CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 Case Digest Up To Midterm Coverage

PARTIAL FULLFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
Submitted By: John Ethelred Osabel

Submitted To: Atty. Gonzalo Malig-on Jr.
Subject: Constitutional Law 1
Schedule: JD-113 Sunday 1:30pm to 6:00pm
This is a Compilation of 63 Must Read
Cases until the Midterm Coverage as
indicated in the Course Outline
Thanl you and Adelante ATTY.

Name : Osabel, John Ethelred T. JD-113 Professor: Atty.
Gonzalo Malig-on, J.R
I.Reference
Subject : Constitutional Law 1
Topic : Understanding the Constitution on the self- executory and
mandatory as a rule
Title : Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS
Citation : G.R No. 122156 , February 3, 1997
“Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of concession , privileges , and

rights covering national patrimony.”
II.BODY
Facts of the Case :
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) pursuant to a certain kind of

privatization program of the government in the Philippines under Proclamation No. 50
that was passed on December 8, 1986 decided to sell in such way of public bidding of
30% to 51 % of the issued and outstanding share of the petitioner in this case which is
the Manila Prince Hotel. What happened next is that the winning bidder or the eventual
strategic partner is to provide the management an expertise. Also, an International
Marketing , reservation system and financial support inorder to strengthen the income
and performance of the respondent. There is a close bidding wherein two bidders
participated. They are Manila Prince Hotel a Filipino corporation which offered to buy
the 51% share and a certain Malaysian Firm who is also willing to buy the 51% share
with a higher bid amount.
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in the
grant of our rights, privileges and concessions, covering our national economy and of
course patrimony. Wherein in this instance, it means that the state should give
preference to qualified Filipinos. It is invoked by the Manila Prince Hotel to acquire the
51% share of Manila Hotel Corporation which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Now, the
respondent contended that the provision in the constitution is not self-executing and it
requires an implementing legislation of its enforcement.
Issue of the Case :

Whether or not the provision in the Constitution which pertains to National
Economy and Patrimony is self-executing.
Ruling of the Case :
We defined the Constitution as a system of fundamental laws for the governance

and administration of a nation. It is being treated as supreme , imperious , absolute and
unalterable from the authority which it emanates. It is the nation's paramount and
fundamental law. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of Government.
Assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties. It establishes
certain fixed principles on which the government refers. Hence, it is the supreme law to
which all other laws must conform with which all private rights must be determined.
Also, all public authority administered under a doctrine of constitutional supremacy. As
a result , if a certain law or contract violates any form of the constitution that law or
contract will be held null and void. It do not have any force and effect. Thus, since the
constitution is the fundamental , paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract.
Thus, a provision which lays down a general principle such as those found in
Article 2 of 1987 Philippine Constitution is usually not a self-executing provision. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the supplementary
or enabling legislation or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right
grants may be enjoyed or protected is considered as self-executing. A constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fix by the constitution itself, so they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms and there is no language indicating that the
subject is referred to the legislative for action . In case of doubt, the constitution prevails
for it is the supreme law of the land.

I. Reference
Topic : Rules in Interpretation
Title : Francisco,et al vs. House Speaker,et al.
Citation : G.R No. 160261 , November 10,2003
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how
passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination
by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their
respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means
and bases for its resolution.
• Body
Facts of the Case :
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by

Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice
"to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public
trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T.
Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the
House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the
first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to
this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the
filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the
House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint
was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by
a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all
the Members of the House of Representatives.

Issue of the Case :
Whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar
provided in the Constitution
Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be
filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5)
of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed
by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with
seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief
Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation
of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period.

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty
which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political
question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1,
Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this
clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly
political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political
questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in
nature.

I.Reference
Topic : Political Question vs. Justiciable Controversy
Title : Santiago vs. Guingona
Citation : G.R No. 134577 , November 18, 1998
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great
branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling
within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.Constitutional respect and a becoming
regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into
the internal workings of the Senate.Where no provision of the Constitution or the laws
or even the Rules of the Senate is clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or
overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts
done within their competence and authority. This Court will be neither a tyrant nor a
wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty
of the law.
• Body
Facts of the Case :
Senators Santiago and Tatad instituted a petition for quo warranto seeking to
oust Senator Guingona as minority leader of the Senate and to declare Senator Tatad as
the rightful minority leader.

The Senate convened for the first regular session for the eleventh Congress. The
agenda was the election of officers. Senator Fernan gaining majority vote of 20 to 2, was
declared as the President of the Senate. Sen. Flavier manifested that the senators
belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and thus also a minority, had
chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the court the subject
petition for quo warranto alleging that Sen. Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully
holding and execising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according
to them, rightfully belonged to Sen. Tatad.

Issue of the Case :
1.)Whether the court have jurisdiction over the petition
2.)Whether there was an actual violation of the Constitution
3.)Whether Sen. Guingona was usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position
of senate minority leader
4.)Whether Sen. Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Sen. Guingona
as the minority leader

1.)NO, there was no violation. The court may only inquire as to whether an act of
congress or its officials has been with grave abuse of discretion. The constitution is clear
regarding the manner of electing the Senate President and a House Speaker but is silent
on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chamber of Congress. The method
must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the court. The constitution vests in each
house the power to determine the rules of its proceedings. The court has no authority to
interfere into the exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that
it is bound to protect and uphold.
2.)NO, there was no usurpation. In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be
successful, the person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the contested
office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully
held by the respondent. 58 In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear
and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no
grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as
minority leader.
Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall that the latter
belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By
unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he
was recognized as such by the Senate President.
Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has
been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of
discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence
and authority.

I.Reference
Topics: National Territory: Philippine Baselines Law
Title: Magallona vs. Ermita
Citation: G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011
This original action for the writ of certiorari and prohibition assails the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522 (R.A. 9522) adjusting the countries
archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
II. Body
Facts of the Case
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of
the Philippines as an Archipelagic State, to comply with the United Nations Convention
on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS I).
The round of negotiations in Geneva for UNCLOS II proved unsuccessful thus,

domestically R.A. 3046, remained the same.
In March 2009, Congress amended R.A. 3046 by enacting R.A. 9522, the statute now
under scrutiny. This is to make R.A. 3046 compliant with the terms of UNCLOS III,
which was ratifies on 27 February 1984. In complying with the requirements of
UNCLOS III, the new law, shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some
basepoints around the Philippine Archipelago and classified the Kalayaan Group of
Islands (KIG) and Scarborough Shoal as “regime of islands” generating their own
maritime zones.
Petitioners, in their respective capacity as citizens or legislators, assail the

constitutionality of R.A. 9522 on grounds that (1) It reduces the maritime territory and
the states sovereign power, in violation of Article I of the 1987 Constitution, (2) It opens
the country’s waters to passage by all vessels, seriously undermining Philippine
Sovereignty and National Security.
Petitioners also contend that, the laws treatment of the KIG as “regime of islands” not
only results in the loss of a large maritime area, but prejudices the livelihood of
subsistence fishermen.
Respondents, in their official comment in the petition, contends that (1) The petitioners
compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on
the petitioners lack of locus standi; (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and
prohibition to assail the constitutionality of R.A. 9522. Respondents also add that R.A.
9522, does not undermine the country’s security, environment and economic interests
or relinquish the claims of the Philippines in Sabah, nor the KIG and Scarborough
Shoal.
Issue of the Case
Whether Petitioners have locus standi
On the merits, whether R.A. 9522 is unconstitutional
Ruling of the Court

Petition is dismissed.
1st Issue:
The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit, since it is the
citizens who will be directly injured and benefitted in affording relief over the remedy
sought.
2nd Issue:
The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.
First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a statutory
tool to demarcate the country’s maritime zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS III.
SC emphasized that UNCLOS III is not a mode of acquiring or losing a territory as
provided under the laws of nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-lateral treaty that is a result
of a long-time negotiation to establish a uniform sea-use rights over maritime zones
(i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24
nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from
the baselines]), and continental shelves. In order to measure said distances, it is a must
for the state parties to have their archipelagic doctrines measured in accordance to the
treaty—the role played by RA 9522. The contention of the petitioner that RA 9522
resulted to the loss of 15,000 square nautical miles is devoid of merit. The truth is, RA
9522, by optimizing the location of base points, increased the Philippines total maritime
space of 145,216 square nautical miles.
Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is

consistent with the Philippines’ sovereignty. Had RA 9522 enclosed the islands as part
of the archipelago, the country will be violating UNCLOS III since it categorically stated
that the length of the baseline shall not exceed 125 nautical miles. So what the legislators
did is to carefully analyze the situation: the country, for decades, had been claiming
sovereignty over KGI and Scarborough Shoal on one hand and on the other hand they
had to consider that these are located at non-appreciable distance from the nearest
shoreline of the Philippine archipelago. So, the classification is in accordance with the
Philippines sovereignty and State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda
obligation under UNCLOS III.
Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with delineation of
the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North
Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty.
And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitution’s
delineation of internal waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522 transformed the
internal waters of the Philippines to archipelagic waters hence subjecting these waters to
the right of innocent and sea lanes passages, exposing the Philippine internal waters to
nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. The Court emphasized that the Philippines
exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including
the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath, regardless whether internal or
archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will not bar the Philippines to comply with its
obligation in maintaining freedom of navigation and the generally accepted principles of
international law. It can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the
absence thereof, it is deemed incorporated in the Philippines law since the right of
innocent passage is a customary international law, thus automatically incorporated
thereto.
This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just signifies
concession of archipelagic states in exchange for their right to claim all waters inside the
baseline. In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its
exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living
and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the
international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If
the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of
course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to determine
the passing of a law and not the Court. Moreover, such enactment was necessary in
order to comply with the UNCLOS III; otherwise, it shall backfire on the Philippines for
its territory shall be open to seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in
the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago and it will weaken the country’s
case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago
and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized
delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA
9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its
maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
I.Reference
Topic : Modes of Acquisition : Citizens of the Philippines
Title : Tecson vs. COMELEC
Citation : G.R No. 161434 , March 3 , 2004
This is a three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of
profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge
the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our
people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe,
Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a
natural-born Filipino or is he not?
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as

Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20
August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X.

Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a
petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC")
to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon
the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father,
Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of
an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent
on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita
Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage
had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
Petitioners also questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking cognizance of
and deciding the citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They asserted that under
Section 4(7), Article VII of the 1987 Constituition, only the Supreme Court had original
and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the case.
Issue of the case:
1. Whether or not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen?
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the qualifications of
presidential candidates?
Ruling of the case:
1. It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a

natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino
citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died
in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when
the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well
been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That
citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe,
father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ
has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. But while the totality
of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to
Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
2. No. An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court on April
1992 categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the
Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes
into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest
can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate
who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an
election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario. It is fair to
conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7,
of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning
the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held.

I.Reference
Title : Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commission on Immigration
Citation : 41 SCRA 29
In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of injunction against the
Commissioner of Immigration, "restraining the latter and/or his authorized
representative from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the Philippines and
causing her arrest and deportation and the confiscation of her bond, upon her failure
to do so."
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her
application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was
a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to
the Philippines to visit her great uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month. She
was permitted to come into the Philippines on March 13, 1961, and was permitted to
stay for a period of one month which would expire on April 13, 1961.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond to undertake, among others that
said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the
expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his
discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might
properly allow. After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to
stay in the Philippines up to February 13, 1962. On January 25, 1962, she contracted
marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen.
Because of the contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her bond and order her
arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she
brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which
took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau
Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could
not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a
Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or
sisters-in-law.
That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on
the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that she will enter and stay
only for a period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her
representation to stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines as she
had promised.
That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer on
the latter Philippine citizenship. The alien wife must possess all the qualifications
required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization and none of the
disqualifications
Issue of the case:
WON the lower court erred in holding that an alien woman may be deemed a citizen of
the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen, only if she possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications specified in the law.
Ruling of the case:
An alien who has been admitted into the Philippines as a non-immigrant cannot remain
here permanently unless he voluntarily leaves the country first and goes to a foreign
country to secure thereat from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and
thereafter undergo examination by officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine
port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements
of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by Republic Act 503, is premised
on the assumption that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung is not a Filipino citizen.
We note the same line of reasoning in the appealed decision of the court a quo.
Accordingly, it is but safe to assume that were the Solicitor General and His Honor of
the view that said petitioner had become ipso facto a Filipina by virtue of her marriage
to her Filipino husband, they would have held her as entitled to assume the status of a
permanent resident without having to depart as required of aliens by Section 9 of the
law.
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines

permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart
voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate Philippine consul
the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the officers of the Bureau of
Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in
accordance with the requirements of the said Act.
It does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors,
legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of
nationality naturally bestows upon their the right to stay in the Philippines permanently
or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities
may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds. True it is that this Court has
vehemently expressed disapproval of convenient ruses employed by alien to convert
their status from temporary visitors to permanent residents in circumvention of the
procedure prescribed by the legal provision.
It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on the strength of a deliberate
and voluntary representation that he will enter only for a limited time, and thereby
secures the benefit of a temporary visa, the law will not allow him subsequently to go
back on his representation and stay permanently, without first departing from the
Philippines as he had promised. No officer can relieve him of the departure
requirements of section 9 of the Immigration Act, under the guise of "change" or
"correction", for the law makes no distinctions, and no officer is above the law. Any
other ruling would, as stated in our previous decision, encourage aliens to enter the
Islands on false pretences; every alien so permitted to enter for a limited time, might
then claim a right to permanent admission, however flimsy such claim should be, and
thereby compel our government to spend time, money and effort to examining and
verifying whether or not every such alien really has a right to take up permanent
residence here. In the meanwhile, the alien would be able to prolong his stay and evade
his return to the port whence he came, contrary to what he promised to do when he
entered. The damages inherent in such ruling are self-evident.
On the other hand, however, the Supreme Court cannot see any reason why an alien
who has been here as a temporary visitor but who has in the meanwhile become a
Filipino should be required to still leave the Philippines for a foreign country, only to
apply thereat for a re-entry here and undergo the process of showing that he is entitled
to come back, when after all, such right has become incontestible as a necessary
concomitant of his assumption of our nationality by whatever legal means this has been
conferred upon him. Consider for example, precisely the case of the minor children of an
alien who is naturalized. It is indubitable that they become ipso facto citizens of the
Philippines. Could it be the law that before they can be allowed permanent residence,
they still have to be taken abroad so that they may be processed to determine whether or
not they have a right to have permanent residence here? The difficulties and hardships
which such a requirement entails and its seeming unreasonableness argue against such
a rather absurd construction.
In other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that the naturalization of
an alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon
him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including that of being entitled to
permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the Commissioner
of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because by its very nature and express provisions,
the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the
Philippines. In the sense thus discussed therefore, appellants' second and fourth
assignments of error are well taken.

I.Reference
Title : Valles vs. COMELEC
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January
15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing
the petition for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against
private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of
Davao Oriental.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an
Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in
the Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since then participated in the
electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998
elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as
candidate on the ground that she is an Australian.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino
Ruling of the case:
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder,
a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of
his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or
citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and
at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal
organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine
Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the
Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on
April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine
citizens. Private respondents’ father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet,
Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law,
Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws,
which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of
jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship,
so also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood
relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus,
the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been
born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her
losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at
most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her
possession of dual citizenship.
I.Reference
Title : Balgamelo Cabiling , et al vs. Commissioner
Citation : G.R No. 183133 , July 26 , 2010
This is a question translated into the inquiry of whether or not the omission negates
the rights to Filipino citizenship as children of a Filipino mother, and erase the years
lived and spent as Filipinos.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
Balgamelo Cabiling Ma (Balgamelo), Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr. (Felix, Jr.), Valeriano
Cabiling Ma (Valeriano), Lechi Ann Ma (Lechi Ann), Arceli Ma (Arceli), Nicolas Ma
(Nicolas), and Isidro Ma (Isidro) are the children of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, a Taiwanese,
and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina. Records reveal that petitioners Felix, Jr.,
Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born under aegis of the 1935 Philippine Constitution
in the years 1948, 1951, and 1957, respectively. They were all raised in the Philippines
and have resided in this country for almost sixty (60) years; they spent their whole lives,
studied and received their primary and secondary education in the country; they do not
speak nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan, and do not
know any relative of their father; they have not even traveled abroad; and they have
already raised their respective families in the Philippines. During their age of minority,
they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of Registration
(ACRs). Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine
citizenship in accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution, which
provides that (t)hose whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship are citizens of the Philippines. Thus, on
15 August 1969, Felix, Jr. executed his affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and
took his oath of allegiance before then Judge Jose L. Gonzalez, Municipal Judge,
Surigao, Surigao del Norte. On 14 January 1972, Balgamelo did the same before Atty.
Patrocinio C. Filoteo, Notary Public, Surigao City, Surigao del Norte. In 1978, Valeriano
took his oath of allegiance before then Judge Salvador C. Sering, City Court of Surigao
City, the fact of which the latter attested to in his Affidavit of 7 March 2005. Having
taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have
the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 (An Act Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect
Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen).
It was only on 27 July 2005 or more than thirty (30) years after they elected Philippine
citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so. On the other hand, there is no showing
that Valeriano complied with the registration requirement. Individual certifications all
dated 3 January 2005 issued by the Office of the City Election Officer, Commission on
Elections, Surigao City, show that all of them are registered voters of Barangay
Washington, Precinct No. 0015A since June 1997, and that records on previous
registrations are no longer available because of the mandatory general registration every
ten (10) years. Moreover, aside from exercising their right of suffrage, Balgamelo is one
of the incumbent Barangay Kagawads in BarangayWashington, Surigao City. Records
further reveal that Lechi Ann and Arceli were born also in Surigao City in 1953and 1959,
respectively. The Office of the City Civil Registrar issued a Certification to the effect that
the documents showing that Arceli elected Philippine citizenship on 27 January 1986
were registered in its Office on 4 February 1986. However, no other supporting
documents appear to show that Lechi Ann initially obtained an ACR nor that she
subsequently elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Likewise,
no document exists that will provide information on the citizenship of Nicolas and
Isidro.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not the omission negates their rights to Filipino citizenship as children of a
Filipino mother, and erases the years lived and spent as Filipinos?
Ruling of the case:
The 1935 Constitution declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are
citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. The mandate states: Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: (4)
Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship. In 1941, Commonwealth Act No. 625 was enacted.
It laid down the manner of electing Philippine citizenship, to wit: Section 1. The option
to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), Section 1, Article IV, of
the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of

election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of
thePhilippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the
nearest civil registry. We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to
elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the
statutory requirements for such election. Such conclusion, contrary to the finding of the
Court of Appeals, is in line with our decisions in In Re:Florencio Mallare, Co v. Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives,[48] and Re:Application for Admission to the
Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching.
I.Reference
Topic: Acquisition and Re-acquisition of Citizenship
Title: Aznar vs COMELEC
Citation: G.R. No. 83820, May 25, 1990
Before us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Commission

on Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11, 1998, which dismissed the petition for the
disqualification of private respondent Emilio “Lito”Osmeña as candidate for
Provincial Governor of Cebu Province.
II.Body
The Facts of the Case:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio “Lito” Osmeña filed his certificate of
candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu province
on the January 18, 1988 local elections.
On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-laban Provincial Council, as represented by

petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with
the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification on the grounds that respondent is
allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.
The petitioner also filed a supplementary urgent ex-parte motion for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order to temporarily enjoining the Cebu Provincial Board of
Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private respondent and
proclaiming him until the final resolution of the main petition.
On January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resorted to order the Board to continue
canvassing but to suspend the proclamation.
At the hearing before the COMELEC (First-Division) petitioner presented the following
evidence to show that respondent was an American Citizen. (1) Application for Alien
Registration Form No. 1 in the Bureau of Immigration, with signature dated November
21, 1979, (2) Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015856 in the name of the respondent
dated November 21, 1979, (3) Permit to re-enter the Philippines dated November 21,
1979, and (4) Immigration Certificate Clearance dated January 3, 1980.
In his reply respondent argued that, he is a Filipino citizen, that he is the legitimate
child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmeña
Sr. and he is a holder of a valid Philippine passport with No. 0885103 issued on March
25, 1987; that he is living in the Philippines since birth and have not gone out of the
country for more than six months and he is a registered voter.
On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First-Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to

proclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes,
respondent was proclaimed, Governor of Cebu.
Thereafter, on June 11, 1988 COMELEC (First-Division) dismissed the petition for
disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that
respondent is not a Filipino Citizen.
Hence, the petition before us.
Issue of the Case
Whether or not private respondent Osmeña lost his Filipino Citizenship and thus
disqualifying him as candidate for Provincial Governor of Cebu Province.
Ruling of the Case
Petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost

his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among
others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation
of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support
the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear
that private respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the
three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United

States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was
issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the
Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed
that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being an
American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance
required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws."
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are
not. Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United
States does not concern Us here.
By virtue of him being the son of a Filipino Father, the presumption
that private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to
prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated,
however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.
Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the
mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not
still a Filipino. In the case of Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American does not
mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities
or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship;
truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We
consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express",
it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is
no renunciation either "'express" or "implied".
I.Reference
Topic : What is the citizenship of a foundling ?
Title : Llamansares vs. COMELEC
Citation : G.R No. 221677-22116700 , March 11 , 2016
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of
temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction assailing the following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for
having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
II.Body
Facts of the Case :
In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9,
2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005.
Grace Poe was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Jaro, Iloilo and was legally
adopted by FPJ and Susan Roces in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her
marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then
became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.
On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating
medical condition, who then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted
her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and finally went home for good to the
Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.

On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her
Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new
Philippine Passport. Before assuming her post as appointed Chairperson of the MTRCB,
she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to
Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her American
passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen
since she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as
Filipinos. The Comelec en banccancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is want of
citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in
her COC.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that Poe is
qualified as candidate for presidency.
ISSUE OF THE CASE :

1.)Whether Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen
2.)Whether Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement

RULING OF THE CASE :
YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied
the constitutional requirement that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.
There is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical
features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an
infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents
there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are
Filipinos. Said probability and circumstantial evidence are admissible under Rule 128,
Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence. The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class,
natural born- citizens as based on the deliberations of the case.
I.Reference
Subject: Constituional Law I
Topic: Citizenship: Repatriation
Title: Frivaldo vs COMELEC
Citation: 257 SCRA 731 June 18,1996
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases: Who should
be the rightful governor of Sorsogon.
II.BODY
Facts of the Case:
Frivaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon in the
1995 elections. Raul R. Lee an opposing candidate, filed a petition before COMELEC
with prayer that Frivaldo be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office by
reason of him not being a Filipino Citizen, and that his certificate of candidacy be
cancelled and COMELEC promulgate a resolution granting the petition.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the
elections. Therefore, his candidacy continued and he was voted upon during the
elections. After completion of the canvassing of votes Frivaldo gained the highest
number, which was then followed by Lee.
Lee filed a supplemental petition praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected
Governor of Sorsogon and accordingly at 8:30 in the evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was
proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
Frivaldo then, filed with COMELEC a new petition, praying for the annulment of Lee’s
proclamation and advocated for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30,
1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon he took his oath of allegiance as Citizen of the Philippines
after his “ petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with Special Committee
on Naturalization in September of 1994 and had been granted”. As such, there was no
more legal impediment to his proclamation as governor.
The COMELEC First –Division promulgated herein assailed Resolution, declaring that
Lee was entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor, for he did not garner the
highest number of votes and that Frivaldo did, as well as reacquiring his Citizenship
under Presidential Decree 725, and therefore hi as qualified to hold the position as
Governor of Sorsogon.
However, it is contended that assuming that the assailed repatriation is valid, it only
took effect at 2:00 pm of June 30, 1995 whereas, the citizenship requirement under the
Local Government Code “ must exist on the date of his election and if not during the
time the certificate of candidacy was filed.
Issue of the Case
Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal?
If it is, then did it solve his lack of citizenship to qualify him to run for governor of
Sorsogon?
If not, may it be given a retroactive effect? If so, when?
Ruling of the Case
There is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo’s repatriation as having

become effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being so,
all questions about his possession of the nationality qualification — whether at the date
of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his
certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot. 2. No, citizenship
qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter the
elected official) registered as a voter.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code," (a)n elective local official must be: * a
citizen of the Philippines; * a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province . . . where he intends to be elected; * a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; * able to read and write Filipino or any
other local language or dialect." * In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . .
. must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day."
After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as
another item of qualification, that he be a "registered voter." And, under the law a
"voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a
voter — much less a validly registered one — if he was not a citizen at the time of such
registration since he was really STATELESS at the time he took oath of allegiance and
even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that
he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship — long
before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim — when he abandoned
and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino
citizenship."
The Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and
hold him still ineligible due to his failure show his citizenship at the time he registered
as a voter before the 1995 elections Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to
escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any
doubt about his loyalty and dedication to this country. Therefore, petition filed by
Frivaldo is dismissed. He is not a citizen of the Philippines and disqualified from serving
as the Governor of the Province of Sorsogon, vacancy shall be filled by the elected Vice-
Governor.
I.Reference
Topic: Citizenship: Modes of Acquiring and Re-acquiring Citizenship
Title: Tabasa vs Court of Appeals
Citation: G.R. No. 125793, August 29, 2006
Citizenship is priceless possession. Former U.S. Chief Justice Earl Warren

fittingly emphasized its crowning value when he wrote that “it is man’s basic right for
it is nothing less than to have rights.” When a person loses citizenship, therefore, the
State sees to it that its reacquisition may only be granted of the former citizen fully
satisfies all conditions and complies with the applicable law. Without doubt,
repatriation is not to be granted simply because of the vagaries of the former Filipino
citizen.
II.Body
Facts of the Case
Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, when petitioner was 7
years old, his father Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of the United States.
By derivative naturalization, Joevani Tabasa acquired the citizenship of his father.
Petitioner arrived in the Philippines in August 1995 and was admitted as “balikbayan”
for one year. Petitioner was arrested and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of BID on
May 23, 1996 in Aklan and was brought to BID Detention Center, Manila.
Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor Atty. Donato and on the same day,
petitioner was accused of violating Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987
Administrative Code. Petitioner’s passport was revoked by the US Department of State.
Hence, respondent (petitioner Tabasa) is now an undocumented and undesirable alien
and may be summarily deported pursuant to Law and Intelligence Instructions No. 53.
Petitioner’s passport was revoked due to federal charges filed against him. Federal
charges are as follows:
In possession of a firearm and one count of sexual battery (all in violation of the
California Penal Code)
Upon revocation of petitioner’s passport, he loses the privilege to remain in the country.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for habeas corpus. That he was not afforded due
process; that no warrant of arrest for deportation may be issued by immigration
authorities before a final order of deportation is made; that no notice of the cancellation
of his passport was made by the U.S. Embassy; that he is entitled to admission or to a
change of his immigration status as a non-quota immigrant because he is married to a
Filipino citizen as provided in Section 13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940; and that he was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines prior to his
derivative naturalization when he was seven years old due to the naturalization of his
father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968. At the time Tabasa filed the petition, he was 35 years
old.
Tabasa then filed a supplementary petition alleging that he has acquired Filipino
citizenship by repatriation in accordance with RA 8171 and because he is now a Filipino
citizen, he can no longer be deported.
CA denied the petition on the grounds that he had only acquired citizenship to escape
from the federal charges filed against him by the US and that he has not successfully
acquired citizenship because he does not fall under any of the requirements under R.A.
8171.
Issue of the Case
Whether or not petitioner has the privilege to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under
Republic Act 8171
Ruling of the Case
The Court finds no merit in this petition.
RA 8171, "An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost
Their Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos," was
enacted on October 23, 1995. It provides for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of
persons, viz:
Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and
natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor
children, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth
Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group
of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault,
or association for the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or

(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases
Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine
citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171?
He does not.
Persons qualified for repatriation under RA 8171
To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following:
a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and
b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
Petitioner contends that he can be repatriated under R.A. 8171 because he is the son a
natural-born Filipino, and that he only lost his Philippine Citizenship by derivative
naturalization when he was still a minor.
Petitioner does not fall under RA 8171 because what is referred in the second class of
persons privileged with repatriation refers to his father.
Even if the Court would concede that petitioner can avail the benefit of RA 8171, he
failed to follow procedure for reacquisition.
Procedure for reacquisition through repatriation is as follows:
SECTION 1. Composition. — The composition of the Special Committee on
Naturalization, with the Solicitor General as Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign
Affairs and the Director-General of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as
members, shall remain as constituted.
SECTION 2. Procedure. — Any person desirous of repatriating or reacquiring
Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 8171 shall file a petition with the
Special Committee on Naturalization which shall process the same. If their applications
are approved, they shall take the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship.
The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their
certificate of registration (emphasis supplied).
SECTION 3. Implementing Rules. — The Special Committee is hereby authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations and prescribe the appropriate forms and the required
fees for the processing of petitions.
SECTION 4. Effectivity . — This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.
Petitioner only took the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines then
executed an affidavit of repatriation which he registered together with his birth
certificate with the office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. The said office issued
him a certificate of such registration.
I.Reference
Subject: Constituional Law 1
Topic: Citizenship: Dual Citizenship vs Dual Allegiance
Title: Mercado vs. Manzano
Citation: 307 SCRA 630 May 26, 1999
II.Body
Facts of the Case
Manzano and Mercado are vice-mayoral candidates Makati City in the May 11, 1998
elections. Manzano got the highest number votes while Mercado bagged the second
place. However, Manzano’s proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition
for disqualification on the ground that he is an American citizen.
In his answer, Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of
Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a
Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States (San Francisco,
CA) on Sept. 14, 1955 and is considered an American citizen under US laws (jus soli).
But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino
citizenship.
The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and cancelled Manzano’s
certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is a dual citizen. Under the Local
Government Code (sec. 40), dual citizens are disqualified from running for any position.
The COMELEC en banc reversed the division’s ruling. In its resolution, it said that
Manzano was both a US citizen and a Filipino citizen. It further ruled that although he
was registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and was using an
American passport, this did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did
not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the US.
Moreover, the COMELEC found that when respondent attained the age of majority, he
registered himself as a Philippine voter and voted as such, which effectively renounced
his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had US
citizenship.
Hence, this petition for certiorari before us.
Issue of the Case
Whether or not Manzano was no longer a U.S. Citizen
Whether or not he is qualified to run and hold public office
Ruling of the Case
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of
the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation
may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private
respondent is considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was
born in San Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on
his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering
the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born
of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus
soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the
laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who
marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s
volition.
By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent
elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The
filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a

permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support
the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he
does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything
which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondent’s
oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his
youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and
taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of
Philippine citizenship.
I.Reference
Topic: Citizenship: Dual Citizenship and the Eligibility to run for Office
Title: Jacot vs Dal and COMELEC
Citation: G.R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008
II.Body
Facts of the Case
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot was a natural born citizen of the Philippines who became a
naturalized citizen of the U.S. on December 13, 1989. Jacot sought to reacquire his
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act no. 9255 or the “Citizenship Retention and
ReAcquisition Act”. He filed a request for the administration of his Path of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los
Angeles, Ca. The Los Angeles PCG issued an Order of Approval of Jacot’s request and on
the same day, he took his Oath and Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before
Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. On September 27, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued
Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing Jacot as a citizen of the Philippines.
On March 27, 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-
Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin and on May 2, 2007, respondent
Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification before the COMELEC Provincial Office
in Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US
citizenship. On May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor. 12 June 2007, the
COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution disqualifying the petitioner
from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make
the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship. The COMELEC Second Division
explained that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225
does not automatically bestow upon any person the privilege to run for any elective
public office. It additionally ruled that the filing of a Certificate of Candidacy cannot be
considered as a renunciation of foreign citizenship. Jacot filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but COMELEC en banc dismissed his Motion. Hence, he sought
remedy from the Supreme Court through a petition for Certiorari.
Issue of the Case
Whether or not Nestor Jacot effectively renounced his American Citizenship so as to

disqualifying him to run for Public Office.
Ruling of the Case
Petition DENIED. His oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before
the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with
the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because
these are distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes. Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are
already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship. By taking
the oath, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is nothing therein
on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation might arise under
Republic Act No. 9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship by also reacquiring or
retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship.
It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those
who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign
citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts,
considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship
I.Reference
Topic: Doctrine of Parens Patriae
Title: Soriano vs Laguardia
Citation: G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009 587 SCRA 79
II.Body
Facts of the Case
Petitioner is a host of the program Ang Dating Daan aired on UNTV 37 and he made the
ff. remarks: “Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka talaga Michael,
masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon
yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa
putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang
kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.”
2 days after, the respondents, before the MTRCB lodged complaints against Soriano.
The MTRCB sent Soriano a notice of the hearing. After the hearing, the MTRCB issued
an order preventively suspending the showing of Dating Daan program for 20 days. This
suspension is in accordance with Sec 3(d) of PD 1986, the law creating the MTRCB and
in relation to its IRR.
The MTRCB also ordered to set the case for preliminary investigation. In the Adm. Case
No. 01-04, the MTRCB issued a decision finding petitioner liable for his utterance and
imposing upon him 3 months suspicion from his program “Ang Dating Daan”
Issue of the Case:
Whether or not the preventive suspension valid
The Petitioner Contended that, the order was violative of freedom of religion and
freedom of speech and expression
Ruling of the Case

The power to issue a preventive suspension order by the MTRCB is a necessary exercise
of its power of regulation and supervision. And such power is not only applicable to
motion pictures and publicity materials but also includes TV programs.  Soriano was
not denied due process since the order by the MTRCB was issued only after a hearing
was held wherein Soriano himself appeared before the Board. Hence, MTRCB duly
appraised petition of his having possibly violated the PD 1986 and of the administrative
complaints filed against him.
As to the petitioners contention of the violation of freedom of speech, the court has this
to say:
As a standard of limitation on freedom of speech and press, the clear and present danger
test is not a magic incantation. It was originally designed to determine the latitude
which should be given to speech that espouses anti-government action, or to have
serious and substantial deleterious consequences on the security and public order of the
community. The clear and present danger test “does not lend itself to a simplistic and all
embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.”
The assailed order penalized petitioner for past speech, not future speeches in a TV
program. Neither can petitioner’s virtual inability to speak in his program during the
period of suspension be plausibly treated as prior restraint on future speech. For viewed
in its proper perspective, the suspension is in the nature of an intermediate penalty for
uttering an unprotected form of speech. In fine, the suspension meted was simply part
of the duties of the MTRCB in the enforcement and administration of the law which it is
tasked to implement. It does not bar future speech of petitioner in other television
programs; it is a permissible subsequent administrative sanction; it should not be
confused with a prior restraint on speech.  Also, the State has a compelling interest to
protect minors, against offensive language in TV programs. The Constitution, no less, in
fact enjoins the State, as earlier indicated, to promote and protect the physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being of the youth to better prepare them fulfill
their role in the field of nationbuilding. In the same way, the State is mandated to
support parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character. As such, the welfare of children and the State’s mandate to protect and
care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a substantial and compelling government
interest in regulating petitioner’s utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986.
I.Reference
Topic : Sovereignty ; Theory of Auto-limitation
Title : Tanada vs. Angara
Citation : G.R No. 118295 , May 2, 1997
Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines to place nationals and
products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products and
(2) that the WTO intrudes, limits and/or impairs the constitutional powers of both
Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the
WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to)
give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of

the Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final
Act, for brevity).
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August
11, 1994 from the President of the Philippine stating among others that the Uruguay
Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to
Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter from
the President of the Philippines likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated among
others that the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services are hereby submitted to the Senate for its
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the
immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled Concurring in the Ratification of
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization.
On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed the Instrument of
Ratification.
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful deliberation on
respondents comment and petitioners reply thereto, the Court resolved on December 12,
1995, to give due course to the petition, and the parties thereafter filed their respective
memoranda. The Court also requested the Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine
Ambassador to the United Nations stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a paper,
hereafter referred to as Bautista Paper, for brevity, (1) providing a historical background
of and (2) summarizing the said agreements.
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would consider the case
submitted for resolution. In a Compliance dated September 16, 1996, the Solicitor
General submitted a printed copy of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, and in Compliance dated October 24, 1996, he listed the various
bilateral or multilateral treaties or international instruments involving derogation of
Philippine sovereignty. Petitioners, on the other hand, submitted their Compliance
dated January 28, 1997, on January 30, 1997.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy
Ruling of the case:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes
the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action
of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. As
explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final arbiter
on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power
but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.”
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor
and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the
rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino
enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other
words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut
out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign
goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In
fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on
foreign competition that is unfair.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty.
By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in
exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all,
states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted
objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise
absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, a portion of
sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale
that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity with all
nations.”
The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an unreasonable

burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute
settlement inherent in our judicial system.
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final
Act required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO
Agreement. Moreover, the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown
by the members’ deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President
Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic minutely dissected what the
Senate was concurring in.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

I.Reference

Topic : Is the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) a state within a state ?
Title : The Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel
Citation : G.R No. 183591 , October 14 , 2008 , 568 SCRA, 402
II.BODY
FACTS OF THE CASE :
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement
of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001
in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to
compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the
MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public
consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:
Whether the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
would be binding itself:
a) To create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or
a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) To revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) To concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for
ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
RULING OF THE CASE:
The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest
in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating
it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to

the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive
Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an
amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in
effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution.
The concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not
only “Moros” as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of
indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not
been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro
homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by
virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that
ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its
specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative
relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the
concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on
its way to independence
I.Reference
Topic : Sovereign Immunity : Doctrine of non- suability of the State
Title : Tan vs. Director of Forestry
This is an appeal from the order dated January 20, 1965 of the then Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch VII, in Civil Case No. 56813, a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary prohibitory injunction, which dismissed
the petition of petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan on the ground that it does
not state a sufficient cause of action, and upon the respondents-appellees' (Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural resources and the Director of Forestry) motion to dismiss.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for
public bidding a certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales,
provided tenders were received on or before May 22, 1961 (p. 15, CFI rec.). This public
forest land, consisting of 6,420 hectares, is located within the former U.S. Naval
Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over by the
United States Government to the Philippine Government. On May 5, 1961, petitioner-
appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan submitted his application in due form after paying the
necessary fees and posting tile required bond therefor. Nine other applicants submitted
their offers before the deadline. Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having
the area declared as a forest reserve or allow the same to be awarded to the most
qualified bidder. On June 7, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive to
the Director of the Bureau of Forestry. On August 3, 1961, Secretary Cesar M. Fortich of
Agriculture and Natural Resources sustained the findings and re comendations of the
Director of Forestry who concluded that "it would be beneficial to the public interest if
the area is made available for exploitation under certain conditions.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not immunity from suit is applicable?
Ruling of the case:
This case is not a suit against the State but an application of a sound principle of law
whereby administrative decisions or actuations may be reviewed by the courts as a
protection afforded the citizens against oppression. But, piercing the shard of his
contention, We find that petitioner-appellant's action is just an attempt to circumvent
the rule establishing State exemption from suits. He cannot use that principle of law to
profit at the expense and prejudice of the State and its citizens. The promotion of public
welfare and the protection of the inhabitants near the public forest are property, rights
and interest of the State. Accordingly, "the rule establishing State exeraiption from suits
may not be circumvented by directing the action against the officers of the State instead
of against the State itself. In such cases the State's immunity may be validly invoked
against the action as long as it can be shown that the suit really affects the property,
rights, or interests of the State and not merely those of the officer nominally made party
defendant. Both the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of
Forestry acted in their capacity as officers of the State, representatives of the sovereign
authority discharging governmental powers. A private individual cannot issue a timber
license.
Consequently, a favorable judgment for the petitioner-appellant would result in the

government losing a substantial part of its timber resources. This being the case,
petitioner-appellant's action cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to be
sued.

I.Reference
Topic: Suability of the State:
Title: Mobile Phil Inc. vs Customs Arrastre Service
Citation: G.R. No. L-23139, December 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 1120
II.Body
Facts of the Case
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville" sometime in
November of 1962, consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. The
shipment arrived at the Port of Manila on April 10, 1963, and was discharged to the
custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then
handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to
the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment.
On April 4, 1964 Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to
recover the value of the undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus other
damages.
On April 20, 1964 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that not being persons under the law, defendants cannot be sued.
After plaintiff opposed the motion, the court, on April 25, 1964, dismissed the complaint
on the ground that neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of Customs is
suable. Plaintiff appealed to Us from the order of dismissal.
Raised, therefore, in this appeal is the purely legal question of the defendants' suability
under the facts stated.
Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suit; that
defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is
discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals.
Issue of the Case

Whether or not the Respondent can invoke the immunity from suit doctrine.
Ruling of the Case
The fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in

nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function
is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of
the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity
The Bureau of Customs, is part of the Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Rev. Adm. Code),
with no personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary
function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from
imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and
penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident.
For practical reasons said revenues and customs duties cannot be assessed and collected
by simply receiving the importer's or ship agent's or consignee's declaration of
merchandise being imported and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law. Customs
authorities and officers must see to it that the declaration tallies with the merchandise
actually landed. And this checking up requires that the landed merchandise be hauled
from the ship's side to a suitable place in the customs premises to enable said customs
officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre operations.
Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a

necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs,
so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For
otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without necessarily exposing
itself to suit. Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end, should not be denied as to the
necessary means to that end.
The court held the dismissal appealed and is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
I.Reference
Topic: Suability of the State: Incoroprated vs Un-Incorporated Agencies
Title: National Airports Corp. vs Teodoro
Citation: G.R. No. L-5122, April 30, 1952
II. Body
Facts of the Case
The National Airports Corporation was organized under Republic Act No. 224, which
expressly made the provisions of the Corporation Law applicable to the said
corporation. On November 10, 1950, the National Airports Corporation was abolished
by Executive Order No. 365 and to take its place the Civil Aeronautics Administration
was created. Before the abolition, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. paid to the National
Airports Corporation P65,245 as fees for landing and parking on Bacolod Airport No. 2
for the period up to and including July 31, 1948. These fees are said to have been due
and payable to the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. which owned the land used by the National
Airports Corporation as airport, and the owner commenced an action in the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental against the Philippine Airlines, Inc., in 1951 to
recover the above amount. The Philippine Airlines, Inc. countered with a third-party
complaint against the National Airports Corporation, which by that time had been
dissolved, and served summons on the Civil Aeronautics Administration. The third party
plaintiff alleged that it had paid to the National Airports Corporation the fees claimed by
the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. "on the belief and assumption that the third party
defendant was the lessee of the lands subject of the complaint and that the third party
defendant and its predecessors in interest were the operators and maintainers of said
Bacolod Airport No. 2 and, further, that the third party defendant would pay to the
landowners, particularly the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., the reasonable rentals for the use
of their lands."
The Solicitor General, after answering the third party complaint, filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the third- party
complaint, first, because the National Airports Corporation "has lost its juridical
personality," and, second, because agency of the Republic of the Philippines,
unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under the law, is incapable of
suing and being sued."
Issue of the Case
Whether or not government corporate agencies can be sued
Whether or not the Civil Aeronautics Administration can be sued
Ruling of the Case
As a general rule, state cannot be sued without its consent and there can be no legal
basis against the authority that formulate the law and which the law depends. But the
exemptions are the unincorporated type of government and functioning for proprietary.
Not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune to suits.
Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity
was organized. however contended that when a sovereign state enters into a contract
with a private person, the state can be sued upon the theory that it has descended to the
level of an individual from which 'it can be implied that it has given its consent to be
sued under the contract.
Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration are, under section 3
of Executive Order No. 365, to execute contracts of any kind, to purchase property, and
to grant concession rights, and under section 4, to charge landing fees, royalties on sales
to aircraft of aviation gasoline, accessories and supplies, and rentals for. the use of any
property under its management. These provisions confer upon 'the Civil Aeronautics
Administration the power to sue and be sued, which is implied from the power to
transact private business. And if it has the power to sue and be sued on its behalf, the
Civil Aeronautics Administration with greater reason should have the power to
prosecute and defend suits for and against the Mational Airports Corporation, having
acquired all the properties, funds and choses in action and assumed all the liabilities of
the latter.
Wherefore, the petition is denied with costs against the Civil Aeronautics
Administration.

I.Reference
Topic: Suability of the State
Title: China National Machinery & Equipment vs Sta. Maria
Citation: G.R. No. 185572, April 24, 2012
II. Body
Facts of the Case
In September 2002, petitioner CNMEG entered into a memorandum of understanding

(MOU) with North Luzon Railways Corp (Northrail) to conduct a feasibility study on a
construction of a railway line from Manila to La Union (Northrail Project)
1. Subsequently, Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and Department of Finance
entered into a MOU whereby China will extend a preferred buyer’s credit to the
Philippines to finance the Northrail Project. EXIM is to loan DOF $400 million payable
in 20 years with a 5-year grace period at the rate of 3% per annum
2. In December 2003, Northrail and CNMEG executed a contract for the construction of
Phase I of the Northrail Project. The contract price was pegged at $421,050,000
3. The Philippine Government then obtained a loan from EXIM for $400,000 to finance
the project
4. Respondents, filed a complaint for annulment of contract, alleging that the contract
was void for being
a. Contrary to the Constitution
b. Government Procurement Reform Act (RA 9184)
c. Government Auditing Code (PD 1445) d. Administrative Cod
Issue of the Case
Whether or not China National Machinery is immune from suit as a state owned
company
Ruling of the Case
No, There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and
firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot,
without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According
to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with
regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or
acts jure gestionis.
The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of sovereign states into purely
commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of governmental functions.
This is particularly true with respect to the Communist states which took control of
nationalized business activities and international trading.
Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal
nature of the act involved – whether the entity claiming immunity performs
governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions. As held in United States of America
v. Ruiz
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise
out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of
an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only
when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the
exercise of its sovereign functions.
CAB: The Memorandum of Understanding dated 14 September 2002 between Northrail

and CNMEG; the letter of Amb. Wang dated 1 October 2003 addressed to Sec. Camacho;
and the Loan Agreement show that CNMEG is engaged in a proprietary activity.
1. The Memorandum of Understanding dated 14 September 2002 shows that

CNMEG sought the construction of the Luzon Railways as a proprietary venture.
(Whereas clauses). It was CNMEG that initiated the undertaking, and not the Chinese
government. The Feasibility Study was conducted not because of any diplomatic gratuity
from or exercise of sovereign functions by the Chinese government, but was plainly a
business strategy employed by CNMEG with a view to securing this commercial
enterprise.
2. The desire of CNMEG to secure the Northrail Project was in the ordinary or
regular course of its business as a global construction company. The implementation of
the Northrail Project was intended to generate profit for CNMEG, with the Contract
Agreement placing a contract price of USD 421,050,000 for the venture. The use of the
term "state corporation" to refer to CNMEG was only descriptive of its nature as a
government-owned and/or -controlled corporation, and its assignment as the Primary
Contractor did not imply that it was acting on behalf of China in the performance of the
latter’s sovereign functions
3. The Loan agreement specifically states that the execution of the contract
agreement constitutes private and commercial acts done and performed for commercial
purposes under Philippine laws.
Even assuming arguendo that CNMEG performs governmental functions, such claim
does not automatically vest it with immunity. The logical question is whether the foreign
state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not
engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be
tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof,
then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
APPLICATION OF GTZ CASE: it is readily apparent that CNMEG cannot claim
immunity from suit, even if it contends that it performs governmental functions. Its
designation as the Primary Contractor does not automatically grant it immunity, just as
the term "implementing agency" has no precise definition for purposes of ascertaining
whether GTZ was immune from suit. Although CNMEG claims to be a government-
owned corporation, it failed to adduce evidence that it has not consented to be sued
under Chinese law. Thus, following this Court’s ruling in Deutsche Gesellschaft, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be presumed to be a government-
owned and -controlled corporation without an original charter. As a result, it has the
capacity to sue and be sued under Section 36 of the Corporation Code. CNMEG failed to
present a certification from DFA: In Public International Law, when a state or
international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign
court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court
that said defendant is entitled to immunity. CAB: CNMEG offers the Certification
executed by the Economic and Commercial Office of the Embassy of the People’s
Republic of China, stating that the Northrail Project is in pursuit of a sovereign activity.
Surely, this is not the kind of cer tification that can establish CNMEG’s entitlement to
immunity from suit, as Holy See unequivocally refers to the determination of the
"Foreign Office of the state where it is sued."
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. Petitioner China National Machinery &
Equipment Corp. (Group) is not entitled to immunity from suit, and the Contract
Agreement is not an executive agreement. CNMEG’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is DENIED for being moot and academic. This
case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 145, for further
proceedings as regards the validity of the contracts subject of Civil Case No. 06-203.

I.Reference
Topic: Suability vs Non-Suability of LGU
Title: Municipality of San Fernando vs Judge Firme
Citation: G.R. No. L-52179, April 8, 1991, 195 SCRA 692
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary

mandatory injunction seeking the nullification or modification of the proceedings and
the orders issued by the respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme, in his capacity as the
presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Second Judicial District,
Branch IV, Bauang, La Union in Civil Case No. 107-BG, entitled "Juana Rimando
Baniña, et al. vs. Macario Nieveras, et al." dated November 4, 1975; July 13, 1976;
August 23,1976; February 23, 1977; March 16, 1977; July 26, 1979; September 7, 1979;
November 7, 1979 and December 3, 1979 and the decision dated October 10, 1979
ordering defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig to
pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs for funeral expenses, actual damages
consisting of the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, attorney's fees and costs of
suit and dismissing the complaint against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and
Bernardo Balagot.
II.Body
Facts of the Case
Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union is a municipal corporation existing

under and in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent
Honorable Judge Romeo N. Firme is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding
judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union. While
private respondents Juana Rimando-Baniña, Laureano Baniña, Jr., Sor Marietta
Baniña, Montano Baniña, Orja Baniña and Lydia R. Baniña are heirs of the deceased
Laureano Baniña Sr. and plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 107-Bg before the aforesaid court.
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a
passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario
Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino
Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven
by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including
Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and four (4) others
suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
On December 11, 1966, the private respondents instituted a compliant for damages
against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver,
respectively, of the passenger jeepney, which was docketed Civil Case No. 2183 in the
Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch I, San Fernando, La Union. However, the
aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver
of a dump truck of petitioner.
Thereafter, the case was subsequently transferred to Branch IV, presided over by
respondent judge and was subsequently docketed as Civil Case No. 107-Bg. By virtue of
a court order dated May 7, 1975, the private respondents amended the complaint
wherein the petitioner and its regular employee, Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the
first time as defendants. Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such
as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and
the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause
of the collision.
Respondent judge ordered defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and

Alfredo Bislig to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs for damages. Upon MR,
respondent judge issued an order providing that if defendants municipality and Bislig
further wish to pursue the matter already disposed of, such should be elevated to a
higher court in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Issue of the Case
Whether or not Municipality of San Fernando may be sued and held liable to pay for
damages.
Ruling of the Case
On suability of the Municipality:
The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the exercise of
its judgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the State in
the guise of the municipality. However, said judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction
when in his decision, he held the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by
its regular employee.
The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI,
Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent."
Stated in simple parlance, the general rule is that the State may not be sued except when
it gives consent to be sued. Consent takes the form of express or implied consent.
Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing
consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from
contracts is found in Act No. 3083.
A special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged
quasi-delict. Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts,
thereby descending to the level of the other contracting party, and also when the State
files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. Suability depends on the consent
of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The
circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the
other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is
not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state
does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it
can, that the defendant is liable.
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent judge's dereliction
in failing to resolve the issue of non-suability did not amount to grave abuse of
discretion. But said judge exceeded his jurisdiction when it ruled on the issue of liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent court is
hereby modified, absolving the petitioner municipality of any liability in favor of private
respondents.

I.Reference
Topic: Suability: Immunity of the Agents of State
Title: USA vs Guinto
Citation: G.R. No. 76607 February 26, 1990, 182 SCRA 644
II. Body
Facts of the Case
USA vs. Guinto. On February 24, 1986, the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base
solicited bids for barbershop concessions. Ramon Dizon won the bidding. Respondents
objected, claiming that Dizon had made a bid for four facilities which includes an area
not included in the bidding. The petitioners explained that Dizon was already operating
the concession, and informed the respondents that solicitation for the barber service
contracts would be available by the end of June before which the respondents would be
notified. On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in court to compel
the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX) and the petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon,
to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions, and to allow the respondents
through a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions pending
litigation. The court issued an ex parte order directing the individual petitioners to
maintain the status quo. Petitioners then filed a motion to dismiss and opposed the
petition for preliminary injunction, stating that the action was in effect a suit against the
United States of America which had not waived its non-suability. The defendants who
are official employees of the U.S. Air Force were also immune from suit. The trial court
denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
USA v. Rodrigo. Fabian Genove who worked as a cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation
Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his
dismissal from work. Belsa, Cartalla, and Orascion had testified during an investigation
that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served
to the club customers. As club manager, Lamachia suspended Genove and referred the
case to a board of arbitrators. The board unanimously found Genove guilty and
recommended his dismissal. Lamachia, et. al., joined by the United States of America
moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia was an officer of the U.S. Air
Force and was thus immune from suit. They argued that the suit was in effect against
the United States which had not given its consent to be sued. The trial court denied the
motion, saying that the defendants went beyond their functions that brought them out
of the protective mantle of whatever immunities they may have initially had such that
the plaintiff’s allegation that the acts complained of were illegal, done with extreme bad
faith and with preconceived sinister plan to harass and finally dismiss the plaintiff gains
significance.
USA v. Ceballos. Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O’
Donnell, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the petitioners who
were special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators (AFOSI). A charge
was filed against Bautista in violation of R.A. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act which
caused his dismissal from employment. Bautista thus filed a complaint for damages
against the petitioners who filed an answer without the assistance of counsel or
authority from the U.S. Department of Justice. The petitioners alleged that they had
only done their duty in enforcing the laws of the Philippines inside the American bases
pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The law firm representing the
defendants filed a motion to withdraw the answer and dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the defendants were just acting in their official capacity and that the
complaint against them was in effect a suit against the United States which did not give
its consent to be sued. The motion was denied by the trial court which stated that the
claimed immunity under the Military Bases Agreement covered only criminal and not
civil cases and that the defendants had come under the jurisdiction of the court when
they submitted their answer.
USA v. Vergara. Plaintiffs alleged that they were beaten up by the defendants,
handcuffed, and allowed to be bitten by dogs which caused extensive injuries to the
plaintiffs. The defendants denied the claim and asserted that the plaintiffs were arrested
for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they struggled and resisted arrest. The
defendants claimed that the dogs were called off and the plaintiffs were immediately
taken to the medical center where they were treated for their wounds. The defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and argued that the suit was in effect a suit
against the United States which had not given its consent to be sued. The defendants
stated that there were immune from suit under the RP-US Military Bases Agreement for
acts they did in performing their official functions. The motion to dismiss was denied by
the trial court.
Issue of the Case
Whether or not the defendants are correct in invoking the doctrine of State Immunity
for acts done by them in their official duties.
Ruling of the Case
USA v. Guinto. The Supreme Court ruled that the barbershop concessions granted by
the United States government are commercial enterprises operated by private persons
and are not agencies of the United States Armed Forces. All the barbershop
concessionaires were under the terms of their contracts and were required to remit fixed
commissions to the United States government. Thus, the petitioners cannot plead any
immunity from the complaint filed by the private respondents. The Court though could
not directly resolve the claims against the defendants because the evidence of the alleged
irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions is lacking. This means that the
Court must receive the evidence first so it can later determine if the plaintiffs are
entitled to the relief they seek.
USA v. Rodrigo. The restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station is of the
nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the United States government in its
proprietary capacity. Thus, the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity
to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove even if it is
established that they were acting as agents of the United States when they investigated
and later dismissed Genove. Not even the United States government itself can claim
such immunity because by entering into an employment contract with Genove, it
impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. But still, the Court
dismissed the complaint against the petitioners since, while suable, the petitioners were
found to be not liable. A thorough investigation established beyond doubt that Genove
had in fact polluted the soup stock with urine.
USA v. Ceballos. The court found that the petitioners were only exercising their official
functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation. The petitioners were connected
with the Air Force Office of Special Investigators and were assigned to prevent the
distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs and to prosecute those guilty of
such acts. As such, the petitioners were not acting in their private or unofficial capacity
when they apprehended and later testified against the complainant. For discharging
their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly prosecuted for acts
imputable to their principal which has not given its consent to be sued.
USA v. Vergara. The Supreme Court found the factual allegations in this case
contradictory and recommended a closer study of what actually happened to the
plaintiffs. The Court found the record scant of information to indicate if the defendants
were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority
when the incident in question occurred. The Court then could not directly decide this
case and ruled that the required inquiry must first be made by the lower court to assess
and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties based on the evidence yet to be
presented at the trial. The Court will determine, if it is still necessary, if the doctrine of
state immunity is applicable only after the determination of what capacity the
petitioners were acting at the time of the incident in question.
WHEREFORE, after considering all the above premises, the Court hereby renders
judgment as follows:
In G.R. No. 76607, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge is directed to
proceed with the hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4772. The temporary restraining
order dated December 11, 1986, is LIFTED.
In G.R. No. 79470, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 829-R(298) is
DISMISSED.
In G.R. No. 80018, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 115-C-87 is
DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated October 14, 1987, is made
permanent.
In G.R. No. 80258, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent court is directed to
proceed with the hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4996. The temporary restraining
order dated October 27, 1987, is LIFTED.

I.Reference
Topic: Suability of the State: Immunity of State Embassies
Title: Republic of Indonesia vs. Vinzon
Citation: G.R. No. 54705 June 26, 2003
II. Body
Facts of the Case
Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered

into a Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole
proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement stated that
respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy
Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the official residence of
petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin. The equipment covered by the Maintenance
Agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters,
and water motor pumps. It is likewise stated therein that the agreement shall be
effective for a period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless cancelled by
either party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry. 1
Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of expiration of the said agreement, or
before August 1999, they informed respondent that the renewal of the agreement shall
be at the discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration, Minister Counsellor Azhari
Kasim, who was expected to arrive in February 2000. When Minister Counsellor Kasim
assumed the position of Chief of Administration in March 2000, he allegedly found
respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards
set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the
agreement in a letter dated August 31, 2000. 2 Petitioners claim, moreover, that they had
earlier verbally informed respondent of their decision to terminate the agreement.
On the other hand, respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and
unlawful. Respondent cites various circumstances which purportedly negated
petitioners’ alleged dissatisfaction over respondent’s services: (a) in July 2000, Minister
Counsellor Kasim still requested respondent to assign to the embassy an additional full-
time worker to assist one of his other workers; (b) in August 2000, Minister Counsellor
Kasim asked respondent to donate a prize, which the latter did, on the occasion of the
Indonesian Independence Day golf tournament; and (c) in a letter dated August 22,
2000, petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin thanked respondent for sponsoring a prize and
expressed his hope that the cordial relations happily existing between them will
continue to prosper and be strengthened in the coming years.
Hence, on December 15, 2000, respondent filed a complaint 3 against petitioners

docketed as Civil Case No. 18203 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch
145. On February 20, 2001, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the
Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit
and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines. The said motion further
alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim are diplomatic
agents as defined under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and therefore
enjoy diplomatic immunity.4 In turn, respondent filed on March 20, 2001, an Opposition
to the said motion alleging that the Republic of Indonesia has expressly waived its
immunity from suit. He based this claim upon the following provision in the
Maintenance Agreement:
"Any legal action arising out of this Maintenance Agreement shall be settled according
to the laws of the Philippines and by the proper court of Makati City, Philippines."
Issue of the Case
Whether or not Republic of Indonesia was immune from suit
Ruling of the Case
Yes. International law is founded largely upon the principles of reciprocity, comity,
independence, and equality of States which were adopted as part of the law of our land
under Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. The rule that a State may not be
sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. The practical justification for the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is that there can be no legal right against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign States, the rule is derived
from the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim par in
parem non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary attitude would “unduly vex the
peace of nations.”
The rules of International Law, however, are neither unyielding nor impervious to
change. The increasing need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial
activities remotely connected with the discharge of their governmental functions
brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity. This concept, the restrictive
theory, holds that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public
acts or acts jure imperii, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
In United States v. Ruiz, for instance, we held that the conduct of public bidding for the
repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station is an act jure imperii. On the other
hand, we considered as an act jure gestionis the hiring of a cook in the recreation center
catering to American servicemen and the general public at the John Hay Air Station in
Baguio City, as well as the bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in
Angeles City.
Apropos the present case, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with
a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure
imperii or jure gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. Is the foreign State
engaged in the regular conduct of a business? If the foreign State is not engaged
regularly in a business or commercial activity, and in this case it has not been shown to
be so engaged, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the
act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure
imperii.
Hence, the existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action
arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and
by a specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity
from suit. The aforesaid provision contains language not necessarily inconsistent with
sovereign immunity. On the other hand, such provision may also be meant
to apply where the sovereign party elects to sue in the local courts, or otherwise waives
its immunity by any subsequent act. The applicability of Philippine laws must be
deemed to include Philippine laws in its totality, including the principle recognizing
sovereign immunity. Hence, the proper court may have no proper action, by way of
settling the case, except to dismiss it.
Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal. It

must be given explicitly or by necessary implication. We find no such waiver in this
case.
Respondent concedes that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is a sovereign

function. On the other hand, he argues that the actual physical maintenance of the
premises of the diplomatic mission, such as the upkeep of its furnishings and
equipment, is no longer a sovereign function of the State.
We disagree. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an

act jure imperii. A sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and
leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance
and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain
the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its
agents and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting
in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent for the
upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities,
water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official
residence of the Indonesian ambassador.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, submits the view that, “the Maintenance
Agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its
governmental functions. In such a case, it cannot be deemed to have waived its
immunity from suit.” As to the paragraph in the agreement relied upon by respondent,
the Solicitor General states that it “was not a waiver of their immunity from suit but a
mere stipulation that in the event they do waive their immunity, Philippine laws shall
govern the resolution of any legal action arising out of the agreement and the proper
court in Makati City shall be the agreed venue thereof.
WHEREFORE, Petition is Granted.

I.Reference
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity
Title: USA vs Ruiz
Citation: G.R. No. L-35645 May 22, 1985, 136 SCRA 487
II.Body
Facts of the Case
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of
those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United
States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for a
couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the invitation
and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US two
telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding
company. The company construed this as an acceptance of its offer so they complied
with the requests. The company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins
of Department of the Navy of the United States, also one of the petitioners herein
informing that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because
of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs, and that the projects were
awarded to third parties. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by
him against the US.
Issue of the Case
Whether or not the United States may be sued.
Ruling of the Case
No. The rule on State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
another State without its consent or waiver. This is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules on international
law are constantly developing and evolving, which made it necessary to distinguish the
activities of States. The activities of the States are categorized into sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,, commercial, and proprietary acts (jure
gestionis). State immunity now extends only to act jure imperii. The correct test for the
application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal
nature of the act. In this case, the contract was clearly for acts jure impreii, not jure
gestionis. Thus, the courts have no jurisdiction to try the case.

I.Reference
Topic: Suability of the State
Title: Amigable vs Cuenca
Citation: G.R. No. L- 26400 February 29, 1972 43 SCRA 360
II.Body
Facts of the Case

Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without prior
expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale, was used by the government. Amigable's
counsel wrote the President of the Philippines requesting payment of the portion of her
lot which had been expropriated by the government.
Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public Highways, for
recovery of ownership and possession of the said lot. She also sought payment for
comlensatory damages, moral damages and attorney's fees.
The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the
government did not give its consent to be sued.
Issue of the Case
Whether or not the petitioner may properly sue the state.
Ruling of the Case
In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, the Supreme Court held
that:
If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken for
public use were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should not be
summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as
an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed
the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been
filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after
tender to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right
to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use
defined in the judgment."
Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her
certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of
her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As
registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land
in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.
However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither
convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road
purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation
which it could and should have done years ago.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to
the court a quo for the determination of compensation, including attorney's fees, to
which the appellant is entitled as above indicated. No pronouncement as to costs.

I.Reference
Topic: Suability of the State: When the Government enters into a Contract
Title: Department of Agriculture vs NLRC
Citation: G.R. No. 104269 November 11, 1993

II.Body
Facts of the Case
Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for
security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant
to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various
premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of
wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay,
holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security
agency.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with
the security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards.
The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became
final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute
the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the
City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA.
Issue of the Case
Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case
Ruling of the Case
No, Department of Agriculture cannot use the principle of non-suability of the State as
an excuse not to be sued.
Section 3, Art. XVI of the 1987 Constitution states that "the State may not be sued
without its consent." This principle reflects a recognition of the sovereign character of
the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from
the jurisdiction of the courts. As per Justice Holmes, a sovereign State is exempt from
suits "not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the
law on which the right depends."
The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that “the State may not be sued
without its consent” reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of
the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from
the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is
exempt from suit based on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under
any circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The State’s consent may be given
expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special
law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences
litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract. In this
situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other
contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.
But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-
suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of
its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. A State may
be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have
actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does
not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.

I.Reference
Topic : Adherence to International Law (Incorporation Clause )
Title : Kuroda vs. Jalandoni
Citation : 83 Phil 171
This is a petition contenting that Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it
violates not only the provision of our constitutional law but also our local laws to say
nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the
Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore
petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and international."
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
Sheginori Kuroda, former Lieutenant General of the Japanese Imperial Army and
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during a
period covering 1943 and 1944, was tried before the military Commission with having
unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting
them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians
and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of
war." Shenginor Kuroda questions the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional
and hence the military commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him, and invoked
the grounds of his arguments that the Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground
that it violates not only the provision of our constitutional law but also our local laws to
say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the
Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore
petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and international.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not Executive Order 68 is a ground for the violations of our provision of
constitutions law and to our local law?
Ruling of the case:
Yes, Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3 that “The Philippines
renounces war as an instruments of national policy and adopts the generally accepted
principle of international law as part of the law of nation.”
In accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of the present
day, including the Hague and Geneva Convention and significant precedents of
international jurisprudence established by the U.N, all the persons, military or civilian,
who have been guilty of planning, preparing, or waging a war of aggression and
commission of the crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in violation
of the laws and customs of war of humanity and civilization, are held accountable
therefore. Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of Executive Order no.
68, the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted
principles and policies of international law which are part our Constitution.


I.Reference
Topic : Adherence to International Law ( Incorporation Clause )
Title : Philip – Morris vs. CA
Citation : G.R No. 91332 , July 16 , 1993
In the petition before us, petitioners Philip Morris, Inc., Benson and Hedges (Canada),
Inc., and Fabriques of Tabac Reunies, S.A., are ascribing whimsical exercise of the
faculty conferred upon magistrates by Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court
when respondent Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier
had issued against Fortune Tobacco Corporation, herein private respondent, from
manufacturing and selling "MARK" cigarettes in the local market.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
Petitioners Philip Morris, Inc., Benson and Hedges (Canada), Inc., and Fabriques of
Tabac Reunies, S.A., are ascribing whimsical exercise of the faculty conferred upon
magistrates by Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court when respondent Court
of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier had issued against Fortune
Tobacco Corporation, herein private respondent, from manufacturing and selling
"MARK" cigarettes in the local market. Banking on the thesis that petitioners' respective
symbols "MARK VII", 'MARK TEN", and "MARK", also for cigarettes, must be protected
against unauthorized appropriation,
Philip Morris, Inc., a corporation (State of Virginia, U.S.A), is the Registered owner of
the trademark “MARK VII” for cigarettes. (per Certificate of Registration No.18723
issued on April 26, 1973 by the Philippine Patents Office (PPO) Similarly, petitioner
Benson & Hedges (Canada), Inc., a subsidiary of Philip Morris, Inc. , is the registered
owner of the trademark “MARK TEN” for cigarettes (PPO Certificate of Registration No.
11147) Fabriques de Tabac Reunies, S.A. (Swiss company), another subsidiary of Philip
Morris,Inc., is the assignee of the trademark “LARK,” (Trademark Certificate of
Registration No. 19053) (originally registered in 1964 by Ligget and Myers Tobacco
Company) Respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation , a company organized in the
Philippines, manufactures and sells cigarettes using the trademark “MARK.”
Petitioners, asserted that their trademarks are entitled to the protection by treaty
obligation under Article 2 of the Paris Convention of which the Philippines is a member
and ratified by Resolution No. 69 of the Senate of the Philippines, as a result an
infringement of their respective trademarks had been committed, filed, on August 18,
1982, a Complaint for Infringement of Trademark and Damages against respondent
Fortune Tobacco Corporation, docketed as Civil Case No.47374 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig , Branch 166.
Issue of the case:

Whether or not respondent has committed trademark infringement against petitioners
by its use of the mark “MARK” for its cigarettes, hence liable for damages?
Ruling of the case:
No, The members of the Paris Union does not automatically entitle petitioners to
protection of their trademarks in this country as that they have absent in actual use of
the marks in local commerce and trade. Philippines adherence to the Paris Convention
effectively obligates the country to enforce its provision, however any protection
accorded has to be made subject to limitations of the Philippine laws, as to “Article 2 of
Paris Convention” provides that foreign nationals must still observe and comply with
the conditions imposed by Philippine law on its nationals. Under the doctrine of
incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given standing
equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments, The fact that international law
has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of
international law over national law in the municipal sphere.

I.Reference
Topic : Conflict of Municipal Law vs. International Law
Title : Ichong vs. Hernandez
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and
constitutionality of a legislative enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in
significance. The enactment poses questions of due process, police power and equal
protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of fact that is whether the
conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist.
Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law
purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it, and within
the field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations
for economic independence and national security, rooted in the drive and urge for
national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free
the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so that the country
and the nation may be free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do
the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman, owner of a retail business, entered the country to
take advantage of business opportunities. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the
RA 1180 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." wherein the said law In effect
it nationalizes the retail trade business. One of the provisions of the Act are : (1) a
prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of
the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception
from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May
15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are
forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of
natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of
term in case of juridical persons. Ichong in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the said Act then
petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several
treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection
clause (pacta sunct servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the
business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he
should be given equal opportunity. He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in
the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he
should be given equal opportunity.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not a law may invalidate treaties or generally accepted principles?

Ruling of the case:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is
no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The
equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”;
and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only
to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within
such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not.”
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict
with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the
police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through
the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his
market stalls in the Pasay city market.

I.Reference

Topic : Conflict of Municipal Law vs. International Law
Title : Gonzales vs. Hechanova
This is an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction. Respondents

maintain that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does not give him sufficient
interest to file the petition herein and secure the relief therein prayed for.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
Entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of
rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the National
Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice. Hence, the then
Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of
rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president
of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements.
Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”,
because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by “the Rice and
Corn Administration or any other government agency.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not R.A 3452 will prevail over the 2 Executive Agreement?
Ruling of the case:
Yes, In case of conflict between International Law and Municipal law Efforts should first
be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that
municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of
international law in observance of the incorporation clause.
In a situation, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a
rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law
should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of
municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.
In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it
conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

I.Reference

Topic : Separation of Church and State
Title : Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu
These two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were
consolidated because they raise essentially the same issue: whether school children
who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled
from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious
beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing
the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic
pledge.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public
school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by
Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
Republic Act No. 1265 provides:
Sec. 1. All educational institutions shall henceforth observe daily flag ceremony, which
shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the Philippine
National anthem.
Sec. 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to issue or cause
to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony herein
provided.
Sec. 3. Failure or refusal to observe the flag ceremony provided by this Act and in
accordance with rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of Education, after
proper notice and hearing, shall subject the educational institution concerned and its
head to public censure as an administrative punishment which shall be published at
least once in a newspaper of general circulation.In case of failure to observe for the
second time the flag-ceremony provided by this Act, the Secretary of Education, after
proper notice and hearing, shall cause the cancellation of the recognition or permit of
the private educational institution responsible for such failure.
Issue of the case:
Whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah's
Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on
account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes
playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine
flag and reciting the patriotic pledge?
Ruling of the case:
The expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are
enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to
receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of
all citizens to quality education . . . and to make such education accessible to all (Sec. 1,
Art. XIV). In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54, 72-75, we
upheld the exemption of members of the Iglesia ni Cristo, from the coverage of a closed
shop agreement between their employer and a union because it would violate the
teaching of their church not to join any labor group. It is certain that not every
conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general laws
conflict with scruples of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some
"compelling state interests" intervenes. We hold that a similar exemption may be
accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony
out of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to
others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give
them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this
Court in Non vs. DamesII, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the highest regard must be
afforded their right to the free exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to
mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit
breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and
patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony
while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite
the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or
pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to
prevent (German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517).

I.Reference

Topic : Separation of Church and State
Title : Ymbong vs. Ochoa
Citation : G.R No. 294819 , April 8 , 2014
In this case, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process
by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to
decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall
offer." It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers
to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
The moment when congress enacted the Republic Act (RA) No. 10354, otherwise known
as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), and
shortly after the President placed his official approval of the said law. Various sectors
from the society came and challenged the said law; as a result they presented fourteen
(14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention. The petitioners assails the
constitutionality or RH Law on the following grounds: The RH Law violates the right to
life of the unborn, the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products, and to religious freedom, equal protection clause, involuntary servitude,
among others.
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal

prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical
practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to
other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health
programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions. It is
also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education
in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.
While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute,
they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the
"compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of
religion and the right to free speech.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not RH Law is unconstitutional?
Ruling of the case:
.No, Because Life begins at fertilization; contraceptive pills do not induce abortion. The
only prevent or delay ovulation. They effect before conception, not after. If there’s no
conception, there’s no abortion.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception.”
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the
moment of “fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization.
In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional;
only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives
that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that
similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus
constitutionally permissible.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place,
the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are
made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the
DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure
shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. Meanwhile, the requirement of Section
9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these devices and materials
have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that
contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective” because under Section 6.
The separation of church and state shall be inviolable, the principle of separation of
Church and State is based on mutual respect generally, and the State cannot meddle in
the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate
upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other
hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of
the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely
believes that they are good for the country. Consistent with the principle that not any
one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited
provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a
mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a
religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations
collectively.
It tend to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the
father from participating in the decision making process regarding their common future
progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter
simply because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which
mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health
Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the
RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed
before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education

has not a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in
upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State. The provisions of Section 14 of the
RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the
right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other

interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that
the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.

I.Reference
Topic : Reserved Law- making power (Initiative and Referendum )
Title : Santiago vs. COMELEC
This is a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of People’s Initiative for Reforms
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the
constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through People’s Initiative. He
based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for
the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of
the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the
hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public
Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-
oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that
one which is cognizableby the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago,
Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several
arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on people’s initiative
to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No
such law has been passed; (2) The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision,
therefore it is outside the power of people’s initiative. The Supreme Court granted the
Motions for Intervention
Issue of the case:
Whether or not R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by
people’s initiative.
Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to
the Constitution, and if so WON the Act as worded adequately covers such initiative
Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific
provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an
amendment of the Constitution
Ruling of the case:
NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to
AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or
reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can
only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause
"proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed"
denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for
Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on
national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have
provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of
interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and
referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to
forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made
permanent.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.

I.Reference
Topic : On party-list
Title : Barangay Association for National Advancement (BANAT) vs.
COMELEC
Citation : G.R No, 179271 , April 21, 2009
This is a petition to proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided

by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its
petition because "the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently been
quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement
the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-
list seats
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
On 27 June 2002, Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency

(BANAT) filed before the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) a petition to proclaim the
full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the
recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELEC’s national board of
canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC
en banc.
BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the resolution of
COMELEC to their petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives
provided by the Constitution.
The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaiming thirteen (13)
parties as winners in the party-list elections in May 2007. The COMELEC announced
that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the
total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance
with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC formula.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,
Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) asked the
COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula.
COMELEC denied the consideration.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition
assailing the resolution of the COMELEC in its decision to use the Veterans formula.
Issue of the case:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one
seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in
the party-list elections?
Ruling of the case:
(1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in
paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the
House of Representatives to Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives
is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then 20% of the members
of the House of Representatives.
(2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued
operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds
that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds
50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.We
therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of
the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two
percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5
(2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
(3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution
clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through
their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in
Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections,
directly or indirectly.

I.Reference
Topic : On party-list
Title : Atong Paglaum , Inc. vs. COMELEC
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions
issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions
for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the

COMELEC Second Division's resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida's (PBB)
registration and accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region.
However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections because
PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to
apply for registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as
an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and
underrepresented." 20 SDHCac
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA,
ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory
injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No.
9604, 21 and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official
ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 22 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled

summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that
filed manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have
continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).
The 39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing
the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official
ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
Issue of the case:

Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections
Ruling of the case:
No, the comelec did not committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections.
The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani
and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as
the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles
established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: national parties or
organizations, regional parties or organizations, and sectoral parties or organizations.
National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector.
Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or

lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who
lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members
of such parties or organizations.
National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some
of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.

I.Reference
Topic : Qualifications and Term of Office ( Residence Requirement)
Title : Marcos vs. COMELEC
Citation : September 18 , 1995
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The
principal issues may be classified into two general areas: (1) the issue of petitioner’s
qualification and (2) the jurisdiction of the Comelec.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of

Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on
March 8, 1995.On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same
position,filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the
Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates to the House of
representative on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record
94-No. 3349772 6 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that an order be issued
declaring petitioner disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy.
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,

changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended
certificate
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the

COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on March 31, 1995. Her Answer to
private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office
on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in
her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation"which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in
her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained
Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation
should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in
the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the
COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the
proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest
number of votes.
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of
Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she
obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent
Montejo.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the

congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution
suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief
Issue of the case:
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 8, 1995 elections
Ruling of the case:
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in

jotting down the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification
requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously
resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the
period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First
District, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and
events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution,
albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced
that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First
District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a
resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual
residence in the First District, which was Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently
noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First
District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of
April 24, 1995 maintains that "except for the time when studied and worked for some
years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The
Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's
domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban,
Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro
Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her
husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she
registered as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang
Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if
she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the
confusion lies.
An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences
in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given
place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a
profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does
not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could
not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of
settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual)
residence and domicile for election law purposes.

I.Reference
Topic : Residence Requirement
Title : Aquino vs. COMELEC
Citation : G.R No. 120265 , September 18 , 1995
This is a petition for certiorari assailing that the Comelec has no jurisdiction to

determine and adjudge the disqualification issue involving congressional candidates
after the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination being reserved to and lodge
exclusively with the house of representative electoral tribunal.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City.
On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,
Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition
to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987
the Constitution, should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding
the May 8, 1995 elections. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 95-113 and was
assigned to the Second Division of the Commission on Elections.
On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner filed
another certificate of candidacy amending the certificate dated March 20, 1995. This
time, petitioner stated in Item 8 of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency
where he sought to be elected for one (1) year and thirteen (13) days.
On May 2, 1995, petitioner filed his Answer dated April 29, 1995 praying for the
dismissal of the disqualification case. On the same day, a hearing was conducted by the
COMELEC wherein petitioner testified and presented in evidence, among others, his
Affidavit dated May 2, 1995, lease contract between petitioner and Leonor Feliciano
dated April 1, 1994, Affidavit of Leonor Feliciano dated April 28, 1995 and Affidavit of
Daniel Galamay dated April 28, 1995.
On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the May 6, 1995 resolution with the COMELEC en banc.
Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where three (3)
candidates vied for the congressional seat in the Second District, petitioner garnered
thirty eight thousand five hundred forty seven (38,547) votes as against another
candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained thirty five thousand nine hundred ten (35,910)
votes. 10
On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion
Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC's Second Division resolution dated May 6,
1995 and a 2nd Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.
On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and

Motion to Resolve Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of
Proclamation" wherein he manifested his intention to raise, among others, the issue of
whether of not the determination of the qualifications of petitioner after the elections is
lodged exclusively in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not the COMELEC finding of non- compliance with the residency
requirement of one year against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable
laws.
Ruling of the case:
No, the COMELEC finding of non- compliance with the residency requirement of one
year against the petitioner is not contrary to evidence and to applicable laws.
In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second
District of Makati City the latter "must prove that he has established not just residence
but domicile of choice.
The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives
should be a resident of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than
one (1) year prior to the elections. Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled
meaning in our jurisdiction.
Clearly, the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,
where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return and remain, his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks
of residence for the purposes of election law. There is nothing wrong with the practice of
establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this
nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through the assent
of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a
candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify.
That purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual
residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area
either by origin or by choice.
Clearly it indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in
1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that
election. At the time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the
same district. 24 His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both
of his parents Benigno and Aurora. Thus, from data furnished by petitioner himself to
the COMELEC at various times during his political career, what stands consistently
clear and unassailable is that hisdomicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his
most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
The property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be
voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro
Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the
condominium unit in Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac) "indicate that
the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical residence" 27 is not to
acquire a new residence or domicile "but only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City." 28 The absence of clear and
positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions
stated above, the lack of identification — sentimental, actual or otherwise — with the
area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all
belie petitioner's claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution, in the
Second District of Makati.
Finally, it would be legally impossible to impose the one year residency requirement in a
newly created political district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political district
is not created out of thin air. It is carved out from part of a real and existing geographic
area, in this case the old Municipality of Makati. That people actually lived or were
domiciled in the area encompassed by the new Second District cannot be denied.
Modern-day carpetbaggers cannot be allowed take advantage of the creation of new
political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts,
prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing
conditions in these areas. It will be noted, as COMELEC did in its assailed resolution,
that petitioner was disqualified from running in the Senate because of the constitutional
two-term limit, and had to shop around for a place where he could run for public office.
Nothing wrong with that, but he must first prove with reasonable certainty that he has
effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law.

I.Reference
Topic : Quorum
Title : Avelino vs. Cuenco
II.BODY
FACTS OF THE CASE :
In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to formulate

charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the
Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent
Tanada from delivering his speech. Before Senator Tañada could deliver his privilege
speech to formulate charges against the incumbent Senate President, the petitioner,
motu propio adjourned the session of the Senate and walked out with his followers.
Senator Cabili request to made the following incidents into a record:

 The deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent
upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the
Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the
Senate.
• Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz suggested that respondent be designated
to preside over the session which suggestion was carried unanimously.
• The respondent, Senator Mariano Cuenco, thereupon took the Chair.
Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting Secretary upon motion of Senator Arranz, because
the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner
when the latter abandoned the session.
Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his
privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said
Resolution No. 68, and submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same was
unanimously approved.
The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to
declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco,
contending that the latter had not been validly elected because twelve members did not
constitute a quorum – the majority required of the 24-member Senate

ISSUES OF THE CASE:
1.)Whether the court has jurisdiction on subject matter
2.)Whether Resolutions 67 and 68 was validly approved
3.)Whether the petitioner be granted to declare him the rightful President of the
Philippines Senate and oust respondent
RULING OF THE CASE:
The Supreme Court held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. The court will be
against the doctrine of separation of powers.
In view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power
should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The court will not
interfere in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the
Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or
reinstate them. If, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the
Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in
the Supreme Court.
Yes, it was validly constituted, supposing that the Court has jurisdiction. When the
Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a quorum, “the
House: does not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute
“the House”. There is a difference between a majority of “the House”, the latter
requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority of all the members
of the Senate less one, constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose
of a quorum.
The Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful President of the
Senate, since the office depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators,
the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any
time by that majority. At any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in
order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here
about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators who
approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place
them beyond the shadow of a doubt.
I.Reference
Topic : Journal Entry Rule vs. Enrolled Bill Theory
Title : Arroyo vs. De Venecia
Citation : supra
This petition challenges the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of
the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of
Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which
petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount
to a violation of the Constitution.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral
committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo
made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the
Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep.
Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano
moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair
called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none,
approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is
that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus,
although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the
Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules
of the House
Ruling of the case:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to
conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite
number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to
qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than
members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in
character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are
involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member
who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with
which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but
only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a
quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum
cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the
purpose of delaying the business of the House.
I.Reference
Topic : Discipline of Members
Title : Osmena vs. Pendatun
Osmeña contended in this petition that: (1) the Constitution gave him complete
parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be
questioned; (20 that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could
be punished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned and discipline therefor, the
House had lost the power to do so because it had taken up other business before
approving House Resolution No. 59. Now, he takes the additional position (4) that the
House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to the Supreme Court a
verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen
in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No.
59.
He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his

parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special
committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion
authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President with
the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not
punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, where it was stated that Sergio
Osmeña, Jr., made a privilege speech entitled a Message to Garcia. There, he claimed to
have been hearing of ugly reports that the government has been selling “free things” at
premium prices. He also claimed that even pardons are for sale regardless of the gravity
of the case.
The resolution stated that these charges, if made maliciously or recklessly and without
basis in truth, would constitute a serious assault upon the dignity of the presidential
office and would expose it to contempt and disrepute.
The resolution formed a special committee of fifteen Members to investigate the truth of
the charges against the President of the Philippines made by Osmeña, Jr. It was
authorized to summon him to appear before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to
require the attendance of witnesses and/or the production of pertinent papers before it,
and if he fails to do so he would be required to show cause why he should not be
punished by the House. The special committee shall submit to the House a report of its
findings before the adjournment of the present special session of the Congress of the
Philippines.
In support of his request, Osmeña alleged that the Resolution violated his constitutional
absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his
words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable
speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules
of House provides that if other business has intervened after the member had uttered
obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to
censure by the House.
The Supreme Court decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to
answer, without issuing any preliminary injunction.
The special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving Congressman
Osmeña a chance to defend himself, found him guilty of serious disorderly behavior and
acting on such report, the House approved on the same day House Resolution No. 175,
declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen
months.
The respondents filed their answer where they challenged the jurisdiction of this Court
to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with
suspension and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session,
the Committee had thereby ceased to exist.
After the new resolution, Osmena added that the House has no power under the
Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
Issue of the case:
Can Osmena be held liable for his speech?
Ruling of the case:
Yes. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in
Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be
questioned in any other place." The provision has always been understood to mean that
although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress,
the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII,
sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in
debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity whose purpose "is to enable and
encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and
success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of
speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one it may
offend."
It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made
responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of
the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter
disorderly or unbecoming a member.
For un-parliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been

censured, committed to prison, and even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. This
was the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its
members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. For instance, the
Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the
parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a
supplementary manner to its proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against
him, because after his speech it had taken up other business. Respondents answer that
Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, that such approval
amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard
parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent.
Granted that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may not, however,
affect past acts or renew its rights to take action which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws extending the period of limitation of
actions and making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. At any rate, courts are
subject to revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.
Mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action taken by a
deliberative body when the required number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee:
The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly

held that it is within the power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or
waive their own rules of procedure, adopted for the orderly con duct of business,
and as security against hasty action. (Certain American cases)
In the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, was
censured by the House, despite the argument that other business had intervened
after the objectionable remarks.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes
disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be disciplined, the court believed that the
House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends
mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be
depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one
thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct
constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction,
which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the
Government. This was due to the theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed
by this. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within
its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission.)
The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to
intervene in what are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is
given the power to example a member, the court will not review its action or revise even
a most arbitrary or unfair decision.
Clifford vs. French- several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of
California for having taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel
reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a chance to make
defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of California
declined to interfere:
Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise
even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, due to
the Constitution. Every legislative body in which is vested the general legislative
power of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause which
it may deem sufficient.
In Hiss. vs. Barlett, it was said that this power is inherent in every legislative
body; that it is necessary to the to enable the body 'to perform its high functions,
and is necessary to the safety of the state; That it is a power of self-protection,
and that the legislative body must necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency
which may justify and require its exercise. Given the exercise of the power
committed to it, the senate is supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or
control the legislature, or either house, in the exercise of the power, would be an
attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.
The Court merely refuses to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions
which it is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity, we
found the House of Representatives of the United States taking the position
upon at least two occasions.
Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino
precedent. In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from
office for 12 months because he had assaulted another member of that Body. The
Senator challenged the validity of the resolution. Although this Court held that in view
of the separation of powers, it had no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate
petitioner, it nevertheless went on to say the Senate had no power to adopt the
resolution because suspension for 12 months amounted to removal, and the Jones Law
gave the Senate no power to remove an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino.
The Jones Law specifically provided that "each house may punish its members for
disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel an elective
member. The Jones Law empowered the Governor General to appoint Senators.
Alejandrino was one.
The opinion in that case stated that "suspension deprives the electoral district of
representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill that
vacancy." But that remark should be understood to refer particularly to the appointive
senator who was then the affected party.
Now the Congress has the full legislative powers and prerogatives of a sovereign nation,
except as restricted by the Constitution. In the Alejandrino case, the Court reached the
conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the power it then exercised—the
power of suspension for one year. Now. the Congress has the inherent legislative
prerogative of suspension which the Constitution did not impair.
The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, limited by the Republic's
Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is
necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides
otherwise.
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation

can not be weighty, becuase deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to
commit one of their members to jail.
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. The petition intended to prevent the
Special Committee from acting tin pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no
preliminary injunction had been issued, the Committee performed its task, reported to
the House, and the latter approved the suspension order. The House had closed it
session, and the Committee has ceased to exist as such. It would seem, therefore, the
case should be dismissed for having become moot or academic.
Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings. But the most
probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a pronouncement of lack of
jurisdictio
I.Reference
Topic : Can a Sandiganbayan suspend a Senator ?
Title : Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan
FACTS OF THE CASE :
That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the Commissioner of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality in the exercise of her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and criminally approve the application for legalization for the stay of the aliens in
violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the
legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified
thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was
unlawfully legalized by said accused.
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
46 and the other for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed,
respectively, No. 91-94555 and No. 91-94897.
Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to "Redetermine Probable
Cause" and to dismiss or quash said information. Pending the resolution of this
incident, the prosecution filed on 31 July 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue
an order suspending petitioner.
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the prosecution to
suspend her.
The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day

preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of
the Philippines, from any government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the
Senate of the Philippines for the implementation of the suspension order.
Issue of the case:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction issuing suspension to petitioner.
Ruling of the case:
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent

public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both
legal and jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute provides:
"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act
or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving
fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
In view of suspension NOT as a penalty
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of

suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once
the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to
issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be "no ifs and
buts about it."
Thus, it has been held that the use of the word "office" would indicate that it applies to
any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office
under which he stands accused.
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-
suspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a
proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2)
the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and
other evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive
suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such
as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts
imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension
from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject
to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
In view of multiple petitions
"Petitioner next claims that the Amended information did not charge any offense
punishable under Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019 because the official acts complained
therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of
Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of approving
applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of "qualified
aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. She
concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the
information (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
"In a motion to quash, the accused the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of
fact in the information(People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner
admitted hypothetically in her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer,

(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who
arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her
official functions.'
In view of RA 3019 and Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power
of Congress to discipline its own ranks.
Section 16, Article VI of the Constitution — which deals with the power of each House of
Congress inter alia to 'punish its Members for disorderly behavior,' and 'suspend or
expel a Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification
that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days — is
unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13
of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding
from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a
Member of the House of Representatives."
In view of the power of the Court
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and
that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive
suspension order.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by
the First Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein
petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems it appropriate to render this decision for
future guidance on the significant issue raised by petitioner.

I.Reference
Topic: Legislative Department: Journal Entry vs Enrolled Bill
Citation: G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974, 56 SCRA 714
II.Body
Facts of the Case
In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department
heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators
and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of
Republic Act No. 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five
members of the city police force who had been assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio
Astorga (assigned under authority of RA 4065).
Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed, before the
Supreme Court, a petition for “Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with
Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to compel Villegas et al and the
members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065. In his
defense, Villegas denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights
and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila) because the said law was considered
to have never been enacted. When the this said “law” passed the 3 rd reading in the lower
house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the
Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by then Senator
Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the
Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made
significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was
then sent back to the lower house and was thereafter approved by the latter. The bill was
sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out
however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the lower house for
approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the
version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by
Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president
and the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they
affixed on the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal of the
concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the
attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due
enactment.
Issue of the Case
Whether or not R.A. 4065 was validly enacted and whether the court can look at the
entries of the journal to determine the due enactment of the bill.
Ruling of the Case
No, Approval of Congress,not signatures of the officers, is essential.

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification
made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking
process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification
does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its
passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the
presiding officers that is essential.
No, while it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of
misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. The SC is
merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President
was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the
purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were
introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the
printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not
asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the
bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both the
President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures
therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never
made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding
that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring
about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.

I.Reference
Topic: Journal Entry Rule vs Enrolled Bill
Title: Morales vs Subido
Citation: G.R. No. L- 29658 November 29, 1968, 27 SCRA 131
II.Body
Facts of the Case
The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of the detective bureau of the Manila
Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He rose to the rank in the
said police force despite his having no college degree. He was provisionally appointed as
chief of police of Manila which became vacant upon the resignation of the former chief
of police, Brig. Gen. Ricardo G. Papa on March 14, 1968.
The resondent Commission of the Civil Service, Abelardo Subido, approved his
designation but rejected his appointment for failure to meet the minimum educational
and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position. The pertinent rule cited is
that of sec. 10 of the Police Act of 1966 (RA 4864). The resp. instead certified other
persons as qualified for the post and called the attention of the Mayor of Manila to fill
the vacancy within 30 days as required by sec. 4 of the Decentralization Act.
The petitioner requested for a mandamus from the Court to compel the respondent to
include him in the list of eligible persons to the post of Chief of Police of Manila for the
consideration of the City Mayor. He contended that he is qualified despite lacking a
college degree under the statement of the aforementioned rule:
“has served in the police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent
therein for at least three years”
Issue of the Case
Whether or not the petitioner and respondent is right in their interpretation of the
contents of the law and whether petition for mandamus is appropriate.
Ruling of the Case
No. The petition for mandamus to compel the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service
to include the name of the petitioner will not be granted since taking the present state of
the law, he is neither qualified nor eligible. Even if ,as noted by the Court, there may be a
possibility of ommision of a phrase, when the bill was passed by the Congress to the
Senate, that may permit the interpretation that he is qualified, the enrolled bill in
possession of the legislative secretary of the President, is signed by the Presidents of
both the Lower and Upper Houses together with their respective secretaries and the
President and therefore must be deemed valid and binding to the Court. No inclusion of
other enlargements, no matter how sound they are, should be used in the interpretation
of an already enrolled bill.
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the
Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of
such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration... by the two houses,
through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received
in the form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is
delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills... which
pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his
approval, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed
complete and unimpeachable.
In conclusion, we hold that, under the present state of the law, the petitioner is neither
qualified nor eligible for appointment as chief of police of the city of Manila.
Consequently, the respondent has no corresponding legal duty — and therefore may not
be compelled by mandamus to certify the petitioner as qualified and eligible.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for mandamus is denied. No pronouncements as to costs.

I.Reference
Topic : Privilege Speech and Debate
Title : Trillanes vs. Oscar Pimentel
Citation : G.R No. 179817 , June 27, 2008
II.BODY
FACTS OF THE CASE :
Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup d’etat in relation to the “Oakwood Incident.”
In the 2007 elections, he won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at
noon on June 30, 2007. Petitioner now asks the Court that he be allowed to attend all
official functions of the Senate, alleging mainly that his case is distinct from that of
Jalosjos as his case is still pending resolution whereas that in the Jalosjos case, there
was already conviction.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:
Whether or not valid classification between petitioner and Jalosjos exists.

RULING OF THE CASE:
The petition is bereft of merit.
In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner
chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted,
albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioner's
Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that
he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still
in his favor.
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral
turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness,
whereas he is indicted for coup d'etat which is regarded as a "political offense."
Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing
legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and
corruption in the AFP.
A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in

Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement.
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for
purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required. (Underscoring supplied)
The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases, both being
punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered
by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the
political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for
release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is
strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a
trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid
curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the
denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense
applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants
like Jalosjos.
Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is not a
flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be
proven by the numerous times he was allowed to travel outside his place of detention.
Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured well when
on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some reason and
proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. The account,
dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident," proves that petitioner's argument bites
the dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact,
the cause for foreboding became real.
Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in

ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in cancelling a discretionary grant of
bail. In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail shall be
denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion.
I.Reference
Topic : General Plenary Powers
Title : League of Cities vs. COMELEC
Citation : G.R No, 176 , November 18, 2008
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities
of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the
constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites
pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009),
which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local
Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the
amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush”
of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal
Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress
adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income
requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved
in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving
Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution
No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However,
the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual
cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16
municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The
Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu
which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on
various dates from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the
voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality
into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal
protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue
Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside
for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Issue of the case:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1.)Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution;
and
2.)Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause
Ruling of the case:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional. First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to
the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took
effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the
creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the
Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they
prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and
unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from
the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of
the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions
are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of
the equal protection clause.
It’s final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of 7-6, denied for lack of merit and with finality the Ad
Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration of its February 15, 2011 ruling that declared
constitutional RA Nos. 9389 (Baybay City in Leyte), 9390 (Bogo City in Cebu), 9391
(Catbalogan City in Samar), 9392 (Tandag City in Surigao del Sur), 9393 (Lamitan City
in Basilan), 9394 (Borongan City in Samar), 9398 (Tayabas City in Quezon), 9404
(Tabuk City in Kalinga), 9405 (Bayugan City in Agusan del Sur), 9407 (Batac City in
Ilocos Norte), 9408 (Mati City in Davao Oriental), 9409 (Guihulngan City in Negros
Oriental), 9434 (Cabadbaran City in Agusan del Norte), 9435 (El Salvador City in
Misamis Oriental), 9436 (Carcar City in Cebu), and 9491 (Naga City in Cebu).
In a 26-page resolution penned by Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, who also penned the
February 15, 2011 resolution, the Court maintained that the said Cityhood Laws do not
violate Art. X, sections 6 and 10 and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
“We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws
not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied
with the requirements of the [Local Government Code] LGC prescribed prior to its
amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the
considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less
by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly
recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress,” the Court said.
The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government units
covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009, which
imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million for the creation of cities.
The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was
well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those
covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA 9009 took effect on June 30,
2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to
exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th
Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint
Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before
June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed
to act on the said Joint Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No.
29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded the same for
approval to the Senate, which again failed to prove it. Eventually, the conversion bills of
respondents were individually filed in the Lower House and were all unanimously and
favorably voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also unanimously
approved. The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses
ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the
clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage
of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by
repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses.
The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from
local sources under RA 9009 was arbitrary. When the sponsor of the law chose the
specific figure of P100 million, no research or empirical date buttressed the figure. Nor
was there proof that the proposal took into account the after-effects that were likely to
arise. While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must
comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the
Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such
amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to
promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant
national growth.
In its February 15 resolution, the Court granted the motion for reconsideration of its
August 24, 2010 resolution filed by respondents Municipality of Baybay, et al. Hence, it
reversed and set aside its August 24, 2010 resolution and declared constitutional the
Cityhood Laws. It held that it “should not be restricted by technical rules of procedure at
the expense of the transcendental interest of justice and equity. While it is true that
litigation must end, even at the expense of errors in judgment, it is nobler rather for this
Court of last resort, as vanguard of truth, to toil in order to dispel apprehensions and
doubt.”
The February 15, 2011 resolution is the fourth ruling since the High Court first resolved
the Cityhood case in 2008.
The cases at bar were spawned by the consolidated petitions filed by the League of Cities
of the Philippines (LCP), et al. On November 18, 2008, the Court, by a 6-5 vote, granted
the petitions and struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating
sections 10 and 6, Art. X, and the equal protection clause.
On March 31, 2009, the Court, by a 7-5 vote, denied the first motion for reconsideration.
On April 28, 2009, the Court, with a 6-6 vote, denied a second motion for
reconsideration for being a prohibited pleading. However, the Court, in its June 2, 2009
resolution, clarified its April 28, 2009 resolution that it voted on the second motion for
reconsideration and that it allowed the filing of the second MR, hence, the second MR
was no longer a prohibited pleading. However, for lack or the required number of votes
to overturn the November 18, 20009 decision and March 31, 2009 resolution, the Court
denied the second MR in its April 28, 2009 resolution.
On December 21, 2009, the Court, by a vote of 6-4, declared the Cityhood Laws as
constitutional.
On August 24, 2010, the Court, this time by a vote of 7-6, resolved the Ad Cautelam
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the Decision of December 21, 2009,
both filed by petitioners, and the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City, et al., reinstating the November 18, 2008
decision.
I.Reference
Topic : Doctrine of Non-delegation of Legislative Power
Title : U.S vs. Ang Tang Ho
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled
"An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and
corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof,
and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue
the necessary rules and regulations
Upon the cessation of the reasons for which such proclamation was issued, the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, shall declare the application
of this Act to have likewise terminated, and all laws temporarily suspended by virtue of
the same shall again take effect, but such termination shall not prevent the prosecution
of any proceedings or cause begun prior to such termination, nor the filing of any
proceedings for an offense committed during the period covered by the Governor-
General's proclamation.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which
rice should be sold. A complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging
him with the sale of rice at an excessive price
That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands,
the said Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one
ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than that
fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the
1st of August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act No. 2868. Contrary to law.
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months'
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming
that the lower court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force
and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the
sentence.
The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it
authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be
noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of
State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,
to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and
emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature
does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the
Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any
cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the
Governor-General.
The Act also says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn." The Legislature does not specify or define what is "an
extraordinary rise." That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act
also says that the Governor-General, "with the consent of the Council of State," is
authorized to issue and promulgate "temporary rules and emergency measures for
carrying out the purposes of this Act." It does not specify or define what is a temporary
rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency
measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect.
That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis
for the order, but has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the Governor-
General to say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an
extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule or an
emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of
facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the
minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice,
sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been any cause, and the
price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency, but,
if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation,
and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.
Issue of the case:
Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which
rice should be sold.
Ruling of the case:
We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to
authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the
price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the
sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.Here
the rice sold was the personal and private property of the defendant, who sold it to one
of his customers.
The government had not bought and did not claim to own the rice, or have any interest
in it, and at the time of the alleged sale, it was the personal, private property of the
defendant. It may be that the law was passed in the interest of the public, but the
members of this court have taken on solemn oath to uphold and defend the
Constitution, and it ought not to be construed to meet the changing winds or emergency
conditions. Again, we say that no state or nation under a republican form of government
ever enacted a law authorizing any executive, under the conditions states, to fix the price
at which a price person would sell his own rice, and make the broad statement that no
decision of any court, on principle or by analogy, will ever be found which sustains the
constitutionality of the particular portion of Act No. 2868 here in question. By the terms
of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and
enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the
people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question here involved, the authority of the
Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in
the manner power in violation of the organic law.
This opinion is confined to the particular question here involved, which is the right of
the Governor-General, upon the terms and conditions stated in the Act, to fix the price
of rice and make it a crime to sell it at a higher price, and which holds that portions of
the Act unconstitutional. It does not decide or undertake to construe the
constitutionality of any of the remaining portions of the Act.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged. So ordered.

I.Reference

Title : Eastern Shipping Lines vs.POEA
II.BODY
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The petitioner challenges the decision of Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration POEA on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over
the case of Vitaliano Saco as he was not an overseas worker.
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an
accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive
Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner
of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the
Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The
POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the
parties ruled in favor of the complainant.
The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees of
the Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad in its international flights, are
not considered overseas workers.
Moreover, the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as
violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no
authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with
such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which,
under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:
Whether Memorandum Circular No. 2 has violated the principle of non-delegation of

legislative power
RULING OF THE CASE:
NO. There was no principle violated. The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly
provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. … “The governing Board of the
Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules
and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the
Administration (POEA).”
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be
enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by
the legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it
more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of
subordinate legislation.”
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a
statute by “filling in’ the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of
Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

I.Reference
Title : Pelaez vs. Auditor-General
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that
said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
This is a special civil action for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction
instituted by Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,
against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents,
from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the EOs
issued by the President creating 33 municipalities and/or any disbursement by said
municipalities.
In 1964, the President, pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code

issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three(33)
municipalities. Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void on the
ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. When RA 2370 (The Barrio
Charter) provides that barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their
names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board
"upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the
"recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities. Section 68 of
RAC, which said EOs are based, provides that the President may define or divide the
boundary or boundaries of any province, sub-province, municipality, municipal district
XXX as the public welfare may require provided, that the authorization of the Congress
of the Philippines shall first be obtained. Petitioner argues that the President under the
new law cannot create a barrio, how much more of a municipality which is composed of
several barrios. Respondent answered that a new municipality can be created without
creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new
municipality. This answer however overlooks on the main import of the petitioners
argument, which questions the President’s authority to create municipalities.
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this
section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon
Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by
virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC
RULING:
On Cardona vs Municipality of Binangonan, such claim is untenable, for said case

involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory — from
an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binañgonan),
likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said transfer. It is obvious, however, that,
whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of
jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature
— involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law
creating said municipalities — the authority to create municipal corporations is
essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is “strictly a legislative
function” or “solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power”
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill
in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be
complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the
delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every
law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine,
with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of
his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to
make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures
inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying
the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and,
consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a
law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President.
Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred
to.
The power of control under the provision Section 10 (1) of Article VII of the Consti
implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be
vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the
national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by
the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With
respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than
that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their
duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with
local governments, so long as the same or its officers act Within the scope of their
authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or
refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although
he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary
action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said
council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He
may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any
disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding
provincial board.
Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect,
remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the
barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become
vacant. Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had
it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation,
thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the
Constitution.

I.Reference

Topic : On Pork Barrel Issue
Title : Belgica vs. Executive Secretary
Citation : G.R. No. 208566 , November 19 , 2013
Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the
complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall heretofore discuss the system‘s
conceptual underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the constitutional
challenge.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:

The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922.
Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members
of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork
Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for
the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40
million for “hard projects” (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools,
etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance,
livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard
projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard
projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain
cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their department
provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator
concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel.The president does have his own source of fund albeit not
included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a)
the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since
1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of
PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In
July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade,
the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles.
Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20
bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that
government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to
“ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the
results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions
before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
Issue of the case:
1.)Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional

2.)Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional
Ruling of the case:
No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional

because it violates the following principles:
Separation of Powers.As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the
release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the
laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may
implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after
the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects
their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they
enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of
PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the
Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only
recommend where their pork barrel funds go).This is also highlighted by the fact that in
realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator
concerned.
Non-delegability of Legislative Power.As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power

in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only
insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being,
legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that
which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve
purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency,
or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as
Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the
projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-
delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in
Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual
members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can
delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto
items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already
being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can
now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how
can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is
made after the approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of
budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President
useless.”
Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through
their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs
and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of
the members of the house of representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman
can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This
is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national officer)
meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is contrary to the State
policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is
happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a
personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which
provides that no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by laws.Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes
from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from
a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya
Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter,
provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from
certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya
Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and
for other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s
earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund)
which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.These are sufficient
laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution.
The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular
appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and
PD 1869.

I.Reference

Topic : On DAP issue
Title : Araullo vs. Executive Secretary
Citation : G.R No. 209287 , July 1 , 2014 and February 3 , 2015
This is a consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the Disbursement

Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related
issuances of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing the
DAP.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish
growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus
plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP
enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects
instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was
that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive
agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn,
these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be
reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the
economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was
attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by
Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that
he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting
in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad
claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of
the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only
realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were
also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation
Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon
Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang

Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that
“no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA
(savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution
(power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of
the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issue of the case:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1),
Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments
by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is
constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
Ruling of the case:

I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was
merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It
is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the
Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In
DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an
appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were
already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds
refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or
deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited
by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget
deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the
case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true
that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government)
are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such
transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”.
Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the
DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive
were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment
of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some
projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the
GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA.
Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent
under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer
to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the
Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among
other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is
completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to
“savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory
definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for
the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But
under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle
of the year and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the
DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the
DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from
the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the
revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed
funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior
to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP
has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the
Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm
than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP
cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity
of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the
authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate
tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
I.Reference
Topic: Riders and Inappropriate Provisions
Title: Guingona vs Carague
Citation: G.R. No. 94751 April 22, 1991
II.Body
Facts of the Case
For the fiscal year of 1990, Congress passed RA 6831, otherwise known as the GAA Act
of 1990. The said budget contained an automatic appropriation of P98.4 billion, of
which P86.8 billion was for debt service. This automatic appropriation was made
pursuant to three Marcos-era issuances: PDs 81, 1177, and 1967.
The said Act set the appropriation for education at P29.7 billion -- significantly lower
than the appropriation for debt service. This was contrary to Section 5, Art. XIV of the
1987 Constitution, which states that "the State shall assign the highest budgetary
priority to education."
Issue of the Case
1. Whether or not greater budget allocation for debt servicing as opposed to education
violates Section 5, Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not PDs 81, 1177, and 1967 are still operative despite having been issued
during the Marcos era.
3. Whether or not automatic appropriation is violative of Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
1987 Constitution.
Ruling of the Case
1. No, the constitutional provision that the highest appropriation should go to education
does not mean that the hands of Congress are so humstrung as to deprive it the power to
respond to the imperatives of the national interest and the attainment of other state
policies/objectives. One of these policies is to ensure that the President can take
advantage of favorable economic conditions, such as situations where interest rates are
low.
2. Yes, said PDs are still operative. These were not automatically revoked upon the
ouster of Marcos. The Court held that these laws remain operative until they are
amended, repealed, or revoked, and so long as they are not inconsistent with the
Constitution. In addition, the Court dismissed petitioners' argument that the aforecited
PDs fall within the ambit of Section 24, Art. VI pertaining to "all appropriation, revenue
or tariff bills," mainly because the PDs in question are considered enacted laws and not
bills.
3. No, the Court held there was no undue delegation of legislative power because the
assailed PDs are complete -- they set out a policy and are complete in their terms, such
that the President doesn't have any choice but to implement them.
I.Reference

Topic : One Subject and Title
Title : Tobias vs. Abalos
Citation : G.R No. L-114783 , December 8 , 1994
This petition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as
"An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to
be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
As taxpayers and residents of Mandaluyong, petitioners assail the constitutionality of

RA No.7675 otherwise known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong
into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as City of Mandaluyong. Prior to the
enactment of the statute, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to one legislative
district. Hon Congressional representative Hon. Ronaldo Zamora sponsored the bill and
signed by pres. Fidel Ramos becoming RA No. 7675. A plebiscite was held on April 10,
1994. The turnout of the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population: 18, 621
voted “yes” while 7,911 voted “no”. Thus, RA7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not RA No 7675 specifically Art VIII Sec 49 thereof is

unconstitutional
Ruling of the case:
For being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution. First objection is that
it contravenes the “one-subject-one bill” rule as enunciated in Art VI section 26(1) of the
Constitution (everybill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof.) this section embraces two principal subjects 1)
the conversion of Mandaluyong into a HUC and 2) the division of the congressional
district of SanJuan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.2)Second and third
objection involve Art VI, Sec 5 (1) and (4) of the COnsti. Petitioners argue that division
of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts has resulted in
increase in the composition of the House of representatives and that it preempts the
right of Congress to reapportion legislatives districts pursuant to Sec 5(4).
Contentions are devoid of merit. The petition is DISMISED for lack of merit.
Ratio:
1) The creation of separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject

separate and distinct from the subject of conversion into a HUC but is a natural and
logical consequence of its conversion into a HUC. A liberal construction of the “one title-
one subject” rule, it should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It
should be sufficient compliance with such requirement is the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions germane to that general subject
2) Statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into HUC with a population of not less than
250thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the one city, one representative
proviso in the constitution—the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed
through the regular congressional processes including due consideration by the
members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate
legislative districts.
3) The present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The phrase “unless otherwise
provided by law” indicates that composition of Congress may be increased if Congress
itself so mandates through a legislative enactment—therefore increase is not
unconstitutional
4) Congress drafted and deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law- Congress
cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself (reapportioning of
legislativedistricts5)The principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion
of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city—the inhabitants of san juan were properly
excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of
mandaluyong6)On the issue of GERRYMANDERING: (practice of creating legislative
districts to favor a particular candidate or party)—rep Ronald Zamora, author of the law
is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/mandaluyong district-by
dividing the district his constituency has in fact been diminished and not favorable to
him.

I.Reference
Topic : Procedural Limitations
Title : Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
These are various suits for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the

constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 on various grounds summarized in the
resolution of July 6, 1994 of this Court.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks
to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by
amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and
challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of
Representatives but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it
did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI,
Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of
the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have
been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity
or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not the R.A. is unconstitutional for having “originated” from the Senate, and
not the House of Representatives
Ruling of the case:

Petition is unmeritorious. The enactment of the Senate bill has not been the first
instance where the Senate, in the exercise of its power to propose amendments to bills
(required to originate in the House), passed its own version. An amendment by
substitution (striking out the text and substituting it), as urged by petitioners, concerns
a mere matter of form, and considering the petitioner has not shown what substantial
difference it would make if Senate applied such substitution in the case, it cannot be
applied to the case at bar. While the aforementioned Constitutional provision states that
bills must “originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,” it also adds, “but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.” The Senate may then propose an
entirely new bill as a substitute measure. Petitioners erred in assuming the Senate
version to be an independent and distinct bill. Without the House bill, Senate could not
have enacted the Senate bill, as the latter was a mere amendment of the former. As such,
it did not have to pass the Senate on second and third readings. Petitioners question the
signing of the President on both bills, to support their contention that such are separate
and distinct. The President certified the bills separately only because the certification
had to be made of the version of the same revenue bill which AT THE MOMENT was
being considered. Petitioners question the power of the Conference Committee to insert
new provisions.
The jurisdiction of the conference committee is not limited to resolving differences

between theSenate and the House. It may propose an entirely new provision, given that
such are germane to the subject of the conference, and that the respective houses of
Congress subsequently approve its report. Petitioner PAL contends that the amendment
of its franchise by the withdrawal of its exemption from VAT is not expressed in the title
of the law, thereby violating the Constitution. The Court believes that the title of the R.A.
satisfies the Constitutional Requirement.
Petitioners claim that the R.A. violates their press freedom and religious liberty, having
removed them from the exemption to pay VAT. Suffice it to say that since the law
granted the press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without
offense to the Constitution. By granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the
exercise of its sovereign prerogative. Lastly, petitioners contend that the R.A. violates
due process, equal protection and contract clauses and the rule on taxation. Petitioners
fail to take into consideration the fact that the VAT was already provided for in E.O. No.
273 long before the R.A. was enacted. The latter merely EXPANDS the base of the tax.
Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property
of the same class be taxed at the same rate, the taxing power having authority to make
reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. It is enough that the
statute applies equally to all persons, forms and corporations placed in similar situation.
I.Reference
Subject: Constitutional Law 1.

Topic: Presidential Power of Item Veto
Title: Bolinao Electronics Corp. vs Valencia
Citation: G.R. No. L-20470 June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 486
II.Body
Facts of the Case
Bolinao Electronics Corporation, Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc. (CBN), and

Montserrat Broadcasting System, Inc. were radio and television network operators
which were denied renewal of their respective station licenses by the Department of
Public Works and Communications through its secretary Brigido Valencia. The sole
reason for the non-renewal was their late filing of their application for renewal. The
three networks then filed a certiorari case against Valencia. In the certiorari case, the
Philippine Broadcasting Service (PBS), a government owned and controlled corporation,
intervened as it alleged it incurred damages when CBN failed to give up Channel 9
despite its lack of license and despite a previous agreement that it would give up said
channel. PBS averred that its claim for damages arose from the fact that under the 1962-
63 Budget (Appropriations Act), the PBS was allotted fund to operate and that such
failure of CBN to give up channel 9 caused it damages.
It appears however that the full text of the pertinent provision of the appropriation act
provides:
For contribution to the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service, including

promotion, programming, operations and general administration; Provided, That no
portion of this appropriation shall be used for the operation of television stations in
Luzon or any part of the Philippines where there are television stations.
It also appears that the President vetoed the second sentence (italicized) of the afore-
mentioned provision.
Issue of the Case
Whether or not the Veto of the President is valid
Ruling of the Case
No. Hence, the provision that the PBS may not spend for the operation of a television
station where there are already existing TV stations is still in effect. Thus, PBS cannot
validly spend for the operation of a TV station in places where there are already existing
TV stations. In short, the PBS can only operate TV stations in areas where there are
none.
As such, if PBS did spend some public fund in operating a TV station where there are
already existing TV stations, it cannot claim for damages because it should not have
made the expenditure in the first place.
The SC ruled that the veto made by the President on the condition is not valid. The
President has the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill.
However, when a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or more items of the
same, the President cannot veto the provision without at the same time vetoing the
particular item or items to which it relates. The executive’s veto power does not carry
with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions.

I.Reference
Topic : Presidential Veto
Title : PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez
Citation : G.R No. 113105 , August 19 , 1994
Suing as members of the Senate and taxpayers, petitioners question: (1) the
constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of
1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d)
Commission on Human Rights (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units
(CAFGU'S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC's); and (2) the
constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt
service.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was
passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it
imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed
budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress
to propose and identify projects in the “pork barrels” allotted to them and to realign
their respective operating budgets. Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and
enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to
the President for consideration and approval. On December 30, 1993, the President
signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act NO. 7663,
entitled “An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the
Philippines From January One To December Thirty One, Nineteen Hundred And
Ninety-Four, And For Other Purposes” (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President
delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed
and on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that “this debt reduction scheme cannot be
validly done through the 1994 GAA.” And that “appropriations for payment of public
debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the
Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26,
Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of1987.2. Special
provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and
maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges
(SUC’s),
3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.

4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the
Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).
5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the
modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the “Use of Fund,” which
requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the corresponding
modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on the “Specific
Prohibition” which states that the said Modernization Fund “shall not be used for
payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150
armored personnel carriers”
6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment
pension and gratuityfunds.7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court,
Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress
Issue of the case:
1.)Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the
GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c)
Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Units (CAFGU’S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s) are
constitutional
2.)Whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt
service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional?
Ruling of the case:
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the
legislative process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7).
There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The
burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation
of the Constitution. The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to
repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177(Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to
reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these
laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law. In the veto of the
provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the President
vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government
agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a
revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such
privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to
the “one-fund policy” (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A
for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of
Budget and Management’s Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the
DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate
provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road
maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended—
70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP
should strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the
Department of Health is an “appropriate” provision. Being directly related to and
inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the
special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item
(Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 [1964]).
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the “use of Fund” for the AFP
modernization program that the President must submit all purchases of military
equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the “congressional or legislative
veto.” However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the
validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the
issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being “inappropriate”
provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed. Furthermore, Special
Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of the
trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the
AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the
obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec.10), more so, contracts entered into by the
Government itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid. The Special
Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for
the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is
violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. Regarding the
deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the challenged
Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the
right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members
all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the
proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in
another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and
there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU’s to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to
appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the
DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures
shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be
determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution
Clause, the President has the power to take “necessary and proper steps” to carry into
execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]). These steps are the
ones to be embodied in the guidelines.
I.Reference
Topic : Legislative Inquiry
Title : Senate vs. Ermita
The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the
President has abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last
September 28, 2005. They thus pray for its declaration as null and void for being
unconstitutional.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused
power by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of
Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of
Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and
void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various
Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call
for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department,
bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National
Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway
project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire
tapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as
provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house of Congress.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials,
enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional
Ruling of the case:
No, Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section
2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress, valid and constitutional
The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive
privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain
information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public
interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose
information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to
outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it
is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the
ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it
must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so
and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

I.Reference
Title : Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committe
Citation : G.R No. L- 89914, November 20 , 1991
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or injuective relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon
committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry
into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez
to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or injunctive relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the
alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-
six (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations.
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential

Commission on Good Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with
the Sandiganbayan Civil Case for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages.
The complaint was amended several times by impleading new defendants and or
amplifying the allegations therein. Under the Second Amended Complaint, the herein
petitioners were impleaded as party defendants.
On 28 September 1988, petitioners (as defendants) filed their respective answers.

Meanwhile, from 2 to 6 August 1988, conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG
of the "Romualdez corporations" were carried in various metropolitan newspapers.
Thus, one newspaper reported that the Romualdez firms had not been sequestered
because of the opposition of certain PCGG officials who "had worked previously as
lawyers of the Marcos crony firms." Another daily reported otherwise, while others
declared that on 3 March 1986, or shortly after the EDSA February 1986 revolution, the
"Romualdez companies" were sold for P5 million, without PCGG approval, to a holding
company controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the President's brother-in-
law, had effectively taken over the firms, even pending negotiations for the purchase of
the corporations, for the same price of P5 million which was reportedly way below the
fair value of their assets. 3
On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile
delivered a speech "on a matter of personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged
"take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flagship of the First Manila Management of
Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to look into the
possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with regard to Republic Act No.
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."
On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate to the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). Thereafter,
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners
and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on
"what they know" regarding the "sale of the thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez." llcd
At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the ground that
his testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused to testify invoking his
constitutional right to due process, and averring that the publicity generated by
respondent Committee's inquiry could adversely affect his rights as well as those of the
other petitioners who are his co-defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the
Sandiganbayan.
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, thereupon, suspended its inquiry and directed the
petitioners to file their memorandum on the constitutional issues raised, after which, it
issued a resolution 6 dated 5 June 1989 rejecting the petitioners' plea to be excused
from testifying, and the Committee voted to pursue and continue its investigation of the
matter. Senator Neptali Gonzales dissented.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and
require their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess
of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their
constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury,
and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a
prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief.
Issue of the case:

Whether or not the inquiry sought by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee be granted
Ruling of the case:
No, the inquiry sought by the Blue Ribbon Committee cannot be granted.
Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation;

he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No.
3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." In other words,
the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon Committee was
to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. Ricardo
Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39
corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group. There
appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.
The Court is also not impressed with the respondent Committee's argument that the
questioned inquiry is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212. The said
resolution was introduced by Senator Jose D. Lina in view of the representations made
by leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of non-governmental
organizations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports Development, to look into
the charges against the PCGG filed by three (3) stockholders of Oriental Petroleum, i.e.,
that it had adopted a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its nominee-directors in a sequestered
oil exploration firm.
Thus, the inquiry under Senate Resolution No. 212 is to look into the charges against the
PCGG filed by the three (3) stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the
implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution.
It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege
speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted
pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212, because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the
PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected
with the government but are private citizens.
It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not

really "in aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction
of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives
of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the "Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the
courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr.
Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case.


Reference

Title : Standard Chapter vs. Senate
Citation : G.R No. 167173 , December 27 , 2007
II.BODY
FACTS OF THE CASE :
SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in Metro
Manila for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of Securities Regulation
Code (RA 8799). Enrile, in his privileged speech, urged the Senate to immediately
conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrences of a similar
fraudulent in the future. The respondent Committee then set an initial hearing to
investigate, in aid of legislation thereto. SCB stressed that there were cases allegedly
involving the same issues subject of legislative inquiry, thus posting a challenge to the
jurisdiction of respondent Committee to continue with the inquiry.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Whether the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach upon the
judicial powers vested solely in the courts who took cognizance of the foregoing cases
RULING OF THE CASE:
YES. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution, as
initiated in the privileged speech of Senate President Enrile, was simply "to denounce
the illegal practices committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign
securities xxx", and at the conclusion of the said speech "to immediately conduct an
inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent in
the future."
The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or
may not be enacted into law. Except only when it exercises the power to punish for
contempt, the committees of the Senate or the House of Representatives cannot penalize
violators even there is overwhelmingly evidence of criminal culpability. Other than
proposing or initiating amendatory or remedial legislation, respondent Committee can
only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever irregularities may be
unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its Report a
recommendation for criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable. At best, the
recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such Report would only be
persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and the courts to determine the
liabilities of the offender
I.Reference
Title : Arnault vs. Nazareno
Citation : 87 Phil 29 (cited for contempt )
This is an original petition for habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from his
confinement in the New Bilibid Prison to which he has been committed by virtue of a
resolution adopted by the Senate on May 15, 1950.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural
Progress Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for
the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. Of the first sum, P1,000,000 was
paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his attorney-in-fact in the
Philippines, the Associated Estates, Inc., represented by Jean L. Arnault, for alleged
interest of the said Burt in the Buenavista Estate.
The second sum of P500,000 was all paid to the same Ernest H. Burt through his other
attorney-in-fact, the North Manila Development Co., Inc., also represented by Jean L.
Arnault, for the alleged interest of the said Burt in the Tambobong Estate.The original
owner of the Buenavista Estate was the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The Philippine
Government held a 25-year lease contract on said estate, with an option to purchase it
for P3,000,000 within the same period of 25 years counted from January 1, 1939.
The occupation republic of the Philippines purported to exercise that option by

tendering to the owner the sum of P3,000,000 and, upon its rejection, by depositing it
in court on June 21, 1944, together with the accrued rentals amounting to P324,000.
Since 1939 the Government has remained in possession of the estate. On June 29, 1946,
the San Juan de Dios Hospital sold the Buenavista Estate for P5,000,000 to Ernest H.
Burt, who made a down payment of P10,000 only and agreed to pay P500,000 within
one year and the remainder in annual installments of P500,000 each, with the
stipulation that failure on his part to make any of said payments would cause the
forfeiture of his down payment of P10,000 and would entitle the Hospital to rescind the
sale to him. Aside from the down payment of P10,000, Burt has made no other payment
on account of the purchase price of said estate.
The original owner of the Tambobong Estate was the Philippine Trust Company. On
May 14, 1946, the Philippine Trust Company sold said estate for the sum of P1,200,000
to Ernest H. Burt, who paid P10,000 down and promised to pay P90,000 within nine
months and the balance of P1,100,000 in ten successive annual installments of
P110,000 each. The nine-month period within which to pay the first installment of
P90,000 expired on February 14, 1947, without Burt's having paid the said or any other
amount then or afterwards.
On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the
Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an absolute deed of sale in
consideration of the sum of P750,000. On February 5, 1948, the Rural Progress
Administration made, under article 1504 of the Civil Code, a notarial demand upon Burt
for the resolution and cancellation of his contract of purchase with the Philippine Trust
Company due to his failure to pay the installment of P90,000 within the period of nine
months. Subsequently the Court of First Instance of Rizal ordered the cancellation of
Burt's certificate of title and the issuance of a new one in the name of the Rural Progress
Administration, from which order he appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its
questions in a congressional hearing in aid of legislation.
Ruling of the case:
Yes, the can senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in a
congressional hearing in aid of legislation.
The Senate of the Philippines is a continuing body whose members are elected for a
term of six years and so divided that the seats of only one-third become vacant every two
years, two-thirds always continuing into the next Congress save as vacancies may occur
thru death or resignation. Members of the House of Representatives are all elected for a
term of four years; so that the term of every Congress is four years. The Second Congress
of the Philippines was constituted on December 30, 1949, and will expire on December
30, 1953.
The resolution of the Senate committing the petitioner was adopted during the first
session of the Second Congress, which began on the fourth Monday of January and
ended on May 18, 1950.
Had said resolution of commitment been adopted by the House of Representatives, we

think it could be enforced until the final adjournment of the last session of the Second
Congress in 1953. We find no sound reason to limit the power of a legislative body to
punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session
terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to
punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional
function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in
practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the
duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed
legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it
would be to defeat the very purpose for which that power is recognized in the legislative
body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to its legislative function. It is but logical
to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is
a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of
the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the
Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally
be exerted as in the present case.
Mere reflection upon the situation at hand convinces us of the soundness of this
proposition. The Senate has ordered an investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong
estates deal, which we have found it is within its competence to make. That investigation
has not been completed because of the refusal of the petitioner as a witness to answer
certain questions pertinent to the subject of the inquiry. The Senate has empowered the
committee to continue the investigation during the recess. By refusing to answer the
questions, the witness has obstructed the performance by the Senate of its legislative
function, and the Senate has the power to remove the obstruction by compelling the
witness to answer the questions thru restraint of his liberty until he shall have answered
them. That power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in
performing the particular legislative function involved. To hold that it may punish the
witness for contempt only during the session in which investigation was begun, would
be to recognize the right of the Senate to perform its function but at the same time to
deny to it an essential and appropriate means for its performance. Aside from this, if we
should hold that the power to punish for contempt terminates upon the adjournment of
the session, the Senate would have to resume the investigation at the next and
succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt proceedings against the witness until the
investigation is completed an absurd, unnecessary, and vexatious procedure, which
should be avoided.

I.Reference
Title : Gudani vs. Senga
Citation : G.R No. 170165 , August 15 , 2006
Petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo enjoining them and other military officers from testifying before Congress
without the President’s consent. Petitioners also pray for injunctive relief against a
pending preliminary investigation against them, in preparation for possible court-
martial proceedings, initiated within the military justice system in connection with
petitioners’ violation of the aforementioned directive.
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
The petitioners are high-ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
Both petitioners, Brigadier General Francisco Gudani (Gen. Gudani) and Lieutenant
Colonel Alexander Balutan (Col. Balutan), belonged to the Philippine Marines. At the
time of the subject incidents, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were assigned to the
Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio City, the former as the PMA Assistant
Superintendent, and the latter as the Assistant Commandant of Cadets.
On 22 September 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited several senior
officers of the AFP to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security (Senate Committee) scheduled on 28 September 2005.
The hearing was scheduled after topics concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections
emerged in the public eye, particularly allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing
of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and an official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
widely reputed as then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano.
Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan, and AFP Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Generoso Senga
(Gen. Senga) were among the several AFP officers who received a letter invitation from
Sen. Biazon to attend the 28 September 2005 hearing. On 23 September 2005, Gen.
Senga replied through a letter to Sen. Biazon that he would be unable to attend the
hearing due to a previous commitment in Brunei, but he nonetheless "directed other
officers from the AFP who were invited to attend the hearing."
The following day, Gen. Senga sent another letter to Sen. Biazon, this time informing the
senator that "no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to
appear" before the hearing scheduled on that day. Nonetheless, both Gen. Gudani and
Col. Balutan were present as the hearing started, and they both testified as to the
conduct of the 2004 elections.
A few hours after Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the
office of Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had appeared before
the Senate Committee "in spite of the fact that a guidance has been given that a
Presidential approval should be sought prior to such an appearance;" that such directive
was "in keeping with the time[-]honored principle of the Chain of Command;" and that
the two officers "disobeyed a legal order, in violation of A[rticles of] W[ar] 65 (Willfully
Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court Martial
proceedings x x x" Both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their
assignments then.
Petitioners wish to see annulled the "gag order" that required them to secure
presidential consent prior to their appearance before the Senate, claiming that it violates
the constitutional right to information and transparency in matters of public concern; or
if not, is tantamount at least to the criminal acts of obstruction of justice and grave
coercion. However, the proper perspective from which to consider this issue entails the
examination of the basis and authority of the President to issue such an order in the first
place to members of the AFP and the determination of whether such an order is subject
to any limitations
Issue of the case:
WON the President may prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a
legislative inquiry
Ruling of the case:
We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power
as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such
injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any
chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against
the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such
attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be
compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President
may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer.
Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the
duty to faithfully execute.
Explication of these principles is in order.
As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate that the President may not issue a blanket
requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to
attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable
limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally
invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military
officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the
Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of
members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are
not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek
presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion
that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-
in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as
budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the
President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the
prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military
discipline and the chain of command mandate that the President’s ability to control the
individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a
military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court
will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the
Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
I.Reference

Title : Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigation
Citation : G.R No. 180643 , March 25 , 2008
Assailed in this motion for reconsideration is the Supreme Court Decision granting the
petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Romulo L. Neri against the respondent
Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, Trade and
Commerce, and National Defense and Security
II. Body
Facts of the Case:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)

entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the
supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in
the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to
be financed by the People’s Republic of China.The Senate passed various resolutions
relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified
that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to
push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he
admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to
answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,(b) whether or
not she directed him to prioritize it, and(c) whether or not she directed him to
approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate
averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the
jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of
respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he
would appear and give his testimony.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered
by executive privilege
Ruling of the case:
Yes, the communications are covered by executive privilege.The revocation of EO 464

(advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution,
existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita
when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way
diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has
Constitutional underpinnings.The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in
cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the
Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under
our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing,
pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers,
the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications

privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-

delegable presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close
advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an
advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that
may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information
sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive
privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the President
and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making
process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.”
Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive
privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited
by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of
the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second,
the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the
“operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if
petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to
them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours.
Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from
the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive
privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of
Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
I.Reference
Subejct: Constitutional Law 1
Topic: Privilege Speech and Debate
Title: Calida vs Trillanes
Citation: G.R. No. 240873 September 3, 2019
II. Body
Facts of the Case
Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV made statements describing Laureano Gregorio Jr. as

Vice President Binay’s dummy connection with the so-called “Hacienda Binay” during
his media interview during gaps and breaks in the plenary and Committee hearing sin
the Senate. He posited his statements were part of an ongoing public debate on a matter
of public concern, and private responded, who had feely entered into and thrust himself
at the forefront of debate, has acquired the stats of a public figure. For these reasons, he
argued that his statements are protected by his constitutional guaranteed rights of free
speech and freedom of expression. He also contended that his statements having been
made in course of the performance of his duties as a senator, are covered by his
parliamentary immunity under Article VI, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution.
On the other hand, private respondent averred that because of the petitioner’s
defamatory statements, his reputation was severely tarnished as sown by the steep drop
of the stock prices of publicly listed companies. Also, petitioners accusations were
defamatory, as they dishonored him and discredited him, and malicious as they were
intended to elicit bias and prejudice his reputation. He further averred that such
statements were not absolutely privileged since they were not uttered in the discharge of
the petitioners function as a Senator, or qualified privileged under Article 354 of the
Revised Penal Code, nor constitutive of fair commentaries on matters of public interest.
Issue of the Case
Whether or not Senator Trillanes statement is covered under the privilege of speech and
debate.
Ruling of the Case
No, since the Senator Trillanes, uttered those statements during the gaps and breaks of
the Plenary and Committee Hearings of the Senate, and therefore not part of any
speech, debate, or inquiry. Therefore, he cannot invoke his privilege of speech and
debate, since he made those statements outside the hearings of the Senate.
Senator Antonio F.
Trillanes, IV made
statements describing
Laureano Gregorio, Jr. as
Vice President Binay9s
dummy in connection with
the so-called <Hacienda
Binay=, during his
media interview during
gaps and breaks in
plenary and Committee
hearings in the Senate.
He
posited that his statements
were part of an ongoing
public debate on a matter
of public concern,
and private responded,
who had freely entered
into and thrust himself to
the forefront of said
debate, has acquired the
status of a public figure.
For these reasons, he
argued that his
statements are protected by
his constitutional guaranteed
rights to free speech and
freedom of
expression. He also
contended that his
statements having been
made in course of the
performance of his duties
as a senator, are covered
by his parliamentary
immunity under Article
VI, Section 11, of the
1987 Constitution.
On the other hand,
private respondent averred
that because of the
petitioner9s
defamatory statements, his
reputation was severely
tarnished as sown by the
steep drop in the
stock prices of his
publicly listed companies.
Also, petitioner9s accusations
were defamatory, as
they dishonored and
discredited him, and
malicious as they were
intended to elicit bias
and
prejudice his reputation.
He further averred that
such statements were not
absolutely privileged
since they were not
uttered in the discharge
of the petitioner9s function
as a Senator, or
qualifiedly privileged under
Article 354 of the
Revised Penal Code, nor
constitutive of fair
commentaries on matters
of public interest
Senator Antonio F.
Trillanes, IV made
statements describing
Laureano Gregorio, Jr. as
Vice President Binay9s
dummy in connection with
the so-called <Hacienda
Binay=, during his
media interview during
gaps and breaks in
plenary and Committee
hearings in the Senate.
He
posited that his statements
were part of an ongoing
public debate on a matter
of public concern,
and private responded,
who had freely entered
into and thrust himself to
the forefront of said
debate, has acquired the
status of a public figure.
For these reasons, he
argued that his
statements are protected by
his constitutional guaranteed
rights to free speech and
freedom of
expression. He also
contended that his
statements having been
made in course of the
performance of his duties
as a senator, are covered
by his parliamentary
immunity under Article
VI, Section 11, of the
1987 Constitution.
On the other hand,
private respondent averred
that because of the
petitioner9s
defamatory statements, his
reputation was severely
tarnished as sown by the
steep drop in the
stock prices of his
publicly listed companies.
Also, petitioner9s accusations
were defamatory, as
they dishonored and
discredited him, and
malicious as they were
intended to elicit bias
and
prejudice his reputation.
He further averred that
such statements were not
absolutely privileged
since they were not
uttered in the discharge
of the petitioner9s function
as a Senator, or
qualifiedly privileged under
Article 354 of the
Revised Penal Code, nor
constitutive of fair
commentaries on matters
of public interest
I.Reference
Topic: Powers of Congress, Inquiries in aid of legislation
Title: Balag vs Senate
Citation: G.R. No. 234608 July 3, 2018
II.Body
Facts of the Case
On September 17, 2017, Horacio Tomas T. Castillo III (Horacio III), a first year law
student of the University of Sto. Tomas (UST), died allegedly due to hazing conducted
by the Aegis Juris Fraternity (AJ Fraternity) of the same university. the Senate
Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs chaired by Senator Panfilo Lacson
(Senator Lacson) together with the Committees on Justice and Human Rights and
Constitutional Amendment and Revision of Codes, invited petitioner and several other
persons to the Joint Public Hearing on September 25, 2017 to discuss and deliberate.
Petitioner, however, did not attend the hearing scheduled on September 25, 2017. On
the same date, Spouses Carmina T. Castillo and Horacio M. Castillo, Jr. (Spouses
Castillo), parents of Horacio III, filed a Criminal Complaint for Murder and violation of
Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049, before the Department of Justice (DOJ)
against several members of the AJ Fraternity, including petitioner. On October 9, 2017,
Spouses Castillo filed a Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit before the DOJ citing the
relevant transcripts of stenographic notes during the September 25, 2017 Senate
Hearing. On October 11, 2017, Senator Lacson as Chairman of Senate Committee on
Public Order and Dangerous Drugs, and as approved by Senate President Aquilino
Pimentel III, issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum addressed to petitioner directing him
to appear before the committee and to testify as to the subject matter under inquiry.
Another Subpoena Ad Testificandum was issued on October 17, 2017, which was
received by petitioner on the same day, requiring him to attend the legislative hearing
on October 18, 2017. On said date, petitioner attended the senate hearing. at around
11:29 in the morning, Senator Grace Poe (Senator Poe) asked petitioner if he was the
president of AJ Fraternity but he refused to answer the question and invoked his right
against selfincrimination
Senator Poe repeated the question but he still refused to answer. Senator Lacson then
reminded him to answer the question because it was a very simple question, otherwise,
he could be cited in contempt.
Senator Poe then moved to cite him in contempt, which was seconded by Senators Joel
Villanueva (Senator Villanueva) and Zubiri.
Senator Lacson ruled that the motion was properly seconded, hence, the Senate
Sergeant-at-arms was ordered to place petitioner in detention after the committee
hearing.
at around 12:09 in the afternoon, Senators Lacson and Poe gave petitioner another
chance to purge himself of the contempt charge. Again, he was asked the same question
twice and each time he refused to answer.
Around 1:19 in the afternoon, Senator Villanueva inquired from petitioner whether he
knew whose decision it was to bring Horacio III to the Chinese General Hospital instead
of the UST Hospital. Petitioner apologized for his earlier statement and moved for the
lifting of his contempt. He admitted that he was a member of the AJ Fraternity but he
was not aware as to who its president was because, at that time, he was enrolled in
another school.
Senator Villanueva repeated his question to petitioner but the latter, again, invoked his
right against self-incrimination.
Issue of the Case
Being a continuing body, can the Senate indefinitely detain a person held in contempt in
connection with its investigation in aid of legislation?
Ruling of the Case

The contempt power of the legislature under our Constitution is sourced from the
American
system. A study of foreign jurisprudence reveals that the Congress' inherent power of
contempt must have a limitation. 2. The Court ruled therein that if the House of
Representatives desires to punish the person cited in contempt beyond its adjournment,
then criminal prosecution must be brought. In that instance, the said person shall be
given an opportunity to defend himself before the courts. 3. In Neri v. Senate44 (Neri),
the Court clarified the nature of the Senate as continuing body: On the nature of the
Senate as a "continuing body", this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there
is no debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing", as it is not dissolved as an
entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members.
However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts
separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it 4. The Rules of the
Senate itself confirms this when it states: RULE XLIV UNFINISHED BUSINESS SEC.
123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session
in the same status. All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the
expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if
present for the first time. Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and
proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a
particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and
it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such
unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The
logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the
succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different composition as that of the
previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of
which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect to the
conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the
expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next
Congress with the same status
The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt
by the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination
of the legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked.
Further, the Court rules that the legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two
instances: First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Sections 22
and 23 of Senate Rules state: Sec. 22. Report of Committee. Within fifteen (15) days
after the conclusion of the inquiry, the Committee shall meet to begin the consideration
of its Report. The Report shall be approved by a majority vote of all its members.
Concurring and dissenting reports may likewise be made by the members who do not
sign the majority report within seventy-two (72) hours from the approval of the report.
The number of members who sign reports concurring in the conclusions of the
Committee Report shall be taken into account in determining whether the Report has
been approved by a majority of the members: Provided, That the vote of a member who
submits both a concurring and dissenting opinion shall not be considered as part of the
majority unless he expressly indicates his vote for the majority position. The Report,
together with any concurring and/or dissenting opinions, shall be filed with the
Secretary of the Senate, who shall include the same in the next Order of Business. Sec.
23. Action on Report. The Report, upon inclusion in the Order of Business, shall be
referred to the Committee on Rules for assignment in the Calendar.
Second, the legislative inquiry of the Senate also terminates upon the expiration of one
(1) Congress. 6. The Court is of the view that these fears are insufficient to permit an
indefinite or an unspecified period of imprisonment under the Senate's inherent power
of contempt.
If Congress believes that there is a necessity to supplement its power of contempt by

extending the period of imprisonment beyond the conduct of its legislative inquiry or
beyond its final adjournment of the last session, then it can enact a law or amend the
existing law that penalizes the refusal of a witness to testify or produce papers during
inquiries in aid of legislation. The charge of contempt by Congress shall be tried before
the courts, where the contumacious witness will be heard. More importantly, it shall
indicate the exact penalty of the offense, which may include a fine and/or
imprisonment, and the period of imprisonment shall be specified therein. This
constitutes as the statutory power of contempt, which is different from the inherent
power of contempt. 7. Notably, there is an existing statutory provision under Article 150
of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the refusal of a witness to answer any legal
inquiry before Congress, to wit: Art. 150. Disobedience to summons issued by the
National Assembly, its committees or subcommittees, by the Constitutional
Commissions, its committees, subcommittees or divisions. — The penalty of arresto
mayor or a fine ranging from two hundred to one thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person who, having been duly summoned to
attend as a witness before the National Assembly, (Congress), its special or standing
committees and subcommittees, the Constitutional Commissions and its committees,
subcommittees, or divisions, or before any commission or committee chairman or
member authorized to summon witnesses, refuses, without legal excuse, to obey such
summons, or being present before any such legislative or constitutional body or official,
refuses to be sworn or placed under affirmation or to answer any legal inquiry or to
produce any books, papers, documents, or records in his possession, when required by
them to do so in the exercise of their functions. The same penalty shall be imposed upon
any person who shall restrain another from attending as a witness, or who shall induce
disobedience to a summon or refusal to be sworn by any such body or official. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Disposition In fine, the interests of the Senate and the witnesses appearing in its
legislative inquiry are balanced. The Senate can continuously and effectively exercise its
power of contempt during the legislative inquiry against recalcitrant witnesses, even
during recess. Such power can be exercised by the Senate immediately when the witness
performs a contemptuous act, subject to its own rules and the constitutional rights of
the said witness. In addition, if the Congress decides to extend the period of
imprisonment for the contempt committed by a witness beyond the duration of the
legislative inquiry, then it may file a criminal case under the existing statute or enact a
new law to increase the definite period of imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for being moot and academic. However, the
period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt of the Senate during
inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative
inquiry. The December 12, 2017 Resolution of the Court ordering the temporary release
of Arvin R. Balag from detention is hereby declared FINAL. SO ORDERED.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 Case Digest Up To Midterm Coverage

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PARTIAL FULLFILLMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER

Submitted By: John Ethelred Osabel

Thanl you and Adelante ATTY.

“Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of concession , privileges , and

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) pursuant to a certain kind of

Issue of the Case :

Ruling of the Case :

We defined the Constitution as a system of fundamental laws for the governance

Name : Osabel, John Ethelred T. JD-113 Professor: Atty.

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by

Ruling of the Case :

Name : Osabel, John Ethelred T. JD-113 Professor: Atty.

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Topics: National Territory: Philippine Baselines Law

Title: Magallona vs. Ermita

Citation: G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011

Facts of the Case

The round of negotiations in Geneva for UNCLOS II proved unsuccessful thus,

Petitioners, in their respective capacity as citizens or legislators, assail the

Issue of the Case

Whether Petitioners have locus standi

On the merits, whether R.A. 9522 is unconstitutional

Ruling of the Court

Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is

Facts of the Case:

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X.

Issue of the case:

1. Whether or not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen?

Ruling of the case:

1. It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a

Name : Osabel, John Ethelred T. JD-113 Professor: Atty.

Facts of the Case:

Issue of the case:

Ruling of the case:

An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines

Name : Osabel, John Ethelred T. JD-113 Professor: Atty.

Facts of the Case:

Issue of the case:

Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino

Ruling of the case:

Facts of the Case:

Issue of the case:

Ruling of the case:

The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Topic: Acquisition and Re-acquisition of Citizenship

Title: Aznar vs COMELEC

Citation: G.R. No. 83820, May 25, 1990

Before us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Commission

The Facts of the Case:

On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-laban Provincial Council, as represented by

On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First-Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to

Hence, the petition before us.

Issue of the Case

Ruling of the Case

Petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost

In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United

ISSUE OF THE CASE :

Subject: Constituional Law I

Topic: Citizenship: Repatriation