24. Jalosjos v.

Comelec, 691 SCRA 646 (2013)

G.R. No. 193314. February 26, 2013.*

SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, EDWIN ELIM TUMPAG and
RODOLFO Y. ESTRELLADA, respondents.

Election Law; Domicile; There are three requisites for a person to acquire a new domicile by choice. First,
residence or bodily presence in the new locality. Second, an intention to remain there. Third, an intention
to abandon the old domicile.—Petitioner’s uncontroverted domicile of origin is Dapitan City. The question
is whether she was able to establish, through clear and positive proof, that she had acquired a domicile of
choice in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, prior to the May 2010 elections. When it comes to the
qualifications for running for public office, residence is synonymous with domicile. Accordingly, Nuval v.
Guray, held as follows: The term ‘residence’ as so used, is synonymous with ‘domicile’ which imports not
only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. There are three requisites for a person to acquire a new domicile by choice.
First, residence or bodily presence in the new locality. Second, an intention to remain there. Third, an
intention to abandon the old domicile.

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* EN BANC.

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Jalosjos vs. Commission on Elections

Same; Same; Fernandez v. COMELEC, 608 SCRA 733 (2009), has established that the ownership of a
house or some other property does not establish domicile.—Assuming that the claim of property
ownership of petitioner is true, Fernandez v. COMELEC, 608 SCRA 733 (2009), has established that the
ownership of a house or some other property does not establish domicile. This principle is especially true
in this case as petitioner has failed to establish her bodily presence in the locality and her intent to stay
there at least a year before the elections, to wit: To use ownership of property in the district as the
determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that the landed can establish
compliance with the residency requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing a property
requirement to the right to hold public office, which property requirement would be unconstitutional.
Jalosjos vs. Commission on Elections, 691 SCRA 646, G.R. No. 193314 February 26, 2013

53. Reyes v. Comelec, 699 SCRA 522 (2013)

G.R. No. 207264. June 25, 2013.*

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO
B. TAN, respondents.

Election Law; House of Representative; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET);

Jurisdiction; As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (1995), the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member of the House of
Representatives.―As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (1995), the HRET does not have
jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member of the House of Representatives, to wit: As to the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’s jurisdiction as the
sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress
begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not
being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no
jurisdiction over the question.

Same; Same; To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence
of the following requisites:(1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.―It is
then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence
of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once a proclamation has been
made, COMELEC’s jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, its jurisdiction over contests relating to elections,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. However, it must be noted that
in these cases, the doctrinal pronouncement was made in the context of a proclaimed candidate who had
not only taken an oath of office, but who had also assumed office.

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* EN BANC.

523

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523

Reyes vs. Commission on Elections

Same; Same; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Jurisdiction; The petitioner cannot be considered a
Member of the House of Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office; The term of
office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins only “at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.” Thus, until such time, the Commission on Elections retains jurisdiction.―Here,
the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because, primarily, she
has not yet assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been said, the term of office of a Member of the
House of Representatives begins only “at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.”
Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction. In her attempt to comply with the second
requirement, petitioner attached a purported Oath Of Office taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5
June 2013. However, this is not the oath of office which confers membership to the House of
Representatives. Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides:
Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members.—Members shall take their oath or affirmation either
collectively or individually before the Speaker in open session. Consequently, before there is a valid or
official taking of the oath it must be made (1) before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2)
in open session. Here, although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it
was made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of
office was indeed complied with. More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy —
that before the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally
disposed of the issue of petitioner’s lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14
May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on
petitioner’s qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of Representative. We will
inexcusably disregard this fact if we accept the argument of the petitioner that the COMELEC was ousted
of jurisdiction when she was proclaimed, which was four days after the COMELEC En Banc decision. The
Board of Canvasser which proclaimed petitioner cannot by such act be allowed to render nugatory a
decision of the COMELEC En Banc which affirmed a decision of the COMELEC First Division.524

524

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Reyes vs. Commission on Elections

Same; COMELEC Rules of Procedure; Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
“shall be liberally construed in order to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission.”―It must be emphasized that
the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the presentation of
evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure “shall be liberally construed in
order x x x to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the Commission.” In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny
due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then the “newly discovered
evidence” was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.

Administrative Proceedings; Due Process; One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also,
and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings.―In
administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the opportunity
or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC, 688 SCRA 552 (2013): The petitioners
should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an
opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and
perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings. In
administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed,
deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration.

BRION, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; View that Section 6 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
merely requires that the petition be sufficient in form and substance to justify an order from the Court to
act on the petition and to require the respondents to file their comments.―Section 6 of Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court merely requires that the petition be sufficient in form and substance to justify

525

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525

Reyes vs. Commission on Elections

an order from the Court to act on the petition and to require the respondents to file their comments. The
same rule also provides that the Court may dismiss the petition outright (as the majority did in the present
case) if it was filed manifestly for delay or if the questions raised are too unsubstantial to warrant further
proceedings. In the present case, the petition is indisputably sufficient in form and substance; no issue on
this point was even raised. Thus, the question before the Court ― if Rule 64, Section 6 were to be
followed ― is whether the issues raised by Reyes were too unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings.
Election Law; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); Jurisdiction; View that the
proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before
it at the time of the proclamation and the party questioning the qualifications of the winning candidate
should now present his or her case in a proper proceeding (i.e. quo warranto) before the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal who, by constitutional mandate, has the sole jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases involving the election, returns and qualification of members of the House of
Representatives.―I submit on this point that the proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative
fact that triggers the jurisdiction of the HRET over election contests relating to the winning candidate’s
election, return and qualifications. In other words, the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation and the party
questioning the qualifications of the winning candidate should now present his or her case in a proper
proceeding (i.e. quo warranto) before the HRET who, by constitutional mandate, has the sole jurisdiction
to hear and decide cases involving the election, returns and qualification of members of the House of
Representatives.

Same; Same; Same; View that as far as the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is
concerned, the proclamation of the winner in the congressional elections serves as the reckoning point as
well as the trigger that brings any contests relating to his or her election, return and qualifications within its
sole and exclusive jurisdiction.―It appears clear that as far as the HRET is concerned, the proclamation
of the winner in the congressional elections serves as the reckoning point as well as the trigger that brings
any contests relating to his or her election, return and qualifications within

526

526

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Reyes vs. Commission on Elections

its sole and exclusive jurisdiction. In the context of the present case, by holding that the COMELEC
retained jurisdiction (because Reyes, although a proclaimed winner, has not yet assumed office), the
majority effectively emasculates the HRET of its jurisdiction as it allows the filing of an election protest or
a petition for quo warranto only after the assumption to office by the candidate (i.e., on June 30 in the
usual case). To illustrate using the dates of the present case, any election protest or a petition for quo
warranto filed after June 30 or more than fifteen (15) days from Reyes’ proclamation on May 18, 2013,
shall certainly be dismissed outright by the HRET for having been filed out of time under the HRET rules.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; View that as a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily
review the COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence.―As a general rule, the Court does not
ordinarily review the COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions to this
rule have been established and consistently recognized, among others, when the COMELEC’s
appreciation and evaluation of evidence are so grossly unreasonable as to turn into an error of
jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to intervene and
correct the COMELEC’s error.

Election Law; Administrative Cases; Evidence; Substantial Evidence; View that in administrative cases,
the quantum of proof required is substantial evidence.―It is also basic in the law of evidence that one
who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. In administrative cases, the quantum of proof required is
substantial evidence. In the present case, the majority obviously believed, together with the COMELEC,
that Tan did overcome this burden and that his documentary evidence he submitted established that
Reyes is not a Filipino citizen. A major clash between the parties exists, of course, on this point as Reyes,
as expressed in her petition, is of the completely opposite view. Even a quick look at Tan’s evidence,
however, indicates that Reyes’ view is not without its merits and should not simply be dismissively set
aside. Reyes vs. Commission on Elections, 699 SCRA 522, G.R. No. 207264 June 25, 2013

82. Grego v. Comelec, 276 SCRA 481 (1997)

VOL. 274, JUNE 19, 1997

481

Grego vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 125955. June 19, 1997.*

WILMER GREGO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HUMBERTO BASCO, respondents.

Election Law; Local Government Code; Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code does not have any
retroactive effect.—In this regard, petitioner submits that although the Code took effect only on January
1, 1992, Section 40 (b) must nonetheless be given retroactive effect and applied to Basco’s dismissal
from office which took place in 1981. It is stressed that the provision of the law as worded does not
mention or even qualify the date of removal from office of the candidate in order for disqualification
thereunder to attach.

_______________

* EN BANC.
482

482

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Grego vs. Commission on Elections

Hence, petitioner impresses upon the Court that as long as a candidate was once removed from office
due to an administrative case, regardless of whether it took place during or prior to the effectivity of the
Code, the disqualification applies. To him, this interpretation is made more evident by the manner in
which the provisions of Section 40 are couched. Since the past tense is used in enumerating the grounds
for disqualification, petitioner strongly contends that the provision must have also referred to removal
from office occurring prior to the effectivity of the Code. We do not, however, subscribe to petitioner’s
view. Our refusal to give retroactive application to the provision of Section 40(b) is already a settled
issue and there exist no compelling reasons for us to depart therefrom.

Same; Same; Statutory Construction; A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so
construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage—the law looks
forward, not backward.—That the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a
candidate’s removal from office and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter us from
applying the law prospectively. The basic tenet in legal hermeneutics that laws operate only
prospectively and not retroactively provides the qualification sought by petitioner. A statute, despite the
generality in its language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which
transpired before its passage. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward.

Same; Civil Service Law; Words and Phrases; Reinstatement; Under Presidential Decree No. 807, the
former Civil Service Decree, the term “reinstatement” had a technical meaning, referring only to an
appointive position—a public officer administratively dismissed then was not therefore barred from
running for an elective position.—Anent Basco’s alleged circumvention of the prohibition in Tordesillas
against reinstatement to any position in the national or local government, including its agencies and
instrumentalities, as well as government-owned or controlled corporations, we are of the view that
petitioner’s contention is baseless. Neither does petitioner’s argument that the term “any position” is
broad enough to cover without distinction both appointive and elective positions merit any
consideration. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the Tordesillas decision did not bar Basco from running
for any elective position. As can be gleaned from the decretal portion of the said decision, the Court
couched the prohibition in this wise: “x x x AND WITH PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TO ANY POSITION
IN THE

483

VOL. 274, JUNE 19, 1997

483

Grego vs. Commission on Elections

NATIONAL OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING ITS AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES, OR

GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS.” In this regard, particular attention is
directed to the use of the term “reinstatement.” Under the former Civil Service Decree, the law
applicable at the time Basco, a public officer, was administratively dismissed from office, the term
“reinstatement” had a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive position. In light of these
definitions, there is, therefore, no basis for holding that Basco is likewise barred from running for an
elective position inasmuch as what is contemplated by the prohibition in Tordesillas is reinstatement to
an appointive position.

Same; Election Protests; Section 20, paragraph (i) of Rep. Act 7166 refers only to a void proclamation in
relation to contested returns and not to contested qualification of a candidate.—Section 20, paragraph
(i) of Rep. Act 7166 reads: “SEC. 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns.—x x x x x x x
x x (i) The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the
Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party. Any
proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not
adversely affect the results of the election. x x x x x x x x x.” The inapplicability of the abovementioned
provision to the present case is very much patent on its face considering that the same refers only to a
void proclamation in relation to contested returns and NOT to contested qualifications of a candidate.

Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The use of the word “may” in Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646 indicates
that the suspension of a proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature and operates to
confer discretion.—Next, petitioner cites Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646 which states: “SEC. 6. Effect of
Disqualification Case.—Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason, a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.” (Italics supplied). This provision, however, does not support petitioner’s
contention that the COMELEC, or more properly

484

484

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Grego vs. Commission on Elections

speaking, the Manila City BOC, should have suspended the proclamation. The use of the word “may”
indicates that the suspension of a proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature and
operates to confer discretion. What is merely made mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the
continuation of the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest. Thus, in view of this discretion
granted to the COMELEC, the question of whether or not evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant
suspension of proclamation must be left for its own determination and the Court cannot interfere
therewith and substitute its own judgment unless such discretion has been exercised whimsically and
capriciously.

Same; Same; Administrative Law; Commission on Elections; The COMELEC, as an administrative body
and a specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has more
than enough expertise in its field that its findings or conclusions are generally respected and even given
finality.—The COMELEC, as an administrative agency and a specialized constitutional body charged with
the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has more than enough expertise in its field that its findings
or conclusions are generally respected and even given finality. The COMELEC has not found any ground
to suspend the proclamation and the records likewise fail to show any so as to warrant a different
conclusion from this Court. Hence, there is no ample justification to hold that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry
out, not supplant or modify, the law; Where the law employs the word “may,” it becomes improper and
highly irregular for an administrative agency to use the word “shall” in its implementing rules.—It is to
be noted that Section 5, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure states that: “SEC. 5. Effect of
petition if unresolved before completion of canvass.—x x x (H)is proclamation shall be suspended
notwithstanding the fact that he received the winning number of votes in such election.” However,
being merely an implementing rule, the same must not override, but instead remain consistent with and
in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are
intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law. Since Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646, the
law which Section 5 of Rule 25

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Grego vs. Commission on Elections

of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks to implement, employed the word “may,” it is, therefore
improper and highly irregular for the COMELEC to have used instead the word “shall” in its rules.

Same; Same; Board of Canvassers; Absent any determination of irregularity in the election returns, as
well as an order enjoining the canvassing and proclamation of the winner, it is a mandatory and
ministerial duty of the Board of Canvassers concerned to count the votes based on such returns and
declare the result.—Moreover, there is no reason why the Manila City BOC should not have proclaimed
Basco as the sixth winning City Councilor. Absent any determination of irregularity in the election
returns, as well as an order enjoining the canvassing and proclamation of the winner, it is a mandatory
and ministerial duty of the Board of Canvassers concerned to count the votes based on such returns and
declare the result. This has been the rule as early as in the case of Dizon v. Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Laguna where we clarified the nature of the functions of the Board of Canvassers, viz.:
“The simple purpose and duty of the canvassing board is to ascertain and declare the apparent result of
the voting. All other questions are to be tried before the court or other tribunal for contesting elections
or in quo warranto proceedings.” (9 R.C.L., p. 1110)
Same; Same; A possible exception to the rule that a second placer may not be declared the winning
candidate is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the
highest number of votes is disqualified, and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate’s disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would
nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.—Obviously, he may not be declared a
winner. In the first place, Basco was a duly qualified candidate pursuant to our disquisition above.
Furthermore, he clearly received the winning number of votes which put him in sixth place. Thus,
petitioner’s emphatic reference to Labo v. COMELEC, where we laid down a possible exception to the
rule that a second placer may not be declared the winning candidate, finds no application in this case.
The exception is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained
the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate’s disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would
nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Both assumptions, however, are absent
in this case. Grego vs. Commission on Elections, 274 SCRA 481, G.R. No. 125955 June 19, 1997