G.R. No. 125796.

December 27, 2000

OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE Petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, et. al., Respondents.

FACTS

Based on the affidavit of former members of the New Peoples Army stated that their group
had an armed encounter with the Philippine Army in Campo Uno, Zamboanga del Norte, as a result
of which one soldier was killed while four others, were seriously wounded. The provincial prosecutor
of Zamboanga del Norte filed with the Regional Trial Court, charging private respondents and 10 other
individuals with murder and multiple frustrated murder. When the case was filed in court, private
respondents contended and prayed that the provincial prosecutor be ordered to change the charge
from murder with multiple frustrated murder to rebellion. The trial court denied the private
respondents motion for amendment of the information. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
respondents petition however finding the provincial prosecutor of guilty of grave abuse of discretion
in charging private respondents with murder with multiple frustrated murder instead of rebellion.

ISSUE

Whether or not, the CA erred in finding that the correct charge is rebellion rather than murder with
multiple frustrated murder.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the CA err in finding that the correct charge is rebellion rather
than murder with multiple frustrated murder.

It is to be noted that private respondents did not even attend the preliminary investigation
during which they could have shown that the crime committed was rebellion because the killing and
wounding of the government troopers was made in furtherance of rebellion and not for some private
motive.

There is no indication of the political motivation for the commission of the crime in the
affidavit of the prosecution's witnesses. Simply because it is alleged that private respondents were
members of the CPP/NPA who engaged government troops in a firefight resulting in the death of a
government trooper and the wounding of four others does not necessarily mean that the killing and
wounding of the victims was made in furtherance of a rebellion. The political motivation for the crime
must be shown in order to justify finding the crime committed to be rebellion.

Therefore, the Petition is GRANTED.

G.R. No. 251693, September 28, 2020

JODY C. SALAS, Petitioner, v. HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, et, al., Respondents.

FACTS

Rodolfo, was indicted for the crime of rebellion. That from 1970 to the present, the
petitioner as his capacity as leaders of the CPP/NPA/NDF, in conspiracy with, and in support of the
cause of, the organizations engaged themselves in war against the forces of the government,
destroying property or committing serious violence, and other acts in pursuit of their unlawful
purpose. Rodolfo pleaded guilty to rebellion and the RTC convicted him of the crime chrage.
Rodolfo served the his sentence in full and was released in 1992.

On August 26, 2006, a mass grave with at least 67 skeletal remains was discovered by the 43
Infantry of the Philippine Army at Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte. It is believed that the said
remains belong to victims of the CPP-NPA's which spanned from 1982 until 1992. Following the
conduct of a preliminary investigation on the case, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte
issued a Resolution recommending the filing of murder charges against Rodolfo and 37 other
leaders of the CPP-NPA. Accordingly, on February 20, 2007, Rodolfo and his co-accused were
formally indicted for 15 counts of murder in an Information. The venue was transferred from RTC
of Hilongos, Leyte to the RTC of Manila presided by respondent Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina.
Rodolfo was arrested by law enforcement and subsequently detained. Hence, the present recourse
which petitioner filed on behalf of Rodolfo.

ISSUE

Whether or not jeopardy attaches, considering the prior conviction of Rodolfo for the crime of
rebellion the penalty for which he had already fully served.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in negative.

It would be improper for this Court to order the dismissal of the murder charges against
Rodolfo on the pretext that the same are already deemed absorbed in his prior conviction for
rebellion and, resultantly, place him in double jeopardy.
 The political nature or motive behind a crime is not presumed. Neither is it readily accepted
as an uncontroverted fact upon the mere assertion of an accused. The defense that a crime was
committed in furtherance of a political end must be raised and proven before the trial court. It
becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the act of killing was done in furtherance of a
political end, and for the political motive of the act to be conclusively demonstrated.

The well-entrenched principle in criminal procedure that the institution of criminal charges,
including whom and what to charge, is addressed to the sound discretion of the public prosecutor.

Therefore, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. L-61388. April 20, 1983.

JOSEFINA GARCIA-PADILLA, Petitioner, v. MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, et. al., Respondents.

The petitioner is the mother of one of the 14 detainees that were arrested by virtue of a
Presidential Commitment Order (PCO). The said PCO was issued by President Ferdinand Marcos for
Violation of P.D. No. 855.

The 14 detainees were under surveillance as they were identified as members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines engaging in subversive activities. 9 of the 14 detainees were
caught in flagrante delicto having a conference and got arrested at the residence of Dr. Parong (one
of the detainees) through raid after securing a search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. The rest were
arrested the following days. The 14 suspects were all detained at PC/INP Command HQ, until their
transfer to an undisclosed place.

Josefina Garcia-Padilla petitioned for the writ of habeas corpus and mandamus before the Supreme
Court on the ground that the arrest was invalid, since the law enforcers were only armed with
search warrants not warrant of arrest.

ISSUE

Whether or not, the arrest and the subsequent detention of the detainees are legal.

RULING

The Supreme Court held that the arrest and the subsequent detention are legal.

The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such

crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance and in connection therewith
under PD No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the
common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide
magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the detainees without a judicial warrant was well within the
bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.
 The absence of judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons
committing over acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in
pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is, thus impelled by the exigencies of
the situation that involves the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted
authorities.

Therefore, the Petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, et al., Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, et al.,

Respondents.

FACTS

After finding sufficient basis of existence of rebellion and lawless violence, on February 24,
2006, the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a
state of national emergency. Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of
all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and
revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments. Because the President
believed that such political rallies were organized for purposes of, destabilization of her
government. Those who were already near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by the anti-riot
police. During the dispersal of the rallyists, police arrested without warrant petitioner Randolf S.
David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Petitioner
contended that the arrest is illegal for it was made without a warrant and it violated his rights of
peaceful assembly.

ISSUE

Whether or not, the petitioner is guilty of illegal assembly.

RULING

The Supre Court held that Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime.
The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the
conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals. The question, if the rights of free speech
and peaceful assembly are not to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting
was held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances
transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If the persons
assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy
against the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violations
of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such
offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as
the basis for a criminal charge.

Tolerance is the rule and limitation is the exception. Only upon a showing that an assembly
presents a clear and present danger that the State may deny the citizens’ right to exercise it.
Respondents failed to show or convince the Court that the rallyists committed acts amounting to
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
G.R. No. 205823, August 17, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. REGIE BREIS et. al., Appellants.

FACTS

Acted upon the information supplied by their informant, PDEA agent Mangili and Peralta
conducted an operation to apprehend the suspects for transporting illegal substance of marijuana.
The informant extensively describe the suspects as well as the packaging used, the time, the place
and the ways of transporting the illegal goods by the appellants.

The team proceeded to the Genesis Bus terminalDue to time constraints, the PDEA team
chose not to secure any warrant nor coordinate with the nearest police station. After identifying the
bus that the suspect will boarded on, Mangili and Peralta boarded the bus and they observed two
male individuals whose physical appearances fitted the descriptions given by the informant. Mangili
sat behind the accused while Peralta, stood near where the accused were seated. Mangili notice a
box under the suspect's feet and found out the same packaging described by their informant.
Mangili then casually asked accused Yumol who owned the "Ginebra San Miguel" box, the accused
replied that it was theirs Accused Yumol suddenly stood up and tried to leave but before he could
do so, Peralta blocked his way while Mangili confronted accused Breis and asked what was
contained in the box. Instead of answering, Breis shoved Mangili and tried to flee but Mangili was
able to block his way. Agent Peralta then summoned the back-up officers to help secure the bus and
subdue the accused.

The RTC convicted the accused and the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE

Whether or not, the shoving of one of the accused constitute resistance and disobedience to an
agent of an authority.

RULING

The Supreme Court held that the act of Breis in physically pushing Mangili and attempting to flee
constitutes resistance defined under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code.
 Mangili is a law enforcement agent of PDEA and as such is an agent of a person in authority
as defined in the RPC. Mangili was in the act of investigating a lead, and possibly apprehending
violators of RA 9165, in accordance with the mandate of the PDEA. He announced his identity as an
a PDEA agent to appellants. Upon knowing that Mangili was a PDEA agent, the appellants
attempted to flee by pushing the former.

The laying of hands or using physical force against agents of persons in authority when not
serious in nature constitutes resistance or disobedience under Article 151. The gravity of the
disobedience to an order of a person in authority or his agent is measured by the circumstances
surrounding the act, the motives prompting it and the real importance of the transgression, rather
than the source of the order disobeyed. Thus, the pushing of Mangili by the appellants, though not
serious defiance is considered resistance nonetheless.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 202692, November 12, 2014

EDMUND SYDECO Y SIONZON, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Police officers were manning a checkpoint established along Roxas Boulevard, Malate,
Manila when, they spotted a swerving red Ford Ranger pick up driven by hte petitioner. The team
members, all in uniform, flagged the vehicle down and asked the petitioner to step out of the
vehicle so he could take a rest at the police station situated nearby, before he resumes driving but
petitioner insisted he could manage to drive. The policemen claimed that petitioner was smelling of
liquor then they conducted a search of the vehicle and again requested petitioner and the
passengers to alight the car. Petitioner refused and intense arguments ensued. The police officers
arrested the petitioner who put up resistance.

In his defense, petitioner claimed that he was assaulted by a police officer and the other
point a gun to his head to forced him out of the car.

The MeTC convicted petitioner on violation of sec. 29 of RA 4136 and article 151 of the RPC in
resisting an agent of person in authority. The RTC and the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE

Whether or not, petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating article 151 of the RPC.

RULING

The Supreme Court held that the petitioner is not guilty of violating artile 151 of the RPC.

What triggered the confrontational stand-off between the police team and petitioner was
the latter's refusal to get off of the vehicle for a body and vehicle search by his insistence on a plain
view search only.

Petitioner's gestures cannot plausibly be considered as resisting a lawful orders. He may

have sounded boorish or spoken crudely at that time, but none of this would make him a criminal.
Petitioner has not committed a crime or performed an overt act warranting a reasonable inference
of criminal activity when he was flagged down. He did not try to avoid the road block established,
instead He came to a full stop when so required to stop.
 There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are persons in
authority or agents of a person in authority manning a legal checkpoint. However, petitioner's act of
exercising one's right against unreasonable searches to be conducted in the middle of the night
cannot, be equated to disobedience let alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of
the RPC.

Moreover, there is, to stress, nothing in RA 4136 that authorized the checkpoint-manning
policemen to order petitioner and his companions to get out of the vehicle for a vehicle and body
search. And it bears to emphasize that there was no reasonable suspicion of the occurrence of a
crime that would allow what jurisprudence refers to as a "stop and frisk" action.

Therefore, the Petitoner is hereby ACQUITTED.

G.R. No. 129069. October 17, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. JULIO RECTO y ROBEA, Appellant

FACTS

Barangay Captain Orbe was in his residence together with Barangay Kagawad Macalipay.
They were trying to settle a land dispute involving Linda Rance and Cornelio Regis, Jr. While the
meeting was in progress, Orbe was summoned by SPO4 Rafol to proceed to the bodega of Rance.
They noticed that the padlock of the bodega was destroyed, and the palay stored therein, stolen.
Barangay Kagawad Macalipay, conducted an investigation. SPO4 Rafol and SPO1 Male, also made
their investigation and reported their findings to Linda Rance. At this point, Barangay Tanod Recto
passed by. Barangay Captain Orbe told the latter about the situation. While the policemen were
leaving the premises, the group of Appellant Julio Recto arrived. The group stopped at the first
trampa near the bodega. Barangay Captain Orbe advised them not to create trouble, but, Dante
Regis pulled a piece of wood and threw it towards them. Appellant stepped backward, opened his
jacket and pulled out a gun. Upon seeing the gun, Barangay Captain Orbe retreated, while Barangay
Kagawad Macalipay stepped forward with both arms raised and uttered the words: Do not do it.
Appellant shot kagawad Macalipay and exchange fire with the guard Emilio Santos. Melchor Recto
saw the shooting from his hiding place behind a concrete pillar. Barangay Captain and Melchor
Recto hide in the bathroom inside the bodega. Thinking that the appellants were gone, they decide
to make their run but both of them were seen by the appellant and shot at them while scaping
away from the gunmen. As a result brng. Kagawad Macalipay and the Santos died; while brng.
Captain Orbe and brng. tanod Melchor sustained gun shot wounds. The appellants interposed self
defense.

The RTC convicted and sentenced appellant to death for the murder of Antonio Macalipay.

It also find appellants guilty of qualified direct assault with frustrated homicide for shoting brgy.
captain Obre and brgy. Kagawad Melchor.

ISSUE

Whether or not, The trial court erred in convicting appellants of direct assault with frustrated
homicide.
RULING

In the case of kagawad Melchor, the Supreme Court held that the trial court err in finding
appellant guilty of direct assault since kagawad Melchor was not engaged in the performance of
his official duties at the time he was shot. Neither was he attacked on the occasion of such
performance.

It must be emphasized that Melchor Recto was on his way home when he happened to pass
by the bodega of the Rance couple. Clearly, from his arrival at the scene of the crime to his
departure therefrom, Melchor was not engaged in the performance of his official duties. Neither
was he attacked on the occasion thereof. Thus, the attack on him did not amount to direct assault.

In the case of brgy. captain Orbe the trial court was correct in ruling that the attack on him, a
person in authority amounted to qualified direct assault, because he was attacked on the occasion
of the performance of his duty. At the time, he was attempting to pacify appellant and to keep the
peace between the two groups.

Given these circumstances, appellant should therefore be convicted of the complex crime of
qualified direct assault with attempted homicide.

Considering that Antonio Macalipay was a kagawad who was in the actual performance of his duties
when he was shot, the attack on him constituted direct assault. appellant should be held liable for
the complex crime of qualified direct assault with homicide.

WHEREFORE ,the Decision dated April 2, 1997, issued by the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, is
hereby MODIFIED.
G.R. No. 173150 : July 28, 2010

LYDIA C. GELIG, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

FACTS

Lydia and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos (Gemma), were public school teachers at
the Nailon Elementary School in Cebu city. Lydia's son, Roseller, was a student of Gemma at the
time of the incedent. Upon learning from her son that Gemma called him a "sissy" while in class,
Lydia confronted Gemma. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed her, thereby causing her
to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result of Lydia's violent assault, Gemma suffered a contusion and
after two days experiencing abdominal pain. A month later she found out that she had an
incomplete abortion. The trial court rendered a Decision convicting Lydia of the complex crime of
direct assault with unintentional abortion. The CA vacated the trial court's judgment. It ruled that
Lydia cannot be held liable for direct assault since Gemma descended from being a person in
authority to a private individual when she engaged in a fight with Lydia. Instead finding Lydia guilty
of slight physical injuries.

ISSUE

Whether or not, the CA erred in not finding petitioner guilty of direct assault.

RULING

The Supreme Court held that the CA erred in declaring that Lydia could not be held guilty of
direct assault since Gemma was no longer a person in authority at the time of the assault because
she allegedly descended to the level of a private person by fighting with Lydia.

The fact remains that at the moment Lydia initiated her tirades, Gemma was busy attending
to her official functions as a teacher. She tried to pacify Lydia by offering her a seat so that they
could talk properly, but Lydia refused and instead unleashed a barrage of verbal invectives.

When Lydia continued with her abusive behavior, Gemma merely retaliated in kind as would a
similarly situated person. Lydia aggravated the situation by slapping Gemma and violently pushing
her against a wall divider while she was going to the principal's office. No fault could therefore be
attributed to Gemma.

However, there is no evidence on record to prove that the slapping and pushing of Gemma
by Lydia that occurred was the proximate cause of the abortion.
Therefore, it is hereby rendered, finding Lydia Gelig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
direct assault.

G.R. No. 201565, October 13, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARLOS ESTONILO, SR. et. al. Accused-
Appellants

FACTS

Accused-appellants, along with four others, were charged of direct assault with murder. On
April 5, 2004 at 8:00 o’clock in the evening at Celera Elementary School victim Floro was shot dead.
One of the witnesses of the prosecution (Antipolo) testified that on that night, he was riding his
motorcycle and passing by the gate of the Celera Elementary School when he heard gunshots and
someone shouted that Floro was shot; that he stopped, alighted from his motorcycle, went to the
gate, and saw four persons holding short firearms; that he identified Nonoy and Negro as the two
who fired at Floro about seven times; that he identified Edel and Nonong as the two other gun
holders; he saw Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s car arrive soon thereafter; that Mayor Carlos, Sr., his son Rey
and Negro alighted from the vehicle and watched the happenings; that he heard Mayor Carlos, Sr.
say “leave it because it’s already dead”; and that afterwards, the police officers arrived.

Servando attested on his part testified that he witnessed Mayor Carlos, Sr. say “ipatumba si
Floro Casas” on the day before the shooting incident. The motives was establish to be political since
the nearing of the election.

After trial, the RTC found the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court giving credence to the testimonies of
the eye witnesses.

ISSUE

Whether or not, the CA erred in convicting accused-appellants of complex crime of direct assault
with murder.

RULING

The Supreme Court held that the RTC and CA correctly concluded that accused-appellants should be
held accountable for the complex crime of direct assault with murder.
 All the elements of direct assault are satisfied. Which are that there must be an attack, use
of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the assault
was made when the said person was performing his duties or on the occasion of such performance;
and the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority or his agent.

In this case, Floro was the duly appointed District Supervisor of Public Schools, Placer,
Masbate, thus, was a person in authority. That the attack or assault on Floro was, made by reason
of the performance of his duty as the District Supervisor.

When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that
matter, there arises the complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide.

Therefore, the appeal is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 224679, February 12, 2020

JONAH MALLARI Y SAMAR, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT

FACTS

On the early morning of January 12, 2007, the Olongapo Police Station 3 received a report
of an altercation on the GenX Billiard Hall on Gordon Avenue. PO2 Navarro and SPO3 Merza, who
were both in uniform, went to the scene. There, they found two (2) groups of women fighting and
pulling each other's hair out, among them a was a drunk Mallari. The officers rushed to stop the
fight; they then invited the women to go to the police station to file proper complaints. However,
the intoxicated Mallari shouted at them and She then grabbed PO2 Navarro by the collar, slapped
his cheek, and kicked his legs several times. She was subdued by the police officers and later on
charge with direct assault.

The Municipal Trial Court found Mallari guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct assault upon an
agent of a person in authority. Which was affirmed by the RTC and the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE

Whether or not, the CA erred in convicting petitioner guilty of the crime of direct assault.

RULING

The Supreme Court held that the CA err in convicting the petitioner of direct assault instead
of the crime of resistance or disobedience under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner was also aware that PO2 Navarro was a police officer. He introduced himself as
one and was in his police uniform. He was performing his official duties as a police officer when he
was pacifying the melee, and right when petitioner attacked him. Thus, the second, third, fourth,
and fifth elements of direct assault are present in this case. However, the first element of the
offense is not present.

To be considered as direct assault, the laying of hands or the use of physical force against the agent
of a person in authority must be serious.

In this case, it was established that petitioner grabbed the shirt of PO2 Navarro, then
slapped and kicked him several times. Based on the circumstances, petitioner's resistance and use
of force are not so serious to be deemed as direct assault. While she exerted force, it is not
dangerous, grave, or severe enough to warrant the penalties attached to the crime.

Thus, instead of direct assault, this Court convicts petitioner of resistance or disobedience.