Marley Belanger & Steven Murnane

Global Policy Paper

February 23rd, 2023

The Dilemmas of Democracy Promotion

Executive Summary 1
Part 1: Context and Importance 2
Part 2: Policy Options 4
Part 2.5: Case Study Selections 5
The Case of Haiti: Top-Down 5
The Case of Bolivia: Bottom-Up 9
Part 3: Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats 12
Strengths and Opportunities of Top-Down 12
Weaknesses and Threats to Top-Down 13
Strengths and Opportunities of Bottom-Up 14
Weaknesses and Threats of Bottom-Up 15
Part 4: Policy Recommendations 15
Part 5. Annex 19
Item 1. The Global State of Democracy framework (Global state of democracy report
2022: Forging social contracts in a time of discontent, 2022) 19
Item 2. Countries Moving Towards Authoritarianism 19
Item 3. Vdem Liberal Democracy Index 20
Item 4: Vdem Electoral Democracy Index (Adiwasito, De Lombaerde and Pietrangeli,
2005) 21
Item 5: Interrelation between economic and political freedom in the world, 2017 21

Executive Summary
Democratic erosion has been a source of global strife, debate, and even conflict for decades. A
contributing factor to the dilemmas of democracy promotion lies in the ambiguity of effective
techniques and fundamental disagreements about the concepts of democracy itself. This paper
aims to explore the Horizontal and Vertical Dimensions of democracy as they contribute to the
dilemmas of democracy promotion. Our analysis of the dilemmas of democracy portion is
centered around the five categories of Global State of Democracy Indices (GSoD Indices):
Representative Government, Participatory Engagement, Fundamental Rights, Checks on
Government, and Impartial Administration. Our research highlights two opposing policy
options: top-down and bottom-up, which we evaluate through the historical interrogation of two
case studies, Haiti and Bolivia. By implementing a strengths-weaknesses-obstacles-threats
(SWOT) analysis, our overarching policy recommendation prioritizes the indices of Impartial
Administration, Representative Government, and Participatory Engagement. Ultimately, our
final policy recommendation is that it is best practice to create a hybrid model of the top-down
 Democracy Promotion 2

and bottom-up strategies by focusing on promoting free trade to stabilize the local economy and
directly promoting effective checks and balances. We also propose an additional strategy of
bolstering and normalizing supranational election observation across the global system,
specifically directed by the United Nations.

Part 1: Context and Importance

Democracy promotion represents more than just a method of governance for many states,

but also a philosophy on life. To understand the dilemmas of democracy promotion, it is crucial

to first identify the defining traits of democratic systems, while also outlining past methods and

failings of democracy promotion as a foreign policy objective.

In the broadest sense, a democracy maintains two key rights: the right to conflict and the

right to participation. The right to conflict consists of the right to form political parties and

freedom of the press, while the right to participation consists of the right to vote for citizens and

free, fair, and frequent elections (Krouse, 1982). The organization Freedom House compiles a

yearly evaluation of a state’s democracy based on the quality of its political rights and civil

liberties (House, 2022). It is through this metric that we define the promotion of democracy as

aiming to increase both the political rights and civil liberties within a state.

Democracy promotion has implications for horizontal and vertical levels of governance.

Horizontally, the traditional dynamic of democracy promotion is actors within the “liberal order”

such as the UN, World Bank, or INGOs are the primary actors facilitating democratic promotion.

Some of the top democracy-promoting institutions are USAID and the US Department of State,

specifically the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (U.S. department of state,

2018). Further, the United States and European Union are other prominent drivers of democracy

promotion.
 Democracy Promotion 3

The vertical erosion of democracy can be characterized by the proliferation of autocratic

consolidation and democratic backsliding on a local, state, and global level. We currently find

ourselves in what many refer to as the “third wave” of democratization, characterized by the

collapse of the Soviet Union. However, we are now seeing a resurgence in autocratic

consolidation and democratic backsliding (Dowding, Hughes, and Margetts, 2001). Democracies

once thought of as established are experiencing the erosion of civil liberties. As a global pattern,

“between 2016 and 2021, the number of countries moving towards authoritarianism was more

than double the number moving towards democracy. During that time, 27 countries experienced

a downgrade in their regime classification, while only 13 improved” (Global state of democracy

report 2022: Forging social contracts in a time of discontent, 2022).

Critically, the fundamental differences in the methods and motivations of the US and EU

when it comes to democracy promotion have created gaps between territorial and functional

policymaking. The United States frames democracy promotion as a “political approach” often

attributes the value of democracy to political freedom and defines democracy as “elections plus

rights.” Therefore, US democracy promotion focuses on forming pro-democratic coalitions

within a target state, or even directly challenging the existing political regime. The EU favors a

“developmental approach” to democracy and values democracy as a driver of development. This

is a slower and more indirect process of nation-building and socioeconomic development. As a

result, this method aims to increase accountability over contestation and tends to be less directly

confrontational (Carothers, 2008). In short, the US tends to prioritize territorial policymaking as

its democratization efforts can be centered around regional interests and development, while the

EU can be seen prioritizing independent development, ultimately favoring functional

policymaking.
 Democracy Promotion 4

Functionally, the challenges to democratic promotion fall under five categories as defined

by the Global State of Democracy framework: Representative Government, Participatory

Engagement, Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government, and Impartial Administration

(Global state of democracy report 2022: Forging social contracts in a time of discontent, 2022).

Effective strategies to promote democracy must strengthen all or most of these variables. It is

through the application of this framework to currently eroded or eroding democracies as case

studies that potential policy solutions can be evaluated.

Part 2: Policy Options

Due to democratic promotion being a heavily academic field, we have elected to use

country case studies to illustrate the existing policy options. As can be observed in our case

studies, while the methods vary, there are two primary approaches to democracy promotion: the

“top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches. Haiti serves as an example of a top-down strategy and

Bolivia serves as an example of a bottom-up strategy.

A top-down approach is generally defined to be a strategy where the goal is to motivate

elites and decision-makers to democratize using direct incentives (Patterson, 2012). Another

definition states, “Incentive (top-down) approaches attempt to promote democracy from the

top-down, by leveraging aid and trade privileges to persuade authoritarian leaders to implement

political reform.” (Collins, 2009) One concrete example of this in action is the existence of

Millennium Challenge Accounts. President Bush linked foreign aid eligibility to governmental

reforms when discussing these accounts and said, “We must tie greater aid to political and legal

and economic reforms. And by insisting on reform, we do the work of compassion” (The

millennium challenge account, 2003). The country of Haiti is still evaluated by the standards of

these Millennium Challenge Accounts (Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2014). USAID is

 Democracy Promotion 5

another organization that, despite often providing services directly to civilians, favors a more

top-down approach to democratization.

There was a bottom-up approach to democracy promotion in Bolivia. Bottom-up

approaches can be best defined as, “assistance approaches aim to induce democratization from

the inside, through funding and technical assistance to state institutions, and from the bottom-up,

by providing support to civil society and elections.” According to Thomas Carothers the

advantage of bottom-up democracy promotion is that people can take ownership of their political

system as a set of norms instead of a blueprint (Carothers, no date). If a democratic system

develops from the bottom-up, it accounts for the cultural context of a region. Carothers writes,

“The greatest successes of democracy… were driven by people within democratizing societies

themselves, despite credit-taking that sometimes went on outside” (Carothers, no date). This

bottom-up approach closely mirrors the EU’s conceptual approach to democracy promotion. In a

recent report (International IDEA, 2007) the EU’s approach was defined to prioritize: the

relationship between development and internal political change, a long-term approach linking

internal political change to social and economic change, and the recognition that democracy can

not be brought about coercively from the outside (International IDEA, 2007).

Part 2.5: Case Study Selections

The Case of Haiti: Top-Down

Using variables defined by the Global State of Democracy Framework, Haiti's history

with democratic promotion showcases challenges pertaining to participatory engagement,

impartial administration, and an overall representation in their government (Global state of

democracy report 2022: Forging social contracts in a time of discontent, 2022).

After a period of political instability and violence within Haiti, the United States took its
 Democracy Promotion 6

first step in promoting democracy by invading the island in 1915 (Crawford-Roberts, no date).

The United States occupied the country under the guise of democratic pursuit, and “forced the

election of a new pro-American president, Philippe Sudré Dartiguenave, by the Haitian

legislature in August 1915” (Bauduy, 2015). The United States went on to spend 19 years

exerting US control over Haiti’s finances and restructured the government to give the executive

unprecedented power (Danticat, 2015). After the US withdrawal of troops in 1934, Haiti saw a

long period of authoritarianism with the 29-year reign of François Duvalier and his son,

Jean-Claude Duvalier (Bogues, 2021).

In 1994, after a series of protests and military coups, the United States once again

invaded and occupied the country. With pressure from the United States, the UN issued

Operation Uphold Democracy, a forceful and militarized top-down democracy promotion

approach, which involved over 25,000 ground troops, two aircraft carriers, and a small coalition

of Caribbean countries, with the goal of occupying Haiti to dismantle the military government

and installing a more democratic government (Milestones: 1993–2000 - office of the historian,

no date). On September 19th, 1994 the United States forces landed in Haiti and began

transitioning the post-coup government to the previous democratic government. The United

States only kept a peace-keeping force in the country until the results of the 1996 presidential

election (Milestones: 1993–2000 - office of the historian, no date), and were then replaced by

United Nations peacekeeping forces under various names from 1995 to 2000 (Haiti: Restoring a

Democracy, no date). The US intervention in Haiti bolstered the country’s index on V-Dem, with

Liberal Democracy increasing from 0.09 (1993) to 0.23 (1995), and Electoral Democracy

increasing from 0.23 (1993) to 0.35 (1995) (Michael et al., 2022).

The stability gained by the US/UN occupation did not last long, as after his second
 Democracy Promotion 7

election, Haitian President Aristide was overthrown in a coup and fled the country in 2004

(Faubert, 2006). The United Nations Development Program initiated the United Nations

Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004, the last of seven UN missions since 1993.

MINUSTAH enforces human rights through government review and judicial reform

recommendations worked to increase security through a national police force, and helped ensure

elections through administrative and technical support. By the elections of 2006, 63 percent of

eligible Haitians voted, and the head of MINUSTAH stated, “...overall, the elections proceeded

in a calm and orderly fashion” (Faubert, 2006).

Along with the support of the United Nations, the United States has sent tens of millions

of dollars in aid to Haiti, which has the highest per-capita rate of NGOs in the world

(Crawford-Roberts, no date). One NGO operating in the nation was the Clinton Foundation,

which had 34 projects and focused on attracting multi-national corporations to Haiti (Kushner,

2019). The United States focused on eliminating the drug trade, investing in energy,

infrastructure, agriculture, and food imports, and most importantly, supporting elections and

democratic candidates. USAID carried out 72 programs with a total funding of $568 million.

USAIDs democratic promotion aims to directly support the Haitian government, to “promote

governance that is more responsive to citizens’ needs” (USAID HAITI, STRATEGIC

FRAMEWORK, no date).

However, support from the United States and the NGOs were not in coordination with

the United Nations and bypassed the Haitian government, even when “[s]uccessive Haitian

leaders and governments failed to provide the infrastructure or institutions of governance

necessary to deliver security and public services to the population…” (Page, 2022). This led to a

general lack of accountability in the government, a reliance on NGOs, and an uncoordinated and
 Democracy Promotion 8

sporadic network of support and aid, rather than a coordinated government effort, leading to the

erosion of government legitimacy (Crawford-Roberts, no date). The hundreds of millions of

dollars from USAID focused on capital projects and architecture, mainly employed Americans,

and led to the deterioration of the Haitian economy and ravaged the agricultural industry (Page,

2022).

Further, during the 2016 election, Haiti saw only an 18 percent turnout in eligible voters,

which was attributed to the United States' financial support in both the administration of the

election and of candidates. Haitians essentially gave up on voting with, “many Haitians believing

that their votes and voices did not matter because the United States would simply choose the

winner” (Page, 2022). Following the 2016 election, in 2017 the United Nations left Haiti which

enabled the security to be eroded, coming to a crisis when President Moïse was assassinated in

2021.

The top-down approach in Haiti by the United States is very direct and aimed to change

the government itself while ensuring stability and security through armed occupancy. However,

this approach does not have a feasible withdrawal plan or end goal, as it is mainly up to the

president and national sentiment, therefore it can create power vacuums and instability in

countries like Haiti, post-occupancy. This has had real-world consequences, as now, Haiti is

leading the world as one of the least democratic countries, ranking 33/100 for Freedom, 11/40 for

Political Rights, and 22/60 in Civil Liberties by Freedom House (House, 2022). Furthermore,

Haiti’s V-Dem Indexes have decreased since 1995, with Liberal Democracy at 0.21 and Electoral

Democracy at 0.35 (Michael et al., 2022).

 Democracy Promotion 9

The Case of Bolivia: Bottom-Up

Bolivia serves as a case example in which the European Union worked in tandem with its

political and economic partners in the region to promote democracy from the bottom-up with the

goal of stabilizing Bolivia's government historically roiled in political instability, revolutions,

and military coups. Based on the Global State of Democracy framework, Bolivia’s challenges to

democratic promotion have centered on: Checks on Government, Impartial Administration, and

violations of Fundamental Rights (Global state of democracy report 2022: Forging social

contracts in a time of discontent, 2022).

A strict government that prioritized elites and land owners over the working class and

indigenous peoples, followed by a series of revolutions to implement socialist ideals in the

constitution left a historical narrative of overthrowing a government that did not work for the

people. This would “set the tone and provided the guidelines for the future generations…”

(Haiti: Restoring a Democracy, no date), as it provided great social support from the state at the

demands of the people or revolutionaries.

It was not until the late 20th century that Bolivia was on track to become a more stable

democracy. From 1981 to 1982 different political parties mobilized a large-scale effort to

democratize the nation, and pushed for congress to elect a new, democratically inclined

president. In 1981, Bolivia’s V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index was 0.02 and its Electoral

Democracy Index was 0.1 (Michael et al., 2022). Freedom House listed the nation as “not free”

with Political Rights at 7/7 (least free), and Civil Liberties at 5/7 (not free), in 1981 (Gastil,

1981).

After the 1982 elections, Bolivia's democratic freedoms increased dramatically, and

EU/UN institutions began to move into the nation to take advantage of beneficial trade, and
 Democracy Promotion 10

ensure a steady and lasting democracy (Bolivia, no date). By 1986, Freedom House considered

Bolivia “partly free” and the nation moved up to 2/7 (free) in Political Rights and 3/7 (free) for

Civil Liberties (Gastil, 1986). Similarly, Bolivia’s standing in the V-Dem indexes increased, the

Liberal Democracy Index was 0.42 and the Electoral Democracy Index was 0.63 (Michael et al.,

2022).

In 1983, Bolivia and the European Union were involved in an overarching trade

agreement that fostered the growth of free trade rather than the state-sponsored economy that

Bolivia had (Adiwasito, De Lombaerde and Pietrangeli, 2005). These political relations were

further fostered in 1990 and 1999 through European Union Summits targeting South and Central

American countries to establish long-term political cooperation (Adiwasito, De Lombaerde and

Pietrangeli, 2005). In 2002, the European Union and Latin America Caribbean Summit called for

an agreement to “strengthen our democratic institutions and nurture the processes of

modernization in our societies taking into account the importance of sustainable development,

poverty eradication, cultural diversity, justice, and social equity” (EUROPEAN UNION – LATIN

AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN SUMMIT, 2002).

Since the first summit in 1999, the EU has held a summit every other year, detailing the

investments, commitments, priorities, and goals for the partnership. Upon establishing formal

political relations in 1999, the EU “had been emphatic on the issue concerning social cohesion

and exclusion in the Andean region as we the state of the art of its integration” (Adiwasito, De

Lombaerde and Pietrangeli, 2005). The EU decided that with an increase in dialogue, free trade,

and security across the entire region, Bolivia could stabilize as a democracy.

Through various evolving institutions and programs such as EuropeAid and

Directorate-General for Development in the early 2000s, and more recently the Multiannual
 Democracy Promotion 11

Indicative Programme, the EU has developed ongoing strategic plans that evolve on a regular

basis. This type of democratic promotion “reflects a general desire to shift support away from

project aid towards broader sectoral and macro support; recognizing the fungibility of aid”

(Dearden, no date). Further, the EU recognizes that there needs to be a cohesive effort by the

member states and independent organizations to complement the development effort set forth by

the Bolivian government, and the reality of the economic and political system in the Andes

region (Dearden, no date).

From 2017 to 2020 the Multiannual Indicative Programme focused on three main areas,

as opposed to the seven areas set in the 2002 strategy (BOLIVIA Country Strategy Paper, 2002).

At the top of the areas of focus in 2017 were to enact justice reform and fight against corruption

(European Union, no date), whereas, in 2002, the areas of focus were primarily economic. This

engaged, cooperative, and cohesive approach to democracy development has seemed to have

stabilized Bolivia since 1983, with indicators remaining steady until 2020.

The European Union's bottom-up approach is strategic and very long-term, it is planned

and implemented through an established program within the structure of the E.U. and is not

affected by one official or even one country's political whim. In 2017, Freedom House

considered Bolivia “partly free” with a score of 68/100 and gave it a score of 29/40 in Political

Rights, and 39/60 for Civil Liberties (House, 2020). Similarly, the V-Dem indexes remained

similar, the Liberal Democracy Index was 0.38 and the Electoral Democracy Index was 0.54

(Michael et al., 2022).

Despite these relative successes, Bolivia’s democratic future is still uncertain, as this

bottom-up approach can easily be overruled by strong and willing political actors looking for

short-term gain in the target countries such as Bolivia. A disputed election in 2019 triggered
 Democracy Promotion 12

large-scale protests and the resignation of the president (Bolivia, 2020). Following the fall of the

president, multiple elected officials were arrested on various corruption and terrorism charges

(House, 2020). Widespread political unrest and civil rights violations paired with a prosecutorial

government eroded some of the work to bolster Political Rights, as its score by Freedom House

dropped to 66/100 with Political Rights dropping to 27/40 (House, 2020). This setback shows

that while Bolivia saw success with a bottom-up approach, the downside of these approaches is

their inherent volatility. However, the practice of political participation in democratic practices

has become a norm in Bolivia, and therefore democratic promotion in Bolivia now has a chance

of future success due to this shift.

Part 3: Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats

In both case study examples of Haiti and Bolivia, while both states experienced

democratic promotion, divergent outcomes could be observed. We link these outcomes to the

overall methodology and contrast between top-down and bottom-up approaches. This segment of

our analysis aims to provide a brief overview of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and

threats (SWOT model). This analysis serves as the foundation for our ultimate policy

recommendation.

Strengths and Opportunities of Top-Down

The top-down approach that the United States, United Nations, and various NGOs

implemented in Haiti brought a significant structural change in the government in a relatively

quick period, around two years. By showing the willingness to use force, or by using force, the

United States can re-implement a democratic leader after a military coup such as in the case of

Haiti. Further, it ensures that the implemented actors and governmental system are in line with

United States policy, and can serve as international allies to the United States in the future. As
 Democracy Promotion 13

the United States has served as the definition of a stable democracy throughout the world for

over two centuries and recently serves as the hegemon of the free world, it is in the best interest

of democratic nations for the United States to ensure political rights in countries by creating a

strict norm of intolerance towards military coups, and authoritarian regimes.

Weaknesses and Threats to Top-Down

While the United States top-down model can be shown to stabilize a country and ensure

political rights in the short term, it has weaknesses in long-term implementation. In Haiti, once

peace-keeping forces were recalled from the country, stability quickly declined as there was no

structure to ensure security. Instead of building a structure from the ground up, military troops

simply serve as the structure that keeps out bad actors, so when the military is not there, the bad

actors are free to act. This also can lead to the delegitimization of the government and lower

democratic participation, as the implemented government is seen as a puppet of the United

States. Further, any military or international operations such as Operation Restore Democracy

are approved by the president, who largely acts based on national views and opinions, which

change every four years.

As the United States has shown in the past, while promoting democracy, it usually has

ulterior motives which erode trust in its actions abroad, while enabling multinational

corporations, or entire industries to take advantage of the democracy promotion. This was seen in

Haiti, as the government supplemented a large number of agricultural imports to ensure food

security, the farmers on the island quickly saw their crops devalued; and while the United States

ensured energy and infrastructure stability, it used American corporations to do so, which further

dried Haitis economy of that activity. NGOs heavily focused on Haiti, poured in hundreds of

millions of dollars with little oversight by government agencies, which can cause a potential for
 Democracy Promotion 14

corruption. Further, NGOs and direct action, Haiti’s infrastructure was overwhelmed, and there

was no comprehensive and cooperational plan implemented to organize all the NGOs to follow

the same path, which led to inconsistencies and an over-focus on the capital city. The import of

American entities, NGOs, and culture clashes with the local culture, in Haiti there was a drive to

rid the island of “Voodoo” due to the West’s misconception of the practices (Ulbrich, 2019), but

this backfired and proved to cause more mistrust towards the Americans.

Strengths and Opportunities of Bottom-Up

Stephen Collins, in an overarching examination of these approaches, finds that “while

top-down incentive approaches can stimulate democratic change, this strategy tends to work only

when aid and trade benefits are conditional… scant evidence exists to demonstrate that inside

approaches—that is, institutional aid—possesses a significant capacity to induce democracy. It is

the bottom-up approach—empowering the masses to compel democratic change—that has

registered the greatest number of democracy promotion successes” (Collins, 2009).

While the European approach to promoting democracy is slow, it is steady. Its long-term

plans frequently change as the target nation changes. For instance, in Bolivia, when the nation

was extremely closed off and skeptical of outside actors, the EUs plan was to simply open up the

country economically and socially, to allow the people to intermingle with other countries and

explore other experiences. Ultimately this widens the citizens' views and enables them to think

more democratically over time. As Bolivia opened up, so did economic opportunities with

Europe and its trade partners in the region, this brought an increase in prosperity in the country

which further moved the citizenry to have higher expectations of their government. Rather than

dumping money onto the government, and the issues of the nation, this approach carefully

considers how problems are created and what needs to be done to solve them on a long-term
 Democracy Promotion 15

scale. This approach focuses highly on long-term stability socially, politically, and economically,

as the EU believes that all of these aspects are needed to create a more democratic state.

Weaknesses and Threats of Bottom-Up

The European bottom-up approach to promoting democracy can be seen as very slow and

inefficient as it is extremely long term, and extensively planned out. This approach does not take

any action against a government or regime, rather it builds democracy through a system that the

EU plans in advance. If a military coup were to overthrow a democratic government, the EU

model would not be able to act in time to ensure political rights or civil liberties, instead, it

would use diplomacy and international policy along its with economic influence to guide the

country toward a stable democratic state. In Bolivia, the European Union started its diplomacy in

the mid-1960s, but did not implement any plans regarding the structure of the government until

2017, instead it paved a path towards this, focusing on opening up the economy and regional

integration. Further, this approach does not hold leaders accountable for their actions until the

EU has an economic opportunity to, and relies on trade to persuade actors one way or another.

This can be seen in the 2019 election in Bolivia, where despite the decades-long strategic

promotion of democracy, a contested election threw the nation into chaos and eroded trust and

legitimacy in the election system. Because the bottom-up approach focuses heavily on

influencing the masses, it is more susceptible to coups and revolutions as citizen expectations

rise and/or government legitimacy decreases.

Part 4: Policy Recommendations

Our overarching policy recommendation is to create a hybrid model of top-down and

bottom-up strategies. This model would prioritize the bottom-up strategy of growing and

supporting free trade and a stable domestic economy. However, we also see some practical value
 Democracy Promotion 16

in the top-down idea of legitimizing state governance by imposing effective checks and balances.

To expand upon this idea in practice, we propose bolstering and normalizing supranational

election observation across the global system to more effectively increase accountability and

trust.

This policy recommendation is feasible, primarily because all three strategies have been

shown to be effective in the context of our case studies. Further, our recommendation to move

away from strictly top-down or bottom-up approaches can be seen in the context of a shift in

how the US thinks of modern democracy promotion today. In 2021, the Biden administration

released a fact sheet announcing the Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal. Within this

initiative, the US planned to contribute up to $424.4 million to support the “functioning of

transparent, accountable governance” The initiative's five areas of work are as follows:

Supporting Free and Independent Media, Fighting Corruption, Bolstering Democratic Reformers,

Advancing Technology for Democracy, and Defending Free and Fair Elections and Political

Processes (The White House, 2021). The combination of these areas of interest, specifically the

support of media and bolstering democratic reformers, seems to balance the top-down and

bottom-up approaches without sacrificing the “directness” of the top-down approach.

As an overarching framework, Further, based on the EU assertion that democracy should

not be implemented through coercion (International IDEA, 2007), the definition of freedom

house providing that democracy combines political rights and civil liberties is problematic in the

context of aggressive top-down democracy promotion by outside actors. It is a civil and political

right of the citizens of a nation to hold the right of self-determination, and therefore if a

democratic system of governance is truly undesirable by the target populace, it is simply

undemocratic to continue to push democracy.

 Democracy Promotion 17

Therefore, in order to support the target populations' will for representative government,

while ensuring the fundamental rights of underrepresented communities it is the most rational

and effective option to choose a balance of top-down and bottom-up approaches. Starting from

the bottom-up, free trade should be fostered throughout the target state and the region. This

phenomenon was observed when Bolivia and the European Union were involved in an

overarching trade agreement that fostered the growth of free trade in the region rather than the

state-sponsored economy that Bolivia had (Adiwasito, De Lombaerde and Pietrangeli, 2005). As

a result, the EU served to stabilize the region and was able to promote the democratic variable

known as “Impartial Administration” (Global state of democracy report 2022: Forging social

contracts in a time of discontent, 2022). This variable pertains to reducing corruption and having

predictable enforcement of laws and regulations.

Promoting an impartial administration is only viable if the target state's government has

an effective and scrupulous system of checks and balances, which are best imposed with

top-down methodology. This strategy was implemented in Haiti when the United States and UN

first occupied the island and implemented a persistent system of checks and balances through

external election observers and peacekeeping forces. This resulted in the promotion of another

democratic variable, “Representative Government” (Global state of democracy report 2022:

Forging social contracts in a time of discontent, 2022). This variable entails having fair and

frequent elections open to all, multiple free political parties, and an elected government that is

representative of the people who elected them. While this strategy was not viable long-term, the

calculated usage of imposing checks and balances when balanced with our other

recommendations would help to prevent violations of a state's right to self-determination.

 Democracy Promotion 18

Our final recommendation hinges upon normalizing and scaling up the frequency and

capacity of UN Electoral Assistance and Observation. This strategy would directly support the

GSoD Indices of “Participatory Engagement”. Currently, there are eight types of electoral

assistance that the UN can provide (Elections, no date), with technical election assistance being

the most common. Our recommendation values UN Electoral observation because the UN has

the capacity to increase the legitimacy of an election (Alshamary and Nir, 2021). More

importantly, the UN is more likely to impose impartial governance norms, whereas the US

running elections has more motivation to prioritize its own goals over the long-term well-being

of a state. Further, electoral credibility can reduce the potential for post-electoral violence and

protests (Lührmann, 2019).

As established by our evaluation, even after exposure to top-down or bottom-up methods,

democracy promotion is not a perfect science. What remains relevant to the discussion, however,

is whether we are targeting the right democratic indices to foster democratic values within a state

(Global state of democracy report 2022: Forging social contracts in a time of discontent, 2022).

It is in this framing that it is critical to understand the unique challenges of individual states.

Haiti's democracy struggles with participatory engagement, impartial administration, and

government representation. Bolivia's challenges have been focused on checks on government,

impartial administration, and violations of fundamental rights. By prioritizing the unique

cultures, histories, and politics of individual states, a targeted and effective combination of

top-down and bottom-up approaches to democracy promotion can be most successfully applied.
 Democracy Promotion 19

Part 5. Annex

Item 1. The Global State of Democracy framework (Global state of democracy report 2022:
Forging social contracts in a time of discontent, 2022)

Item 2. Countries Moving Towards Authoritarianism

 Democracy Promotion 20

Item 3. Vdem Liberal Democracy Index

(Adiwasito, De Lombaerde and Pietrangeli, 2005)

Item 4: Vdem Electoral Democracy Index (Adiwasito, De Lombaerde and Pietrangeli, 2005)
 Democracy Promotion 21

Item 5: Interrelation between economic and political freedom in the world, 2017

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 Democracy Promotion 22

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 Democracy Promotion 25

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