijr Wirtschaftsforschung, Vanadium, Berlin, 1981; Roskill’s Metals Databook 1983,
4 ed, London; “Deutsches lnstitut Mr Wirtschaftsforschung. Titan, Berlin, 1980; ‘World Bank, China, Recent Economic Trends and Policy Developments,
Report No 4072, March 1983; mWorld Bank, World Development Report 1982.

Table 11. Chinese imports of metal minerals and metals, 1980.

Chinese
imports as
% share of overall percent
China Import Chinese imports World of world
Imports Price value (1980:19 550 $ million) Production Exports Production Exports Production
(tons) ($/ton) ($ million) (tons) (tons) (tons)

Aluminium metal 110000’ 1663 183’ 0.9 350 oooc 4 100 OOOd 13 130 OOOd 2.7 0.8
Copper metal 128 000’ 2 133 273’ 1.4 270 000’ 5 050 oood 7 800 OOOd 2.5 1.6
iron
Iron ore 7253rXiY 14.1 102’ 0.5 113 000 000’ 375 000 000” 892 000 OOOd 1.9 0.8
Pig iron 353 000’ 142 50 0.3 34 000 oooa na 500000 000’ na 0.1
Steel 5OOOooo’ 448 2246’ 11.5 37 100 000’ 178 000 000” 713 000 OOOd 2.8 0.7
Lead metal 39 000‘ 9rXb 35 0.2 175 OOOd 2 000 oood 3 600 OOOd 2.0 1.1
Magnesium 4650a 2580g 12 0.1 6 500g na 316 OOOg na 1.5

Total above
minerals 2 895 14.9

Sources: *US Bureau of Mines, The Mineral Industry of China, preprint from Minerals Yearbook 1987; bWorld Bank, Commodity Price Trends, 1982/83
edition: CMetallgesellschaft, Metal Statistics (annual), several issues; dWorld Bank, Price Prospects for Major Primary Commodities, for official use only,
July 1982; BWorld Bank, World Development Report 1982; ‘Almanac of China’s Economy, 1982; gP. Crowson, Minerals Handbook 1982/3, Macmillan,
London, 1982; “US Bureau of Mines, Mineral facts and Problems, 1980; ‘Statistical Yearbook of China 1987, Economic Information and Agency, Hong
Kong, 1982; ‘World Bank, China, Recent Economic Trends and Policy Developments, Report No 4072, 31 March 1983, for official use only; trade figures
quoted based on data from Ministry of Foreign Trade.

282 RESOURCES POLICY September 1986

 China’s foreign trade in metal minerals

Table 12. Socialist Asia’s” foreign trade ($ million).

Overall foreign trade

Exports Imports

Socialist Asia China Socialist Asia China

1970 2 a35 1710 2 305 1 921
1978 13 422 10 895 11 118 9 747
1979 18 431 15 674 15395 13 657
1980 22 540 19 530 20 363 18 255
1981 21 973 19 135 23 787 21 963

Socialist Asia’s foreign trade in non-fuel minerals and metals

Metal ores Iron and steel Non-ferrous All minerals

and scrap metals and metals

(SITC 28) (SITC 67) (SITC 66) (SITC 26 + 67 + 68)

Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports

1970 43 28 86 420 50 201 179 649
1978 100 127 218 2 972 177 341 495 3 440
“Socialist Asia comprises China, Mongolia, North 1979 170 145 285 3 420 293 382 748 3 947
., ..,.
Korea ana wetnam. 1980 201 162 364 2 254 428 368 993 2 784
Source: UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, August 1981 262 94 547 1 381 306 222 1115 1 697
1982 and May 1983.

Table 13. Exports of seven major non-fuel minerals, selected LDCs, 1978-80 (annual averages, $ million).
-
Share of
7 minerals
Total in total
Manganese national
Bauxite Copper Tin Lead Zinc Iron ore ore Total exports exports (%)

Bolivia 4 299 6 37 346 839 41 .o

Brazil 20 22 1 296 48 1 388 15 997 8.7
Chile 1 651 110 1 761 3 687 47.8
Mexico 57 100 95 7 259 9 964 2.6
Peru 619 140 136 88 983 2 926 33.6

Morocco 8 84 1 1 5 99 1 877 5.3

Zaire 778 23 26 2 829 1 552 53.4
Zambia 1 046 9 29

India 282 18 300 7 600 4.0

Indonesia 11 89 387 487 16381 3.0
Malaysia 5 44 876 925 11 467 8.1
Philippines 462 2 80 544 4 605 11.8

All LDCs (IBRD defini-

tiion) excluding China, 648 5 529 2 158 481 473 2 700 319 12 308 443 179 2.8
Cuba, Mongolia,
Vietnam

World exports 769 8 992 2 660 1 710 2 002 6 266 410 22 709 1 645 500 1.4

China (1980) nil (2.5;; nil (0.4%; nil (0.5%; 96 18270 0.5
China’s share of world (2.5;;

Sources: China, Table 10; all other countries, World Bank, CommoMy Trade and Price Trends, 1982/83.

RESOURCES POLICY September 1986 283

China’s foreign trade in metal minerals

Table 14. China’s export metals, production and exports, 1980-80.

1985 1970 1975 1980

Antimony
Production (tons) 15 000’ 15 000’ 14 oooc 11 oooc 10 oooc
Share of world (%) 27’ 24’ 2oc 15c 15c

Exports (tons)d 7 400 5 100 2 400 8 100 8 900

Share of production (%) 49 34 17 74 89

Price ($/ton, nominal,e 1 370 1 370 1 320 1 650 3 090

constant 1981 $) 4 780 4 840 3 990 2 470 2 940

Mercury
Production (tons) 850 900 900 800 600
Share of world (%) 9 9 9 9 9

Exports (tons)d 1 697 347 118 357 985

Share of production (%) 200 39 13 44 184

Price ($/ton, nominal,e 6 320 17 100 12230 4 750 12 000

constant 1981 $) 21 940 57 970 36 950 7110 11430

Tin
Production (tons) 30 000 25 000 22 000 20 000 18 000
Share of world (%) 16 12 10 9 7
Exports, (tons)d 26 200 10 100 7 700 15200 4 200
Share of production (%) 87 40 35 76 28

Price ($/ton, nominal,b 2 198 3 893 3 673 6 870 16 775

constant 1981 5) 7 625 13 197 11 100 IO 280 16 192

Tungsten, W content
Production (tons) 10 850’ 8 080’ 6 040’ 9 0009 13 520=
Share of world(%)” 35 30 18 23 28

Exports (tons)” 20 160 16 720 6 580 11440 18320

Share of production (%) 186 207 108 127 121

Price ($/ton, nominal.e 1 950 2 490 7 040 8 320 13 100

constant 1981 $) 8 770 8 440 21 870 12480 12480

Note: Constant dollars obtained by using the World Bank’s US dollar Manufactured Exports Unit Value Index as deflator.
Sources: aUS Bureau of Mines, The Mineral Industry of China, preprint from Minerals Yearbook 1981; bWorld Bank, Commodity Trade and Price Trends,
1982/83; CMetallgesellschaft, Metal Sfatistics, annual, several issues: dAlmanacofChina’s Economy, 1982; Woskill’s Metals Databook 1983,4 ed, London;
‘C.J. Schmitz, World Non-ferrous Metal Production and Prices 170&1976, Frank Cass, London, 1979; gUS Bureau of Mines, Mineral Perspectives, Far
fast and South Asia, 1977.

284 RESOURCES POLICY September 1986

 China’s foreign trade in metal minerals

Table 15. China’s import metals, production and imports, 1960-60.

1970 1975 1980

Production of bauxite, Al content

(actual weight - 0.23 (ton+ 68 000 91 000 136 000 227 000 391 000
Production of aluminium (tons)b 70 000 90 000 180 000 300 000 350 000
Share of world (%)b 1.5 1.4 1.8 2.3 2.2

Imports of aluminium (tons)d 22 000 4 200 91 600 287 100 110200

Share of production (%) 31 5 51 96 31

Metal price ($/ton, nominal,= 513 540 614 686 1 746

constant 1981 $) 1 800 1 831 1 925 1 065 1 686

Copper
Production of concentrates (Cu content, ton@ 72 000 75 000 100 000 140 000 165 000
Production refined (tons)b 90 000 90 000 120 000 230 000 270 000
Share of world (%)b 1.8 1.5 1.6 2.8 2.9

Imports of refined (tons)d 110 100 67 000 132 000 112500 128 300
Share of production (%) 122 74 110 49 47

Metal price ($/ton, nominala 677 1 290 1413 1 237 2 183

constant 1981 $) 2 375 4 373 4 429 1 921 2107

Lead
Mine production (tons)b 80 000 100 000 110000 140 000 160 000
Production refined metal (tons)b 70 000 100 000 110000 140 000 175 000
Share of world (%)b 2.8 3.1 2.8 2.9 3.3

imports of lead metaId 0 24 000 51 200 52 300 38 800

Share of production (%) 0 24 47 37 22

Metal price ($/ton, nominal,= 198 317 304 417 906

constant 1981 $) 895 1 075 953 648 875

Steel
Production iron ore, Fe content (tons x 103) 30 250’ 21 450e 24 200e 32 500e 40 300’
Production of crude steel (tons x 103) 18 450’ 15 OOOB 18 OOOe 29 oooe 37 1ood
Share of world (%) 5.3e 3.38 3.oc 4.5c 5.2’

Imports of steel (tons x 103) 870 760 2700 4000 5000

Share of production (%) 4.7 5.1 15.0 13.8 14.7

Steel price ($/ton, nominal,= 104 107 125 301 466

constant 1981 $) 366 364 392 487 450

Sources: aWorld Bank, Commodify Trade and Price Trends, 1982183; “Metallgesellschaft. Metal Statistics, annual, several issues: ‘World Bank, Price
Prospects for Major Primary Commodities, for official use only, July 1982; dAlmanac of China’s Economy, 1982; YIN Statistical Yearbook, several issues;
‘Eisenerzforderung der Welt, Statistisches Bundesamt, Dusseldorf, 1982.
Note: Constant dollars obtained by using the World Bank’s US dollar Manufactured Exports Unit Value Index as deflator.

RESOURCES POLICY September 1986 285