ALEXANDER A. PADILLA v.

CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 231671
July 25, 2017
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

SUBJECT MATTER:
III. The Executive Department; F. Powers of the President; 5. Commander-in-Chief Powers

Petitioner(s): ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, LORETTA ANN P.
ROSALES, RENE B. GOROSPE, and SENATOR LEILA M. DE LIMA

Respondent(s): CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, consisting of the SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, as

represented by Senate President Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III, and the HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, as represented by House Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez

SUMMARY:
In 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued a proclamation declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao. The proclamation was issued following a series of armed attacks committed by the
Abu Sayyaf and Maute terrorist groups against civilians and government authorities for the ultimate purpose of
establishing an Islamic Province of Mindanao. The Senate and the House of Representatives separately invited officials
from the Executive Department and the military to brief them on the circumstances surrounding the President’s
proclamation. Both Houses of Congress separately passed a resolution expressing their support for the President’s
proclamation and stating that they had no intent to revoke it. Both Houses rejected a proposed resolution calling for both
Houses of Congress to convene in joint session to deliberate on whether to revoke the President’s proclamation.
Petitioners then filed a petition for mandamus to compel Congress to convene in joint session and to deliberate and vote
jointly on whether to revoke the President’s proclamation, in accordance with Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution.

The issue here was whether or not Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution compels Congress to automatically
convene in joint session whenever the President proclaims a state of martial law or suspends the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.

The Supreme Court held that Article VII, Section 18 does not compel Congress to automatically convene in joint session
whenever the President declares martial law or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It merely requires
Congress to vote jointly when revoking the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ. In this case, Congress had no obligation to convene in joint session, since both Houses had already separately
adopted resolutions expressing support for the President’s proclamation, which meant that the joint-voting requirement in
cases of revocation never went into operation. It would have been different if either the Senate or the House had resolved
to revoke the President’s proclamation, in which case Congress would have been obliged to convene in joint session to
vote jointly on the question of whether to revoke the President’s proclamation.

The case of Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo is not on all fours with this case, since in Fortun, both Houses of Congress
adopted concurrent resolutions to convene in joint session to revoke the President’s proclamation, while in this case, both
Houses of Congress separately adopted resolutions expressing support for the President’s proclamation and stating that
they had no intent to revoke it.

The Court also held that there was no violation here of the constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.
It should be noted that this right is not absolute: The government may withhold certain types of information from the
public, such as state secrets regarding military, diplomatic, and other matters affecting national security.

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ANTECEDENT FACTS:
● On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, in which he declared a state of martial
law and suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao.
○ Within 48 hours from the issuance of the proclamation and while Congress was in session, President
Duterte transmitted to the Senate and to the House of Representatives a report about the proclamation.
○ In the report, the President explained that the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao were prompted by the “series of armed attacks, violent
acts, and atrocities directed against civilians and government authorities [. . .] perpetrated by the Abu
Sayyaf and Maute terrorist groups [. . .] for the ultimate purpose of establishing a DAESH wilayah or an
Islamic Province of Mindanao.”
● Officials from the Executive Department and the military were invited by the Senate and the House of
Representatives separately to provide a briefing on the circumstances and details surrounding the President’s
proclamation and report.
● The Senate deliberated on two resolutions:
○ The first proposed resolution (Senate Resolution No. 388) expressed support for the President’s
proclamation.
○ The second proposed resolution (Senate Resolution No. 390) called for a joint session of the Senate and
the House of Representatives to deliberate on the President’s proclamation.
○ The first resolution was approved, while the second resolution was rejected.
● The House of Representatives likewise considered two resolutions:
○ The first proposed resolution (House Resolution No. 1050) expressed full support for the President’s
proclamation and stated that there was no reason to revoke it.
○ The second proposed resolution called for a joint session of the Senate and the House of
Representatives to deliberate on the President’s proclamation.
○ As in the Senate, the first resolution was approved, while the second resolution was rejected.
● Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel Congress to convene in joint session and to deliberate and
vote jointly on whether to revoke the President’s proclamation, in accordance with Article VII, Section 18 of the
1987 Constitution.
○ They contend that the duty of Congress to convene in joint session upon the President’s proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is a ministerial duty that does
not require the exercise of discretion. Therefore, the performance of the duty may be compelled by
mandamus.
○ They also argue that the discretionary word “may” in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution refers
to the power of Congress to revoke but not to the obligation of Congress to jointly convene and vote,
which they assert is mandatory.
○ They cite in support of their argument Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, in which the Court described as
“automatic” the duty of Congress to convene in joint session upon the President’s proclamation of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
○ While a writ of mandamus will generally not lie against a coordinate branch of government or to compel
the performance of a discretionary act, petitioners argue that this rule admits of certain exceptions, such
as when there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, palpable excess of authority, or when there
is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
● On the other hand, respondents contend that there is no mandatory duty on their part to convene and vote jointly
except in cases of revocation or extension of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution does not require a joint session to be
convened upon the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; it
merely requires joint voting for the revocation or extension by Congress of the President’s proclamation or
suspension.
○ Respondents further argue that petitioners’ assertion of being citizens and taxpayers is inadequate to
clothe them with locus standi. Petitioners must show that they have a direct and personal interest in
Congress’ failure to convene in joint session.
○ Respondents dismiss as mere obiter dictum the Court’s pronouncement in the Fortun case that Congress
has a duty to convene jointly upon the President’s declaration of martial law. In Fortun, both Houses of
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 Congress had issued a concurrent resolution calling for the convening of a joint session to revoke
President Arroyo’s proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Maguindanao. In this case, on the other hand, both Houses have already adopted resolutions
expressing support for President Duterte’s proclamation and making clear their intention not to revoke it.
● On July 22, 2017, Congress convened in joint session and, with 261 votes in favor and 18 votes against,
overwhelmingly approved the extension of the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao until December 31, 2017.

ISSUE(S), RULE, AND ANALYSIS:

ISSUE(S):
1. WON Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution compels Congress to automatically convene in joint session
when the President proclaims a state of martial law or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus — NO

RULE (APPLICABLE LAW/JURISPRUDENCE):

Const. art. VII, § 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever
it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight
hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President
shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially
charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

ANALYSIS:

RULING APPLICATION OF RULE BASED ON FACTS

1. NO, Article VII, Section 18 Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
does not compel Congress to
a. Within forty-eight (48) hours from the proclamation of martial law or
convene in joint session when
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
the President proclaims a state

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of martial law or suspends the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to Congress;
privilege of the writ of habeas
b. Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
corpus. It merely requires
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
Congress to vote jointly when
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside
revoking the President’s
by the President;
proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of c. Upon the initiative of the President, Congress may, in the same
the writ of habeas corpus. manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist; and
d. Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours (24)
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance
with its rules without need of call.
The above constitutional provision is clear, plain, and unambiguous.
 In its literal and ordinary meaning, the provision grants Congress the
power to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It also
prescribes how Congress may exercise such power, i.e., by a vote of
at least a majority of all its Members, voting jointly, in regular or
special session.
 The use of the word "may" in the provision — "[t]he Congress [. . .]
may revoke such proclamation or suspension [. . .]" — is to be
construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion on
whether or not to revoke, but in order to revoke, the same provision
requires that at least a majority of the Members of Congress, voting
jointly, must favor revocation.
The requirement that “Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority
of all its Members in regular or special session [. . .]" explicitly applies only to
the situation where Congress revokes the President's proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Simply put,
the provision only requires Congress to vote jointly when it revokes the
President’s proclamation or suspension.

Legislative History: The Deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission

The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission reveal the framers'
intention to:
(a) remove the requirement of prior concurrence of Congress for the
effectivity of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
(b) grant to Congress the discretionary power to revoke the
President's proclamation and/or suspension by a vote of at least a
majority of its Members, voting jointly.
To reiterate, the clear meaning of the Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution is that Congress is only required to vote jointly on the
revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
As the Commander-in-Chief clause was initially drafted, the President's
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus required the prior

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concurrence of at least a majority of all the members of Congress in order to
be effective. The Commissioners, however, extensively debated whether or
not there should be prior concurrence by Congress, and ultimately voted to
remove this requirement from the provision.
 MR NATIVIDAD: “If there is actual invasion and rebellion, as
Commissioner Crispino de Castro said, there is need for imemdiate
response because there is an attack. Second, the fact of securing a
concurrence may be impractical because the roads might be blocked
or barricaded. [. . .] So the requirement of an initial concurrence of the
majority of all the Members of the Congress in case of an invasion or
rebellion might be impractical[.]”
The 1987 Constitution does not provide at all for the manner in which
Congress must determine and express its concurrence in the President's
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
 In contrast—being one of the constitutional safeguards against
possible abuse by the President of his power to proclaim martial law
and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus—the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides how Congress may exercise its
discretionary power to revoke the President's proclamation or
suspension, that is, "voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session."
Based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the underlying
reason for the requirement that the two Houses of Congress must vote jointly
is to avoid the possibility of a deadlock and to facilitate the process of
revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The Commissioners only settled the manner of voting by Congress, i.e.,
"voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members," in order to
revoke the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, but they did not directly take up and
specify in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution that the voting shall
be done during a joint session of both Houses of Congress.
 In this case, there was no obligation on the part of Congress to
convene in joint session, as the provision on revocation under
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution did not even come
into operation in light of the resolutions separately adopted by
the two Houses of Congress in accordance with their respective
rules of procedure, expressing support for President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216.
o It would be a completely different scenario if either the
Senate or the House of Representatives or both Houses
resolve/s to revoke the President's proclamation of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, in which case, Article VII, Section 18 of
the 1987 Constitution shall apply and Congress must
convene in joint session to vote jointly on the revocation of
the proclamation and/or suspension.
 The provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution

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 requiring Congress to vote jointly in joint session is specifically for the
purpose of revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
It cannot be disputed that the Senate and the House of Representatives
placed President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216 under serious review and
consideration, pursuant to their power to revoke such a proclamation vested
by the Constitution on Congress.
 Each House timely took action by accepting and assessing the
President's report, inviting and interpellating executive officials, and
deliberating among their fellow Senators or Representatives, before
finally voting in favor of expressing support for President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216 and against convening a joint session with the
other House.

Manner in Which Congress Convenes in Joint Session

The Senate and Senate President Pimentel explained in their Consolidated
Comment that, by practice, the two Houses of Congress adopt a concurrent
resolution when holding a joint session, and only thereafter do the Houses
adopt the rules to be observed for that particular joint session.
 There is no general body of Rules applicable to a joint session of
Congress. Based on parliamentary practice and procedure, the
Senate and House of Representatives only adopt Rules for a joint
session on an ad hoc basis and only after both Houses agree to
convene in joint session through a Concurrent Resolution. The Rules
for a Joint Session become functus officio after the purpose of the
joint session has been achieved.
 The usual procedure for holding a joint session is for both Houses to
first adopt a Concurrent Resolution to hold a joint session. This is
done in either of two (2) ways:
o (1) Both the Senate and the House of Representatives
simultaneously adopt a Concurrent Resolution — an example
would be when the two (2) Houses inform the President that
they are ready to receive his State of the Nation Address; or
o (2) One House passes its own resolution and sends it to the
other House for the latter's concurrence.

Fortun Not on All Fours with This Case

Fortun is not an applicable judicial precedent to this case. The factual
background of Fortun is not on all fours with this case.
 In Fortun, the Senate expressed through a resolution its objection to
President Arroyo's proclamation for being unconstitutional, and both
the Senate and the House of Representatives adopted concurrent
resolutions to convene in joint session for the purpose of revoking the
proclamation.
 In this case, on the other hand, the Senate and the House of
Representatives each adopted a resolution expressing support for
President Duterte's proclamation. Both Houses of Congress also

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 voted against convening in joint session.
 The word "automatic" in Fortun referred to the duty or power of
Congress to review the proclamation of martial law and/or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It did not
refer to convening a joint session of Congress.

No Violation of the Right to Information on Matters of Public Concern

Congress did not violate the public’s right to information when it did not
convene in joint session.
 The Court was not swayed by petitioners' argument that by not
convening in joint session, Congress violated the public's right to
information.
 The records show that both Houses of Congress conducted
deliberations on President Duterte's proclamation, albeit separately.
 It should also be noted that the public's right to information on matters
of national security is not absolute. When such matters are being
taken up in Congress, whether in separate or joint sessions,
Congress has the discretion to determine the manner in which the
proceedings are to be conducted.
o Sessions are generally open to the public, but each House
may decide to hold an executive session due to the
confidential nature of the subject matter to be discussed.
o Rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives
provides: Section 82. Sessions Open to the Public. —
Sessions shall be open to the public. However, when the
security of the State or the dignity of the House or any of its
Members are affected by any motion or petition being
considered, the House may hold executive sessions.
o It is clear that matters affecting the security of the state are
considered confidential and must be discussed and
deliberated upon in an executive session.The government
may withhold certain types of information from the public,
such as state secrets regarding military, diplomatic, and other
national security matters.

Court Cannot Compel Congress by Mandamus to Convene in Joint Session

The Court has no authority to compel the Senate and the House of
Representatives to convene in joint session absent a clear ministerial duty on
its part to do so under the Constitution and in complete disregard of the
separate actions already undertaken by both Houses on Proclamation No.
216, including their respective decisions to no longer hold a joint session and
not to revoke the Proclamation.

Certiorari Also Unwarranted

In the same vein, there is no cause for the Court to grant a writ of certiorari.
The two Houses of Congress decided to no longer hold a joint session only
after deliberations among their Members and putting the same to a vote in

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 accordance with their respective rules of procedure.
Congress did not gravely abuse its discretion when it did not jointly convene
upon the President's issuance of Proclamation No. 216 prior to expressing its
concurrence thereto. SaCIDT

CONCLUSION/HOLDING:
Petition for mandamus and certiorari denied. Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution does not compel Congress to
automatically convene in joint session whenever the President declares martial law or suspends the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. The constitutional provision merely requires Congress to vote jointly when revoking or extending the
President’s declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

H

SEPARATE OPINION:

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