SUPREME COURT & HIGH COURTS LITIGANTS’

ASSOCIATION OF INDIA (SCHCLA)

Injustice anywhere is threat to justice everywhere
Head Office - 1-B/3, Nityanand Baug, R. C, Marg, Chembur, Mumbai – 400 074.
Email- aischcla@gmail.com Phone No. +91 2249717796

Date:28.04.2023

Case No before Hon’ble President of India PRSEC/E/2023/0015432

To,
1.Hon’ble Smt. Draupadi Murmuji,
The President of India,
Rashtrapati Bhavan,
New Delhi.

2. Hon’ble Shri. Jagdip Dhanekar

The Vice President of India,
New Delhi.

3. Hon’ble Shri. Narendra Modiji,

The Prime Minister of India,
New Delhi.

4. Hon’ble Shri. Amit Shah,

The Home Minister of India,
New Delhi.

5. Hon’ble Shri Kiren Rijiju,

The Law Minister of India,

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 New Delhi.
Subject: (i) Immediate directions to Attorney General for India or
Solicitor General to file an application for recusal of Ld. Chief Justice
of India Shri. D.Y. Chandrachud from hearing the case regarding Same-
sex marriage (LGBTQ) for his obvious bias due to his act of promoting
causes of LGBTQ community his regular and fervent support on one
hand and heading the Bench to decide the petition filed by the same
people on other hand. And also to file a Contempt Petition against Shri.
Justice D.Y. Chandrachud as per law & ratio laid down in the Case
of Re: C.S. Karnan (2017) 7 SCC 1.
(ii) Further directions to take immediate steps to prevent Contempt of
law laid down by the Constitution Benches of the Supreme Court &
wastage of public money & time by ld. Chief Justice of India D.Y.
Chandrachud by hearing a case, when he is disqualified to hear the case
and it is the corum – non-judice, and the Bench had became
unconstitutional thereby vitiating the entire proceedings.
(iii) As prosecution of offender is the obligation of the state therefore
appropriate direction to C.B.I. to register FIR u.sec 409,219, 166,
120(B), 34 etc of IPC against ld. Chief Justice of India D.Y.
Chandrachud and others after completing the formality of consultation
by Hon’ble President of India with any of the Judges of the Supreme
Court as per her choice as per law laid down by the Constitution Bench
in the case of K.Veeraswami Vs. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 655;
OR
Though it is not the part of official duty of ld. Chief Justice of India
D.Y. Chandrachud and others to commit criminal offences but in order
to avoid any doubt about the provisions of section 197 of Cr. P. C. and
section 3 of The Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 appropriate sanction/
permission be given/ accorded urgently to the undersigned to initiate
prosecution against ld. Chief Justice of India D.Y. Chandrachud and

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 others under relevant provisions of IPC and other law applicable
thereto,
(iv) Taking immediate steps to create Constitutional Courts or Courts
of appeal for dealing the issues / orders /judgments / injustice done by
the Supreme Court including the cases of recusal applications against
Chief Justice of India, which cannot bne decided by himself as no one
can be Judge in his own case and to avoid embarrassment to as law laid
others down in Mitchell v. State 320 Md. 756 (Md. 1990) and as per
ratio laid down by the Constitution Bench in Indore Development
Authority (Recusal Matter-5 J.) v. Manohar Lal, (2020) 6 SCC 304
In spirit of Art. 14(5) of International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) which are constitutionally guaranteed to all Indian
citizen by the constitution and further upheld by the nine-judge bench
of the Supreme Court in K. S. Puttaswamy vs. Union of India (2017)
10 SCC 1;
(v) Request to the Hon’ble Chairman of Rajya to initiating
impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice of India D.Y.
Chandrachud;
(vi) Request to Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court to call a Full
Court meeting and form an impartial committee to conduct enquiry and
immediate action to withdraw judicial works from CJI D. Y.
Chandrachud till the decision in impeachment proceedings is taken in
earlier cases of CJI per ‘In-House- Procedure’ and as per ratio laid
down in Additional District and Sessions Judge ‘X’ (2015) 1 SCC
799.
(vii) Further action including issuance of notice of preventive action
under section 149 of CrPC to Ld. Chief Jusice of India
D.Y.Chandrachud to maintain aloofness as per ‘Judges Ethics Code’
and stop from attending meetings, conferences and regular media
interviews which are regularly attended by him to propogate the secret
agenda of spreading disharmony and division between different classes

3
 of citizen in India to serve ulterior purposes and to please anti national
elements from Harvard Group like George Soros, Bill Gates and others
as explained by Sh. Rajeev Malhotra in his book ‘Snakes in the
Ganga’ and proved from the acts of commissions by Mr. Chandrachud,
which is against the constitutional duty of Ld. Chief Justice of India Dy
Chandrachud under Article.51(A) of the Constitution of India;
(viii) Direction to ld. Chief Justice of India D.Y. Chandrachud to
respect and follow the binding directions given by the Constitution
Bench of the Supreme Court in K. Veeraswami Vs.Union Of India
(1991) 3 SCC 655 and to resign forthwith from the post and to not to
damage the image of institution of Supreme Court.
Reference - (i) Mineral Development Ltd. Vs. The State of Bihar
(1960) 2 SCR 609
(ii) S.C.A.O.R.A Vs Union of India (2016) 5 SCC 1
(iii) ‘Judges Ethics Code’ adopted by the full court of Supreme Court
Judges
(iv) Luis Hens Serena Vs. Spain 2008 SCC OnLine HRC 20
Hon’ble Madam/ Sir,
1. That, Jusice Chelmeshwar while setting aside the highly illegal order by the
High Court Judge had in the case of Perumal v. Janaki, (2014) 5 SCC 377, ruled
as under;
“22(…) As was pointed earlier by this Court in a different context
“there is no rule of law that common sense should be put in cold
storage” [ Para 63 of Prakash Chandra Mehta v. State of Kerala, 1985
Supp SCC 144 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 332] . Our Constitution is designed
on the theory of checks and balances. A theory which is the product
of the belief that all power corrupts —such belief is based on
experience.”
2. The above observations seems to be more apparent and correct for ex-facie
misconduct of Chief Justice of India D.Y. Chandrachud.

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 3. That the undersigned declares that he is a Muslim by faith and believer of Holy
Quran. That as per Quaranic principles the sex with same gender is treated as worst
sin in the eyes of God. [Surah Lut].
However, I am sending representation only on the issue that are based on our
constitutional mandates and binding precedents of the Supreme Court.
4. At the outset, I appreciate the resolutions passed and stand taken by ‘Bar Council
of India’, ‘Vishwa Hindu Parishad’s Legal Cell’, ‘Indian Bar Association’,
‘Supreme Court Lawyers Association’ and ‘Co-ordination committee of All
District Courts Bar Association of Delhi’ and all other activists who on all forums
and more particularly on social media who had exposed, criticized and opposed the
malpractices and misuse of Supreme Court machinery by CJI D.Y. Chandrachud.
The resolutions are annexed herewith at Annexed A Colly. (Pg No. ___)

5. My Main Grievance Are Two Fold:-

5.1. That, the Ld. Chief Justice of India Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud should not have
presided the Constitution Bench dealing the petition concerning the subject of
LGBTQA because the sound proofs available and given here, ex facie proves that
Justice D. Y. Chandrachud is a firm supporter and promoter of the causes of rights
of LGBTQA which is a part of the petitions being argued before the bench headed
by him. And it is more than a sufficient ground for his disqualification to sit on the
Bench and vitiate all the proceeding and orders if any. It is a clear case of misuse of
public property, time, money and Supreme Court machinery for unauthorized
purposes to serve the hidden agenda and is an offence under sec
409,219,166,120(B),34 etc of IPC. [Mineral Development Ltd. v. State of Bihar,
(1960) 2 SCR 609, State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, (2012) 14
SCC 770, Caperton et al. v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., et al., 2009 SCC OnLine
US SC 65, Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte
Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2), [1999] 2 WLR 272, S.C.A.O.R. A. vs UOI (2016) 5
SCC 808]
5.2. That the arrogant misbehavior of Justice Chandrachud in using harsh and
insulting language and giving degrading treatment to highest law officer of the state

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 i.e. Solicitor General Sh. Tushar Mehta and not deciding preliminary objection first
that Supreme Court cannot make the law and constitution permits only parliament
to make law and Supreme Court can only interpret the law, is non tolerable at all and
Justice Chandrachud should tender apology to entire nation for this. This also proves
deep attachment and personal interest of Justice Chandrachud in any how allowing
and propagating the said cause at the cost of public money at time.
This is a gross contempt of Supreme Court on two count.
(a) Insulting advocate is a contempt and
(b) Hearing the case on merit without deciding preliminary objection of
maintainability of the petition is also contempt of many binding precedents.
In case of Securities & Exchange Board of India v. Mangalore Stock Exchange,
(2005) 10 SCC 274 it is ruled as under;
“2(…)We are of the view that once the Tribunal has noted that
the appeal had been challenged as not being maintainable, it
should dispose of the issue of maintainability first before
passing any further order.”
5.3. The logic in deciding preliminary objection of maintainability of the petition
first is very clear if there is no jurisdiction then entire exercise will be futile it will
be wastage of public time and money. Further it is the basic rule and sound principle
that the person/ counsel/ party raising preliminary objection should be given first
opportunity to put his/ their case and then opposite party should be allowed to
counter it. But Bench acted exactly contrary to it.
In Madhuri Vasantrao Arathe vs. Manish and Ors. MANU/MH/2633/2014 it is
ruled as under;
“4. As already observed by me, the order made by the Collector
showing that the preliminary objection would be decided along with
merits of the disqualification applications, does not appear to be legal,
correct and proper. It may be true that ultimately, there may be found
any force in the preliminary objection, but then the settled legal
position is that in such cases, preliminary objection ought to be
decided, all the more so because it is ordained by Rule 7 of the said

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 Rules. By making the aforesaid arrangement, namely of filing Written
Statement/reply, in my opinion, the petitioners should be heard on
preliminary objections which should be decided.”

5.4.That the Supreme Court have no jurisdiction to frame law or direct parliament
to make law.
5.5. In Suresh Seth v. Commr., Indore Municipal Corpn., (2005) 13 SCC 287 it
is ruled as under;
“5. […] That apart this Court cannot issue any direction to the
legislature to make any particular kind of enactment. Under our
constitutional scheme Parliament and Legislative Assemblies exercise
sovereign power to enact laws and no outside power or authority can
issue a direction to enact a particular piece of legislation. In Supreme
Court Employees' Welfare Assn. v. Union of India [(1989) 4 SCC 187:
1989 SCC (L&S) 569] (SCC para 51) it has been held that no court can
direct a legislature to enact a particular law.”

5.6. Please see also Ashwani Kumar v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 585.
5.7. It must be noted that;
(i) Evil Tolerated is evil propagated.
(ii) ‘Injustice’ anywhere is threat to ‘Justice’ everywhere.
[- Martin Luther King]
(iii) This world suffered a lot, not because of violence of bad people,
but because of silence of good people. [- Napoleon Bonaparte]
6. That, the present representation is sub-divided into following parts for the sake of
convenience.
Sr. Particular Para Pg. No.
No.
1. Proofs that Ld. CJI D.Y. Chandrachud is involved in 7 13
promotion of the causes of LGBTQI + community.

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 2. Ld. CJI Sh. Chandrachud had breached the oath taken 8 23
as a Judge of the Supreme Court and as a CJI and
committed Contempt of binding precedents of
Constitution Benches of the Supreme Court by giving
media interviews and lectures supporting rights of
LGBTQ+ community and then presiding the Bench
hearing the related with LGBTQ+ matter when he was
is disqualified to hear the case. Furthermore he was also
disqualified to hear the case and bound to recuse from
the case/s where Adv. Saurabh Kirpal is appearing as
an advocate because of his close proximity and proven
concern for him and conflict of interest as per specific
law laid down by the SC and as per ‘Judges Ethics
Code’.
3. Pinochet’s principle and law laid down by the 9 42
constitution Benches of the Supreme Court and Article
14 (1) of the ICCPR disqualified Ld. CJI Chandrachud
to sit on the Bench hearing cases of same-sex
marriages. An impartial tribunal is fundamental rights
of every citizen.
4. Evidence and instances of court hearing proving bias, 10 46
arrogance, irritation, misuse of power by Ld. CJI
Chandrachud to silence the voice of other side and to
promote the pre-determined cause without first
considering the preliminary objection of Union of India
that Supreme Court cannot make the law but having
given power to only interpret the law as per constitution
and as has been declared by the Supreme Court itself in
catena of decision.

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 5. The act of Ld. CJI D. Y. Chandrachud in misusing / 11 56
mis-utilizing the Supreme Court machinery, public
money and time for unauthorized purposes is an
offence under section 409 of IPC.
6. The silence and act of omission and commission by 12 59
four brother Judges is more disappointing and vitiates
all proceeding and makes all the five Judges liable for
criminal prosecution under section 120(B) r/w 409,
166, 218 etc. of IPC. [Raman Lal v. State of
Rajasthan, 2000 SCC OnLine Raj 226, CBI
Vs. Bhupendra Champaklal Dalal 2019 SCC
OnLine Bom 140, State of Oddisa Vs. Pratima
Mohanty 2021 SCC On Line SC 1222]
7. Recusal of Ld. Chief Justice of India D.Y. Chandrachud 13 59
on the ground of serious misconduct cannot be decided
by himself in view of law laid down
in Mitchell v. State 320 Md. 756 (Md. 1990).
8. As per law laid down by the Constitution Bench 14 63
in K.Veeraswami VS. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC
655 Hon’ble president of India can pass an order
directing CBI to register FIR & prosecution against CJI
D.Y. Chandrachud by consulting any Judge which she
thinks proper. There is no compulsion upon her to
consult a particular Judge.
9. Breach of oath taken as a Judge of the Supreme Court 15 64
and as Chief Justice of India, by acting with bias &
favor and against the law and the constitution. It makes
him to resign forthwith from the post, as per law laid
down by the Constitution Bench in the case

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 of K.Veeraswami VS. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC
655.
10. Urgent need and obligation of Law Ministry and 16 66
Government of India under Article 14(5) of ICCPR and
law laid down by nine judge bench of the Supreme
Court in K. S. Putaswamy case and by 17 member
Human Rights Committee of United Nations
comprising Justice P.N. Bhagwati as a member in Luis
Hens Serena and Juan Ramón Corujo Rodriguez
Vs. Spain 2008 SCC OnLine HRC 20 and many other
judgements to create constitutional courts to hear and
decide the validity and legality of the judgments passed
by the Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction or
instances like ex-facie bias by the CJI himself.
11. Other examples of an ex-facie misuse of Power and 17 71
violation of the Fundamental Rights of the citizen by
the Ld. Chief Justice of India D. Y. Chandrachud.
12. Proofs of agenda run by Mr. D. Y. Chandrachud to 18 75
spread disharmony & hatred amongst different classes/
castes/ religion in his private speeches/ interviews,
thereby to cause damage to country and fulfil the
ulterior purposes of anti-national elements like George
Soros & other Harvard groups.
This is an offence under section. 153-A, 166, 120(B),
34, etc. of IPC.
It is the breach of oath and obligation under Article.
51(A) of the Constitution.
13. Other proven examples of the misuse of power and 19 87
violation of fundamental rights of the citizen,
advocates, bureaucrats, IPS officers, lawyers, women,

10
 minority communities, top businessman and
corporates, husbands, fathers, mothers, human right
activists, etc. by other judges of the Supreme Court in
the cases of Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India,
(2014) 8 SCC 470, Zahira Habibullah
Sheikh Vs. State (2006) 3 SCC 374 , M.S. Ahlawat v.
State of Haryana, (2000) 1 SCC 278, Re: Vijay
Kurle 2020 SCC OnLine SC 407, Perry Kansagra,
In re, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 858, Dy. GM, Inter-
State Bus Terminal v. Sudershan Kumari, (1997) 3
SCC 496 etc.
14. Supreme Court itself admitted in the case of Ram Deo 20 88
Chauhan Vs. Bani Kant Das (2010) 14 SCC 584 that
the Supreme Court orders can violate fundamental
rights of the citizen and in such case independent
tribunal like Human Rights Commission can enquire
the issue and help the victim to get justice. Said
judgement is followed by the Nine-Judge Bench in K.
S. Puttaswamy vs. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1
15. Law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of 21 101
Shrirang Yadavrao Waghmare Vs State of
Maharashtra 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1237 that if any
judge passes any order or does any act to give favor to
advocate / party like Adv. Kripal and LGBTQ
Petitioners then such judge is guilty of doing corruption
and is a ground for dismissal of said judge. Such
conduct is also called as ‘Judicial Dishonesty’ in
Muzaffar Husain Vs State of Uttar Pradesh 2022
SCC OnLine SC 567.
16. Provisions of IPC section 166, 219, 409 etc. of IPC are 22 105

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 attracted against CJI D. Y. Chandrachud for acting
contrary to law and misusing the public money, time
and machinery of Supreme Court for unauthorized
purposes.
17. Law laid down by the Supreme Court in R.R. Parekh 23 105
v. High Court of Gujarat, (2016) 14 SCC 1,that the
Judges passing orders in wanton breach of mandates of
the rule and law is itself a proof that the Judge is
actuated with corrupt motive. No further proof is
required & is an act of unbecoming of a judge.
18. Law settled by Supreme Court & High Court that it is 24 110
duty of every citizen under Article 51 (A) of the
Constitution to expose the malpractices in Judicial
Institution and warning that such voice cannot be
silenced by misusing contempt jurisdiction.
19. Provisions of Bar Council Rules & Law settled by the 25 129
Supreme Court in R. Muthukrishnan v. Union of
India, 2014 SCC OnLine Mad 737, that the advocates
should not be servile and sycophant and it is their duty
to file complaint against corrupt Judges and to protect
honest Judges.
20. Instances showing tendency of some Judges of the 26 131
Supreme Court to pass unlawful orders and misuse the
machinery of Supreme Court to save accused brother
Judges.
21. The Case laws Regarding applicability of section 218, 27 136
409 of IPC to the judicial officers.
22. Case laws on Judicial dishonesty and unbecoming of 28 138
Judges.
23. Proofs of misuse of power by the Bench of Justice U. 29 162

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 U. Lalit, Ravindra Bhat and Bela Trivedi to save Justice
Chandrachud in a Petition filed by Shri. Mursalin
Shaikh with ex- facie proofs of misconduct.
24. Jurisdiction of Hon’ble Supreme Court to take 30 163
cognizance of Contempt against a Judge of the
Supreme Court and examine the allegations on judicial
side.
25. Right of the petitioner to have clean and incorruptible 31 166
judicial system and to have impartial, fair and judicious
Judges and Chief Justice of India.
26. Constitutional duty of the petitioner and advocates 32 171
under Article 51 (a) (h) of the Constitution to file
present petition
27. Law regarding disqualification of a Judge committing 33 174
breach of the oath by discriminating advocates & poor
litigants and thereby violating their constitutional rights
is a ground for termination of his appointment as a
Judge of the Supreme Court requiring his remand from
the office. Such person is unfit for the post of
supervision of judicial officers in India and cannot be
appointed as CJI.
28. Deemed sanction accorded by Hon’ble President of 34 183
India to Shri Rashid Khan Pathan, to prosecute Ld.
Justice D.Y. Chandrachud for offences under sections
52, 109, 115, 166, 167, 201, 202, 218, 219, 302, 304,
304(A), 409,120(B), 34 of IPC and section 51(B), 54,
55 of Disaster Management Act, 2005 and other
provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

7. Point No.1: - Proofs that Ld. CJI D.Y.Chandrachud is involved in promotion

of the causes of LGBTQI + community.

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 7.1. Hon’ble Justice DY Chandrachud is presently heading the 5 judge
constitutional bench hearing the 20 odd petitions regarding the matter of equality of
same sex marriages (W.P.(C) No. 1011/2022 PIL-W Supriyo@Supriya
Chakraborty and Anr. Versus Union of India.)

7.2. Given his background of being an ardent supporter and sympathiser of

LGBTQIA+ rights, how conscientious is it for Justice Chandrachud to be a part of
the bench that is dealing with the matter for which there is clear bias/inclination on
his part and where he is likely to be in favour of a particular outcome of the case (i.e.
in favour of granting rights of marriage to same sex couples).

7.3. The following instances offer reasonable grounds to believe that the present
hearing in the Supreme Court is not being conducted in a fair manner due to
established and proven inclination of CJI DY Chandrachud in promoting the
LGBTQIA+ rights.

7.4. A judge is supposed to be free from bias and should hear the matters in a
dispassionate manner. Here are some facts collated from the public domain wherein
CJI DY Chandrachud has openly professed his support for LGBTQIA+ causes and
where he has openly championed for their rights.

7.5. The British High Commission in India had hosted a reception in August 2022
to mark the fourth anniversary of the Section 377 judgment. The judgment was
passed on 6th September 2018 by the Supreme Court of India decriminalising
consensual sexual conduct between adults of the same sex. The landmark judgment
has had major implications for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
community.

7.6. The reception had witnessed the presence of members of Indian business, civil
society, NGOs working on human rights, and diplomats of other international

14
 missions coming together to celebrate and advance rights of the LGBT community.
Justice DY Chandrachud, one of the five judges of the bench that passed the historic
judgment, was invited to grace the celebration as the guest of honour.
Read more on the link below:
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-in-india-marks-fourth-
anniversary-of-section-377-judgment

7.7. Justice Dhananjay Yeshwant Chandrachud, Supreme Court of India is quoted

as follows:
“While the decision in Navtej was momentous, we have a long way to
go. The Beatles famously sang ‘All you need is love, love; Love is all
you need’. At the risk of ruffling the feathers of music aficionados
everywhere, I take the liberty to disagree with them and say – perhaps
we need a little more than love. Structural changes as well as
attitudinal changes are essential.”

7.8. An article published on India Today web portal on August 31, 2022 also covers
the event organized by British High Commission in India mentioned in para above.
Link: https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/lgbtq-rights-justice-chandrachud-cites-
the-beatles-song-1994950-2022-08-31
It is mentioned in this article that:
“The Supreme Court judge emphasised that quality is not achieved
with the decriminalization of homosexuality alone, but must extend
to all spheres of life including the home, the workplace, and public
places.
He said that while the decision in Navtej was momentous, we have a
long way to go, and structural changes as well as attitudinal changes
are essential.”
7.9. It is very evident that Justice DY Chandrachud is clearly envisioning further
progress in terms of structural changes and attitudinal changes in the society.

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 7.10. Drawing from the point of Justice DY Chandrachud’s zest for bringing in
structural changes and attitudinal changes in the society, there is one instance from
recent memory where he has expressed his anguish over the withdrawal of the
Karwa Chauth advertisement by Dabur citing society’s intolerance that resulted
withdrawal of the subject advertisement. Here are the details of this incident:

7.11. The National Commission for Women (NCW), along with National Legal
Services Authority (NALSA) had launched a pan-India Legal Awareness Program
for Women, "Empowerment of Women through Legal Awareness” to impart
practical knowledge about legal rights and remedies provided under various women
related laws, thereby making them fit to face the challenges in real life situations.
The programme was launched on October 30, 2021 in Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh
by Justice UU Lalit, Judge Supreme Court of India and Executive Chairman,
NALSA, Chairperson, National Commission for Women Rekha Sharma in the
presence of Justice DY Chandrachud, Judge, Supreme Court of India (he had joined
online and the video of his address is given below) and other dignitaries.
Link: https://argusenglish.in/article/national/ncw-nalsa-launch-pan-india-legal-
awareness-programme-for-women

Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l8WTf5ZgzAs

[Listen at timer 9:00 onwards and 10:00 specifically for CJI’s comment on Dabur
advertisement.]

7.12. On September 6, 2022, Justice DY Chandrachud spoke on the topic "Realising

Diversity- Making Differences In Higher Education" at IIT Delhi.
Link to video is here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cw-v6xCvfcg

The transcript of the speech delivered by Supreme Court judge Justice is attached.
"Today marks the fourth anniversary of the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Navtej Singh Johar. Decriminalisation of section

16
 377 of the penal code has enabled queer people to emerge as legally
empowered citizens and demand their rights rightfully and proudly.
Structural changes are still needed to ensure that we are able to
extend these positive legal actions to marginalised queer people who
continue to face intersecting oppressions", said Justice
Chandrachud.”
Continuing, he discussed, "Intersectional discrimination is not something which is
confined only to the queer, but certain groups of queer people, due to their class and
caste positions, are more susceptible and vulnerable to the abuse of law, both in
terms of material and symbolic harm. Discrimination is intersectional in the sense
that our identities intersect.
“As science will teach you and as law has taught me, doctrine is not
really neutral as text books would like to teach us. Because doctrine
embodies within itself ideology preferences and a worldview which
sometimes protects the dominant or that which lies in the mainstream.
Our experiential learning whether we are faculty or judges or citizens
is affected by what we combat in our day to day life. So the ability of
diversity lies in its potential to transform what we learn in terms of
doctrines in these institutions of higher education and technical
excellence with experiential learning of others. It was a diverse
student population of the IITs as I said which combated the
stereotypes which were built into section 377 of the penal code",
proceeded the judge.

“From my own judicial clerk who were the members of the LGBTQ
community and their friends, I have understood what really happens
in society across us and that enables us to live more fuller, more
richer lives as individuals as we transform the lives of others. In other
words, we need to recalibrate how we understand old vocabulary and
realise that diversity and excellence actually compliment and
reinforce each other. To go back to one of my older judgments, the

17
 way we understand merit should not be limited to individual agency
or ability which in any event is not our soul or own doing; it must be
envisioned as a social good that advances equality because that is the
value which our Constitution espouses. It is important to know that
equality here does not have a mere redistributive dimension but also
includes recognising the worth and dignity of every individual.”

7.13. Refer to the article published on TimesNow portal on August 29, 2022 titled:
“’Atypical’ manifestation of a family unit is as real as its traditional counterpart
and deserved protection under the law: Supreme Court “

Link: https://www.timesnownews.com/mirror-now/in-focus/atypical-
manifestation-of-a-family-unit-is-as-real-as-its-traditional-counterpart-and-
deserves-protection-under-the-law-supreme-court-article-93846201

It said that these manifestations of love and families may not be typical but they are
as real as their traditional counterparts and equally deserving not only of protection
under the law but also of the benefits available under social welfare legislation.

Justice Chandrachud said that atypical or unconventional families must be able

to enjoy all the legal and societal benefits that their more traditional
counterparts do, be it through marriage or otherwise.

https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/family-may-take-form-of-unmarried-or-queer-
relationships-atypical-families-also-entitled-to-protection-of-law-supreme-court-
207716

7.14. In a recent order, the Supreme Court has made certain significant observations
which expand the traditional meaning of family.

18
 "Familial relationships may take the form of domestic, unmarried partnerships
or queer relationships", the Court observed, while holding that atypical family
units are also entitled to the equal protection of law.

7.15. A bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and AS Bopanna made these

observations in a judgment delivered on August 16, 2022 while granting the relief
of maternity leave to a Central Government employee regardless of the fact that she
had availed child care leave for the children of her husband from his earlier marriage.
“Our very understanding of the family unit must change to include the
myriad ways in which individuals forge familial bonds”, he said.

“The presence of queer individuals in public spaces must be the norm rather
than the exception. The accomplishment of this simple yet crucial task
would breathe life into the decision in Navtej.”

7.16. The judgment authored by Justice Chandrachud made certain notable

observations regarding "atypical" family units which are also entitled to equal
protection of law as under :
"The predominant understanding of the concept of a "family" both
in the law and in society is that it consists of a single, unchanging
unit with a mother and a father (who remain constant over time) and
their children. This assumption ignores both, the many circumstances
which may lead to a change in one‟s familial structure, and the fact
that many families do not conform to this expectation to begin
with. Familial relationships may take the form of domestic,
unmarried partnerships or queer relationships. A household may be
a single parent household for any number of reasons, including the
death of a spouse, separation, or divorce. Similarly, the guardians and
caretakers (who traditionally occupy the roles of the "mother" and
the "father") of children may change with remarriage, adoption, or
fostering. These manifestations of love and of families may not be

19
 typical but they are as real as their traditional counterparts. Such
atypical manifestations of the family unit are equally deserving not
only of protection under law but also of the benefits available under
social welfare legislation".

7.17. Interestingly in his address at IIT Delhi explained in para above, on being asked
how do judges deal with human biases while adjudicating the matters in the Court,
Justice Chandrachud responded as follows:
"The last question which was extraordinarily interesting was when you
do justice or when you are in a court of law and you have your human
biases, how do you confront those human biases. At a very theoretical
level, we were told that the law is objective, that the law is uniform, that
it applies equally to everybody. But when you enter the actual practice of
law, the practice of judging, you realise there is no such thing as an
abstract law. Doctrine itself is not objective, doctrine itself suffers from
all the asymmetry which you find in society, because doctrine itself is in
that sense formulated by the products of that asymmetry in society. We
know that algorithms are not that asymmetrical. So I think part of the
issue of good judging, and I am speaking from my own experience- don't
take it as a gospel truth because I am sure there are different parts to
achieving the same objective- is that the important thing first and
foremost is to be aware of your own biases, where you come from. When
you confront your own biases and you are not afraid of your own biases,
that helps in overcoming. Second is exposure. The greatest learning that
you have is from the exposure of others around you who teach you. One
of the problems which all of us today face is that we feel we know
everything that there is to learn. That is what the age of information
technology tries to tell you, that all the information that you need is at
the click of a mouse. It is not necessarily so because there is some vision
which lies beyond information. That vision, that knowledge which lies
beyond the information you really gather from your association and it is

20
 in the multiplicity of association, not with like-minded people but with
people who don't necessarily think like you, who don't necessarily dress
like you, who don't necessarily believe like you or people who do not
believe agree with you, that gives you better perspective. Speaking for
myself, the dining table is a place for discussion with a feminist spouse
who does not think like me or agree with me and I believe there is a great
deal of learning in that process of dialogue which takes place. Finally, it
is never to be judgmental about the lives of others. It applies not only to
the judge but to each one of us that very often we tend to judge others.
Wait for a moment and ask ourselves the question why is he like this or
why is she like that and why am I like this. I think the important thing
about whatever profession we are in is the importance of not being
judgmental about others, by just letting others be And allow others to
lead their own lives and learn how enriching it is that others live lives in
ways which are very different from the way in which we lead our life",
concluded Justice Chandrachud.

7.18. Following are couple of articles that speak loudly regarding inclination of
Justice Chandrachud towards promoting the interests of the LGBTQ community:

New India Supreme Court Chief Justice seen as LGBTQ ally – published on
November 30, 2022.
The article states:
Two petitions filed by gay couples came to the India’s Supreme
Court on Nov. 25 asking for recognition of same-sex marriage under
the Special Marriage Act, 1954. A bench led by the new Chief Justice
D. Y. Chandrachud issued a notice to the federal government and the
attorney general and posted the matter for further hearing after four
weeks.

21
 Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), a public sector insurance
company under India’s Finance Ministry, last month appeared to
recognize a same-sex couple who lives in Kolkata. The arrival of the
Supreme Court’s new chief justice is an additional ray of hope for the
country’s LGBTQ and intersex community.

On many occasions, Chandrachud has signaled his support for the

community. For instance, while speaking at the British High
Commission in New Delhi, the Indian capital, on Aug. 31,
Chandrachud said that decriminalization of homosexuality alone
cannot achieve equality, and it must extend to “all spheres of life,”
including home, workplace, and public places.
Chandrachud has been expressing his observations and opinions on
the issue of LGBTQ rights in India, even when he was not the chief
justice but a Supreme Court judge. Chandrachud, while speaking at
the British High Commission event, which focused on the future of the
country’s LGBTQ and intersex rights movement, said society owes a
debt of gratitude to every individual who formed and continues to form
a part of the struggle for equality.

“Perhaps, we need a little more than love,” highlighted Chandrachud

at the New Delhi event while calling for structural change in society to
let the LGBTQ community live a life of autonomy and dignity.

7.19. Article published on November 9, 2022 titled Pro-LGBTQ Rights Judge

Heads Top Court in Modi’s Divisive India:
• D.Y. Chandrachud takes charge as India’s Chief Justice
• Appointment comes as court faces challenges to its credibility
Link : https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-09/pro-lgbtq-rights-
judge-heads-top-court-in-modi-s-divisive-india

22
 8. Point No. 2 :- Ld. CJI Sh. Chandrachud had breached the oath taken as a
Judge of the Supreme Court and as a CJI and committed Contempt of binding
precedents of Constitution Benches of the Supreme Court by giving media
interviews and lectures supporting rights of LGBTQ+ community and then
presiding the Bench hearing the related with LGBTQ+ matter when he was is
disqualified to hear the case. Furthermore he was also disqualified to hear the
case and bound to recuse from the case/s where Adv. Saurabh Kirpal is
appearing as an advocate because of his close proximity and proven concern
for him and conflict of interest as per specific law laid down by the SC and as
per ‘Judges Ethics Code’.

8.1. That, it appears that current CJI DY Chandrachud’s father, former CJI YV
Chandrachud had recommended the name of BN Kripal as a high court judge in
1979; then in 2000, BN Kripal was part of the SC Collegium which recommended
the name of DY Chandrachud as a high court judge. And now CJI DY Chandrachud
is insisting that BN Kripal’s son, Saurabh Kripal be made a high court judge.
“Tittle: Why is Collegium adamant on elevation of Saurabh Kripal?
Date: January 25, 2023
Link: https://hindupost.in/law-policy/why-is-collegium-adamant-on-
elevation-of-saurabh-kripal/
8.2. In above blog it is also mentioned as under:
“After extracts from sensitive reports of the Intelligence Bureau and
Research and Analysis Wing were put in public domain by the Supreme
Court Collegium, Union Law Minister Kiren Rijiju has rightly
expressed grave concern at the immature and short-sighted action.
He said intelligence agency officials work in a secret manner for the
nation, and they would think twice in future if their reports are made
public.
Rijiju was responding to reporters’ questions on some recent SC
Collegium resolutions, which contained portions of IB and RAW
reports on certain names repeatedly recommended by the top court for

23
 appointment as high court judges, being made public last week. The
Collegium had dismissed the intelligence inputs as ‘irrelevant’.

The center has repeatedly returned certain names suggested by the

Collegium – like lawyer Saurabh Kirpal, son of former Chief Justice of
India BN Kirpal (nepotism is a serious problem in upper echelons of
judiciary), because of his activist stance on LGBTQ+ issues which
reflects a clear Western bias, but even more importantly because his
gay partner is a Italian-born Swiss national, Nicolas Germain
Bachmann, who works at the Swiss embassy in Delhi and is also
reportedly a ‘human rights activist’ who has worked for organizations
like the International Red Cross in the past.

For anyone with passing knowledge of the anti-Bharat and anti-Hindu

bias of Western human rights organizations like Amnesty International,
this alone would be enough to raise a red flag. Is the Collegium blind
to the havoc unleashed by foreign-funded NGOs in Bharat under guise
of ‘human rights and social justice’, or is it in tacit agreement with
anti-Bharat forces that Bharatiyas need to be ‘civilized’ i.e.
Westernized?

The CJI Chandrachud-led Collegium, while publicly posting sections

of the IB & RAW reports on the SC website, also made the astonishingly
flippant remark that “Switzerland is a friendly nation and therefore it
does not have any bearing on national security”.

Switzerland is notorious for being a haven for black money hoarders

across the world. Would a ‘friendly’ nation steadfastly refuse for
decades to share bank account details of corruption-accused Indians?
It is only recently, due to intense pressure from the Modi government
and negative publicity in the non-West world, that Switzerland has

24
 reluctantly agreed to share some details of its opaque banking system.
Switzerland has also joined other Western nations in condemning
Bharat for ‘restricting internet access’, making it out to be
‘suppression of free speech’.”

8.3. Advocate Saurabh Kirpal who is Counsel for one of the Petitioners in the same
sex marriage petitions and who was seen in the court room on all three days of the
hearing (April 18, 19 and 20, 2023) is the person whom the CJI is actively rooting
for elevation to the constitutional post of High Court judge at New Delhi. We have
seen aggressive face offs between the CJI and the Central Government that was silent
on the recommendation of the SC Collegium on appointment of Adv. Saurabh Kirpal
as judge at the Delhi High Court.
Refer the links below: https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/cji-dy-
chandrachud-on-advocate-saurabh-kirpal-sexual-orientation-has-nothing-to-
101679187352590.html

8.4. Judges Ethics Code [Restatement of Values of Judicial Life (1997)] prohibits
hearing of any such cases by the Supreme Court Judges.
On May 7, 1997, the Supreme Court of India in its Full Court adopted
a Charter called the “Restatement of Values of Judicial Life” to serve
as a guide to be observed by Judges, essential for independent, strong
and respected judiciary, indispensable in the impartial administration
of justice. This Resolution was preceded by a draft statement
circulated to all the High Courts of the country and suitably redrafted
in the light of the suggestions received. It has been described as the
‘restatement of the pre-existing and universally accepted norms,
guidelines and conventions’ observed by Judges. It is a complete code
of the canons of judicial ethics. It reads as under:

“1. Justice must not merely be done but it must also be seen to
be done. The behaviour and conduct of members of the higher

25
 judiciary must reaffirm the people’s faith in the impartiality of
the judiciary. Accordingly, any act of a Judge of the Supreme
Court or a High Court, whether in official or personal capacity,
which erodes the credibility of this perception has to be avoided.

3. Close association with individual members of the Bar,

particularly those who practice in the same court, shall be
eschewed.

4. A Judge should not permit any member of his immediate

family, such as spouse, son, daughter, son-in-law or daughter-
in-law or any other close relative, if a member of the Bar, to
appear before him or even be associated in any manner with a
cause to be dealt with by him.

7. A Judge shall not hear and decide a matter in which a

member of his family, a close relation or a friend is concerned.

8. A Judge shall not enter into public debate or express his

views in public on political matters or on matters that are
pending or are likely to arise for judicial determination.

9. A Judge is expected to let his judgments speak for

themselves. He shall not give interviews to the media.”

16. Every Judge must at all times be conscious that he is under

the public gaze and there should be no act or omission by him
which is unbecoming of the high office he occupies and the
public esteem in which that office is held.

26
 These are only the “Restatement of the Values of Judicial Life”
and are not meant to be exhaustive but illustrative of what is
expected of a Judge.

The above “restatement” was ratified and adopted by Indian

Judiciary in the Chief Justices’ Conference 1999. All the High
Courts in the country have also adopted the same in their
respective Full Court Meetings”

8.5. When the impartiality of a judge is in doubt, the appropriate remedy is to

disqualify that judge from hearing further proceedings in the matter. [
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009)]

8.6. In R. Vs. Commissioner of pawing (1941) 1 QB 467, William J. Observed:

"I am strongly dispassed to think that a Court is badly constituted of
which an intrested person is a part, whatever may be the number of
disintrested peraons. We cannot go into a poll of the Bench."

8.7. In Kanishk Sinha Vs. Union of India, 2019 SCC OnLine Cal 2341 it is ruled
as under;

“After having heard the submissions of the petitioner it appears

that his contention is that if a Hon’ble Judge has a friend on
facebook who is a member of the Bar that is a reason for him
to rescue from the case.
If that is the view of the petitioner it will not be proper for me to
take up this matter and release this matter on personal ground.”

8.8. Any adjudicatory process worth its name must perforce pass the test of fairness
and impartiality. These are non-negotiable elements in ensuring purity in the
administration of justice. The test applied to Judges is one of reasonable likelihood

27
 of bias as was explained by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal
Singh Bhullar, (2011) 14 SCC 770, in the following words:
"31. The test of real likelihood of bias is whether a
reasonable person, in possession of relevant information,
would have thought that bias was likely and whether the
adjudicator was likely to be disposed to decide the matter
only in a particular way. Public policy requires that there
should be no doubt about the purity of the adjudication
process/administration of justice. The Court has to
proceed observing the minimal requirements of natural
justice i.e. the Judge has to act fairly and without bias and
in good faith. A judgment which is the result of bias or
want of impartiality, is a nullity and the trial coram non
judice. Therefore, the consequential order, if any, is liable
to be quashed. (Vide Vassiliades v. Vassiliades
[MANU/PR/0066/1944: AIR 1945 PC 38], S.
Parthasarathi v. State of A.P. [MANU/SC/0059/1973:
(1974) 3 SCC 459: 1973 SCC (L&S) 580] and Ranjit
Thakur v. Union of India [MANU/SC/0691/1987: (1987)
4 SCC 611: 1988 SCC (L&S) 1].)"

8.9. Frankfurter, J. in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, (1951) 343 US 451 at Pg.
466 had ruled that when there is ground for believing that unconscious feelings of
the Judge may operate in the ultimate judgment or may not unfairly lead others to
believe they are operating, Judges recuse themselves. They do not sit in judgment.

It has held thus:

"The judicial process demands that a Judge move within the

framework of relevant legal rules and the court covenanted
modes of though for ascertaining them. He must think
dispassionately and submerge private feeling on every aspect of

28
 a case. There is a good deal of shallow talk that the judicial
robe does not change the man within it. It does. The fact is that
on the whole, Judges do lay aside private views in discharging
their judicial functions. This achieved through training,
professional habits, self-discipline and that fortunate alchemy
by which men are loyal to the obligation with which they are
entrusted. But it is also true reason cannot control the
subconscious influence of feelings of which it is unaware.
When there is ground for believing that such unconscious
feelings may operate in the ultimate judgment or may not
unfairly lead others to believe they are operating, Judges recuse
themselves. They do not sit in judgment.

8.10. That, Constitution Bench in Mineral Developement Ltd. Vs State of Bihar,

(1960) 2 SCR 609, it is ruled as under;
“10. […] Tribunals or authorities who are entrusted with quasi-judicial
functions are as much bound by the relevant principles governing the
“doctrine of bias” as any other judicial tribunal. This Court in a recent
decision in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. State of Andhra
Pradesh [1959 Supp (1) SCR 319] observed:
“The principles governing the ‘doctrine of bias’ vis-a-vis
judicial tribunals are well-settled and they are: (i) no man
shall be a judge in his own cause; (ii) justice should not only
be done but manifestly and undoubtedly seem to be done.
The two maxims yield the result that if a member of a
judicial body is ‘subject to a bias (whether financial or
other) in favour of, or against, any party to a dispute, or is
in such a position that a bias must be assumed to exist, he
ought not take part in the decision or sit on the tribunal’;
and that ‘any direct pecuniary interest, however small, in
the subject-matter of inquiry will disqualify a Judge, and

29
 any interest, though not pecuniary, will have the same
effect, if it is sufficiently substantial to create a reasonable
suspicion of bias’. The said principles are equally applicable
to authorities, though they are not courts of justice or
judicial tribunals, who have to act judicially in deciding the
rights of others i.e. authorities who are empowered to
discharge quasi-judicial functions.”

8.11. That in In State of Punjab Vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar and Ors. (2011)
14 SCC 770, it is ruled as under

“JUDICIAL BIAS

24. There may be a case where allegations may be made against a

Judge of having bias/prejudice at any stage of the proceedings or after
the proceedings are over. There may be some substance in it or it may
be made for ulterior purpose or in a pending case to avoid the Bench if
a party apprehends that judgment may be delivered against him.
Suspicion or bias disables an official from acting as an adjudicator.
Further, if such allegation is made without any substance, it would be
disastrous to the system as a whole, for the reason, that it casts doubt
upon a Judge who has no personal interest in the outcome of the
controversy.

25. In respect of judicial bias, the statement made by Frank J. of the

United States is worth quoting:

If, however, 'bias' and 'partiality' be defined to mean the total absence
of preconceptions in the mind of the Judge, then no one has ever had a
fair trial and no one will. The human mind, even at infancy, is no blank
piece of paper. We are born with predispositions ''. Much harm is done
by the myth that, merely by''. taking the oath of office as a judge, a man

30
 ceases to be human and strips himself of all predilections, becomes a
passionless thinking machine.

(In re: Linahan 138 F. 2nd 650 (1943))

(See also: State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Shivananda Pathak and
Ors. MANU/SC/0342/1998 : AIR 1998 SC 2050).

26. To recall the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Public Utilities

Commission of the District of Columbia v. Franklin S. Pollak 343 US
451 (1952) 466: The Judicial process demands that a judge moves
within the framework of relevant legal rules and the covenanted modes
of thought for ascertaining them. He must think dispassionately and
submerge private feeling on every aspect of a case. There is a good deal
of shallow talk that the judicial robe does not change the man within it.
It does. The fact is that, on the whole, judges do lay aside private views
in discharging their judicial functions. This is achieved through
training, professional habits, self-discipline and that fortunate alchemy
by which men are loyal to the obligation with which they are entrusted.

27. In Bhajan Lal, Chief Minister, Haryana v. Jindal Strips Ltd. and
Ors. MANU/SC/0836/1994 : (1994) 6 SCC 19, this Court observed that
there may be some consternation and apprehension in the mind of a
party and undoubtedly, he has a right to have fair trial, as guaranteed
by the Constitution. The apprehension of bias must be reasonable, i.e.
which a reasonable person can entertain. Even in that case, he has no
right to ask for a change of Bench, for the reason that such an
apprehension may be inadequate and he cannot be permitted to have
the Bench of his choice. The Court held as under:

Bias is the second limb of natural justice. Prima facie no one should be
a judge in what is to be regarded as 'sua causa', whether or not he is
named as a party. The decision-maker should have no interest by way

31
 of gain or detriment in the outcome of a proceeding. Interest may take
many forms. It may be direct, it may be indirect, it may arise from a
personal relationship or from a relationship with the subject-matter,
from a close relationship or from a tenuous one.

28. The principle in these cases is derived from the legal maxim nemo
debet esse judex in causa propria sua. It applies only when the interest
attributed is such as to render the case his own cause. This principle is
required to be observed by all judicial and quasi-judicial authorities as
non-observance thereof, is treated as a violation of the principles of
natural justice. (Vide: Rameshwar Bhartia v. The State of Assam
MANU/SC/0039/1952 : AIR 1952 SC 405; Mineral Development Ltd.
v. The State of Bihar and Anr. MANU/SC/0015/1959 : AIR 1960 SC
468; Meenglas Tea Estate v. The Workmen MANU/SC/0139/1963 :
AIR 1963 SC 1719; and The Secretary to the Government, Transport
Department, Madras v. Munuswamy Mudaliar and Ors.
MANU/SC/0435/1988 : AIR 1988 SC 2232).

The failure to adhere to this principle creates an apprehension of bias

on the part of the Judge. The question is not whether the Judge is
actually biased or, in fact, has really not decided the matter impartially,
but whether the circumstances are such as to create a reasonable
apprehension in the mind of others that there is a likelihood of bias
affecting the decision. (Vide: A.U. Kureshi v. High Court of Gujarat
and Anr. MANU/SC/0209/2009 : (2009) 11 SCC 84; and Mohd. Yunus
Khan v. State of U.P. and Ors. MANU/SC/0767/2010 : (2010) 10 SCC
539).

29. In Manak Lal, Advocate v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi and Ors.
MANU/SC/0001/1957 : AIR 1957 SC 425, this Court while dealing with
the issue of bias held as under:

32
 Actual proof of prejudice in such cases may make the Appellant's case
stronger but such proof is not necessary'. What is relevant is the
reasonableness of the apprehension in that regard in the mind of the
Appellant.

30. The test of real likelihood of bias is whether a reasonable person,

in possession of relevant information, would have thought that bias was
likely and whether the adjudicator was likely to be disposed to decide
the matter only in a particular way. Public policy requires that there
should be no doubt about the purity of the adjudication
process/administration of justice. The Court has to proceed observing
the minimal requirements of natural justice, i.e., the Judge has to act
fairly and without bias and in good faith. A judgment which is the result
of bias or want of impartiality, is a nullity and the trial 'coram non
judice'. Therefore, the consequential order, if any, is liable to be
quashed. (Vide: Vassiliades v. Vassiliades AIR 1945 PC 38; S.
Parthasarathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh MANU/SC/0059/1973 : AIR
1973 SC 2701; and Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and Ors.
MANU/SC/0691/1987 : AIR 1987 SC 2386).

31. In Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and Anr.

MANU/SC/0910/2002 : (2002) 4 SCC 388, this Court observed that
public confidence in the judiciary is said to be the basic criterion of
judging the justice delivery system. If any act or action, even if it is a
passive one, erodes or is even likely to erode the ethics of judiciary, the
matter needs a further look. In the event, there is any affectation of such
an administration of justice either by way of infraction of natural justice
or an order being passed wholly without jurisdiction or affectation of
public confidence as regards the doctrine of integrity in the justice
delivery system, technicality ought not to outweigh the course of justice
' the same being the true effect of the doctrine of ex debito justitiae. It
is enough if there is a ground of an appearance of bias.

33
 While deciding the said case, this Court placed reliance upon the
judgment of the House of Lords in Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2)
1999 All ER 577, in which the House of Lords on 25.11.1998, restored
warrant of arrest of Senator Pinochet who was the Head of the State of
Chile and was to stand trial in Spain for some alleged offences. It came
to be known later that one of the Law Lords (Lord Hoffmann), who
heard the case, had links with Amnesty International (AI) which had
become a party to the case. This was not disclosed by him at the time
of the hearing of the case by the House. Pinochet Ugarte, on coming to
know of that fact, sought reconsideration of the said judgment of the
House of Lords on the ground of appearance of bias and not actual
bias. On the principle of disqualification of a Judge to hear a matter on
the ground of appearance of bias, it was pointed out:

An appeal to the House of Lords will only be reopened where a party

though no fault of its own, has been subjected to an unfair procedure.
A decision of the House of Lords will not be varied or rescinded merely
because it is subsequently thought to be wrong.

32. In Locabail (UK) Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties Ltd. and Anr. (2000)
1 All ER 65, the House of Lords considered the issue of disqualification
of a Judge on the ground of bias and held that in applying the real
danger or possibility of bias test, it is often appropriate to inquire
whether the Judge knew of the matter in question. To that end, a
reviewing court may receive a written statement from the Judge. A
Judge must recuse himself from a case before any objection is made or
if the circumstances give rise to automatic disqualification or he feels
personally embarrassed in hearing the case. If, in any other case, the
Judge becomes aware of any matter which can arguably be said to give
rise to a real danger of bias, it is generally desirable that disclosure
should be made to the parties in advance of the hearing. Where
objection is then made, it will be as wrong for the Judge to yield to a

34
 tenuous or frivolous objection as it will be to ignore an objection of
substance. However, if there is real ground for doubt, that doubt must
be resolved in favour of recusal. Where, following appropriate
disclosure by the Judge, a party raises no objection to the Judge
hearing or continuing to hear a case, that party cannot subsequently
complain that the matter disclosed gives rise to a real danger of bias.

33. In Justice P.D. Dinakaran v. Hon'ble Judges Inquiry Committee

MANU/SC/0727/2011 : (2011) 8 SCC 380, this Court has held that in
India the courts have held that, to disqualify a person as a Judge, the
test of real likelihood of bias, i.e., real danger is to be applied,
considering whether a fair minded and informed person, apprised of all
the facts, would have a serious apprehension of bias. In other words,
the courts give effect to the maxim that 'justice must not only be done
but be seen to be done', by examining not actual bias but real possibility
of bias based on facts and materials.

The Court further held:

The first requirement of natural justice is that the Judge should be

impartial and neutral and must be free from bias. He is supposed to be
indifferent to the parties to the controversy. He cannot act as Judge of
a cause in which he himself has some interest either pecuniary or
otherwise as it affords the strongest proof against neutrality. He must
be in a position to act judicially and to decide the matter objectively. A
Judge must be of sterner stuff. His mental equipoise must always
remain firm and undetected. He should not allow his personal prejudice
to go into the decision- making. The object is not merely that the scales
be held even; it is also that they may not appear to be inclined. If the
Judge is subject to bias in favour of or against either party to the
dispute or is in a position that a bias can be assumed, he is disqualified
to act as a Judge, and the proceedings will be vitiated. This rule applies

35
 to the judicial and administrative authorities required to act judicially
or quasi-judicially.'
34. Thus, it is evident that the allegations of judicial bias are required
to be scrutinised taking into consideration the factual matrix of the case
in hand. The court must bear in mind that a mere ground of appearance
of bias and not actual bias is enough to vitiate the judgment/order.
Actual proof of prejudice in such a case may make the case of the party
concerned stronger, but such a proof is not required. In fact, what is
relevant is the reasonableness of the apprehension in that regard in the
mind of the party. However, once such an apprehension exists, the
trial/judgment/order etc. stands vitiated for want of impartiality. Such
judgment/order is a nullity and the trial 'coram non-judice.”

8.12. That constitution Bench in A.K. Kraipak Vs. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC
262, had ruled as under;
“17…Good administration and an honest or bona fide decision must,
as it seems to me, require not merely impartiality, nor merely bringing
one's mind to bear on the problem, but acting fairly; and to the limited
extent that the circumstances of any particular case allow, and within
the legislative framework under which the administrator is working,
only to that limited extent do the so-called rules of natural justice
apply, which in a case such as this is merely a duty to act fairly.
15…It is unfortunate that Naqishbund was appointed as one of the
members of the selection board. It is true that ordinarily the Chief
Conservator of Forests in a State should be considered as the most
appropriate person to be in the selection board. He must be expected
to know his officers thoroughly, their weaknesses as well as their
strength. His opinion as regards their suitability for selection to the All-
India Service is entitled to great weight. But then under the
circumstances it was improper to have included Naqishbund as a
member of the selection board. He was one of the persons to be

36
 considered for selection. It is against all canons of justice to make a
man judge in his own cause. It is true that he did not participate in the
deliberations of the committee when his name was considered. But then
the very fact that he was a member of the selection board must have
had its own impact on the decision of the selection board. Further
admittedly he participated in the deliberations of the selection board
when the claims of his rivals particularly that of Basu was considered.
At every stage of his participation in the deliberations of the selection
board there was a conflict between his interest and duty. Under those
circumstances it is difficult to believe that he could have been
impartial. The real question is not whether he was biased.
It was in the interest of Naqishbund to keep out his rivals in order to
secure his position from further challenge. Naturally he was also
interested in safeguarding his position while preparing the list of
selected candidates.
16… In a group deliberation each member of the group is bound to
influence the others, more so, if the member concerned is a person with
special knowledge. His bias is likely to operate in a subtle manner. It is
no wonder that the other members of the selection board are unaware
of the extent to which his opinion influenced their conclusions. We are
unable to accept the contention that in adjudging the suitability of the
candidates the members of the board did not have any mutual
discussion. It is not as if the records spoke of themselves. We are unable
to believe that the members of selection board functioned like
computers.
17…The horizon of natural justice is constantly expanding. The
question how far the principles of natural justice govern administrative
enquiries came up for consideration before the Queen's Bench Division
In re H.K. (An Infant). [(1967) 2 QB 617 at p. 630] Therein the validity
of the action taken by an Immigration Officer came up for

37
 consideration. In the course of his judgment Lord Parker C.J. observed
thus:
That is not, as I see it, a question of acting or being required to
act judicially, but of being required to act fairly.
The decisions of the courts do seem to have drawn a strict line in these
matters according to whether there is or is not a duty to act judicially
or quasi-judicially.
21…Looking at the composition of the board and the nature of the
duties entrusted to it we have no doubt that its recommendations should
have carried considerable weight with the UPSC. If the decision of the
selection board is held to have been vitiated, it is clear to our mind that
the final recommendation made by the Commission must also be held
to have been vitiated. The recommendations made by the Union Public
Service Commission cannot be disassociated from the selections made
by the selection board which is the foundation for the recommendations
of the Union Public Service Commission.
23…To that extent he was undoubtedly a judge in his own case, a
circumstance which is abhorrent to our concept of justice. Now
coming to the selection of the officers in the junior scale service, the
selections to both the senior scale service as well as junior scale service
were made from the same pool. Hence it is not possible to separate the
two sets of officers.
24. For the reasons mentioned above these petitions are allowed and
the impugned selections set aside. The Union Government and the
State Government shall pay the costs of the petitioners.”

8.13. That Article 14 (1) of ICCPR reads thus;

“14.( 1). All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals.
In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his
rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a
fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial

38
 tribunal established by law. The press and the public may be
excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order
(ordre public) or national security in a democratic society, or when
the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the
extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of
justice; but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at
law shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile
persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial
disputes or the guardianship of children.”

8.14. For centuries, impartiality has been a defining feature of the AngloAmerican
judge’s role in the administration of justice. The reason is clear: in a constitutional
order grounded in the rule of law, it is imperative that judges make decisions
according to law, unclouded by personal bias or conflicts of interest. Accordingly,
upon ascending the bench, every federal judge takes an oath to “faithfully and
impartially discharge and perform all the duties” of judicial office; and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution has
been construed to guarantee litigants the right to a “neutral and detached,” or
impartial, judge.

8.15. Moreover, in a democratic republic in which the legitimacy of government

depends on the consent and approval of the governed, public confidence in the
administration of justice is indispensable. It is not enough that judges be impartial;
the public must perceive them to be so. The Code of Conduct for United States
Judges therefore admonishes judges to “act at all times in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” and to “avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.”

8.16. When the impartiality of a judge is in doubt, the appropriate remedy is

to disqualify that judge from hearing further proceedings in the matter. In

39
 Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), a case concerning
disqualification of a state supreme court justice, the U.S. Supreme Court
reaffirmed that litigants have a due process right to an impartial judge, and
that under circumstances in which judicial bias was probable, due process
required disqualification. The Court noted, however, that disqualification rules
may be and often are more rigorous than the Due Process Clause requires. So it is
with disqualification requirements for Judicial Disqualification: An Analysis of
Federal Law federal judges, which require disqualification when a judge’s
impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.”

8.17. In common parlance, some use “disqualification” and “recusal”

interchangeably, while others distinguish between the two, using “recusal” to mean
withdrawal on the judge’s own initiative, and “disqualification” to mean withdrawal
on the motion of a party. Because applicable federal statutes use “disqualification”
broadly to embrace withdrawal on motion and sua sponte and do not refer to
“recusal,” this monograph will follow their lead and do the same, except to the extent
that quoted material from the cases speaks of recusal. Disqualification has ethical
and procedural dimensions. The ethical dimension is governed by Canon 3C of the
Code of Conduct for United States Judges, as construed by the Codes of Conduct
Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

8.18. The text of Canon 3C on disqualification8 is substantially similar to 28 U.S.C.

§ 455, and both seek to promote public confidence in the judiciary, the focus of the
two is different: Whereas the goal of the Code of Conduct, including Canon 3C, is
to inform federal judges of their ethical obligations to the end of advising them on
how judges should conduct themselves,

8.19. In Berger v. United States, 14 the Supreme Court interpreted this statute to
prohibit a judge from ruling on the truth of matters asserted in such an affidavit, and
to require automatic disqualification if the affidavit was facially sufficient.

40
 Disqualification of justice, judge or magistrate judge (a) Any justice, judge, or
magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:

(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of
them, or the spouse of such a person: …. (iii) Is known by the judge to have an
interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;

8.20. Judicial Disqualification: An Analysis of Federal Law (d) For the purposes of
this section the following words or phrases shall have the meaning indicated: (1)
“proceeding” includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or other stages of
litigation; (2) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law
system;
(e) No justice, judge, or magistrate judge shall accept from the parties to the
proceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification enumerated in
subsection (b). Where the ground for disqualification arises only under
subsection (a), waiver may be accepted provided it is preceded by a full
disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification. The Code of Conduct
for United States Judges nonetheless declares that “a judge should hear and
decide matters assigned, unless disqualified.” The point is simply to
underscore that judges have a duty to decide the cases that come before them,
and that disqualification should not be used as an excuse to shirk that duty by
dodging difficult or unpleasant cases. As a result, most circuits have said
“there is as much obligation for a judge not to recuse when there is no occasion
for him to do so as there is for him to do so when there is.”

41
 9. Point No. 3:- Pinochet’s principle and law laid down by the constitution
Benches of the Supreme Court and Article 14 (1) of the ICCPR disqualified Ld.
CJI Chandrachud to sit on the Bench hearing cases of same-sex marriages. An
impartial tribunal is fundamental rights of every citizen.

9.1. That the Constitution Bench in the case of Constitution Bench in Supreme
Court Advocates-on-Record Vs. Union of India (2016) 5 SCC 808, has ruled as
under;
“20. The Pinochet case [R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan
Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2), (2000) 1
AC 119 : (1999) 2 WLR 272 : (1999) 1 All ER 577 (HL)] added
one more category to the cases of automatic disqualification for
a Judge. Pinochet, a former Chilean dictator, was sought to be
arrested and extradited from England for his conduct during his
incumbency in office. The issue was whether Pinochet was
entitled to immunity from such arrest or extradition. Amnesty
International, a charitable organisation, participated in the said
proceedings with the leave of the Court. The House of Lords held
that Pinochet did not enjoy any such immunity. Subsequently, it
came to light that Lord Hoffman, one of the members of the
Board which heard Pinochet case [R. v. Bow Street
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Pinochet Ugarte,
(2000) 1 AC 61 : (1998) 3 WLR 1456 (HL)] , was a Director and
Chairman of a company (known as AICL) which was closely
linked with Amnesty International. An application was made to
the House of Lords to set aside the earlier judgment [R. v. Bow
Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Pinochet
Ugarte, (2000) 1 AC 61 : (1998) 3 WLR 1456 (HL)] on the
ground of bias on the part of Lord Hoffman.
21. The House of Lords examined the following questions:

42
 (i) Whether the connection of Lord Hoffman with Amnesty
International required him to be automatically disqualified?
(ii) Whether an enquiry into the question whether cause of Lord
Hoffman's connection with Amnesty International posed a real
danger or caused a reasonable apprehension that his judgment
is biased — is necessary?
(iii) Did it make any difference that Lord Hoffman was only a
member of a company associated with Amnesty International
which was in fact interested in securing the extradition of
Senator Pinochet?
22. Lord Wilkinson summarised the principles on which a Judge
is disqualified to hear a case. As per Lord Wilkinson: (Pinochet
case [R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p
Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2), (2000) 1 AC 119 : (1999) 2 WLR 272 :
(1999) 1 All ER 577 (HL)] , AC pp. 132 G-H-133 A-C)
“The fundamental principle is that a man may not be a
Judge in his own cause. This principle, as developed by
the courts, has two very similar but not identical
implications. First it may be applied literally: if a Judge is
in fact a party to the litigation or has a financial or
proprietary interest in its outcome then he is indeed sitting
as a Judge in his own cause. In that case, the mere fact
that he is a party to the action or has a financial or
proprietary interest in its outcome is sufficient to cause his
automatic disqualification. The second application of the
principle is where a Judge is not a party to the suit and
does not have a financial interest in its outcome, but in
some other way his conduct or behaviour may give rise to
a suspicion that he is not impartial, for example because
of his friendship with a party. This second type of case is
not strictly speaking an application of the principle that a

43
 man must not be Judge in his own cause, since the Judge
will not normally be himself benefiting, but providing a
benefit for another by failing to be impartial.
In my judgment, this case falls within the first category of
case, viz. where the Judge is disqualified because he is a
Judge in his own cause. In such a case, once it is shown
that the Judge is himself a party to the cause, or has a
relevant interest in its subject-matter, he is disqualified
without any investigation into whether there was a
likelihood or suspicion of bias. The mere fact of his
interest is sufficient to disqualify him unless he has made
sufficient disclosure….”
And framed the question: (AC p. 134B-C)
“… the question then arises whether, in non-financial
litigation, anything other than a financial or proprietary
interest in the outcome is sufficient automatically to
disqualify a man from sitting as Judge in the cause.”
(emphasis supplied)
He opined that although the earlier cases have
“all dealt with automatic disqualification on the grounds
of pecuniary interest, there is no good reason in principle
for so limiting automatic disqualification”. (AC p. 135B)
23. Lord Wilkinson concluded that Amnesty International and its
associate company known as AICL, had a non-pecuniary interest
established that Senator Pinochet was not immune from the
process of extradition. He concluded that: (Pinochet
case [R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p
Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2), (2000) 1 AC 119: (1999) 2 WLR 272:
(1999) 1 All ER 577 (HL)], AC p. 135C-D)
“… the matter at issue does not relate to money or economic
advantage but is concerned with the promotion of the cause, the

44
 rationale disqualifying a Judge applies just as much if the
Judge's decision will lead to the promotion of a cause in which
the Judge is involved together with one of the parties.”
24. After so concluding, dealing with the last question, whether
the fact that Lord Hoffman was only a member of AICL but not a
member of Amnesty International made any difference to the
principle, Lord Wilkinson opined that: (Pinochet case [R. v. Bow
Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Pinochet Ugarte
(No. 2), (2000) 1 AC 119 : (1999) 2 WLR 272 : (1999) 1 All ER
577 (HL)] , AC p. 132H-133A)
even though a Judge may not have financial interest in the
outcome of a case, but in some other way his conduct or behaviour
may give rise to a suspicion that he is not impartial…. and held
that: (AC p. 135 E-F)
“… If the absolute impartiality of the judiciary is to be
maintained, there must be a rule which automatically
disqualifies a Judge who is involved, whether personally or
as a Director of a company, in promoting the same causes
in the same organisation as is a party to the suit. There is
no room for fine distinctions….”
This aspect of the matter was considered in P.D. Dinakaran
case [P.D. Dinakaran (1) v. Judges Inquiry Committee, (2011) 8
SCC 380, paras 49 to 53]
25.3. The Pinochet case [R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan
Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2), (2000) 1
AC 119 : (1999) 2 WLR 272 : (1999) 1 All ER 577 (HL)] added a
new category i.e. that the Judge is automatically disqualified from
hearing a case where the Judge is interested in a cause which is
being promoted by one of the parties to the case.”

45
 10. Point No. 4 :- Evidence and instances of court hearing proving bias,
arrogance, irritation, misuse of power by Ld. CJI Chandrachud to silence the
voice of other side and to promote the pre-determined cause without first
considering the preliminary ojection of Union of India that Supreme Court
cannot make the law but having given power to only interpret the law as per
constitution and as has been declared by the Supreme Court itself in catena of
decision.

10.1. That law regarding deciding the preliminary objection first is settled by catena
of decisions. [Securities & Exchange Board of India v. Mangalore Stock
Exchange, (2005) 10 SCC 274]

10.2. In Madhuri Vasantrao Arathe vs. Manish MANU/MH/2633/2014 it is

ruled as under;
“4. As already observed by me, the order made by the Collector
showing that the preliminary objection would be decided along with
merits of the disqualification applications, does not appear to be legal,
correct and proper. It may be true that ultimately, there may be found
any force in the preliminary objection, but then the settled legal
position is that in such cases, preliminary objection ought to be
decided, all the more so because it is ordained by Rule 7 of the said
Rules. By making the aforesaid arrangement, namely of filing Written
Statement/reply, in my opinion, the petitioners should be heard on
preliminary objections which should be decided.”

10.3. However when this objection was raised by the ld. Solicitor General for India,
Chief Justice of India Chandrachud shouted at him saying that, “It is my court and
I will decide it”

10.4. This is not only Contempt law for deciding preliminary objection, but also
Contempt of its own court by insulting Advocate.

46
 10.5. Needless to mention that there is no discretion to any Judge when law is clear.

10.6. That larger Bench of Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan
Vs. Prakash Chand (1998) 1 SCC 1 had specifically ruled that there is no
unlimited discretion available to Judges of all levels.

10.7. In Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms v. Union of India,

(2018) 1 SCC 196 by holding that the said ratio is applicable to Judges of the
Supreme Court and any order in contravention of it is nullity and should not be
followed by any authority.
It is ruled as under;

‘‘10. The rules have been framed in that regard. True, the
rules deal with reference, but the law laid down in Prakash
Chand [State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand, (1998) 1 SCC
1] has to apply to the Supreme Court so that there will be
smooth functioning of the Court and there is no chaos in the
administration of justice dispensation system. If any such
order has been passed by any Bench, that cannot hold the
field as that will be running counter to the order passed by
the Constitution Bench.’’
10.8. That in Medical Council of India v. G.C.R.G. Memorial Trust, (2018) 12
SCC 564 it is ruled as under;
“The judicial propriety requires judicial discipline. Judge
cannot think in terms of "what pleases the Prince has the force
of law". Frankly speaking, the law does not allow so, for law
has to be observed by requisite respect for law.
A Judge should abandon his passion. He must constantly
remind himself that he has a singular master "duty to truth"
and such truth is to be arrived at within the legal parameters.
No heroism, no rhetorics.

47
 A Judge even when he is free, is still not wholly free; he is not
to innovate at pleasure; he is not a knighterrant roaming at will
in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness; he is to
draw inspiration from consecrated principles.
10. In this context, we may note the eloquent statement of
Benjamin Cardozo who said:
The judge is not a knight errant, roaming at will in pursuit of
his own ideal of beauty and goodness.
11. In this regard, the profound statement of Felix Frankfurter1
is apposite to reproduce:
For the highest exercise of judicial duty is to subordinate one's
personal pulls and one's private views to the law of which we are
all guardians-those impersonal convictions that make a society
a civilized community, and not the victims of personal rule.
The learned Judge has further stated:
What becomes decisive to a Justice's functioning on the Court in
the large area within which his individuality moves is his general
attitude toward law, the habits of the mind that he has formed or
is capable of unforming, his capacity for detachment, his
temperament or training for putting his passion behind his
judgment instead of in front of it. The attitudes and qualities
which I am groping to characterize are ingredients of what
compendiously might be called dominating humility.
13. In this context, we may refer with profit the authority in Om
Prakash Chautala v. Kanwar Bhan MANU/SC/0075/2014 :
(2014) 5 SCC 417 wherein it has been stated:
19. It needs no special emphasis to state that a Judge is not to
be guided by any kind of notion. The decision making process
expects a Judge or an adjudicator to apply restraint, ostracise
perceptual subjectivity, make one's emotions subservient to
one's reasoning and think dispassionately. He is expected to be

48
 guided by the established norms of judicial process and
decorum.
And again:
20. A Judge should abandon his passion. He must constantly
remind himself that he has a singular master "duty to truth"
and such truth is to be arrived at within the legal parameters.
No heroism, no rhetorics.
14. In Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem Heavy
Engineering Works (P) Ltd. and Anr. MANU/SC/0639/1997 :
(1997) 6 SCC 450, the threeJudge Bench observed:

32. When a position in law is well settled as a result of judicial

pronouncement of this Court, it would amount to judicial
impropriety to say the least, for the subordinate courts
including the High Courts to ignore the settled decisions and
then to pass a judicial order which is clearly contrary to the
settled legal position. Such judicial adventurism cannot be
permitted and we strongly deprecate the tendency of the
subordinate courts in not applying the settled principles and in
passing whimsical orders which necessarily has the effect of
granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to one of the parties.
It is time that this tendency stops.
15. The aforestated thoughts are not only meaningfully pregnant
but also expressively penetrating. They clearly expound the role
of a Judge, especially the effort of understanding and attitude of
judging. A Judge is expected to abandon his personal notion or
impression gathered from subjective experience. The process of
adjudication lays emphasis on the wise scrutiny of materials
sans emotions. A studied analysis of facts and evidence is a
categorical imperative. Deviation from them is likely to

49
 increase the individual gravitational pull which has the
potentiality to take justice to her coffin.”
10.9. In Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija v. Collector, Thane, (1989) 3 SCC 396, it is
ruled as under;
“18[...] One must remember that pursuit of the law, however glamorous
it is, has its own limitation on the Bench. In a multi-Judge court, the
Judges are bound by precedents and procedure. They could use their
discretion only when there is no declared principle to be found, no
rule and no authority.”

10.10. That advocates are officer of the court. They entitle for equal respect as that
of Judges.

10.11. That all Advocates are officers of the court and are equal partner of justice.
Among Judges & Lawyers no one is higher or lower. They entitle for similar respect.
But degrading and insulting treatment to Solicitor General by Chief Justice of India
is lightly objectionable. He should tender apology. Earlier Justice Arun Mishra had
tendered apology to Sr. Counsel Sh. Gopal Sankaranarayanan.
Link: https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/i-apologize-a-hundred-times-justice-arun-
mishra-on-his-comments-against-gopal-sankaranarayanan-150468

10.12. In Latief Ahmad Rather Vs. Shafeeqa Bhat, 2022 SCC OnLine J&K 249,
it is ruled as under;
“6[…] The advocates are the officers of the Court and deserve
the same respect and dignity as is being given to the Judicial
Officers and Presiding Officers of the Courts. Bench and Bar
are two wheels of the chariot of justice. Both are equal and no
one is superior to the other. The members of the Bar, as such,
deserve the utmost respect and dignity”
10.13. The judges misbehaving with advocates will be held guilty of contempt.
Using insulting words to Solicitor General the highest law officer of country, will be

50
 more grave offence. If this is not checked in time then it will increase the confidence
of other Judges to behave more rudely with other advocates.

10.14 . In Harish Chandra Mishra Vs. Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ali Ahmad 1986 (34)
BLJR 63 it is ruled as under;

“JUDGE IS GUILTY OF CONTEMPT, IF JUDGE INSULTS

THE ADVOCATE - A Judge has every right to control the
proceedings of the court in a dignified manner and in a case of
misbehavior or misconduct on the part of a lawyer proceedings
in the nature of contempt can be started against the lawyer
concerned. But, at the same time a Judge cannot make personal
remarks and use harsh words in open Court which may touch
the dignity of a lawyer and bring him to disrepute in the eyes of
his colleagues and litigants.Lawyers are also officers of the
court and deserve the same respect and dignity which a Judge
expects from the members of the Bar. In my opinion, this
application cannot be brushed aside and has been rightly
contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the
matter can be resolved only after issuance of notice to the
opposite party.
It was essential to preserve the discipline, while administering
justice, was realized centuries ago when Anglo Saxon Laws
developed the concept of contempt of court and for punishment
therefor. The acts which tend to obstruct the course of justice
really threaten the very administration of justice. By several
pronouncements such acts which tend to obstruct or interfere
with the course of justice were identified and were grouped into
'civil contempt' and 'criminal contempt'. However, for a long
time they were never defined leaving it to the courts to give their

51
 verdict whether under particular set of circumstances any such
offence has been committed or not.
But assuming the provision of Section 15 of the Contempt of
Courts Act are mandatory, we are not inclined to throw out the
petition on this technical ground because the issue involved is of
tremendous importance. There is nothing to prevent us from
treating it as an action of our own motion and we accordingly
order that the petition be treated as one on our own motion.
The remedy is not lost even if the offending Judge was a judge of
the High Court. The matter can be heard by a specially
constituted Bench of the High Court.
Merely on basis of the aforesaid views it cannot be held that after
coining in force of the Act a Judge of the Supreme Court or High
Court is also answerable to a charge of having committed
contempt of the Supreme Court or the High Court for having
conducted the proceeding of the Court in a manner which is
objectionable to the members of the Bar.
There cannot be two opinions that Judges of the Supreme Court
and High Courts are expected to conduct the proceedings of the
Court in dignified, objective and courteous manners and without
fear of contradiction it can be said that by and large the
proceedings of the higher courts have been in accordance with
well settled norms. On rare occasions complaints have been
made about some outrageous or undignified behavior. It has
always been impressed that the dignity and majesty of court can
be maintained only when the members of the Bar and Judges
maintain their self-imposed restriction while advancing the
cause of the clients and rejecting submissions of the counsel who
appear for such cause. It is admitted on all counts that a counsel
appearing before a court is entitled to press and pursue the cause
of his client to the best of his ability while maintaining the dignity

52
 of the court. The Judge has also a reciprocal duty to perform and
should not be discourteous to the counsel and has to maintain his
respect in the eyes of clients and general public. This is, in my
view, very important because the system through which justice is
being administered cannot be effectively administered unless the
two limbs of the court act in a harmonious manner. Oswald on
Contempt of Court, 3rd Edition at page 54 remarked "an over
subservient bar would have been one of the greatest misfortune
that could happen to the administration of Justice."
Greatest of respect for my learned Brethren it is not possible for
me to agree with the proposition that the Judges of the High
Courts and the Supreme Court are immune from a contempt of
courts proceeding nor do I agree that an application filed
without the consent in writing of the Advocate General is not
maintainable.
The Bench and the bar are the two vital limbs of our judicial
system and nothing should be done on either side in haste to
impair the age old cordial relationship between these two limbs.
It is no mean achievement of this system that inspite of stains and
stresses the Bench and the bar have maintained the ideal and
harmonious relationship.
This is rather an unfortunate case, in which a Judge and a
member of the Bar after a wordy duel in the midst of a case came
to a clash, resulting in filing of this application, N.P. Singh, J.
has rightly observed that such things have happened in Court
rooms in the past as well but they were happily buried in the
spirit of forget and forgive. We judges, and the members of the
Bar are the two limbs of the Court and all of us (who constitute
this Full Bench) and the opposite party were members of the Bar
previously.”

53
 10.15. In Muhammad Sahfi, Advocate Vs. Chaudhary Qadir Bakhsh,
Magistrate 1st Class AIR 1949 Lah 270 it is ruled as under ;

“A] Judge intimidating Lawyer is guilty of Contempt.HeShould

have tendered apology to the advocate.Since the respondent
Judge tendered apology before High Court. Court is taking
lenient view and fine of Rs. 50 imposed upon the Judge and in
default imprisonment of 1 month ordered.
5. The whole episode cannot be divided into eight or ten different
incidents in order to deter, mine whether each sentence uttered
by the respondent did or did not constitute contempt of
Court. For instance, when a lawyer is asked in the ordinary
course by a presiding officer of a Court “where have you come
from?” or “what is your standing?”, no objection can be taken
to these words. In the present case, these words were used in a
contemptuous manner towards Mr. Muhammad Shafi, and the
object of the whole episode was to intimidate the lawyer who
had dared to secure an injunction in order to help his client
Said-ur-Rahman against Najmul Hassan. The fact that the
lawyer was meant to be intimidated so that he may not carry on
further proceedings in the Court of the Sub-Judge against
Najmul Hassan, is fairly evident from the following words
uttered by the respondent:
“You are instrumental in procuring this foolish order and as
such you have committed a crime for which you could be sent
behind the bars.”
6. It passes one's comprehension how the act of the counsel in
procuring a temporary injunction could be regarded as a
crime. I am very doubtful whether the Sub-Judge could not pass
such an order, but assuming that he could not do so, it is no crime

54
 for a counsel to ask for a temporary injunction. It is for the Judge
to determine whether he is entitled in law to issue a temporary
injunction or not in a particular matter. The respondent did not
finish there. He plainly told Mr. Muhammad Shafii that he
wanted to teach him a lesson so that he would be careful in
future. The object of this remark was to intimidate Mr.
Muhammad Shafi from carrying on the proceedings on behalf of
his client in the Court of the Sub-Judge. As I have already said,
the whole episode has to be regarded as one incident and
cannot be split up into its component parts so that each remark
may be explained away.
8…..If the abuse of the witnesses who appear in a Court of law
is to be regarded as contempt of Court on the ground that it
would intimidate other witnesses and thus impede the course of
justice, it must be held that the intimidation of a lawyer, who is
representing one of the parties, is also contempt of Court as it
would seriously interfere with the administration of justice.
9. It is of the greatest importance that the prestige and dignity of
the Courts of law should be preserved at all costs. There cannot
be anything of greater consequence than to keep the streams of
justice clear and pure, so that litigants may have the utmost
confidence that they would be treated in a considerate manner
by Courts of law. No Judge or Magistrate has any business to
lose his temper in a Court of law, to get up from his chair and to
make contemptuous re-marks about other Judges or counsel
appearing on either side. If parties to a litigation feel that they
are likely to be subjected to insulting behaviour at the hands of
the presiding officers of the Courts it would shake all confidence
in the administration of justice and would thus pollute the stream
of justice.

55
 13. On the one hand, the conduct of the respondent was highly
objectionable. He made insulting remarks about a brother Judge
in a very contemptuous manner. He insulted an advocate without
rhyme or reason, and did not tender him any apology or redress
till the date of the hearing. On the other hand, the respondent
mitigated his offence to a certain extent by tendering an
unconditional apology in this Court and by admitting the
correctness of the affidavits of Mr. Muhammad Shafi and Malik
Shaukat Ali, advocates. In these circumstances, I am inclined to
take a lenient view of the matter and not to impose a heavy
sentence. I would, therefore, find Chaudhari Qadir Bakhsh guilty
of contempt of the Court of Mian Muhammad Salim, Sub-Judge,
and order him to pay a fine of Rs. 50. In default of payment of
fine, he will suffer simple imprisonment for a period of one
month.

10.16. The judges unduly interrupting the arguments of advocates are held guilty of
bias and it vitiates the entire proceeding. Such Chief Justice can be summoned and
examined as a witness to prove his bias and to declare the judgement as coram -non-
judice. [R.Vishwanthan vs Rukam AIR 1963 SCC 41]

11. Point No. 5:- The act of Ld. CJI D. Y. Chandrachud in misusing / mis-
utilizing the Supreme Court machinery, public money and time for
unauthorized purposes is an offence under section 409 of IPC.

11.1. In Emperor vs Bimla Charan (1913) 35 ALL 361, where it is ruled as under;

“I.P.C. Section 406, 408 :- Criminal breach of trust--Water works

inspector misappropriating water.

The applicant was a member of the municipality at Cawnpore and one

of his duties was to supervise and check the distribution of water from

56
 the municipal water-works. In other words he had dominion over the
water belonging to the municipality. He deliberately misappropriated
that water for his own use and for the use of his tenants, for which he
paid no tax and about which he laid no information to his employers
nor obtained permission for tapping the main. In thus misappropriating
municipal water the applicant clearly committed the offence described
in Section 408 of the Indian Penal Code.

Accused rightly convicted.

It may be that the offences of applicant may be punishable under the

Water-Works Act also, but that does not vitiate the conviction under
sections, 406 and 408 of the Indian Penal Code.”

11.2. In Krishan Kumar Vs. Union of India 1959 AIR 1390, in para 9 it is ruled
as under;

“The question would only be one of intention of the appellant and the
circumstances which have been above set out do show that the
appellant in what he has done or has omitted to do was moved by a
guilty mind.

If under the law it is not necessary or possible for the prosecution to

prove the manner in which the goods have been misappropriated then
the failure of the prosecution to prove facts it set out to prove would
be of little relevance.
So the essence of the offence with which the appellant was charged is
that after the possession of the property of the Central Tractor
Organization he dishonestly or fraudulently appropriated the property
entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant
The giving of false explanation is an element which the Court can take
into consideration. (Emperor v. Chattur Bhuj (1935) ILR 15 Patna

57
 108, In Rex v. William (1836) 7 C&P 338. Coleridge, J., charged the
jury as follows :"
The circumstances of the prisoner having quit- ted her place and gone
off to Ireland is evidence from -which you may infer that she intended
to appropriate the money and if you think that she did so intend, she is
guily of embezzlement".

In our opinion the appellant was rightly convicted and we would

therefore dismiss this appeal.
9. It is not necessary or possible in every case to prove in what precise
manner the accused person has dealt with or appropriated the goods of
his master. The question is one of intention and not a matter of direct
proof but giving a false account of what he has done with the goods
received by him. may be treated a strong circumstance against the
accused person. In the case of a servant charged with misappropriating
the goods of his master the elements of criminal offence of
misappropriation will be established if the prosecution proves that the
servant received the goods, that he was under a duty to account to his
master and had not done so. If the failure to account was due to an
accidental loss then the facts being within the servant's knowledge, it is
for him to explain the loss. It is not the law of this country that the
prosecution has to eliminate all possible defences or circumstances
which may exonerate him. If these facts are within the knowledge of the
accused then he hag to prove them. Of course the prosecution has to
establish a prima facie case in-the first instance. it is not enough to
establish facts which give rise to a suspicion and then by reason of s.
106 of the Evidence Act to throw the onus on him to prove his
innocence. See Harries, C.J., in Emperor v. Santa Singh AIR 1944
Lah.339.”
11.3. In Raman Lal vs. State of Rajasthan 2001 CRI. L. J. 800, it is ruled as under;

58
 “Conspiracy – I.P.C. Sec. 120 (B) – Apex court made it clear that
an inference of conspiracy has to be drawn on the basis of
circumstantial evidence only because it becomes difficult to get
direct evidence on such issue – The offence can only be proved
largely from the inference drawn from acts or illegal ommission
committed by them in furtherance of a common design – Once
such a conspiracy is proved, act of one conspirator becomes the
act of the others – A Co-conspirator who joins subsequently and
commits overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy must also be
held liable – Proceeding against accused cannot be quashed.”

12. Point No. 6: - The silence and act of omission and commission by four
brother Judges is more disappointing and vitiates all proceeding and makes all
the five Judges liable for criminal prosecution under section 120(B) r/w 409,
166, 218 etc. of IPC. [Raman Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 2000 SCC OnLine Raj
226, CBI Vs. Bhupendra Champaklal Dalal 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 140, State
of Oddisa Vs. Pratima Mohanty 2021 SCC On Line SC 1222]

13. Point No.7 :- Recusal of Ld. Chief Justice of India D.Y. Chandrachud on the
ground of serious misconduct cannot be decided by himself in view of law laid down
in Mitchell v. State 320 Md. 756 (Md. 1990).

Even otherwise no one can be Judge in his own case. As per law & ratio laid down
in R. Viswanathan v. Rukn-ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid, (1963) 3 SCR 22, a Civil
Suit for declaration that judgment is product of bias and coram-non-judice is
maintainable and in the said case Ld. Chief Justice of India can be examined as a
witness.

13.1. If Judges fails to recuse at his own, then, the Union of India or any party can
make request for recusal of said Judges. However, the Judge whose recusal is sought
on gross personal misconduct cannot hear the recusal petition as no one can be Judge

59
 in his own case refusal to recuse in such cases will erode the facet of rule of law.
Law is very well settled that if there is any doubt about to recuse or not, then the
benefit should go in favor of recusal. [Mitchell v. State 320 Md. 756 (Md.
1990), Re: C.S. Karnan (2017) 7 SCC 1, Punjab Vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar
(2011) 14 SCC 770, 82. P.K. Ghosh v. J.G. Rajput, (1995) 6 SCC 744, Caperton
et al. v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., et al., 2009 SCC OnLine US SC 65]

13.2. In Mitchell v. State 320 Md. 756 (Md. 1990), it is ruled that;
“…The judge must banish personal impulses to reprisal, or to vent his
spleen.
Where a verbal attack upon a judge becomes particularly offensive, or
where a judge becomes enraged at offensive conduct, recusal is
necessary.
A judge whose recusal is sought on the ground of personal
misconduct cannot decide the recusal motion.
13.3. In Re: Justice C.S.Karnan (2017) 7 SCC 1 : 2017 SCC OnLine SC 703 it is
ruled as under;
“55 Unfortunately the contemnor appears to be oblivious of
one of the fundamental principles of law that a
complainant/informant cannot be a judge in his own
complaint.The contemnor on more than one occasion "passed
orders purporting to be in exercise of his judicial functions"
commanding various authorities of the states to take legal
action against various judges of the Madras High Court on the
basis of the allegations made by him from time to time.

56. Whether all the above-mentioned conduct amounts to either

"proved misbehavior" or "incapacity" within the meaning of
Article 124(4) read with Article 217(1)(b) of the Constitution
of India warranting the impeachment of the contemnor is a
matter which requires a very critical examination..”

60
 14.4. Hence it is just and necessary that one constitutional Court must be created
urgently to deal with such cases where Chief Justice of India himself is disqualified
and he cannot hear the recusal application. Constitution Bench in In Indore
Development Authority (Recusal Matter-5 J.) v. Manohar Lal, (2020) 6 SCC
304 it is ruled as under;
“37.3. Lokur, J. in his opinion, has observed : [Supreme
Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. (Recusal Matter) case
[Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. (Recusal
Matter) v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 808 : (2016) 3
SCC (Civ) 492 : (2016) 3 SCC (Cri) 173 : (2016) 2 SCC
(L&S) 253] , SCC pp. 839-40, paras 60 & 65]

“60. In my respectful opinion, when an application

is made for the recusal of a Judge from hearing a
case, the application is made to the Judge
concerned and not to the Bench as a whole.
Therefore, my learned Brother Khehar, J. is
absolutely correct in stating that the decision is
entirely his, and I respect his decision.
*
65. The issue of recusal from hearing a case is not
as simple as it appears. The questions thrown up are
quite significant and since it appears that such
applications are gaining frequency, it is time that
some procedural and substantive rules are framed
in this regard. If appropriate rules are framed, then,
in a given case, it would avoid embarrassment to
other Judges on the Bench.”

13.5. Hence, it is just and necessary that the petition & request for declaring that Ld.
CJI D.Y. Chandrachud was disqualified to hear the case due to bias & conflict of

61
 interest should be heard by another Constitution Bench which has to be assigned by
the next senior most Judge other than CJI & members of present Bench as per the
law and practice followed in the case of former CJI Sharad Bobde while taking suo-
moto cognizance of Contempt against Adv. Prashant Bhushan.

13.6. In. R. Vishwanathan Vs. Rukn-Ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid Since

Deceased AIR 1963 SC 1 it is ruled as under;
“124. …If the Judge unreasonably obstructs the flow of an
argument or does not allow it to be raised, it may be said that
there has been no fair hearing.
122. …No litigant should leave the Court feeling reasonably that
his case was not heard or considered its merit.
41. …It is the essence of a judgment of a Court that it must be
obtained after due observance of the judicial process, i.e., the
Court rendering the judgment must observe the minimum
requirements of natural justice- It must be composed of impartial
persons, acting fairly, without bias, and in good faith; it must
give reasonable notice to the parties to the dispute and afford
each party adequate opportunity of presenting his case.
41. ..A judgement will not be conclusive, however, if the
proceeding in which it was obtained is opposed to natural
justice. The words of the statute make it clear that to exclude a
judgment under Cl. (d) from the rule of conclusiveness the
procedure must be opposed to natural justice. A judgment which
is the result of bias or want of impartiality on the part of a
Judge will be regarded as a nullity and the trial coram non
judice.
122. The rule of law about judicial conduct is as strict, as it is
old. No judge can be considered to be competent to hear a case
in which he is directly or indirectly interested. A proved interest
in a Judge not only disqualifies him but renders his judgment a

62
 nullity. There is yet another rule of judicial conduct which
bears upon the hearing of case. In that, the Judge is expected
to be serene and even-handed, even though his patience may be
sorely tried and the time of the Court appear to be wasted. This
is based on the maxim which is often repeated that justice
should not only be done but should be seen to be done. No
litigant should leave the Court feeling reasonably that his case
was not heard or considered its merit. If he does, then justice,
even though done in the case, fails in the doing of it.
124… If however every adverse remark of a judge made from
the Bench is to be construed as indicating prejudice, most Judges
will fail to pass the exacting test.
124. … In the course of arguments, Judges, express opinions,
tentatively formed, sometimes even strongly; but that does not
always mean that the case has been prejudged. An argument in
Court can never be effective if the Judges do not sometimes point
out what appears to be the underlying fallacy in the apparent
plausibility thereof, and any lawyer or litigant, who forms an
apprehension on that score, cannot be said to be reasonably
doing so. It has frequently been noticed that the objection of a
Judge breaks down on a closer examination, and often enough,
some Judges acknowledge publicly that they were mistaken. Of
course, if the Judge unreasonably obstructs the flow of an
argument or does not allow it to be of an argument or does not
allow it to be raised, it may be said that there has been no fair
hearing. (Paras 123 125)”

14. Point No.8 :- As per law laid down by the Constitution Bench
in K.Veeraswami VS. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 655 Hon’ble president of
India can pass an order directing CBI to register FIR & prosecution against

63
 CJI D.Y. Chandrachud by consulting any Judge which she thinks proper.
There is no compulsion upon her to consult a particular Judge.

14.1. In K.Veeraswami VS. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 655, it is ruled as under;
“60. …If the Chief Justice of India himself is the person against whom
the allegations of criminal misconduct are received the government
shall consult any other Judge or Judges of the Supreme Court. There
shall be similar consultation at the stage of examining the question of
granting sanction for prosecution and it shall be necessary and
appropriate that the question of sanction be guided by and in
accordance with the advice of the Chief Justice of India. Accordingly
the directions shall go to the government. These directions, in our
opinion, would allay the apprehension of all concerned that the Act is
likely to be misused by the executive for collateral purpose.”

15. Point No.9 : Breach of oath taken as a Judge of the Supreme Court and as
Chief Justice of India, by acting with bias & favor and against the law and the
constitution. It makes him to resign forthwith from the post, as per law laid
down by the Constitution Bench in the case of K.Veeraswami VS. Union of
India (1991) 3 SCC 655.

15.1. Constitution Bench in the case of K. Veeraswami Vs. Union of India (1991)
3 SCC 655, while dealing with the case of criminal prosecution of a Supreme Court
Judge and his duty to resign when there are prima facie material against him
had ruled that;
“53. It is inappropriate to state that conviction and sentence are no bar
for the Judge to sit in the court. We may make it clear that if a Judge is
convicted for the offence of criminal misconduct or any other offence
involving moral turpitude, it is but proper for him to keep himself away
from the court. He must voluntarily withdraw from judicial work and
await the outcome of the criminal prosecution. If he is sentenced in a

64
 criminal case he should forthwith tender his resignation unless he
obtains stay of his conviction and sentence. He shall not insist on his
right to sit on the bench till he is cleared from the charge by a court of
competent jurisdiction. The judiciary has no power of the purse or the
sword. It survives only by public confidence and it is important to the
stability of the society that the confidence of the public is not shaken.
The Judge whose character is clouded and whose standards of
morality and rectitude are in doubt may not have the judicial
independence and may not command confidence of the public. He
must voluntarily withdraw from the judicial work and administration.

54. The emphasis on this point should not appear superfluous. Prof.
Jackson says “Misbehaviour by a Judge, whether it takes place on the
bench or off the bench, undermines public confidence in the
administration of justice, and also damages public respect for the law
of the land; if nothing is seen to be done about it, the damage goes
unrepaired. This must be so when the judge commits a serious
criminal offence and remains in office”. (Jackson's Machinery of
Justice by J.R. Spencer, 8th edn. pp. 369-70).

55. The proved “misbehaviour” which is the basis for removal of a

Judge under clause (4) of Article 124 of the Constitution may also in
certain cases involve an offence of criminal misconduct under Section
5(1) of the Act. But that is no ground for withholding criminal
prosecution till the Judge is removed by Parliament as suggested by
counsel for the appellant. One is the power of Parliament and the
other is the jurisdiction of a criminal court. Both are mutually
exclusive. Even a government servant who is answerable for his
misconduct which may also constitute an offence under the IPC or
under Section 5 of the Act is liable to be prosecuted in addition to a
departmental enquiry. If prosecuted in a criminal court he may be

65
 punished by way of imprisonment or fine or with both but in
departmental enquiry, the highest penalty that could be imposed on him
is dismissal. The competent authority may either allow the prosecution
to go on in a court of law or subject him to a departmental enquiry or
subject him to both concurrently or consecutively. It is not
objectionable to initiate criminal proceedings against public servant
before exhausting the disciplinary proceedings, and a fortiori, the
prosecution of a Judge for criminal misconduct before his removal
by Parliament for proved misbehavior is unobjectionable.”

15.2. Summary of proofs, video recordings proving around 14 serious Criminal

Offences and gross misconduct by CJI D.Y. Chandrachud is sufficient for his
forthwith removal from the post as a Chief Justice of India.

16. Point No.10: Urgent need and obligation of Law Ministry and Government
of India under Article 14(5) of ICCPR and law laid down by nine judge bench
of the Supreme Court in K. Puttuswamy case and by 17 member Human Rights
Committee of United Nations comprising Justice P.N. Bhagwati as a member
in Luis Hens Serena and Juan Ramón Corujo Rodriguez Vs. Spain 2008 SCC
OnLine HRC 20 and many other judgements to create constitutional courts to
hear and decide the validity and legality of the judgments passed by the
Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction or instances like ex-facie bias by the
CJI himself.

16.1. That a 17-Judge Bench of United Nations Human Rights Committee

comprising Justice P.N. Bhagwati in the case of Anthony Michael Emmanuel
Fernando v. Sri Lanka, 2005 SCC OnLine HRC 22 had strongly condemned
the conviction of imprisonment in contempt by the Chief justice of the Supreme
Court of Srilanka and declared it to be arbitrary, draconian and inappropriate and
violative of Art. 9 of ICCPR. The committee in many such cases had directed the

66
 State authority to pay compensation to the citizen and provide them an appellate
jurisdiction against the conviction by the Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction.

The other landmark judgments are;

(i) Luis Hens Serena v. Spain, 2008 SCC OnLine HRC 20
(ii) Chota Ratiani Vs. Georgia 2005 SCC OnLine HRC
25 (Para 11.3 & 12).
(iii) Luis Olivero Capellades Vs. Spain 2006 SCC OnLine
HRC 42 (Para 7 & 8).

16.2. Article 14 (5) of ICCPR reads thus;

“5. Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his
conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal
according to law.”
16.3. That, Nine Judges Bench of this Hon’ble Court in the case of K. Putaswamy
vs. UOI (2017) 10 SCC 1, had specifically ruled that the provisions of ICCPR and
other international Covenants are constitutionally protected under our constitution
and its violation can be challenged in the same manner as a violation of fundamental
rights guaranteed under constitution of India.

16.4 That, the ratio laid down in a recent judgment of Five – Judge Bench of UK
Supreme Court in the case of Her Majesty’s Attorney General Vs. Crossland
[2021] USKC 58, support the prayers of the petitioners. There it is held that the
person convicted by the Supreme Court under contempt in its original jurisdiction
had a right of one appeal before larger benches.

16.5. That the Article 14(1) of the ICCPR, reads thus;

“14.( 1). All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals.
In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his
rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to
a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and

67
 impartial tribunal established by law. The press and the public may
be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public
order (ordre public) or national security in a democratic society, or
when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to
the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of
justice; but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at
law shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile
persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial
disputes or the guardianship of children.”

16.6. That though the Article 14(5) of the ICCPR deals only with the conviction,
however such appellate jurisdiction is required at every stage where the judge/bench
of the Supreme Court misuses its power and violates fundamental rights of the
citizens.

16.7. In Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Assn. (2) v. S.C.

Sekar, (2009) 2 SCC 784 it is ruled as under;
“43. A similar view had been taken in Ashis Chakraborty v.
Hindusthan Lever Sramik Karmachari Congress [96 CWN 673 :
(1992) 1 CHN 160] by the Calcutta High Court, stating: (CHN pp.
169-70, para 9)
“9. … We are, however, not oblivious of the fact that Section
19(1) does not merely speak of an appeal lying only against
punishment for contempt but uses the expression that an appeal
lies from any ‘order or decision’ passed in exercise of the
jurisdiction to punish for contempt.
As regards the meaning of the expression ‘any order or
decision’ we understand a variety of orders and decisions that
may be passed by a court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish
for contempt. Our own High Court in Ranjit Chatterjee v. Ram

68
 Badan Choubey [(1981) 2 CHN 97] held that if the order or
decision prejudicially affects a party, he has indeed a right of
appeal. If no other order except punishment would have been
appealable, there would have been no necessity of using the
words ‘any order or decision’ in the expression ‘the execution of
the punishment or order appeal against’ as used in Section
19(2)(a) of the Act. If the scope of appeal under Section 19 is
restricted only to punishment imposed under Section 12 and
nothing beyond, then a person who is ex facie found guilty of
contempt under Section 14 and is detained in custody pending
the hearing on the charge of contempt and is refused bail, would
have no right of appeal against such refusal of bail pending the
decision on the charge of contempt which will amount to deprive
the alleged contemnor of the right of appeal in such
circumstances. If in case of such an exigency, where he is
directed to be released on a particular bond which is found to be
much excessive, his right is to be defeated to a large extent and
the very purpose of making provision for appeal to give relief in
appropriate cases will be lost. We are of the clear view that while
the contemnor is detained in custody under Section 14 pending
determination of the charge, there is no punishment imposed on
him as yet under Section 12. The contention of Mr Mukherjee is
that the detention in such circumstances would also be a form of
punishment under Section 12 is really untenable. The legislature
in its wisdom does not use surplus words but obviously uses such
words which would advance its object and would remove the
mischief of ambiguity. We have exhaustively dealt with all the
contingencies in this regard over appealability or otherwise of
an order or decision in Ashoke Kumar Rai v. Ashoke Arora [
FMAT No. 2146 of 1991 decided on 17-12-1991. See also fn 9
above.] to hold that even though it was stated in D.N.

69
 Taneja v. Bhajan Lal [(1988) 3 SCC 26 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 546]
that unless a punishment is imposed, no appeal lies against it, at
best relates to a case of criminal contempt and nothing beyond
and if any order or decision is arrived at deciding any bone of
contention or any issue in the controversy an appeal lies.”
(emphasis in original)
44. It is also relevant to notice that a Division Bench of this Court
in Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda [(2006)
5 SCC 399] opined as under: (SCC pp. 411 and 413-14, paras 11
and 15)
“11. (v) If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an
issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute
between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved
person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge
in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single
Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by
seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India (in other cases).
***
15. Interim orders/interlocutory orders passed during the
pendency of a case, fall under one or the other of the following
categories:
(i) to (iii)***
(iv) Routine orders which are passed to facilitate the
progress of the case till its culmination in the final judgment.
(v) Orders which may cause some inconvenience or some
prejudice to a party, but which do not finally determine the
rights and obligations of the parties.”
45. Assuming that an appeal under Section 19 was technically
not maintainable, having regard to the fact that the interim

70
 injunction was granted till disposal of the contempt application, in
our opinion, it was a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of
the Letters Patent of the Madras High Court.
46. We will, however, proceed on the assumption that no appeal
was maintainable. An aggrieved person cannot be left without a
remedy. Access to justice is a human right. In certain situations it
may also be considered to be a fundamental right. (See Tashi Delek
Gaming Solutions Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [(2006) 1 SCC 442]
and Arunima Baruah v. Union of India [(2007) 6 SCC 120]
.)47. Concededly this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain a
special leave petition. When the entire matter is before us this Court
in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 read with Article 142
of the Constitution of India may pass such orders which would do
complete justice to the parties. (See T. Vijendradas v. M.
Subramanian [(2007) 8 SCC 751] .)”

17. Point No.11: Other examples of an ex-facie misuse of Power and violation
of the Fundamental Rights of the citizen by the Ld. Chief Justice of India D. Y.
Chandrachud.

17.1. That there are 13 offences committed Chief Justice of India

D.Y.Chandrachud and details proofs.

17.2. The Summary of 13 offences are as under;

“Offence No. 1:- Deliberate Contempt of Constitution Bench
judgment in the case of Common Cause Vs. Union of India, (2018) 5
SCC 1, and in K.S. Puttaswamy vs. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC
1 by compelling the citizen to disclose the reason to disclose their
reason for not getting vaccine and thereby violating their fundamental
right to privacy.

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 Offence No. 2:- Contempt of binding precedents in Maneka Gandhi v.
Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248. Failure to protect the violation of
fundamental rights of the citizen and rejecting their claim without
hearing the party and their advocates thereby violating the principles
of natural justice and Audi Alterim Rule.

Offence No. 3:- Contempt of Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. Vs.

Prem Heavy Engineering Works (P) Ltd., (1997) 6 SCC 450, Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248, by refusing to give fair
hearing to a Lawyer and not taking their written submissions and
binding precedents in to consideration.

Offence No. 4:- Contempt of binding precedents in the case of R.

Viswanathan Rukn-ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid AIR 1963 SC 1, by
continuous and unreasonable interruption in the argument of advocate
and not allowing him to put his submission fairly in a case of death risk
of pregnant women. This is against the basic concept of fair trial.

Offence No. 5: Passing order contrary to the judgment of co-ordinate

bench thereby promoting chance litigation. It is Contempt of binding
precedents in Hari Singh Vs State of Haryana, (1993) 3 SCC 114,
Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem Heavy Engg. Works (P)
Ltd., (1997) 6 SCC 450, Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community
vs. State of Maharashtra (2005) 2 SCC 673, Sundarjas Kanyalal
Bhatija v. Collector, Thane, (1989) 3 SCC 396, Neeharika
Infrastructure Vs. State of Maharashtra 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315. It
is also a case of violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.

Offence No. 6: - Contempt of binding precedents in Academy of

Nutrition Improvement Vs. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 274 by
giving suggestions to advocate for the parties to ask the petitioner to

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 get Covid - 19 vaccines without knowing allergic or other medical
condition of the parties and without telling them about the death
causing side effects of vaccines which was beyond his jurisdiction and
against the law of informed consent which mandates a right of every
citizen to have true information of death causing side effects of Covid -
19 vaccines before taking such treatment. This was also against the
operational guidelines for vaccination, issued by National Disaster
Management. Authority.

Offence No. 7:- Contempt of binding directions given in Vijay

Shekhar Vs. Union of India (2004) 4 SCC 666, Dwarikesh Sugar
Industries Ltd. Vs. Prem Heavy Engineering Works (P) Ltd., (1997)
6 SCC 450, Prem Kaur Vs. State (2013) 14 SCC 653, and also
committing offences of ‘Malice in Law & Fact’ by passing orders by
ignoring written submissions submitted by the advocate for the party
and putting life of pregnant woman and unborn child in danger with
deliberate ignorance of the materials, research, binding judgments and
Operational Guidelines issued by National Disaster Management
Authority for Covid-19 Vaccination.

Offence No. 8:- Contempt of law laid down in Maneka Gandhi v.

Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 in passing order without hearing
the other party including State.
Serious offences against Supreme Court and contempt of law laid down
in ABCD Vs. Union of India (2020) 2 SCC 52, and in Pushpa Devi
M. Jatia v. M.L. Wadhawan, (1987) 3 SCC 367, by not taking any
action against the petitioner for relying on false and fabricated version
of an application which is never filed before the High Court and not
annexed to the petition before the supreme Court.
This is a case of misuse of power by Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud in
passing extremely fraudulent order with ex-facie false & fabricated

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 version to help extortionist in a multi-Crore scam where his son Adv.
Abhinav Chandrachud is representing the extortionist group.
It requires enquiry and action as per sec 340, 344 of Cr.P.C. as per
specific law laid down in Gobind Mehta AIR 1971 SC 1708, State Of
Maharashtra Vs. Kamlakar Nandram Bhawsar ALLMR (CRI)
2640, K. Ram Reddy Vs. State of A.P. 1997 SCC OnLine AP 1210.

Offence No. 9:- Breach of ‘Judges Ethics Code’, Contempt of law laid
down in State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, (2011) 14
SCC 770, Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record - Association and
another vs. Union of India (2016) 5 SCC 808. Fraud on power by
hearing cases related with his son for more than 3 occasions and
recently on 10th October, 2022 despite knowing the fact that the
controversy is debated between bar and common man across the
country.

Offence No. 10: - Contempt of Pinchet principle of disqualification of

a Judge to hear a particular case where Ld. Judge himself is interested
in a cause being promoted by the vaccine companies and some
dishonest bureaucrats. And thereby undermining the majesty & dignity
of the Supreme Court and eroding the facet of rule of law.

Offence No. 11: - Contempt of Constitution Bench guidelines

in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. A.P. State Road Transport Corpn.
1959 Supp (1) SCR 319 & Mineral Development Ltd. Vs. State (1960)
2 SCR 609.

Offence No.12: - Violating the fundamental rights of the staffs of

mental institutes and the person with mental disabilities and putting
their life in danger in giving directions against operational guidelines
issued by the National Disaster Management Authority and

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 withdrawing their right to refuse the treatment to which they may be
allergic or have death causing side effects. Contempt of binding
precedent in Common Cause v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1.

Offence No.13: - Discrimination of junior advocates and the

petitioners. Offence of judicial impropriety and contempt of law laid
down in Sant Lal Gupta and Ors. Vs. Modern Co-operative Group
Housing Society Ltd. and Ors. (2010) 13 SCC 336 & Mohinder
Kumar Vs. State (2001) 10 SCC 605.”

18. Point No.12: Proofs of agenda run by Mr. D. Y. Chandrachud to spread

disharmony & hatred amongst different classes/ castes/ religion in his private
speeches/ interviews, thereby to cause damage to country and fulfil the ulterior
purposes of anti-national elements like George Soros & other Harvard groups.
This is an offence under section. 153-A, 166, 120(B), 34, etc of IPC.

It is the breach of oath and obligation under Article. 51(A) of the Constitution.

18.1. That regarding conduct of the Judges on & off the Bench, there are many
judgments.

18.2. ‘Judges Ethics Code’ reads thus;

“1. A Judges should not contest election to any office of a club,
society or the association.
2. He should not hold such elective office except a society or
association connected with the law.
3. Close association of a judge with individual members of the
bar, particularly those who practice in the same court, must be
eschewed.
4. A Judge should not permit any member of his immediate
family, such as spouse, son, daughter, son-in-low any other close

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 relative, if he or she is a member of the bar, to appear before him
or even be associated in any manner with a case to be dealt by
him.
5. A member of a judge’s family, if he or she is a member of the
bar, should not be permitted to use the residence in which the
judge actually resides, as an office.
6 A judge should conduct himself with a degree of aloofness
consistent with the dignity of his office.
7. A judge should not hear and decide a matter in which a
member of his family, a close relative or a friend is concerned.
8. A Judge should not enter into public debate or express his
express his view in public on political matter or on matters that
are pending or are likely to arise for judicial determination.
9. A judge is expected to let his judgments speak for themselves.
He will not give interviews to the media.
10. A judge will not accept gifts or hospitality except form his
family, close relatives and friends.
11. A judge will not hear and decide a matter in which a company
in which he holds shares is concerned, unless he has disclosed
his interest and no objection to his hearing the matter is raised.
12. A Judge must not speculate in shares, stocks or the like.
13. A judge should not engage directly or indirectly in trade or
business, either by himself o in association with any other
business (publication of a legal treatise or nay activity in the
nature of a hobby will not be construed as trade or business).
14. A Judge should not ask for, accept contributions or otherwise
actively associate himself with the raising of any fund.
15. Every judge must at all time be conscious that he is under
public gaze and there should be no act or omission by him which
is unbecoming of his office.

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 16. The Code of Ethics was released by Chief Justice A. S. Anand
at the Chief Justice annual conference. It was also resolved that
it would be mandatory for every judge to declare his assets,
including those of his spouse and depenents.”

18.3.That, on 19th November, 2022 accused Chief Justice of India Shri D.Y.
Chandrachud had given a speech at felicitation ceremony organised for him by the
Bar Council of India (BCI).

18.3.1 In the said speech the accused had made a false and offensive statement that
the legal profession in India is caste based and must open up to all sections.
The entire video is available at following Link:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PmSxp2VGWrM
18.3.2. The news published in Bar & Bench is titled as under;
Title: Legal profession patriarchal, caste based; must open up to all sections:
CJI DY Chandrachud.
Lawyers need to take steps to ensure that such changes are ushered in and the
profession is opened up to people from different communities and marginsalised
groups, he stated.

Link:- https://www.barandbench.com/news/legal-profession-patriarchal-caste-
based-must-open-up-all-sections-cji-dy-chandrachud

18.3.3. That, the above statement is out and out false and was unnecessary. It
wasmade as a part of well-orchestrated conspiracy to defame our nation and to
destabilize the nation by creating disharmony and spreading rumours to create
doubts in the mind of some community and some castes about a non-existent
injustice in legal profession.

18.3.4. That, in India all the advocates are working in harmony with each other and
there is no such disharmony as projected by accused D.Y. Chandrachud.

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 18.3.5. That, law of the land, constitutional duty and also the code of conduct for
Judges, Chief Justice of India etc., mandates them to show the real and positive
pictures about their nation and to promote brotherhood, harmony and atmosphereof
peace.

18.3.6. But accused CJI Shri D.Y. Chandrachud is doing exactly opposite and
making false misleading statements, circulating 'false narratives’ and ‘conspiracy
theories' with ulterior motive to implant a seed of disharmony, distrust and hatred
between the various castes and community.

18.3.7. The source of the conspiracy theories and 'false narratives' run by accused
D.Y. Chandrachud and its anti-national agenda can be ex-facie seen from his few
other speeches and from the book Snakes in the ganga' written by Dr. Rajeev
Malhotra & Vijaya Vishwanathan

Following video Links gives the detail proofs of links of accused D.Y Chandrachud
with anti-national and terror group who are keen to destroy our nation ‘India' i.e.
'Bharat'

i) Harvard Liberal Arts Infiltrates Supreme Court of India!

Link: https://twitter.com/RajivMessage/status/1575474603635269637?t=hfqlL*-
aelukASLIGELYO&s-08

ii) Snakes In The Ganga - Breaking India 2.0 | Rajiv Malhotra, Vijaya
Viswanathan. Vibhuti Jha

Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oiV2qR5C85E

iii) Ajeet Bharti Discovers Snakes in the Ganga With Rajiv Malhotra.

Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gD2014qnJ5o

18.3.8. That, the entire evidences are sufficient to prove the ulterior purposes
'intellectual dishonesty' and 'sophistry' of the narratives set up and propagated by
the accused D.Y. Chandrachud.

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 18.3.9. That, irrespective of its justification the penal law prohibits any such
statements which propagates any disharmony between any groups or community.
That accused CJI D.Y. Chandrachud had acted in breach and gross violation of
constitutional duties as enschrigned under Article 51 -A of the Constitution of India.
Article 51-A of Constitution reads thus;
"51A. Fundamental duties: It shall be the duty of every citizen of
India
(a) to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions,
the national Flag and the National Anthem;
(b) to cherish and follow the noble ideals which inspired our national
struggle for freedom;
(c) to uphold and protect the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India;
(e) to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood
amongst all the people of India transcending religious. linguistic
and regional or sectional diversities: to renounce practices
derogatory to the dignity of women:
(h) to develop the scientific temper, humanism and the spirit of inquiry
and reform; (i) to safeguard public property and to abjure violence;
(j) to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and
collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of
endeavour and achievement."
18.3.10. The most disappointing part is that, he is misusing the public property and
his position as CJI to filful the ulterior purposes of anti- national elements which is
in fact an offence under section 409 of Indian Penal Code.

18.3.11. The relevant offences under Indian Penal Code which are committed by the
accused are as under;
(a) Section 153-A of IPC reads thus;
“153A. Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds
of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and
doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony.

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 (1) Whoever-
(a) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible
representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote,
on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language,
caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony
or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different
religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or
communities, or
(b) commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of
harmony between different religious, racial, language or
regional groups or castes or communities, and which disturbs or
is likely to disturb the public tranquillity, 2[or] 2[(c) organizes
any exercise, movement, drill or other similar activity intending
that the participants in such activity shall use or be trairied to
use criminal force or violence or knowing it to be likely that the
participants in such activity will use or be trained to use criminal
force or violence, or participates in such activity intending to use
or be trained to use criminal force or violence or knowing it to
be likely that the participants in such activity will use or be
trained to use criminal force or violence, against any religious,
racial, language or regional group or caste or community and
such activity for any reason whatsoever causes or is likely to
cause fear or alarm or a feeling of insecurity amongst members
of such religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or
community, I shall be punished with imprisonment which may
extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. Offence
committed in place of worship, etc. (2) Whoever commits an
offence specified in sub-section (1) in any place of worship or in
any assembly engaged in the performance of religious wor ship
or religious ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment
which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.”

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 (b) Section 505 of IPC reads thus;
505. Statements conducing to public mischief.-
(1) Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement,
rumour or report,
(b) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, fear or alarm
to the public, or to any section of the public whereby any person
may be induced to commit an offence against the State or against
the public tranquility; or
(c) with intent to incite, or which is likely to incite, any class or
community of persons to commit any offence against any other
class or community shall be punished with imprisonment which
may extend to 6[three years], or with fine, or with both.
7[(2) Statements creating or promoting enmity, hatred or ill-
will between classes. Whoever makes, publishes or circulates
any statement or report containing rumour or alarming news
with intent to create or promote, or which is likely to create or
promote, grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence,
caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, feelings
of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial,
language or regional groups or castes or communities, shall be
punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years,
or with fine, or with both.”
(c) Section 120(B) of IPC reads thus;
120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy
(1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an
offence punishable with death, [imprisonment for life] or
rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall,
where no express provision is made in this Code for the
punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same
manner as if he had abetted such offence.

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 (2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a
criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as
aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or
with both.]

(d) Section 409 of IPC reads thus;

409. Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker,
merchant or agent. Whoever, being in any manner entrusted
with property, or with any dominion over property in his capacity
of a public servant or in the way of his business as a banker,
merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent, commits criminal
breach of trust in respect of that property, shall be punished with
1 [imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall
also be liable to fine.

(e) Section 34 of IPC reads thus;

34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common
intention. When a criminal act is done by several persons in
furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons
is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him
alone.

(f) Section 166 of IPC reads thus;

166. Public servant disobeying law, with intent to cause inury
to any person. Whoever, being a public servant, knowingly
disobeys any direction of the law as to the way in which he is to
conduct himself as such public servant, intending to cause, or
knowing it to be likely that he will, by such disobedience, cause
injury to any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment

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 for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with
both.
18.3.11. That, section 52 of the Indian Penal Code states that, noting can be said to
be done in good faith if it is not done with due care and caution.

18.3.12. That, the behaviour and conduct of any Judge on the bench or in public is
expected of the highest character as per accepted norms. [Subramanian Swamy V.
Arun Shourie, (2014) 12 SCC.3441]

In an interview with India Today in 1996, former Chief Justice of India, Justice J.S.
Verma, was about his opinion regarding making the judiciary more accountable
replied as:
"It's long overdue with the increase in judicial activism; there
has been a corresponding increase in the need for judicial
accountability. There is a perception that the people are doubt
whether some of us in the higher judiciary satisfy the require
standard of conduct. Since we are the ones lay down the rules
of behaviour for everyone else. We have to show that the
standard of our behavior is at least as high as the highest by
which we judge the others. We have to earn that moral authority
and justify the faith the people have placed in us. One way of
doing this is by codifying judicial ethics and adhering to them.”
18.3.13. That, by way of his act of commission and omission the accused had
forfeited his right to continue on his post of CJ.

18.3.14. That, accused CJI D.Y.Chandrachud had breached his oath as CJI by acting
against the constitution and laws. Hence, he forfeited his right to continue to be CJI
and Judge of the Supreme Court of India. [In K. C. Chandy Vs. R.Balakrishna
Pillai. IIR 1986 Ker 116, R. C. Pollard vs Satra Gopal Mazumdar 1943 SCC
OnLine Cal 153]

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 18.3.15. That, it is basic law and Hon'ble Supreme Court & High Court had clarified
that, when a judge gives any offensive public speech or interview then he is not
entitled to claim any protection. He has to be prosecuted from his prosecution
like a common man. [Bidhi Singh Vs. M. S. Mandyal 1993 CRI. L. J. 499, K.
Veeraswami v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655]

18.3.16. That, in Raman Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan 2000 SCC OnLine Raj 226
it is clarified that, when a judge of High Court or Supreme Court involved in any
criminal conspiracy than FIR can be registered against him without in taking any
consultation as per Constitution Bench judgment in K. Veeraswami Vs. Union of
India (1991) 3 SCC 655, where it is ruled as under;
"A] Cri. P.C. Sec. 156 - Investigation against accused Addl.
High Court Judge - Whether prior consultation with Chief
Justice is necessary prior filling of F.I.R. against a High Court
Judge as has been laid down by Supreme Court in K.
Veerswami's case (1991) (3) SCC 655) - Held - In K.
Veerswami's case Supreme Court observed that the Judges are
liable to be dealt with just the same as any other person in
respect of criminal offence and only in offence regarding
corruption the sanction for criminal prosecution is required -
the directions issued by Hon'ble Supreme Court are not
applicable in instant case.
B] Cri. P.C. Sec. 197 - Sanction for prosecution of High Court
Judge - Accused are Additional High Court Judge,
Suprintendant of Police Sanjeev Bhatt and others - The accused
hatched conspiracy to falsely implicate a shop owner in a case
under N.D.P.S. Act and when shop owner submitted to their
demands he was discharged - Complaint u.s. 120-B, 195, 196,
342, 347, 357, 368, 388, 458, 482, I.P.C, and Sec. 17, 58 (1), (2)
of NDPS Act - Held - there is no connection between official

84
 duty and offence - No sanction is required for prosecution -
Registration of F.I.R. and investigation legal and proper.
C] The applicant - Ram Lal Addl. High Court Judge hatched
criminal conspiracy - The Bar Association submitted a
representation to Hon'ble Chief Justice of India on 11-09-1997
requesting to not to confirm Raman Lal as
Judge of the High Court - Later on he was transferred to
Principal Judge of city Civil and Sessions Court at Ahmedabad
- S.P. (C.I.D.) Jaipur sent a questionnaire through the registrar,
Gujrat High Court to accused Addl.
High Court Judge - Chief Justice granted permission to 1.0. to
interrogate - Later on I.O. sent letter to applicant to remain
present before Chief Judicial Magistrate at the time of filing the
charge-sheet -Applicant filed petition before High Court
challenging it - Petition of applicant was rejected by High Court
and Supreme Court in limine - No relief is required to be granted
to petitioner in view of the facts of the case.
D] Jurisdiction - Continuing offence - Held - Where
complainants allegations are of stinking magnitude and the
authority which ought to have redressed it have closed its eyes
and not even tried to find out the real offender and the clues for
illegal arrest and harassment are not enquired then he can not
be let at the mercy of such law enforcing agencies who adopted
an entirely indifferent attitude - Legal maxim Necéssiatas
sublege Non contineture Quid Qua Quad Alias Non Est Lictum
Necessitasfacit Lictum, Means necessity is not restrained by laws
- Since what otherwise is not lawful necessity makes it lawful -
Proceeding proper cannot be quashed "
18.3.17. That, while uploading the prosecution upholding the prosecution of a Judge
about his involvement in a conspiracy it is rule that, no direct proof is necessary
because such conspiracies are hatched in secrecy.

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 In Raman Lal (Supra), lit is ruled as under;
"Conspiracy - I.P.C. Sec. 120 (B) - Apes court made it clear that
an inference of conspiracy has to be drawn on the basis of
circumstantial evidence only because it becomes difficult to get
direct evidence on such issue - The offence can only be proved
largely from the inference drawn from acts or illegal omission
committed by them in furtherance of a common design - Once
such a conspiracy is proved, act of one conspirator becomes the
act of the others - A Co-conspirator who joins subsequently and
commits overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy must also be
held liable - Proceeding against accused Judge cannot be
quashed. "
18.3.18. That, Section 10 of Evidence Act reads thus;
"10. Things said or done by conspirator in reference to
common design. - Where there is reasonable ground to believe
that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an
offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written
by any one of such persons in reference to their common
intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained
by any one of them, is a relevant fact as against each of the
persons believed to so conspiring, as well for the purpose of
proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of
showing that any such person was a party to it."
Illustration:-
Reasonable ground exists for believing that A has joined in a
conspiracy to wage war against the Government of India).
The facts that B procured arms in Europe for the purpose of
the conspiracy, C collected money in Calcutta for a like object,
D persuaded persons to join the conspiracy in Bombay, E
published writings advocating the object in view at Agra, and F
transmitted from Delhi to G at Kabul the money Chad collected

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 at Calcutta, and the contents of a letter written by H giving which
an account of the conspiracy, are each relevant, both to prove
the existence of the conspiracy, and to prove A's complicity in it,
although he may have been ignorant of all of them, and although
the persons by whom they were done were strangers to him, and
although they may have taken place before he joined the
conspiracy or after he left it.
19. Point No.13: Other proven examples of the misuse of power and violation
of fundamental rights of the citizen, advocates, bureaucrats, IPS officers,
lawyers, women, minority communities, top businessman and corporates,
husbands, fathers, mothers, human right activists, etc. by other judges of the
Supreme Court in the cases of Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India, (2014) 8
SCC 470, Zahira Habibullah Sheikh Vs. State (2006) 3 SCC 374 , M.S. Ahlawat
v. State of Haryana, (2000) 1 SCC 278, Re: Vijay Kurle 2020 SCC OnLine SC
407, Perry Kansagra, In re, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 858, Dy. GM, Inter-State Bus
Terminal v. Sudershan Kumari, (1997) 3 SCC 496 etc.

19.1. That the maximum punishment in Contempt Cases is six months

imprisonment but in Zahira Shaikh she was sentenced to 1 years imprisonment
19.2. Subrato Roy Sahara was sent to Jail for indefinite period under Contempt by
Supreme Court. He got bail after 2 years 2 months.
19.3. This is a clear violation of Article20 (1) of Constituion. It reads as under
“(1) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for
violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the
act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater
than that which might have been inflicted under the law at the
time of the commission of the offence”
19.4. Article 15(1) of ICCPR reads thus;
“1 . No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a

87
 criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time
when it was committed.”
19.5. That IPS M.S. Ahlawat was sent to jail by the Supreme Court under perjury.
Later three Judge Bench in M.S. Ahlawat accepted the mistake and set aside the
conviction. [M.S. Ahlawat v. State of Haryana, (2000) 1 SCC 278]
19.6. Similar injustice done to advocate by the three Judge Bench to Vinay Chandra
is set aside by the Five Judge Bench.

19.7. There are similar injustices to many. But no is provided with appeal provision
as mandated under Article 14(5) of ICCPR.

20. Point No.14: Supreme Court itself admitted in the case of Ram Deo
Chauhan Vs. Bani Kant Das (2010) 14 SCC 584 that the Supreme Court orders
can violate fundamental rights of the citizen and in such case independent
tribunal like Human Rights Commission can enquire the issue and help the
victim to get justice. Said judgement is followed by the Nine-Judge Bench in K.
S. Puttaswamy vs. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1;

20.1. That in Ram Deo Chauhan Vs. Bani Kant Das (2010) 14 SCC 584 it is ruled
as under;
“39. NHRC was constituted under Section 3 of the 1993 Act for better
protection of human rights. The term “human rights” as defined in
Section 2(d) of the 1993 Act reads as follows:
“2. (1)(d) ‘human rights’ means the rights relating to life,
liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the
Constitution or embodied in the international covenants and
enforceable by courts in India;”
46. The jurisdiction of NHRC thus stands enlarged by Section 12(j) of
the 1993 Act to take necessary action for the protection of human rights.
Such action would include inquiring into cases where a party has been
denied the protection of any law to which he is entitled, whether by a

88
 private party, a public institution, the Government or even the courts of
law. We are of the opinion that if a person is entitled to benefit under a
particular law, and benefits under that law have been denied to him, it
will amount to a violation of his human rights.
47. Human rights are the basic, inherent, immutable and inalienable
rights to which a person is entitled simply by virtue of his being born a
human. They are such rights which are to be made available as a matter
of right. The Constitution and legislations of a civilised country
recognise them since they are so quintessentially part of every human
being. That is why every democratic country committed to the rule of
law put into force mechanisms for their enforcement and protection.
48. Human rights are universal in nature. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as UDHR) adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on 10-12-1948 recognises and
requires the observance of certain universal rights, articulated therein,
to be human rights, and these are acknowledged and accepted as equal
and inalienable and necessary for the inherent dignity and development
of an individual. Consequently, though the term “human rights” itself
has not been defined in UDHR, the nature and content of human rights
can be understood from the rights enunciated therein.
49. Possibly considering the wide sweep of such basic rights, the
definition of “human rights” in the 1993 Act has been designedly kept
very broad to encompass within it all the rights relating to life, liberty,
equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution or
embodied in the International Covenants and enforceable by courts in
India. Thus, if a person has been guaranteed certain rights either
under the Constitution or under an International Covenant or under
a law, and he is denied access to such a right, then it amounts to a
clear violation of his human rights and NHRC has the jurisdiction to
intervene for protecting it.

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 50. The contrary finding in the judgment under review about the
absence of jurisdiction of NHRC to make some recommendations to the
Governor is thus vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the record.
Of course, NHRC cannot intervene in proceeding pending in court
without its approval [Section 12(b)] as it is assumed that the court will
remedy any case of violation of human rights. The assumption in the
judgment under review that there can be no violation of a person's
human rights by a judgment of this Court is possibly not correct.
51. This Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction has to deal with
many judgments of the High Courts and the Tribunals in which the High
Courts or the Tribunals, on an erroneous perception of facts and law,
have rendered decisions in breach of human rights of the parties and
this Court corrects such errors in those judgments. The instances of
this Court's judgment violating the human rights of the citizens may
be extremely rare but it cannot be said that such a situation can never
happen.
52. We can remind ourselves of the majority decision of the
Constitution Bench of this Court in ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant
Shukla [(1976) 2 SCC 521] . The majority opinion was that in view of
the Presidential Order dated 27-6-1975 under Article 359(1) of the
Constitution, no person has the locus standi to move any writ petition
under Article 226 before a High Court for habeas corpus or any other
writ to enforce any right to personal liberty of a person detained under
the then law of preventive detention (Maintenance of Internal Security
Act of 1971), on the ground that the order is illegal or mala fide or not
in compliance with the Act (see SCC paras 78 and 136 of the Report).
53. The lone dissenting voice of Khanna, J. in ADM, Jabalpur
case [(1976) 2 SCC 521] interpreted the legal position differently by
inter alia holding: (SCC p. 777, para 593)
“593. (8) Article 226 under which the High Courts can issue
writs of habeas corpus is an integral part of the Constitution. No

90
 power has been conferred upon any authority in the Constitution
for suspending the power of the High Court to issue writs in the
nature of habeas corpus during the period of emergency. Such a
result cannot be brought about by putting some particular
construction on the Presidential Order in question.”
54. There is no doubt that the majority judgment of this Court
in ADM, Jabalpur case [(1976) 2 SCC 521] violated the fundamental
rights of a large number of people in this country. Commenting on the
majority judgment, Chief Justice Venkatachaliah in the Khanna
Memorial Lecture delivered on 25-2-2009, observed that the same be
“confined to the dustbin of history”. The learned Chief Justice equated
Khanna, J.'s dissent with the celebrated dissent of Lord Atkin
in Liversidge v. Anderson [1942 AC 206 : (1941) 3 All ER 338 (HL)] .
In fact the dissent of Khanna, J. became the law of the land when, by
virtue of the Forty-Fourth Constitutional Amendment, Articles 20 and
21 were excluded from the purview of suspension during Emergency.
76. For the reasons discussed above and considering the aforesaid
legal issues, this Court concludes as follows:
77. The review petition is allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove.
The parties are left to bear their own costs.”
20.2. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of Oscar Enrique
Barreto Levia Vs. Venezula vide its order dated 17th November 2019 had ruled as
under;
“2. The application relates to the criminal proceeding by which Mr.
Oscar Enrique Barreto Leiva (hereinafter, "Mr. Barreto Leiva" or the
"alleged victim") was sentenced to one year and two months
imprisonment for crimes against public property as a result of his
actions while serving as a Director General in 1989, of the Department
of Administration and Services of the Ministry of the Secretariat of the
Presidency of the Republic. According to the Commission. during the
processing of a criminal proceeding before the Supreme Court of

91
 Justice against the then President of the Republic, a senator and a
representative, Mr. Barreto was summoned to festify as witness and
later on, an arrest warrant was issued against him. The Commission
argued that in said proceeding, the alleged victim was not notified of
the charges against him due to the secrecy of the investigation phase.
Furthermore, the Commission alleged that the secrecy of the
investigation phase implied that Mr. Barreto Leiva was not able to be
assisted by a counsel of his choice during that phase, to examine and
cross-examine witnesses, to have access to the evidence being
gathered, present evidence in his defense and counteract the evidence
against him. Moreover, according to the Commission, the fact that the
Supreme Court of Justice tried, in sole instance, the case of the alleged
victim would constitute a violation of his right to be tried by a
competent tribunal, given the fact that his position did not merit a
special criminal privilege, as well as a violation of his right to appeal
an adverse judgment. Finally, the Commission deemed that Mr.
Barreto Leivo was subjected to preventive detention based exclusively
on indications of criminal responsibility, with no possibility of bail,
which lasted longer than the final sentenced imposed
3. The Commission requested the Court to declare that the State is
responsible for the violation of the rights enshrined in Articles 7(1),
7(3) and 7(5) (Right to Personal Liberty), 8(1), 8(2)(b), 8(2)(c),
8(2)(d), 8(2)(f) and 8(2)(h) (Right to a Fair Trial) and 25(1) (Right to
Judicial Protection) of the American Convention, in relation to the
obligations established in Articles 1(1) (Obligation to Respect Rights)
and 2 (Domestic Legal Effects) therein, to the detriment of the alleged
victim. Moreover, the Commission requested the Court to order certain
measures of reparations.
V. 1. Every person has the right to a hearing [...] by a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal [...].

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 V. 2. Every person accused of a criminal offense has the right to be
presumed innocent so long as his guilt has not been proven according
to law. During the proceedings, every person is entitled, with full
equality, to the following minimum guarantees:
[…]
b) prior notification in detail to the accused of the charges against him;
c) adequate time and means for the preparation of his defense;
d) the right of the accused to defend himself personally or to be assisted
by legal counsel of his own choosing, and to communicate freely and
privately with his counsel;
[....]
f) the right of the defense to examine witnesses present in the court and
to obtain the appearance, as witnesses, of experts or other persons who
may throw light on the facts; […], and
54. One of the fundamental rights is the right to count on adequate time
and means for the preparation of the defense, enshrined in Article
8(2).c) of the Convention, which binds the State to allow the accused
having access to the record of the case and to the evidence gathered
against him [FN39]. Moreover, in the presence of both parties to an
action, the State must guarantee the intervention of the accused in the
analysis of the evidence.
55. If the State intends to limit this right, it must respect the principle
of nullum crimen nulla pocna sine lege praevia, arguing, in a well-
founded way, which is the legitimate goal it intends to achieve and
proving that the means to be used in order to achieve such goal is
adequate, necessary and strictly proportional. Otherwise, the
restriction of the right to defense of the individual will be contrary to
the Convention.
57.4. right of the accused to be assisted by a counsel of his choosing
(Article 8(2)(d))
81.7. right to appeal a judgment (Article 8(2)(h)

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 84. […] The Committee considers that the expression "according to
law", found at párrafo 5 del artículo 14 del Pacto is not intended to
leave the very existence of the right of review to the discretion of the
States parties, since the rights are those recognized by the Covenant,
and not merely those recognized by domestic law. Rather, what is to be
determined "according to law" is the modalities by which the review by
a higher tribunal is to be carried out. The Committee ruled against the
State on the grounds that the State denied Mrs. Consuelo Salgar de
Montejo the right to review by a higher tribunal.
86. […] State party concerned; rather, such a system is incompatible
with the Covenant, unless the State party concerned has made a
reservation to this effect (FN47] (emphasis added)
87. As a consequence, the international decisions that Venezuela refers
to in its defense, are not applicable to the State. In fact, such decisions
are adverse to the State.
88. The case-law of this Court has emphasized that the aim of the right
to appeal a judgment is to protect the night of defense by creating a
remedy to prevent a flawed ruling, containing errors unduly prejudicial
to a person's interests, from becoming final. [FN48]
90. While States have a margin of discretion in regulating the exercise
of that remedy, they may not establish restrictions or requirements
inimical to the very essence of the right to appeal a judgment. [FN49]
The State may establish special judicial privileges for the prosecution
of high- ranking government authorities and these privileges are
compatible, in principle, with the American Convention (supra para.
74). However, even in these situations, the State may allow the accused
the possibility of appealing a condemnatory judgment. This would
happen, for example, if it were decided that the proceedings at first
instance would be conducted by the president or of a courtroom of a
superior tribunal and the appeal would be heard by the full tribunal, to
the exclusion of those who already issued an opinion on the case.

94
 91. Based on the foregoing, the Tribunal declares that Venezuela
violated the right of Mr. Barreto Leiva enshrined in Article 8(2)(h) of
the Convention, in conjunction with Article 1(1) and 2 therein,
inasmuch as the alleged victim was convicted in a court of sole instance
and he did not have the possibility, as a result, of appealing the
judgment. It is worth mentioning, moreover, that Mr. Barreto Leiva
could have appealed the condemnatory judgment issued by the court
that heard his case should the principle of connection, which combined
the prosecution of several people in the hands of a same court, had not
be applied. In this case, the application of the principle of connection,
which is admissible per se, entailed the inadmissible consequence of
depriving the accused of the remedy referred to in Article 8(2)(h) of the
Convention.
8. right to be tried by an impartial tribunal
101. Article 25(1) of the Convention establishes, in broad terms, the
obligation of every State Party to provide, to all persons subject testa
jussito effective legal recourse against legal acts that violate the
fundamental rights.
102. In this respect, the Court considers that the facts of this case are
limited to the field of application of Article 8(2)(h) of the Convention
that, as has been previously mentioned (supra para. 87), embodies a
specific type of remedy that must be offered to every person accused of
a crime, as a guarantee of his or her right to defense and it deems that
it is not provided for in the case of the application of Article 25(1) of
said treaty. The defenseless situation of Mr. Barreto Leiva was due to
the impossibility of appealing the condemnatory judgment, situation
covered by Article 8(2)(h) in question.
107. This principle requires the adoption of two types of measure,
namely: i) the repeal of laws and practices of any kind that entail a
violation of the guarantees established in the Convention, or that
disregard the rights recognized therein or impede their exercise, and

95
 (ii) the enactment of laws and the development of practices conducive
to respect for those guarantees.
110. The Commission indicated that the imposition of preventive
detention on Mr. Barreto Leiva was "based exclusively on indications
of criminal responsibility [...] with no justification of what objectives
the prosecution sought with the imposition of that measure", all of
which amounted to, according to the Commission, a violation of the
rights enshrined in Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the American Convention
The representative agreed with the argument put forward by the
Commission and the State did not contest such allegations.
124. It is a principle of International Law that any violation of an
international obligation that has caused damage entails the duty to
provide adequate reparation. [FN69] The Court has based its decisions
on this particular subject pursuant to the provisions of Article 63(1) of
the American Convention. [FN70]
125. In accordance with the above considerations on the merits and the
violations of the Convention declared to be such in the preceding
chapters, as well as in the light of the criteria embodied in the Court's
case-law in connection with the nature and scope of the obligation to
make reparations, [FN71] the Court will now address the requests for
reparations made by the Commission and the representative, as well as
the State's observations thereof, in order to adopt the measures
required to redress the damage.
126. The Court considers that Mr. Barreto Leiva is the "injured party"
in his capacity of victim of the violations which have been proven to be
committed to his detriment, as a result of which he is entitled to the
reparations as may be set by the Tribunal.
128. The Tribunal pointed out in the preceding paragraphs that
Venezuela violated Article 8(2)(h) of the Convention insofar as it
prevented Mr. Barreto Leiva from appealing the condemnatory
judgment issued against him. The Commission and the representative

96
 did not request any other measure than compensation, tending to
repair the violation. However, the Court, considering that the
reparation of the damage flowing from a breach of an international
obligation calls for, if practicable, full restitution (restitutio in
integrum), which consists in restoring a previously-existing situation,
[FN73] decides to order the State to offer Mr. Barreto Leiva the
possibility of appealing the judgment in question.
130. Consequently, if Mr. Barreto Leiva requests so to the State, by
means of the Judiciary, he must be granted the right to appeal the
decision to fully review the condemnatory judgment. If the court decides
that the conviction was according to the Law, such court shall not
impose an additional punishment on the victim and it shall reiterate
that the victim has already complied with all the convictions imposed
in due time (supra para. 22). If, however, the court decides that Mr.
Barreto Leiva is innocent or that the conviction imposed on him was
not according to the Law, the court shall order appropriate measures
of reparations for the time that Mr. Barreto Leiva was deprived of
liberty and for all the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused to
him. This obligation must be complied with within a reasonable time.
131. The Court recalls that the obligation to provide reparations, which
is governed in every aspect by international Law, must not be altered
or breached by the respondent State on the basis of its domestic law.
134. Without prejudice to the foregoing and considering the violations
declared in the instant case, the Tribunal deems appropriate to order
the State to adapt, within a reasonable term, its domestic legal system,
in order to guarantee the right to review by a higher court, according
to Article 8(2)(h) of the Convention, to every person tried for a crime,
even to those persons who enjoy a special judicial privilege.
138. The Commission and the representative requested the Court to
order the State to publicly acknowledge its international responsibility

97
 for the harm inflicted. The State did not present arguments in this
aspect.
139. The Court has ordered, on several occasions, defendant States the
organization of acts to confer dignity on the victim or in the victim's
memory, when the seriousness of the facts and the violations committed
call for it. For example, in the case of Anzualdo Castro V. Perú, a
public act of apology was ordered given that the State was found
responsible for the forced disappearance of the victim, his
stigmatization and the revictimization of his next-of-kin. In the case of
Heliodoro Portugal V. Panamá, related to the forced disappearance of
the victim, the Tribunal considered it was proven that the lack of justice
and the concealment of the truth caused the victim's next-of-kin a
profound distress, intense psychological suffering, anguish, and
uncertainty and so, it ordered a public act for the acknowledgment of
the State's international responsibility in order to repair the damage
caused and to avoid the repetition of facts similar to those of that case.
140. In other cases, the Court has considered that the judgment
constitutes per se a form of reparation. For example, in the cases of
Fermin Ramirez V. Guatemala, Raxcacó Reyes V. Guatemala [FN80]
and Case of Boyce et al V. Barbados, [FN81] related to death sentences
incompatible with the Convention, where the victims were not executed,
the Tribunal did not order the States an act of public apology and even,
it did not order the payment of compensation for non-pecuniary
damage, given that it considered that the issuance of the judgment was
sufficient.
141. In the instant case, the Court considers that the violations
committed against Mr. Barreto Leiva shall be sufficiently repaired by
the issuance of the instant judgment, the publication thereof (supra
para. 137) the possibility of appealing the condemnatory judgment
(supra para. 130) and the compensatory amount set in paragraph 148
infra.

98
 6.1. Pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage
143. The representative claimed that the victim must be compensated
for lost wages as of his arrest The representative set the amount of US$
233.685, 08 (two hundred thirty-three thousand six hundred eighty-five
with 08/100 cents dollars of the United States of America).

144. As to the non-pecuniary damage, the representative indicated that

during two years, Mr. Barreto Leiva suffered "a systematic and
aggressive campaign, verbal insults, slander, lies and strong epithets,
most of them degrading, daily transmitted by radio, television and
printed media". It further asserted that his social life was "seriously
affected" and that he was forced to send his two minor daughters to
study abroad. The amount that, for this item, is requested substantially
varies from the brief of pleadings and motions to the brief of final
arguments. While in the first brief, the representative requested US$
150.000, 00 (a hundred and fifty thousand dollars of the United States
of America), in the last brief, it requested US$ 250.000, 00 (two
hundred and fifty thousand dollars of the United States of America).
The representative did not explain the reason for such an increase.
148. Based on the foregoing, the Tribunal abstains from ordering a
compensation for the alleged pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage
under the terms mentioned by the representative. The Court, however,
must acknowledge that the violations declared in this Judgment
resulted in a non-pecuniary damage, since it is part of human nature
itself that any person who suffers a violation of their human rights
experiments suffering. [FN82] Therefore, the Court equitable
determines the amount of US$ 15.000, 00 (fifty thousand dollars of the
United States of America) that must be delivered to Mr. Barreto Leiva
directly.

99
 160. The State violated the right to prior notification in detail of the
charged filed embodied in Article 8(2)(b) of the American Convention,
in relation to Article 1(1) therein, to the detriment of Mr. Barreto Leiva,
under the terms of paragraphs 28 to 48 of this Judgment.
2. The State violated the right to have adequate time and means for the
preparation of his defense, embodied in Article 8(2)(c) of the American
Convention, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 therein, to the detriment
of Mr.Barreto Leiva, under the terms of paragraphs 53 to 57 of this
Judgment.
3. The State violated the right to be assisted by legal counsel of his
choice, embodied in Article 8(2)(d) of the American Convention, in
relation to Article 1(1) therein, to the detriment of Mr. Barreto Leiva,
under the terms of paragraphs 60 to 64 of this Judgment.
6. The State violated the right to appeal a ruling, embodied in Article
8(2)(h) of the Convention, in conjunction with Articles 1(1) and 2
therein, to the detriment of Mr. Barreto Leiva, under the terms of
paragraphs 84 to 91 of this Judgment.
9. The State violated the right to personal liberty and the right not to be
subject to arbitrary detention, embodied in Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the
American Convention, in relation to Articles 9. 1(1) and 2 therein, to
the detriment of Mr. Barreto Leiva, under the terms of paragraphs 111
to 116 of this Judgment.
10. The State violated the right to personal liberty, the right to trial
within a reasonable time and the right to be presumed innocent,
embodied in Articles 7(1), 7(5) and 8(2) of the American Convention,
in conjunction with Articles 1(1) therein, to the detriment of Mr.
Barreto Leiva, under the terms of paragraphs 118 to 123 of this
judgment.
11. This Judgment is per se a form of reparation.
12. The State, by means of its Judiciary and according to the terms of
paragraphs 128 to 131, must grant Mr. Badatory referee decision and

100
 fully reviewing the condemnatory judgment to which this Judgment
makes reference (supra para. 22). If the court decides that the
conviction was according to the Law, such court shall not impose an
additional punishment on the victim and it shall reiterate that the victim
has already complied with all the convictions imposed in due time. If,
however, the court decides that Mr. Barreto Leiva is innocent or that
the conviction imposed on him was not according to the Law, the court
shall order appropriate measures of reparations for the time that Mr.
Barreto Leiva was deprived of liberty and for all the pecuniary and
non-pecuniary damage caused to him. This obligation must be
complied with within a reasonable time.
13. The State must, within a reasonable time and according to
paragraphs 133 and 134 of this Judgment, adapt its domestic legal
system, in order to guarantee the right to review by a higher court,
according to Article 8(2)(h) of the Convention, to every person tried for
a crime, even to those persons who enjoy a special judicial privilege
15. The State must, within the term of one year as of notice of this
Judgment, pay the amounts determined in paragraphs 148 and 153
therein, as compensation for non-pecuniary damage and
reimbursement of costs and expenses, under the conditions and terms
mentioned in paragraphs 154 to 159 of this Judgment.”

20.3. Similar remedy must be provided to all Indian citizen.

21. Point No. 15 :Law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Shrirang
Yadavrao Waghmare Vs State of Maharashtra 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1237
that if any judge passes any order or does any act to give favor to advocate /
party like Adv. Kripal and LGBTQ Petitioners then such judge is guilty of
doing corruption and is a ground for dismissal of said judge. Such conduct is
also called as ‘Judicial Dishonesty’ in Muzaffar Husain Vs State of Uttar
Pradesh 2022 SCC OnLine SC 567.

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 21.1 That in Shrirang Yadavrao Waghmare Vs State of Maharashtra 2019 SCC
OnLine SC 1237 it is ruled as under;
“5. The first and foremost quality required in a Judge is integrity.
The need of integrity in the judiciary is much higher than in other
institutions. The judiciary is an institution whose foundations are
based on honesty and integrity. It is, therefore, necessary that
judicial officers should possess the sterling quality of integrity.
This Court in Tarak Singh v. Jyoti Basu [Tarak Singh v. Jyoti
Basu, (2005) 1 SCC 201] held as follows: (SCC p. 203)
“Integrity is the hallmark of judicial discipline, apart from
others. It is high time the judiciary took utmost care to see
that the temple of justice does not crack from inside, which
will lead to a catastrophe in the justice-delivery system
resulting in the failure of public confidence in the system.
It must be remembered that woodpeckers inside pose a
larger threat than the storm outside.”
6 [Ed.: Para 6 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No.
F.3/Ed.B.J./105/2019 dated 6-11-2019.] . The behaviour of a
Judge has to be of an exacting standard, both inside and outside
the court. This Court in Daya Shankar v. High Court of
Allahabad [Daya Shankar v. High Court of Allahabad, (1987) 3
SCC 1 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 132] held thus: (SCC p. 1)
“Judicial officers cannot have two standards, one in the
court and another outside the court. They must have only
one standard of rectitude, honesty and integrity. They
cannot act even remotely unworthy of the office they
occupy.”
7. Judges are also public servants. A Judge should always
remember that he is there to serve the public. A Judge is judged

102
 not only by his quality of judgments but also by the quality and
purity of his character. Impeccable integrity should be reflected
both in public and personal life of a Judge. One who stands in
judgments over others should be incorruptible. That is the high
standard which is expected of Judges.
8. Judges must remember that they are not merely employees but
hold high public office. In R.C. Chandel v. High Court of
M.P. [R.C. Chandel v. High Court of M.P., (2012) 8 SCC 58 :
(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 343 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 782 : (2012) 2 SCC
(L&S) 469] , this Court held that the standard of conduct
expected of a Judge is much higher than that of an ordinary
person. The following observations of this Court are relevant:
(SCC p. 70, para 29)
“29. Judicial service is not an ordinary government
service and the Judges are not employees as such. Judges
hold the public office; their function is one of the essential
functions of the State. In discharge of their functions and
duties, the Judges represent the State. The office that a
Judge holds is an office of public trust. A Judge must be a
person of impeccable integrity and unimpeachable
independence. He must be honest to the core with high
moral values. When a litigant enters the courtroom, he
must feel secured that the Judge before whom his matter
has come, would deliver justice impartially and
uninfluenced by any consideration. The standard of
conduct expected of a Judge is much higher than an
ordinary man. This is no excuse that since the standards
in the society have fallen, the Judges who are drawn from
the society cannot be expected to have high standards and
ethical firmness required of a Judge. A Judge, like
Caesar's wife, must be above suspicion. The credibility of

103
 the judicial system is dependent upon the Judges who man
it. For a democracy to thrive and the rule of law to survive,
justice system and the judicial process have to be strong
and every Judge must discharge his judicial functions with
integrity, impartiality and intellectual honesty.”
9. There can be no manner of doubt that a Judge must decide the
case only on the basis of the facts on record and the law
applicable to the case. If a Judge decides a case for any
extraneous reasons, then he is not performing his duty in
accordance with law.
10. In our view the word “gratification” does not only mean
monetary gratification. Gratification can be of various types. It
can be gratification of money, gratification of power,
gratification of lust etc., etc. In this case the officer decided the
cases because of his proximate relationship with a lady lawyer
and not because the law required him to do so. This is also
gratification of a different kind.
12. Hence, we find no merit in the appeal, which is accordingly,
dismissed.
11. The judicial officer concerned did not live up to the
expectations of integrity, behaviour and probity expected of him.
His conduct is as such that no leniency can be shown and he
cannot be visited with a lesser punishment.”
21.2 That in Muzaffar Husain Vs State of Uttar Pradesh 2022 SCC OnLine SC
567 it is ruled as under;
“15. In our opinion, showing undue favour to a party under the
guise of passing judicial orders is the worst kind of judicial
dishonesty and misconduct. The extraneous consideration for
showing favour need not always be a monetary consideration.
It is often said that “the public servants are like fish in the water,
none can say when and how a fish drank the water”. A judge

104
 must decide the case on the basis of the facts on record and the
law applicable to the case. If he decides a case for extraneous
reasons, then he is not performing his duties in accordance
with law. As often quoted, a judge, like Caesar's wife, must be
above suspicion.”

22. Point No.16: Provisions of IPC section 166, 219, 409 etc. of IPC are attracted
against CJI D. Y. Chandrachud for acting contrary to law and misusing the
public money, time and machinery of Supreme Court for unauthorized
purposes.

23. Point No.17: Law laid down by the Supreme Court in R.R. Parekh v. High
Court of Gujarat, (2016) 14 SCC 1, that the Judges passing orders in wanton
breach of mandates of the rule and law is itself a proof that the Judge is actuated
with corrupt motive. No further proof is required & is an act of unbecoming
of a judge.

23.1 That in R.R. Parekh (2016) 14 SCC 1 (Supra) ruled as under.

“A Judge passing an order against provisions of law in order to
help a party is said to have been actuated by an oblique motive
or corrupt practice - breach of the governing principles of law
or procedure by a Judge is indicative of judicial officer has
been actuated by an oblique motive or corrupt practice - No
direct evidence is necessary - A charge of misconduct against a
Judge has to be established on a preponderance of probabilities
- The Appellant had absolutely no convincing explanation for
this course of conduct - Punishment of compulsory
retirement directed.
A wanton breach of the governing principles of law or procedure
by a Judge is indicative of judicial officer has been actuated by
an oblique motive or corrupt practice. In the absence of a cogent

105
 explanation to the contrary, it is for the disciplinary authority to
determine whether a pattern has emerged on the basis of which
an inference that the judicial officer was actuated by extraneous
considerations can be drawn - It is not the correctness of the
verdict but the conduct of the officer which is in question- . There
is on the one hand a genuine public interest in protecting fearless
and honest officers of the district judiciary from motivated
criticism and attack. Equally there is a genuine public interest in
holding a person who is guilty of wrong doing responsible for his
or his actions. Neither aspect of public interest can be ignored.
Both are vital to the preservation of the integrity of the
administration of justice - A charge of misconduct against a
Judge has to be established on a preponderance of probabilities
- No reasons appear from the record of the judgment, for We
have duly perused the judgments rendered by the Appellant and
find merit in the finding of the High Court that the Appellant paid
no heed whatsoever to the provisions of Section 135 under which
the sentence of imprisonment shall not be less than three years,
in the absence of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to
be recorded in the judgment of the Court. Most significant is the
fact that the Appellant imposed a sentence in the case of each
accused in such a manner that after the order was passed no
accused would remain in jail any longer. Two of the accused
were handed down sentences of five months and three months in
such a manner that after taking account of the set-off of the
period during which they had remained as under-trial prisoners,
they would be released from jail. The Appellant had absolutely
no convincing explanation for this course of conduct.”

23.2 In Raman Lal vs. State of Rajasthan 2001 CRI. L. J. 800, it is ruled as under;

106
 “Conspiracy – I.P.C. Sec. 120 (B) – Apex court made it clear that
an inference of conspiracy has to be drawn on the basis of
circumstantial evidence only because it becomes difficult to get
direct evidence on such issue – The offence can only be proved
largely from the inference drawn from acts or illegal ommission
committed by them in furtherance of a common design – Once
such a conspiracy is proved, act of one conspirator becomes the
act of the others – A Co-conspirator who joins subsequently and
commits overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy must also be
held liable – Proceeding against accused cannot be quashed.”

23.3 Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of CBI VS Bhupendra Champaklal
Dalal 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 140 it is ruled as under;
“CHARGE FOR THE OFFENCE OF CRIMINAL BREACH
OF TRUST :-
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Narain Poply Vs.
Central Bureau of Investigation, AIR 2003 SC 2748, wherein
the Hon'ble Apex Court has, at length, dealt with the charge of
criminal conspiracy, in the backdrop of the similar allegations,
in a case arising out of the decision of this Court in the matter of
Harshad Mehta and others. While dealing with the essential
ingredients of the offence of criminal conspiracy, punishable u/s.
120 B IPC, the Hon'ble Court was, in paragraph No.349 of its
Judgment, pleased to hold that, "349. Privacy and secrecy are
more characteristics of a conspiracy, than of a loud discussion
in an elevated place open to public view. Direct evidence in
proof of a conspiracy is seldom available, offence of conspiracy
can be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence. It is
not always possible to give affirmative evidence about the date
of the formation of the criminal conspiracy, about the persons
who took part in the formation of the conspiracy, about the

107
 object, which the objectors set before themselves as the object of
conspiracy, and about the manner in which the object of
conspiracy is to be carried out, all this is necessarily a matter of
inference."
[Emphasis Supplied]
177. This Court can also place reliance on another landmark
decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of
Maharashtra Vs. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659, wherein
the Hon'ble Apex Court was pleased to observe as follows :-
"24. The aforesaid decisions, weighty as they are, lead us
to conclude that to establish a charge of conspiracy
knowledge about indulgence in either an illegal act or a
legal act by illegal means is necessary. In some cases,
intent of unlawful use being made of the goods or services
in question may be inferred from the knowledge itself. This
apart, the prosecution has not to establish that a
particular unlawful use was intended, so long as the goods
or service in question could not be put to any lawful use.
Finally, when the ultimate offence consists of a chain of
actions, it would not be necessary for the prosecution to
establish, to bring home the charge of conspiracy, that
each of the conspirators had the knowledge of what the
collaborator would do, so long as it is known that the
collaborator would put the goods or service to an unlawful
use." [See State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan, (2000) 8 SCC
203, SCC p. 212, para 14]"." [Emphasis Supplied]
178. While dealing with the offence of criminal conspiracy in
respect of the financial frauds, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Ram Narain Poply (supra), in paragraph No.344, was
pleased to observe that,

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 "344. .................... The law making conspiracy a crime, is
designed to curb immoderate power to do mischief, which
is gained by a combination of the means. The
encouragement and support which co-conspirators give to
one another rendering enterprises possible which, if left to
individual effort, would have been impossible, furnish the
ground for visiting conspirators and abettors with condign
punishment. The conspiracy is held to be continued and
renewed as to all its members wherever and whenever any
member of the conspiracy acts in furtherance of the
common design."
[Emphasis Supplied]
179. In the context of Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, it
was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court, in paragraph No.348, that,
the expression "in furtherance to their common intention"
in Section 10 is very comprehensive and appears to have been
designedly used to give it a wider scope than the words "in
furtherance of" used in the English Law : with the result anything
said, done or written by co- conspirator after the conspiracy was
formed, will be evidence against the other before he entered the
field of conspiracy or after he left it. Anything said, done or
written is a relevant fact only.

186. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further quoted with approval
in paragraph No.101, the observations made in the case of State
(NCT of Delhi) Vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, (2005) 11 SCC
600, wherein it was held that, "The cumulative effect of the
proved circumstances should be taken into account in
determining the guilt of the accused rather than adopting an
isolated approach to each of the circumstances."

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 24.Point No.18: Law settled by Supreme Court & High Court that it is duty of
every citizen under Article 51 (A) of the Constitution to expose the malpractices
in Judicial Institution and warning that such voice cannot be silenced by
misusing contempt jurisdiction.

24.1. That in Aniruddha Bahal v. State, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 3365 It is ruled as
under;
“DUTY OF A CITIZEN UNDER ARTICLE 51A(H) IS TO
DEVELOP A SPIRIT OF INQUIRY AND REFORMS
- Constitution of India mandates citizens to act as agent
provocateurs to bring out and expose and uproot the corruption
- it is a fundamental right of citizens of this country to have a
clean incorruptible judiciary, legislature, executive and other
organs and in order to achieve this fundamental right, every
citizen has a corresponding duty to expose corruption wherever
he finds it, whenever he finds it and to expose it if possible with
proof so that even if the State machinery does not act and does
not take action against the corrupt people when time comes
people are able to take action

Chanakaya in his famous work 'Arthshastra' advised and

suggested that honesty of even judges should be periodically
tested by the agent provocateurs. I consider that the duties
prescribed by the Constitution of India for the citizens of this
country do permit citizens to act as agent provocateurs to bring
out and expose and uproot the corruption

I consider that one of the noble ideals of our national struggle

for freedom was to have an independent and corruption free
India. The other duties assigned to the citizen by the Constitution
is to uphold and protect the sovereignty, unity and integrity of

110
 India andI consider that sovereignty, unity and integrity of this
countrycannot be protected and safeguarded if the corruption is
not removed from this country. - I consider that a country
cannot be defended only by taking a gun and going to border
at the time of war. The country is to bedefended day in and day
out by being vigil and alert to the needs and requirements of
the country and to bring forth the corruption at higher level.
The duty under Article 51A(h) is to develop a spirit of inquiry
and reforms. The duty of a citizen under Article 51A(j) is to
strive towards excellence in all spheres so that the national
constantly rises to higher level of endeavour and achievements
I consider that it is built-in duties that every citizen must strive
for a corruption free society and must expose the corruption
whenever it comes to his or her knowledge and try to remove
corruption at all levels more so at higher levels of management
of the State.
9. I consider that it is a fundamental right of citizens of this
country to have a clean incorruptible judiciary, legislature,
executive and other organs and in order to achieve this
fundamental right, every citizen has a corresponding duty to
expose corruption wherever he finds it, whenever he finds it and
to expose it if possible with proof so that even if the State
machinery does not act and does not take action against the
corrupt people when time comes people are able to take action
either by rejecting them as their representatives or by compelling
the State by public awareness to take action against them.”
24.2. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Prakash Chand (1998)1 SCC 1, it is ruled as under;
“Erosion of credibility of the Judiciary, in the public mind, for
whatever reasons, is the greatest threat to the independence of the
Judiciary. It must be remembered that IT IS THE DUTY OF EVERY
MEMBER OF THE LEGAL FRATERNITY TO ENSURE THAT

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 THE IMAGE OF THE JUDICIARY IS NOT TARNISHED AND
ITS RESPECTABILITY ERODED. … Judicial authoritarianism is
what the proceedings in the instant case smack of. It cannot be
permitted under any guise. … It needs no emphasis to say that all
actions of a Judge must be Judicious in character. Erosion of the
credibility of the judiciary, in the public mind, for whatever reasons,
the is the greatest threat to the independence of the Judiciary. Eternal
vigilance by the Judges to guard against any such latent internal
danger is, therefore, necessary, lest we “suffer from self-inflicted
mortal wounds”. We must remember that the Constitution does not give
unlimited powers to anyone including the Judge of all levels. The
societal perception of Judges as being detached and impartial referees
is the greatest strength of the Judiciary and every member of the
Judiciary must ensure that this perception does not receive a setback
consciously or unconsciously. The authenticity of the Judicial process
rests on public confidence and public confidence rests on the legitimacy
of the judicial process. Sources of legitimacy are in the impersonal
application by the Judge of recognized objective principles which owe
their existence to a system as distinguished from subjective moods,
predilections, emotions and prejudices.”

24.3. That Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Indirect Tax Practitioners
Association Vs. R.K. Jain (2010) 8 SCC 281, had ruled that it is duty of every
citizen to expose the malpractice even on judicial side and any obstruction in such
duty should be saddled with cost. It is further ruled that when the association has not
even suggested that what has been mentioned in the publication is incorrect or that
the respondent has presented a distorted version of the facts, there is no warrant for
discarding the respondent's assertion that whatever he has written is based on true
facts. The external whistleblowers report misconduct on outside persons or entities.
In these cases, depending on the information's severity and nature, whistleblowers
may report the misconduct to lawyers, the media, law enforcement or watchdog

112
 agencies, or other local, state, or federal agencies. Such person can appropriately be
described as a whistleblower for the system who has tried to highlight the
malfunctioning of an important institution established for dealing with cases and
there is no reason to silence such person by invoking the provisions of the Act. The
attempt by the Association to silence the voice of such person is highly condemned.
The Association is a body of professionals who represent the cause of their clients.
They are expected to be vigilant and interested in transparent functioning of judicial
institution. However, instead of doing that, they have come forward to denounce the
editorial and in the process misled the Attorney General of India . Attempt of
Association to silence the voice of person performing his duty under Art. 51 (A) h
of the Constitution is condemned and Association is saddled with cost of
Rs.2,00,000/-, of which Rs.1,00,000/- shall be deposited with the Supreme Court
Legal Services Committee and Rs.1,00,000/- shall be paid to the said whistleblower.
Supreme Court said;
“ We are sorry to observe that a professional body like the petitioner
has chosen wrong side of the law.”
It is ruled as under;

“25…Voltaire expressed a democrat's faith when he

told, anadversary in arguments : "I do not agree with
a word you say, but I will defend to the death your right
to say it". Champions of human freedom of thought and
expression throughout the ages, have realised that
intellectual paralysiscreeps over a society which denies,
in however subtle a form, due freedom of thought and
expression to its members.

Since, the petitioner has not even suggested that what has been
mentioned in the editorial is incorrect or that the respondent
has presented a distorted version of the facts, there is no
warrant for discarding the respondent's assertion that whatever
he has written is based on true facts and the sole object of

113
 writing the editorial was to enable the concerned authorities to
take corrective/remedial measures.

23. At this juncture, it will be apposite to notice the growing

acceptance of the phenomenon of whistleblower. A
whistleblower is a person who raises a concern about
wrongdoing occurring in an organization or body of people.
Usually this person would be from that same organization. The
revealed misconduct may be classified in many ways; for
example, a violation of a law, rule, regulation and/or a direct
threat to public interest, such as fraud, health/safety violations
and corruption. Whistleblowers may make their allegations
internally (for example, to other people within the accused
organization) or externally (to regulators, law enforcement
agencies, to the media or to groups concerned with the issues).
Most whistleblowers are internal whistleblowers, who report
misconduct on a fellow employee or superior within their
company. One of the most interesting questions with respect to
internal whistleblowers is why and under what circumstances
people will either act on the spot to stop illegal and otherwise
unacceptable behavior or report it. There is some reason to
believe that people are more likely to take action with respect to
unacceptable behavior, within an organization, if there are
complaint systems that offer not just options dictated by the
planning and controlling organization, but a choice of options
for individuals, including an option that offers near absolute
confidentiality. However, external whistleblowers report
misconduct on outside persons or entities. In these cases,
depending on the information's severity and nature,
whistleblowers may report the misconduct to lawyers, the
media, law enforcement or watchdog agencies, or other local,

114
 state, or federal agencies. In our view, a person like the
respondent can appropriately be described as a whistleblower
for the system who has tried to highlight the malfunctioning of
an important institution established for dealing with cases
involving revenue of the State and there is no reason to silence
such person by invoking Articles 129 or 215 of the Constitution
or the provisions of the Act.

21. […]By writing the editorial which must have caused

embarrassment to functionaries of the Central Government and
CESTAT and even some members of the petitioner-Association
but that cannot be dubbed as an attempt to scandalize CESTAT
as a body or interfere with the administration of justice. What the
respondent projected was nothing but true state of the
functioning of CESTAT on administrative side and to some extent
on judicial side. By doing so, he had merely discharged the
constitutional duty of a citizen enshrined in Article 51A(h). It is
not the petitioner's case that the facts narrated in the editorial
regarding transfer and posting of the members of CESTAT are
incorrect or that the respondent had highlighted the same with
an oblique motive or that the orders passed by Karnataka and
Kerala High Courts to which reference has been made in the
editorial were reversed by this Court. Therefore, it is not possible
to record a finding that by writing the editorial in question, the
respondent has tried to scandalize the functioning of CESTAT or
made an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice.

24. We agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that
this petition lacks bonafide and is an abuse of the process of the
Court. The petitioner is a body of professionals who represent
the cause of their clients before CESTAT and may be other
Tribunals and authorities. They are expected to be vigilant and

115
 interested in transparent functioning of CESTAT. However,
instead of doing that, they have come forward to denounce the
editorial and in the process misled the Attorney General of
India in giving consent by suppressing the factum of
appointment of Inquiry Committee by the President, CESTAT.
We are sorry to observe that a professional body like the
petitioner has chosen wrong side of the law.

25. In the result, the petition is dismissed. For filing a frivolous

petition, the petitioner is saddled with cost of Rs.2,00,000/-, of
which Rs.1,00,000/- shall be deposited with the Supreme Court
Legal Services Committee and Rs.1,00,000/- shall be paid to the
respondent. ”

24.4. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manohar Lal v. Vinesh Anand reported in
2001 AIR SCW 1590 has held that, to prosecute the offender is a social need and
concept of locus standi is foreign to criminal jurisprudence. In para no. 5, it is
observed thus:-
“5. Before adverting to the matter in issue and the rival contentions
advanced one redeeming feature ought to be noticed here pertain to
Criminal jurisprudence : To pursue an offender in the event of
commission of an offence, is to sub-serve a social need Society cannot
afford to have a criminal escape his liability, since that would bring
about a state of social pollution, which is neither desired nor
warranted and this is irrespective of the concept of locus the doctrine
of locus-standi is totally foreign to criminal jurisprudence.”

24.5. In Indirect Tax Practitioners Association Vs. R.K. Jain, (2010) 8

SCC 281, it is ruled as under;
‘‘31. The word “scandalise” has not been defined in the Act. In
Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Edn., p. 1372, reference has been made

116
 to Eugene A. Jones, Manual of Equity Pleading and Practice 50-51,
wherein the word scandal has been described as under;

“Scandal consists in the allegation of anything

which is unbecoming the dignity of the court to hear,
or is contrary to decency or good manners, or which
charges some person with a crime not necessary to be
shown in the cause, to which may be added that any
unnecessary allegation, bearing cruelly upon the moral
character of an individual, is also scandalous. The matter
alleged, however, must be not only offensive, but also
irrelevant to the cause, for however offensive it be, if it is
pertinent and material to the cause the party has a right
to plead it. It may often be necessary to charge false
representations, fraud and immorality, and the pleading
will not be open to the objection of scandal, if the facts
justify the charge.”

(emphasis in original)
32. In Aiyer's Law Lexicon, 2nd Edn., p. 1727, reference has been
made to Millington v. Loring [(1880) 6 QBD 190: 50 LJQB 214 (CA)]
wherein it was held:
“A pleading is said to be ‘scandalous’ if it alleges
anything unbecoming the dignity of the court to hear or is
contrary to good manners or which charges a crime
immaterial to the issue. But the statement of a scandalous
fact that is material to the issue is not a scandalous
pleading.”
37. Although the petitioner has tried to project the editorial as a piece
of writing intended to demean Cestat as an institution and scandalise
its functioning but we do not find anything in it which can be described
as an attempt to lower the authority of Cestat or ridicule it in the eyes

117
 of the public. Rather the object of the editorial was to highlight the
irregularities in the appointment, posting and transfer of the members
of Cestat and instances of the abuse of the quasi-judicial powers. What
was incorporated in the editorial was nothing except the facts relating
to manipulative transfer and posting of some members of Cestat and
substance of the orders passed by the particular Bench of Cestat, which
were set aside by the High Courts of Karnataka and Kerala. Even this
Court was constrained to take cognizance of the unusual order passed
by Cestat of which Shri T.K. Jayaraman was a member whereby the
appeal of the assessee was decided on merits even though the Tribunal
was required to examine the question of limitation only. By writing the
editorial which must have caused embarrassment to functionaries of
the Central Government and Cestat and even some members of the
petitioner Association but that cannot be dubbed as an attempt to
scandalise Cestat as a body or interfere with the administration of
justice. What the respondent projected was nothing but true state of
the functioning of Cestat on the administrative side and to some
extent on the judicial side. By doing so, he had merely discharged the
constitutional duty of a citizen enshrined in Article 51-A(h).
38. It is not the petitioner's case that the facts narrated in the editorial
regarding transfer and posting of the members of Cestat are incorrect
or that the respondent had highlighted the same with an oblique motive
or that the orders passed by the Karnataka and Kerala High Courts to
which reference has been made in the editorial were reversed by this
Court. Therefore, it is not possible to record a finding that by writing
the editorial in question, the respondent has tried to scandalise the
functioning of Cestat or made an attempt to interfere with the
administration of justice.
39. The matter deserves to be examined from another angle. The
substituted Section 13 represents an important legislative recognition
of one of the fundamentals of our value system i.e. truth. The amended

118
 section enables the court to permit justification by truth as a valid
defence in any contempt proceeding if it is satisfied that such defence
is in public interest and the request for invoking the defence is bona
fide. In our view, if a speech or article, editorial, etc. contains
something which appears to be contemptuous and this Court or the
High Court is called upon to initiate proceedings under the Act and
Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution, the truth should ordinarily be
allowed as a defence unless the Court finds that it is only a camouflage
to escape the consequences of deliberate or malicious attempt to
scandalise the court or is an interference with the administration of
justice. Since, the petitioner has not even suggested that what has been
mentioned in the editorial is incorrect or that the respondent has
presented a distorted version of the facts, there is no warrant for
discarding the respondent's assertion that whatever he has written is
based on true facts and the sole object of writing the editorial was to
enable the authorities concerned to take corrective/remedial measures.
40. At this juncture, it will be apposite to notice the growing acceptance
of the phenomenon of whistleblower. A whistleblower is a person who
raises a concern about the wrongdoing occurring in an organisation or
body of people. Usually this person would be from that same
organisation. The revealed misconduct may be classified in many ways;
for example, a violation of a law, rule, regulation and/or a direct threat
to public interest, such as fraud, health/safety violations and
corruption. Whistleblowers may make their allegations internally (for
example, to other people within the accused organisation) or externally
(to regulators, law enforcement agencies, to the media or to groups
concerned with the issues). Most whistleblowers are internal
whistleblowers, who report misconduct on a fellow employee or a
superior within their company.
41. One of the most interesting questions with respect to internal
whistleblowers is why and under what circumstances people will either

119
 act on the spot to stop illegal and otherwise unacceptable behaviour or
report it. There is some reason to believe that people are more likely to
take action with respect to unacceptable behaviour, within an
organisation, if there are complaint systems that offer not just options
dictated by the planning and controlling organisation, but a choice of
options for individuals, including an option that offers near absolute
confidentiality. However, external whistleblowers report misconduct
on outside persons or entities. In these cases, depending on the
information's severity and nature, whistleblowers may report the
misconduct to lawyers, the media, law enforcement or watchdog
agencies, or other local, State, or federal agencies.
42. In our view, a person like the respondent can appropriately be
described as a whistleblower for the system who has tried to highlight
the malfunctioning of an important institution established for dealing
with cases involving revenue of the State and there is no reason to
silence such a person by invoking Articles 129 or 215 of the
Constitution or the provisions of the Act.
43. We agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that this
petition lacks bona fides and is an abuse of the process of the court.
The petitioner is a body of professionals who represent the cause of
their clients before Cestat and may be other tribunals and authorities.
They are expected to be vigilant and interested in transparent
functioning of Cestat. However, instead of doing that, they have come
forward to denounce the editorial and in the process misled the
Attorney General of India in giving consent by suppressing the factum
of appointment of the Inquiry Committee by the President, Cestat. We
are sorry to observe that a professional body like the petitioner has
chosen the wrong side of the law.
44. In the result, the petition is dismissed. For filing a frivolous petition,
the petitioner is saddled with costs of Rs. 2,00,000, of which Rs.

120
 1,00,000 shall be deposited with the Supreme Court Legal Services
Committee and Rs. 1,00,000 shall be paid to the respondent.”
24.6. Constitution Bench in the case of Subramanian Swamy v. Arun Shourie,
(2014) 12 SCC 344, had uphold the law laid down in R.K. Jain’s case (supra)
It is ruled as under;
“12. In Wills [Nationwide News (Pty) Ltd. v. Wills, (1992) 177 CLR 1
(Aust)] the High Court of Australia suggested that truth could be a
defence if the comment was also for the public benefit. It said, “… The
revelation of truth—at all events when its revelation is for the public
benefit—and the making of a fair criticism based on fact do not amount
to a contempt of court though the truth revealed or the criticism made
is such as to deprive the court or Judge of public confidence…”

24.7. Constitution Bench in Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy Vs. State of Madras

AIR 1952 SC 149, it is ruled as under;
“12. [Scandalous News published against a Judge] If the
allegations were true it would be to the benefit of the public to
bring these matters in to light”
24.8. In Rama Surat Singh Vs. Shiv Kumar Pandey 1969 SCC OnLine All
226, it is ruled as under;
“Contempt of Courts Act (32 of 1952), S.3- Complaint
against Judge alleging corrupt practices and malfides - Is no
contempt - The contempt is not available as a cloak for
judicial authorities to cover up their inefficiency and
corruption or to stifle criticism made in good faith against
such officers. - Vindication of prestige is not the object of
Contempt.
If a particular judge or magistrate is corrupt and sells justice,
then a bona fide complaint to higher authorities to take
necessary action against the delinquent judicial officer is
also an act to maintain the purity of the

121
 administration of justice, for it is unthinkable that a judicial
officer should be allowed to take bribes and if anybody
makes a grievance of the matter to the higher authorities,he
should be hauled up for contempt of Court. Contempt law
does not mean that if a Magistrate or judge acts dishonestly
or is corrupt then too, he is beyond the reach of law and can
take protection under the threat of prosecuting those who
bona fide raise their voice against him.
In the light of the law as laid down by the Supreme Court
and interpreted by this Court these opposite parties should
not be prosecuted for contempt, particularly when the
allegations of corruption made by the first opposite party
against the applicant are still under investigation and it
cannot be said, at this stage that they were either untrue or
mala fide.
The Committee of International Jurists 1959 Lord Shaw Cross
at page 15 desired a more progressive view when he stated :-
"…….Clearly if someone wishes in good faith to make
a charge of partiality or corruption against Judge he
ought to have the opportunity of making it : .......
We consider that he should be able to do so by letter to
the Lord Chancellor or to his Member of Parliament
without fear of punishment and would deplore the use
of the law of contempt to prevent him from doing so.
The charges could then be considered either
administratively or in the House of Commons or in the
House of Lords.”

24.9. Constitution Bench in Baradkanta Mishra Case (1974)1 SCC 374 ruled as
under;

122
 “71. As early as 1892, the Privy Council in The matter of a
Special Reference from the Bahama Islands [1893 AC 138, 149]
had to upset a sentence of indefinite imprisonment imposed by
the Chief Justice of Bahamas on one Mr Moseley for two “letters
to the editor” full of snub and sarcasm about Yelverton, Esq.,
Chief Justice. In these there was cynical reference to the Chief
Justice's incompetence and imprudence, couched in stinging
satire. The Judicial Committee held:
“(a) That the letter signed ‘Colonist’ in The Nassau
Guardian though it might have been made the subject of
proceedings for libel was not, in the circumstances, calculated
to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice or the due
administration of the law, and therefore did not constitute a
contempt of Court.”
91. The Court being the guardian of people's rights, it has been
held repeatedly that the contempt jurisdiction should be
exercised “with scrupulous care and only when the case is clear
and beyond reasonable doubt”, [vide R. v. Gray.]’’
86. Similarly, in Rex v. B.S. Nayyar [AIR 1950 All 549, 554] the
Court considered a representation made to the Premier of the
State about a judicial officer and also to the President of the All
India Congress Committee. ………………... A pregnant
observation made by the Court deserves mention:
“It would indeed be extraordinary if the law should provide
a remedy — the conduct of even a member of the highest
Judicial Tribunal in the exercise of his judicial office may be
the subject of enquiry with a view to see whether he is fit to
continue to hold that office — and yet no one should be able to
initiate proceedings for an enquiry by a complaint to the
appropriate authority by reason of a fear of being punished for
contempt, and I can find no justification for this view.”

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 49. Scandalization of the Court is a species of contempt and
may take several forms. A common form is the vilification of the
Judge. When proceedings in contempt are taken for such
vilification the question which the Court has to ask is whether
the vilification is of the Judge as a judge. (See Queen v. Gray),
[(1900) 2 QB 36, 40] or it is the vilification of the Judge as an
individual. If the latter the Judge is left to his private remedies
and the Court has no power to commit for contempt. If the
former, the Court will proceed to exercise the jurisdiction with
scrupulous care and in cases which are clear and beyond
reasonable doubt. Secondly, the Court will have also to
consider the degree of harm caused as affecting administration
of justice and, if it is slight and beneath notice, Courts will not
punish for contempt. This salutary practice is adopted by
Section 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The
jurisdiction is not intended to uphold the personal dignity of the
Judges. That must rest on surer foundations. Judges rely on
their conduct itself to be its own vindication.
93. To wind up, the key word is “justice”, not “judge”; the
keynote thought is unobstructed public justice, not the self-
defence of a judge; the corner-stone of the contempt law is the
accommodation of two constitutional values — the right of free
speech and the right to independent justice. The ignition of
contempt action should be substantial and mala fide interference
with fearless judicial action, not fair comment or trivial
reflections on the judicial process and personnel.”

24.10. That in Sahara India Real Estate Corpn. Ltd. v. SEBI, (2012) 10 SCC
603 the constitution Bench noted the arguments of Sr. Adv. Shanti Bhushan as
under;

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 “7. Even in the case of Judges, it has been held by the US
Supreme Court that even the concern for the reputation of courts,
did not justify punishment for criminal contempt even if the
statement contained half truths and misinformation. The reason
given for this view was that if a critic of official conduct was
required to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions, it
would lead to "self censorship", which would deter not only false
speech but also true speech. The critic would thereby be deterred
from voicing his criticism even though he believed that the facts
were true and even in fact they were true because he may
entertain a doubt whether he could prove in court that the facts
were true or may like to avoid the expense of proving them to be
true. This would be grossly detrimental to the great cause for
which freedom of speech was guaranteed. So the rule recognised
was that the critic must not make any statement with actual
malice that is with the knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
8. In this connection, the following extracts from the decision of
the US Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. L.B. Sullivan!
are extremely instructive: (L Ed pp. 700-06)
"The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public
questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been
settled by our decisions. The constitutional safeguard, we have
said, 'was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people'. ... The maintenance of the opportunity for free political
discussion to the end that the Government may be responsive to
the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful
means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic,
is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.'... 'It is a
prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not

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 always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions,' ... and
this opportunity is to be afforded for 'vigorous advocacy' no less
than abstract
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief,
sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may
seem the rankest error to his neighbour. To persuade others to
his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts
to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are,
prominent in church or State, and even to false statement. But
the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history,
that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these
liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion
and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy."
That erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that
must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
'breathing space' that they 'need... to survive,' NAACP v. Button,
L Ed 2d p. 418, was also recognised by the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in Sweeney v. Patterson.
Edgerton, J. spoke for a unanimous court which affirmed the
dismissal of a Congressman's libel suit based upon a newspaper
article charging him with anti-Semitism in opposing a judicial
appointment. He said:

Cases which impose liability for erroneous reports of the

political conduct of officials reflect the obsolete doctrine that the
governed must not criticise their Governors. The interest of the
public here outweighs the interest of the appellant or any other
individual. The protection of the public requires not merely
discussion, but information. Political conduct and views which
some respectable people approve, and others condemn, are
constantly imputed to Congressmen. Errors of fact, particularly

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 in regard to a man's mental states and processes, are inevitable.
Whatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of
free debate.'
Injury to official reputation affords no more warrant for
repressing speech that would otherwise be free than does factual
error. Where judicial officers are involved, this Court has held
that concern for the dignity and reputation of the courts does
not justify the punishment as criminal contempt of criticism of
the Judge or his decision. This is true even though the
utterance contains half-truths' and 'misinformation".. Such
repression can be justified, if at all, only by a clear and present
danger of the obstruction of justice. If Judges are to be treated
as men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate,'... surely
the same must be true of other government officials, such as
elected city commissioners. Criticism of their official conduct
does not lose its constitutional protection merely because it is
effective criticism and hence diminishes their official
reputations.
9. This celebrated decision of the US Supreme Court has been
referred to by this Court in R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N.6, SCC
in paras 16 to 23, and several important passages from the US
judgment have also been extracted. It has also been pointed out
in this judgment that the principle of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan¹ was carried forward by the English courts particularly
by the House of Lords in the "Spy catcher case".”

24.11. In State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639, it is ruled
as under;
“69. The courts are not to perpetuate an illegality, rather it is
the duty of the courts to rectify mistakes. While dealing with a

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 similar issue, this Court in Hotel Balaji v. State of A.P. [1993
Supp (4) SCC 536 : AIR 1993 SC 1048] observed as under : (SCC
p. 551, para 12)
“12. … ‘2. … To perpetuate an error is no heroism. To
rectify it is the compulsion of judicial conscience. In this we
derive comfort and strength from the wise and inspiring
words of Justice Bronson in Pierce v. Delameter [1 NY 3
(1847)] , AMY at p. 18:
“a Judge ought to be wise enough to know that he is
fallible and therefore ever ready to learn : great and
honest enough to discard all mere pride of opinion and
follow truth wherever it may lead : and courageous
enough to acknowledge his errors.”’ [Ed. : As observed
in Distributors (Baroda) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1986)
1 SCC 43, p. 46, para 2.] ”
(See also Nirmal Jeet Kaur v. State of M.P. [(2004) 7 SCC 558 :
2004 SCC (Cri) 1989] and Mayuram Subramanian
Srinivasan v. CBI [(2006) 5 SCC 752 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 83 :
AIR 2006 SC 2449] .)
70. In Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, In re [(1995) 3
SCC 619] this Court observed : (SCC p. 629, para 10)
“10. … None is free from errors, and the judiciary does
not claim infallibility. It is truly said that a judge who has not
committed a mistake is yet to be born. Our legal system in fact
acknowledges the fallibility of the courts and provides for
both internal and external checks to correct the errors. The
law, the jurisprudence and the precedents, the open public
hearings, reasoned judgments, appeals, revisions, references
and reviews constitute the internal checks while objective
critiques, debates and discussions of judgments outside the

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 courts, and legislative correctives provide the external
checks. Together, they go a long way to ensure judicial
accountability. The law thus provides procedure to correct
judicial errors.”

24.12. In Ambard’s case (1936) 38 Bom LR 681 (PC) it is ruled that the Judges
should respect Criticism.
It is ruled as under;:-
“Whether the authority and position of an individual Judge or the due
administration of justice is concerned, no wrong is committed by any
member of the public who exercises the ordinary right of criticizing
in good faith in private or public the public act done in the seat of
justice. The path of criticism is a public way: the wrong headed are
permitted to err therein: provided that members of the public abstain
from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the
administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of
criticism and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the
administration of justice, they are immune. Justice is not a cloistered
virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the security and respectful even
though outspoken comments of ordinary man.”

25. Point No.19: Provisions of Bar Council Rules & Law settled by the Supreme
Court in R. Muthukrishnan v. Union of India, 2014 SCC OnLine Mad 737, that
the advocates should not be servile and sycophant and it is their duty to file
complaint against corrupt Judges and to protect honest Judges.

25.1. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of O. P. Sharma Vs. High Court of
Punjab & Haryana (2011) 6 SCC 86 has ruled that,
“As per section-I of Chapter-II, part VI title “standards
of professional conduct and etiquette” of the Bar
Council India rules specifies the duties of an advocate

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 that ‘he shall not be servile and whenever there is proper
ground for serious complaint against Judicial officer, it
shall be his right and duty to submit his grievance to
proper authorities.”

25.2. In R. Muthukrishnan Vs. Registrar General, High Court of Madras (2019)

16 SCC 407, it is ruled that, any act or tendency to make the Bar too sycophant and
fearful is not conducive for fair administration of Justice. It is ruled as under;
“86. […] It is duty of the lawyer to lodge appropriate
complaint to the concerned authorities as observed by
this Court in Vinay Chandra Mishra (supra), which right
cannot be totally curtailed.
[…]
Making the Bar too sycophant and fearful which would
not be conducive for fair administration of justice. Fair
criticism of judgment and its analysis is permissible.
Lawyers' fearlessness in court, independence,
uprightness, honesty, equality are the virtues which
cannot be sacrificed.
19.[…] It is the duty of the Bar to protect honest judges
and not to ruin their reputation and at the same time to
ensure that corrupt Judges are not spared
16 […] THERE CANNOT BE EXISTENCE OF A
STRONG JUDICIAL SYSTEM WITHOUT AN
INDEPENDENT BAR.
20. The Bar is an integral part of the judicial
administration. In order to ensure that judiciary remains
an effective tool, it is absolutely necessary that Bar and
Bench maintain dignity and decorum of each other. The
mutual reverence is absolutely necessary. The Judges are
to be respected by the Bar, they have in-turn equally to

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 respect the Bar, observance of mutual dignity, decorum
of both is necessary and above all they have to maintain
self-respect too.
23. Independent Bar and independent Bench form the
backbone of the democracy. In order to preserve the very
independence, the observance of constitutional values,
mutual reverence and self-respect are absolutely
necessary. Bar and Bench are complementary to each
other. Without active cooperation of the Bar and the
Bench, it is not possible to preserve the Rule of law and
its dignity. Equal and even-handed justice is the hallmark
of the judicial system. The protection of the basic
structure of the Constitution and of rights is possible by
the firmness of Bar and Bench and by proper discharge
of their duties and responsibilities. We cannot live in a
jungle raj.

86. […] Making the Bar too sycophant and fearful

which would not be conducive for fair administration of
justice. Fair criticism of judgment and its analysis is
permissible. Lawyers' fearlessness in court,
independence, uprightness, honesty, equality are the
virtues which cannot be sacrificed. It is duty of the lawyer
to lodge appropriate complaint to the concerned
authorities as observed by this Court in Vinay Chandra
Mishra (supra), which right cannot be totally curtailed.”

26. Point No.20: Instances showing tendency of some Judges of the Supreme
Court to pass unlawful orders and misuse the machinery of Supreme Court to
save accused brother Judges.
This is a ground for urgently creating constitutional courts or Courts of Appeal.

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 26.1. That a two Judge Bench of Shri Justice K. Ramaswammy & Shri G.B.
Pattnaik had passed an order of unlawful conviction of an IPS officer with 4 Police
personal. (Afzal v. State of Haryana, (1996) 7 SCC 397)

26.2 Three Judge Bench of the S.C. in M. S. Ahlawat Vs. State of Haryana (2000)
1 SCC 278 had set aside said conviction on the ground that it is without jurisdiction
and authority of law. [Corum: Dr. A. S. Anand, C. J., S. Rajendra Babu & R. C.
Lahoti]

26.3 That passing such conviction and putting a person in jail for 1 year without any
jurisdiction is an offence u/s. 220 r/w 34 of IPC on the part of Justice Sh. K.
Ramaswamy & Shri G.B. Pattnaik ]
26.4 But the three Judge Bench in order to save said accused Judges from serious
punishment have made unlawful observations in the order as under ,

“To perpetuate an error is no virtue but to correct it is a

compulsion of judicial conscience. We, therefore, unhesitatingly set
aside the conviction of the petitioner for the offence under Section
193 IPC. …..

For the aforesaid reasons, the order made in Writ Petitions (Criminal)
Nos. 356-357 of 1996 convicting the petitioner under Section
393 1PC is recalled and set aside. It is made clear that this order will
not enable the petitioner to claim any compensation or initiate any
proceedings in any court arising out of his conviction under Section
193 IPC except to use the same in any proceeding initiated against the
petitioner departmentally regarding his services. ”

26.5 This is a clear case of offence under section 218, 201 etc. of IPC by Justices
Shri. Dr. A.S. Ananad (then CJI), Shri. Rajendra Babu & Shri. R.C. Lahoti.

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 26.6 Similar is the case of Adv. Vijay Kurle, Adv. Nilesh Ojha & Rashid Khan
Pathan where in order to save Accused Judges R.F Nariman & Vineet Saran, the
Bench of Justice Deepak Gupta & Aniruddha Bose have relied upon overruled
judgement, created forged record, stolen documents from Supreme Court record and
convicted the Complainants by giving at least 10 overruled finding in one
judgement.

However, the said dishonesty is ex-facie proved from the written reply given by the
office of Hon’ble CJI and also from the subsequent judgment in Re: Prashant
Bhushan’s Case where larger Bench had ruled that the cognizance of any Suo-moto
case has to be only as per directions issued under P.N.Duda’s case.
The details of misuse of power, forgery, perjury destroying record of the case by
Judges Shri. Deepak Gupta & Anirudhha Bose is given in following paras.

26.7. That Justice R.F. Nariman & Vineet Saran on 12.03.2019 gave a judgement
laying down a ratio that the Supreme Court is having power to dispense with the
procedure under section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. and straightaway
pronounce the sentence against any advocate without framing charges, issuing show
cause notice, hearing the advocates and without allowing him to prove his defence.

26.8. The abovesaid ratio is per-per-incuriam and nullity as it is against the binding
precedents laid down in;
(i) Dr. L.P. Mishra Vs. State (1998) 7 SCC 379(3J)
(ii) Pallav Sheth v. Custodian, (2001) 5 SCC 763(3J)
(iii) Re: Pollard LR 2 PC 106
(iv) Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. Chief Justice S. Teja Singh, 1954 SCR 454 :
AIR 1954 SC 186
(v) Ramesh Maharaj Vs. The Attorney General(1978) 2 WLR 902
(vi) Baradkanta Mishra Vs. Registrar Of Orissa High Court (1974) 1
SCC 374
(vii) J.R. Parashar Vs. Prashant Bhushan AIR 2001 SC 3395

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 (viii) R.S. Sherawat Vs. Rajeev Malhotra 2018 SCC Online SC 1347
(IX) Re: C.S. Karnan (2017) 7 SCC 1.
(X) Sahara India Real Estate Corpn. Ltd. v. SEBI, (2012) 10 SCC 603

26.9. It was also an attack on ‘Independence of Bar’

Therefore Adv. Vijay Kurle, State President of Indian Bar Association filed a
case before Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for taking appropriate action against
Justice R.F. Nariman & Vineet Saran.

26.10. Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman asked his agents Adv. Milind Sathe & Mr.
Kaiwan Kalyaniwalla to give letter to the Chief Justice of India against Adv. Vijay
Kurle.

26.11. On 23.03.2019 Adv. Milind Sathe gave the letter to the Hon’ble Chief
Justice of India to take action against Adv. Vijay Kurle & Ors.

26.12. Hon’ble Chief Justice of India (Shri. Ranjan Gogoi) within two days i.e.
on 25.03.2019 rejected the prayers of the said agents Adv. Milind Sathe & Mr.
Kaiwan Kalyaniwalla and closed their grievances.

26.13. Therefore, Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman & Justice Vineet Saran hatched
new conspiracy to save themselves and they thereby took cognizance of contempt
of courts against the complainant in their own case by saying that filing case against
them is contempt. This was against the law and procedure in P.N. Duda Vs. P. Shiv
Shankar (1988)3 SCC 167 and laid down by the larger and constitution benches in
the cases of Bal Thackrey v. Harish Pimpalkhute, (2005) 1 SCC 254, Campaign
for Judicial Accountability and reforms vs Union of India (2018) 1 SCC 196.
The ratio in the above judgement is very clear that the suo-moto cognizance of
contempt on any letter can be taken only by the Chief Justice of India and no other
judge can take the cognizance at his own. If such action is taken then such
cognizance and the proceedings including the sentence thereupon stands vitiated.

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 26.14. The abovesaid unlawful cognizance came for hearing before the bench of
Justice Deepak Gupta and Justice Aniruddha Bose. Both of the said judges were
made available with all documents and case laws, but in order to save the accused
judges Shri. Rohinton Fali Nariman and Shri. Vineet Saran, the bench of Justice
Deepak Gupta had acted in utter disregard and defiance of the binding precedents of
the Constitution benches, ignored the documentary proofs of Office of Chief Justice
of India and straightaway convicted two Advocates & a Human Rights Activist.
Following are the ex-facie proofs of malafides of Justices Deepak Gupta &
Aniruddha Bose.

26.15. Misuse of power by the three judge bench in Leila David v. State of
Maharashtra, (2009) 4 SCC 578 in contravention of binding precedents to save
accused judge Arijit Pasayat.

26.15.1 That one lady thrown chappal at Justice Arijit Pasayat in open court and
Justice Arijit Pasayat straightaway sentenced her under contempt for ____ Months
imprisonment.[ Leila David v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 4 SCC 578]

26.15.2. However in the same judgment, the brother Judge Justice A.K. Ganguly
acted judiciously and fairly and in his dissenting opinion had relied upon the three
judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Dr. L.P. Mishra Vs. State (1998) 7 SCC 379
and other binding precedents to point out that even if offence is gravest court can not
pass sentence without following procedure laid down in section 14 of the contempt
of Court Act, 1971.

26.15.3. The said case was referred to the larger Benches of three Judges Sh.
Altamas Kabir, Sh. G.S. Singhvi and Sh. H.L. Dattu.

26.15.4. The three Judge Bench in Leila David (6) v. State of Maharashtra, (2009)
10 SCC 337 , had passed an order by deliberately disregarding the precedents

135
 laid down in the case of Dr. L.P. Mishra Vs. State (1998) 7 SCC 379 and uphold
the unlawful order of accused Judge Arijit Pasayat.

26.15.5. This was done with only intention to save the accused Judge Arijit Pasayat
from charges under section 166 , 219, 220 etc. of IPC .

26.16. Misuse of power by the Bench of Justice K.M. Joseph and Justice Hrishikesh
Roy in Mehmood Pracha v. Central Administrative Tribunal, 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 1029 to save Justices R.F. Nariman & Vineet Saran.

26.16.1. That the Bench of Justice K.M. Joseph set aside the conviction of Adv.
Mehmood Pracha not following procedure. But deliberately did not mentioned the
binding precedents in Dr. L.P. Mishra Vs. state of U.P. (1998) 7 SCC 379, Pallav
Sheth v. Custodian, (2001) 7 SCC 549 etc.

On the other hand made unlawful observations that the Supreme Court can dispense
with procedure .

Such observation were in fact made with ulterior motive that said ratio could not
used in Supreme Court by the Victim advocates against Justice (retd.) Rohinton
Nariman & it was done to save accused Judges.
The said unlawful observations reads that Supreme Court can dispense procedure
under contempt of Courts Act by virtue of power under Art. 142 of the Constitution.

27. Point No.21:- The Case laws Regarding applicability of section 218, 409 of
IPC to the judicial officers.
27.1. Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Anverkhan Mahamad khan Vs.
Emperor 1921 SCC OnLine Bom 126 it is ruled as under;
“Indian Penal Code Section 218 – The gist of the section is the
stiffening of truth and the perversion of the course of justice in cases
where an offence has been committed.

136
 It is not necessary even to prove the intention to screen any particular
person. It is sufficient that he know it to be likely that justice will not be
executed and that someone will escape from punishment.”

The section is concerned with bringing erring public servants to book for falsifying
the public records in their charge. The essence of the offence under section 218 is
intent to cause loss or injury to any public or person or thereby save any person from
legal punishment or save any property from forfeiture or any other charge, Biraja
Prosad Rao Vs. Nagendra Nath, (1985) 1 Crimes 446 (Ori.)
Actual commission of offence not necessary:-
The actual guilt or innocence of the alleged offender is immaterial if the accused
believes him guilty and intends to screen him, Hurdut Surma, (1967) 8 WR (Cr.)
68.
The question is not whether the accused will be able to accomplish the object he had
in view, but whether he made the entries in question with the intention to cause or
knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause loss and injury. The fact that the
accused conceived a foolish plan of injuring in retaliation of the disgrace inflicted
upon him by his arrest is no ground for exculpating him from the
office, Narapareddi Seshareddi, In Re, AIR 1938 Mad 595.

Where the accused increased the marks of particular persons for pecuniary benefits
during the course of preparing final record for appointment as physical education
teacher, it was held that the offence alleged is clearly made out, Rakesh Kumar
Chhabra Vs. State of H.P., 2012 CrLJ 354(HP)

For the purpose of an offence punishable under section 218 the actual guilt or
otherwise of the offender alleged as sought to be screened from punishment is
immaterial. It is quite sufficient that the commission of a congnizable offence has
been brought to the notice of the accused officially and that in order to screen the
offender that accused prepared the record in a manner which he knew to be
incorrect, Moti Ram Vs. Emperor, AIR 1925 Lah 461.

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 The Supreme Court has held that if a police officer has made a false entry in his
diary and manipulated other records with a view to save the accused was
subsequently acquitted of the offence cannot make it any the less an offence under
this section, Maulud Ahmad Vs. State of U.P.,(1964) 2 CrLJ 71 (SC).
Where it was proved that the accused’s intention in making a false report was to
stave off the discovery of the previous fraud and save himself or the actual
perpetrator of that fraud from legal punishment, it was held that he was guilty of this
offence, Girdhari Lal,(1886) 8 All 633.
In Emperor vs Bimla Charan (1913) 35 ALL 361 where it is ruled as under;
“I.P.C. Section 406, 408 :- Criminal breach of trust--Water works
inspector misappropriating water.
The applicant was a member of the municipality at Cawnpore and one
of his duties was to supervise and check the distribution of water from
the municipal water-works. In other words he had dominion over the
water belonging to the municipality. He deliberately misappropriated
that water for his own use and for the use of his tenants, for which he
paid no tax and about which he laid no information to his employers
nor obtained permission for tapping the main. In thus misappropriating
municipal water the applicant clearly committed the offence described
in Section 408 of the Indian Penal Code.
Accused rightly convicted.
It may be that the offences of applicant may be punishable under the
Water-Works Act also, but that does not vitiate the conviction under
sections, 406 and 408 of the Indian Penal Code.”

28. Point No.22: Case laws on Judicial dishonesty and unbecoming of Judges.
28.1. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the catena of decisions had ruled that the Judge of
any court including Supreme Court is deemed to have the knowledge of binding
precedents of the Supreme Court if and the Judge is passing order against the binding
precedents or if he fails to protect the rights of the citizen as laid down by the
Supreme Court then such Judges will be liable to be punished under contempt and it

138
 will be no defence for the said Judge to say that he was not aware of the said binding
precedents. Passing order by not referring judgment relied by the party’s, advocates
etc.
Is also held to be contempt/ judicial adventurism/ fraud on power/ perversity.
Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Court have punished the judges under contempt
and also directed the departmental action. Supreme Court made it clear that even
misinterpretation of Supreme Court judgment will also make such judge laible for
contempt. Supreme Court made it clear that the judge/s has to apply the correct law
even if it is not raised by a party. Judges cannot act like what pleases the prince has
the force of law. They are bound by the precedents. There is no such thing of
unlimited discretion to judges of any court. Even if two judge bench of Supreme
Court refused to follow the direction/ law laid down by three judge bench then such
two judges of Supreme Court will be guilty under contempt. The Petition of
contempt against any judge including Supreme Court judge can be filed by any
citizen and court is bound to examine it. Non- exercise of arbitrary power is first
requirement of rules of law. Supreme Court even under Article 142 of the
Constitution cannot by-pass the statutory provision. [Re: M.P. Dwivedi, (1996) 4
SCC 152, Superintendent of Central Excise and others Vs. Somabhai
Ranchhodhbhai Patel (2001) 5 SCC 65, Smt. Prabha Sharma V. Sunil Goyal (2017)
11 SCC 77, Re: C. S. Karnan (2017) 7 SCC 1, State Vs. Rabindranath Singh,
(2010) 6 SCC 417, P.M (2010), Legrand Pvt. Ltd. 2007 (6) Mh.LJ 146,
Baradakanta Misra v. Bhimsen Dixit, (1973) 1 SCC 446, Garware Polyster Ltd. Vs.
State 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 2223, New Delhi Municipal Council v. Prominent
Hotels Limited, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 11910, Priya Gupta Vs. Additional
Secretary (2013) 11 SCC 404, Subrata Roy Sahara vs. UOI (2014) 8 SCC 470,
Shrirang Yadavrao Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 144 (1),
Sailajanand Pande Vs. Suresh Chandra Gupta AIR 1969 (Pat) 194, D.K. Basu Vs.
State of W.B. (1997) 1 SCC 416, Muzaffar Husain Vs State of Uttar Pradesh 2022
SCC OnLine SC 567, Vijay Shekhar v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 666, Medical
Council of India Vs G.C.R.G. Memorial Trust & Others (2018) 12 SCC 564, State
Bank of Travancore and Ors. Vs. Mathew K.C. 2018 (3) SCC 85, Supreme Court

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 Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409, Nidhi Keim vs State of Madhya
Pradesh (2017) 4 SCC 1, M/s. Spencer and Co. Ltd. and another vs. M/s.
Vishwadarshan Distributors Pvt. Ltd (1995) 1 SCC 259, Umesh Chandra Vs. State
of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. MANU/UP/1412/2005, State of Maharashtra, through
Shri. S.S. Nirkhee District and Sessions Judge, Wardha Vs. R.A. Khan, Chief
Judicial Magistrate, 1993 Cr. L.J. 816 (Bom) (DB), Food Corporation of India vs
Jagdish Bahira (2017) 8 SCC 670].

28.2. That Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of in Vijay Shekhar Vs. Union of
India (2004) 4 SCC 666, had ruled that, if any Judge passes an order by ignoring
material on record & considering extraneous materials then such Judge will be guilty
of fraud - on - power.

28.3. In Muzaffar Husain Vs State of Uttar Pradesh 2022 SCC OnLine SC 567
it is ruled as under;
“15. In our opinion, showing undue favour to a party under the
guise of passing judicial orders is the worst kind of judicial
dishonesty and misconduct. The extraneous consideration for
showing favour need not always be a monetary consideration.
It is often said that “the public servants are like fish in the water,
none can say when and how a fish drank the water”. A judge
must decide the case on the basis of the facts on record and the
law applicable to the case. If he decides a case for extraneous
reasons, then he is not performing his duties in accordance
with law. As often quoted, a judge, like Caesar's wife, must be
above suspicion.”

28.4. In Shrirang Yadavrao Waghmare Vs State of Maharashtra 2019 SCC

OnLine SC 1237 it is ruled as under;
“5. The first and foremost quality required in a Judge is integrity.
The need of integrity in the judiciary is much higher than in other

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 institutions. The judiciary is an institution whose foundations are
based on honesty and integrity. It is, therefore, necessary that
judicial officers should possess the sterling quality of integrity.
This Court in Tarak Singh v. Jyoti Basu [Tarak Singh v. Jyoti
Basu, (2005) 1 SCC 201] held as follows: (SCC p. 203)
“Integrity is the hallmark of judicial discipline, apart from
others. It is high time the judiciary took utmost care to see
that the temple of justice does not crack from inside, which
will lead to a catastrophe in the justice-delivery system
resulting in the failure of public confidence in the system. It
must be remembered that woodpeckers inside pose a larger
threat than the storm outside.”
6 [Ed.: Para 6 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No.
F.3/Ed.B.J./105/2019 dated 6-11-2019.] . The behaviour of a
Judge has to be of an exacting standard, both inside and outside
the court. This Court in Daya Shankar v. High Court of
Allahabad [Daya Shankar v. High Court of Allahabad, (1987) 3
SCC 1 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 132] held thus: (SCC p. 1)
“Judicial officers cannot have two standards, one in the
court and another outside the court. They must have only one
standard of rectitude, honesty and integrity. They cannot act
even remotely unworthy of the office they occupy.”
7. Judges are also public servants. A Judge should always
remember that he is there to serve the public. A Judge is judged
not only by his quality of judgments but also by the quality and
purity of his character. Impeccable integrity should be reflected
both in public and personal life of a Judge. One who stands in
judgments over others should be incorruptible. That is the high
standard which is expected of Judges.

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 8. Judges must remember that they are not merely employees but
hold high public office. In R.C. Chandel v. High Court of
M.P. [R.C. Chandel v. High Court of M.P., (2012) 8 SCC 58 :
(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 343 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 782 : (2012) 2 SCC
(L&S) 469] , this Court held that the standard of conduct
expected of a Judge is much higher than that of an ordinary
person. The following observations of this Court are relevant:
(SCC p. 70, para 29)
“29. Judicial service is not an ordinary government
service and the Judges are not employees as such. Judges
hold the public office; their function is one of the essential
functions of the State. In discharge of their functions and
duties, the Judges represent the State. The office that a Judge
holds is an office of public trust. A Judge must be a person of
impeccable integrity and unimpeachable independence. He
must be honest to the core with high moral values. When a
litigant enters the courtroom, he must feel secured that the
Judge before whom his matter has come, would deliver justice
impartially and uninfluenced by any consideration. The
standard of conduct expected of a Judge is much higher than
an ordinary man. This is no excuse that since the standards
in the society have fallen, the Judges who are drawn from the
society cannot be expected to have high standards and ethical
firmness required of a Judge. A Judge, like Caesar's wife,
must be above suspicion. The credibility of the judicial system
is dependent upon the Judges who man it. For a democracy
to thrive and the rule of law to survive, justice system and the
judicial process have to be strong and every Judge must
discharge his judicial functions with integrity, impartiality
and intellectual honesty.”

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 9. There can be no manner of doubt that a Judge must decide the
case only on the basis of the facts on record and the law
applicable to the case. If a Judge decides a case for any
extraneous reasons then he is not performing his duty in
accordance with law.
10. In our view the word “gratification” does not only mean
monetary gratification. Gratification can be of various types. It
can be gratification of money, gratification of power,
gratification of lust etc., etc. In this case the officer decided the
cases because of his proximate relationship with a lady lawyer
and not because the law required him to do so. This is also
gratification of a different kind.
12. Hence, we find no merit in the appeal, which is accordingly,
dismissed.
11. The judicial officer concerned did not live up to the
expectations of integrity, behaviour and probity expected of him.
His conduct is as such that no leniency can be shown and he
cannot be visited with a lesser punishment.”
28.5. In Govind Mehta Vs. The State of Bihar AIR 1971 SC 1708 it is ruled as
under;
“Criminal P.C. (5 of 1898), S.195- I.P.C. 167, 465, 466, 471 -
A first class Magistrate was alleged to have made some
interpolation in the order sheet of a case in after sanction under
section 197 by the state Govt. a complaint was filed in a
competent court of Magistrate against the said first class
Magistrate. Action is legal The jurisdiction of the court, under
S. 190, to take cognisance of a complaint, filed by the Public
Prosecutor against a magistrate under S. 197, for offences
under Ss. 167, 465, 466 and 471. Penal Code, for having
interpolated in the order sheet, after an application for transfer
of a case has been made, certain orders, containing the remark

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 that the District magistrate was interfering with the proceeding
in the case before him. in order to make it appear that they had
been passed much earlier, and sending the order sheet as the
true report in the case to the court dealing with the transfer
application, is not barred by S. 195 or S. 476 of the
Code. (Para 18)

The offences under Ss. 167 and 466 are not covered by S. 194 (1)
(b) or (c) and therefore the power of the Court to take cognisance
of the offences is not barred on the ground of absence of a
complaint against the accused by the court to which he was
subordinate. (Para 15)

Even as regards the offence under S. 471, Penal Code the

jurisdiction of the magistrate to take cognisance is not barred by
S. 195 (1) (c) as although that offence is taken in by that section
its essential requirement that the offence should have been
committed by a party to any proceeding in court is not satisfied.
The accused had no personal interest in the transfer applications
and the mere fact that certain allegations had been made against
the accused in the transfer application would not make him party
to the proceeding before the court dealing with that
application. (Para 17)

Section 476 of the Code also would not apply to the case in view
of the fact that cls (b) and (c) of S.195 (1) do not apply. The fact
that an application was also made by the complainant for filing
a complaint under Sections 471 and 467, Penal Code would not
attract the application of the section when the court gave its
finding that the accused had committed forgery and interpolation
in the order sheets only for the purpose of transferring the case

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 and merely sent its order to the Government for taking action
against the accused if it desired. (Para 18)

It is true that S. 465, Penal Code was mentioned in the complaint

and since it deals with punishment for offence under S. 463,
Penal Code which is taken in by Cl. (c) of S. 195 (1) of the Code,
it may also be said to be covered by that clause. Even then that
clause cannot operate in the case because the offence cannot be
said to have been committed by the accused "as a party to any
proceeding " in a court . (Para 19)

28.6. In K. Ram Reddy Vs. State of A.P. 1997 SCC OnLine AP 1210, it is ruled
as under;
“7. Though the report of the learned District and Sessions Judge
at Karimnagar dated 30-10-1996 is a confidential one, as it was
specifically referred to in the ground, and the appellants are
aware of it and a copy of it is available in the records and bias
is alleged against the learned District and Sessions Judge,
Karimnagar, it is necessary to notice the said report. The
relevant portions of it are as follows:
“4. My discreet enquiries revealed that the concerned
Section Clerks, the I and II Additional District Judges, their
Additional Public Prosecutors and the Advocates all have
joined hands in tampering with these bail applications and
the Registers.
5. It is necessary to state here how the bail applications
are registered, how they are made over to the Additional
District Courts, and how the relevant entries of these
applications are made in the concerned Registers.

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 15. The Modus Operandi is - the Advocate files a bail
application falsely mentioning that the offence alleged
against the accused is one under Section 307 I.P.C. After it
was made over to any of the Additional District Courts, the
figures ‘307’ are altered to 302 in the bail application/s
wherever ‘the figures 307’ occur. In case of offence u/s. 376
IPC, they file bail applications initially mentioning that the
offence committed in one u/s. 354 IPC. After it was made over
to any of the Addl. District Courts, the figures ‘354’ are
altered to ‘376’ in the application/s.
16. The second mode of getting their bail applications
made over to the Addl. District Courts is - they falsely give a
number of an earlier bail application, which was made over
to the disposed of by any of the Addl. District Judges.
19. By adopting these malpractices they used to get their
bail applications made over to any of the Addl. District
Courts of their choice, for reasons best known to them. The
earlier bail application referred to by them in the bail
application will have nothing to do with the present
application. The staff of the Principal District Court will not
have any opportunity to check the earlier application, as the
earlier bail application mentioned by them would be in that
Court only.
20. The concerned Advocates, Clerks of the Addl. District
Courts, Additional Public Prosecutors joined hands in this
racket and the role of the two Addl. District Judges cannot be
ruled out in this murky affair.
21. The malpractices that were resorted to are apparent
on the face of the records, and they are detailed below.”
(emphasis supplied)

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 8. Thereafter, the learned District and Sessions Judge,
Karimnagar dealt with specific cases.
9. What is apparent from this report dated 30-10-1996 is that
certain devious methods were being adopted in the Sessions
Court at Karimnagar by certain advocates with the connivance
of the staff of the I and II Additional Sessions Courts and the
Additional Public Prosecutors attached to those courts, and that
the two Additional Sessions Judges at the relevant time were also
parties aware of those devious methods employed mostly in
matters relating to bails - C.C. No. 29 of 1997 relates to a land
acquisition O.P. These devious methods polluted the streams of
justice and necessitated urgent correctives and action in the
interests of administration of justice. The occurrences were not
isolated instances totally unconnected with one another there
was a pattern in the modus operandi adopted, with minor
variations. I am of the view that this background is very relevant
in considering the contentions raised in these matters.
64. It is not necessary to minutely examine the facts mentioned
in the orders and complaints in each of the cases and express
views because the enquiry into the offences is still to be
conducted and it would not be proper to pre-judge or prejudice
the cases, as observed by the Supreme Court in MS Sheriffs
case, AIR 1954 SC 397. The learned Counsel also did not take
me through the facts of each of these cases. The facts mentioned
in Calendar Case Nos. 1 and 4 of 1997 illustrate the methods
employed in all these matters. In Calendar Case No. 1 of 1997
(in respect of which Criminal Appeal Nos. 275, 307 and 337 of
1997 have been preferred) the facts are stated as follows:
“Firstly, Sri S. Chandra Mohan, Advocate filed an
application for bail on behalf of the accused No. 4 Sanjeev on

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 22-4-1996 in Cr.M.P. No. 884/96 and it was dismissed as not
pressed on 30-4-1996 by the complainant.
Again A1 (Appellant in Crl.A. No. 337/97) filed another
bail application on 7-5-1996 in Cr.M.P. No. 961/96 on behalf
of the same Sanjeev falsely mentioning the Cr. No. as 91/96
of Karimnagar, II Town u/s. 307 IPC and it was also
dismissed by the complaint as not pressed on 9-5-1996.
Again A2 (did not prefer appeal) filed another bail
application in Cr.M.P. No. 992/96 on 13-5-1996 on behalf of
the same Sanjeev (A4 falsely mentioning the Cr. No. as 96/96
of Karimnagar, II Town u/s. 307 IPC and it was also
dismissed as no representation on 14-5-1996 by the
complainant.
On or about 21-5-1996 all the accused and the I-Addl.
Sessions Judge who was in charge of the II-Addl. Sessions
Judge entered into criminal conspiracy to do all sorts of
illegal acts in order to get their bail application made over to
any of the Addl. Sessions Courts with a view to get favourable
orders.
In pursuance of their criminal conspiracy suppressing the
earlier three bail applications, which were dismissed by the
complainant earlier, A1 once again filed another bail
application on behalf of A4 in Cr.M.P. No. 1086/96 on 21-5-
1996 mentioning the Cr. No. as 91/96 falsely, instead of Cr.
No. 97/96 u/s. 302. IPC, knowing that the said information is
false and the earlier three bail application were dismissed,
giving the impression that the bail application is filed for the
first time.

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 A4, the petitioner in Cr.M.P. No. 1086/96 is not an
accused either in Cr. No. 91/96 or Cr. No. 96/96 of
Karimnagar, II-Town Police Station.
A1 and A2 who are advocates, are legally bound to state
the truth, but they intentionally gave false information in a
judicial proceeding viz., bail application, knowing fully well-
that their statements are false and they thereby fabricated
false evidence in a judicial proceeding. The I-Addl. Sessions
Judge who was in charge of the District and Sessions Court
and a party to the conspiracy, made over the bail application
to the II-Addl. Sessions Court on 22-5-1996 and it was
received by A3 (appellant in Crl. A. No. 307/97) on 23-5-
1996.
Entries in respect of the Cr.M.P. No. 1086/96 are made in
the Cr.M.P. Register and Diary of the Prl. Dist. Court and
also in the Cr.M.P. Register of the II-Addl. Sessions Court as
Cr. No. 91/96 in which originally the bail application was
filed:
In pursuance of their criminal conspiracy after the bail
application was made over to the II-Addl. Sessions Court,
A3 who was the custodian of the bail application got the
application tampered with by altering the Cr. No. from
91/96 to 97/96 in the cause title, on the office note, on the
docket sheet, memo of appearance and in the process
payment form, which are records of the court, without
lawful authority and thus fabricated and forged the
records of a Court of Justice illegally with intent to commit
fraud in relation to a judicial proceeding to make it appear
that the application was originally filed in Cr. No. 97/96.

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 In pursuance of their conspiracy A5 and the I-Addl.
Session Judge, who was in charge of the II-Addl. Sessions
Judge helped A1, A2 and A4 by willfully, and intentionally
ignoring the dismissal of earlier three bail applications and
the alterations in the bail application and the said Judge
granted bail to A4 on 27-5-1996. By using as genuine a
tampered and forged bail application the petitioner (A4) has
been granted bail and thus benefited.”
66. In Calendar Case No. 13 of 1997 (in respect of which
Criminal Appeal Nos. 385 and 394 of 1997 have been preferred)
the facts alleged are as follows:
“on or about 7-8-1996 all the accused and Sri P.
Thirupathi Reddy, the then II-Addl. Sessions Judge entered
into a criminal conspiracy to do all sorts of illegal acts in
order to get their bail application made over to the II-Addl.
Sessions Court with a view to get favourable orders.
In pursuance of their criminal conspiracy A1 (1st
appellant in Crl. Appeal No. 394/97) filed an application for
bail in Cr.M.P. No. 1714/96 on 7-8-1996 on behalf of A4 and
A5 furnishing a false Cr. No. 25/90 of P.S. Yellareddipet and
a false Cr.M.P. No. 1626/96, stating that was filed by their
co-accused and were granted bail by the II-Addl. Sessions
Court.
A1 and A5 have nothing to do with Cr. No. 25/90 u/ss.
148,-307T/IV.-149 IPC and Section 25/(1)(a) of Arms Act,
1959 of P.S. Yellareddipet and also with Cr.M.P. No.
1626/96.
Only with a view to get their bail application made over to
the II-Addl. Sessions Court, A1 and A2 (2nd appellant in Crl.
Appeal No. 394/97), for the benefit of their client, A4 and A5,

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 furnished a false Cr. No. and Cr.M.P. No. in the bail
application. A1 and A2, who are advocates, are legally bound
to state the truth, but they intentionally furnished false
information in the bail application, knowing fully well that
their statement is false and the accused thereby fabricated
false evidence in a judicial proceeding.
On account of the false statement made by the accused, the
complainant was misled to make over the bail application to
the II-Addl. Sessions Court for disposal.
After the bail application was made over to the II-Addl.
Sessions Court, in pursuance of their criminal conspiracy A2
filed an application Cr.M.P. No. 334/96 on 8-8-1996 u/s. 482
Cr.P.C. to amend the Cr. No. 25/90 to 12 of 1994 in the bail
application.
The then II-Addl. Sessions Judge and A3 (appellant in Crl.
Appeal No. 385/97) helped the other accused by willfully and
intentionally ignoring the false Cr.M.P. No. 1626/96, which
has no connection either with A4 and A5 or the Crime in
which they are involved. The II-Addl. Sessions Judge, who is
a party to the conspiracy, allowed the petition for amendment
on 13-8—1996 and granted bail to A4 and A5. The II-Addl.
Sessions Judge is being proceeded with departmentally and
is now under suspension.”

28.7. In State Of Maharashtra Vs. Kamlakar Nandram Bhawsar ALLMR (Crl)

2640 it is ruled as under;
“I.P.C. Sec. 193, 196, 466, 471, 474, r/w 09 – Criminal
Procedure code, 1978, Sec. 344 – Summary trail for
fabricating false evidence against Judicial Magistrate
,P.P., Police Officer, and others– Trial court acquitting
accused on basis of forged dying declaration not

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 produced by the prosecution – Trial Judge without
clarifying anywhere as to who produced the dying
declaration directly taking it on record – Held Acquittal
set aside – High Court issued show cause notice to
Advocate for accused, Additional public Prosecutor for
State, PSI, Special, Judicial Magistrate calling
explanation as to why they should not be tried summarily
for giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence.
Issue show cause notice to Mr. B.J. Abhyankar, Advocate
for the accused, Mr. B.A. Pawar, Additional Public
Prosecutor, Dr. Narayan Manohar Pawar, Civil Hospital,
Nashik, PSI Ramesh Manohar Patil, Yeola Police Station,
and Mr. RS. Baviskar, Special Judicial Magistrate,
Nashik, why action under Section 344 of the Criminal
Procedure Code should not be taken against them and they
should not be summarily tried for knowingly and willfully
giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence with an
intention that such evidence should be used in Trial Court,
or in the alternative why they should not be prosecuted for
offences under Sections 193, 196, 466, 471 and 474 read
with 109 of Indian Penal Code. Show cause notice
returnable on 12.12.2002 before the regular Division
Bench.
All the papers of the Trial Court and the papers produced
by the Medical Officer of Nashik should be kept in seal in
the custody of the Registrar of this Court.”

28.8. In Jagat Jagdishchandra Patel Vs. State of Gujrat 2016 SCC OnLine Guj
4517, it is ruled as under;

“Two Judges caught in sting opration – demanding bribe to give

favourable verdict – F.I.R. registered – Two accused Judges

152
 arrested – Police did not file charge-sheet within time – Accused
Judges got bail – complainant filed writ for transferring
inverstigation.

Held, the police did not collected evidence, phone details –

CDRS – considering apparent lapses on the part of police, High
Court transferred investigation through Anti-Corruption
Bureau.

A Constitution Bench of this Court in Subramanian Swamy v.

Director, Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. (2014) 8 SCC
682, reiterated that corruption is an enemy of the nation and
tracking down corrupt public servants and punishing such
persons is a necessary mandate of the Act 1988.

Not only this has a demoralising bearing on those who are

ethical, honest, upright and enterprising, it is visibly antithetical
to the quintessential spirit of the fundamental duty of every
citizen to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual
and collective activity to raise the nation to higher levels of
endeavour and achievement.

It encourages defiance of the rule of law and the propensities for

easy materialistic harvests, whereby the society's soul stands
defiled, devalued and denigrated.

Corruption is a vice of insatiable avarice for self-

aggrandizement by the unscrupulous, taking unfair advantage of
their power and authority and those in public office also, in
breach of the institutional norms, mostly backed by minatory
loyalists. Both the corrupt and the corrupter are indictable and
answerable to the society and the country as a whole. This is
more particularly in re the peoples' representatives in public life

153
 committed by the oath of the office to dedicate oneself to the
unqualified welfare of the laity, by faithfully and conscientiously
discharging their duties attached thereto in accordance with the
Constitution, free from fear or favour or affection or ill-will. A
self-serving conduct in defiance of such solemn undertaking in
infringement of the community's confidence reposed in them is
therefore a betrayal of the promise of allegiance to the
Constitution and a condemnable sacrilege. Not only such a
character is an anathema to the preambular promise of justice,
liberty, equality, fraternal dignity, unity and integrity of the
country, which expectantly ought to animate the life and spirit of
every citizen of this country, but also is an unpardonable
onslaught on the constitutional religion that forms the bedrock
of our democratic polity.

Both the Presiding Officers and two staff members were

suspended by the Gujarat High Court and a first information
report being I-C.R. No. 1 of 2015 came to be registered

The accused-judicial officers preferred Special Criminal

Application, seeking a writ of mandamus, which ultimately came
to be rejected by this Court on the ground that it was a large
scale scam. The Court further observed in its prima facie
conclusion that the officers have tarnished the image of the
judiciary and the facts of the case are gross and disturbing.

Both the said accused were arrested and produced before the
learned District and Sessions Judge. The regular bail
application preferred by them came to be rejected and they were
sent to the judicial custody. It is alleged that except the evidence
furnished by the petitioner, no fresh evidence came to be
collected by the respondent No. 2-Investigating Officer. The

154
 slipshod manner of investigation of the complaint led the
petitioner to approach the High Court.

It is the grievance of the petitioner that due to improper

investigation by an incompetent Police Officer, there are many
more accused who are roaming freely in the society and no
attempts have been made to arrest the seven advocates who were
a part of this corruption racket. It is also their say that in a zeal
to protect the erring officer, the remand of both the accused
persons has not been sought for. The reason of unaccounted
wealth received towards the illegal gratification has not been
pressed into service for seeking remand. The deliberate lapse on
the part of the respondent No. 2 has jeopardised the audio and
video proof which have been tendered. The hard disk which is a
preliminary evidence and the CD-a secondary evidence, have
been ignored. The charge sheet ought to have been filed within a
period of sixty days from the date of the arrest of the accused,
which since was not done, it resulted into their release as they
both have been given default bail. According to the petitioner, it
was the duty of the respondent as well as the Registrar
(Vigilance) to check the entire hard disk to find out other and
further corrupt practices by the accused persons. Therefore, it is
urged that the investigation be carried out by a person having
impeccable integrity.

Dealing firstly with the first issue of remand, it is not in dispute

that the remand of the accused who both are the judicial officers
and allegedly involved in corrupt practice has not been sought
for.

From the beginning it is the case of the complainant that the

conduct, which has been alleged in the complaint has brought

155
 disrepute to the investigation. It is also his say that huge amount
of illegal gratification had been demanded by both the judicial
officers in the pending matters and, therefore, to presume that
there was no material to seek remand, is found unpalatable. It is
an uncontroverted fact that the Vigilance Officer (VO-II), who
has filed his affidavit-in-reply, has retired during the pendency
of the investigation. While he continued to act as Investigating
Officer also, he could have conducted the investigation more
effectively and with scientific precision. To be complacent and/or
to presume anything while handling serious investigation cannot
be the answer to the requirements of law. It though may not be
said to be an attempt to save the accused, it surely is an act,
which would raise the eye-brows, particularly when the
investigation was at a very nascent stage against the judicial
officers. Recourse of the society against all kinds of injustice and
violation of law when is in the judiciary, all the more care would
be essential when judicial officers themselves are alleged of
demand of bribe for discharging their duties under the law. Not
that remand in every matter is a must to be sought. But, the stand
taken by the Investigating Officer to justify his stand leaves much
to be desired.

At the time of hearing of this petition, when a specific query was

raised as to why the charge sheet was not filed within the time
frame, non-receipt of report from the Forensic Science
Laboratory was shown to be one of the strongest grounds

Undoubtedly, in every criminal matter where the investigation is

to be completed and the charge sheet is to be laid either within
60 days or 90 days, the report of the Forensic Science
Laboratory does not necessarily form the part of the papers of
the charge sheet. The Criminal Manual also provides for

156
 submission of the Forensic Science Laboratory report if not
submitted with the charge sheet, at a belated stage.

It is not a sound reason put forth on the part of the Investigating

Officer that the pendency of the Forensic Science Laboratory
report had caused delay in filing the charge sheet.

Such time limit to place the charge sheet could not have gone
unnoticed and that ought not to have furnished a ground for
default bail when otherwise these officers were refused bail by
the competent Court.

Even when the CD did not reveal giving of illegal gratification,

but only demand, how could all other angles of this serious issues
be left to the guesswork. To say that after the Special Officer
(Vigilance) recorded the statement of the complainant and
collected some material, nothing remained to be collected, is the
version of the Investigating Officer wholly unpalatable. After a
thorough investigation, he would have a right to say so and the
Court if is not satisfied or the complainant finds it unacceptable,
he can request for further investigation under section 173(8) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. But, how could an Investigating
Officer presume from the tenor of the complaint or the CD sent
by the complainant about non-availability of the evidence.

To give only one example, it is unfathomable as to why the

Investigating Officer failed to call CDRs in this matter.

In every ordinary criminal matter also, collecting of CDRs is

found to be a very useful tool to prove whereabouts of parties
and also to link and resolve many unexplained links. CDRs are
held to be the effective tool by a Division Bench of this Court in
one of the appeals, by holding thus:

157
 "It would be apt to refer to certain vital details CDR, which
known as Call detail record as also Call Data record, available
on the internet [courtesy Wikipedia]. The CDR contains data
fields that describe a specific instance of telecommunication
transaction minus the content of that transaction. CDR contains
attributes, such as [a] calling party; [b] called party; [c] date
and time; [e] call duration; [f] billing phone number that is
charged for the call; [g] identification of the telephone
exchange; [h] a unique sequence number identifying the record;
[i] additional digits on the called number, used to route the call;
[j] result of the call ie., whether the same was connected or not;
[k] the route by which call left the exchange; [l] call type [ie.,
voice, SMS, etc.].

Call data records also serve a variety of functions. For telephone

service providers, they are critical to the production of revenue.
For law enforcement, CDRs provide a wealth of information that
can help to identify suspects, in that they can reveal details as to
an individual's relationships with associates, communication
and behavior patterns and even location data that can establish
the whereabouts of an individual during the entirety of the call.
For companies with PBX telephone systems, CDRs provide a
means of tracking long distance access, can monitor telephone
usage by department; including listing of incoming and outgoing
calls.

In a simpler language, it can be said that the technology can be

best put to use in the form of CDRs which contains data fields
describing various details, which also includes not only the
phone number of the subscriber originating the call and the
phone number receiving such call etc., but, the details with
regard to the individual's relationships with associates, the

158
 behavior patterns and the whereabouts of an individual during
the entirety of the call.

The whole purpose of CDR is not only to establish the number of

phone calls which may be a very strong circumstance to establish
their intimacy or behavioral conduct. Beyond that, such potential
evidence also can throw light on the location of the mobile phone
and in turn many a times, the position and whereabouts of the
person using them with the aid of mobile phone tracking and
phone positioning, location of mobile phone and its user is
feasible. As the mobile phone ordinarily communicates
wirelessly with the closest base station. In other words,
ordinarily, signal is made available to a mobile phone from the
nearest Mobile tower. In the event of any congestion or excessive
rush on such mobile tower, there is an inbuilt mechanism of
automatic shifting over to the next tower and if access is also not
feasible there, to the third available tower. This being largely a
scientific evidence it may have a material bearing on the issue,
and therefore, if such evidence is established scientifically before
the Court concerned, missing link can be provided which more
often than not get missed for want of availability of credible eye-
witnesses. We have noticed that in most of the matters these days,
scientific and technical evidence in the form of Call Data Record
is evident. However, its better and further use for the purpose of
revealing and establishing the truth is restricted by not
examining any witness nor bringing on record the situation of
the mobile towers. Such kind of evidence, more particularly in
case of circumstantial evidence will be extremely useful and may
not allow the truth to escape, as the entire thrust of every
criminal trial is to reach to the truth.”

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 25. With the nature of direct allegations of demand of illegal
gratification by the judicial officers for disposition of justice,
they would facilitate further investigation and also may help
establishing vital links. No single reason is given for not
collecting the CDRs during the course of investigation of crime
in question.

This Court has exercised the power to transfer investigation from

the State Police to the CBI in cases where such transfer is
considered necessary to discover the truth and to meet the ends
of justice or because of the complexity of the issues arising for
examination or where the case involves national or international
ramifications or where people holding high positions of power
and influence or political clout are involved.

The Apex Court in the said decision further observed that the
purpose of investigation is to reach to the truth in every
investigation. For reaching to the truth and to meet with the ends
of justice, the Court can exercise its powers to transfer the
investigation from the State Police to the Central Bureau of
Investigation. Such powers are to be exercised sparingly and
with utmost circumspection.

In Sanjiv Kumar v. State of Haryana and Others (2005) 5 SCC

517, where this Court has lauded the CBI as an independent
agency that is not only capable of but actually shows results:

CBI as a Central investigating agency enjoys independence and

confidence of the people. It can fix its priorities and programme
the progress of investigation suitably so as to see that any
inevitable delay does not prejudice the investigation of the
present case. They can think of acting fast for the purpose of
collecting such vital evidence, oral and documentary, which runs

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 the risk of being obliterated by lapse of time. The rest can afford
to wait for a while. We hope that the investigation would be
entrusted by the Director, CBI to an officer of unquestioned
independence and then monitored so as to reach a successful
conclusion; the truth is discovered and the guilty dragged into
the net of law. Little people of this country, have high hopes from
CBI, the prime investigating agency which works and gives
results. We hope and trust the sentinels in CBI would justify the
confidence of the people and this Court reposed in them.

Mere glance at these two documents also prima facie reveal

hollowness of the investigation in criminal matter and this Court
is further vindicated by these materials that the matter requires
consideration.

It is certainly a case where the investigation requires to be

conducted by a specialised agency which is well equipped with
manpower and other expertise.

Some of the aspects where the said officer Ms. Rupal Solanki,
Assistant Director, Anti-Corruption Bureau, needs to closely
look at and investigate are:

“(i) The collection of CDRs of the accused and all other persons
concerned with the crime in question.

(ii) Non-recordance of any statements of advocates and litigants

by the then Investigating Officer except those which had been
recorded by the Special Officer (Vigilance) at the time of
preliminary investigation.

(iii) Investigation concerning various allegations of demand of

illegal gratification by both the judicial officers and the details

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 which have been specified in the CD, as also reflected in the
imputation of charges for the departmental proceedings.

(iv) The issue of voice spectography in connection with the

collection of the voice sample in accordance with law.

(v) The examination of hard disk/CPU by the Forensic Science

Laboratory, which is in possession of the petitioner.

(vi) Investigation against all other persons who are allegedly

involved in abetting this alleged crime of unpardonable nature.

(vii) All other facets of investigation provided under the law,

including disproportionate collection of wealth which she finds
necessary to reach to the truth in the matter.”

29. Point No.23: Proofs of misuse of power by the Bench of Justice U. U. Lalit,
Ravindra Bhat and Bela Trivedi to save Justice Chandrachud in a Petition filed
by Shri. Mursalin Shaikh with ex- facie proofs of misconduct.

29.1 That Shri. Mursalin Shaikh have filed Petition running in 400 pages with 45
prayers requesting to stop the elevation of Justice Chandrachud as CJI. The said
Petition was heard by the Bench of Justice U.U. Lalit himself .

29.2. Actually Justice Lalit himself had recommended the name of Justice D.Y
Chnadrachud to the Hon’ble President of India therefore, he was disqualified to hear
the Petition.

29.3. Moreover, as per the law laid down by Seven Judges Bench in S. P. Gupta’s
case the Bench hearing the Petition could have summoned and called affidavit of the
then Chief Justice Shri. U.U. Lalit. Under these circumstances he was disqualified
to hear that case.

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 29.4. A Specific objection in writing was taken by his Cousel, but then also Justice
Lalit took the matter to himself and without allowing the Petitioner’s Counsel to
adjourn the case and argue in detail.

29.5. Justice Lalit straightaway took the matter and without giving any reason
dismissed the Petition and in a two line order said that it is misconceived. The video
recording of the said proceeding is ex-facie proof of the misuse of power by these
three Judges.

29.6 The objection of Justice Ravindra Bhat to the Counsel for Mursalin Shaikh in
not arguing on allegations of contempt committed by Justice Chandrachud was
infact against the binding precedent of Seven Judge Bench of Supreme Court in Re:
C.S. Karnan Case (2017) 7 SCC 1 which was part of the prayers. But three were
so in hurry that they wanted to dismiss the petition at any cost and this ex-facie shows
the misuse of power by the Judges with ulterior motives to save the brother Judges
and this is a ground for providing the Constitutional Courts and Courts of Appeal
against such cases and against such instances so that the confidence of common man
should instill in this institution and rule of law.

30. Point No.24: Jurisdiction of Hon’ble Supreme Court to take cognizance of

Contempt against a Judge of the Supreme Court and examine the allegations
on judicial side.

30.1. Section 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 reads thus;

16. Contempt by Judge, Magistrate or other person acting
judicially.—
(1) Subject to the provisions of any law for the time being in
force, a Judge, Magistrate or other person acting judicially shall
also be liable for contempt of his own court or of any other court
in the same manner as any other individual is liable and the
provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly.

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 —(1) Subject to the provisions of any law for the time being in
force, a Judge, Magistrate or other person acting judicially shall
also be liable for contempt of his own court or of any other court
in the same manner as any other individual is liable and the
provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly."
(2) Nothing in this section shall apply to any observations or
remarks made by a Judge, Magistrate or other person acting
judicially, regarding a subordinate court in an appeal or revision
pending before such Judge, Magistrate or other person against
the order or judgment of the subordinate court.”
30.2. In C.S. Karnan, In Re, (2017) 7 SCC 1 it is ruled as under;
“1. […….] The task at our hands is unpleasant. It concerns
actions of a Judge of a High Court. The instant proceedings
pertain to alleged actions of criminal contempt, committed by
Shri Justice C.S. Karnan. The initiation of the present
proceedings suo motu, is unfortunate. In case this Court has to
take the next step, leading to his conviction and sentencing, the
Court would have undoubtedly travelled into virgin territory.
This has never happened. This should never happen. But then, in
the process of administration of justice, the individual's
identity, is clearly inconsequential. This Court is tasked to
evaluate the merits of controversies placed before it, based on
the facts of the case. It is expected to record its conclusions,
without fear or favour, affection or ill will.
60. Faced with an unprecedented situation resulting from the
incessant questionable conduct of the contemnor perhaps made
the Chief Justice of India come to the conclusion that all the
abovementioned questions could better be examined by this
Court on the judicial side. We see no reason to doubt the
authority/jurisdiction of this Court to initiate the contempt
proceedings. Hypothetically speaking, if somebody were to

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 move this Court alleging that the activity of Justice Karnan
tantamounts to contempt of court and therefore appropriate
action be taken against him, this Court is bound to examine the
questions. It may have accepted or rejected the motion. But the
authority or jurisdiction of this Court to examine such a
petition, if made, cannot be in any doubt. Therefore, in our
opinion, the fact that the present contempt proceedings are
initiated suo motu by this Court makes no difference to its
maintainability. If only the contemnor appropriately participated
in the proceedings, all the abovementioned questions and
perhaps many more questions incidental to them could have been
properly examined and necessary conclusions could have been
recorded.”
30.3. In Baradakanta Mishra and Ors. Vs. Registrar of Orissa High Court
(1974) 1 SCC 374, it is ruled as under;
‘‘15. The conduct of the appellant in not following the
previous, decision of the High Court is calculated to create
confusion in the administration of law. It will undermine
respect for law laid down by the High Court and impair the
constitutional authority of the High Court. His conduct is
therefore comprehended by the principles underlying the law
of Contempt. The analogy of the inferior court's disobedience
to the specific order of a superior court also suggests that his
conduct falls within the purview of the law of Contempt. Just as
the disobedience to a specific order of the Court undermines the
authority and dignity of the court in a particular case,
similarly the deliberate and malafide conduct of not following
the law laid down in the previous decision undermines the
constitutional authority and respect of the High Court. Indeed,
while the former conduct has repercussions on an individual
case and on a limited number of persons, the latter conduct has

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 a much wider and more disastrous impact. It is calculated not
only to undermine the constitutional authority and respect of
the High Court, generally, but is also likely to subvert the Rule
of Law 'and engender harassing uncertainty and confusion in
the administration of law.’’

Also Relied on: New Delhi Municipal Council vs. M/s. Prominent Hotels
Limited 2015 SCC OnLine Del 11910

31. Point No.25: Right of the petitioner to have clean and incorruptible judicial
system and to have impartial, fair and judicious Judges and Chief Justice of
India.

31.1. In Aniruddha Bahal Vs. State 2010 (119) DRJ 102 it is ruled as under;

“Duty of a citizen under Article 51A(h) is to develop a spirit of

inquiry and reforms - it is a fundamental right of citizens of
this country to have a clean incorruptible judiciary, legislature,
executive and other organs and in order to achieve this
fundamental right, every citizen has a corresponding duty to
expose corruption wherever he finds it, whenever he finds it
and to expose it if possible with proof so that even if the State
machinery does not act and does not take action against the
corrupt people when time comes people are able to take action.

Chanakaya in his famous work 'Arthshastra' advised and

suggested that honesty of even judges should be periodically
tested by the agent provocateurs. I consider that the duties
prescribed by the Constitution of India for the citizens of this
country do permit citizens to act as agent provocateurs to bring
out and expose and uproot the corruption.

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 I consider that one of the noble ideals of our national struggle
for freedom was to have an independent and corruption free
India. The other duties assigned to the citizen by the Constitution
is to uphold and protect the sovereignty, unity and integrity of
India and I consider that sovereignty, unity and integrity of this
country cannot be protected and safeguarded if the corruption is
not removed from this country. - I consider that a country cannot
be defended only by taking a gun and going to border at the
time of war. The country is to be defended day in and day out
by being vigil and alert to the needs and requirements of the
country and to bring forth the corruption at higher level. The
duty under Article 51A(h) is to develop a spirit of inquiry and
reforms. The duty of a citizen under Article 51A(j) is to strive
towards excellence in all spheres so that the national constantly
rises to higher level of endeavour and achievements I consider
that it is built-in duties that every citizen must strive for a
corruption free society and must expose the corruption whenever
it comes to his or her knowledge and try to remove corruption at
all levels more so at higher levels of management of the State.
31.2. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Superintendent of Central Excise Vs. Somabhai
Ranchhodhbhai Patel AIR 2001 SC 1975, ruled as under;
“(A) Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S.2 –The level of
judicial officer's understanding can have serious impact on other
litigants – Held, The officer is holding a responsible position of
a Civil Judge of Senior Division. Even a new entrant to judicial
service would not commit such mistake assuming it was a
mistake - It cannot be ignored that the level of judicial officer's
understanding can have serious impact on other
litigants. There is no manner of doubt that the officer has acted
in most negligent manner without any caution or care
whatsoever- Without any further comment, we would leave this

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 aspect to the disciplinary authority for appropriate action, if
any, taking into consideration all relevant facts. We do not know
whether present is an isolated case of such an understanding?
We do not know what has been his past record? In this view, we
direct that a copy of the order shall be sent forthwith to the
Registrar General of the High Court.”.
15. Reverting now to the contempt proceedings initiated against
the judicial officer, tendering unconditional and unqualified
apology, he says that “with my limited understanding, I could
not read the order correctly”. The judicial officer further says in
his affidavit that while passing the order dated 7-4-2000, he
inadvertently erred in reading and understanding the order
dated 27-3-2000 and that there has been a serious lapse on his
part in this regard. What we have said earlier while dealing with
the stand of the respondent that the facts are incapable of being
controverted and in clear breach of the order of this Court, a sum
of Rs 9,78,634 was permitted to be withdrawn without security,
is applicable with more force against the judicial officer. It is a
matter of great concern, regret and deep anguish that the order
of the type in question which clearly and unambiguously grants
a stay of the order of the High Court permitting withdrawal of
50% of amount without security could not be understood by the
officer. The officer is holding a responsible position of a Civil
Judge of Senior Division. Even a new entrant to judicial service
would not commit such mistake assuming it was a mistake.
Despite these glaring facts we assume, as pleaded by the judicial
officer, that he could not understand the order and, thus, on that
assumption it would be a case of outright negligence, which, in
fact, stands admitted but wilful attempt to violate the order for
any extraneous consideration or dishonest motive would,

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 therefore, be absent. In this view, we drop these contempt
proceedings against the officer by issue of severe reprimand.

16. What we have said above, however, is not the end of the
matter. It cannot be ignored that the level of judicial officer's
understanding can have serious impact on other litigants. There
is no manner of doubt that the officer has acted in a most
negligent manner without any caution or care whatsoever.
Without any further comment, we would leave this aspect to the
disciplinary authority for appropriate action, if any, taking into
consideration all relevant facts. We do not know whether present
is an isolated case of such an understanding. We do not know
what has been his past record. In this view, we direct that a copy
of the order shall be sent forthwith to the Registrar General of
the High Court of Gujarat.”
31.3. In Rama Surat Singh Vs. Shiv Kumar Pandey 1969 SCC OnLine All
226, it is ruled as under;
“Contempt of Courts Act (32 of 1952), S.3- Complaint against
Judge alleging corrupt practices and malfides - judicial
authorities to cover up their inefficiency and corruption or to
stiffle criticism made in good faith against such officers. -
Vindication of prestige is not the object of Contempt. - If a
particular judge or magistrate is corrupt and sells justice, then
a bona fide complaint to higher authorities to take necessary
action against the delinquent judicial officer is also an act to
maintain the purity of the administration of justice, for it is
unthinkable that a judicial officer should be allowed to take
bribes and if anybody makes a grievance of the matter to the
higher authorities, he should be hauled up for contempt of
Court. Contempt law does not mean that if a Magistrate or
judge acts dishonestly or is corrupt then too, he is beyond the

169
 reach of law and can take protection under the threat of
prosecuting those who bona fide raise their voice against him.

- In the light of the law as laid down by the Supreme Court and
interpreted by this Court these opposite parties should not be
prosecuted for contempt, particularly when the allegations of
corruption made by the first opposite party against the
applicant are still under investigation and it cannot be said, at
this stage that they were either untrue or mala fide.
The Committee of International Jurists 1959 Lord Shaw Cross at
page 15 desired a more progressive view when he stated :-

". . . . . Clearly if someone wishes in good faith to make a

charge of partiality or corruption against Judge he ought
to have the opportunity of making it : .......
We consider that he should be able to do so by letter to
the Lord Chancellor or to his Member of Parliament
without fear of punishment and would deplore the use of
the law of contempt to prevent him from doing so. The
charges could then be considered either administratively
or in the House of Commons or in the House of Lords."
31.4. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Prakash Chand (1998)1 SCC 1, it is ruled as
under;
“Erosion of credibility of the Judiciary, in the public mind, for
whatever reasons, is the greatest threat to the independence of
the Judiciary. It must be remembered that IT IS THE DUTY
OF EVERY MEMBER OF THE LEGAL FRATERNITY TO
ENSURE THAT THE IMAGE OF THE JUDICIARY IS NOT
TARNISHED AND ITS RESPECTABILITY ERODED.
… Judicial authoritarianism is what the proceedings in the
instant case smack of. It cannot be permitted under any guise. …

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 It needs no emphasis to say that all actions of a Judge must be
Judicious in character. Erosion of the credibility of the judiciary,
in the public mind, for whatever reasons, the is the greatest
threat to the independence of the Judiciary. Eternal vigilance by
the Judges to guard against any such latent internal danger is,
therefore, necessary, lest we “suffer from self-inflicted mortal
wounds”. We must remember that the Constitution does not give
unlimited powers to anyone including the Judge of all levels. The
societal perception of Judges as being detached and impartial
referees is the greatest strength of the Judiciary and every
member of the Judiciary must ensure that this perception does
not receive a setback consciously or unconsciously. The
authenticity of the Judicial process rests on public confidence
and public confidence rests on the legitimacy of the judicial
process. Sources of legitimacy are in the impersonal application
by the Judge of recognized objective principles which owe their
existence to a system as distinguished from subjective moods,
predilections, emotions and prejudices.”

32. Point No.26: Constitutional duty of the petitioner and advocates under
Article 51 (a) (h) of the Constitution to file present petition.

32.1. In Indirect Tax Practitioners Association Vs. R.K. Jain , (2010) 8 SCC
281, it is ruled that, it is ruled that, it is duty of every citizen to expose the
malpractices on judicial side. The person doing such duty is to be treated as a
whistleblower.

32.2. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manohar Lal v. Vinesh Anand reported in
2001 AIR SCW 1590 has held that, to prosecute the offender is a social need and
concept of locus standi is foreign to criminal jurisprudence. In para no. 5, it is
observed thus:-

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 “5. Before adverting to the matter in issue and the rival contentions
advanced one redeeming feature ought to be noticed here pertain to
Criminal jurisprudence : To pursue an offender in the event of
commission of an offence, is to sub-serve a social need Society cannot
afford to have a criminal escape his liability, since that would bring
about a state of social pollution, which is neither desired nor warranted
and this is irrespective of the concept of locus the doctrine of locus-
standi is totally foreign to criminal jurisprudence”

32.3. Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy AIR

1952 SC 149 had read in para 12 as under;
“[Scandalous News published against a Judge] 12.[……]If the
allegations were true obviously it would be to the benefit of the
public to bring these matters in to light......”

32.4. In Subramanian Swamy Vs. Arun Shourie (2014) 12 SCC 344, it is ruled
as under;

“12. In Wills [Nationwide News (Pty) Ltd. v. Wills, (1992) 17

7 CLR 1 (Aust)] the High Court of Australia suggested that
truth could be
a defence if the comment was also for the public benefit. It said
, “… The revelation of truth—at all events when its revelation
is for the public benefit—and the making of a fair criticism
based on fact do not amount to a contempt of court though the
truth revealed or the criticism made is such as to deprive the
court or Judge of public confidence…”

32.5. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of R. MuthukrishnanVs.The Registrar

General 2019 SCC OnLine SC 105 ruled as under ;
THERE CANNOT BE EXISTENCE OF A STRONG
JUDICIAL SYSTEM WITHOUT AN INDEPENDENT BAR.

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 The Bar is an integral part of the judicial administration. In
order to ensure that judiciary remains an effective tool, it is
absolutely necessary that Bar and Bench maintain dignity and
decorum of each other. The mutual reverence is absolutely
necessary. The Judges are to be respected by the Bar, they have
in-turn equally to respect the Bar, observance of mutual dignity,
decorum of both is necessary and above all they have to maintain
self-respect too.
Independent Bar and independent Bench form the backbone of
the democracy. In order to preserve the very independence, the
observance of constitutional values, mutual reverence and self-
respect are absolutely necessary. Bar and Bench are
complementary to each other. Without active cooperation of the
Bar and the Bench, it is not possible to preserve the Rule of law
and its dignity. Equal and even-handed justice is the hallmark of
the judicial system. The protection of the basic structure of the
Constitution and of rights is possible by the firmness of Bar and
Bench and by proper discharge of their duties and
responsibilities. We cannot live in a jungle raj.
Making the Bar too sycophant and fearful which would not be
conducive for fair administration of justice. Fair criticism of
judgment and its analysis is permissible. Lawyers' fearlessness
in court, independence, uprightness, honesty, equality are the
virtues which cannot be sacrificed. It is duty of the lawyer to
lodge appropriate complaint to the concerned authorities as
observed by this Court in Vinay Chandra Mishra (supra), which
right cannot be totally curtailed.”

32.6. In State of Rajasthan vs. Prakash Chand (1998) 1 SCC 1 it has been held as
under;

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 “It must be remembered that it is the duty of every member of
the legal fraternity to ensure that the image of the judiciary is
not tarnished and its respectability eroded. …”

33. Point No.27:- Law regarding disqualification of a Judge committing breach

of the oath by discriminating advocates & poor litigants and thereby violating
their constitutional rights is a ground for termination of his appointment as a
Judge of the Supreme Court requiring his remand from the office. Such person
is unfit for the post of supervision of judicial officers in India and cannot be
appointed as CJI.

33.1. That, the format of Oath to be taken by the Judge of the Supreme Court
and Chief Justice of India is given in our Constitution. It is as under;

The constitution of India Schedule III Articles 75 (4), 99, 124 (6) 148 (2) 164 (3),
188 and 219 provides that forms of oaths or Affirmation No. VIII is as follows.
“ Form of oath or a affirmation to be made by the Judges
of a Supreme Court.”
I, A.B., having been appointed Chief Justice (or a Judge)
of the Supreme Court at (or of) ----------------- do that I will
bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India
as by law established, [that I will uphold the sovereignty
and integrity of India] that, I will duly and faithfully and
to the best of my ability, Knowledge and
judgement perform the duties of my office without fear
or favour, affection or ill-will and that I will uphold the
Constitution and the laws.
33.2. In Indirect Tax Association Vs. R.K.Jain 2010) 8 SCC 281 (Supra),it is
ruled by Hon’ble Supreme Court that;
“Judge have their accountability to the society and their accountability
must be judged by their conscience and oath of their office, that is to

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 defend and uphold the Constitution and the laws without fear and favor
with malice towards none, with charity for all, we strive to do the
right.”
33.3. In K. C. Chandy Vs. R.Balakrishna Pillai, AIR 1986 Ker 116, the Full
Bench of Kerala High Court, while considering, as to whether, High Court held as
follows:
"6. Oath of office is not an empty formality with no constitutional
significance. In the debates in the Constituent Assembly on Art. 56,
Dr. Ambedkar is reported to have said that the phrase “violation of
the Constitution” is a large one and may well include treason, bribery
or other high crimes and misdemeanours, because treason is certainly
violation of the Constitution and bribery will be violation of the
Constitution because it will be violation of the oath by the
President. In the Judges transfer case, S.P. Gupta v. President of India.
AIR 1982 SC 149 Pathak J., observed thus:
“When a Judge permits his judgments in a case to be
influenced by the irrelevant consideration of caste and creed,
of relationship or friendship, of hostility or enmity, he commits
a breach of his oath. It is a case where justice is not done and
is denied. It is a case of misbehaviour to which the provisions
of Art. 218 read with Cls. (4) and (5) of Art. 124 are attracted.”
33.4. That the oath of office is the prescription of a fundamental code of conduct in
the discharge of the duties of a Judge and not a mere moral obligation and binds him
throughout his tenure of office.

33.5. When judges violate their oath of office, they deserve the same kind of censure
that the Calcutta High Court delivered on the Chief Minister of Bengal AK Fazlul
Huq in R. C. Pollard vs Satya Gopal Mazumdar 1943 SCC OnLine Cal 153,
where it is ruled that violation of oaths brands such man unfit for public office. A
person not preventing outside interferences in the judicial function is not fit to

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 exercise supervision over judicial officer and is a danger to the community. It is
ruled as under;
“30. A person who takes an oath or makes an affirmation to tell
the truth in a judicial proceeding and breaks it is guilty of perjury
and may be punished at law by the Courts. A person, however,
who on taking up an office is required by law to take an oath
of office that he will faithfully perform the duties of that office
takes what is called a promissory oath: see Halsbury's Laws of
England, 2nd (Edn.), vol. 9, p. 342. The breach of a promissory
oath in the absence of a special provision of law to that effect is
not punishable at law. As far as I am aware there is no
punishment in law for the breaking of the promissory
oath taken by Mr. Fazlul Huq when he assumed office as Chief
Minister. But the clear violation of it brands a man as unfit for
public office. If solemn promissory oaths by persons who take
high office in the State are to be disregarded as mere
formalities there is no possibility of good government. Mr. Huq
is left to the contemplation and judgment of his fellow men. Mr.
Chatterjee, the District Magistrate, who on one occasion at least
carried out Mr. Fazlul Huq's wishes, knew full well that he was
doing wrong in so doing. I cannot imagine that he was unaware
of the judgment in Cri. Revn. No. 407 of 19414 since this
judgment which was of particular concern to District
Magistrates — received a certain amount of prominence in the
legal press. It was the plain duty of Mr. Chatterjee when he
received from Mr. Huq the letter of 29th September, to tell Mr.
Huq that he was asking him to do something contrary to his duty
and to firmly refuse to interfere. But he seems to have been more
anxious to oblige Mr. Huq than to do his duty. He ought to have
prevented all attempts at interference with the Magistracy
under his control. In my view he is not fit to exercise

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 supervision over judicial officers and he should be transferred
to some other branch of the public service where plasticity may
possibly be an advantage and not a danger to the community.
33.6. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra
Ag arwal, (2020) 5 SCC 481, having one of the Judge in the said Judgement
Respondent No.1 Ld. Justice Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, ruled as under;
“186[…]Constitutional functionaries are bound to the oath of
their office to discharge their duties in a fair manner in
accordance with the principles enshrined in the
Constitution.[…..]
222. Article 124(6) and Article 219 of the Constitution of India
prescribe that every person who is appointed to be a Judge of the
Supreme Court or the High Court respectively, shall, prior to
entering office, make and subscribe to an oath or affirmation
set out in the Third Schedule of the Constitution. The oath for
the office reads:
“I, (name), having been appointed Chief Justice (or a Judge) of
the Supreme Court of India, do swear in the name of God (or
affirm) that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the
Constitution of India as by law established, that I will uphold the
sovereignty and integrity of India, that I will duly and faithfully
and to the best of my ability, knowledge and judgment perform
the duties of my office without fear or favour, affection or ill-will
and that I will uphold the Constitution and the laws.”
223. Prior to the advent of the Constitution, the oath or
affirmation for a person appointed to the Federal Court was
prescribed in Schedule IV to the Government of India Act,
1935. Significantly, the words “without fear or favour, affection
or ill-will”, contained in the present Constitution in Form VIII
did not find place in the oath prescribed [ “I, A.B., having been
appointed Chief Justice [or a Judge] of the Court do solemnly

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 swear [or affirm] that saving the faith and allegiance which I
owe to C.D., his heirs and successors, I will be faithful and bear
true allegiance in my judicial capacity to His Majesty the King,
Emperor of India, His heirs and successors, and that I will
faithfully perform the duties of my office to the best of my ability,
knowledge and judgment.”] in Schedule IV to the Government of
India Act, 1935. Added to the present Constitution, these are
words with significance. The Framers of the Constitution were
alive to the need for the exercise of judicial power in accordance
with the ethics of judicial office. The express inclusion of these
words indicates that persons entering judicial office bind
themselves to the principles inherent in the effective discharge of
the judicial function, in conformity with the rule of law and the
values of the Constitution.
224. The oath of office postulates that the Judge shall
discharge the duties of the office without fear or favour,
affection or ill-will. Any action that abridges the discharge of
judicial duty in conformity with the principles enunciated in the
oath negates the fundamental precept underlying the conferment
of judicial power. Commenting on the significance of the
inclusion of the term in its application to Judges of the High
Courts in Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth [Union
of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth, (1977) 4 SCC 193 : 1977
SCC (L&S) 435] , P.N. Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) held : (SCC
p. 236, para 49)
“49. … These words, of course, do not add anything to the nature
of the judicial function to be discharged by the High Court Judge
because, even without them, the High Court Judge would, by the
very nature of the judicial function, have to perform the duties of
his office without fear or favour, but they serve to highlight two

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 basic characteristics of the judicial function, namely,
independence and impartiality.”
225. As constitutional functionaries tasked with adjudication,
Judges of the High Courts and Supreme Court are bound to
discharge their duties in a fair and impartial manner in
accordance with law and the principles enshrined in the
Constitution. But this indeed is only a restatement of a principle
which attaches to all judicial office. The principles embodied in
the oath furnish a non-derogable obligation upon the person
affirming it to abide by its mandate.
231. In the view explored above, judicial accountability traces
itself from both the oath of office and the nature of the judicial
power itself. In a broader sense however, there is a significant
public interest in ensuring the smooth and efficient functioning
of the justice delivery system, consistent with the requirements of
justice in individual cases. The legitimacy of the institution which
depends on public trust is a function of an assurance that the
judiciary and the people that work it are free from bias and
partiality. Mark Tushnet explores the idea of judicial
accountability in the following terms:
“Under prevailing understandings in liberal democracies, law is
a human artefact, so accountability ‘to law’ must involve
accountability to someone. Roughly, ‘political accountability’
refers to accountability to contemporaneous power-holders as
representatives of today's people, whereas ‘accountability to
law’ refers to accountability to the people and their
representatives in the more distant past. Accountability to law is
a form of indirect accountability to the people in the past, taking
its route through their enactments of law. [ Mark Tushnet,
“Judicial Accountability in Comparative Perspective”, in
Accountability in the Contemporary Constitution (Nicholas

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 Bamforth and Peter Leyland eds.) (2013), Oxford Scholarship
Online at Tushnet, p. 69.]”
33.7. In the Judges transfer case S.P. Gupta v. President of India AIR 1982 SC
149 this Hon’ble Court observed thus:
“921. When a Judge permits his judgment in a case to be
influenced by the irrelevant considerations of caste and creed,
of relationship or friendship, of hostility or enmity, he commits
a breach of his oath. It is a case where justice is not done and
is denied. It is a case of misbehaviour, to which the provisions
of Article 218 read with Clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124 are
attracted. There is another kind of case where a Judge acts in
accordance with his conscience on the basis of the facts and the
law as he bona fide understands them, and yet because of
surrounding circumstances it may appear that justice, has not
been done even though in fact it may have been done. Where
there is a danger that justice will not appear to be done, and the
prevailing environment is linked with the person of the Judge,
notwithstanding that he may have done nothing to promote it, the
injury to the administration of justice can be as serious as a case
where the Judge has consciously deviated from the standards of
impartial judgment. Where there is a genuine apprehension that
justice may not appear to be done, the ordinary rule is that the
case pending before the Judge should be transferred to another
Judge. But where the apprehension is rooted in local association,
on links with members of the Bar or influences present in close
proximity to the Judge and the circumstances are such that,
notwithstanding that the conduct of the Judge has done nothing
to promote it, there is grave and bona fide fear in the minds of
honest citizens that the fount of justice may be polluted, its
effect is not confined to a single case but spreads widely,
endangering the purity of the entire administration of justice.

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 Inasmuch as the administration of justice relies for its vitality
on the strength of public confidence, it must range supreme
and, therefore, if the Judge is transferred in these
circumstances, it must be regarded as a transfer in the public
interest. [……….]”
33.8. In Official Liquidator v. Dayanand, (2008) 10 SCC 1, it is ruled as under;
“91. We may add that in our constitutional set-up every citizen
is under a duty to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals
and institutions. Those who have been entrusted with the task
of administering the system and operating various constituents
of the State and who take oath to act in accordance with the
Constitution and uphold the same, have to set an example by
exhibiting total commitment to the constitutional ideals. This
principle is required to be observed with greater rigour by the
members of judicial fraternity who have been bestowed with the
power to adjudicate upon important constitutional and legal
issues and protect and preserve rights of the individuals and
society as a whole. Discipline is sine qua non for effective and
efficient functioning of the judicial system. If the courts
command others to act in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution and rule of law, it is not possible to countenance
violation of the constitutional principle by those who are
required to lay down the law.”

33.9. Constitution Bench in the case of K. Veeraswami Vs. Union of India (1991)
3 SCC 655,while dealing with the case of criminal prosecution of a Supreme Court
Judge and his duty to resign when there are prima facie material against
him had ruled that;
“53. It is inappropriate to state that conviction and sentence are no bar
for the Judge to sit in the court. We may make it clear that if a Judge is
convicted for the offence of criminal misconduct or any other offence

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 involving moral turpitude, it is but proper for him to keep himself away
from the court. He must voluntarily withdraw from judicial work and
await the outcome of the criminal prosecution. If he is sentenced in a
criminal case he should forthwith tender his resignation unless he
obtains stay of his conviction and sentence. He shall not insist on his
right to sit on the bench till he is cleared from the charge by a court of
competent jurisdiction. The judiciary has no power of the purse or the
sword. It survives only by public confidence and it is important to the
stability of the society that the confidence of the public is not shaken.
The Judge whose character is clouded and whose standards of
morality and rectitude are in doubt may not have the judicial
independence and may not command confidence of the public. He
must voluntarily withdraw from the judicial work and administration.

54. The emphasis on this point should not appear superfluous. Prof.
Jackson says “Misbehaviour by a Judge, whether it takes place on the
bench or off the bench, undermines public confidence in the
administration of justice, and also damages public respect for the law
of the land; if nothing is seen to be done about it, the damage goes
unrepaired. This must be so when the judge commits a serious
criminal offence and remains in office”. (Jackson's Machinery of
Justice by J.R. Spencer, 8th edn. pp. 369-70).

55. The proved “misbehaviour” which is the basis for removal of a

Judge under clause (4) of Article 124 of the Constitution may also in
certain cases involve an offence of criminal misconduct under Section
5(1) of the Act. But that is no ground for withholding criminal
prosecution till the Judge is removed by Parliament as suggested by
counsel for the appellant. One is the power of Parliament and the
other is the jurisdiction of a criminal court. Both are mutually
exclusive. Even a government servant who is answerable for his

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 misconduct which may also constitute an offence under the IPC or
under Section 5 of the Act is liable to be prosecuted in addition to a
departmental enquiry. If prosecuted in a criminal court he may be
punished by way of imprisonment or fine or with both but in
departmental enquiry, the highest penalty that could be imposed on him
is dismissal. The competent authority may either allow the prosecution
to go on in a court of law or subject him to a departmental enquiry or
subject him to both concurrently or consecutively. It is not
objectionable to initiate criminal proceedings against public servant
before exhausting the disciplinary proceedings, and a fortiori, the
prosecution of a Judge for criminal misconduct before his removal
by Parliament for proved misbehavior is unobjectionable.”

34. Point No.28: Deemed sanction accorded by Hon’ble President of India to

Shri Rashid Khan Pathan, to prosecute Ld. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud for
offences under sections 52, 109, 115, 166, 167, 201, 202, 218, 219, 302, 304,
304(A), 409,120(B), 34 of IPC and section 51(B), 54, 55 of Disaster Management
Act, 2005 and other provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

34.1. That, on 28th November 2021, Shri Rashid Khan Pathan made a detailed
complaint before Hon’ble President of India.
The prayers in the said complaint dated 28th November 2021 reads thus;
(i) Immediate direction to C.B.I. to register an F.I.R.
against accused Judges under section 52, 109, 115,
166, 167, 201, 202, 218, 219, 302, 304, 304 (A), 409,
120(B), 34 Etc. of IPC;

AND

Section 51(b), 54, 55 of Disaster Management Act,

2005 AND provisions of Prevention of Corruption
Act 1988., for their act of commission, active

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 participation in committing the offences and
omission to prevent the offences of abatement of
murder, preparation to commit murder,
misappropriation of thousands of Crores of public
fund with ulterior motive to save the real culprits
and give wrongful profits to the vaccine syndicate;

OR

(i) Granting sanction to the complainant to

initiate prosecution against the accused
Judges Sh. D. Y. Chandrachud and
others for the above said offences and
also for any other offences disclosed from
the materials available on record;
(ii) (ii) Immediate directions to the accused
Judges toforthwith tender their resignation
by following the binding precedents of the
Constitution Benchjudgment in the case of
K.Veeraswami Vs. Union ofIndia (1991)
3 SCC 655;
(iii) Immediate directions to the Attorney
General for India to file the Contempt
petition before Supreme Court against
accused Judges, for their wilful
disregard and defiance of the binding
precedents of the Supreme Court of
India and for abusing the process of
Court.

34.2. That, even after period of 3 months plus one months is over the application
was not rejected.
34.3. Today it is almost a period of 11 months is over.

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 34.4. On 18.02.2022 the said complainant Shri Rashid Khan Pathan sent one more
representation, informing his intention to file complaint on the basis of deemed
sanction. [Case No PRSEC/E/2022/04661].
The complainant relied upon the judgement of Hon’ble Supreme Court & High
Court in the case of Shashikant Prasad Vs. The State Thru C.B.I., / A.C.B.,
Lucknow 2013 SCC OnLine 13099 & Dr. Subramanaan Swamy Vs. Dr.
Manmohan Singh and another, AIR 2012 SC 1185.

34.5. In Shashikant Prasad Vs. The State Thru C.B.I., / A.C.B., Lucknow 2013
SCC OnLine 13099 it is overserved as under;
“SECTION 197 OF CR.P.C. DEEMED SANCTION FOR
PROSECUTION : Whether trial Court is competent to proceed with
the case on the basis of deemed sanction to prosecute the accused, if
prosecution sanctioned is not accorded by competent authority/State
within the period of four months in terms of the direction issued by
Apex Court in Vineet Narain and another Vs. U.O.I. and another
(1998 SCC(Cri) 307) - It has been submitted by the learned counsel
for the petitioner that law laid down in Vineet Narayan's case (supra)
has no binding effect in absence of any legislative amendment made
in P.C. Act. It was further submitted that in Vineet Narain's case
(Supra) certain directions have been given by the Apex Court to CBI
and Central Vigilance Commission (for short 'CVC'). Direction no.
15 deals with time frame for according sanction which runs as
follows:-
"Time limit of three months for grant of sanction for prosecution must
be strictly adhered to. However, additional time of one month may be
allowed where consultation is required with the Attorney General (AG)
or any other law officer in the AG's office."

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 7. In this regard paragraph 61 of the judgement of Vineet Narain's Case
(Supra) is very important and so it is reproduced hereinbelow :
"61. In the result, we strike down Directive No. 4.7(3) of the Single
Directive quoted above and issue the above directions, which have to
be construed in the light of the earlier discussion. The Report of the
Independent Review Committee (IRC) and its recommendations which
are similar to this extent can be read, if necessary, for a proper
appreciation of these directions. To the extent we agree with the
conclusion and recommendations of the IRC, and that is a large area,
we have adopted the same in the formulation of the above directions.
These directions require the strict compliance/adherence of the Union
of India and all concerned."

8. In the light of this paragraph no room left to doubt that the direction
given in Vineet Narain's case (Supra) ought to have been strictly
complied with by all concerned including State Government. Therefore,
directions issued in Vineet Narain's case (Supra) shall have the binding
effect in the light of Article 141 of Constitution of India- learned
counsel appearing for CBI drew attention of this court towards the
judgement of Division Bench of this Court delivered in Writ Petition
No. 10503 (M/B) of 2009 (Vishwanath Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India),
wherein the Division of this court keeping in view the direction issued
in Vineet Narain's case (Supra) fixing time limit to accord sanction has
held that in default of taking decision to accord sanction within the time
fixed, the sanction shall be deemed to have been granted -Perusal of
this paragraph reveals that unless the amendment is made by the
parliament in the light of Vineet Narain's case (Supra) the concept of
deemed sanction shall be there. The order dated 3.12.2010 passed by
the Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid writ petition was
assailed by the State before Apex Court by filing a Special Leave
Petition (c) No.11563 of 2011. The Apex Court while entertaining the

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 appeal vide its order dated 18.4.2011 has passed the following interim
order:-
"..... Ad-inteirm stay of the direction No. (iii) in para 155 and the second
part of directions no. (viii) in para 155 requiring the reports to be
submitted to the High court in read to every investigation at interval of
two months.

In regard to directions no. (iv) in para 155 of the impugned order, the
period three months mentioned therein shall be substituted by the
period 'six months' ....."
12. Perusal of it shows that the Apex court has not stayed the operation
of direction (iv) given in para 155 but simply extent period from three
months to six months which shows that concept of deemed sanction has
been accepted by the Apex court . In Dr. Subramanian Swamy's case
(supra). The Apex court again reminded to the Parliament to do its job.
The guide line no. 3 of para 56 deals with concept of deemed sanction.
13. As such if Investigating Officer asked for grant of sanction from the
government, after expiry of time limit fixed as above, the prosecuting
agency or complainant may ask the trial court to proceed in the matter
on the basis of deemed sanction.”
34.6. The reply given by the president’s Secretariat reads thus;

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 34.7. Under these circumstances there is a deemed sanction to said Shri Rashid Khan
Pathan, and this was a ground for law ministry for not accepting the recommendation
of the Hon’ble present Chief Justice of India.

35. Request : It is therefore humbly requested for;

i) Immediate directions to Attorney General for India or Solicitor
General to file an application for recusal of Ld. Chief Justice of
India Shri. D.Y. Chandrachud from hearing the case regarding
Same-sex marriage (LGBTQ) for his obvious bias due to his act
of promoting causes of LGBTQ community his regular and
fervent support on one hand and heading the Bench to decide the
petition filed by the same people on other hand. And also to file
a Contempt Petition against Shri. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud as
per law & ratio laid down in the Case of Re: C.S. Karnan (2017)
7 SCC 1.
(ii) Further directions to take immediate steps to prevent
Contempt of law laid down by the Constitution Benches of the
Supreme Court & wastage of public money & time by ld. Chief
Justice of India D.Y. Chandrachud by hearing a case, when he is
disqualified to hear the case and it is the corum – non-judice, and
the Bench had became unconstitutional thereby vitiating the
entire proceedings.
(iii) As prosecution of offender is the obligation of the state
therefore appropriate direction to C.B.I. to register FIR u.sec
409,219,166,120(B),34 etc of IPC against ld. Chief Justice of
India D.Y. Chandrachud and others after completing the
formality of consultation by Hon’ble President of India with any
of the Judges of the Supreme Court as per her choice as per law
laid down by the Constitution Bench in the case of
K.Veeraswami Vs. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 655;
OR

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 Though it is not the part of official duty of ld. Chief Justice of
India D.Y. Chandrachud and others to commit criminal offences
but in order to avoid any doubt about the provisions of sec.197
of Cr. P. C. and sec 3 of The Judges (Protection) Act, 1985
appropriate sanction/permission be given/ accorded urgently to
the undersigned to initiate prosecution against ld. Chief Justice
of India D.Y. Chandrachud and others under relevant provisions
of IPC and other law applicable thereto,
(iv) Taking immediate steps to create Constitutional Courts or
Courts of appeal for dealing the issues / orders /judgments /
injustice done by the Supreme Court including the cases of
recusal applications against Chief Justice of India, which cannot
bne decided by himself as no one can be Judge in his own case
and to avoid embarrassment to as law laid others down in
Mitchell v. State 320 Md. 756 (Md. 1990) and as per ratio laid
down by the Constitution Bench in Indore Development
Authority (Recusal Matter-5 J.) v. Manohar Lal, (2020) 6
SCC 304
In spirit of Art. 14(5) of International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) which are constitutionally guaranteed
to all Indian citizen by the constitution and further upheld by the
nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court in K. S. Puttaswamy vs.
Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1;
(v) Request to the Hon’ble Chairman of Rajya to initiating
impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice of India D.Y.
Chandrachud;
(vi) Request to Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court to call a
Full Court meeting and form an impartial committee to conduct
enquiry and immediate action to withdraw judicial works from
CJI D. Y. Chandrachud till the decision in impeachment
proceedings is taken in earlier cases of CJI per ‘In-House-

189
 Procedure’ and as per ratio laid down in Additional District and
Sessions Judge ‘X’ (2015) 1 SCC 799.
(vii) Further action including issuance of notice of preventive
action under section 149 of CrPC to Ld. Chief Jusice of India
D.Y.Chandrachud to maintain aloofness as per ‘Judges Ethics
Code’ and stop from attending meetings, conferences and regular
media interviews which are regularly attended by him to
propogate the secret agenda of spreading disharmony and
division between different classes of citizen in India to serve
ulterior purposes and to please anti national elements from
Harvard Group like George Soros, Bill Gates and others as
explained by Sh. Rajeev Malhotra in his book ‘Snakes in the
Ganga’ and proved from the acts of commissions by Mr.
Chandrachud, which is against the constitutional duty of Ld.
Chief Justice of India Dy Chandrachud under Article.51(A) of
the Constitution of India;
(viii) Direction to ld. Chief Justice of India D.Y. Chandrachud to
respect and follow the binding directions given by the
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in K.
Veeraswami Vs.Union Of India (1991) 3 SCC 655 and to
resign forthwith from the post and to not to damage the image of
institution of Supreme Court.

Date: 28.04.2023
Place: Mumbai

Rashid Khan Pathan

President
Supreme Court & High Courts Litigants’
Association Of India (SCHCLA)

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