562

Control of Eviction of Tenans Sec. 15

should be resorted to only where there is a possible doubt about the person to whomn
rent is payable and mere denial of relationship without any basis is not enough.
If there is a dispute about status of parties, the Controller can order deposit with
the Controller and the amount can be paid to appropriate party after determination
of his status If seriously disputed questions arose whether relationship between
the tenant and the original landlord subsisted or not, and whether the original
landlord had agreed to sell the premises to another person with whom suit for

specitic performance was pending in the Civil Court, the appropriate order is to be
under this sub-section, and order under section 15(1) can not be passed. On facts
the eviction proceedings were also stayed till decision of civil suit.' Very often the
question arises where the original landlord has died and the dispute arises between
the heirs inter se as to which one of them is entitled to the property and to realise
rent thereof. The Controller passed an order under the sub-section as the lease in
favour of the landlord had been forfeited. Later the lease was restored. The amount
was directed to be paid to the landlord. The Controller has power to make such an
order under section 15(4) even after the eviction petition has been dismissed and
does not become functus officio."
22. Section 15(5)-False or Frivolous Dispute under sub-section (4)
The sub-section applies only to a case falling under sub-section (4). Where the
plea is found to be false or frivolous the defence may be struck out. It implies that the
Rent Controller shall make an order under sub-section (4) and proceed to determine
the dispute, i.e. whether the applicant is the landlord and entitled to rent, before
trying the matter on other grounds. The reason is that an objection of this nature
goes to the root of the case and affects the maintainability of the petition itself. To
attract the penalty it is not sufficient that the tenant's plea is found to be wrong. It
must be found that it was false to his knowledge or that there was no reasonable
ground whatsoever to justify taking of the plea.
23. Section 15(6)-Dismissal of the Eviction Application
The sub-section will apply to a case where the application has been made on the
ground of non-payment only. Where other grounds have been taken there must be
a trial of other grounds also. Though the sub-section refers to sub-section (3) which
refers to sub-section (1) as well as sub-section (2), it is obvious that it cannot apply
to a case under sub-section (2). In other words this sub-section has been inserted
only to give effect to section 14(2). We have already seen that the tenant's liability
to pay future rent lasts so long as the eviction proceedings are pending and they
terminate only when the Rent Controller passes an order under this sub-section. This
sub-section is to be read along with sub-section (7) which lays down the penalty
for failure to comply with an order under the section, i.e., an order not only under
sub-section (1) only but also those under sub-sections (2), (3) and (4).
24. Section
15(7)-Striking Out Defence
Section 13(5) of the Act 38 of 1952 provided for passing an order similar to
one under sub-section
(1) under the present Act. In a case of non-compliance it
was
provided that the court shall order the defence against ejectment to be struck
out and the tenant to be
claim against
placed in the same position as if he had not defended
the
ejection. The provision was mandatory
and there was no
1. Ashok Kumar Sharma v. Lal
discretion
Chand Sharma, 2001 (94) DLT 768: 2001
2. Ajit Kumar v. Surinder
Kumar &Sons, 1998
(7) AD 717 (Del).
3. Vinod Industries Pot. Ltd. v. (74) DLT 522: 1998 (46) DRJ 535.
4. Viran Devi v. T.N.
Suraj Kumari, 1993 (51) DLT 360.
Sachdeva, 1985 (1) RCR 589 (Del): (27) 1985 (1) DLT 415
636. (DB): 1985 (1) RC
5. Aziz Ahmed v. Zetoon
Begum, 66 Punj LR 200
(Puni); V.K. Verma
SC 1317: 1964 Cur LJ (SC) 106: 66 Pun LR 690. v. Radhey Shyam, AIR 196*
 When a Tenant can Get the Benefit of Protection against Eviction
Sec. 15] 563
.. dho nresent Act, the word 'may has been used implying that the Controller
r o t i o n in the matter and is not bound to pass an order in every case.
In several State Acts the word 'shall has been used, for instance section 11A of
the Bihar Act, 19472 In the MP Act, 1961 the word 'may' has been used
Striking out the defence of the tenant is a last resort and before such an order
can be made two conditions must be satisfied:
1. There is default in payment of deposit of rent by the tenant.
2. The default by the tenant must be such that indicates wilful failure,
deliberate default or volitional non performance or is result of gross
neglect.
The discretion to strike out to defence of the tenant should not be exercised
without any application of mind to the facts of the case. A three judge Bench of the
Supreme Court explained the meaning of "discretion" in this context as follows:
"6. The question which, therefore, requires consideration is whether the
appellant has made out any ground for exercising discretion in his favour
of not striking out his defence. According to Black's Law Dictionary "judicial
discretion" means the exercise of judgment by a judge or court based on what
is fair under the circumstances and guided by the rules and principles of law;
a court's power to act or not act when a litigant is not entitled to demand
the act as a matter of right. The word "discretion" connotes necessarily an
act of a judicial character, and, as used with reference to discretion exercised
judicially, it implies the absence of a hard-and-fast rule, and it requires an
actual exercise of judgment and a consideration of the facts and circumstances
which are necessary to make a sound, fair and just determination, and a
knowledge of the facts upon which the discretion may properly operate. (See
27 Corpus Juris Secundum, p.m 289). When it is said that something is to be
done within the discretion of the authorities, that something is to be done
according to the rules of reason and justice and not according to private
opinion; according, to law and not humour. It only gives certain latitude
or liberty accorded by statute or rules, to a judge as distinguished fromn
a ministerial or administrative official, in
adjudicating on matters brought
before him."
It was held thus that where the tenant had taken a patently false plea that he
had sent the rent by cheque, of which there was absolutely no evidence, and the
rent was a meager Rs. 30 p.m. for commercial
out the defence of the tenant
premises in Karol Bagh, the striking
by the Controller was fully justified.
Where the tenant
pleaded that delay was due to serious illness but no medical record was produced
in support, the defence was rightly struck
of.
Before striking out defence, a positive
finding that the tenant had failed or
refused to pay rent negligently is a must. The sub-section does not
automatic striking out of the defence but conters on the Controller a prescribe any
discretion to

1. Onkarmal Lakhotia (dead) v. Sumitra Devi,

(23) 1983 (1) DLT 291: 1982 (2) RCR 707: 1983 (1)
RCJ 58: 1983 (1) RLR 91; Bimal Chand v. Sri Gopal, (1981) 3 SCC 486: AIR 1981 SC 1657: 1982
Raj LR 11 SC, one or two defaults by inadvertent mistake.
2. Ganga Prasad v. Mahendra, 1967 BLJR 53.
3. Chitra Kumar v. Ganga Ram, 1966 Jab LJ 1028.
4. Santosh Mehta v. Om Parkash, 1980 (1) RCJ 697
(SC).
5. Aero Traders v. Ravinder Kumar Suri,
(2004) 8 SCC 307 para 6: 114 (2004) DLT 753: 2004 (9)
SCALE 95.
6. Manjit Singh v. Sant Singh, 2004 (115) DLT 606.
7. Abdul Razak v. Kali Charan, 1995 (1) AD
(Del) 836(Del).
 Eviction of Tenans
Control of Sec. 15
564
circumstances of cach case.' But
But itit is for the
to the
to explain
be why
exercised the default
according tenant
had occurred and where he offers no ou lanation or
unreasonable or wrong, the Controller will
his explanation
is apparently
proposition will hold der his
out. It is submitted that this d
detence to be struck
nature stated
above is made out. In another line only
where default of the struck out only if the delay in don es it has
defence should be
been held that
accord with the law
laid down by the S
contumacious." This is in
or account of a bona fide mistakedo
made late on
not be the
Where struck out,' w
deposit ora sthere is bona fide confusion about the interpretat of
ewill
the
condition for granting leave to defend or under
order whether it was a
suspended the payment of rentEtions
where the tenant
15(2) or 15(4).5 Similarly had forcibly dispossessed
averment was that the landlord
of counsel and the not deposit the rent because offasl
from a part of the
demised premises" or did of
the counsel, the default could not be considered wilful or contumacious. ginal
substantial compliance of the order of deposit
delays small defaults where there is
or
condoned.*
ought to be Court in Santosh Mehta v. Om Parkash on the
The comments of the Supreme
reproduced below:
object and scope of this provision are

"3. We must adopt a socially intormed perspective while construing the

Controller is armed with a
provisions and then it will be plain that the
facilitative power. He may, or may not strike out the tenane's defence. A
scheme of the statute in
judicial direction has built-in self-restraint, has the
of circumstances which are present in
mind, cannot ignore the conspectus
the case and has the brooding though playing on the power that, in a court,
not a routine visitation
striking out a party's defence is in exceptional step,
of a punitive extreme following upon a mere failure to pay rent. First of all,
there must be a failure to pay rent which, in the context, indicates wilful
the section
failure, deliberate default or volitional non-performance. Secondly,
no automatic weapon but prescribes a wise discretion, inscribes
provides
no mechanical consequence but invests a power to overcome intransigence.

1. Santosh Mehta v. Om Parkash, supra.

2. Bhagwan Singh v. N.D. Khanna, 66 Punj LR 402; Sudershan Lal Wadhawan v. Devi Dass, 1974 Raj
LR 27; Radhey Bai v. Savitri Sharma, 1975 Delhi Digest Item No. 65; Mahesh Das v. Gomti Devi,
SAO 93 of 1970 decided on 30-7-1970; B.D. Mittal v. Gosuwami, 1978 (2) RLR 635: 1978 Raj LR
601: 1978 (2) RCR 436, in defaults; Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Hem Chand, 1980 Raj
LR 692: 1980 (2) RLR 542: 1980 (2) RCR 403, after remand by the Supreme Court, hinancial
stringency no excuse; Kedar Nath v. Ram Nath, 1979 (1) RLR 115 decided on 24-4-1970; Deep
Chand v. Saroopi Devi, 1980 (17) DLT 486: 1980 (1) RLR 468.
3. Bharat Pulverising Mills (P) Ltd. v. Tara Chand Malik B. Trust, 1971 Raj LR 35; K.C. Sharma V.
Sant Ram, 1975 Delhi Digest Item No. 267, single default; Aftab Ahmed v. Nasiruddin, 1976 K
400 Del, there was a delay of three years. Order was upheld; International Centre for athe7
v.H.K. Malik, 1981 (1) RCR 77 (Del): 1980 (2) RLR 527; Mohd. Sualin v. Sunita Chugh, (2 o
DLT 77: 1981 (2) RCR 639: 1982 (1) RCJ 321: 1982 (1) RLR 58: 1982 Raj LR 29; Ram Kuao
Janki Prasad, AIR 1981 Del 210: (20) 1981 DLT 135: 1981 (2) RCR 58: 1981 Raj LK l 0 1981
(2) RCJ 34: 1981 (2) RLR 120, default due to error.
4. (SC);
Manmohan Kaur v. Surya Kant, (1988) 4 SCC 698: AIR 1989 SC 291: 1989 (2) RC
Swran Singh v. Pooran Chand, 1973 Raj LR 3; Sultan Singh v. Ram Sarup, 1974 Raj LK
an
478
Aghan Arlines v. Cycle Equipment (P) Ltd., 1978 (14) DLT 19 (SN): 1978 Raj LR 427: 1
(2) Del 317 (DB): 1978 (2) RCJ 316: 1979 (1) RCJ (SN) 58.
5. S.R. Bose v. Gurbax
Singh, 1993 (49) DLT 507: 1993 (1) RCI 387: 1993 (1) RCK U
6. NirmalKapoor v. Sushila Devi
Jain, 1986 (10) DRJ 323: 1986 (2) RCR 181: 1987 (1) RC) 146
7. Ram Kishan Gupta v. Nathu Ram Gupta, 1993 (2) RCI 515: 1993 (2) RCR 513.
8. Shanti Sarup Khullar v. O.P. Sood, 1998 (73) DLT 65: 1998 (45) DRJ 487; Baruri amal Optical
Bindra

Ban Gupta, 1998 (73) DLT 607: 1998

(4) AD 360 (Del); Ram Suwaroop Kathuria
V.
i*
Co., 1993 (50) DLT 387.
Sec. 15 When a Tenant can Get the
Benefit of Protection
Thus, if a tenant fails or
against Eviction
refuses to pay or 565
a mood of defiance of
gross deposi rent
neglect, the tenant and the court
aard in defence. The last
resort may forfeit his discerns
nunitive direction of court cannot be right to
nce this telescopical cannot be used as converted into the be
a
body trap to get first resort,
interpretation
matter-of-course invocation of the
dawns, the mist of the tenant o
a

misconception
tothe realities of a given case is power to strike out will about
power", playing truant with the vanish. Farewell
Rent was duty underlying the
was
deposited
in time but there were
in the Court
pursuant to an interim order.
certain
to correctdiscrepancies
was moved for in the challan The deposit
permission
deposit. The defence of the tenant the errors in the challan
and an
application
was not in compliance with the was struck off on the within 15 days the of
Court held that the Court order. that
High ground
the deposit
Court upheld
be struck off, irregularity
in the it. The
challan was not suchSupreme
especially
The true legal
when
prayer for correction was made that the defence should
position within a
may be struck out in case may
be thus
he fails to expressed by saying that the tenant's fortnight.2
and the default is not give satisfactory
a defence
will presume that the minor or explanation
inadvertent. And where such is the of the default
reader will notice that default was wilful or
otherwise the result case the Court
in the above
contumaciousness. Thus, where observations gross neglect hasof been
gross neglect. The
depositing the tenant was
rent, firstly when order was equated with
granted number of opportunities
Tribunal at the time of made under section 15(1), for
under section 15(1), withdrawal of secondly
appeal against the interlocutory order made by the
thirdly when application moved under section
reason was
given for not depositing the rent, was
conduct and his defence was the tenant was 15(7), and no
guilty of contumacious
rightly struck out.' Failure to deposit rent on
basis without
proper explanation or gross
default, amounts to wilful default." Rent has negligence in
making
monthly
to be deposit or
repeated
the sub-tenant or
any one else and non deposited by the tenant and not
compliance with order under section deposit by the tenant would result in non
by the MCD the tenant cannot discharge the 15(1).3 In the absence of an
attachment order
adjustment of the amount deposited liability of the landlord and claim
be in default and his defence against the rent due and he would be deemed to
can be
and with mala fide intent rightly struck out Where the tenant
delayed the deposit of rent and made repeateddeliberately
defaults in
making deposits, his defence was held to be rightly struck
If legal heirs of the deceased tenant out.
assert themselves to have
their defence is liable to be struck out for become tenants,
the order under section 15(1). The tenant's unexplained delay in compliance with
advise of the counsel and that it was plea that rent was not
deposited as per
being deposited with the clerk of the counsel
1. (1980)
3 SCC 610: AIR 1980 SC 1664
(17) DLT 576.
(para 3): 1980 (1) RCJ 697 (SC): 1980 Raj LR 355: 1980
2. Awadhesh Mishra v. Lakhan Sao, AIR 1990 SC
2217, Bihar Act: 1991 (Supp 2) SCC 417.
3 Rajesh Wadhwa v. Sushma Govil, 1989 AIR (Del) 144: 1989 DLT 88: (57) 1988
1989 (1) RCR 201. (2) RCJ 699 (Del):
4. Surinder Kumar Jain v.
Champa Rani, 1999 (81) DLT 928: 1999 (51) DRJ 263: 1999 LR 517:
1999 (5) AD 829 (Del); Lata Malhotra v. Dhan Shob Raj, 1997 (66) DLT 567: 1997 RajRCR 551:
1997 (1)
Raj LR 238; Shanti Sarup Khullar v. O.P. Sood, 1998 (73) DLT 65: 1998 (45) DRJ 487;
Rajbir
Singh v. Mohan Lal Sharma, 1996 (62) DLT 451: 1996 (37) DRJ 548: 1996 (3) AD 551 (Del); Pravin
Gogia v. Dayal Chand, 1992 (82) DLT 95: 1999 (51) DRJ 639: 2000 Raj LR 22 (N); Kanwal Raj
Sadana v. D.D. Saigal, 1995 (58) DLT 814: 1996 (1) RCR 84: 1995 (33) DRJ 344.
5. Chanderbhan v. Munnalal Ramdhan, 2001 Raj LR 129.
6. Usha Arora v. Narmada Devi, 169 (2010) DLT 90.
7. Harjinder Singh Bedi R.P. Malhotra, 171
v.
(2010) DLT 361
 Control of Eviction of Tenants
566
for
striking the defen
out Sec. 15
not taken in the reply to the application efence was rejected
being an afterthought and contradictory to the plea taken earlier as
The relationship between non-compliance with an order der
striking out detence under section 15(7) has to be further considered section 15 and
in the light
the Supreme Court
case' holding that the Rent evto Controller can
ne time fixed
for deposit or payment ndone the
of rent and consequently condone default. In
there was proved good cause for condonation of delay by extension of tim Case
already noticed the Supreme Court has laid down that the default in payment As
he wilful and contumacious if tenant's defence is to be struck out. It is submitte
the same test will be applied to extend time. Where time is not extended t h a t
Wl be
out the detence as a matter of course. It would be inco
proper to strike to
hold that though detault ought not to
be condoned but at the Same imo ous
e of
the tenant should not be struck out. In other words the two matters will go ther
as the ground will be substantially the same. Where time is extended there shallbe
no occasion to invoke section 15(7). But possibly there may be cases where the Ren
Controller in the exercise of his discretion may refuse to extend the time and yet
may decide to refuse striking out the defence under section 15(7). But, for reasons
stated above, it must be a rare case.
Section 14(2) uses affirmative language, inter alia, to confer a benefit on the
tenant, where the application for eviction is made on the ground of non-payment of
rent. It is a restriction on the right of the landlord. His failure to make an application
under sub-section (7) and to get the tenant's defence struck out does not mean
that the default stands condoned. In case of default he forfeits the benefit under
section 14(2) and the restriction on the landlord's right to recover possessions stands
removed.' But where the delay in deposit of rent is condoned, the order striking out
defence stands set aside and the tenant is entitled to benefit of section 14(2).
If eviction is sought under section 14(1)(a) as well as other grounds (mentioned
in clause (b) etc.), a direction to deposit may be relatable to both section 15(1) and
section 15(2). If order in such a case is made under section 15(7) striking out detence
tor non-compliance of the order for deposit, it does not follow that order under
section 15(7)is liable to be revoked in case ground under section 14(1)(a) ultimately
fails. The Act does not provide for such a consequence.
In a case under the M.P. Rent Act it was held by the Supreme Court that the
aerence of a tenant cannot be struck out due to nonpayment of rent during the
pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court, reason being that constitutiona
remedy under Article 136 cannot be controlled by the provisions of the Rent Act
This principal is of general application."
25. Section 15(7)-Consequences of Striking out the Tenant's Defence
One effect of an order striking out the defence is that the tenant will not be
allowed to produce any evidence of his own at the trial. But it does not
that Nill
results
it automatically in a decree or order of eviction. AISO tne
not be if the tenant had not defended the landlord's claim
f the
the
treated as
l.e.
Peeaings are ex-parte against him. He has a right to be present at the hea
and participate in the
proceedings.
Shanti Prasad Jain v. Prakash Narain Mathur. (2009) 11 ScC 663 affirming Parkash Nuta Mathur
v. Shanti Parshad
Jain, 148 (2008) DLT 542.
2 Ram Murti v. Bhola
Nath, 1984 (26) DLT 91
Subash Mehta (Dr.) v. S.P.
4 Ved Prakash v. Bimla Devi, Chaudhary,
1988 (2)
1981 (19) DLT 97.
.Kundan RCJ128 (Del). 679-
lal v,
case under sec.
Angan Lal, AIR 1994 SC 479: 1993 AIR sCW 3899: 1994 (3) SCC
14(1)(d). SCW
6. Ram Babu
Agarwal v. Jai Kishan Das, (2010) 2010 SC 721:
7260
1 SCC 164: AIR 00
Sec. 15] When a Tenant can Get the Benefit of Protection against Eviction 567
The effect of such an order on the tenant's right came up for consideration before
the Supreme Court in a case.' It said:
"Even when defence is struck off the defendant is entitled to appear, cross-
examine the plaintiffs' witnesses and submit that even on the basis of evidence
on behalf of the plaintiff a decree cannot be passed against him".
In another case, the Supreme Court, after an elaborate discussion, has laid down
that in such a case the defendant can cross examine plaintiffs witnesses and argue.
This right is, however, limited to demonstrating to the Court that plaintiff's witnesses
are not speaking the truth, or that the evidence of plaintiff is not sufficient to fulfil
the terms of the statute. He cannot be allowed to lead his own evidence. It also held
that Order 8, rule 10, C.P.C. does not make it obligatory for Court to pass a decree
straightway. It is only permissive2 The cross examination is limited to pointing out
legal infirmities, patent illegalities and falsity in the case itself.3
Under section 15(7) even where the defence is struck out, the Controller has to
proceed with the hearing of the application. The application for eviction may fail
for many reasons. The tenant can still address the Controller in order to convince
him that leaving aside the defence raised against the eviction petition, the eviction
petition by itself is liable to fail because of another patent illegality
The landlord has still to make out the grounds for eviction. No automatic order
consequent on striking out the defence follows. In the first case it was stated that
the tenant may plead that no notice of termination was given or the notice given
was not valid. The same view was taken in an earlier case. Other High Courts have
taken the view that the tenant can address the Controller on this point," but he cannot
examine any witness on the point of service or validity of notice. The Controller can
not dismiss the eviction petition relying upon the pleadings of the tenant."
The tenant can challenge the claim for arrears of rent or challenge the title
of the plaintiff and set up his own title.10 The plaintiff will be required to adduce
evidence in support of his claim. He may not succeed if such proof falls short of
the requirement.'" The tenant is not debarred from contesting the landlord's case on
his own allegations and it would be incumbent on him to establish his case.12 He

1. Paradise Industrial Corporation v. Kiln Plastics Products, 1976 RCJ 7: AIR 1976 SC 390: (1976) 1
SCC 91: 1976 (1) SCWR 442.
2. Modula India v. K.S. Deo, (1988) 4 SCC 619: AIR 1989 SC 162: 1988 (2) RCR 530 (SC): 1988 (2)
RCJ 525.
3. Shukla Malhotra v. Dee Pee Kagaj udyog Pot. Ltd., 2001 (94) DLT 724: 2001 (60) DRJ 725: 2001
(6) AD 797 (Del).
4. United Auto Tractors (P) Ltd. v. Urvashi Rohtagi, 1975 RCJ 29: 1974 Raj LR 68.
5. L.T. Thadaniv. Yogeshrwar Dayal, 1971 (73) Punj LR (D) 218; Madan Lal Seth v. Amar Singh
Bhalla, 1980 Raj LR 693.
6. Kishan Chand v. Ramesh Chander, 1969 RCJ 839 (Del).
7. Bishan Prasad v. Jagmohan Swaroop, 1968 BLJR 847, case law considered; Contra Mahabirv.
Shiva Sanka, AIR 1968 Pat 413, Bishun Nath Prasad v. Shanti Devi, 1978 (1) RCR 525 (Pat)
Nana Shah v. Ram Kumar, 1966 Raj LW 446; N.C. Moitra v. Bhupendra Kumar Chatterji, 1978 (1)
RCJ 372: 1978 (2) RLR 353 (Cal).
8. Maharam Ali v. Dinanath Prasad Sha, 77 CWN 202; Ajit Kumar v. Baij Nath Kumar, 65 CWN
1110 treated as jurisdictional requirement; Deo Chand Singh v. Shah Mohammad, AIR 1965 Cal
398: 69 Cal WN 399: ILR (1967) 2 Cal 688.
9. Rudra Dutt Sharma v. Shobha Ghosh, 1999 (82) DLT 201: 1999 (51) DRJ 646: 2000 Raj LR 66
(N).
10. Union of India v.Akhauri Harendra Narayan Singh, AIR 1974 Pat 159; Lal Mohan Prasad v. Bhavis
Kumar, 1969 RCR 243 (Pat HC).
11. Chaturbhuj Mistry v. Jagan Ram, 1967 BLJR 44.
12. Vanraj v. Kusumwati, 1961 MPLJ (Notes) 120.
 Control of Eviction of Tenants
568
ako u the defence that he 1S not a tenant at all.' Cases
ases
been taken that the tenant cannot cross-examine landlord'e where the Sec. 15
good law.2 ss are view had
no
The view that he can, has been taken in some other cases.3 Tho longer
examine the landlord witnesses on the point of notice to quit ne tenant may
crOss
FullBench of the Calcutta High Court by majority has held that
tho the se, a
not entitled to cross examine plaintiff s witnesses except on
to quit. The tenant is entitled to detend that no arrears are
he defendant
question of is
examine the landlord's witnesses on his claim for arrears h
notice
can cross-
claim for ejectment." After the defence ad been struck out, the eviction defend the
smissed in default. On restoration, that order revives. An
written statement may be relied upon by the landlord7
application
admission in the
26. Section 15-Orders under section 15, if Appealable
Section 38 lays down that every order under the Act by the Control
appealable before the Tribunal. After the amendment of the Act in 1988 Such is
lies only on questions of law. Section 43 lays down that an order of the Cona
shall be final subject to the provisions of the Act. Reading these two sectionstoa
e,
since 1964 the view had been taken that the Controller's order is appealable, andf
no appeal is filed, it becomes final and its correctness cannot be challenged in an
appeal from the order of eviction which may follow.° A LDivision Bench overruled this
view and held that where the order had not been appealed against, even though an
an appeal from the final order
appeal lies, it is open to the tenant to challenge it in
or eviction." In that case it was an order under section 15(1). But the same principle
will apply to orders passed under other sub-sections. This case was applied and an
was set aside on an appeal from the
final order of eviction
order under sub-section(7)
by the Tribunal." The above ruling was given on a tenant's appeal but there
passed his application has
the landlord is the aggrieved party in that
may be cases where is made on the ground of section
been dismissed. Take a case where an application
but the landlord may be aggrieved
14(1)(a). An order is passed under section 15(1) the rate of rent
arrears payable or/and
in that, according to him, the amount of and the
tenant complies with the order
have not been correctly determined. The
The landlord may appeal, and challenge
application is refused under section 14(2). In the Tribunal agrees with him,
the correctness of the order under section 15(1).
case
ana
have to pass another order
it will have to remand the case, the Controller will Ofcourse
to comply with it."
the tenant will have to be given another opportunity
1. Nene Shah v. Ram Kumar, 1966 Raj LW 446; Dayal Singh v. Pooran Chand Jain, 1980 (2) KJ 1

(Raj). 1952 Cal 685; Nagmu

Co., Ltd. v. Olympia Trading Corpn. Ltd., 88 Cal LJ 298: AIR
. 1ading
6Ram v. Bishwanath Prasad, 1964 BLJR 197.
. Hiranand v. Umaid Raj, AIR 1973 Raj 120: 1973 RLJ 441: 1973 Raj LW 32; Deo Chanu
WN 399: ILR (1967) 2 Cal
688; Daya Moy
a n lonammad, AIR 1965 Cal 398: 69 CalRCR 445: 1980 (1) RCJ 583; observations o
Dal Singer Singh, AIR 79 Cal 332: 1979 (2)
contrary in Cal 110 FB were held to be obiter. RLR
4. Rameshiwar Kumar v. Biseswari Lal, 1982 (1) RCR 30 (Cal): 1982 (1) KJ o7
678.
Act
5. Jageshwar Chaudhry v. Ugrasen Narain, 1981 (2) RCR 301 (Pat) on sec.on11A, 3 Bi
sec. 1 ,
Act.
v. Sharda
6.7. Ranjit Kumar Sinha Ranjan Prasad, 1982 (1) RCJ 695 Patna
Ambumal Sindhi v. Sheik Mohd. Siddique, 1965 MPLJ (Notes) 140. Deo
RaniV.
guarup v. Murari Lal, 1964 (66) Puni LR 586: followed in Urmilla
1970 RCR 763; Sanyukta
Uppal v. Vidya Prakash, 1972 RCR 168. DLT1 1978 (1) RC
9. Kehar Singh v. Raghunandan Saran, 1978 AIR (Del) 236: 1978(14) (2) (SN):
(14) DLT 1 (2) ari Mohan
530: 1987 Raj LR 120: 1978 (1) RCR 728: ILR 1978 (2) Del 40 (DB) followed "*

Nehru v. Rameshwar Dayal, AIR 1980 Del 291: 1980 Raj LR 249.
10. Ariana Afghan Airlines Co. Ltd. v. Cycle
11.
Equipment, 1978 Raj LR
Silvertone Manufacturing Co. of India v. Usha Soi, AIR 1984 Del 271: (1984) 1 K 427
RCR 287 (Del).
 Sec. 15] When a Tenant can Get the Benefit of Protection against Eviction 569
the second order will take into consideration amounts
already paid. Take a different
situation. The tenant did not comply with the order, his defence is struck off and an
order of eviction is passed against him. On appeal the Tribunal sets aside the
order
under section 15 and as a necessary consequence the order
of the tenant falls and there is bound to be a remand and a striking
off the defence
retrial. An order under
section 15(1) may be challenged in an appeal from an order of eviction or if it is
not
done in appeal, it cannot be
being without jurisdiction.
challenged in execution of that order on the
ground
Under the Punjab Act there is a
an order similar to under section
specific provision for filing an appeal against
15(1) under the present Act. However, there is no
provision in that Act to the effect that if the interim order for deposit of rent is not
appealed against, the same cannot be questioned in the appeal from the final order
for eviction. The Supreme Court contrasted the provisions of the Punjab Act with that
of the Civil Procedure Code and held that even if the
interim order of deposit was
not appealed against by the tenant, still the tenant could challenge it in the appeal
from the final order for eviction. The Court dealt with the matter as
follows:
"32. In our view, the High Court fell into grave error in what it held. The
legal position, in our opinion, is this: where a tenant does not challenge the
order of the fixation of provisional rent passed under section 13(2)(7) proviso
in fails to comply with that order, the
appeal under section 15(1)(6) and also
order of eviction must follow as per the provisions contained in the 1949 Rent
Act but when the tenant challenges the order of eviction in appeal and therein
also challenges the order determining the provisional rent, it is not open to
the appellate authority to refuse to consider the legality and validity of the
order determining the provisional rent on the ground that the correctness of
such appeal was filed
order cannot be examined
an appeal lay therefrom."
as no from that order though
Once the order under section 15(1) was confirmed by the Tribunal in appeal, and
the tenant did not challenge the same in further appeal, at the final hearing of the
eviction petition it is not open to the tenant to contend that no ejectment should be
made on the ground that the order under section 15(1) was illegal. Once the order
under section 15(1) had become final on being confirmed in appeal it operated as
res judicata on that question in subsequent proceedings."
If appeal against order striking out defence is pending, it will not become
infructuous if eviction order is passed. If appeal succeeds the eviction order will
also fall.
27. Section 15(7)-Contents of the Application under section 15(7)
Full details of defaults should be given. The case was
remanded.
28. Section 15-Order under section 15 in Proceedings for Eviction under
section 25B and section 21
It was held that an order under section 15(2) cannot be
passed in proceedings
under section 25B. The reason stated was that an order under section 15 is
whereas no appeal lies from any order passed in
appealable
under the proceedings
summary
procedure under Chapter IlLA of the Act. The Supreme Court case Santosh Mehta

1. Gurbax Rai v. Vidyawati, 1981 (19) DLT (SN) 20.

2. Harjit Singh Uppal v. Anup Bansal, (2011) 11 SCC 672.
3. Krishan Kumar v. Dau Dayal, 1987 (2) RCJ 408 (Del).
4. Chamber of Colours and Chemicals (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Trilok Chand Jain, 1973 Delhi Digest Item 323.
5. Harvir Giri v. Jagdish Chand, 1971 Raj LR (Notes) 138.
6. Ram Nath v. O.P. Khadria, 1980 (17) DLT 435: 1980 (1) DRJ 38: AIR 1980 (Del) 237: 1980 (1)
RCJ 701 D; Ram Nath v. Rann Shishak, 1980 Raj LR 451: 1980 (2) RCJ 455.