PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS is a legal concept that refers to the fair and impartial procedures that must be followed

by government agencies or
courts when taking any action that could potentially affect an individual's rights or interests. Procedural due process ensures that individuals have the
right to notice of any legal proceedings that may affect them and the opportunity to be heard, to present evidence and arguments in their defense, and to
receive a fair and impartial decision based on the facts and the law.
Procedural due process is an essential component of the rule of law and the protection of individual rights, as it guarantees that individuals are not
deprived of life, liberty, or property without proper legal procedures. It is a fundamental principle of the U.S. Constitution, and it is also recognized in
many other legal systems around the world.

CASE TITLE: GOVERNMENT OF US VS. PURGANAN, G.R. NO. 148571, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002

FACTS:
The case involves a petition for certiorari seeking to void and set aside two orders issued by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 42, in the context of extradition proceedings against Mark Jimenez. The first order set for hearing
petitioner's application for the issuance of a warrant for Jimenez's arrest, while the second directed the issuance of a
warrant but at the same time granted him bail. The petition seeks to lift the bail order, cancel the bond, and take Jimenez
into legal custody.
The case involves an extradition request by the United States Government against Mark Jimenez who was charged in the
United States with various offenses, including bribery and fraud, arising from alleged illegal campaign contributions to US
politicians. The US government requested his extradition to stand trial in the US. The Philippine Department of Justice
filed a petition for extradition against Jimenez with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, which was granted by the
court.
Jimenez filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest and an application for bail, which were denied by the RTC. However,
on appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the CA ruled in Jimenez's favor and granted him bail pending the extradition
proceedings.
The Government of the United States, through the Philippine Department of Justice, filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
Supreme Court, seeking to set aside the CA's ruling and to revoke Jimenez's bail. Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court, arguing that the denial of bail violated his constitutional right to procedural due process.

ISSUE:
Whether the denial of bail in extradition proceedings violates the right to procedural due process.

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the denial of bail in extradition proceedings does not violate the right to procedural due
process. The right to procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard, but does not necessarily
require a prior opportunity to be heard. In extradition proceedings, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is sufficient due
to the flight risk involved. Moreover, the grant of bail in extradition cases is subject to judicial discretion in the context of
the peculiar facts of each case. In Jimenez's case, the RTC erred in granting bail since Jimenez had a history of
absconding and failed to show that he was not a flight risk. Therefore, the Court upheld the CA's decision setting aside the
RTC's order granting bail.

The court argues that Jimenez's detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not violate his right to due process. The court explains that due
process does not always require a prior opportunity to be heard, and in cases like extradition, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is sufficient. Jimenez will have a
full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition.
The court also argues that there is no arbitrariness in the immediate deprivation of Jimenez's liberty prior to being heard, as his arrest and detention will not be
arbitrary because the DOJ filed the Petition in court after a determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty.
Additionally, the extradition judge independently made a prima facie determination that Jimenez's arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest. Jimenez also has an opportunity to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
The court also notes that before the US government requested Jimenez's extradition, proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he left
the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, he was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its
laws. Hence, his invocation of due process has become hollow.
The court emphasizes that the government's interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world community in the suppression of
crime outweighs Jimenez's supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without the due process that he had previously shunned. The court argues that constitutional
liberties must be carefully balanced against exigent and palpable government interests.
The court also states that the denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14 of the Treaty, since this practice
would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of
extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy
disposition.
The "No Bail Rule" in extradition cases states that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave
abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. Accordingly, after a potential extraditee has
been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once
granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian, and compelling circumstances
including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears
the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision, and emphatic forcefulness. The court realizes that extradition is basically an executive,
not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should
be characterized by caution so that the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised.

SIGNIFICANCE: This case clarifies the issue of procedural due process in the context of extradition proceedings,
particularly with respect to the denial of bail. The ruling establishes that the right to procedural due process in extradition
cases does not necessarily require a prior opportunity to be heard and that the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.
The case also highlights the importance of complying with extradition treaties and laws and conducting proceedings with
all deliberate speed to avoid delays and technicalities that may negate the purpose of extradition.
ACADEMIC DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS (WAEEC)
1. The students must be informed in Writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
2. That they shall have the right to Answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
3. They shall be informed of the Evidence against them;
4. They shall have the right to adduce Evidence in their own behalf;
5. The evidence must be duly Considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case. Disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the
right to cross examination. An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students' participation in a
hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. Thus, it is not subject to the
rigorous requirements of criminal due process, particularly with respect to the specification of the charge involved.
(ADMU v. Capulong, G.R. No. 99327, May 27, 1993

CASE TITLE:
Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo, and Ariel Ramacula
v. National University and Domingo L. Jhocson in his capacity as President of National University
CASE NUMBER: G.R. No. L-68288
DATE: July 11, 1986

FACTS:
Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo, and Ariel Ramacula, students of National University, filed a petition for
"extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction" against the university's
continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enroll. The students alleged that the university's reason for their refusal
to re-enroll was due to their participation in peaceful mass actions within the university premises. They also claimed that
the university's actions were a continuation of their hostility towards the students' exercise of their basic constitutional and
human rights, as recorded in a previous case, and a violation of due process, as they were not informed of any cause for
their expulsion and were not afforded the opportunity to defend themselves.

In response, National University and its President Domingo L. Jhocson claimed that the students' failure to enroll was due
to their own fault, and not because of their exercise of their constitutional and human rights. The university also cited the
poor academic showing of one of the petitioners, Guzman, due to his activities in leading boycotts of classes, as well as
his pending criminal charges for malicious mischief and involvement in a civil case for damages arising from the
destruction of university properties. Another petitioner, Ramacula, was accused of continuing to lead or actively participate
in activities that disrupted classes within university premises, without the necessary permit from university officials. The
university argued that the students' actuations amounted to a forfeiture of their privilege to seek enrollment and that it was
not in the best interest of all concerned to allow them to enroll.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the university's refusal to re-enroll the students violated their right to due process.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the students, stating that their right to due process was violated by the university's
actions. The Court issued a mandatory injunction enjoining the university to allow the enrollment of the students for the
coming semester without prejudice to any disciplinary proceeding to which any or all of them may be subjected, with their
right to lawful defense recognized and respected.

The Court held that the university's refusal to enroll the students amounted to a penalty of expulsion without cause or
without the opportunity to defend themselves, which violated their right to due process. While the university claimed that
the students' failure to enroll was due to their own fault, the Court noted that the university failed to provide any evidence
to support its claim. Moreover, the Court held that even if the students were guilty of any misconduct, they still had the
right to be informed of the charges against them and to be given the opportunity to defend themselves before any penalty
could be imposed.

The Court also noted that the university's hostile attitude towards the students' exercise of their basic constitutional and
human rights, as well as its disregard for due process, had been previously recorded in a similar case. Thus, the Court
emphasized the importance of upholding due process in school proceedings and recognized the students' right to enroll in
the university.

ANALYSIS:

This case highlights the importance of due process in school proceedings and the need for universities to respect the
basic constitutional and human rights of their students. The Court's ruling shows that even if students are guilty of
misconduct, they still have the right to be informed of the charges against them and to be given the opportunity to defend
themselves
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS is a constitutional principle enshrined in Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. This principle requires that all
persons be treated equally under the law, without discrimination or favoritism. It means that the government must apply the law equally to all individuals and groups,
regardless of their race, gender, religion, or other personal characteristics.
The equal protection clause is an important safeguard against discrimination and arbitrary actions by the government. It ensures that everyone is entitled to the same
rights and privileges under the law, and that no one is unfairly disadvantaged or singled out for special treatment. In practice, the equal protection clause has been
used to challenge discriminatory laws or practices by the government, as well as to promote social justice and equality. For example, it has been invoked in cases
involving unequal access to education, healthcare, housing, and other public services.
Overall, the equal protection clause is a fundamental principle of Philippine law and an essential component of a fair and just society.
(from book) EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws. (PHIL. CONST., art. III, § 1)
1. CONCEPT AND PURPOSE The equal protection of the law clause merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory
within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents.

CASE: G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988

PARTIES: Petitioner: Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. Respondents: Hon. Franklin M. Drilon as Secretary of Labor and
Employment and Tomas D. Achacoso as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration

FACTS:
PASEI is a company primarily engaged in the recruitment of Filipino workers for overseas placement, including domestic and household
workers. The case involves the challenge to the constitutionality of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, an administrative order issued
by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) of the Philippines in 1988. It imposed a ban on the deployment of Filipino
domestic helpers to 24 countries, including Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan, due to the volatile political situations in those countries and the
potential danger that Filipino workers may face. The order was issued to protect the welfare and safety of Filipino overseas workers,
particularly domestic helpers, who were deemed most vulnerable to abuse and exploitation in foreign countries. PASEI argues that the
measure is discriminatory against males or females, as it applies only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills. PASEI also
contends that the order is violative of the right to travel and that it is an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, which belongs to the
legislative, not executive, branch.

The petitioner, (PASEI), argues that Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, was passed without proper consultations with workers,
violating Section 3, Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution which provides for worker participation in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits. PASEI alleged that the order was a violation of the equal protection clause since it only
applied to domestic and household workers and not to other types of workers. It argued that there was no reasonable basis for the
classification and that the order should apply to all workers or none at all.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the suspension of the deployment of Filipino domestic and household workers violates the equal protection of the law.

RULING:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and upheld the constitutionality of the Department Order No. 1. The Court held that the order
did not violate the equal protection of the law because there was a valid classification based on substantial distinctions or differences.
Domestic workers were considered vulnerable to exploitation, and there was evidence of the lack of adequate protection for Filipino
domestic workers abroad. The Court held that the classification was reasonable and rationally related to the objective of ensuring the
welfare and protection of Filipino domestic workers.

The Court also held that the right to travel was not absolute and could be subject to limitations for the promotion of public welfare. The
DOLE, through its rule-making power, had the authority to issue the order to protect the rights and welfare of Filipino workers.

The Court emphasized that the government's duty was to ensure decent, just, and humane employment for Filipino workers, whether
local or overseas, and that the government had a compelling interest in regulating the deployment of Filipino workers. The non-
impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the government's duty to protect Filipino workers.

In conclusion, the Court found that Department Order No. 1 was a valid exercise of the DOLE's rule-making power and did not violate
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

CONCLUSION:
The Court held that the classification of domestic workers for purposes of the deployment ban was valid, based on substantial
distinctions or differences, and reasonably related to the objective of ensuring the welfare and protection of Filipino domestic workers.
The Court noted that domestic workers were considered vulnerable to exploitation, and that there was evidence of the lack of adequate
protection for Filipino domestic workers abroad. The deployment ban was aimed at protecting the rights and welfare of Filipino workers,
and the classification was a reasonable means to achieve this objective.

The Court held that the right to travel was not absolute and could be subject to limitations for the promotion of public welfare. The
government had a compelling interest in regulating the deployment of Filipino workers to ensure decent, just, and humane employment
for Filipino workers, whether local or overseas. The non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the government's duty to
protect Filipino workers.

The Court emphasized that the government had a duty to provide adequate protection for Filipino workers, and that the deployment ban
was a valid exercise of the DOLE's rule-making power. The Court noted that the deployment ban had not been indiscriminately applied
and had been lifted with respect to certain countries. The Court found that Department Order No. 1 was a valid exercise of the DOLE's
rule-making power and did not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

(from the book) *In Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386, it was held that Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves,
because of the special risks to which their class was exposed. *an administrative order issued by the Secretary of Labor temporarily suspending the deployment of Filipino female
domestic helpers abroad was upheld, in view of the need to extend protection to female domestics who were most prone to exploitation and abuse by their foreign employers.
Case: International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE) v. Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing, et al.

FACTS:

The International School (IS) is a private educational institution located in the Philippines. The School is a domestic educational
institution primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. Pursuant to Presidential Decree 732,
the School is authorized to employ its teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, exempt from
otherwise applicable laws and regulations, except those enacted for the protection of employees.

The School employs both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2)
local-hires. Foreign-hires are paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires and are given certain benefits not
accorded to local-hires, including housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. The School justifies
the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b)
limited tenure.

Petitioner International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE), the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the
School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires, claiming that it constitutes racial discrimination.

In 1996, the International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE), a union composed of local-hired teachers, filed a complaint with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) seeking equalization of benefits between local and foreign-hired teachers. The DOLE
Secretary, Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing, issued a decision granting the complaint and ordering the IS to provide the same benefits to
both local and foreign-hired teachers.

The IS appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the DOLE's ruling. The ISAE then appealed to the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the compensation scheme for foreign-hires, which provides them higher salaries and certain benefits, violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the compensation scheme of the School for foreign-hires violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. The Court first noted that the equal protection clause under the Philippine Constitution provides that no person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws. The clause means that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike both in rights
enjoyed and liabilities imposed. The point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos, and the grant of
higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

Employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. This principle is long honored in the Philippines and rests on
fundamental notions of justice. The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an
international level in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international education, but it violates the Constitution.

The Court also rejected the School's justification for the difference in compensation, stating that the "dislocation factor" and limited
tenure are not unique to foreign-hires and do not justify a distinction in compensation between foreign and local hires. Therefore, the
Court ordered the School to pay the local-hires the same salary rate as the foreign-hires and to grant them the same benefits.

The Court then analyzed the IS's argument that the additional benefits were necessary to attract foreign-hired teachers and ensure the
quality of education provided by the IS. The Court acknowledged the importance of hiring qualified foreign teachers but held that this
objective should not be pursued at the expense of Filipino teachers' constitutional rights. The Court also noted that the IS's argument
did not explain why the additional benefits were limited only to foreign-hired teachers and not given to Filipino teachers who may also
have similar qualifications.

The Court further held that the grant of additional benefits to foreign-hired teachers was not justified by the principle of reciprocity. The
Court noted that the Philippines has a policy of extending benefits to foreign nationals employed in the country on the basis of
reciprocity. However, the Court found that the IS's policy did not comply with the reciprocity principle because it did not grant the same
benefits to Filipino teachers employed by foreign schools in the Philippines.

The Court concluded that the IS's policy violated the equal protection clause and ordered the IS to grant the same benefits to local and
foreign-hired teachers.

Note: The case highlights the importance of the principle of equal pay for work of equal value and the prohibition of discrimination
under the Philippine Constitution. It also illustrates the limits of the exercise of management prerogative in relation to labor standards
and constitutional rights.

In International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000, it was held that there was no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by
“foreign hires" and “local hires” as to justify the disparity in salaries paid to these teachers.
CASE NAME: Mayor Antonio J. Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho and Judge Francisco Arca
CITATION: G.R. No. L-29646, November 10, 1978

FACTS:
The City of Manila passed Ordinance No. 6537, Ordinance No. 6537 which prohibited foreign nationals from being employed within
the City of Manila without first securing a permit from the Mayor. The permit will cost them P50.00. Violation of this ordinance carried a
penalty of imprisonment or a fine, or both. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila, filed a petition in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch I, for a writ of preliminary injunction and a judgment declaring the ordinance null and void. He argued that
the ordinance violated the principles of uniformity of taxation, the rule against undue delegation of legislative power, and the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

This is a case involving a petition for certiorari to review the decision of a lower court that declared City Ordinance No. 6537 of the City
of Manila null and void. The ordinance prohibited aliens from being employed or participating in any occupation or business within the
city without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00, subject to punishment
upon conviction for violations.

The trial court granted Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho's petition and declared Ordinance No. 6537 null and void, which prompted Mayor
Antonio J. Villegas to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 6537 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, stating that Ordinance No. 6537 violates the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. The Court found that the ordinance applies only to non-Filipino citizens and does not provide any substantial
distinction or rational basis for the distinction made between Filipino and non-Filipino citizens in terms of the right to work or engage in
business in Manila. Moreover, the ordinance fails to consider the qualifications or skills of the non-Filipino citizen in determining whether
he or she should be granted an employment permit, making it arbitrary and discriminatory.
The Court also found that the ordinance is not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, as it does not serve any compelling
state interest, such as public health or safety, and that the P50.00 employment permit fee is excessive and not commensurate with the
cost of registration.
Accordingly, the Court upheld the trial court's decision and declared Ordinance No. 6537 null and void for being unconstitutional and
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human right of the people in the Philippines to engaged in a means of livelihood. While it is true
that the Philippinesas a state is not obliged to admit aliens within it's territory, once an alien is admitted he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes
the means of livelihood. Also it does not lay down any standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance or denial of an alien employment permit fee.

(*from the book ) In Villegas v. Hui Chiong, supra., the ordinance imposing a work permit fee of P50.00 upon all aliens desirous of obtaining employment
in the City of Manila was declared unconstitutional, because the fee imposed was unreasonable and excessive, and it failed to consider valid substantial
differences in situation among individual aliens who were required to pay it.

SEPARATE OPINION

Justice Teehankee is concurring with the decision made by Justice Fernandez in the case involving the nullification of Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila.
Justice Teehankee argues that the matter of employment of aliens in the country is a matter of national policy and regulation, which should be handled by national
government officials and agencies concerned, and not by local governments. He asserts that the national policy on the matter has already been determined in the
statutes enacted by the legislature, which generally recognize the right of aliens to obtain gainful employment in the country with some exceptions.
Justice Teehankee emphasizes that local governments, such as the City of Manila, are mere creations of the national government and do not have separate and
independent authority to interfere, thwart, or negate national policies. He cites the early case of Phil. Coop. Livestock Ass'n. vs. Earnshaw, 59 Phil. 129, where the
court held that when the national government adopts a policy, a municipality is without legal authority to nullify and set at naught the action of the superior authority.
Furthermore, he argues that national policies are even more binding on local governments when they involve foreign relations with other countries and their nationals
lawfully admitted to the country, as the views and decisions of the Chief of State and the legislature must prevail over those of subordinate and local governments
and officials who have no authority to take official acts to the contrary.