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How radical was the Russian working class?

To attempt to examine the Russian working-class as an homogenous entity would be futile. The
monolithic construct that Soviet commentators alternatively saw as their greatest support and most
immediate danger was just that, a construct. The Russian working-class was made up of workers
with different levels of skill, in widely differing industries and in vastly different economic, political
and social conditions. Without almost immediately deeming the question one without an answer, it
is important to recognise the difficulties inherent in generalising in the context of any class, social
group or section of society. Furthermore, the question of radicalisation presents some very
fundamental difficulties. It is important to note that the degree of radicalisation must be viewed
relatively: relative to the program of the Provisional Government, to the aims of the Bolshevik party
both before and after the October Revolution, to the economic and political context of the period,
and the list goes on. Given that all of the above prove to be additional complexities to an issue
already visited countless times, it seems difficult at first glance to reach a solid conclusion.
Nevertheless, by attempting to address the issues within the historiographical debate over the
working-class, it will hopefully become clear that within these difficulties lies our answer. The
Russian working-class was radical only insomuch as historians have pinpointed specific cross-sections
and individual committee minutes that might suggest so. Often the Russian working-class was as
radical as the context of 1917 made it.

One of the major issues in our question is that of determining what constituted radical aims and
demands. Most obvious would perhaps be worker demands, in particular that of worker control.
Here perhaps we can see a pattern in the frequency of these demands, increasing as the October
Revolution approached. In this pattern then, one might find a validation of the Bolshevik view that
the Revolution was the culmination and sum total of the ‘mood of the nation’. This mood being both
revolutionary and radical. The early Bolshevik policy towards this economic organisation of worker’s
democracy was initially favourable. The November Decree of the Bolsheviks, supporting factory
committee control of enterprise, was to a large extent designed to secure the support of the
proletariat. In view of the fact that by 1918 Lenin had denounced worker control as ‘chaotic,
shattering [and] primitive’, and the Bolsheviks moved towards nationalisation of industry with the
creation of the Supreme Economic Council in December, one could conclude that the expediency of
the initial support of worker control was designed to harness the radical power of the working-
classes.1 However, it is important to note that even from the start various members of the working-
class had denounced worker control. In November, the Union of Petrograd Engineers had declared
workers incapable of management. That the tide of support for worker control of production
changed in the face of a deepening, rather than resolving, economic crisis is crucial. Rather than the
working-classes merely being swept along by their revolutionary fervour only to be contained by the
Bolsheviks, this initial radicalism was actually founded on expedient principles.

Many of the demands for a decentralised economy and worker control of production had stemmed
from the staunch belief that capitalist owners were incapable of directing production. Indeed, in the
light of owner sabotage and lock-outs, the belief that production would be ‘safer’ in the worker’s
hands is unsurprising. Furthermore, the economic crisis had yet to be satisfactorily addressed by the
bourgeois Provisional Government. Between 1917 and the beginning of 1918 gross production
halved. Real wages had fallen by about 9% in such an industrial centre as Petrograd while prices
continued to rise. The war may have initially contributed beneficially to the economy but by July
1917 the production for defence had decreased by 40%. Furthermore, the destruction of the
transport system meant that the abundant natural resources of Russia simply couldn’t be exploited.
In the context of this spiralling economic recession, worker demands were often based on the simple
attempt to find an alternative solution to the problems of the economy. Perhaps more than
anything these demands were more facilitated by the prevarication and inability of the Provisional
1
P Avrich, ‘The Bolshevik Revolution and workers; control in Russian industry’, Slavic Review, 1963, p48
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Government to even attempt to address the problems of the economy than by a burgeoning
radicalism within the working-class.

The issue of the actual links between the proletariat and the Bolshevik party is crucial to our
question of radicalism. Although, inevitably, post-Revolution Bolshevik commentators have
attempted to demonstrate that the Bolsheviks reflected the will of the people and subsequently
their radicalism has been emphasised. Indeed, this framework of analysis helped further
demonstrate the almost uncontrollable urges of the masses and validate the need for a vanguard
party to protect the revolution from the vicissitudes of the masses. One fruitful way of
demonstrating the radicalism of the working-classes, aside from their demands, had been the
prevalence of armed militias and the organisation of the Red Guard. Soviet commentators have
sometimes placed the membership of Red Guard organisations as high as 200,000. D Collins rejected
such a high figure and estimated that there were only between 70,000 and 100,000 Red Guard, a
figure that had previously been reached by V P Verkhos. 2 Most importantly, the Red Guards actually
received very little direct support from the Bolsheviks. As late as August, at a conference of Red
Guard leaders from 12 districts of Petrograd, it was declared that the Bolsheviks ‘must wake up’.
This to a certain extent demonstrates the radicalisation of a section of workers outside of the
framework of Bolshevik agitation. Indeed, the fear of the Bolsheviks that the Red Guard could prove
to be too fertile a breeding ground for radicals was demonstrated on the 10 th June 1918 by a decree
of the 5th All Russian Congress of Soviets abolishing all Red Guard units and other autonomous militia
bands. However, even taking such an inflated estimate of 200,000, in relation to an overall working
population of 3 million, the Red Guards represent a rather small minority. At this level then, the
working-class does not seem particularly radical.

By attempting to examine exactly what it was that led to elements of radicalism within the working-
class, one can try to find the cause of such radicalism. Whether advocating or signalling the danger
of the working-class, many commentators noted the almost uncontrollable, inherent revolutionary
nature of the proletariat. That revolution is one of the fundamental features of being a proletariat
has become an almost commonplace idea. Taking such a view, historians such as Rashin have
attempted to demonstrate that by 1917, the process of ‘proletarianisation’ of the workforce had
been completed and this accounted for the apparent radicalism of the year. 3 Such analyses attempt
to show the break between urban and rural dwellers. However, even Rashin is forced to concede
that 30% of urban workers still had ties with the land. Indeed, the fact that the war caused a rapid
turnaround in worker make-up meant that many workers by 1917 were not ‘second-generation’
urbanites but rather maintained close links with the peasantry. Indeed, even in Moscow, perhaps
the centre of industry in Russia, by 1917 10% of the working population had returned to the
countryside. That the process of proletarianisation is an academic is an important point to
recognise. Not only does the evidence suggest that the Russian working-class was not simply
formed of homogenous ‘proletariats’, such a phenomenon is in any situation never existent. Such a
conclusion may seem commonsensical, but often within the literature of the subject there remains a
sense that the working-class, as a whole and as proletariats, can be generalised over.

That the economy played a role in creating radicalism among the Russian working-classes is obvious.
Almost as important, was the role of agitation. Alan Wildman has noted that the process of
agitation, in aiding the day-to-day economic struggle of the working-class and simultaneously
attempting to raise the political consciousness and awareness of the class, was fundamental in
redirecting, or at least funnelling, the economic demands towards more political goals. 4 Such an
argument obviously undermines the theoretical inevitability of radicalism among the workers of

2
D N Collins, ‘A note on the numerical strength of the Russian Red Guard in October 1917’, Soviet Studies,
1972, p280
3
Taken from R Zelnik, ‘Russian workers and the revolutionary movement’, Journal of Society History, p216
4
In ibid, p225
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Russia. Furthermore, in emphasising the role of agitators, it becomes clear that the Marxist
framework for explaining the revolutionary nature of the working-class is fallible. In particular, the
fact that the economic demands of the early labour movement, taking place within an economic
framework of capitalism and a political one of feudalism, had already surpassed, or indeed
overtaken, the political struggle of the masses.

In examining the working-class thus far, a rather amorphous conception has been delivered. So far
there has been no mention of the differentiation within the proletariat that was prevalent in Russia
in 1917. For some, this differentiation was in itself one of the fundamental causes of worker
radicalism. In C Goodey’s words, the revolution was ‘the product of the internal relations between
mass movement and organisation’.5 In this formula, the organisational skills of more highly skilled
workers are contrasted with the almost blind followers that were the semi and unskilled workers in
Russian industry. Not only were these skilled workers much better adapted to the organisation of
strikes and worker demands, they were often in the relatively higher position of the factory
committees to do so. The war had increased the value of skilled workers. Becoming a ‘scarcer
commodity’, skilled workers had been ‘squeezed out’ to the top of the factory hierarchy. Certainly
the evidence from various metallurgical plants, with the relative increased skill levels required for
basic work, suggests this correlation between radicalism and skill. The Putilov Plant during the Great
War constituted 3.2% of all the workers strikes of Petrograd, going on strike 42 times. However, as
with all analyses of class, this correlation was not all-prevalent.

According to the data collected by Rosenberg and Koenker in Skilled Workers and the Strike
Movement, skilled workers during strikes were more prevalent during the earlier strikes of the year
only to apparently diminish as the revolution drew closer; certainly not an indication of radicalism.
Rosenberg and Koenker agree with Goodey that the burdens of war increase the value of skilled
workers but rather than increasing their ‘radicalism’, actually places them in a position that naturally
leans more conservatively. With their increased power derived from their value, skilled workers
attract the ire of both factory owners and workers. Certainly the organisational skills of the skilled
workers allowed them to take prominent positions within many strike movements, their demands
however did not differ greatly from those of semi-skilled workers. Perhaps more cogently,
Rosenberg and Koenker show how different groups of skilled workers could differ across industry.
The contrast between metallurgists and printers, who had been so prominent in the labour
movement of 1905, highlights this. Whether for the introduction of different forms of technology, or
other factors, most important is the fact that printers, among some of the most highly skilled of
workers, did not play a large role in demonstration in 1917. That level of skill played a role in
radicalisation, but not necessarily a determinant one, further opens up our question. In different
situations, the ties between workers varied. Certainly some skilled workers felt an affinity for others
in different industry but there are also instances of workers solidarity based on region, specific
industry and many other ties.6

A further point that Rosenberg and Koenker emphasise is the role that strikes themselves play in
radicalising the populace. In an article from 1987, it is argued that the fact that earlier strikes in the
year, such as those during April, had caused such a powerful political crisis demonstrated to many
workers their own power and this knowledge played a fundamental role in radicalising the
proletariat.7 As such, strikes develop from being purely representative of labour-management
conflicts into something much more powerful and being used as a forum to demonstrate worker
alienation. A further point to make is that of individual participation within mass movements. It is

5
C Goodey, ‘Factory committees and the dictatorship of the proletariat’, Critique 3, 1974, p33
6
W G Rosenberg and D P Koenker, ‘Skilled workers and the strike movement in Revolutionary Russia’, Journal
of Society History, 1985-1986
7
W G Rosenberg and D P Koenker, ‘The Limits of formal protest: worker activism and social polarization in
Petrograd and Moscow, March-October 1917,’ American Historical Review, 1987
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highly probably that the radicalism expressed during mass movement was to a certain extent
motivated by the sense of being part of a crowd. Perhaps that the July Days so shocked the
Bolsheviks highlights this more than a apparent gulf between party leadership and events at the
street level.

The radicalism of the Russian working-class varied from almost every different group that one
examines. The Russian proletariat was certainly not the single entity that some Soviet
commentators have viewed it as. It is now clear that the working-classes were not mere vehicles for
an inherent radical fervour but rather that their radicalism was tempered and forged by numerous
factors. The economic crisis of Russia added further burdens onto the workers and understandably
led to radical demands for their own control of production in order to assess these burdens. The
working-class in Russia during the revolution was composed of a myriad of micro-groups that all had
different economic and social backgrounds to mould their political demands. The solidarity that one
sees within the strike movements of 1917 is, importantly, perhaps more determined by the nature
of striking than that of the workers. The success of the Bolshevik seizure of power should not, I
think, be seen purely as representative of the radical demands of the workers. Rather, just like the
radicalism of workers, it was facilitated by the wider context of Russian society. Some Russian
workers presented radical demands to the Provisional Government, whilst others supported the
war. That the frequency of radical political demands increased over the course of the year must also
be seen in conjunction with the deepening economic crisis. Worker radicalism was determined by
the wider context in Russia, and by numerous factors within their individual societal conditions.