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GM 46668-474711 Rev 4 Nexus DP Operations Manual
GM 46668-474711 Rev 4 Nexus DP Operations Manual
GM 46668-474711 Rev 4 Nexus DP Operations Manual
GM-46668-474711
3.15 BASIC FORCES AND MOTIONS .................................... 26 T +44 (0) 203 465 2500
F +44 (0) 203 465 2501
3.16 THRUSTERS .............................................................. 28
www.globalmaritime.com
3.17 POSITION REFERENCE SYSTEMS ................................. 29
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3.20 DP CONTROLLER........................................................ 32
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6. POWER DISTRIBUTION ..............................64
6.1 GENERAL .................................................................. 64
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11.6 COMPLETION OF DP OPERATIONS................................ 98
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16.2 UPDATING DP CAPABILITY PLOTS .............................. 124
Appendices
Figures
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FIGURE 14: DGNSS PRINCIPLE................................................... 55
Tables
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Document Issue Record
PAGE 8
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 General
1.1.1 Global Maritime received instructions from Damen Shipyard to prepare and
compile a DP Operations Manual for the Cable Laying Vessel Nexus.
1.1.2 The basis for a vessel specific DP operations manual is laid out in IMCA M103
Section 2. This manual is laid out in compliance with this IMCA document and is
written specifically for the Nexus.
1.1.3 The Nexus is a purpose built cable laying vessel fitted with a Kongsberg K-POS
DP-21 operating system.
1.1.4 This document is an updated version of the original DP Operations Manual and has
been issued after completion of the DP FMEA Proving Trials.
1.2 Purpose
1.2.1 This manual is designed to familiarise and provide guidance to the key DP
personnel on the characteristics, limitations, and operating procedures of the “CS
Nexus” when operating in Dynamically Position mode.
1.2.2 The contents of this manual are intended to assist in the planning, preparation,
and performance of DP operations and will ensure that all such operations are
carried out safely.
1.2.3 Nothing in this manual shall restrain the Master from taking what actions he
considers necessary in circumstances or conditions which may endanger the safety
of the vessel, the crew or the environment.
1.2.4 This manual should be read in conjunction with the K-Pos 21 Operator Manuals as
supplied by Kongsberg Maritime and the DP FMEA and trials documentation. It
should also be read in conjunction with the relevant equipment manuals for the
mechanical and electrical equipment on the vessel.
1.2.5 The primary objectives of this manual are as follows:-
To describe the vessel’s DP operations, capabilities and limitations
To describe the DP system, its sub-systems and auxiliaries.
To describe the ways in which DP operations are organised and managed,
responsibilities and communications.
To provide guidance on DP status, alerts, emergency responses and
procedures.
To give clear instructions to the vessel’s staff who have particular duties and
responsibilities in respect of DP operations.
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IMCA, Guidelines for the Design and Operation of DP Vessels - IMCA M 103
Rev. 1, December, 2007
IMCA, Guidelines for Auditing Vessels with Dynamic Positioning Systems -
1993 – 112 UKOOA Part 2. Issue 2.
IMO 1994 Guidelines for vessels with Dynamic Positioning Systems
IMO MSC Circular 645
IMCA M 117 The training and experience of key DP personnel.
IMCA M109 A guide to DP-related documentation for DP vessels.
A complete list of reference documentation can be found in Section 18.
1.3.3 In particular, this document has been compiled in accordance with IMCA M103
Section 1.5 which states that:
Every DP vessel should have an Operation Manual that is particular to that DP
system and the operating practice of the owners or operators of the vessel. It
should cover all the work for which the vessel is designed or likely to be used. It
should include but not be limited to the following:
Capability Plots.
Trials Data.
Working Profiles and capabilities of equipment.
DP status, alerts, emergency responses, and procedures.
Responsibilities and communications.
Approach, setting up, checking and testing of the DP systems.
Reporting and recording.
DP footprints.
Manning.
All documents should be controlled and updated in accordance with the
vessels QA (ISM code) procedure.
In addition to the above general document, each work location, task, or operation
of the DP vessel may require a site-specific document that further specifies
additional constraints or procedures for a particular project if the general
document will not suffice e.g. project safety plan, HAZID/HAZOP exercises,
SIMOPS and close out documentation.
1.3.4 In addition, the relevant Classification Society rules have been considered and
adhered to in the compilation of this manual. The relevant Classification Society
is DNV-GL.
1.3.5 The contents of this manual complement the various manuals referred to in the
list in section 17. For detailed operation, fault finding and for procedures for
maintenance and repair of equipment it is necessary to consult the various
manufacturers' manuals.
1.3.6 Any illustration or figure included in this manual and its appendices are for
illustration purposes only. For further systems study, please refer to the vessel’s
approved drawings and manuals.
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1.4 Abbreviations
1.4.1 The following abbreviations have been used throughout the report:
A/C Air Conditioning ER Engine Room
ADP Automatic DP control ESB Emergency Switchboard
mode ESD Emergency Shutdown
AFE Active Front End (drive) System
AI Analogue Input ETO Electro Technical Officer
ANSI American National F&G Fire & Gas (System)
Standards Institute FMEA Failure Modes & Effects
Standard Device Number Analysis
AO Analogue Output FO Fuel Oil
ARPA Automatic Radar Plotting FPSO Floating Production
Aid Storage and Offloading
AVR Automatic Voltage FU Follow Up (control)
Regulator
FW Freshwater
AZI Azimuth Thruster
GM Global Maritime
BAT Bow (Retractable)
Azimuth Thruster GNSS Global Navigation Satellite
System
BTT Bow Tunnel Thruster
HIPAP High Precision Acoustic
CCW Counter-Clockwise Positioning
(thruster control)
HT High Temperature
CPP Controllable Pitch
Propeller HVAC Heating, Ventilation & Air
Conditioning
CW Clockwise (thruster
control) HVRC Hydraulic Valve Remote
Chilled Water (HVAC) Control
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NC Normally Closed RCU Remote Controller Unit
NDE Normally De-Energised ROV Remotely Operated
Non-Driven End (bearing) Vehicle
NDU (DP) Network Distribution SAT Stern Azimuth Thruster
Unit (Switch) SBAS Satellite Based
NE Normally Energised Augmentation Service
NFU Non-Follow Up (control) SDPO Senior Dynamic
NO Normally Open Positioning Operator
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1.5 Industry Associations
1.5.1 IMCA is an internationally recognised organisation of DP vessel owners and
operators. One of their objectives is to provide guidance for vessel owners to set
and maintain common high standards of performance in the operation of DP
vessels world-wide.
1.5.2 IMCA is recognised by statutory authorities, classification societies, international
offshore oil companies, DP systems and subsystems manufacturers, owners and
others, as an authoritative and competent body to deal with matters relating to
DP operations, including safety, training, competency, documentation and
auditing.
1.5.3 Van Oord is a member of IMCA. All members of the Association are committed to
carrying out and maintaining high standards of DP operations. The IMCA / DPVOA
Guidelines referred to above provide the standards for all members to comply
with.
1.5.4 In line with other members of IMCA, it is the policy of Van Oord to commit sufficient
resources so that the standards of IMCA are implemented, as appropriate to the
operation of DP vessels.
1.5.5 The resources committed by Van Oord are in line with the principles of reasonable
practicability.
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1.7 Responsibilities
1.7.1 Company personnel involved in DP cable laying operations are required to be
familiar with the contents of this manual.
1.7.2 In particular, the following personnel must have a thorough knowledge of the
contents of the manual and are obliged to apply the DP procedures and practices.
Master
DPOs
Chief Engineer
Engineers & Electricians.
1.7.3 The following staff (where applicable) should also be fully aware of the existence
and content of this manual:
Vessel Superintendent
Survey Superintendent
ROV Superintendent
Party Chief/Offshore Manager.
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2. VESSEL DETAILS
2.1.1 The DP2 Cable-Laying Vessel Nexus (Yard No. 553014) is a dynamically-positioned
cable layer, based on the Damen Offshore Carrier 7500 design. The following are
the principal particulars of the vessel:
Length (overall) 122.75m
Length (between perpendiculars) 116.15m
Beam (moulded) 27.45m
Beam (overall) 27.58m
Draught (max) 5.82m
Draught (with BAT deployed) 8.70m
Deadweight (max draught) 8270t
Flag Netherlands
IMO Number 9715505.
2.1.2 The vessel is a diesel-electric design, with three thrusters at the bow (one
retractable azimuth thruster and two tunnel thrusters) and two azimuth thrusters
at the stern. All thrusters have variable speed fixed pitch propellers.
2.1.3 The vessel is equipped with four main diesel generators, one auxiliary diesel
generator and an emergency diesel generator. The Main Diesel Generators and
the Auxiliary Diesel Generator are located in the single engine room. The
Emergency Diesel Generator is located in a separate space.
2.1.4 The vessel’s automation and power management systems are provided by
Alewijnse Marine Systems and consist of distributed control hardware connected
by a single ring network.
2.1.5 The vessel is equipped with a DP Control System supplied by Kongsberg Maritime,
this system is provided with redundancy. There is an Independent Joystick
System, also supplied by Kongsberg Maritime as an independent backup for the
DP Control System.
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2.2 Relevant Classification Standards
2.2.1 The vessel is classed by DNV-GL, equivalent to IMO DP Class 2. This implies the
following:
Power, control and thruster systems and other systems necessary for, or which
could affect the correct functioning of the DP system are to be provided and
configured such that a fault in any active component or system will not result in a
loss of position. […] Such components may include but are not restricted to the
following;
Prime movers
Generators and their excitation equipment
Gearing
Pumps
Fans
Switchgear and control gear, including their assemblies
Thrusters
Valves (where power actuated).
Systems which are not part of the DP system but which in the event of a fault
could affect the correct functioning of the DP system (for example, fire suppression
systems, engine ventilation systems, shutdown systems etc.) are to be included
in the FMEA.
Port MSB
BTT BTT
SAT Port
BAT
Aft Fwd
Centre MSB
SAT
Starboard
Starboard MSB
2.3.3 The Port 690V Switchboard is powered by two diesel generators (DG1 & DG2) and
the switchboard supplies one bow tunnel thruster (BTT Forward) and one stern
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azimuth thruster (SAT Port). The Port 690V Switchboard powers the Port 440V
switchboards and Port 230V switchboards.
2.3.4 The Centre 690V Switchboard is powered by a single diesel generator (DG5) and
the switchboard supplies the Bow Azimuth Thruster (BAT). The Centre 690V
Switchboard powers a single Centre 440V Switchboard, there is no Centre 230V
distribution.
2.3.5 The Starboard 690V Switchboard is powered by two diesel generators (DG3 &
DG4) and the switchboard supplies one bow tunnel thruster (BTT Aft) and one
stern azimuth thruster (SAT Starboard). The Starboard 690V Switchboard powers
the Starboard 440V switchboards and Starboard 230V switchboards.
2.3.6 The design intent is that the three redundancy groups are independent. This
implies that when operating in OPEN BUS Mode; no single failure will result in the
loss of more than two thrusters. Therefore, failures affecting the Port, Centre or
Starboard sections cannot affect any other section.
2.3.7 The most effective thruster is the Bow Azimuth Thruster, failure of this individual
thruster is as significant as failure of a bow tunnel thruster and a stern azimuth
thruster. Reference is made to Damen Document No. 1612072, DP Performance
& Power Consumption Revision D.
2.3.8 Notwithstanding the above the Nexus will be required to conduct DP operations in
shallow water which will preclude the use of the Bow Azimuth Thruster. Under
these circumstances, because there will only be the Port and Starboard
switchboards available, the WCFDI will be the loss of either of these switchboards.
See section 11.9
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All 230V bus tie breakers open
All DP-essential pumps & fans assigned “duty” are available and running
All DP-essential pumps & fans in “remote”
Both DP UPS running, not in bypass mode, with no alarms active
Both DP OS running, with one selected as “in command”
Both DP controllers running, one selected as master and in control of the
propulsion
All three wind sensor inputs selected into DP
Four gyrocompass data inputs selected into DP
Three motion reference units data inputs selected into DP.
At least three position references selected into DP, of which two must
utilise different principles.
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3. PRINCIPLE OF DP OPERATIONS
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3.2 DP Class Notations
3.2.1 There are three principle DP Equipment Classes defined by the IMO as follows:
Equipment Class 1; Loss of position may occur in the event of a single fault.
Equipment Class 2; Loss of position is not to occur in the event of a single fault
in any active component or system. Normally static components will not be
considered to fail where adequate protection from damage is demonstrated, and
reliability is to the satisfaction of the Administration. Single failure criteria include:
Any active component or system (generators, thrusters, switchboards,
remote controlled valves, etc.).
Any normally static component (cables, pipes, manual valves, etc.) which
is not properly documented with respect to protection and reliability.
Equipment Class 3; For this class a single failure includes:
Items listed above for class 2, and any normally static component is
assumed to fail.
All components in any one watertight compartment, from fire or flooding.
All components in any one fire sub-division, from fire or flooding.
3.2.2 For equipment classes 2 and 3, a single inadvertent act should be considered as a
single fault if such an act is reasonably probable.
To achieve a DP class notation with certain classification societies may require
additional considerations such as an independent joystick which some societies
require for class 2 or 3.
3.2.3 The decision on which class of vessel is adequate for a particular task or a series
of tasks is addressed in section 2.1 of 113 IMO – Guidelines for vessels with
dynamic positioning systems (IMO MSC Circ.645) which states:
The equipment class of the vessel required for a particular operation should be
agreed between the owner of the vessel and the customer based on a risk analysis
of the consequence of a loss of position. Else, the Administration or coastal State
may decide the equipment class for the particular operation.
3.2.4 This paragraph from the IMO MSC circular is repeated here because this principle
should apply to all DP vessels irrespective of when they were built or what DP
notation or class they have. The risk analysis that is called for need not be
extensive, but it has to adequately reflect the consequences that a loss of position
can reasonably cause or lead to.
The best time to carry out a risk analysis is when the work scope is known and
experienced personnel from the vessel are available.
3.2.5 The Nexus has Equipment Class 2 DNV-GL.
3.3 Accuracy
3.3.1 The position keeping accuracy of a DP system depends on many different factors,
such as vessel shape and construction, power and propulsion available, quality of
position reference and control systems.
3.3.2 Position keeping accuracy is typically within +/- 3 metres or within +/- 3° of
heading.
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3.4 Computer Control & Monitoring
3.4.1 The heart of a DP system is the computer control and monitoring system. It
contains an accurate model of the dynamics of the vessel. The model simulates
the vessel’s responses to various forces, including wind, sea, and current.
3.4.2 Any deviations from the required position and heading of the vessel are detected
by the DP system’s position and reference sensors. This information is then
processed by the model to produce corrective commands to the vessel’s propulsion
system, thus counteracting the deviations from the required position and heading.
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3.7 Power Generation
3.7.1 The type, number and arrangement of power generation units, will have a direct
bearing on the safe working limits of the DP system, because the effect of the
failure of any one unit, or common sub-system, will be considered in the
determination of safe working limits. This includes the number and type of engine
shutdowns. The number of engine rooms and engines should be determined by
the safety, reliability and availability required for the work as well as the time to
completely shut down. Utilities supporting power generation systems, e.g. cooling
water, ventilation, fuel oil, lubricating oil should be arranged so that their total
failure is not more critical than failure of the equipment they support.
3.7.2 Safety systems that enable shut down of power generation automatically or
manually should be designed to fail safe so that unwanted shut down does not
take place from single faults. If the design philosophy is that a single fault also
includes a fire in any one compartment (IMO DP equipment class 3) then the
shutdown control system should withstand fire damage or be separated so that in
the worst case adequate power remains to meet the safe working limits.
3.7.3 The vessel’s Power Generation systems are detailed in Section 5.
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3.9.2 The electrical power distribution to thrusters is usually the aspect of the DP system
design which determines the worst case failure mode. For DP equipment class 3
vessels fire and flood subdivision should not make the design failure case worse.
3.9.3 Examples of single failures in power distribution include the following:
Undervoltage.
Underfrequency i.e. governor failure.
Earth faults.
Phase-phase short circuits.
Faults on a bus tie breaker.
Over/under excitation.
3.9.4 The highest priority should always be given to clearing faults that risk the overall
power and control networks, and maintaining enough power to give time to cease
any operation and reach a safe situation.
3.9.5 The vessel’s Power Distribution system is detailed in Section 6.
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Internal self-checking.
Independent I/Os for sensors.
3.10.4 The DP control console should ideally be located so that the DPO can see the
controls, the external environment and the working operations of the vessel.
Every reasonable effort should be made to compensate in the event that this is
not fully achievable for example by CCTV.
3.10.5 DPO inputs to the system should require a confirming action before being accepted
by the computer to prevent accidental changes being made by a single inadvertent
act.
3.10.6 Power supplies for position control should be redundant, secure and so arranged
that no short circuit, cable damage, earth fault, or automatic changeover could
result in the loss of position control.
3.10.7 The location of the secure power supplies should be chosen such that:
They can be easily checked.
They are unlikely to be misused or to fail from mechanical damage, fire,
inadequate ventilation etc.
3.10.8 Where position references, environmental sensors and vessel sensors are powered
by the position control system’s secure supply, care should be taken to ensure
adequate sensors remain after the worst power failure, for example failure of the
UPS’s inverter.
3.10.9 Control information should be displayed or be easily available to meet the DP Class
principles. For all DP vessels this should include the following:
Thrust units status and power ordered and used;
Power generation and distribution arrangement in use;
Reference sensor status and performance;
Position performance present and past;
Alarm status and sensor trends.
3.10.10 The DP control should enable automatic position and heading changes to be made
in any preselected direction at rates within the vessel’s capability so that the new
heading and/or position is quickly established without instability, or a position
excursion, or overshoot above acceptable limits for the work.
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equipment, so that they could give a false steady position reference with the vessel
moving, should be avoided whenever practicable, and this limitation considered
when determining redundancy and safe working limits. The positioning of acoustic
units in the hull should take into account the likely sources of noise that could
interfere with the acoustic signals and result in the loss of position reference data.
If two acoustic systems are installed their independence or dependence should be
clearly established and this reflected in how they are treated by the DP control
software.
3.11.4 Deploying more than one transponder does not make the acoustic position
reference redundant if it is still subject to a common failure mode, for example
thruster noise.
3.11.5 Short range radio position reference systems can suffer sudden failure from loss
of line of sight or a fault at a remote station. They should be designed so that
they cannot accept any signal that is not unique by design or procedure to the DP
vessel on which they are being used. Precautions should be taken to avoid all
failures or faults that cause the position data to ‘freeze’ irrespective of whether
the vessel is stationary or not (IMCA M 170 – A review of marine laser positioning
systems; IMCA M 224 RADius; IMCA M 142 – Position reference reliability study).
3.11.6 The use of DGPS as more than one position reference depends on the level of
independence achieved with respect to hardware and software, the number of
satellites available, the antennae locations, the quality and number of differential
corrections available and their effects if giving the same incorrect data. However
when two separate DGPS inputs of position are used by the DP control system,
their contribution to the estimated position together with other position references
needs to be properly balanced. Here balanced means that two DGPSs (or GPS or
GPS Relative) should never out-vote one or more other position references and
operate the system such that a loss of position could result.
3.11.7 The DGPS input should also provide information on fix quality for use by the DP
control systems (Ref. 128 DPVOA – QRA for the use of a dual DGPS system for
dynamic positioning – and IMCA M 141 – Guidelines of the use of DGPS as a
position reference in DP control systems).
3.11.8 The vessels Position Reference systems are detailed in section 4.12
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3.13 Vessel Sensors
3.13.1 Position keeping includes the control of the vessel’s heading; gyro compasses are
normally used for this purpose. Failure of heading input has a dramatic effect on
position keeping and excursion, particularly if the heading data is lost to all position
references or if the DP rotation centre is remote from the geometrical centre of
the vessel. Provision of gyro compass redundancy and the ability of the DP system
to detect failure, including a slow drift of the on-line unit, are factors to be taken
into account when determining safe limits, particularly on mono-hulled vessels.
3.13.2 The vessels Gyrocompasses are detailed in Section 4.
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Figure 3: FORCES AND MOTIONS
3.15.3 The vessel also moves in three vertical degrees of freedom: pitch, roll, and heave.
The pitch and roll motions are not controlled by the K-POS DP system, however,
in order to allow the position-reference system to correct for these motions, the
system must have information about them. The K-POS system does not control
or require information about the heave motion, but the motion can be measured
and displayed.
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3.16 Thrusters
3.16.1 The most common principle of thrusters and azi propellers are shown below.
Thrust is normally controlled by varying either azi propeller RPM or propeller pitch.
Tunnel Thruster
Generate sideways thrust in either transverse direction. Can be fixed-pitch,
variable speed or controllable pitch propeller (CPP).
Azimuth Thrusters
3.16.2 These are rotatable and control both thrust magnitude and direction. The
complete unit with the propeller mounted in a nozzle can be retractable (drop-
down or swing-up type) or in a fixed position in the hull for either main propulsion
and/or auxiliary thruster propulsion. Azimuthing main propulsion is now very
popular with diesel electric DP propulsion systems for offshore vessels.
Main Propulsion
3.16.3 These are normally conventional fixed-pitch (FP), variable-speed, or controllable
pitch propellers (CPP) which, in conjunction with rudders/steering, control the
magnitude of the ahead/astern thrust or azimuth units that control magnitude and
direction of thrust at the stern.
Figure 5: THRUSTERS
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3.17 Position Reference Systems
3.17.1 Accurate measurement of the vessels position at any point in time is necessary for
precise Dynamic Positioning. A typical DP2 reference system arrangement would
consist of 2 x DGNSS, 1 x HPR and 1 x SpotTrack.
3.17.2 If two different DGPS systems are in use as two of the three required reference
systems (three reference systems on – line are minimum in Class 2 operation) the
GPS receivers and the differential receivers include the antennas must be supplied
from different power supplies and receive the differential signal from different
sources.
3.17.3 A typical arrangement of reference systems on an offshore support vessel is shown
on the diagram below.
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3.18 DP System Principles
3.18.1 The K-Pos 21 DP system relies on a mathematical vessel model which includes
hydrodynamic characteristics such as current drag coefficients and virtual mass
data. This model, called the Mathematical Vessel Model, describes how the vessel
responds to an applied force, e.g. from wind or thrusters.
Mathematical model and Kalman filtering techniques improve noise filtering
of all measurements which reduces thruster modulation and wear.
Optimum controller and wind feed-forward signals assure accurate
positioning.
Mathematical modelling provides dead reckoning control mode
Ease of operation
Simultaneous use of all reference systems.
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by the mathematical model, and the differences are then used to update the
model.
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periods between measurements, and the vessel model will therefore be heavily
updated, with each measurement.
3.20 DP Controller
3.20.1 The controller calculates the resulting force to be exerted by the
thrusters/propellers in order for the vessel to remain on station. In station-
keeping operations, the K-Pos DP Controller can be working in several of the
following modes, all with special characteristics:
High Precision control
Relaxed control
Green control.
3.20.2 The transition between K-Pos DP controller modes is bumpless.
High Precision control
3.20.3 Provides high accuracy station-keeping in any weather condition at the expense
of power consumption and exposure to wear and tear of machinery and thrusters.
Relaxed control
3.20.4 Uses the thrusters more smoothly, at the expense of station-keeping accuracy.
However, this type of control cannot guarantee that the vessel will stay within its
operational area, and is mainly applicable for calm weather conditions.
Green control
3.20.5 Uses a different control technology called non-linear Model Predictive Control,
which is optimised for precise area keeping with minimum power consumption.
Green control is applicable in all weather conditions.
3.20.6 In Green Control mode, the system maintains the vessel within an allowed area
with minimum use of power. The software consists of two parts; the
Environmental Compensator which is designed to compensate for the averaged
environmental forces and the Model Predictive Controller which uses a prediction
of the vessel movement as input for the control and ensures that the vessel stays
within the operational area.
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This mode enables the vessel to automatically follow a predefined track. The
system controls the position, the heading, and the speed using all available
propulsion forces.
Autopilot mode.
This mode enables the vessel to steer along a selected course
Follow Target mode
This mode allows the vessel to follow a moving submerged target, such as a
Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV), while keeping the vessel at a constant
position relative to the target.
3.21.2 The system incorporates either a Trainer function or a Simulator function. The
built-in Trainer function provides simple simulations for operator training
purposes, and for analysing the vessel behaviour during changes in operational
conditions. The Simulator function provides the same features as the Trainer
function but with more functionality and flexibility in defining the operational
conditions.
3.22.1 The K-Pos DP operator station includes a high-resolution colour flat screen for
monitoring and operation of the system, and an operator panel with push buttons,
lamps, and joystick controls.
The power switch and adjustment controls for the screen are placed on the right
hand side of the screen. For DP2 systems, there are two identical operator
stations.
3.22.2 The operator panel provides:
Dedicated buttons
Keypad
Trackball
3-axis joystick
Heading wheel and buttons.
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3.22.3 Dedicated buttons with status lamps are provided on the operator panel for
activation of main modes, position-reference systems, thrusters, and functions
where indicator lights can assist the assessment of the situation. Other frequently-
used functions, such as selection of display views and dialog boxes, may also be
initiated from dedicated panel buttons. The buttons are grouped according to their
main function. For safety reasons, some of the buttons must be pressed twice
within four seconds to invoke action. These buttons are indicated by a separate
colour. The panel also provides a keypad for input of numeric data, a trackball to
control the screen cursor and a 3-axis joystick. A heading wheel to set the vessel’s
heading may also be supplied.
3.22.4 The Modes buttons group contains buttons for selecting the main operational
modes. Three additional buttons allow the selection of Surge, Sway, and Yaw axes
for automatic control.
3.22.5 The Controls buttons group contains buttons for enabling thrusters and for
accessing system functions and dialog boxes.
3.22.6 The Sensors buttons group contains buttons for enabling position-reference
systems, and for initiating dialogue boxes related to other system sensors.
3.22.7 The Views buttons group contain buttons for selecting the view to be displayed in
the main working area of the screen.
3.22.8 The Alarms button group contains indicators and buttons to display and
acknowledge alarms and events.
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3.22.9 The Command button group contains buttons for transferring command from one
operator station or operator terminal to another.
3.22.10 The Heading Wheel comprises one heading wheel and seven buttons. Three of
these buttons are located on the front and the other four form a circle close to the
heading wheel. The functions that are available depend on the present mode. To
activate the Heading Wheel, one of its three associated buttons must be pressed.
The heading set-point can be changed by turning the Heading Wheel or by using
the Decrease or Increase button.
3.22.11 The Keypad provides numeric, function and cursor buttons. The numeric keys are
used to enter values into dialog boxes. The function keys are used to select
predefined view configurations.
3.22.12 The Trackball is used to position the cursor on the screen. The left button is used
to click on buttons, operate menus, and select displayed symbols. The right button
is used to display a pop-up view menu. The middle button is not used.
3.22.13 The 3-axis joystick is used for joystick thruster control in all three axes (when
these axes are not selected for automatic control). To move the vessel in the
surge and sway axes (alongships and athwartships directions), tilt the joystick.
The direction in which the joystick is tilted determines the direction of applied
thruster force, and the angle of tilt determines the amount of applied thruster
force. To rotate the vessel (the yaw axis), rotate the joystick. The direction in
which the joystick is rotated determines the direction of the rotational moment
demand, and the angle through which the joystick is rotated determines the
amount of applied rotational moment.
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3.23 Display Layout
3.23.1 The display interface uses standard Microsoft Windows NT operating features such
as menus and dialog boxes.
3.23.2 The display is divided into a number of predefined areas, and dialog boxes are
displayed whenever operator interaction is required. The Title Bar, Menu Bar, and
Message Line are at the top of the page. The Performance Area, Monitoring Area,
and Working Area arranged in the centre of the display, and the Status Line and
Status Bar at the foot of the page as shown below.
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4. DP CONTROL SYSTEM
Table 1: DP OS DETAILS
4.2.5 Each operator station is connected to the dual automation network (Net A & Net
B).
4.2.6 Each operator station runs a history recording; this contains data for
approximately twenty-four hours. There is also a printer connected to the DP
Control System, which is used for printing alarm logs and for other hardcopy data
export from the DP Control System. The Alarm Printer is located next to the DP
OS on the Wheelhouse Aft Console and is powered from (DP) UPS 1.
4.2.7 The Mode Selector Switch is mounted on the Wheelhouse Aft Console next to DP
OS 1. This is used for selection of the active control system for all thrusters. The
switch has three positions:
Manual Lever
Independent Joystick
DP.
4.2.8 The switch is provided with 24VDC from the local operator station (DP OS 1) and
is configured to route switch position to each of the five thrusters, there are
separate contacts for each thruster. The selector switch is covered to prevent acts
of inadvertent mal-operation changing the mode of thruster operation.
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4.3 DP Operator Station Failure Modes & Effects
4.3.1 Failure of an individual DP operator station will have little effect as control can be
maintained via another DP operator station. If the in command operator station
fails, the operator will have to take command on another operator station, there
will be no effect on the vessel’s positioning (as the control cabinet is unaffected).
4.3.2 Common failure of both DP OS (following a systemic software failure/error) may
deprive the operator of control of the DP Control System. In principle, the DP
controllers will continue to maintain DP control of the vessel, however these
controllers are connected to the same data network as the operator stations and
there may be an effect to their performance.
4.3.3 The operator can in this eventuality, take command of the vessel on the
Independent Joystick System or on the manual (remote) thruster levers.
4.3.4 The incidence of this form of failure is very low and the DP Control System
manufacturer actively provides updates to guard against any known failure
mechanism. This is based on their experience of thousands of DP controllers in
operation worldwide.
4.3.5 Proper operational procedures, sufficient operator training/competence and good
maintenance of the DP Control System all will act as mitigations against occurrence
and the effects of this failure mode.
4.3.6 Failure of the printer (power failure, unit failure, connection failure, paper jams,
zero paper and zero ink/toner) will not raise an alarm (except locally on the
printer), there will be no effect to the operation of the DP Control System, however
alarm and event recording will be degraded (each DP OS will maintain its own
history record).
4.3.7 The Selector Switch is covered to prevent acts of inadvertent mal-operation
changing the mode of thruster operation.
4.3.8 Power failure to the Selector Switch is alarmed and will result in the switch failing
as set and the operator not being able to make any changes to the operational
mode. All thrusters will remain in their previously assigned control mode (i.e. DP).
4.3.9 Open circuit or short circuit failure of any contact to within the Selector Switch for
an individual thruster will not affect the operating mode of the thruster.
4.3.10 Although all thrusters are switched through the Selector Switch the only
commonality between thrusters is via the mechanical linkage of the switch to each
thruster’s contacts.
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4.4.3 The DP Control Cabinet is dual supplied from two 230V UPS sources. Each UPS is
fed to a power supply unit within the DPC-2 cabinet. Each PSU (A & B) supplies
both DP controllers and all remote I/O modules. Each PSU supplies 24VDC power
to the DP cabinet. There are alarms for total failure of either PSU.
4.4.4 The duplex DP controllers within DPC-2 are configured in a master/slave
arrangement, where both controllers perform the same calculations (with the
same data), however only one is in command of the thrusters. Upon failures
affecting the master controller, the slave controller will become the master. The
transfer of command between controllers will be ‘bumpless’ and there will be no
impact on the DP function of the vessel. Failures to a slave controller will be
alarmed, and similarly have no effect on DP control.
4.4.5 Each DP controller individually is connected with the dual automation network (Net
A & Net B).
4.4.6 Within the cabinet there is a dual (i.e. redundant) RBus network connecting both
DP controllers and all I/O modules. These are founded on network hubs located
on I/O modules WU3 U31 (RBus A) and WU6 U61 (RBus B).
4.4.7 The DP cabinet is interfaced with the PMS, all thrusters, vessel sensors and
position references (except the HPR) via hardwired signals to the RIO units. Data
with the HPR is interfaced via the dual Ethernet network.
4.4.8 The signal I/O is not itself redundant; however, redundancy is achieved by the
segregation of I/O.
4.4.9 An internal fault to a remote I/O unit can result in the loss from the DP Control
System of the connected signals, therefore each remote I/O unit is arranged to
have no more than one thruster or one of a type of sensor or one of a type of
position reference connected.
4.4.10 Each remote I/O unit is dual supplied from the internal cabinet 24VDC power
distribution and is connected with each DP controller via the dual RBus network.
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during switching between two functional DP controllers, control will be maintained
by the original master controller.
4.5.6 As both DP controllers are running identical software with identical inputs, it is
possible that a common (systemic) fault could occur in the controller
programming. This may result in failure of the DP Control System to provide
effective control of the thrusters.
4.5.7 The operator can in this eventuality, take command of the vessel on the
Independent Joystick System or on the manual (remote) thruster levers.
4.5.8 The incidence of this form of failure is very low and the DP Control System
manufacturer actively provides updates to guard against any known failure
mechanism. This is based on their experience of thousands of DP controllers in
operation worldwide.
4.5.9 Proper operational procedures, sufficient operator training/competence and good
maintenance of the DP Control System all will act as mitigation against occurrence
and the effects of this failure mode.
4.5.10 It should be noted that a common (systemic) failure has the potential to affect the
IJS as it has the same RCU as the DP controllers (the manual levers do not share
such commonality).
4.5.11 A communication failure to one of the DP controllers from a network failure (or
fault) will not be critical, as there is redundancy in the DP controllers (and in RBus
and Ethernet networks).
4.5.12 Failure in communication between a vessel sensor and the DP Control System will
result in that sensor being rejected from DP. Likewise, a sudden jump in sensor
value would result in rejection.
4.5.13 Failure in communication between a position reference and the DP Control System
will result in that position reference being rejected from DP. Likewise, a sudden
jump in measured position would result in rejection.
4.5.14 A signal freeze in the input signal from a vessel sensor to the DP Control System
will be automatically detected and the sensor will be rejected from the DP Control
System.
4.5.15 A signal freeze in the input signal from a position reference to the DP Control
System will be automatically detected and the reference will be disregarded by the
DP Control System (the weighting will be set to zero).
4.5.16 A slowly varying signal from a bad reference or poor sensor will not be instantly
detected by the DP Control System. After the signal has drifted outside the mean
position fix (when using at least three position references) or outside the
acceptance limits (for the vessel sensors) the DP Control System will then reject
the faulty reference or sensor.
4.5.17 There is a danger upon rejection of a faulty signal of a drive off, as the mean
position fix (or sensor value) may jump following rejection of the erroneous signal.
The mitigations against this are twofold; the first is provided by use of three
sensors or position references, such that the rejected sensor is always outweighed
by the two healthy sensors and the second is provided by prompt recognition of
this problem by the operator, this relies heavily on operator training and
experience.
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4.5.18 Failure of I/O module WU3 U31 will fail RBus A communication throughout the DP
control cabinet. Internal cabinet communication will be maintained on RBus B.
4.5.19 Failure of I/O module WU3 U32 (RSER200-4) will fail input into the DP Control
System from Wind 1, Wind 3, Gyro 1 and DGNSS 1.
The DP Control System will remain operating with no effect to station keeping,
utilising the other wind sensor, three remaining gyrocompasses and with HPR,
DGNSS 2, DGNSS 3 and SpotTrack still available.
4.5.20 Failure of I/O module WU3 U33 (RSER200-4) will fail input into the DP Control
System from the Forward Draught Sensor, Tensioner 1, DGNSS 3 and SpotTrack.
The DP Control System will remain operating with no effect to station keeping,
with HPR, DGNSS 1 and DGNSS 2 still available.
4.5.21 Failure of I/O module WU3 U34 (RMP201-8) will fail input into the DP Control
System from Gyro 1 and the connection with the Bow Azimuth Thruster.
The DP Control System will remain operating utilising the three remaining
gyrocompasses. The Bow Azimuth Thruster will fail to zero rpm; the DP Control
System will maintain positioning with the remaining thrusters. This failure is
equivalent to the Worst Case Failure Design Intent.
4.5.22 Failure of I/O module WU3 U35 (RMP201-8) will fail input into the DP Control
System from MRU 1 and the connection with the Bow Tunnel Thruster Aft.
The DP Control System will remain operating utilising the two remaining motion
reference units. The Bow Tunnel Thruster Aft will fail to zero rpm; the DP Control
System will maintain positioning with the remaining thrusters.
4.5.23 Failure of I/O module WU3 U36 (RMP201-8) will fail the connection between the
DP Control System and the Stern Azimuth Thruster Starboard.
The DP Control System will remain operating. The Stern Azimuth Thruster
Starboard will fail to zero rpm; the DP Control System will maintain positioning
with the remaining thrusters.
4.5.24 Failure of I/O module WU3 U37 (RMP201-8) will fail input into the DP Control
System from DG1 and (DP) UPS 1.
The DP Control System will remain operating; loss of status of (DP) UPS 1 will
have no effect.
Loss of data relating to DG1’s status and load may affect the power available for
the Port thrusters (BTT Forward & SAT Port). If the thrusters are using more than
95% of the power available from DG2 (i.e. >2432kW), then the DP Control System
will institute a power chop for the Port thrusters. The Centre and Starboard
thrusters will not be affected and are capable of maintaining positioning by
themselves.
4.5.25 Failure of I/O module WU4 U41 (RMP201-8) will fail input into the DP Control
System from DG3 and Bus Tie 2.
The DP Control System will remain operating; loss of status of Bus Tie 2 will have
no effect as the bus tie is open (NO) during DP operations.
Loss of data relating to DG3’s status and load may affect the power available for
the Starboard thrusters (BTT Aft & SAT Starboard). If the thrusters are using
more than 95% of the power available from DG4 (i.e. >1815kW), then the DP
Control System will institute a power chop for the Starboard thrusters. The Port
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and Centre thrusters will not be affected and are capable of maintaining positioning
by themselves.
4.5.26 Failure of I/O module WU4 U42 (RMP201-8) will fail input into the DP Control
System from MRU 3.
The DP Control System will remain operating with no effect to station keeping,
utilising the two remaining motion reference units.
4.5.27 Failure of I/O module WU6 U61 will fail RBus A communication throughout the DP
control cabinet. Internal cabinet communication will be maintained on RBus B.
4.5.28 Failure of I/O module WU6 U62 (RSER200-4) will fail input into the DP Control
System from Wind 2, Gyro 2, Gyro 3, MRU 2 and DGNSS 2.
The DP Control System will remain operating with no effect to station keeping,
utilising the other wind sensor, two remaining gyrocompasses, two remaining
motion reference units and with HPR, DGNSS 1, DGNSS 3 and SpotTrack still
available.
4.5.29 Failure of I/O module WU6 U63 (RSER200-4) will fail input into the DP Control
System from Gyro 4 and both Waypoint inputs.
The DP Control System will remain operating with no effect to station keeping,
utilising the three remaining gyrocompasses. The effect of failure of the waypoint
input will prevent import of future waypoints into the DP Control System. Any
active waypoints being followed by the DP Control System will not be affected.
4.5.30 Failure of I/O module WU6 U64 (RMP201-8) will fail input into the DP Control
System from Gyro 2 and the connection with the Bow Tunnel Thruster Forward.
The DP Control System will remain operating utilising the three remaining
gyrocompasses. The Bow Tunnel Thruster Forward will fail to zero rpm; the DP
Control System will maintain positioning with the remaining thrusters.
4.5.31 Failure of I/O module WU6 U65 (RMP201-8) will fail the connection between the
DP Control System and the Stern Azimuth Thruster Port.
The DP Control System will remain operating. The Stern Azimuth Thruster Port
will fail to zero rpm; the DP Control System will maintain positioning with the
remaining thrusters.
4.5.32 Failure of I/O module WU6 U66 (RMP201-8) will fail input into the DP Control
System from DG2, Bus Tie 1 and (DP) UPS 2.
The DP Control System will remain operating; loss of status of Bus Tie 1 will have
no effect as the bus tie is open (NO) during DP operations. Loss of status of (DP)
UPS 2 will have no effect.
Loss of data relating to DG2’s status and load may affect the power available for
the Port thrusters (BTT Forward & SAT Port). If the thrusters are using more than
95% of the power available from DG1 (i.e. >1815kW), then the DP Control System
will institute a power chop for the Port thrusters. The Centre and Starboard
thrusters will not be affected and are capable of maintaining positioning by
themselves.
4.5.33 Failure of I/O module WU6 U71 (RMP201-8) will fail input into the DP Control
System from DG4.
Loss of data relating to DG4’s status and load may affect the power available for
the Starboard thrusters (BTT Aft & SAT Starboard). If the thrusters are using
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more than 95% of the power available from DG3 (i.e. >2432kW), then the DP
Control System will institute a power chop for the Starboard thrusters. The Port
and Centre thrusters will not be affected and are capable of maintaining positioning
by themselves.
4.5.34 Failure of I/O module WU6 U72 (RMP201-8) will fail input into the DP Control
System from DG5.
The DP Control System will remain operating, however it will consider there to be
a blackout on the Centre 690V MSB. The Bow Azimuth Thruster will remain
running; however, the power available from the DP Control System’s perspective
for the thruster will be zero.
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4.7.4 A systemic error (failure of communication on both networks in a pair) may occur
as a result of a network storm, which can cause a loss of the DP system. Filters
on the networks are used to guard against network storms. This, according to the
manufacturer, is sufficient protection. Protection is installed on both the DP
Ethernet networks and on the DP RBus networks.
4.7.5 Another failure mode which can cause systemic failure is ‘clogging’ of network
communications. This is where high levels of valid network traffic exceeds the
available bandwidth. Networks are designed to have sufficient bandwidth with
safety margins, however as a result of modifications and additions to the DP
Control System, the safety margin may be reduced.
4.7.6 As the DP controllers and operator stations are connected to each other via data
networks, there exists a pathway for computer viruses, trojans and other malware
to be propagated across the DP Control System. Each operator station is
configured with a firewall and has anti-virus software. However, as the vessels
systems are not connected to the internet (for security), the virus definitions will
only be updated during periods of maintenance; therefore newer viruses, trojans
or other malware may be able to bypass these protections.
4.7.7 The presence of viruses, trojans or other malware can cause an increase in
network traffic, compromise the security settings of operator stations (and allow
further infection), reduce the reliability of operator stations and may affect the
correct operation of field stations.
4.7.8 The primary pathway for introduction of viruses, trojans or other malware for
networks is via USB stick. Procedures should be in place to control the use of USB
sticks with the DP control computers. USB ports that are not required should be
deactivated.
4.7.9 In the event of a systemic failure of network communication, the operator can
take command of the vessel on the Independent Joystick System or on the manual
(remote) thruster levers.
The incidence of this form of failure is very low and the DP Control System
manufacturer actively provides updates to guard against any known failure
mechanism. This is based on their experience of thousands of DP controllers in
operation worldwide.
Proper operational procedures, sufficient operator training/competence and good
maintenance of the DP Control System all will act as mitigations against occurrence
and the effects of this failure mode.
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4.8 Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS)
4.8.1 There are five 230V UPS provided, these are each identified in the following table:
UPS Charging Power Supply
14UPS 440V ESB (12EP)
(DP) UPS 1 Port 230V MSB (11L1)
(DP) UPS 2 Starboard 230V MSB (11L2)
(IJS) UPS 3 440V ESB 13EL6
Owner (Van Oord) UPS Port 220V MSB (11L1)
4.8.2 The DP-relevant consumers of the Transitional Source of Power (14UPS) are
identified in the following table:
Transitional Source of Power Consumers (14UPS1)
Auto-Telephone System
PA System 1
PA System 2
Fire Detection System
Local Fire Fighting System Engine Room
4.8.3 The DP-relevant consumers of the DP & IJS UPS are identified in the following
tables:
(DP) UPS 1 (DP) UPS 2
DPC-21 PSU A (& MRU 3) DPC-21 PSU B (& MRU 1)
DP OS 1 DP OS 2
DP Alarm Printer
Wind 1 Wind 2
Gyro 1 Interface Gyro 2 Interface
Gyro 1 PSU Gyro 2 PSU
Wind 3 HYDRINS
HPP OS
HPR Transceiver HPR Transceiver
DGNSS 1 PSU DGNSS 2 PSU
Seapath 330
DGNSS Differential Correction Receiver
SpotTrack
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(IJS) UPS 3
IJS cC-1
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Power will be failed to a single DP operator station (DP OS 1) and to the Alarm
Printer. The DP Control System will remain operating and the operator can use
the remaining DP OS (which is adjacent to the failed OS).
Power will be failed to Wind 1 and Wind 3, the wind speed and direction input into
the DP Control System from Wind 1 and Wind 3 will be failed, this will be alarmed.
There will be no effect to the operation of the DP Control System as there is
another wind sensor available.
Power will be failed to Gyro 1, the heading input into the DP Control System from
Gyro 1 will be failed, this will be alarmed. There will be no effect to the operation
of the DP Control System as there are other gyrocompasses available.
Power will be failed to a single power supply for the HPR Transceiver, this will be
alarmed, however there will be no effect to the operation of the transceiver or the
HPR system as the unit is dual supplied.
Power will be failed to the power supply unit for DGNSS 1; this will fail the input
of this reference into the DP Control System.
Power will be failed for the Seapath (DGNSS 3); this will fail the input of this
reference into the DP Control System. As the unit also outputs MRU data and
gyrocompass data the Gyro 4 input and MRU 3 input to the DP Control System will
also be failed.
Power will be failed to the power supply unit for DGNSS Differential Correction
Receiver, this will degrade the performance of DGNSS 2 (DGNSS 1 & DGNSS 3 are
already failed).
In all, two out of four gyrocompass inputs to the DP Control System will be failed
(Gyro 1 & Gyro 4); the DP Control System will remain operating with the remaining
gyrocompass inputs.
In all, a single MRU will be failed (MRU 3); the DP Control System will remain
operating with the remaining MRU inputs.
In all, two out of five position reference inputs to the DP Control System will be
failed (DGNSS 1 & DGNSS 3); provided sufficient other position references are
selected (i.e. HPR, DGNSS 2 & SpotTrack) the DP Control System will remain
operational.
(DP) UPS 2
4.9.9 Failure of supply to (DP) UPS 2’s battery charger or failure of the battery charging
unit itself, will cause the distribution to revert to battery backup and an alarm will
be raised in the DP Control System and in the Alarm & Monitoring System. The
attached consumers will be maintained.
4.9.10 Failure of (DP) UPS 2’s battery such that it has low charge, will raise an alarm in
the DP Control System and in the Alarm & Monitoring System. The attached
consumers will be maintained.
4.9.11 If (DP) UPS 2’s battery is bypassed, either from mal-operation in this mode or
following a failure, an alarm will be raised in the Alarm & Monitoring System. The
attached consumers will be maintained.
4.9.12 Failure of (DP) UPS 2’s distribution owing to local electrical fault or following failure
of the charging power supply (or battery charging unit) and subsequent (hidden)
failure of the battery to maintain the distribution will cause the attached
consumers to fail.
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Power will be failed to a single power supply unit for the DP Control Cabinet (DPC-
21 PSU B), this will have little effect to the operation of the cabinet as all
components are dual supplied, failure of the power supply to the PSU will be
alarmed. MRU 1 will be failed as it derives power from the DP Control Cabinet.
Power will be failed to a single DP operator station (DP OS 2). The DP Control
System will remain operating and the operator can use the remaining DP OS
(which is adjacent to the failed OS).
Power will be failed to Wind 2, the wind speed and direction input into the DP
Control System from Wind 2 will be failed, this will be alarmed. There will be no
effect to the operation of the DP Control System as there is another wind sensor
available.
Power will be failed to Gyro 2, the heading input into the DP Control System from
Gyro 2 will be failed, this will be alarmed. There will be no effect to the operation
of the DP Control System as there are other gyrocompasses available.
Power will be failed to the HYDRINS inertial measurement unit; failure of this unit
is alarmed. The MRU 2 and Gyro 3 input into the DP Control System will be failed.
The DP Control System will maintain operation using the remaining MRUs and
gyrocompasses.
Power will be failed to the HPR OS, this will fail the HPR input into the DP Control
System as the interface between the HPR system, external sensors and the DP
Control System will be failed. Power will also be failed to a single power supply
for the HPR Transceiver, this will be alarmed, however there will be no effect to
the operation of the transceiver as the unit is dual supplied.
Power will be failed to the power supply unit for DGNSS 2; this will fail the input
of this reference into the DP Control System.
Power will be failed for the SpotTrack position reference; this will fail the input of
this reference into the DP Control System.
In all, three out of four gyrocompass inputs to the DP Control System will be failed
(Gyro 2, Gyro 3 & Gyro 4); the DP Control System will remain operating with the
remaining gyrocompass inputs.
In all, three out of five position reference inputs to the DP Control System will be
failed (HPR, DGNSS 2 & SpotTrack); provided sufficient other position references
are selected (i.e. DGNSS 1 & DGNSS 3) the DP Control System will remain
operational.
(IJS) UPS 3
4.9.13 Failure of supply to (IJS) UPS 3’s battery charger or failure of the battery charging
unit itself, will cause the distribution to revert to battery backup and an alarm will
be raised in the DP Control System and in the Alarm & Monitoring System. The
attached consumers will be maintained.
4.9.14 Failure of (IJS) UPS 3’s battery such that it has low charge, will raise an alarm in
the DP Control System and in the Alarm & Monitoring System. The attached
consumers will be maintained.
4.9.15 If (IJS) UPS 3’s battery is bypassed, either from mal-operation in this mode or
following a failure, an alarm will be raised in the Alarm & Monitoring System. The
attached consumers will be maintained.
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4.9.16 Failure of (IJS) UPS 3’s distribution owing to local electrical fault or following failure
of the charging power supply (or battery charging unit) and subsequent (hidden)
failure of the battery to maintain the distribution will cause the attached
consumers to fail.
4.9.17 Power will be failed to the Independent Joystick System; this will not affect the
operation of the DP Control System.
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4.12.3 The HPR reference is connected to the DP Control System via the dual redundant
Ethernet. The remaining references are hardwired into the DP Control Cabinet.
4.12.4 During DP operations, at least three position references must be selected into DP.
This is mandated in IMO & Class rules and in IMCA guidance.
4.12.5 Three position references selected into the DP Control System allow for voting on
the references to be enabled. This allows for the identification and rejection of
faulty position references.
4.12.6 The selection of position references should be such that no single common failure
can outvote other healthy reference systems. Therefore, no selection of position
references should be used where more than 50% of the weighting of references
(user adjustable) in the DP Control System derives from systems operating on
common principles (e.g. simultaneous loss of all satellite based position reference
systems).
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Figure 12: HiPAP CONFIGURATION
4.13.5 The transducer receives the data, and a position estimator will then use the data
to estimate the transponder position. The system can calculate a variance for its
measurements and determine the known system accuracy and standard deviation.
The HiPAP has a built-in Kalman filter, which improves the stability and accuracy
of the initial narrow beam guidance but does not interfere with raw fixed data
being sent to the DP control computers or cause a lag in the data.
4.13.6 The Hoist Control Unit and Main control Unit are only required for
deployment/recovery of the transducer pole, it is not required during normal DP
operations.
4.13.7 The HPR Operator Station is interfaced with the DP Control System over the dual
DP network. The HPR Operator Station also is connected with a range of other
sensors and position references, HPR data is also fed to the Survey Rack
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4.13.8 The inputs to the HPR reference system are identified below:
MRU 1
MRU 2 (HYDRINS)
Gyro 1
Gyro 2
DGNSS 1
DGNSS 2
DGNSS 3 (Seapath).
4.13.9 The inputs from the Motion reference units and gyrocompasses are used to permit
operation of the HPR as vessel attitude and motion is used to direct the acoustic
signal.
4.13.10 The input from the DGNSS is used as an input for the geographical calibration
(during setup) of arrays (SSBL & LBL), is used for representation in APOS.exe of
vessel and transponder position in geographical coordinates and is used for
synchronising the HPR system clock.
4.13.11 IMCA has a library of guidance documents on the use of HPR as a position
reference for DP operations. For further reading on hydro-acoustic position
reference systems, see the following IMCA publications:
IMCA M200.
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4.14.7 Failure of the input from MRU 2 will raise an alarm in the HPR Operator Station;
however, the HPR input to DP will be unaffected as there is a second motion
reference unit input connected.
4.14.8 Failure of the input from Gyro 1 will raise an alarm in the HPR Operator Station;
however, the HPR input to DP will be unaffected as there is a second gyrocompass
input connected.
4.14.9 Failure of the input from Gyro 2 will raise an alarm in the HPR Operator Station S;
however, the HPR input to DP will be unaffected as there is a second gyrocompass
input connected.
4.14.10 Failure of the DGNSS input (DGNSS 1) to the HPR Operator Station will fail clock
synchronisation of the HPR, there will be no operational effect to the HPR.
4.14.11 Failure of the DGNSS input (DGNSS 2) to the HPR Operator Station will only
prevent the setup and configuration of the HPR, there will be no operational effect
to the HPR.
4.14.12 Failure of a single power supply to the HPR Transceiver will raise an alarm in the
HPR Operator Station; however, the HPR input to DP will be unaffected as there is
a second power supply.
4.14.13 Failure of the HPR Transceiver (from dual power supply failure, communication
fault etc.) will result in the loss of the HPR input to DP. The DP Control System
will maintain operation with the remaining position references.
4.14.14 Failure of the transducer head will fail the HPR position reference. The DP Control
System will maintain operation with the remaining position references.
4.14.15 Failure of the Hoist Control Unit, either from power supply failure or following a
local fault, will prevent operation of the HPR Transducer Pole’s hoist. This will not
affect the operation of the HPR while deployed.
4.14.16 Failure of the Main Control Unit, either from power supply failure or following a
local fault, will prevent operation of the HPR Gate Valve and HPR Transducer Pole’s
hoist. This will not affect the operation of the HPR while deployed.
4.14.17 Total failure of the acoustic system can be caused by dragging or lifting of a
transponder, transponder failure or battery failure. These are largely a matter of
good procedures. If only one or two transponders are deployed, the HiPAP is
vulnerable to such a failure.
The effects of total failure of the acoustic system will not be significant, as the
vessel will be operated with sufficient other position reference systems available.
4.14.18 Noise interference is generally the typical problem affecting acoustic systems. The
transceiver head is mounted a reasonable distance from the thrusters. When
working in heavy weather, noise turbulence, thruster interference and vibrations
may cause occasional signal loss.
In all cases, loss of the acoustic input the DP Control System will not have a
significant effect, as there will be sufficient other position reference systems
available.
4.14.19 Reverberation can arise as a direct consequence of using an acoustic positioning
system. Reverberation can be subdivided into four major classifications:
Volume reverberation - scattering by particle matter, both animate and
inanimate
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Sea surface reverberation - scattering off the surface
Sea bottom reverberation - scattering off bottom layers
Structure reverberation - scattering off synthetic structures.
4.14.20 The latter three types are the most dangerous, as ‘multipath echoes’ can be highly
coherent and cause total destructive interference with the ‘direct’ path signal from
an interrogator or transponder.
The effects of reverberation may present a misleading position fix, in this case,
the DP Control System will reject the reference, as it will fail the median test (i.e.
the position fix is out of limits).
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(internally computed) distance, and receiver stations may correct their distance
by the same amount (accuracy 1.0-0.1m). The digital correction signal is typically
broadcast locally over ground-based transmitters of shorter range or via satellites
for longer range systems.
4.15.4 The DP Control System is provided with three satellite based position references.
Two of these come from conventional differential global navigation satellite
systems and one from a Seapath unit, which combines satellite based signals with
MRU and gyrocompass inputs.
4.15.5 IMCA has a library of guidance documents on the use of DGNSS as a position
reference for DP operations. For further reading on DGNSS, see the following
IMCA publications:
IMCA M141
IMCA M199
IMCA S012
IMCA S018.
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4.16.3 These three DGNSS position references cannot be classed as independent as there
are common failure modes, which can affect all DGNSS. These are described in
the following paragraphs.
4.16.4 DGNSS will suffer from scintillation due to atmospheric conditions placing sole
reliance on the remaining systems, which highlights the importance of selecting
as many reference systems as possible. The vulnerabilities of reliance on GNSS
are discussed further in the Royal Academy of Engineering report ‘Global
Navigation Space Systems, Reliance and Vulnerability’, 2011.
4.16.5 One of the most common failures of DGNSS is loss of differential signal and or
satellites. Both are susceptible to shielding, and the quality and stability of
receiving signals from them, and the differential link stations. Loss of all DGNSS
as a reference to the DP Control System at the same time is likely to happen if the
loss is due to scintillation or shielding. Correct positioning of the antennae avoids
the loss of signal due to shielding and multipath errors.
4.16.6 A DGNSS receiver measures the direct path distance between the satellite and the
vessel’s antenna. When working near a platform or other offshore structures,
fixed or mobile, then a reflection of the signal may occur this will then degrade
the direct signal. This effect is known as multipath and it will cause the positional
accuracy to deteriorate and possibly jump. Any number of satellites within a
satellite constellation can be affected by multipath depending on the geometry
between the antenna, nearby objects and the satellite constellation in view.
Multipath manifests itself in a noisy and unstable position. This effect may only
be experienced at particular times of day and may vary in a cyclical fashion.
4.16.7 Most multipath will be due to obstructions within 150m of the antenna, and it is
extremely important to consider the presence of local reflectors when installing
the vessel antenna.
4.16.8 Most problems experienced with DGNSS relate to the differential link being lost.
Loss of radio-based differential links is often due to poor differential antenna
installation. Other problems with radio links are loss of HF during dawn and dusk
periods and extreme atmospheric conditions. Loss of differential input will
normally (default setting) result in the DGNSS reference being rejected from DP,
the operator should set the reference rejection criteria to alarm only on loss of
correction, not rejection.
4.16.9 A commonly reported problem is interference such as radio interference to high
frequency differential links caused by choice of a frequency too close to that of the
correction link. At its most extreme, this can result in complete loss of satellite
differential position computation.
4.16.10 DGNSS is vulnerable to jamming of the satellite and differential signals, the
sources can arise from other HF signals similar in frequency or from deliberate
flooding of the near electromagnetic spectrum. The effects of jamming from
transmissions, from military sources, other hostile jamming or from other sources
may render the system inoperable or at worst may present a misleading position
fix.
4.16.11 Complete loss of positioning may also be due to the vessel’s location or antenna
masking, or to one of the following causes of malfunction:
Water in cable
Perished cable
Lightning strike on antenna
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Defective hardware
Old almanac or different almanac in mobile and reference receivers
Insufficient channels in receiver
Operator error.
4.16.12 A change in satellite geometry will normally show a small change in position.
However, some systems may exhibit significant jumps, possibly as high as 25m.
In the event of very poor geometry, a reduction in the satellite mask angle from
10° to 5° may introduce additional satellites, which will improve the geometry.
However, lower elevation satellites are less stable than higher elevations, and can
degrade the quality of the position. The K-Pos software deals with position jumps
more easily than drift. Slow position drift can be a more serious problem. With
insufficient redundancy, it is sometimes not seen by the DP control system. It is
important to be able to check what is happening at the DGNSS reference station(s)
in use when slow drift is suspected.
4.16.13 When the number of satellites in use by the DGNSS is reduced, the weighting of
the DGNSS is reduced to the point where a timeout alarm is received and the
reference will be rejected from DP. There is not likely to be any unwanted thrust
or position excursion in this event.
4.16.14 The effects of DGNSS failure, or differential drop out, can be mitigated by
comparing the following recommendations drawn from various IMCA Marine
Division reports (M141, M199, S018. See section 18.3):
Altitude aiding is selected
Alarms are provided when less than four satellites are available in each
system
Antennae are properly installed and checked
The operators are properly trained in DGNSS
The latest signal processing firmware is used
Interference checks are made on board for all radio equipment, particularly
mobile phones
Line of sight can be maintained to all DGNSS satellites (management of
obstructions e.g. masts)
The geometry is such that one axis of the vessel is not dependent on one
satellite
Common software is avoided or identified and thoroughly tested (e.g. the
DP control systems interface)
Checks for blind sectors.
4.16.15 Implementation of multiple DGNSS receivers utilising multiple correction signals
and two types of satellite constellation will improve the redundancy of DGNSS as
a position reference for the vessel. However, sole reliance on DGNSS should not
be attempted for DP operations.
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SpotTrack
4.17.2 SpotTrack is an advanced multi-target laser based relative position reference
system.
4.17.3 The SpotTrack reference system is powered from (DP) UPS No. 2.
4.17.4 SpotTrack is a highly robust, yet lightweight, motion stabilised rotating laser
sensor offering precision range and bearing readings to one or multiple retro-
reflective targets. As a multi-target sensor, SpotTrack uses an advanced detection
system and tracking algorithms for true target recognition – minimising lock-on to
false reflections. Motion stabilisation provides improved target lock on a moving
platform. SpotTrack can utilise already established, optical targets.
4.17.5 The sensor itself is a completely sealed unit, with all moving parts housed inside,
so the system is less prone to mechanical wear from exposure to the elements.
4.17.6 By utilising roll and pitch stabilisation from a motion reference unit, (KONGSBERG
MRU) SpotTrack can track targets even at high elevation angles.
4.17.7 The SpotTrack has a range of 250m with a stated distance accuracy of 20cm and
a stated bearing accuracy of 0.01°. A pulse of light is fired at the reflective targets
and the round trip is timed to provide the distance measurement. At the instant
the pulse from a target is returned, an optical encoder on the shaft is triggered to
provide the angle.
4.17.8 The reflected beam is picked up by the receiving lens and converted to an electrical
signal by a photo diode. The time interval measured between the transmitting
and receiving of the beam is used to compute the range.
4.17.9 The quality and type of material used for reflectors is critical to the reliable
operation of the SpotTrack. The system can make use of flat or cylindrical targets
using prism clusters.
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4.18 Target Relative Positioning Systems Failure Modes
SpotTrack
4.18.1 There are several failure modes, which can affect the performance of the
SpotTrack.
Signals can be blocked by dirt on the unit lens
The acquisition of false targets, e.g. reflective tape on working gear,
lifeboats etc. (This has been mitigated by using digital pulses)
Signals can be distorted by a low rising or setting sun
Inclement weather, e.g. heavy rain, snow or fog can reduce system
efficiency
Loss of the serial link
Loss of supply from PSU
Loss of encoder feedback.
For each of the above failures, the DP Control System will reject the SpotTrack if
it is sufficiently inaccurate. The DP Control System will maintain operation with
the remaining position references.
4.18.2 The most serious failure of the SpotTrack is that it could track a new target.
Software in place and digital coding should prevent this from occurring. If the
system tracks another mobile target (e.g. a reflective jacket), then the position
reference will drift. In this case, the DP Control System will reject the reference,
as it will fail the median test. The DP Control System will maintain operation with
the remaining position references.
4.18.3 Operation of the SpotTrack system in poor weather conditions where visibility is
limited (e.g. fog) will reduce the maximum range of the system because it uses
an infrared laser beam as this is easily absorbed by moist air.
4.19 Gyrocompasses
4.19.1 The vessel is fitted with four gyrocompass inputs; these are used to translate
position reference data (from all position reference systems at different offsets) to
a single vessel position fix and to provide heading data to the DP Control System,
DGNSS and the HPR. Stable heading data is of high importance as the DP Control
Systems are generally run in heading priority mode (especially for monohull
vessels).
4.19.2 The gyrocompass input to the DP Control Systems is used for heading control and
for correcting the DGNSS. The gyrocompass input to the HPR is used for
converting relative X and Y into Eastings and Northings as well as for offset
corrections.
4.19.3 The Gyro 3 input to the DP Control System is a signal derived from the HYDRINS
inertial measurement unit which utilises internal motion detection and heading
detection corrected by inputs from DGNSS.
4.19.4 Gyro 4 input to the DP Control System is a signal derived from the Seapath 330,
which generates smoothed heading data utilising inputs of gyrocompass data from
Gyro 1, motion reference data from MRU 3 and DGNSS data from the Seapath Unit
itself.
4.19.5 As there are at least three gyrocompass signals available to the DP Control
System, voting is enabled to allow detection of faulty signals, including
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gyrocompass drift. This will present no disruption to heading control as faulty
units can be automatically rejected from the DP Control System.
4.19.6 Each gyrocompass is fitted with a serial splitter to distribute the heading data to
separate signal consumers, the signals to the DP Control System are routed
directly from each gyrocompass interface (Gyro 1 & Gyro 2).
4.19.7 9.4.8 The gyrocompass output from the HYDRINS unit is fed to the DP Control
System and to the Survey Rack; likewise the Gyrocompass output of the Seapath
unit is fed to the DP Control System and to the Survey Rack.
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4.21.3 The DGNSS each have the ability to self-correct for vessel motion (including
heave) so that the signals can be exported to the Survey System; this is as each
DGNSS is fed with data from individual MRUs.
4.21.4 The MRUs are much more important for use by the HPR particularly when operating
in SSBL mode.
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5. POWER GENERATION MACHINERY
5.1 General
5.1.1 The vessel is a diesel-electric design; power for the thruster prime movers is
supplied via the 690V switchboard sections. 690V electric power is developed by
four main diesel generators and one auxiliary diesel generator; these are all
located in the Engine Room.
5.1.2 The design of the power generation machinery (and their control hardware) is in-
line with the DP Redundancy Concept as the control hardware is segregated per
diesel generator. Where connections exist between diesel generators, these are
only active when the machines are connected in a load sharing pair.
5.1.3 There is an Emergency Diesel Generator, however during normal DP operations
this is operated in standby and it is not required as part of the DP redundancy
concept.
Following a blackout of the 440V Emergency Switchboard the Emergency Diesel
Generator will start and connect, this is not required for maintenance of position.
The Emergency Generator will not be considered any further in this failure modes
and effects analysis.
5.2.6 Control voltage for each of the generator’s breaker is derived internally from the
generator’s 690V output (690V230V) and is not supported by battery systems.
6.1 General
6.1.1 The primary distribution of the vessel is 690VAC, 3Ph, 60Hz, this is divided into
three sections; Port, Centre and Starboard. The 690V Main Switchboard DP design
intent is to operate the switchboard in a split bus configuration with the 690V
switchboard bus ties open.
6.1.2 The design of the power distribution is in-line with the DP Redundancy Concept as
the distribution boards and consumers are segregated per redundancy group. This
is achieved by operating in a split bus configuration and by segregation of
consumers.
6.1.3 Each 690V switchboard supports one 440V main switchboard and (Port and
Starboard only) one 230V switchboard for the low voltage distributions. The 440V
Emergency Switchboard is normally powered from the Starboard 440V Main
Switchboard. There are five 230V UPS and seven 24VDC systems; these are
charged from the low voltage distributions.
6.1.4 The principle power distribution of the vessel is illustrated in the following figure:
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6.2 690V Distribution
6.2.1 The 690V distribution is divided in to three parts; Port, Centre and Starboard. The
Port and Starboard sections are each powered from two diesel generators (Port:
DG1 & DG2, Starboard: DG3 & DG4), the Centre section is powered from a single
diesel generator (DG5).
6.2.2 During DP operations, these three sections will be operated split, i.e. open bus.
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Intent. The remaining thrusters will ramp load to maintain position, there will be
sufficient power available on the remaining switchboards to meet this demand.
6.3.9 The power supply to the Centre 440V MSB (via 690V/440V Transformer 10T3) will
be failed, this will cause a loss of consumers as outlined in Section 6.5, these
failure effects will not affect any of the remaining running thrusters and hence the
Worst Case Failure Design Intent will not be exceeded.
Starboard 690V Main Switchboard
6.3.10 Failure (partial blackout) of the Starboard 690V Main Switchboard (10P-SB) will
fail the Bow Tunnel Thruster Aft and the Stern Azimuth Thruster Starboard, this is
equivalent to the Worst Case Failure Design Intent. The remaining thrusters will
ramp load to maintain position, there will be sufficient power available on the
remaining switchboards to meet this demand.
6.3.11 The power supply to the Starboard 440V MSB (via 690V/440V Transformer 10T2)
will be failed, this will cause a loss of consumers as outlined in Section 6.5, these
failure effects will not affect any of the remaining running thrusters and hence the
Worst Case Failure Design Intent will not be exceeded.
6.3.12 The failure will also fail the power supply to two LO purifiers and a single FO
separator, this will not affect the operation of the Port and Centre machinery
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Azimuth Thruster Port. This will cause failure effects equivalent to the Worst Case
Failure Design Intent.
Centre 440V Main Switchboard
6.5.3 Failure of the Centre 440V Main Switchboard (10P90) can be caused by supply
failure (supply breaker, transformer or higher distribution failure) or following local
electrical fault. The failure will affect the auxiliary systems supporting DG5 and
the Bow Azimuth Thruster. This will cause failure effects equivalent to the Worst
Case Failure Design Intent.
Starboard 440V Main Switchboard
6.5.4 Failure of the Starboard 440V Main Switchboard (10P20) can be caused by supply
failure (supply breaker, transformer or higher distribution failure) or following local
electrical fault. The failure will affect the auxiliary systems supporting the
Starboard power generation machinery (DG3 & DG4), Bow Tunnel Thruster Aft
and Stern Azimuth Thruster Starboard. This will cause failure effects equivalent
to the Worst Case Failure Design Intent.
440V Emergency Switchboard
6.5.5 Failure of the 440V Emergency Switchboard (12EP) by itself can be caused by
supply failure (supply breaker, transformer or higher distribution failure) or
following local electrical fault. The failure will affect emergency systems required
in case of blackout recovery.
6.5.6 The Emergency Diesel Generator will start upon detection of the blackout on the
440V Emergency Switchboard and attempt to connect. The start or connection of
the Emergency Diesel Generator has no implication on DP.
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Starboard 230V Main Switchboard
6.7.2 Failure of the Starboard 230V Main Switchboard (11L2) will cause loss of;
14BCH21, 14BCH41, 14BCH61, BTT Aft VFD Auxiliary Supply & SAT Starboard VFD
Auxiliary Supply. DP UPS 2 will fail to battery backup. Two thrusters will be failed
(BTT Aft & SAT Starboard) as the auxiliary supply to their VFDs trip. This failure
is equivalent to the WCFDI.
230V Emergency Switchboard
6.7.3 Failure of the 230V Emergency Switchboard will cause loss of; 14BCH12,
14BCH22, 14BCH32, 14BCH42, 14BCH52, 14BCH62 & 14BCH72. All 24VDC
systems dual charged and battery supported. All thrusters and main machinery
will remain running, with no effect to positioning.
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7. POWER MANAGEMENT
7.1 General
7.1.1 All automation functions are governed by a distributed hardware networked
remote control system. This system contains functions for power management
and remote control, alarm and monitoring of machinery.
7.1.2 The primary functions of the automation system are:
Diesel generator & power plant monitoring
Power management functions
Automatic & manual remote control of connected machinery.
7.1.3 The power management system consists of three controllers each governing one
section of the 690V main switchboard (Port, Centre and Starboard).
7.1.4 The power management system is assisted at a local level (i.e. per main diesel
generator) by each engine’s governor, LESS and each generator’s AVR and PPU.
7.1.5 Load share is normally executed by each engine’s governor; load share is
isochronous between the main diesel generators (DG1 & DG2 and DG3 & DG4),
or each of the relevant Bus-Bars when powered by only one engine with the other
on standby for direct activation by the PMS. If the system is operated in PMS droop
mode, the load share is controlled for all engines from the Deif PPU.
Synchronisation of a diesel generator to a switchboard is provided by the Deif PPU.
7.1.6 The primary functions of the power management system are:
Switchboard Mode Selection
Generator start/stop control
Blackout prevention
Blackout recovery.
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7.2.3 The switchboard configuration of the vessel when conducting DP operations is
normally identified as the following;
Switchboard selected to “DP” mode
Bus Tie 1 (TB1) open between Port 690V MSB & Centre 690V MSB
AND/OR
Bus Tie 2 (TB2) open between Centre 690V MSB & Starboard 690V MSB
DG1 & DG2 running & connected to the Port 690V MSB
DG3 & DG4 running & connected to the Starboard 690V MSB
DG5 running & connected to the Centre 690V MSB.
Extensive load tests were successfully carried out on the effects of carrying out
DP operations with one engine online for each of the Port and Starboard
Switchboards, with the remaining engines on standby for direct activation by the
PMS. This DP operation would be subject to weather conditions and cable lay
operations. The switchboard configuration for Port and Starboard would then be
identified as the following:
DG1 running and connected to the Port 690V MSB, DG2 on standby
DG3 running and connected to the Starboard 690V MSB, DG4 on standby
DG5 running and connected to the Centre 690V MSB
The FMEA considers both 690V bus ties to be open, i.e. OPEN BUS Mode. This is
to demonstrate the independence of each of the three redundancy groups.
7.2.4 The Worst Case Failure Design Intent (WCFDI) of this vessel when operated in
OPEN BUS Mode is for failure of one 690V main switchboard (Port, Centre or
Starboard). This will cause either the failure of one bow tunnel thruster and one
stern azimuth thruster or (in the case of failure of the Centre 690V Main
Switchboard) the failure of the Bow Azimuth Thruster.
GM has no objection (provided that there are suitable DP capability plots) to
operating the vessel in configurations where two independent redundancy groups
are operated combined, these are:
SPLIT BUS Mode 1; the 690V switchboard is operated in two sections, [Port
& Centre] and [Starboard].
SPLIT BUS Mode 2; the 690V switchboard is operated in two sections, [Port]
and [Centre & Starboard].
SHALLOW DRAUGHT Mode 1; the 690V switchboard is operated in two
sections, [Port & Centre] and [Starboard], DG5 and BAT are not in use.
SHALLOW DRAUGHT Mode 2; the 690V switchboard is operated in two
sections, [Port & Centre] and [Starboard], DG5 and BAT are not in use.
The DP Capability of the vessel will be dependent on the configuration used, as
the vessel’s WCFDI will vary for each of these modes:
SPLIT BUS Mode 1; the WCFDI of this vessel in this mode is for failure of
both the Port 690V Main Switchboard and Centre 690V Main Switchboard.
This will cause the failure of the Bow Azimuth Thruster, Bow Tunnel Thruster
Forward and Stern Azimuth Thruster Port.
SPLIT BUS Mode 2; the WCFDI of this vessel in this mode is for failure of
both the Centre 690V Main Switchboard and Starboard 690V Main
Switchboard. This will cause the failure of the Bow Azimuth Thruster, Bow
Tunnel Thruster Aft and Stern Azimuth Thruster Starboard.
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SHALLOW DRAUGHT Mode 1; the WCFDI of this vessel in this mode is for
failure of both the Port 690V Main Switchboard and Centre 690V Main
Switchboard. This will cause the failure of the Bow Tunnel Thruster Forward
and Stern Azimuth Thruster Port.
SHALLOW DRAUGHT Mode 2; the WCFDI of this vessel in this mode is for
failure of both the Centre 690V Main Switchboard and Starboard 690V Main
Switchboard. This will cause the failure of the Bow Tunnel Thruster Aft and
Stern Azimuth Thruster Starboard.
7.2.5 Selection of the in use switchboard mode is operator selectable via the automation
system workstations.
Selection of “Auto” mode will not have an immediate effect; however, the
restrictions to closing the bus tie breakers will be removed. If one or both 690V
bus ties close, the load sharing mode will be switched to governor droop as there
are no isochronous load share lines for DG5. The load dependant stop function of
diesel generators is enabled.
Selection of “Semi-auto” mode will not have an immediate effect; however, the
restrictions to closing the bus tie breakers will be removed. If one or both 690V
bus ties close, the load sharing mode will be switched to governor droop as there
are no isochronous load share lines for DG5.
Selection of either “Auto” or “Semi-auto” mode will not cause any immediate
change in the switchboard’s configuration, however, restrictions for the operator
changing the switchboard configuration will be removed, which in turn may reduce
the power available to the thrusters and permit failure modes which could exceed
the Worst Case Failure Design Intent (e.g. total blackout from a closed bus
configuration).
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7.4 Blackout Prevention
7.4.1 The blackout prevention system is provided to prevent the vessel from suffering a
total blackout as a result of the load demanded of a switchboard section exceeding
the available power.
If the system did not have this functionality, the resulting frequency drop and then
breaker trips could cause one or all parts of the 690V main switchboards to black
out.
7.4.2 When operating in DP mode, it is anticipated that there will be enough spinning
reserve to maintain power on two 690V switchboard sections following the loss of
one third of the power generation for the vessel (Worst Case Failure Design
Intent).
Transitioning from the intact situation to the degraded situation may pose risks to
the healthy switchboard sides, as they will be suddenly heavily loaded. The
blackout prevention logic will assist during such a failure by reducing the load
demand from the thrusters and other heavy consumers (the MaK engines are
arranged to give a pre-trip warning).
7.4.3 The blackout prevention logic is provided at the expense of position keeping as it
functions by ultimately reducing the thrust available to the vessel. This may cause
a small loss of position (drift off); however, this can then be recovered. This is
regarded as more advantageous than a blackout, where the loss of position will
be greater.
7.4.4 The PMS executes some of the blackout prevention barriers arranged to protect
the vessel’s power systems. The blackout prevention barriers arranged for the
vessel’s power systems are:
Non-Preferential Consumer Tripping
PMS Thruster Power Limitation
PMS Thruster Power Limitation (Fast)
DP Thruster Power Chop
Local Thruster VFD Phase Back.
7.4.5 Non-preferential consumer tripping is arranged to reduce the load on a
switchboard by the trip of non-essential/preferential consumers. This logic is
triggered if the used generator power is greater than 105% for more than 20s or
bus bar frequency is less than 55Hz for more than 2s.
The nominated consumers to be tripped are:
Bow Tunnel Thruster Forward Noise Reduction Air Injection System
Bow Tunnel Thruster Aft Noise Reduction Air Injection System
Auxiliary Deck Crane
Engine Room Chiller 1
Engine Room Chiller 2
Ballast Water Treatment Systems
50% of crane supply
Trencher
These consumers are not essential for operation of the power generation
machinery or the thrusters. Operation of the non-essential trip function will not
affect operation of the DP Control System.
7.4.6 The PMS calculates the available power for the thrusters per connected
switchboard section (the difference between the kW power generated and the kW
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power consumed by non-thrusters), this value is fed to each local thruster drive
to set the maximum demand the drive can make of the switchboard section. In
the case of a reduction of the generating power (e.g. following a diesel generator
trip) the power available signal fed to the thrusters on the affected switchboard
section will be reduced. This may (depending on thruster load) cause a reduction
in the thruster rpm output.
This function is similar to the action of the DP Power Chop.
7.4.7 The PMS will apply a fast power limitation immediately following trip of a generator
breaker or a bus tie breaker or following receipt of a “generator shutdown delay
1s” signal. The PMS will reduce the “power available for thrust” signal to 10% for
all thrusters per connected switchboard section.
The limitation will remain active until after 1s of normal operation.
7.4.8 The DP control system will execute a reduction in the rpm command signal (DP
Power Chop) to all thrusters on a connected switchboard section when the thruster
load is (instantaneously) greater than a predetermined percentage of the
calculated available power (set to 98% of power available).
The calculation of power available is performed by the DP control system utilising
information on the switchboard configuration (generator and bus tie status), the
measured kW load per switchboard section and the rated loads for each of the
diesel generators.
This function is similar to the action of the PMS reduction in power available.
7.4.9 Upon a measured rapid drop in frequency (currently set to if the measured
frequency is below 55Hz) the thruster’s VFD will phase back to 10% of the
thrusters rated load. This function is independent of the PMS. The limitation will
remain active until after 10s of normal operation.
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sections. The system will not attempt to close the breakers between the 690V
main switchboard sections.
7.5.3 In the event of a blackout of the power supply to the 440V Emergency
Switchboard, the Emergency Generator is started. A typical time for start and
connect of the Emergency Generator is forty-five seconds.
Power to the 440V Emergency Switchboard is not essential for DP operations.
7.5.4 It should be considered that blackout on a single 690V main switchboard section
(partial blackout) is equivalent to the Worst Case Failure Design Intent. Recovery
from this state is not required for the vessel to maintain position (if operated
correctly and in conditions which do not exceed the vessel’s capability after the
Worst Case Failure Design Intent).
7.5.5 Failure of any part of the blackout recovery system may prevent the vessel from
recovering from a partial blackout. As the partial blackout state is the Worst Case
Failure Design Intent, this is not critical for station keeping.
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8. THRUSTERS AND PROPULSION
8.1 General
8.1.1 The vessel is equipped with five thrusters, there are three thrusters at the bow
(one retractable azimuth thruster and two tunnel thrusters) and there are two
azimuth thrusters at the stern. This is indicated in the following figure and table:
Port MSB
BTT BTT
SAT Port
BAT
Aft Fwd
Centre MSB
SAT
Starboard
Starboard MSB
8.1.2 In general each thruster is independent, therefore failures to a single thruster will
not affect the other thrusters (except for an increase/change in thruster demand
to maintain station keeping).
8.1.3 DP rules require analysis of the failure behaviour of each thruster to ensure that a
thruster does not fail to full thrust nor to an unpredictable azimuth (where
relevant).
8.1.4 All thrusters are fitted with fixed pitch propellers and are driven by variable speed
(frequency) drives. The primary power supply to each thruster derives from the
690V distribution.
8.1.5 The lubrication and hydraulic systems for each thruster are independent to the
thruster. The bow tunnel thrusters each have a single hydraulic lubrication
system. The Bow Azimuth Thruster has a hydraulic lubrication system and
hydraulic steering gear, the two stern azimuth thrusters each have a hydraulic
lubrication system and two steering gear motors.
9.1 Introduction
9.1.1 Cable-lay operations from a DP mono-hull unit require specialised techniques and
the close co-operation between all departments. All personnel should be aware of
their own responsibilities and duties. These may be different from those on other
vessels.
9.1.2 It is the responsibility of Van Oord SMD to ensure that there is a competent crew
on board the vessel to enable DP operations to be carried out safe.
9.1.3 This manual is to be read in conjunction with the company Safety Management
System (SMS) documentation XXXX_XX with particular reference to:-
SMS Safety and Environmental Policies
SMS Company Responsibilities and Authority
SMS Master’s Responsibility and Authority
SMS Shipboard Operations Plans
SMS Emergency Preparedness
SMS Maintenance of Vessel and Equipment.
9.2 Organisation
9.2.1 The following chart illustrates the lines of responsibility and communication which
are applicable to the DP operation of the vessel. A solid line indicates a line of
responsibility. A dashed line between positions indicates a line of communication.
9.3 Responsibilities
9.3.1 The general responsibilities for key employees with regard to DP operations are
outlined below:
The Master
9.3.2 He has the overall responsibility for the safety of the personnel and of the unit.
He is also the ultimate authority on all matters relating to the DP systems and
must be kept informed of any significant changes in operations or equipment
status. In this respect, he is responsible for a proper implementation of the Work
Permit System to cover all unplanned maintenance. In any case, any routine and
extraordinary maintenance interventions related to the DP Systems has to be
assessed for the impact it may have on DP operations and the Master is the final
authority for the corrective actions to be taken.
9.3.3 This does not preclude any competent person from taking immediate action to
protect personnel and equipment without reference to the Master.
9.3.4 Should this be the case, the Master must be informed as soon as possible of the
actions taken and of the present vessel status. The Master reports to the Vessel
Manager and works in close liaison with the Client Rep (if applicable). The Master
must ensure that:
All key DP personnel are trained, qualified, and competent to carry out their
duties in a safe and efficient manner.
An induction to the specific nature of vessel operations and an appropriate
period of familiarisation is provided to new comers prior to allowing them to
take independent responsibilities.
The department heads and supervisors are well informed during the morning
daily meetings and whenever deemed necessary of the DP system status.
The operation underway at the time and the forthcoming one are covered by
a proper schedule and/or safe job analysis detailing at least the operational
steps, the responsible person for each of them, critical path, expected
duration, check points, communication channels, required equipment and
personnel, the risks involved and relevant contingency plans.
All personnel involved have understood their role.
Adequate procedures are in existence to cover the operation underway.
Whenever deemed appropriate, new procedures are issued to consolidate
the preparatory work performed in advance of special operations.
A system of written instructions including standing orders, daily orders, and
specific operational procedures in place.
9.3.5 The Master should be a fully trained, qualified, and competent SDPO. His
knowledge and experience should be such as to enable him to perform his
management role i.e. the overall optimisation of the performances of the unit. The
Master directly co-ordinates with the various sections’ heads and closely liaises
with the Project Manager and client (if carried). He should therefore be conversant
10.1 Familiarisation
10.1.1 Prior to the clearance as independent DPO, the Master or other qualified person
should ensure that the operator is properly familiarised with the equipment and
the vessel.
10.1.2 The familiarisation should emphasise (not limited to) the following items:
Ship handling in DP Joystick manual mode
Vessel propulsion configuration
DP system reference configuration
DGPS blind zones if any
Differential signal antennas blind zones if any
Communication Bridge / Engine Control Room, Crane and Deck.
10.1.3 The Master is further responsible that DPOs are familiar with following
publications:
Vessel DP Operation Manual and its checklists.
Vessel’s FMEA report and last Annual Trials Report.
10.1.4 DPOs should be familiar with and competent in the use of all the manual propulsion
controls such that, in the event of DP Control failure, the DPO can take full control
of the vessel to prevent unnecessary excursion and loss of position.
10.2 Assessment
10.2.1 The assessment process for key DP personnel is meant to be in accordance to the
IMCA C 002 guidelines.
10.2.2 The assessment process is meant to cover knowledge and skill levels in the
position they hold on board.
10.2.3 As a minimum the assessment shall focus on:
Demonstration of competence
Knowledge
Acceptable criteria.
10.3 Training
10.3.1 Training of all DP personnel should be conducted in accordance with the guidelines
set out by IMCA, in their document entitled, “IMCA M117-The Training and
Experience of Key DP Personnel” which is accepted by IMO.
10.3.2 The extent of training and experience necessary for a particular vessel is a matter
for the vessel owner and/or vessel management. Training may take the following
forms:
Onboard training under the supervision of an experienced operator when on
DP but not when the vessel is operational, for example when vessel is
standing by.
A shore based training course or courses.
11.1 Introduction
11.1.1 The intention of the DP Philosophy guidelines and Operational procedures is to
give the DP operator guidance on how to conduct safe operations.
11.1.2 Nothing in these guidelines and procedures shall be treated as other than a best
practice for a DP operation and shall not over rule the Master’s authority and the
DP operator’s final decision in performing their duty.
11.2 DP Philosophy
11.2.1 The DP philosophy is based on the IMCA guidelines and industry best practise to
archive a safe DP operation.
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DP Location Setup Checks
11.3.9 Location setup checks should be carried out on every occasion and before the
vessel moves into the final working location.
11.3.10 The principal objectives of these checks are to assess the vessel’s station keeping
performance at the working location and to ensure that the position reference
systems are properly set up.
11.3.11 These checks should be carried out at a safe distance from the installation, in the
region of 50 meters. They should also be carried out, wherever possible, at a
location where, in the event of a loss of thrust, the vessel would drift clear of the
installation. These checks should be documented and kept on board the vessel.
Close Proximity Time
11.3.12 Close proximity time at the working location should be kept to a minimum. The
vessel should only remain in the working location when supply operations are
being carried out.
11.3.13 During periods of inactivity, e.g. when the installation crane is not available for
cargo transfers, the vessel should move a safe distance away from the installation.
11.3.14 Wherever possible, when undertaking hose transfers, sufficient hose length should
be given to allow the vessel to increase the separation distance.
Separation Distance
11.3.15 The separation distance at set up between the vessel and the installation should
be carefully selected.
11.3.16 The distance should be agreed between the vessel and offshore installation before
the start of operations.
11.3.17 The separation distance should take account of the combined movements of the
vessel and the installation, where the installation is not fixed in position
11.3.18 The separation distance should be as large as is attainable in the circumstances,
without adversely affecting the safety of the supply operation.
11.3.19 Wherever possible, such as when hose transfers alone are being carried out,
consideration should be given to maximizing the distance by extending hose
length.
Selecting a Safe Working Location
11.3.20 A safe working location should be selected for every operation. It is safer to work
on the lee side of the installation than on the weather side. It is always preferable
to set up on the lee side.
11.3.21 Other elements to be considered in selecting a safe working location include the
position and reach of the installation cranes, obstructions on the installation and
interaction with installation thrusters.
Safe Working Heading
11.3.22 The most appropriate vessel heading should be selected on the basis that it may
be necessary to make a rapid escape from the installation by driving ahead or
astern. It can be an advantage to provide a good steadying vector by placing the
vessel such that environmental forces are opposed by a steady state thrust output.
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Escape Route
11.3.23 An escape route should be identified. The escape route should provide a clear
path for the vessel to follow when making a routine or emergency departure from
the installation.
11.3.24 Other vessels should stay clear of the escape route. The escape route should, if
possible, extend 500 meters from the installation.
Environmental Forces Monitoring
11.3.25 Environmental forces are never constant. Wind, current and swell should be
monitored continuously as should their effects on position keeping.
11.3.26 Electronic monitoring methods, such as wind sensors and resultant force vectors
provide the DP control system with inputs, but these methods should be supported
by visual monitoring and forecasting.
11.3.27 Great care should be taken where there is likely to be sudden wind and / or current
changes. Preventative measures may require the vessel to cease operations
during these periods and move off to a safe location.
11.3.28 Great care should also be taken in areas where lightning strikes are likely.
Preventative measures may also require the vessel to cease operations during
these periods and move off to a safe location.
Maintaining a Safe Working Location
11.3.29 A safe working location should be maintained at all times at the installation. In
particular this will require constant vigilance in respect of a possible accumulation
of a number of hazards.
11.3.30 These could include, for example, those from environmental forces and other
potential dangers, such as marine and airborne traffic, or cargo operations.
11.3.31 It will also require the vessel to operate within its design parameters and within
the range of the vessel’s DP capability plots.
11.3.32 Consideration should be given to unrestricted view of the work area from the DPO
position. CCTV or an observer could be of assistance.
DP Watch Keeping Handovers
11.3.33 Wherever possible, watch handovers should take place when the vessel is in a
steady state and where the vessel is settled in position.
11.3.34 Using a checklist handover ensures that all relevant information is passed on to
the oncoming watch keeper. See Appendix for a checklist.
On board Engineering, Electrical and Electronics Support
11.3.35 An engineer should be available in engine when the vessel is within 500 meters of
the installation.
11.3.36 Wherever possible, electricians and, where carried, electronics officers should be
on call when the vessel is inside the 500 meter zone.
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11.3.37 Engineers, electricians and electronics officers should take account of the following
when the vessel is inside the 500 meter zone:
Do not start, stop, or carry out maintenance on any machinery or equipment
that could affect the DP system while the vessel is in DP, when in doubt a
check should be made with the DP bridge watch keeper.
If problems or potential problems are detected with any DP or associated
equipment during a DP operation then the DP bridge watch keeper is to be
informed immediately.
Critical and Allowable Vessel Excursions
11.3.38 Critical and allowable excursion limits should be set.
11.3.39 The critical limit should not exceed half of separation distance between the vessel
and the installation.
11.3.40 The allowable limit should not exceed half of the critical limit.
Electronic Off Position Warning and Alarm Limits
11.3.41 The electronic warning limit should not exceed the allowable excursion limit above.
The electronic alarm limit should not exceed the critical excursion limit above.
11.3.42 For example, where the separation distance is 10 meters, the warning limit should
not exceed 2.5 meters and the alarm limit should not exceed 5 meters.
11.3.43 However, wherever possible, the warning and alarm limits should be less than the
critical and allowable excursion limits.
Electronic Off-Heading Warning and Alarm Limits
11.3.44 The electronic off-heading warning limit should be set at a value that does not
result in movement of any part of the vessel greater than the allowable excursion
limit.
11.3.45 The electronic off-heading alarm limit should be set at a value that does not result
in movement of any part of the vessel greater than the critical excursion limit.
11.3.46 However, wherever possible, the off-heading warning and alarm limits should be
set at lower values.
11.3.47 In setting the off-heading limits consideration should be given to the alignment of
the vessel and the installation and the vessel’s point of rotation.
Position and Heading Changes
11.3.48 Changes in vessel position and heading are frequently necessary, especially during
supply operations when supply vessels are alongside fixed installations, typically
because of wind and / or current changes, or for operational reasons.
11.3.49 Such changes should be carried out in small increments.
11.3.50 Operators should be aware of the potential dangers of a number of cumulative
changes, e.g. that they may affect the line of sight for some position reference
systems, such as SpotTRack.
Power Consumption and Thruster Output Limits
11.3.51 The power and thruster limits will depend on the nature of the vessel / installation
interface.
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11.3.52 Vessels with DP class notations 2 and 3 can, if agreement is reached with the
installation OIM and or charterer, if applicable, operate to DP class 1 standard on
those occasions when a DP class 1 vessel would be permitted alongside.
11.3.53 For vessels that are operating to DP class 2 or 3 standards, the limits should be
set so that the vessel will be left with sufficient power and thrusters to maintain
position after worst case failure.
11.3.54 The Guidelines thus provide two possible limits. For DP OSV capability 2 and 3,
the vessel operates to worst case failure in the given environmental conditions,
typically half the propulsion.
11.3.55 For DP OSV capability 1, the vessel operates to the intact capability in given
environmental conditions.
11.3.56 Methods of monitoring power consumption and thruster output limits include the
use of the DP computer system’s consequence analysis and effective DPO watch
keeping.
11.3.57 After a failure the main objective would be to make the situation safe. The route
to getting back to work again is to carry out a risk assessment, taking account of
all possibilities.
11.3.58 The risk assessment should determine whether it is safe to do so.
11.3.59 Regional and or charterer’s guidelines may take precedence.
Consequence Analysis
11.3.60 Where classification societies require consequence analysis to be fitted, to IMO DP
equipment class 2 and 3 Vessels and classification society equivalents (see MSC
Circular 645 3.4.2.4), to remain in class it is a requirement for these vessels to
operate with the consequence analysis switched on.
11.3.61 The consequence analyser monitors power, and thrust output and gives a warning
to the operator when it is calculated that the vessel will lose position if the worst
case failure occurs.
11.3.62 Whenever the consequence analysis alarms, the vessel is in a degraded
operational condition and appropriate action should then be taken to ensure the
safety of the vessel. Appropriate action will include a degraded condition risk
assessment.
Safe Operating Limits
11.3.63 Safe operating limits are not solely based on power consumption and thruster
output levels.
11.3.64 In setting safe operating limits consideration should be given to other relevant
factors such as a mariner’s awareness of the weather environment, the nature of
the operation, the safety of the crew and the time needed to move clear.
11.3.65 The safe operating limits should be governed by risk assessment.
Position Reference Systems
11.3.66 Wherever possible, if multiple position references are in use, they should be
independent of each other and should be based on different principles.
11.3.67 Relative position references should be used at installations that are not fixed in
position, such as FPSOs, spar buoys, TLPs, etc. Relative systems include, for
example, SpotTrack.
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11.3.68 The use of relative and absolute position reference systems in this situation can
cause conflicts.
11.3.69 A possible example of ‘three position references’ could be a dual laser system
operating on independent targets on different lines of sight with one DGPS.
Change of Operating Control Mode
11.3.70 There may be occasions during a normal supply operation when it is appropriate
to change over from auto DP control to joystick / manual control.
11.3.71 In this case the vessel will revert to conventional supply vessel mode and will be
subject to appropriate controls. Where the vessel transfers control from DP to
manual or conventional control, transfer back to DP control should be subject to a
repeat of location set up checks.
11.3.72 Another possible issue in relation to control, is that the preferred location for the
DP control console would be the aft end of the bridge to allow unrestricted view
for the DPO of the work deck and the installation.
11.3.73 Where this is not possible some other means should be available to observe
external conditions, e.g. CCTV at the DP control console or an observer on the
bridge with unrestricted view.
Standby Time
11.3.74 There are frequently occasions when the vessel stands down for a period of time.
Standby time should be put to good use. Standby time is useful since it provides
opportunities to practice skills, such as (a) ship handling, (b) DP operating
experience and (c) taking DP footprint plots away from the installation.
Vessel Thruster Efficiency at Different Drafts and Trims
11.3.75 Changes in vessel draft / trim usually occur at an installation.
11.3.76 A smaller draft can have an adverse effect on thruster efficiency, particularly for
bow tunnel thrusters.
11.3.77 This can result in a significant loss of thruster effect, resulting in poor station
keeping as well as impacting on thruster redundancy.
11.3.78 Wherever possible, measures should be taken to maintain an appropriate draft /
trim at all times when at an installation. This may mean taking in water ballast.
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11.4.5 Stabilise the vessel’s position on DP joystick.
11.4.6 When the vessel’s position is relatively stable and the vessels speed is reduced to
less than 0.5 knots.
11.4.7 Select Yaw control and stabilize the vessels heading. Observe power and thruster
use.
11.4.8 When the vessels heading is stable: Control vessels SWAY motions by use of DP
Joystick. When the vessel is table in the SWAY motions: Select SWAY control to
DP console. Observe power and thruster use.
11.4.9 When the vessels YAW and SWAY motions are stable: Control vessel SURGE
motions by use of DP Joystick. When the vessel is stable in the YAW and SWAY
motions: Select SURGE control to DP console. Observe power and thruster use.
11.4.10 The vessel should now be in Auto Positioning control. Confirm status OK at the
backup system.
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Go to manual DP mode; deselect all reference systems and thrusters. Go to
DP Standby Mode and switch over to bridge manual control. Hand over
manoeuvring to officer of watch.
Inform the ECR that the vessel is off DP and from what time.
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environment conditions. At this point, it has to be noted that the capability plots
are a theoretical calculation and can only be taken as a rough guide. Allowance
must be made to the plots due to loss of thruster performance over time, marine
growth accumulation, changing wind surface moment etc.
11.8.3 If the vessel is to work to windward in close proximity of platforms and
obstructions, the Master can cease operations when the safety of the vessel or
personnel is threatened. The situation may also occur where the
Platform/Installation OIM requests a stop of operations after consulting the
Master. The situation has to be carefully assessed before initiating vessel
movements. The associated risks are:
Vessel contact with surface structure due to inappropriate movements. To
avoid this situation, the vessel’s movements have to be controlled. In many
cases, a simple sideways move on the joystick will cause a closer distance
to the structure due to changing heading of the vessel. A sideways move
away from the platform in increasing blow-on environment may overload the
weakest thruster and limit its output, which subsequently results in a
decrease in thrust at the weaker end of the vessel and a movement of that
end towards the structure.
The most suitable way in most cases is the controlled movement ahead or
astern in order to keep the distance to the structure and control the thrust
levels required for the ahead/ astern movement.
In general, this situation can be avoided by careful assessing the forecasted
conditions before committing to the worksite. Give ample notice by
monitoring the present environment (squalls) and not wait until consequence
analysis alarm appears rather than to monitor the DP system to detect trends
which may suggest that thrust levels will be critical within the expected
project duration.
11.8.4 The Master should always carefully consider the position of his vessel relative to
the wind, current and the structure and the limited DP capability athwartships.
Note for DP Operations in High Currents: Tidal Stream atlases are not necessarily
available for all areas of operations, however in these cases some clients should
and will have completed their own tidal current analysis, and they should be made
available to the DPOs. In cases where this information is not available relevant
hydrographical publications should be consulted i.e. Mariners Handbook, Pilots etc.
Personnel
11.8.5 The Master is responsible for ensuring vessel safety, the safety of the crew and
the protection of the environment.
11.8.6 The Master is also responsible for liaisons with the Project Superintendent on all
matters, which affect the vessel's operations, including the operable weather
conditions.
11.8.7 The Master must consider the time taken to recover/abort the jacking when
deciding on whether to recommend to the Project Superintendent to continue or
to abort operations.
11.8.8 The Project Superintendent/project manager is responsible for the execution of
the project and for the wind farm equipment.
11.8.9 The Project Superintendent/project manager is required to consider the opinion of
the Master of the vessel when deciding to continue or to abort the operation,
although the Master has the final decision.
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Action
11.8.10 This procedure to be considered constantly and a system established for each
project, which ensures that weather forecasts are provided on a regular and
frequent basis.
11.8.11 These procedures shall not take precedence over the judgment of the Master when
unusual circumstances are encountered, nor do they relieve him of his duties.
11.8.12 The best available weather forecast shall be obtained at least twice daily and the
weather reporting service shall be requested to give special advisories on sudden
changes and as requested by the Captain under imminent storm conditions. The
actual weather shall be continuously monitored and recorded at least every six
hours.
11.8.13 Any sudden change in conditions should be noted, closely observed, and
evaluated. If there is any potential storm or other bad weather predicted, the
Master shall immediately inform the Project Superintendent/project manager of
the impending weather change.
11.8.14 The Master shall evaluate the weather conditions (forecast and actual), to
determine the course and timing of action to be taken. Actual modification of
normal operations should take into consideration that weather usually increases
over a period of time, which should be used as an alert that action may be
necessary.
11.8.15 After securing for bad weather, a continuous weather watch shall be maintained
together with close surveillance of all equipment, especially the power and DP
units, fuel consumption and planning, ballast and other equipment. Deck
equipment should be sea fastened. Time must be allowed to permit all safety
requirements and evacuation/storm avoidance procedures to be completed before
the storm reaches the vessel. Based on the forecast/storm condition, the Master
shall determine whether to remain on location, seek sheltered waters, or run for
open seas.
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11.9.6 It is paramount that the Nexus builds a database of DP footprint plots for the
shallow water condition, both intact and after the Worst Case Failure. (For details
on footprint plots see section 17).
11.9.7 The capability plots will provide some guidance on assessing the environmental
envelopes. The data is included in Appendix A of this document.
The FMEA was written for the Nexus operating with open busbars. The table below
shows the cases to be considered for various operations.
Normal Shallow
Intact 1. 2e
DWCF 2e/3a/3b 3c/3d
Table 10: CAPABILITY PLOT CASES
DP OPERATING PROCEDURES
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12. DP ALERT OPERATING GUIDELINES
12.1 General
The “Nexus” will always operate within the “IMCA Guidelines for the Design and
Operation of Dynamically Positioned Vessels” document (IMCA M 103). All DPO’s
will have full knowledge of these guidelines and the use of the alert signals. When
vessel is engaged in cable laying or ROV operations, a system of lights and audible
alarms should be provided in the key areas such as Bridge, ECR, Cable Control
Area, ROV Control Van etc. The alert lights will be as follows:
Green Status
Yellow Alert
Red Alert
12.2.2 The “on desk” DPO has the authority to activate the yellow / red alert on their own
initiative.
Note: The DP alert levels are not to be confused with the Kongsberg Maritime DP
Heading and position alarms.
One Bus Move to yellow Prepare for red Move to safe location
Drive Off 0-3m
Intact DP DP
YELLOW STATUS
Communications/ Actions
DPO on desk DPO off desk ERO/ ETO Master/ Client Rep
Change status from
Terminate auxiliary
Green to Yellow,
operations i.e.
call for assistance
ballasting, supply Try to restart failed Muster on bridge
of 2nd DPO, await
vessel handling and equipment if any. assess situation
acknowledgement
any other on-going
of DP alert
activity
outstations
On PA give a short
and concise
description of the Inform Master and Consulting with
situation and time assist DPO on desk section leaders to
Await instructions
until red alert is with make decision on
from the bridge
expected. If PA communications ceasing of
unavailable, use and documentation. operations
backup
communications
Take every action
required to
maintain the Document changes
Assist DPO on desk
vessels position, in equipment status
until situation is
prepare escape and report to
cleared
route surface and bridge
assess escape route
subsea.
Table 13: YELLOW ALERT STATUS
RED STATUS
Communications/ Actions
Master/ Client
DPO on desk DPO off desk ERO/ ETO
Rep
Terminate all other
Muster on bridge
Change status to on-going Acknowledge to
immediately and
RED operations, inform bridge.
assess situation.
Master
If required, initiate
Undertake all emergency
PA announcement,
Undertake all efforts to restore response
request
efforts required to thrust power. communications
acknowledge of key
regain control over Muster off shift with onshore
operator stations
vessel personnel to ECR if management. Alert
(ROV, ECR, deck.)
required. field operator, if
applicable.
Consult with section
Assess escape leaders and
Advise structure
routes from surface Assist ROV control onshore
operator and other
structure, advise if required management (if
vessels if SIMOPS
Master applicable) to
decide actions.
Assist on desk DPO Establish
with Report all changes appropriate safety
communications in equipment status area and advise
and documentation. to bridge. field operator of
Confirm with ROV if In case of general intentions.
clear to move to marine emergency Client rep to assist
safe location. (fire, collision, Master in
muster the communications
Document events.
necessary with field operator
personnel (off shift) and structure, if
to assist. applicable.
Table 14: RED ALERT STATUS
13.1 Introduction
13.1.1 No matter how well operated, managed and maintained a DP vessel is, it is
nevertheless inevitable that at some time in the lifetime of the vessel, an undesired
event will occur during a DP operation which will require emergency action by the
DPOs.
13.1.2 For the purposes of the DP operation of the vessel, an undesired event is defined
as some event, which results in impending or actual loss of vessel position to the
extent that the vessel, the operation, personnel or the environment are at risk.
13.1.3 Such undesired events can be caused by one or more of a number of faults,
including loss of thruster(s), loss of power generating or distribution systems, loss
of DP control caused by loss of position reference signals, onboard emergency
such as fire/collision, sudden and unpredicted onset of excessively bad weather,
etc.
13.1.4 It is impossible to provide DP emergency operating procedures to deal with all
emergency situations; however, it is possible to give guidance as to initial actions
and to allocate particular responsibilities to specific persons.
13.1.5 The emergency procedures contained in this section have been prepared for DPO’s
and those involved in the DP operation of the vessel.
13.1.6 Principal Responsibilities:
All immediate decisions on DP emergency and intervention actions are to be
taken by the Senior DPO until the Master of the vessel, advises that he has
taken over control.
The “Nexus” will always operate within the “IMCA M103 Guidelines for the
Design and Operation of Dynamically Positioned Vessels”. All DPOs should
have full knowledge of these guidelines and of the use of the recognized
ALERT Levels as described in the previous section.
The “on desk” DPO has the authority to activate Yellow/Red Alerts without
contacting any other person and without using the telephone.
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13.2.3 As a guideline the following information should be assessed during an alert
condition:
Any position or heading performance loss as a result of alert cause.
Weather conditions at time of alert.
Expected changes in work progress planned.
Additional hazards presented as a result of alert.
Assessments of additional weather forecasts which may be required.
Time required to reach a safe situation.
Blow on / Blow off scenario.
Escape route from all structures (both surface and subsea) in the vicinity.
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13.4 Initial Actions – Emergency Status
DPO
13.4.1 In the event of a DP system or subsystem failure which results in uncontrolled loss
of position, the “on desk” DPO will first initiate Red alert to the various
departments. It is anticipated that in most circumstances this will require him to
attempt to maintain the position of the vessel as close to the intended target as is
possible. This may mean resorting to DP joystick control or may mean taking
control of the vessel's propulsion at another control location i.e. manual thruster
controls or via IJS control.
13.4.2 The ability of the DPO to hold the vessel in position via manual controls will depend
on various issues, experience of the DPO, weather, current / tides, availability of
generators and thrusters, and the proximity of fixed structures to give a visual
reference.
13.4.3 Until the Master arrives on the bridge and has notified the DPO that he takes over,
the DPO on the desk makes all decisions required to minimise the impact of the
situation on human life, vessel integrity, environment, and equipment.
Master
13.4.4 The Master will come to the Bridge as soon as possible and will assess the situation
before taking executive DP action or giving instructions to the DPOs. He will inform
both DPOs when he takes command of the situation.
13.4.5 If the Master is on the bridge at the time of the uncontrolled loss of position he
will similarly inform the DPOs when he has assumed command of the situation.
13.4.6 At this point, effective bridge team management is of utmost importance and the
instructions provided in the vessel’s SMS / Emergency Procedures have to be
adhered to in order to utilise all available resources effectively to regain control
over the vessel.
Duty Engineer
13.4.7 Maintains power and propulsion to the DP system. He is also responsible for
keeping the Chief Engineer informed.
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DP System Alarms
13.5.2 Loss of all Computers:
Indication Alarms
Results Loss of total DP Control
[Red Alert]
Changeover to IJS / Manual Control
Try and maintain position on Joystick / manual controls
Operator Action
using visual references and other available raw data from
Reference Systems, Survey display, radar range &
bearing.
Notify Master, ECR, Ch.Eng., Deck crew, OCM
Indication Alarms
Offline computer will take control (No redundancy
Results
available in DP System)
[Yellow Alert]
Operator Action
Prepare to move away from surface structures
Notify Master, ECR, Ch.Eng., Deck crew.
Indication Alarms
Results Loss of Position / Heading
[Yellow Alert] or [Red Alert] (Dependent on severity)
Prepare to move away from surface structures
Operator Action
Select other controller as Master and when stable reset
offline.
Notify Master, ECR, Ch.Eng., Deck crew.
Indication Alarms
Model control of vessels DP Position, however position
Results
keeping will degrade
[Red Alert]
Operator Action If other references available deploy & select into DP desk
and reduce alert level to yellow.
Notify Master, ECR, Ch.Eng, Deck crew, OCM.
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13.5.7 Loss of UPS Power System:
Indication Alarms
Batteries will take over & run DP computers
Results If batteries fail within 30 minutes then DP partial blackout
will occur
[Yellow Alert]
Batteries should be able to maintain power for 30
minutes.
Operator Action
Stop operations.
Prepare to move away from surface structures if problem
cannot be resolved within a short period of time
Notify Master, ECR, Ch.Eng., Deck crew, OCM
Thrusters
13.5.9 Loss of Single Thruster Control:
Indication Alarm
Results Degraded thruster performance possible LOP
[Yellow Alert]
Stop defective thruster
Operator Action
Review continuation of Operations depending on available
thruster redundancy. Consider yellow alert.
Notify Master, ECR, Ch.Eng., Deck crew, OCM
DP EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
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Power Distribution
13.5.11 Loss of a Main Switchboard:
DP EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
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14. PLANNED MAINTENANCE SYSTEM AND ROUTINES
14.1 Introduction
14.1.1 The vessel is using the “XXXXXX” planned maintenance system. The planned
maintenance system is certified by the vessel’s class authority and in accordance
with the ISM Code.
14.1.2 For the planned maintenance system to be compliant with the IMCA
recommendations, the planned maintenance system shall as a minimum contain
maintenance procedures of the following:
14.1.3 DP System:
DP Control System and Sensors
UPSs
Power Management System
Switchboards
All relevant engine equipment
Auxiliaries
Thrusters
Oil Sampling
Communication System.
It’s advised that the maintenance routines are as a minimum in line with the
maker’s specification and recommendations with regards to routines.
15.1 Introduction
15.1.1 Van Oord has a DP trials and verification programme. This programme is intended
to demonstrate on a continuing basis that the vessel's DP system is in effective
and safe operable condition.
DP Logbook Level 6
Figure 18: FLOW CHART OF FMEA AND DP TRIALS & TESTING PROCEDURES
15.11 DP Incidents
15.11.1 Any DP related incidents are to be recorded and reported to Van OOrd and IMCA
as per IMCA M103 Guidelines for the Design and Operation of Dynamically
Positioned Vessels Appendix A, “DP Incident Reporting” and the ISM Manual
requirements using the appropriate Forms. Copies of Incident Reports sent to Van
Oord and / or IMCA are to be retained on board.
15.11.2 A copy of the IMCA incident reporting form is contained in Appendix B.
16.1 DP Capability
16.1.1 The DP Capability Analysis function computes the maximum weather conditions in
which the vessel is able to continue DP operations and allows you to select the
optimum heading for safe operation. Analyses are performed cyclically (usually
every five minutes).
16.1.2 When the analyses are performed, a force correction is taken into account. The
following criteria must be satisfied:
The system is in AUTO POSITION mode.
The position setpoint status as displayed on the status bar is PRESENT
POSITION.
The heading setpoint status as displayed on the status bar is PRESENT
HEADING.
16.1.3 The maximum weather conditions in which the vessel can maintain its position and
heading are predicted. The weather conditions are defined by a one-minute mean
wind velocity, a most-probable significant wave height, and a corresponding mean
wave period.
16.1.4 For a discrete number of vessel headings, the mean environmental loads from
wind, waves and current all having constant (fixed) directions, are calculated. The
environmental loads are increased (for example, through an increase in mean wind
speed and corresponding significant wave height), until one or both of the
following situations occur:
There is insufficient thrust for position and heading keeping.
There is insufficient power for position and heading keeping.
16.1.5 The results of the analysis are displayed on the Capability view as limiting wind or
current speed capability envelopes, one for each of the situations listed above.
17.1 Introduction
17.1.1 A DP footprint plot is a record that is made of the vessel’s DP station keeping
ability in particular environmental conditions using various propulsion
configurations, such as:
With all propulsion units available (i.e. two main azimuths, one bow tunnel
thrusters and one compass thruster),
With the most effective propulsion unit lost, (i.e. the most effective unit for
the given circumstances) and,
With the worst case failure (as stated in vessel’s DP FMEA).
17.1.2 A DP footprint plot should define an envelope within which the vessel maintained
station during a test period and should also identify any conditions under which
the vessel was unable to maintain position. In this way DP footprint plots can
verify the accuracy of the computer generated DP capability plots.
17.1.3 DP footprint plots should be recorded as regularly as possible. Opportunities
should be taken during stand-by periods and at times of weather downtime. A file
should be built up during the life of the vessel so that a record is maintained of
the vessel’s station keeping ability in various environmental conditions and with
various propulsion unit configurations.
17.1.4 DP footprint plots provide evidence to clients, classification societies and other
authorities of the vessel’s DP station keeping performance and DP capabilities. In
addition, DP footprint plots provide evidence of continuing thoroughness in DP
vessel management.
17.2 Procedure
17.2.1 DP footprint plots are made in the following manner:
Set up vessel in auto DP
Select a 5-10 minute trace on Pos Plot view
Print screen.
17.2.2 Over the years of vessel operation a portfolio of DP footprint plots should be
compiled.
17.2.3 The DP footprints should only be used as guidance during planning the of a DP
operation.
17.2.4 The Nexus has a permanent survey team onboard. An alternative to the above
method would be to request the survey team to plot the vessel’s position.
DP FOOTPRINT PLOTS
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18. REFERENCE DOCUMENTATION
18.1 Introduction
18.1.1 The following documents are considered to be important references for the safe
and efficient conduct of DP operations carried out on board the vessel. All key DP
personnel should be aware of the relevant documents / manuals and should have
a level of knowledge of their contents that is considered appropriate to their
position on board.
REFERENCE DOCUMENTATION
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18.3 Standard References
18.3.1 This manual meets the requirements of the various design, construction and
operating rules and guidelines that provide the basis for DP performance
standards. In particular, the documents below have been used as principal
reference standards during the compilation of this manual.
Document Reference Document name
Guidelines for the Design and Operation of
IMCA M103
Dynamically Positioned Vessels.
Guidelines for Vessels with Dynamic Positioning
IMCA M113 (IMO 645)
Systems.
IMCA M 117 Training and Experience of Key DP Personnel.
Guidelines on the use of DGPS as a position reference
IMCA M 141
in DP control systems.
IMCA M 142 Position reference reliability study.
IMCA M 166, April 2002 Guidance on Failure Modes & Effects Analysis.
IMCA 1997 Safety Interface doc. for a DP vessel
IMCA M 125
working near an Offshore Platform.
QRA for the use of dual DGPS system for Dynamic
DPVOA M128
Positioning.
IMCA M 115, October IMCA 1994 Risk Analysis of collision of Dynamically
1994 Positioned support vessels with offshore installations.
IMCA 1997 Standard Report for DP vessels’ Annual
IMCA M 139, July 1997
Trials.
A review of marine laser positioning systems - Part 1:
IMCA M170
MK IV Fanbeam® and Part 2: Cyscan.
IMO A.481 (XII) Principles of Safe Manning.
International Guidelines for The Safe Operation of
IMCA M182 Dynamically Positioned Offshore Supply Vessels, March
2006.
Guidelines on installation and maintenance of DGNSS-
IMCA M199
based positioning systems.
IMCA M205 Guidance on operational communications.
IMCA M109 Rev. 1 A Guide to DP-Related Documentation for DP Vessels.
Guidelines on installation and maintenance of GNSS-
IMCA S012
based positioning systems.
Guidance on the selection of satellite positioning
IMCA S018
systems for offshore applications.
IMO MSC / Circ. 738. DP operators’ qualification.
International Convention on Standards of Training,
STCW 1995
Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers.
Good practice guideline: The safe management of
G9 Offshore Wind small service vessels used in the offshore wind
industry. December 2014.
Guidelines for Auditing Vessels with Dynamic
112 UKOOA - 2
Positioning Systems.
REFERENCE DOCUMENTATION
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19. DP INCIDENT REPORTING
19.1 Introduction
19.1.1 A DP Incident Reporting System has been established for a number of years. Users
of DP systems make use of the reporting system for recording and reporting faults,
failures, and problems that have occurred on DP vessels.
19.1.2 The main purpose of the reporting system is to provide a means of disseminating
relevant information to other DP users. In addition, the incidents are analysed
and important conclusions drawn.
19.2 Responsibilities
19.2.1 The Master is responsible for ensuring that all DP incidents are recorded and
reported on the enclosed form. Reports should be sent to Van Oord head office
and also to the Secretary of IMCA, whose address is given on the form in Appendix
B.
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APPENDICES
Appendix C – DP Checklists
1. Intact
2. Single thruster failure:
a. PS Stern Azimuth Thruster (SAT ps)
b. SB Stern Azimuth Thruster (SAT sb)
c. Forward Bow Tunnel Thruster (BTT fwd)
d. Aft Bow Tunnel Thruster (BTT aft)
e. Bow Azimuth Thruster (BAT).
3. Combined thrusters running:
a. SAT ps + BTT fwd + BAT
b. SAT sb + BTT aft + BAT
c. SAT ps + BTT fwd
d. SAT sb + BTT aft
e. SAT ps + BAT
f. SAT sb + BAT.
Also a reference case is given for the weather conditions in the Wadden Sea:
Main Particulars:
ERN: The conditions used for the calculation of the DP capability are those specified by
DNV before the revision of the rules in 2013 (Part 6, Chapter 7, Dynamic Positioning
Systems). The old rules are used to comply with previous reports and to give output for
all directions of wind, wave and current. The probability of non-exceedance is combined
with the JONSWAP wave spectrum, as specified for the North Sea. The current is assumed
to be constant at 0.75 m/s from the same direction as the wind and waves. The position
keeping ability of the vessel shall be calculated according to the concept of the
environmental regularity numbers (ERN). The relation between ERN, wind and wave is
shown below. The ERN conditions represent the Northern North Sea.
25 10
20 8
Wind speed [m/s]
V wind [m/s]
10 4 Hsignificant [m]
5 2
0 0
0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0
ERN
Gemini: The environmental conditions for the seas near the location of the Gemini Wind
Park is defined from wind and wave statistics, the JONSWAP wave spectrum and a current
speed of 2kn. The wind wave relation is defined as:
The DP capability is determined for the propulsion train as presented below. For the sake
of clarity the frequency drives are not shown.
ERN
According to the calculation, the vessel is able to return to the reference position for wind,
wave and current loads:
Please note again that these results are for the ERN specific wind/wave relation based on
northern north sea data as given by DNV as in the regulations before the last update of
2013 .
Intact
180
Current speed = 0.75 m/s SB Azi failure
210 150 Retractable failure
TT fwd failure
TT aft failure
PS Azi failure
240 120
270 5 10 90
15
20 25
Wind speed
[m/s]
300 60
Wind/wave/current-
330 30 direction,
coming from [deg]
0
270 5 10 90
15
20 25
Wind speed
[m/s]
300 60
Wind/wave/current-
330 30 direction,
coming from [deg]
0
Intact
180
Current speed = 1.03 m/s a
210 150 b
c
d
e
240 120
270 10 90
20
30
Wind speed
[m/s]
300 60
Wind/wave/current-
330 30 direction,
coming from [deg]
0
270 10 90
20
30
Wind speed
[m/s]
300 60
Wind/wave/current-
330 30 direction,
coming from [deg]
0
Some wave statistics were available for the Wadden Sea. Because of the sheltered area
and shallow depth of the sea, the waves are low and short compared with the data of ERN
and Gemini. The wind on the other hand shows higher average values. Please note that
the following calculations not hold any shallow water effects. There is no method available
to incorporate the water depth in the current force, but this will be significant when h/T
will come close to 1. Because of the shallow water condition, the retractable thruster (BAT)
is disabled in the following calculations.
No current
Calculations showed that the vessel is able to return to the reference position 99.9% of
the time corresponding to wind speeds up to 19.8m/s. This includes 1.22m significant
wave height, but is only a small contribution to the total environmental load.
Intact
180
Current speed = 0 m/s, 180 deg
210 150
240 120
270 5 10 90
15
20 25
Wind speed
[m/s]
300 60
Wind/wave direction,
330 30 coming from [deg]
With current
The DP capability will be largely depending on the current force and slightly on the wind
force. The current force is maximum from the side (i.e.+ 90 degree angle) whereas the
wind force will have a strong effect on the yawing moment (i.e + 45 and + 135 degree
angle).
To give some indication of the capability in the sheltered Wadden Sea area, the
maximum current is calculated for the vessel to withstand at an angle of 90 degree (in
deep water). This is approximately 3.0 kn.
When in operation, the vessel will be kept at an angle aligned with the current.
Therefore the current load can easily be taken care off by the main propulsion system.
The wind load on the other hand will not be aligned to the current anymore. Therefore,
Capability plot for fixed current directions (3.0 kn) and varying wind and wave loads
The motions that can be expected from these maximum wave height of 1.5 meter does
not give rise to grounding when operating with 2m under keel clearance or more. The
shallow water condition ensures short wave lengths compared to the beam of the vessel.
Remarks:
- In the calculations no dynamic allowance for thrust degradation has been taken into
account as this is not specified in the ERN or in IMCA M140 guidelines. The results
are therefore highly theoretical but suitable for comparison between different
vessels.
- The wave and current coefficients are assumed to be the same as the PSV3300,
model test experiments with a different configuration of the DOC7500 showed a
good agreement between these coefficients and the test results.
- The wind coefficients are determined in a wind tunnel. The additional deckload of
680 m2 is taken into account.
- The calculations in the Wadden Sea condition do not include shallow water effects
on the current. Solutions are given for expected operational conditions.
Vessel: Date:
Place: Reported By:
Client: Position:
This section is confidential
2.) Environment
Available
Stand-By
On-Line
Preferred
Available
Stand-By
On-Line
Preferred
4.) Sketch (Vessel outline, heading, location of pos. ref., divers, ROV, installation, pipeline)
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
6.) Narrative Description of Events: (if available attach internal incident reports)
Modify Procedures
Repair
Report to Supplier
Initiating event:
Main cause:
Secondary cause:
Were too many tasks being performed, or were there too many people involved/discussions taking place at
the time of the incident?
Were the factors leading to the incident adequately covered by the circumstances within the training and
familiarisation sessions with the DP Operators?
Do you believe that the DP Operator, if faced with a similar situation now, would react in a different way?
11.) Comments
Please add any comments or suggestions that have not been fully covered in the report.
APPENDIX C: DP CHECKLISTS -
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