5th INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE URBAN E-PLANNING

Institute of Geography and Spatial Planning

University of Lisbon, Portugal 7 - 9 September 2021

CITIZENS‟ PARTICIPATION FOR

CHOOSING BETWEEN ALTERNATIVE PUBLIC
SPACES‟ DESIGN
A REVIEW OF TWO INITIATIVES FROM VOTING THEORY

Ricardo Alvira, PhD

Universidad de Murcia

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Background Image: Proyecto Greenfingers. Source: https://decide.madrid.es/vota/rehabilitacion-plaza-civica-mar-cristal
INTRODUCTION

• The importance of citizens’ participation in the design of cities

transformations has been increasingly highlighted in recent decades.

• This communication aims to show the frequent flaws that, from voting theory,
can be appreciated in most initiatives implying a citizens’ vote.

• To better illustrate it, we review two recent Public Transformation initiatives in

Madrid city.

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SOME NOTIONS ON VOTING THEORY

• Voting Rules can also be designated as Preference Aggregation Rules.

• The goal of these Rules is to aggregate individuals’ preferences in order to

determine which is the collective preference.

• There are two types of Voting Rules: Positional and Non-positional

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POSITIONAL RULES

• Positional rules assign a numeric preference value to each option.

• An option with a higher preference value is considered to be more collectively

preferred than an option with a lower preference value.

• The most used rule is the Plurality Rule. Other positional rules are: Approval
voting, the Borda Rule; Score Voting, ….

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NON-POSITIONAL RULES

• Non-positional rules build on options’ pairwise comparison (1).

• The most known is the Condorcet method (other rules are: Llul’s rule; Kemeny’s
rule; Schulze’s Rule;..)

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POSITIONAL RULES: THE PLURALITY RULE
Each individual casts one vote for his/her most preferred option.

Each option is assigned a collective preference equal to the number of received

votes.

For instance, in the Roman Empire there was a trial where 9** judges advocated
different sentences (adapted from Quintiliano, cited in Urdanoz, 2020):
• 4 judges advocated Death
• 2 judges advocated Imprisonment
• 3 judges advocated Banishment

The accused was sentenced to Death, as advocated by the greatest number of judges.

** The actual number of judges were 7, but 9 allows us to better illustrate the issue..
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NON-POSITIONAL RULES: CONDORCET’S RULE

• Each two options are individually compared: the one preferred by a greater
number of individuals is assigned higher relative preference.

• In order to calculate the collective preference ordering, it is necessary that every

individual provides a complete ordering of the options, such as:

𝐴≻𝐵≻𝐶

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NON-POSITIONAL RULES: CONDORCET’S RULE
We have reviewed above the Roman trial that sentenced the accused to death.

Now let us consider that the complete preferences of the 9** judges most likely were:

4 judges 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ ≻ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ≻ 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡

2 judges 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ≻ 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ≻ 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ
3 judges 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ≻ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ≻ 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ

If we pairwise compare the options, we find that

• Imprisonment was preferred to both Banishment (6 to 3 judges) and to Death (5
to 4 judges)
• Banishment was preferred to Death (5 to 4 judges)

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NON-POSITIONAL RULES: CONDORCET’S RULE

Hence, according to Condorcet‟s Method the actual collective preference ordering

was strictly opposed to that obtained using the Plurality Rule:

𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ≻ 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ≻ 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ

„Imprisonment‟ was a Condorcet Winner; the most preferred option according to most
voting theory experts.

„Death‟ was the least collectively preferred option by the judges. It was a Condorcet
Loser.

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POSITIONAL VS NON-POSITIONAL RULES

• Above example shows us that the choice can be even opposed when using
different voting rules.

• Choosing the right voting rule becomes fundamental.

• Sometimes the difference can be a ‘matter of life and death’.

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CHOOSING THE RIGHT [DEMOCRATIC] CHOICE

• So, which rule should we use?

• There is no univocal answer.

• Furthermore, in the twentieth century several mathematical impossibilities were

stated proving no rule always complies with every reasonable criterion

• So, which criteria can we use to assess whether the results of the processes
were the democratic choice or an imposed (no democratic) choice?

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CHOOSING THE RIGHT [NON-IMPOSED] CHOICE

A first criterion accepted by most experts is that

• if there is a Condorcet Winner, this option should be chosen.

• If there is a Condorcet Loser, this option should not be chosen

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CHOOSING THE RIGHT [NON-IMPOSED] CHOICE

A second criterion to prevent imposed decisions was stated by Arrow (1950. Def. 4)

A voting rule may lead to imposed decisions if there is some pair of alternatives x
and y such that the community can never express a preference for y over x no
matter what the individuals’ preferences are, even if all individuals prefer y to x

In other words, citizens should have the choice to express their preference on
every eligible option

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ASSESSING THE INITIATIVES

Let us now briefly review each Initiative, to check whether the procedures complied
with above condition.

Firstly, we review the 11 Plazas

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11 PLAZAS IN MADRID

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11 PLAZAS IN MADRID

• An Open Architectural Competition was summoned by the City Council for each
Plaza.

• The received proposals were assessed by municipal technicians, who selected

two finalist proposals, to be voted by the citizens.

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11 PLAZAS IN MADRID

Citizens were requested to vote on two issues:

• 1: Whether they preferred to preserve the Plaza in its current status (0) or to
remodel it

• 2: In case remodelation was approved, which of the two projects selected by the
technicians (Project 1 or Project 2 ) they preferred?

In the two questions, blank vote was allowed.

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11 PLAZAS IN MADRID

The procedure implied several breaches of Arrow Cond 04:

• The citizens were never allowed to express their preferences on some of the
proposals to the Competition, which were excluded by the municipal technicians
before the vote

• There actually were three options voted by citizens: Preserving the plaza (0),
Project 1 and Project 2. Yet the sequential design of the vote, made that
Preserving the plaza was never individually compared to Project 1 and 2

• But also, in some plazas the winning option could change if the citizens who casted
blank votes, preferred the less voted Project to the more voted Project.

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11 PLAZAS IN MADRID

• Thus, for the 11 plazas the most collectively preferred option could actually
be any proposal submitted to the competition which was discarded by the
municipal technicians before the citizens‟ vote.

• Furthermore, the vote results show for 6 of the 11 Plazas any of the two finalists
projects, or even the option of preserving the Plaza in its current status,
could be a Condorcet Winner.

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PLAZA DE ESPAÑA

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PLAZA DE ESPAÑA

A survey was undertaken by the City Council.

[Note: the “choose one answer” questions could be understood as a Plurality Rule vote,
while the “multiple answer” questions could be understood as an Approval Rule vote]

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PLAZA DE ESPAÑA
For instance, the “choose one answer” question regarding whether the Cervantes
Monument should be preserved in its current location; moved to a different location or
moved outside the plaza, somehow equates a Plurality Voting.

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PLAZA DE ESPAÑA
For instance, the “multiple answers” question regarding the uses to be prioritized in the
new design, can be understood as an Approval Voting.

Each individual casts as many votes as options he ‘approves’, and each option is
assigned a collective preference as the number of received votes.

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PLAZA DE ESPAÑA

• Citizens’ preferences expressed in above survey were incorporated into the

basis of an Open Architectural Competition summoned by the City Council.

• After the proposals were received, an exhibition was made open to citizens.

• A preliminary citizens’ vote was held using the Plurality Rule (the competition
basis indicated this citizens‟ vote would be considered as the vote of “an additional
member of the jury”).

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CITIZENS‟ FIRST PRELIMINARY VOTE: RESULTS

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PLAZA DE ESPAÑA

The proposals were assessed by municipal technicians, who pre-selected five

proposals, and requested their authors to further develop them.

The proposals were:

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CITIZENS‟ FIRST VOTE: JURY PRE-SELECTION

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PLAZA DE ESPAÑA

The developed proposals were assessed again by municipal technicians, who

selected two finalist proposals

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CITIZENS‟ FIRST VOTE: JURY FINAL SELECTION

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PLAZA DE ESPAÑA
The citizens voted on the two finalist proposals.

PROJECT 1 PROJECT 2
110,076 votes (51,99%) 63.543 votes (30,01%)

There were also 38,106 Blank votes (18%)

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PLAZA DE ESPAÑA

This procedure also breached Arrow Cond 04:

• In the preliminary vote, the citizens’ preferences were accounted using

Plurality Rule, hence the most voted option not necessarily was the most
collectively preferred… Yet, the municipal technicians excluded the two most
voted options from their selection of the finalists.

• Since Project 1 obtained more than 50% votes when compared to Project 2, we
can assume it to be more preferred to Project 2. But we cannot assume it is more
collectively preferred than any previously discarded option by the municipal
technicians, which could actually be the Condorcet Winner.

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PLAZA DE ESPAÑA

Therefore, the most collectively preferred option could be the one declared by the
City Council, but it could also be any proposal discarded by the technicians
before the final vote, or even the option to preserve the Plaza in its current
status.

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CONCLUSION

• In a democratic context, designing public decision making procedures so they

agree with citizens preferences, stands as almost axiomatic.

• Yet, giving the voting impossibilities it is also a most difficult issue.

• In fact, none of the two herein reviewed initiatives actually ensured this goal.
Their review shows several breaches of several Voting Theory prerequisites for
democratic decisions.

• This means the citizens’ most collectively preferred option in both cases
could be the one chosen by the City Council, but it could also be many other
options, even preserving the plazas in their current status.

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CONCLUSION

• The initial surveys stand as positive to define the basis of the architectural
competitions incorporating collective preferences. Specifically, multiple choice
questions (approval voting) as included in the Plaza de España survey pose
interest to gain knowledge on citizens’ preferences, with a rule that has proven
to somehow approach the median voter.

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CONCLUSION

Yet, the way the subsequent votes were organized imply a high probability that
the City Council choice was not the most collectively preferred proposal.

• This uncertainty, could be reduced with a final vote where citizens could express
their preference over a greater number of proposals (maybe the five
preselected finalists), using more adequate voting rules (for instance, multiple
voting -approval voting-; preferential voting -Condorcet Rule-; or Majority
Judgment).

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CONCLUSION

• Alternatively, instead of linking the final decision to a citizens‟ vote, it can be

established some kind of ‘citizens-right-to-request-a-vote’ procedure (Alvira,
2015).

• Building on citizens’ preferences (expressed in initial surveys and

workshops), the technicians make their decision, and a exhibit is made where
both the architectural proposals and the technicians assessment of each of them is
available to citizens.

• Should citizens not request a vote, they implicitly approve the technicians decision,
but if citizens request a vote, then said vote should be undertaken, using
above procedure.

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CONCLUSION

Lastly, it needs to be emphasized that a democratic decision is a decision made

using the citizenry structure of preferences but also using the best available
knowledge (Alvira, 2021).

Therefore, in order to achieve the democratic choice is made, the process would
also require the technicians knowledge (i.e., their assessment of the plazas current
state and each proposal advantage and disadvantages) is somehow made available
to the citizenry during the process before any final vote is made.

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.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION !!

email: ricardo.alvira@um.es

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REFERENCES
• Alvira Baeza, Ricardo (2015). From vote to veto. The (im)possibility of (un)democratic choice.

• Alvira Baeza, Ricardo (2021 [2016]). Mnll, Psll & Prll. Three rules for democratic decision making.

• Arnstein, Sherry R. (1969). A ladder of citizen participation. AIP Journal, July 1969: 216-224

• Arrow, K. J. 1950. A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare. Policy and Economics Review, 58 (4):
328-346

• Condorcet. 1785. Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendue à la pluralité
des voix

• Hägele, G. & Pukelsheim, F. 2001. Llull‟s writings on electoral systems. Studia Lulliana 41 (2001): 3-38

• Moreno Balboa, C. 2017. Urbanismo Colaborativo. Cuadernos de Investigación Urbanística, 115.

• Urdánoz, Jorge. 2020. Mayorías y Minorías. Enciclopedia de las Ciencias Morales y Políticas para el
siglo XXI. Ed: Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas. 40