Airbus A380:

A Risk Management Framework

Appasaheb Naikal
MSc Knowledge management
Wee Kim School of Communication and Information
Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore - 637718
Email: naikalab@gmail.com

Dissertation Guide
Dr. Alton Chua
Associate Professor
Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore - 637718
E-mail: altonchua@ntu.edu.sg

Keywords: People management; Risk Management; Change management; Cultural

diversity

ABSTRACT
Airbus – A subsidiary of EADS is one of the World’s leading commercial aircraft

manufacturers. Its customer focus, technological innovations and manufacturing

efficiencies, and product offering have resulted in it becoming one of the leading

companies in the aviation industry. However, it stunned the aviation world in 2006-2007

by announcing significant Airbus A380 production delays. Further its 2007 production

quota for the A380 was reduced to one from twenty five. The cost relating to these

shortfalls was more than $6.8 billion as a result of penalties, higher cost of production

and order cancellations. The delays of up to eighteen months in the production of the

Airbus were the result of several challenges including wiring problems; non-

compatibility of software’s used at the different Airbus factories and production sites, etc.

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The A380 project was also delayed as a result of national rivalries between France and

Germany, a clumsy management structure, and lack of visionary leadership.

In the following analysis we have made use of Willcocks and Margett’s (Willcocks and

Margett, 1991) Risk Assessment Model which is comprised of six components, namely

History, internal context, external context, content, process and Risk outcomes to analyze

and describe what went wrong with the Airbus A380 project. Further this study

emphasizes the importance of managing the risk factors associated with global

collaborative projects. It also highlights how theoretical models can be applied to real

world cases. This research also shows that projects cannot be successful without

comprehensive consideration of the organizational, social and political factors. As an

additional contribution of this study we have investigated the nature and magnitude of

theimpact of the A380 delay on aviation industry and aircraft makers.

Introduction
For the last 50 years, the United States has been the leading supplier of large aircraft to

the world. However, recent changes in the global aircraft industry structure and market

have affected the U.S. industry’s continued dominance. Most significant has been the rise

of European aircraft manufacturing though Brazil and Canada have made relatively small

inroads in commercial aircraft production. Looking into the future variety of factors

including technology breakthroughs, and the high growth rate in Asian market has

enabled new players like Russia and a few other Asian countries to enter the market. The

Russian aircraft industry, in particular, has had a long history in aeronautical design and

manufacturing that almost collapsed during the break-up of the Soviet Union. But, with

the recent efforts by the government to force industry consolidation, Russia might emerge

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as the next key aircraft maker. It is also important to recognize that in order to achieve

cost efficiencies, aircraft makers are working more closely with Asian suppliers on parts

supply. Through this partnership, the knowledge transfer process has enhanced, thus,

enabling Asian’s understanding of aircraft and manufacturing processes and the

likelihood that a fully fledged aircraft industry will emerge in Asis and, in particular,

China.

Recently the International Air Transport Association (IATA) released an industry traffic

forecast indicating that the world’s airlines can expect to welcome some 3.6 billion

passengers in 2016. That’s about 800 million more than the 2.8 billion passengers carried

by airlines in 2011(Airbus, 2012a). Although both Airbus and Boeing manufacture

aircraft, do not focus on precisely the same market segments. While Airbus focuses only

on the commercial aerospace sector, Boeing focuses on the defense sector as well.

Boeing manufactures military aircraft which enables them to capitalize of a higher

production level as a result of designs that have both military and civilian use.

In the civilian sphere Airbus and Boeing manufacture aircraft of various seating

capacities. The key segment that they compete on is the 100-200 seats category. With the

introduction of A380 by Airbus has created another segment of competition which

achieves a much improved cost efficiency per passenger compared to existing Boeing

(and Airbus) products. The increased competition has also seen an increase in Airbus

revenue. The new Airbus strategy has been accompanied by a major delay of 10 years

which has cost the company its image and business, and has had a significant negative

impact on the aviation industry in general. Below we discuss a variety of other major

projects related to aviation that have experienced significant delay and cost overruns.

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Denver International Airport Delayed: A High Profile Saga
Denver International Airport is America’s largest international airport and the second

largest in the world (Gilbert, 1993). The airport's computerized baggage system, which

was supposed to reduce flight delays by cutting down waiting times at luggage carousels,

and reduce labour costs significantly, turned into a complete disaster. It was scheduled to

be fully operational from October 31, 1993 with a single system for all three concourses,

but was postponed to February 28, 1995 when it was finally operational with separate

systems for each concourse. The original estimated construction cost for this system was

$186 million but this grew by $1 million per day during months of modifications and

repairs. Incoming flights at the airport's B Concourse hardly made use of this system, and

only United, Denver International Airport's dominant airline, used it only for its outgoing

flights. (Montealegre & Keil, 2000).

Heathrow Airport Terminal 5

Another high publicized and high technology aviation failure was 'The Heathrow Airport

Terminal 5' project. London’s Heathrow Airport’s Terminal 5 opened to public on 14

March 2008, after almost twenty years of planning, with cost incurring around 8.5 billion

dollars and 100 million hours in manpower. It is a glass and concrete and steel marvel,

and the largest free standing building in the UK, with over 10 miles in suitcase moving

belts, and was expected to be a solution to the Airport's major congestion problems. But

on opening day the terminal and its systems turned into a big embarrassment as they just

did not work. (Atkin, et al., 2007). The display boards either did not display any

information or displayed incorrect information. Systems that were meant to control

payment for the parking structures did not function properly. Counters were not open at

the check-in desks at 4 AM which led to ticket holders having to start lining up, causing a

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backlog that certainly didn't help the launch. In addition, by noon, 20 flights had been

canceled due to baggage handling problems. As with the Denver International Airport the

baggage handling system was intended to be the corner stone of the new terminal

providing streamlined handling of baggage improving the experience of the travelers and

the efficiency of baggage handling (Bizley, 2005).

Dreamliner 787 of Boeing

Boeing, the all time competitor of Airbus, delayed 787 Dreamliner project and has

already announced delays couple of times. Boeing 787 Dreamliner planned to enter

service in May 2008 but due to multiple delays for various reasons It entered commercial

service on October 26, 2011, costing the aircraft maker billions of dollars in

compensation payments, and forcing it to take at least a short-term loss on the

programme (Economist, 2011)

Airbus A380
From all the above examples it is clear that most of the companies that design complex

and high-tech products have their horror stories and Airbus is not an exception in this

matter. Airbus’s development of A380 which is nicknamed as “Superjumbo” suffered

major delays and cost overturns because of incompatibilities in the design of the

electrical harnesses of various sections of the plane’s fuselage (Sosa and et al 2007) in the

later stages of production. These mistakes led the loss of Airbus’s reputation and

important changes in management structure.

Research Objectives
In one performs an Internet search there is an extensive literature relating to aviation

industry projects and their attendant major delays and cost overruns. However, there have

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been no detailed scholarly attempt to find out that how much these delays or failures cost

the industry and the companies involved. In the following paper we have investigated

how much and to what extent these delays cost the industry. We have also investigated

how these failures and overruns can be reduced in future.

The main research objectives of this paper are as follows:

• Identification of the factors that contributed to the delay of Airbus A380

• Investigation of the role of IT in Aviation industry

• Investigation of the impact of delays on Aviation Industry and aircraft makers

The Role of Information Technology (IT) in Aviation Industry

In the last two decades the aviation industry has undergone mamy changes. The

deregulation of parts of the aviation industry, economic cycle trends, and breakthroughs

in Information Technology (IT) have resulted in the significant restructuring of the

aviation industry demand and services (Nucciareli and Gastaldi, 2008). Thanks to

extensive innovations and breakthroughs in the aviation industry, the benefit of air travel

has become accessible and affordable to travellers of relatively modest means all over the

world. However, the increasing demand for eco-efficient industry, that creates economic

and social value with less environmental impact, are renewing pressure on aircraft

manufacturers to innovate and develop more and more eco-friendly aircraft.

It is appropriate to observe that there in less than 50 years, technological advances have

reduced fuel consumption and carbon dioxide (CO2) emission by 70%, noise by 75% and

unburned hydrocarbons by 90% (Airbus, 2007b). Of course this progress did not happen

overnight. Aircraft manufactures engaged in a lot of trial and error, research and

development and became involved with many projects requiring the taking of

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considerable risk and the development of approaches to managing these projects and their

associated risks.

The management of risk in the case of project is first explicitly mentioned in PMI’s 1987

edition of a guide to the project management body of knowledge (project management

Institute, 2001). Generally, risk is defined as the uncertainty about the project task

duration and cost related to all stages of project life cycle. Numerous risk assessment

models have been developed to date for analyzing Information Systems (IS) project risk.

Most of these highlight the important risk factors associated with IS projects, but not all

identify the importance of organizational issues and the overall environment and context

within which the IS is required to function. This is a significant oversight since we

maintain that to thoroughly analyze and accommodate relevant aspects of the

organizational environment and context during the design stage of an IS if an IS is to

function smoothly and successfully in an organization.

In the following section we will consider some of the advanced technologies used in the

Airbus A380 which contributed to the challenges in managing the A380 project.

The Technologies Used in Airbus A380

Airbus adapted many advanced technologies and techniques in development of the A380.

Some of them are discussed below

Avionics Full Duplex Switched Ethernet (AFDX) AFDX is an avionics data network

based on commercial 10/100Mbit switched Ethernet network. AFDX uses a special

protocol to provide deterministic timing and redundancy management providing secure

and reliable communications of critical and non-critical data. AFDX data

communications are used on the Airbus A380/A350/A400M, Boeing B787 Dreamliner

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(ARINC664), ARJ21 and Super jet 100. AFDX and ARINC664 are being used as the

backbone for all systems including flight controls, cockpit avionics, air-conditioning,

power utilities, fuel systems, landing gear and others (Aerospace Testing International,

2005) .

Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) IMA was mainly used in advanced defense

aircraft. But many of A380 controls are based on IMA concepts. With IMA many

applications run on a standardized common hardware using a distributed operating

system. Airbus estimates that its IMA approach cuts in half the part numbers of processor

units for the new A380 avionics suite (Ramsey, 2007a)

Hydraulicssystem and Electrical Systems: Large sized aircraft like the A380 have

significant weight issues. To reduce the weight Airbus used only two hydraulic systems

instead of traditional three centralized hydraulic systems and provided a third electrical.

Led and High intensity Discharge (HID): Airbus used LED based illumination systems

for lighting different areas of A380 aircraft. LEDs have low electricity consumption

arelower in weight than conventional lighting and have a longer life span. LEDs are said

to last 30-60 times longer than any conventional lighting system. Hence Airbus preferred

LEDs for the A380 aircraft Ramsey, 2007b)

In this following section we review some risk assessment models before adopting a

suitable model for this study.

Risk Assessment Models

What is Risk Management?

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In today’s complex business environment managing risk effectively has become integral

part of project management. Careful risk management helps project managers to

minimize the known and unknown risks involved in projects. Failure to perform effective

risk management can cause projects to exceed budget, fall behind the schedule, miss

critical performance targets, or exhibit a combination of these troubles. In 1999, the

Standish group reported that only 26% of software projects were successful. Successful

project completion depends significantly on the early identification of the risks involved

in that project. Certainly there are a number of other factors as well that determine

whether a project will be success or not. But, failing to perform adequate risk

management is one of the key factors that is likely to lead to the failure of projects.

Risk refers to the possibility that a given activity or system fails to achieve its intended

goal, and that this failure causes has negative consequences. (Scalliet, 2006) Risk

management thus relates to the process of risk minimization. For any given task, risks can

be minimized, but typically one cannot eliminate risk completely whilst still engaging in

the task.

Risk-adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC)

Development of the RAROC methodology began in the late 1970s, initiated by a group

of people at Bankers Trust. Their main idea behind this development was to measure the

risk of the bank’s credit portfolio, as well as the amount of equity capital necessary to

limit the exposure of the bank’s depositors and other debt holders to a specified

probability of loss (James, 1996). Since then, a number of other large banks have

developed RAROC or RAROC-like systems with the aim, in most cases, of quantifying

the amount of equity capital necessary to support all of their operating activities -- fee-

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based and trading activities, as well as traditional lending. Thus since this risk

management approach is mainly used in banking and insurance sector it is not an

appropriate fit with the Airbus project.

Pro-active Risk Management- Smith and Merritt

Pro-active Risk Management (Smith and Merritt, 2002) evaluates the probability of risk

event occurring, risk event drivers, risk events, the probability of impact and the impact

drivers prior to the risk actually taking place. Smith and Marritt have developed and

defined a practical approach to risk management that is focused on new product

development. Their primary purpose behind the development of this approach was to

enable product development teams to identify surprises and reduce the disruption.

As we have noteda number of risk assessment models have been developed to analyze

Information Systems (IS) project risk. Even though most of them highlight the important

characteristics of risk in IS projects, the importance of organizational issues, work

environment, internal and external context within which the IS would function have been

ignored. If an IS needs to function successfully in an organization, one has to assess

organizational environment and context thoroughly and need to accommodate them in the

IS design system (Jeffcott and Johnson, 2002). According to Webster’s dictionary the

tern environment refers to “that which environs or surrounds; surrounding conditions,

influences, or forces, by which living forms are influenced and modified in their growth

and development”. In this study, we limit the term environment to Aviation Industry and

Airbus, in the same dictionary context defined as “the set of facts or circumstances that

surround a situation or event.” The environment and context of the Airbus are unique in

their own way because of the organizational structure, which is lead by four different

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national consortium members. Most of the previous risk assessment models deeply

focused on technical factors and have ignored other factors like environment, culture, and

work context.

Willcocks and Margett’s Risk Assessment Model

Willcocks and Margett’s risk assessment model is devised based on the work of

Pettigrew and Whipp's 1991; (Pettigrew, et al., 1992). Willcoks and Margett developed

six interrelated conceptual categories that can be utilized in analyzing the development,

introduction, and use of information technologies (Jeffcott and Johnson, 2002).

Why we proposed using the Willcocks and Margett’s Risk

Assessment Model?
As discussed above, the RAROC model was primarily devised to measure a bank’s credit

portfolio and equity capital risk factors. In contrast, Pro-active Risk Management- was

developed by Smith and Merritt with a focus on new product development. Both of these

models address particular sectors and have factors that they do not take into account such

as the history of the organization, the internal context, the external context, and the

processes of the organization that play a central role in any project's success or failure.

Willcocks and Margett’s risk assessment model consists of six components and each of

the components can be assessed in the context of Airbus. Each component of Willcocks

and Margett’s risk assessment model is elaborated below in the context of Airbus.

History: The organizational history of Airbus and key developments, its project

management experience and success and failure stories.

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Internal Context: Refers to organizational characteristics of Airbus like structure, its

business strategy, its industrial contacts and supply chains, its IS, and its project

management experience.

External Context: Includes economic, political situations, government policies, market

and industry situation at Airbus partner countries, and their relation with investors and

funding agencies.

Content: Refers to project risk factors, project size and complexity, technical uncertainty

and its impact on the project.

Process: Refers to the way the project is carried out and how the issues are perceived.

For example project management, team experience, staffing stability, and user

commitment.

Risk outcomes: Refers to planned or unanticipated and desirable or otherwise outcomes.

For example cost, time technical performance, operational efficiency, and user

acceptance.

History of Aviation Industry

The airline industry is one of the first industries to be influenced by economic and

political events whether positive or negative. The industry suffered a considerable

downturn as a result of the 2001 global economic slump, followed by the September 11

terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the current downturn in air travel has had a particularly

sever impact not just on the airlines but also on lessors and aircraft manufacturers, which

have seen their order books shrink significant as a result of numerous cancellations and

postponements (Costa, et al., 2002). Costa does not consider that rather then recover

airlines are likely to continue to struggle and their putative recovery is likely to be

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complicated and difficult. Indeed, most signs suggest that the current slump is likely to be

worse then previous downwturns and that the industry emerging at the end of it will be

significantly transformed compared to the current industry (Thompson, 2003).

Background of EADS and Airbus

Airbus was founded in 1970 by a consortium of French and German companies. In 1971,

the Spanish company, Construcciones Aeronauticas S.A. (CASA) joined the consortium.

British Aerospace became a full partner of the consortium by end of 1970s. The

company introduced its first aircraft, the A300B at the Paris Air Show in 1992. Airbus

was initially headquartered in Paris, but, in 1974 it moved to Toulouse, France.

Gradually, by the end of 1980’s, it became one of the most significant global aircraft

manufacturers joining Boeing. The A320 which launched in 1984 went on to become one

of the best selling aircraft of Airbus. A commitment to cintinuous innovation has resulted

in improvements in aircraft efficiency and performance ensuring the production of

competitive products over many decades.Innovation has also allowed Airbus to new

aircrafts such as the A321 in 1989, the A319 in 1992, the A340 four engine aircraft in

1993 and the A330 twin engine aircraft in 1994 (Datamonitor, 2008). Airbus officially

announced the A380 project in 2000. It was originally scheduled to enter service at the

end of 2007.

It has been argued, by Ian Massey (who was the financial controller of Airbus SAS’s

predecessor, Airbus Industrie, from 1991-2001) that the company has been plagued with

internal conflicts among its partners since its inception. Ian Massey, Now Streiff must

end the finger pointing between the French and Germans (Rothman, 2008).

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Insider trading: In March 2006, EADS, the parent company of Airbus, reported that

certain executives and shareholders had sold shares during a pre-approved window. Soon

afterwards, EADS announced significant delays of production of the Airbus A380 super

jumbo jet. French market regulators said they had found evidence of insider trading at

EADS, Following nineteen months of investigation (Cable News Network, 2008). Airbus

Chief Executive Tom Enders said, the company recognizes what went wrong. “The

Underlying problem was the lack of integration,” he said, “further we are taking

voluminous lessons from that.” (Michaels, 2006b)

Dual-management System:
From the day of its inception, Airbus had a dual management system which led to open

national rivalries between France and German for Airbus control. A report by the French

Senate identified rivalries between executives and team in Frankfurt (Germany) and

Toulouse (France) as being primarily responsible for delays that have wiped more than 5

billion Euros off the company‘s profit forecasts for 2006-2010 (Vandore, 2007). On July

16 2007, Shareholders of EADS agreed to end its cumbersome dual management

structure. Frenchman Louis Gallois became and the CEO of EADS, backed by a German

national as Chairman, with a second German heading up Airbus operations. Apart from

these changes, the top three executive posts will have incumbents with alternate

nationalities every five years. A summit between French President Nicolas Sarkozy and

German Chancellor Angela Merkel was mainly aimed to eliminate the sorts of rivalries

that have been blamed for series of costly delays to Airbus A 380. Both leaders hailed

the deal as a victory for EADS saying it will give company more power and efficient

management structure. Later, in a press conference Sarkozy, along with Merkel, said that

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“France hasn’t won over Germany and it’s not Germany that has won over France. It’s

EADS that won” (Vandore, 2007). According to the new deal Frenchman Louis Gallois

become sole in-charge of EADS and was supported by a German as Chairman. The top

three executive posts would swipe alternate nationalities for every five years. This system

looked like “old wine in new bottle” because dual management still existed. Hence, Jean-

Francois, a representative of Airbus's main workforce union rightly said, “nothing has

changed “with new management structure. “The actors have been shifted around but the

struggles for power and influence will continue” he said (Vandore, 2007). This rotation

policy was the beginning of the solution for the problems. Some industry experts, such

as, Zafar Khan, a London based aerospace and defence analyst with Societe Generale

welcomed this move as a first step. He further said, “The way governance was organized

previously meant that you ended up with a lot of deadlocks on major decision and there

was no mechanism for solving those issues. The real test of the overhaul will be when

some decision has to be taken”.

Cultural and National Rivalries Issue

The management of Airbus and its parent EADS had paralyzed tensions between its

French and German shareholders due to cultural and national issues among the two

nationals. Airbus and EADS appeared incapable of taking strategic decisions without

resorting to public displays of brinkmanship. Airbus has had three chief executives in less

than 12 months, four in two years due to national rivalries. Louis Gallois, the CEO of

Airbus flayed around Europe briefing government and trade union leaders about the

necessity of embarking on a drastic restructuring of Airbus, and he tried to build a

consensus on the necessary measures about the Power8 restructuring programme, which

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he was proposing (Done, 2007a). Mr Gallois is one of France’s most experienced

industrialists with an intimate knowledge of the workings of the French government. He

was said to be held in high regard by his German colleagues, but even he has been unable

to overcome the deep-seated French-German rivalry. This national rivalry has had a great

impact on the A380 productions which lead to the delay. Tom Enders responded that

“Power8 is no walk in the park. It’s about revamping the competitiveness and

profitability of our Airbus operations and requires tough and painful decisions”. He

further said, the burdens resulting from the power8 programme, also the opportunities,

the future industrial and technological core activities have to be shared in a fair and

balanced way. Both are possible and we are intensively discussing to find the right

solution.”

Technological Reasons:
Use of incompatible programs takes the rap, but behind that is a management team

cobbled together from formerly separate companies- Carol Matlack – Bossiness Week

Paris Bureau Chief.

On October 5 2006, Business week reported that “It sounds too simple to be true. Airbus

A380 mega jet is now full two years behind schedule and the reason, CEO Christian

Streiff admitted on October 3, is that design software used at different Airbus factories

were not compatible”. “They didn’t have uniform design tools throughout the system and

that’s biting them badly” says Hans Weber, CEO of Tecop International Inc. a San Diego

based aviation consulting firm. Further, Weber comments that “The lack of uniform

software, to develop what Airbus has billed as the greatest achievement of its 36 years

history, suggests that former CEO Noel Forgeard failed to integrate the plane maker’s

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national units, into a single team to compete with Boeing Co. This turned out as one of

the costliest blunders in the history of commercial aerospace”.

Wiring Problems
When Airbus engineers began with the final assembly process in Toulouse, the Airbus

headquarters, the rear fuselages made in Hamburg (Germany) were supposed to arrive in

Toulouse with all their wiring ready to plug into the forward parts coming in from

factories in north and west France. But the 500km of wiring in the two halves did not

match up. The wiring problem primarily resulted from the failure to use the latest three-

dimensional modeling software. In addition, nobody anticipated the effect of using

lightweight aluminum wiring rather than copper, which makes bends in the wiring looms

bulkier (Economist, 2005).

“The various Airbus locations had their own legacy software, methods, procedures, and

Airbus never succeeded in unifying all these efforts” says Hans Weber, CEO of San

Diego based Aviation consultant Tecop international, who has close contacts with the

company’s German operations. (Matlack, 2006a) Further, businessweek.com reports that

experts familiar with Airbus design operations told that the Toulouse assembly plant used

the latest version of a sophisticated design software tool called CATIA made by France’s

Dassault systems (DASTY), an independent software unit of French aircraft maker

Dassault Aviation. In contrast, Hamburg (Germany) design centre used an older version

of the CATIA software of 1880s made. Due to this version difference, design

specifications could not flow easily back and forth between these two systems. Munich

based Robert Weigi, (the director- professional services for proficiency, who specializes

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in helping manufacturers integrate different design software), says “the two systems are

completely different, they have nothing to do with each other” (Matlack, 2006b)

CATIA Design Software

The real problem looks to be a lack of leadership at the top levels of Airbus. Somebody

inside Airbus must have known that engineers in Germany and Spain were using CATIA

V4 while CATIA V5 was in use in the UK and France. Somebody made a decision not to

push for single compatible standard, or to at least invest in a translator system. As a

result, Airbus has already announced earnings losses of $2.54 billion over the next three

years (Newton, Randall, 2006). The above statement clearly indicates how Airbus

leadership ignored the software compatible matter. The incompatible software products

are CATIA V4 and CATIA V5, 3D CAD software from Dassault systems. An expert says

that there is no secret that these versions of CATIA are incompatible at the file format

level, and CAD Software Company was well aware of it (Newton, 2006).

Besides using different versions of CATIA there were also reports that Airbus designed

the A380 \using software supplied by a different supplier called “Parametric Technology

(PMTC)” of Needham, mass. But Parametric has a different version of story. It claims its

software is not used for the A380 electrical harnesses. Though Dassault Systems have

been widely accepted as global leader in aircraft design software for more than a decade,

Airbus didn’t buy this software until 2000, which leads to speculation from insiders that

“out of rivalry with Dassault Aviation, Airbus resisted moving to Dassault”.

Economic and Political Issues

When Dollar sinks profit dry up: According to EDAS chief executive Louis Gallois, the

rise of the Euro against the dollar in 2007 had cost the company at least one billion in

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operating profit. So Airbus needs to sell more than 400 A380 to break even because of

series of production delays. Airbus costs are in Euros but sales are in USD hence Airbus

lost from the weak dollar. Because aircraft sales are priced in dollars, but Airbus builds

planes mainly in Europe, every 10% rise in the Euro’s value against the dollar slashes

more than $1.6 billion off its bottom line profit (Done & Wiesmann, 2007a). Apart from

Dollar weakness, the Power8 program which carried out to trim head-office, costs and,

other overheads by 30% which amid for a 20% improvement in productivity over the

next four years without mass firing. Early 2007, Airbus announced its so called Power8

restructuring program (Done & Wiesmann, 2007b) it figured it needed to cut costs by $ 3

billion annually to offset losses due to weaker dollar.

Above literature review describes the circumstances surrounded the delay of Airbus

A380 super jumbo. Indeed it’s been a bumpy ride. Building leviathan plane which almost

ran two years behind the schedule and a $6.8 billion over budget created chaos at Airbus.

Communication failures and chauvinistic conflicts that had existed between the

company’s French and German operations exploded into full-down crises (Michaels,

2007a). Later, when A380 reached to assembly level, software problems like

mismatching CAD software file formats, use of different versions of CATIA software

and later decreasing value of dollar against Euro caused the over-all problem. In chapter

Four, these causes have been analyzed by using the Willcocks and Margett’s risk

assessment framework to quantify and assess the impact of each of the reasons.

Methodology
Data and information for this work are drawn from various sources like news reports

from leading news agencies, press releases, news wire, television interviews, transcripts

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and congressional hearings like LexisNexis and Factiva. Meta search engines like

WebCrawler, Copernic and so on were used to locate the information related to Airbus

A380 delay discussed on various on line discussion forums and blogs. These sources

represent different narrative styles and facts of recounting the Airbus A380 development

process.

Data Collection Methodology

While searching sources of data I have adopted pearl-growing method. This pearl-

growing method involves relying on a limited set of keywords to search terms. This is

another technique that many searchers use sometimes unconsciously.

What is Citation Pearl Growing Method?

Citation Pearl Growing is the process of using the characteristics of a relevant and

authoritative article, called a pearl, to search for other relevant and authoritative

materials. Citation Pearl Growing is the parallel process of using the characteristics of a

relevant and authoritative website to search for other relevant and authoritative websites

(Ramer, 2005) Citation Pearl Growing often involves several repetitions of the basic

strategy. The number of repetitions depends on the success of previous repetitions and the

amount of material needed (Hawkins & Wagers, 1982). Although general search engines

can sometimes provide satisfactory results, citation pearl growing helps in searching the

web, because no search engine crawls all websites and search engines only bring some

order to the wildly disorganized Internet (LaGesse, 2004). Users who find a limited

number of authoritative and relevant sites can use the process to find similar sites. In the

beginning of the search, different combinations of keywords like “delay”, “slow” Airbus,

Airbus A380, and Airbus Jumbo Jet were used. Returned hits and web pages were

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analyzed using TextSTAT (2.8 Version). TextSTAT is a simple programme for the

analysis of texts. It reads ASCII/ANSI texts (in different encodings) and HTML files

(directly from the internet) and produces word frequency lists and concordances. This

version includes a web-spider which reads as many pages as you want from a particular

website and puts them in a TextSTAT-corpus. The new news-reader puts news messages

in a TextSTAT-readable corpus file (Hüning, 2001)

TextSTAT also reads MS Word and OpenOffice files (OOo 1 (.sxw) and 2 (.odt)). No

conversion is required, and we just add the files to the corpus. Later new combination

keywords like “Airbus and delay”, and “Aviation delays” were used to get more reports.

The search has covered material from 1989 to June 2009. Reports published after June

2009 is not considered for this study.

Coding Scheme and Procedure

The data collected were analyzed by adopting systemic textual analysis. In the 1st step all

documents were coded. The following details are captured from this coding design:

• Reasons behind delay (RD): Is a binary variable coded either “yes” or “no”

denoting the presence and absence of reasons related to delay respectively

• Brief description of each delay (DD): Variables were derived during the coding

process. Because there could be more than one delay reasons in a document,

which may lead to multiple values of PI and TP.

• People involved delay (PI): So PI includes a set of binary variables referring to

specific reasons.

• Time period of delay (TP): is set of binary variables, denoting three distinct time

periods; pre- Airbus A380, Airbus A380 development, and post Airbus A380.

21
Sources of Data
The data for this study have been collected from seven to eight sources, namely, news

paper articles, news wire, international weekly magazines, television interview

transcripts, congressional reports, and the internet, by using pearl- growing method. Total

of 2095 documents were yielded. The same data is shown in the below table:

Table 1: Sources and number of documents analyzed.

Type of Sources Sources Number of Documents

Financial Times, Wall street

Newspapers 700
Journals, etc.

Associated press, knight

Newswire 220
Ridder/ Tribune, etc.

International weekly The Economist, Business week,

800
magazines Time.

TV interview transcripts CNN, NPR CBS. 150

Congressional press releases,

Congressional reports 25
congressional testimony, etc.

Blogs, Daily Post (Liverpool),

Business daily, Online

Web based publications 150
discussion forums, company

websites

Industry trade press 50

Total 2095

22
Methods of Data Analysis
Out of 2095 documents analyzed, a total of 1400 documents were found to cite causes

related to the contribution of the delay of Airbus A380. Many of them have citied

multiple reasons ranging from cultural differences between France and German workers,

billing problems (spending in Euros, billing customers in USD), assembly problems,

software problems and most importantly, the organizational structure behind the delay.

Data has been validated by referring to more than one sources like newspaper article,

journal reports etc.

Airbus announced the A380 project in 2000 and subsequently started its production in

January 2002 projecting that it would deliver its first A380 to Singapore Airlines in

March 2006. But, it went on to deliver the first A380 on 15th October 2007 after a 19

month delay. The A380 debacle plunged Airbus into losses in 2006 as it suffered billions

of Euros of cost overturns and penalty payments in the struggle to bring the A380 super

jumbo, the most ambitious project undertaken by the European Aerospace Industry

(Done, 2007b). The A380 problems have exposed deeps flaws in the organization and

development processes at Airbus. Airbus had five different chief executives in just over

two years. This literature reviews also reveals how EADS, the Airbus parent company,

struggled to end months of internal fighting among its Franco-German shareholders over

the top management structure. Studies also reveal that delays were caused most

importantly in manufacturing and installation of electrical systems and wiring harness.

Research Ethics
Most ethical issues in research fall into one of the four categories;

• Protection from harm

23
 • Informed consent

• Right to privacy

• Honesty with professional colleagues (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005).

This work has honored these research ethics while collecting the data. Most of the data

collected for this work is secondary in nature and has been collected from public domain

and paid databases. Hence, this work does not breach any company’s confidential code

matter. No interview has been conducted because of the same reason. Motive of this

research work is not to look into political or commercial interest of the company. The

main focus of the study is to find out the reason behind the delivery delays of Airbus

A380.

Technological reasons like wiring, CATIA design software problem and integration of

software usage thought Airbus factories were not only caused the delay of A380. Social

factors like cultural differences between French and German workers, organization

structure problem, have also caused the delay of Airbus A380. In the next section, we

will analyze delay factors in detail by using the Willcocks and Margett’s (1991) risk

assessment.

Discussion

Findings indeed point to various directions like political, socio-cultural, economical,

organizational, and technological reasons that led to the delay of jumbo jet plane A380.

When European consortium “Airbus Industrie” (now Airbus) announced the development

of the World's largest plane, the A380, many aviation industry experts wondered whether

the industry really required such a big plane. But Airbus announced this project based on

24
its prediction of industry growth by 2020. The June 5th 2000 issue of Newsweek

described the AXXX (which later become A380) as a “paper air plane” that would never

fly, and never should. The magazine reported that critics said its sheer bulk would

damage runways, stir up gale-force winds with defining noise, and overwhelm airport

terminals by disgorging mobs of 600 people. The Airbus A380 plane that many thought

would never be built, flew its first test flight on 27th April 2005 from Toulouse, France,

and made its first commercial flight from Singapore to Sydney on 25th October 2007

with Singapore Airlines (Pierce, 2005). To add to its efficiency credit, it generates only

half the noise of a 747 Boeing flight is very fuel efficient, and burns 12 percent less fuel

per passenger than a 747.

Airbus made it possible with a lot of trial and error and a couple of delay announcements

that cost the company loss of millions of dollars. In this section, Willcocks and Margett’s

risk assessment model has been used to analyze the problems related to the making of

Airbus A380.

Findings and Overview of Airbus

From the day of its inception Airbus is in news for the wrong reasons mainly because of

its complex management structure. It is always said that European Aeronautic Defence

and Space Co. (EADS); consortium formed by France, Germany, United Kingdom, and

Spain are the ring master of Airbus. Airbus was established in 1970 by a consortium of

French and German Companies. By late 1970, British Aerospace became a full partner of

the consortium. In 1971, the Spanish Company Construcciones Aeronauticas S.A.

(CASA), joined this consortium. In other words, since its inception in 1970, Airbus had

25
operated as a loose consortium of aerospace companies of France, Germany, Britain, and

Spain.

Use of Willcocks and Margett’s Risk Assessment Model

As described earlier in section 2.3.4, Willcocks and Margett’s Risk Assessment Model

comprises 6 components, namely history, internal context, external context, content, and

process and risk outcomes. Same components have been used to describe the issues in the

Airbus A380 project.

Digram1: The six interconnected factors of Willcocks & Margett’s (1991) risk assessment model

IT-RELATED
CHANGE

HISTORY CONTEXT

CONTEXT

(EXTERNAL) OUTCOMES

PROCESS

CONTEXT

(INTERNAL)

History
EADS which was formed by merging Aerospatiale Matra of France, DaimlerChrysler

Aerospace of Germany, and Construcciones of Spain, took 80% stake in the company.

And BAE systems took 20% stake. In 2001, Airbus became a fully integrated company

26
when EADS and BAE systems transferred all of their Airbus related assets to the newly

formed company and became shareholders in it.

According to estimation, in the last 30 years, European Union (EU) taxpayers have paid

about $15 billion to cover the cost overturns in EADS projects this company seems

vulnerable to political pressures from all consortium members because of its various

factories in partner countries. In October 2006 EADS confirmed rumors that the delay to

the A380 had increased to nearly two years (Refer Appendix I for Chronology of Airbus

A380 Development) and spelled out the financial consequences. Only one aircraft would

be delivered the next year. The delay would knock a further Euro 4.8 billion ($ 6 billion)

off profits and Euro 6.3 billion off revenues at EADS between 2006 and 2010 (The

Economist, 2006a).

From its inception from 1970 to 2000, Airbus had a steady growth with a lot of

technological breakthroughs that helped the company to become the number one

commercial plane maker. Introduction of new air crafts like A320, A321, A319, A340

(four engine aircraft) and A330 (twin engine aircraft) further boosted its conference.

These products directly helped Airbus to widen its presence in aviation market and took

the company’s sales statistics curves ahead of its arch rival Boeing by ending its

monopoly in the sky. But national rivalry and other disputes like controlling important

projects and key positions of the company remained among partner nations and grew

wider along with company. This issue was clearly visible and had great influence in the

delay of A380 craft.

27
Internal Context
Since Airbus was established by four-nation consortium, it never had great character as

an organization. There were always differences of opinion, national revelry, and culture

issues mainly between French and German workers. Dual management system that was

practiced from the beginning at Airbus and EADS was an ugly and unrealistic practice in

this modern era. It was also the biggest hurdle in the way of Airbus becoming a world

class aviation company. Individuals and their interests were bigger than the organization.

If this could bring French president Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela

Merkel to the negotiating table, one can imagine the depth of this problem. On July 16th

2007, a summit between these two leaders was aimed at eliminating the sorts of rivalries

that have been blamed for a series of costly delays to Airbus super jumbo A380

(Vandore, 2007). Again, opinions are divided about the outcome of this summit. Some of

the insiders felt that “nothing has changed with new management structure the actors

have been shifted around but the struggles for power and influence will continue.” But

some industry analysts like Zafar Khan expressed that this rotation policy was beginning

of the solutions for the problems and the first step towards fixing organizational issues at

Airbus.

Insider trading is another major issue that troubled and damaged Airbus image in the

international market. Coincidently, Airbus announcement of delay in the production of

A380 and insider trading issue became public at the same time. This hurt Airbus's

sentiments. Though its impact on production of A380 was small, the A380 order book

was prime victim of this development.

28
External Context
France, Germany, Britain and Spain are politically and economically stable countries. But

national rivalry was inherent in Airbus and EADS because of multinational partners and

management representatives. This affected the development of A380 at a great extent.

Being member of the European Union, Airbus's spending are in Euros and it bills its

customers in US Dollars. During 2006 and 2007 value of US Dollar went down against

EURO. This cost the company millions of dollars in profit. This compounded the

pressure on A380 development. Because, as and when Airbus announced delivery delays,

some of A380 customers penalized the company for not meeting its deadlines and others

cancelled the order and switched over to Boeing. The Company also ruined its public

image by frustrating Indian officials by registering complaint against Air India when the

latter cancelled its order with Airbus and replaced them with Boeing.

Content
There is no doubt that development of Airbus A380 was one challenging and technology

driven project in the history of aviation industry till date. A380 was the first double-deck

passenger plane. The overall length of 72.7 meters, wing span of 78.9 meters, height of

24.1 meters, and weight of 544.3 tones with 555 seat aircraft, made the A380 the biggest

passenger aircraft. (Refer Appendix II for A380 specifications). When we look at Hans

Weber, CEO of Tecop international statement “the various Airbus locations had their

own legacy software, methods, procedures, and Airbus never succeeded in unifying all

these efforts” one can realize the complexity and risk involved in this project. But

interestingly this lack of integration among its various factories was due to internal

disputes among its management and lack of effective leadership. Use of different

versions of software, and wiring problems make us suspect the project management.

29
A380 is an ideal example of worst project management. All the above things force us to

conclude that A380 project is a victim of organizational circumstances.

Process
By overcoming all hurdles, Airbus A380 moved down to assembly line. Airbus is

clawing back. It is a magical turnaround at Airbus and much of this credit goes to few

mid level executives who found a way to fuse the company's balkanized units while

boardroom was in disarray. One of them is Rudiger, a 41 year old German engineer who

forced designers, engineers and assembly like workers at Airbus Germany factory

Hamburg to start cooperating. He also got tremendous support from Alain Carcasses; a

French engineering manager. Mr. Fuchs also coaxed French electrical specialists into

helping their German counterparts at an engineering office in Toulouse, France. Mr.

Fuchs visited Mr. Carcasses at Toulouse to hash out an emergency plan. According to the

plan, a group of German engineers would move to Toulouse and French engineers trained

them on French software and design methods. Even French engineers worked on German

parts of the A380 and reported to Mr. Fuchs as part of the plan (Michaels, 2007b)

Risk Outcomes
When this project is analyzed with Willcocks and Margett’s risk assessment model, the

obvious outcome is the delayed production of A380 plane with USD 6.8 billion over cost.

Most undesirable factor of this project is when Airbus engineers started final assembly of

A380; 500km of wiring in the two halves did not match up. The wiring problem was

caused due to non compatibility of three-dimensional modelling software (The

Economist, 2006b). Nobody bothered to check and confirm this matter till the project

reached it final stage. This speaks about how things are managed at Airbus. Thanks to

30
Mr. Fuchs who was desperate to finish an electrical test that airbus promised to its

customers. In a last effort to improve the productivity, he ordered his German engineers

to move off the factory floor and finish their work inside the A380 itself, to better advise

assembly workers labouring on the cables. This move increased the productivity to

double within weeks and went on to clear the clear test fly.

French Senators Jean-Francois Le grand and Roland Ries, who have investigated Airbus

and EADS for six months, found that problems with this A380 project were due to

national rivalries, a clumsy management structure, and lack of surveillance by private

shareholders like Daimler Chrysler Ag and the Lagardee Groupe SCA and too much

autonomy at the plane maker (Vandore, 2007). The analysis with Willcocks and

Margett’s risk assessment model validates above senators findings. Various factors

caused the delay of Airbus A380 production.

Conclusion
When Airbus announced its plan to develop the world biggest commercial passenger

aircraft A380 in December 2000, everybody thought this project would take Airbus to

new heights. However instead of setting new benchmarks in the aviation history and

lifting Airbus reputation to new levels the A380 project dragged the company down with

its frequent delay announcements. The company cited complicated electrical wiring

problem as reasons for the delay. But many aviation industries experts argued that Airbus

production delay problems are political in nature. They stated that Airbus’ problems

started in 2005 when the French and the German started lobbying for top positions of the

company. Though Airbus is led by a Four-nation consortium (France, Germany, English

and Spain) France and Germany always played key role in Airbus. Hence the company

31
always had French and German Co-Chairpersons and co Chief executives. This dual-

management system led to many cold wars in EADS and Airbus. Company senior

management failed to realize the adverse effect of this national revelry on the A380

project. As a result, the A380 production was delayed and Airbus lost its number one

position and market share to its arch rival Boeing. This study discovered how good

companies face potential ruin if the appropriate organizational structure and man

management systems are not in place.

Research Objective and Main Findings

The delivery of A380 did not start by end of 2005 as was promised and announced

earlier. The first delivery of A380 came two years behind schedule and a $6.8 billion

over budget.

Some of the objectives and findings of this research are as follows:

• Identify the factors that contributed to the delay of Airbus A380

• Role of IT in Aviation industry

• Impact of delays on Aviation Industry and aircraft makers.

Identify the Factors that Contributed to the Delay of Airbus A380

A consortium led project like Airbus A380 is collaborative in nature and has multiple

teams, working on multiple tasks within the same project or unit. Working in such an

environment often crosses all national, linguistic and cultural boundaries and needs

changes in the risk management policies. Due to globalization, the trend in the business

world has been changed from central to collaborative and cooperative. These partnerships

require the modification of internal organizational practices, particularly for collaborative

communication and significant enhancements to an organization’s risk monitoring,

32
mitigation and management (RMMM) activities (Mohtashami et al., 2006). However this

study didn’t find any such efforts being made by Airbus while developing the world’s

biggest passenger aircraft.

The wiring problem which was the root cause of all technical delays arose due to non

existence of proper project management and the failure of system integration throughout

all Airbus production units. From the beginning Airbus practiced dual management

systems which lead to open national rivalries between France and German for Airbus

control. The French Senate report pointed out that rivalries between executives and

team in Frankfurt (Germany) and Toulouse (France) was responsible for delays that have

wiped out more than 5 billion Euros off the company‘s profit forecasts for 2006-2010

(Vandore, 2007).

Insider Trading: Morel has also been hurt by accusations that senior managers profited

from knowledge about the A380 problem to cash in on share options. This also

contributed to delay of A380.

Role of IT in Aviation Industry

The whole world has benefited by a breakthrough in Information Communication

Technology (ICT) and aviation industry is no exception in this matter. Due to IT

innovation today we have a double Decker jumbo jet which was but a dream earlier. It

has also led to a reduction in the noise level during takeoff at full thrust. Airbus claims

that the A380’s “noise footprint” outside is half of the size of that of rival Boeing. Due to

innovations and breakthroughs in the aviation industry, the benefits of air travel have

become more accessible and affordable to all commuters irrespective of their economic

backgrounds. However, the increasing demand for an eco-efficient industry, that creates

33
economic and social value with minimal environmental impact possible, is pushing the

aircraft manufactures hard to be technological pioneers and develop eco-friendly

aircrafts.

Evolution of the transport technology is simply astonishing. In less than 50 years,

technological advances have reduced fuel consumption and CO2 emission by 70%, noise

by 75% and unburned hydrocarbons by 90% (Airbus 2007).

Impact of Delays on Aviation Industry and Aircraft Makers

The eighteen months delay in the deliveries of the Airbus A380 had an adverse impact on

Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) service providers. Lufthansa Technik (LHT),

Air France Industries and Emirates are among the companies who have invested in MRO

hardware for the super jumbo (Dubois, 2006). Apart from this, it derailed a lot of A380

customer future plans. The setback punched a hole in the finely calibrated flight

schedules of carriers including Emirates, Singapore Airlines, Malaysia Airlines and

Qantas, all of which placed major orders for the A380. The impact of the A380 delay is

twofold for airlines, affecting their cost reduction and growth strategies," said Derek

Sadubin, the general manager of the Center for Asia Pacific Aviation, a consultant based

in Sydney. Being an aircraft maker, it was not happy moment for Airbus either. Delay

reduced the forecast operating profits from the A380 programme by about 500 million

Euros a year between 2007 and 2010. Apart from these losses Airbus also faced lot

financial penalties for the late deliveries and even some customers cancelled orders. Air

India cancelled its order when Airbus announced delays. As of February 2013 Airbus

has 262 orders of A380 and it needs a minimum of a 138 orders more to reach break

even.

34
Implications for Practitioners
Due to globalization and advancement in information technology (IT) the geographical

boundaries of world have become almost non existent. Today managing projects, be it

software development projects, financial projects or aviation projects like A380 have

moved away from “single team, single location and single management structure to

collaborative structure. Hence practitioners should realize the importance of doing

together learning together. Time has come to work with multinational, multiple

ethnicities and from multi locations. But this kind of a work environment needs a much

greater level of understanding between the people involved in such projects. Leadership

plays a key role in motivating people and bonding them together.

Implications for Research

There is a lot to learn from Mr. Rudiger Fuch, German Engineer and Alain Carcasses,

French engineers who together changed Airbus fate and turned around the Airbus A380

production with their great man management skills. To be successful in any venture one

need to have the right attitude, great leadership qualities and people management skills.

The trend in the business World has been changed from central to collaborative and

cooperative. These partnership require the modification of internal organizational

practices, particularly for collaborative communication and significant enhancements to

an organization’s risk monitoring

Some of the major reasons behind this chaos at Airbus may be identified as

Communication failures and chauvinistic conflicts that had existed between the

company’s French and German operations and exploded into full-down crises (Michaels,

2007c).

35
Appendix

Appendix I: Chronology of Airbus A380 Development

Year Delay announcements

Airbus unrolls the A3XX concept for a very large plane, to

1996
become the A380.

EADS confirms plans for its Airbus unit to build A380 at a budget
Dec 19, 2000
of roughly USD 12 billion

Airbus unveils the A380 in a glitzy ceremony known as the

January 18, 2005
"reveal"

Airbus announces 1st delay of A380 and said plane will be

April 27, 2005
delivered six months late, in second half of 2006

Airbus announces 2nd six month delay in first A380 delivery due to
June 13, 2006
wiring problems.

Airbus announces 3rd delay of A380 up to one year (cost overrun

October 3, 2006
by USD 6.8 billion

December 30, 2006 First A380 for Singapore Airlines completes tests of all wiring

Oct. 15, 2007 First A380 delivered to Singapore Airlines.

Source: www.airbus.com

36
Appendix II A380 Specifications

metric imperial

Overall length 73 m. 239 ft. 3 in.

Height 24.1 m. 79 ft. 7 in.

Fuselage diameter 7.14 m. 23 ft. 5 in.

Main deck: 6.58 m. Upper Main deck: 21 ft. 7 in. Upper

Maximum cabin width
deck: 5.92 m. deck: 19 ft. 5 in.

Cabin length 49.90 m. 163 ft. 8 in.

Wingspan (geometric) 79.8 m. 261 ft. 8 in.

Wing area (reference) 845 m2 9,100 ft2

Wing sweep (25% chord) 33.5 degrees 33.5 degrees

Wheelbase 30.4 m. 99 ft. 8 in.

Wheel track 14.3 m. 46 ft. 11 in.

BASIC OPERATING DATA

metric imperial

Engines Trent 900 or GP 7000 Trent 900 or GP 7000

Engine thrust range 311 kN 70,000 lb. slst

Typical passenger seating 525 525

Range (w/max. passengers) 15.200 km. 8,200 nm.

Max. operating Mach

0.89 Mo. 0.89 Mo.
number (Mmo)
Bulk hold volume -
17.3 cu. m. 650 ft3
Standard/option
DESIGN WEIGHTS

tones lb x 1000

Maximum ramp weight 562 1,239

Maximum takeoff weight 560 1,235

Maximum landing weight 386 851

Maximum zero fuel weight 361 796

Maximum fuel capacity 310.000 Litres 81,890 US gal.

37
Typical operating weight
276.8 608.4
empty

Typical volumetric payload 66.4 145.5

Source: http://www.airbus.com/en/aircraftfamilies/a380/a380/specifications.html

Appendix III Airbus A380 Orders as on 28th February 2013

Total Orders 262

Total Deliveries 99
Aircraft in Operation 99
Number of Operators 9
Number of Customers 20
Orders 262
Deliveries 99
A380
CUSTOMER
Ord Del Opr
1
Governments; Executive and private Jets
AIR AUSTRAL 2
AIR FRANCE 12 8 8
ASIANA AIRLINES 6
BRITISH AIRWAYS 12
CHINA SOUTHERN AIRLINES
5 5 5
COMPANY
EMIRATES 90 31 31
ETIHAD AIRWAYS 10
HONG KONG AIRLINES 10
KINGFISHER AIRLINES 5
KOREAN AIR 10 6 6
LUFTHANSA 17 10 10
MALAYSIA AIRLINES 6 5 5
QANTAS AIRWAYS 20 12 12
QATAR AIRWAYS 10
SINGAPORE AIRLINES 24 19 19
SKYMARK AIRLINES 6

38
 THAI AIRWAYS INTERNATIONAL 6 3 3
TRANSAERO AIRLINES 4
VIRGIN ATLANTIC 6
TOTALS 262 99 99
Source: www.airbus.com

Appendix IV: Airbus A380 Prototype

Source: www.airbus.com

39
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