AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88 SCRA 195, NO.

L-49112 FEBRUARY 2, 1979

Constitutional Law; Police power construed.—The broad and expensive scope of the police power, which was
originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as “nothing more or
less than, the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty” was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v.
Ericta thus: “Justice Laurel in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams,
identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property
in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.’ Shortly after
independence in 1948; Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as ‘the power
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of
the people.’ x x x The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in
the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and
welfare.”

FACTS: Leovilo Agustin, a private citizen and owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, asked the validity of a Letter of
Instruction providing for an early warning device for motor vehicles which required all motor vehicles to secure early
warning devices (EWD) consisting of a pair of triangular, collapsible, reflectorized plates in red and yellow to be
purchased from the Land Transportation Commission. It is assailed as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of
due process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned, for transgressing the
fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power. The reasons on the said instruction is to prevent fatal or
serious accidents. This was recognized by international bodies such as Vienna Convention on Road Signs and
Signals and the UN. It was then amended enabling motor vehicle owners to purchase EWD anywhere as long as the
standards are there.

President Marcos issued a six-month suspension of said LOI, after which he issued another LOI lifting its
suspension. On August 29, 1978, Land Transportation Commissioner Romeo Edu issued Memorandum Circular No.
32, which contained LTC Administrative Order No. 1 or the rules and regulations in the implementation of LOI No. 229
as amended.

ISSUE:

Whether or not LOI No. 229 as amended violated the constitutional provision on undue delegation of power.

HELD:

No, the Court ruled that LOI No. 229 as amended falls within the State's police power, and President Marcos'
issuance of the same was clearly an exercise of such power. The intent of the law can be clearly seen in the
WHEREASes of the assailed LOI (to prevent accidents, safeguard the safety of the public, and adhere to the State's
commitment to public international law). The Court later went on a lengthy discourse in defining what police power is:

"Nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty." (Chief Justice Taney, US
Supreme Court Chief Justice, 1847)

"The State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare. Persons and property could thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
achieve the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State." (Calalang v. Williams)

"The power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people." (Primicias v. Fugoso)

"Inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and
welfare of society." (Justice Malcolm)

"The totality of legislative power." (Morfe v. Mutuc)

"A dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in
organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare."
 CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY vs. HON. JUDGE
VICENTE G. ERICTA

1987 Constitution Art III, Sec. 9: Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

Local Governments; Constitutional Law; An ordinance of Quezon City requiring memorial park operators to set
aside at least six percent (6%) of their cemetery for charity burial of deceased persons is not a valid exercise of police
power, and one that constitute taking of property without just compensation.—There is no reasonable relation between
the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The
ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who
are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city
passes the burden to private cemeteries. (The end does not justify the means)
FACTS: An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation ofestablishment of private
cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private memorial park shall be set
aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a
private memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it
cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. It also
contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police
power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the public.

ISSUE: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?

RULING: No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The ordinace is
actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges
of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaing a public cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of
expropriation requires payment of just compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the
property with just compensation or due process, would amount to unjust taking of a real property. Since the property
that is needed to be taken will be used for the public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will come
forward and not the police power of the state.

YNOT VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

GR NO. L-74457 MARCH 20, 1987

The ban on slaughter of carabaos is directly related to public welfare.—In the light of the tests mentioned above,
we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the
public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also
reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again
following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they
are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the
executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.

The ban on the transportation of carabaos from one province to another (E.O. 626-A), their confiscation and
disposal without a prior court hearing is violative of due process for lack of reasonable connection between
the means employed and the purpose to be achieved and for being confiscatory.—But while conceding that the
amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty
that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the
original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on
their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef
shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable
connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is
missing.

FACTS: Pres. Marcos issued EO 626-A to strengthen EO 626, which prohibits the interprovincial movement of
carabaos. Ynot transported 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by the
police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. Ynot sued for recovery, and the Iloilo’s RTC issued a writ of
replevin.
 After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation. The court also declined to rule
on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for 1) lack of authority and 2) EO’s presumed
validity.

ISSUE: WON, EO 626-A is constitutional.

RULING: NO. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the
inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will
not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly
observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were
returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00.
The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying
due process.

TIO VS VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

GR NO L-75697 18 JUNE 1987

Same; Same; Same; Tax imposed under the Decree is not harsh; oppressive, confiscatory and in restraint of
trade but regulatory and a revenue measure; The levy is for a public purpose.—Petitioner also submits that the
thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is harsh and oppressive, confiscatory, and in restraint of trade. However, it is beyond
serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely
deters the activities taxed. The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the
courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of
the authority which exercises it. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a
sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation. The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a
regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of
around P600 million per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional
source of revenue. It is an end-user tax, imposed on retailers for every videogram they make available for public
viewing, It is similar to the 30% amusement tax imposed or borne by the movie industry which the theater-owners pay
to the government, but which is passed on to the entire cost of the admission ticket, thus shifting the tax burden on the
buying or the viewing public. It is a tax that is imposed uniformly on all videogram operators. The levy of the 30% tax is
for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly
because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of
pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax
remains a valid imposition.

Same; Same; Same; Same; PD 1987 not an undue delegation of legislative power.—Neither can it be
successfully argued that the DECREE contains an undue delegation of legislative power. The grant in Section 11 of
the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to “solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and Units of the government
and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement
functions for the Board” is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion
as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. “The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make
the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its
execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection
can be made.” Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for
a “fixed and limited period” with the deputized agencies concerned being “subject to the direction and control of the
BOARD.” That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the
DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy
in law.

FACTS: Petition assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram
Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred to
as the BOARD). A month after the promulgation of the abovementioned decree, Presidential Decree No. 1994
amended the National Internal Revenue Code providing for an annual tax on processed video-tape cassette and a
sales tax on blank video tapes.

Petitioner alleges that taxes are excessive and confiscatory, there is over-regulation of the industry, undue delegation
of authority and there is no legal or factual basis for the exercise of Presidential decree.

ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1987 is unconstitutional?

RULING: NO. Presidential Decree No. 1987 is not unconstitutional. Tax does not cease to be valid merely because it
regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. The power to impose taxes is a sovereign right
and it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation. The tax imposed by the
decree is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure. The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the
motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one industry over another. Decree of authority to
the Board is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its
execution, enforcement, and implementation. Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action
taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid.

REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI

58 SCRA 336, NO. L-20620 AUGUST 15, 1974

Eminent domain; “Taking” of property; Elements of.—A number of circumstances must be present in the “taking”
of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into
private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or
color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Same; Same; Mere notice of intention to expropriate cannot bind landowner; Expropriate must be commenced
in court.—It might really have been the intention of the Republic to expropriate the lands at some future time, but
certainly mere notice—much less an implied notice—of such intention on the part of the Republic to expropriate the
lands in the future did not, and could not, bind the landowner, nor bind the land itself. The expropriation must be
actually commenced in court.

Same; Just compensation; Value of property expropriated determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint.—Under section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the “just compensation” is to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint. When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent
domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing
of the complaint.

FACTS: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement
over a land in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to terminate the lease in
1956, the AFP refused because of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were
erected and already established on the property. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In
1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question.

ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied the
property as lesse.

HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.

The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more than a momentary
period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or
injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
thereof.

In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the property under a
contract of lease. The requisites for taking are:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;
4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial
enjoyment of the property.

Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for purposes of
eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the republic commenced to occupy the
property as lessee thereof.

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY VS. REYES

123 SCRA 245, NO. L-49439 JUNE 29, 1983

Same; Property; Expropriation; There being no question raised as to the validity of P.D. 757, P.D. 42, P.D. 464
and P.D. 1224. The respondent judge should have followed the rule of valuation stated on matters of just
compensation in expropriation cases, that the lower value made by the landowner should be the basis for
fixing said just price.—In view of the urgency of the housing problem the various decrees mentioned earlier were
issued for the purpose of assuring that the government would be in a financial position to cope with such basic human
need which in the Philippines, under the welfare state concept, and according to the express language of the
Constitution, is an obligation cast upon the State. The memorandum for petitioner submitted by Government Corporate
Counsel, now likewise the Presidential Legal Assistant, Justice Manuel M. Lazaro, pursues the matter further in prose
impressed with force and clarity: ‘The issue in this petition for certiorari and mandamus involves the application of a
rule introduced by P.D. No. 76 and reiterated in subsequent decrees that not only promotes social justice but also
ends the baneful and one-sided practice abetted by the collusive acquiescence of government officials and
employees, of underdeclaring properties for the purpose of taxation but ballooning the price thereof when the same
properties are to be acquired by the government for public purposes. Put to the test, therefore, is the power of the
government to introduce rationality in the laws and to discourage a deceitful practice that is not only ruinous to the
government coffers but also undermines its efforts at awakening a democratic responsiveness of the citizenry toward
good government and its economic and social programs. The courts should recognize that the rule introduced by P.D.
No. 76 and reiterated in subsequent decrees does not upset the established concepts of justice or the constitutional
provision on just compensation for, precisely, the owner is allowed to make his own valuation of his property.”

FACTS: The undisputed fact against respondent Judge for failure to comply with the provision of the Presidential
Decrees as to the amount to be paid by petitioner to entitle it to a writ of possession in an expropriation proceeding, no
question was raised as to their validity, calls for the grant of the remedy sought. The controversy started with the filing
of a complaint with the then Court of Agrarian Relations, Seventh Regional District, Branch II, Cavite City, against
private respondents, for the expropriation, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 757, of a parcel of land, with an area of
25,000 square meters, owned and registered in the name of respondent Quirino Austria, and needed for the
expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project. Then came from petitioner about a year later, a motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession. Petitioner was able to secure an order placing it in possession. Thereafter, private
respondent Quirino Austria filed a Motion to Withdraw Deposit in the amount of P6,600.00, a sum which was
equivalent to the value of the property assessed for taxation purposes and which was deposited by petitioner pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 42. There was an Opposition to the Motion to Withdraw Deposit by petitioner, citing Section
92 of Presidential Decree No. 464.
Petitioner's submission is that the owner's declaration at P1,400.00 which is lower than the assessor's
assessment, is the just compensation for the respondents' property, respondents thus being precluded from
withdrawing any amount more than P1,400.00. Respondent Judge, however, issued an order dated July 13, 1978
which, according to petitioner, is clearly contrary to the letter and spirit of the aforecited laws.
There was a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 21, 1978. Its basis is the provision in Presidential Decree
No. 1224: "In the determination of just compensation for such private lands and improvement to be expropriated, the
government shall choose between the value of the real property and improvements thereon as declared by the owner
or administrator thereof or the market value determined by the City or provincial assessor, whichever is lower, at the
time of the filing of the expropriation complaint." It was then submitted that under the aforequoted statutory provision,
the owner's declared market value at P1,400.00 which is lower than that fixed by the assessor is the just
compensation of respondent Quirino Austria's property sought to be expropriated. The motion for reconsideration was
denied for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was just compensation.

RULING: The issue in this petition for certiorari and mandamus involves the application of a rule introduced by P.D.
No. 76 and reiterated in subsequent decrees that not only promotes social justice but also ends the one-sided practice
supported by the conniving consent of government officials and employees, of under declaring properties for the
purpose of taxation but ballooning the price thereof when the same properties are to be acquired by the government
for public purposes. Put to test is the power of the government to introduce rationality in the laws and to discourage a
deceitful practice that is not only damaging to the government officers but also undermines its effort at awakening a
democratic responsiveness of the citizenry toward good government and its economic and social programs. The
courts should recognize that the rule introduced by P.D. 76 and reiterated in subsequent decrees does not upset the
established concepts of justice or the constitutional provision on just compensation for, precisely, the owner is allowed
to make his own valuation of his property. The writ of certiorari is granted and the order of respondent judge of July 13,
1978 is hereby nullified and set aside.

MATAAS NA LUPA TENANTS ASSOC., INC. VS. DIMAYUGA

130 SCRA 30, NO. L-32049 JUNE 25, 1984

Constitutional Law; Property; Urban Land Reform; Leases; Under R.A. 1162, as amended by R.A. 2342 and
3516, tenants have a preferential right to buy the lands they are renting within Metro Manila, provided there are at
least 40 tenants, regardless of non-expropriability or size of the land in question.—The provision clearly defines the
preferential right of herein petitioners to buy the parcel of land. It should be noted that respondent Vda. de Gabriel
voluntarily sold the land to respondent Dimayuga without informing the petitioners of the transaction. Respondent Vda.
de Gabriel did not give the first offer to petitioners who were then tenants-lessees and who would have either accepted
or refused to buy the land in a public document. The fact is that on discovery of the sale to respondent Dimayuga,
petitioners filed their original claim for preferential rights eight months after the clandestine sale. Thus, the condition
set forth in the aforesaid proviso—that of offering first the sale of the land to petitioners and the latter’s renunciation in
a public instrument—were not met when the land was sold to respondent Dimayuga. Evidently, said sale was made
illegally and, therefore, void. Petitioners have still the first option to buy the land as provided for in the above provision.

FACTS: On January 17, 1969, petitioners filed a complaint for the exercise of preferential rights with the then Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch IV. The said complaint alleged that petitioner association has for its members Nicolas
Aglabay, et al., which members are heads of 110 tenant families, and who have been, for more than ten years prior to
1959, occupants of a parcel of land (with their 110 houses built thereon), formerly owned by the respondent, Juliana
Diez Vda. de Gabriel, to whom petitioners have been paying rents for the lease thereof, but who, on May 14, 1968,
without notice to petitioners, sold the same to respondent Carlos Dimayuga, who, in turn, mortgaged the same to her
for the balance of the purchase price; that according to Republic Act 1162, as amended by Republic Act 2342, a
parcel of land in Manila and suburbs, with at least fifty (50) houses of tenants erected thereon and actually leased to
said tenants for at least ten (10) years prior to June 20, 1959, may not be sold by the landowner to any person other
than such tenants, unless the latter renounced their rights in a public instrument; that without said tenants-appellants
having renounced their preferential rights in public instrument, respondent Vda. de Gabriel sold the land to respondent
Dimayuga; that petitioners-tenants are willing to purchase said land at the same price and on the same terms and
conditions observed in the contract of sale with respondent Dimayuga; and that since aforesaid contract of sale is
expressly prohibited by law, the same is null and void, while it is mandatory for respondent Vda. de Gabriel to execute
such sale to petitioners, Petitioners therefore prayed that said contract of sale be declared void, and that respondent
Vda. de Gabriel be ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of petitioners at the same price and conditions followed
in the contract with respondent Dimayuga, plus attorney's fees and damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have the pre-emptive or preferential rights to buy the land in question.

RULING: This preferential right of petitioners and the power of eminent domain have been further mandated,
strengthened and expanded by recent developments in law and jurisprudence. Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation (Sec. 2 Art. IV). The state shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity,
welfare, and security of the people. Toward this end, the state shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits (Sec. 6 Art. 11).
P.D. No. 1517 was enacted and Proclamation No. 1967 as an Implementing law, undoubtedly adopts and
crystallizes the greater number of people when it speaks of tenants and residents in declared urban land reform zones
or areas without any mention of the land area covered by such zones. The focus is on people who would stand to
benefit and not on the size of the land involved. The 110 tenant-families have been vested with the right of first refusal
to purchase the land in question within a reasonable time and reasonable prices, subject to Ministry of Human
Settlements rules and regulations. The Oct. 30, 1969 order is set aside and the Ministry of Human Settlements is
hereby directed to facilitate administer the implementation of the rights of petitioners.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
175 SCRA 343, G.R. NO. 78742, G.R. NO. 79310, G.R. NO. 79744, G.R. NO. 79777 JULY 14, 1989

Same; Same; Same; Eminent Domain; Police Power; Property condemned under Police Power is
noxious or intended for a noxious purpose is not compensable.—There are traditional distinctions between the
police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time
on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, for example, where a law required the transfer of all
municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the
power being exercised was eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome and intended for a public
use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on
the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be
destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of
property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Cases at bar: The extent, retention limits, police power, deprivation,
excess of the maximum area under power of eminent domain.—The cases before us present no knotty
complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under
challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of
private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a
taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking
contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the
physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary.
This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.

FACTS: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious challenges to the
constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O.
No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657. G.R. No. 79777. The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229
on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no
private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
G.R. No. 79310 .This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They
contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with
money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
G.R. No. 79744. The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional provision
that no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.
G.R. No. 78742. Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the
above-quoted decree.

ISSUE: Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain

RULING: There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically
preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. Property condemned under the police
power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be
demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The
confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which
requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is
concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is
an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to
carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of
the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just
compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is
the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the
owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of
eminent domain