CONTEMPT executory unless otherwise restrained by a court

of competent jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 129521 September 7, 1999
SO ORDERED.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION CHAIRMAN
PERFECTO R. YASAY, JR., ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONERS FE EDSA, Greenhills,
ELOISA C. GLORIA, EDIJER MARTINEZ and ROSALINDA U. Mandaluyong City.
CASIGURAN, petitioners,
vs.
(s/t) PERFECTO R. YASAY, JR.
MANUEL D. RECTO, PELAGIO T. RICALDE and CESAR P.
MANALAYSAY, respondents.
Chairman
 PARDO, J.:
(s/t) FE ELOISA C. GLORIA
The case before the Court is an appeal from a decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 setting aside the order of the Securities and Exchange Associate Commissioner
Commission
(SEC) 2 declaring respondents guilty of contempt for disobeying a (s/t) EDIJER A. MARTINEZ
temporary restraining order issued to respondents to desist from
holding a stockholders meeting of the Interport Resources Corporation.
Associate Commissioner4
The facts are as follows:
In due time, respondents appealed from the aforesaid order to the
Court of Appeals.
On June 28, 1996, SEC Chairman Yasay upon request of certain
stockholders of Interport Resources Corporation, directed respondent
Ricalde to submit to the SEC a list of stockholders and to set a definite After due proceedings, on April 14, 1997, the Court of Appeals
time and place for the validation of proxies and nominations for promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the SEC order
directors of the firm. declaring respondents guilty of contempt. The dispositive portion
reads:
On the same date, June 28, 1996, the SEC issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) enjoining the Interport Resources Corporation WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents'
from holding the July 9, 1996 scheduled annual meeting of the Order dated July 15, 1996, is hereby REVERSED
stockholders. and SET ASIDE.

Notwithstanding the SEC's TRO, the stockholders proceeded with the The cash bond of P50,000.00 may be withdrawn
meeting on July 9, 1996, presided over by respondent Manalaysay. by petitioners.

On July 10, 1996, the SEC declared the stockholders meeting of SO ORDERED.
Interport Resources Corporation held on July 9, 1996, null and void
and directed respondents to appear before the SEC on July 15, 1996, (s/t) ARTEMIO G. TUQUERO
at 3:00 p.m., to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them or why they should not be cited in contempt.
Associate Justice

At the hearing on July 15, 1996, respondent Manalaysay questioned

the validity of the TRO as well as the contempt proceedings in light of (s/t) ARTEMON D. LUNA
the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals restraining the SEC from
enforcing its TRO. 3 Associate Justice

After the hearing, on July 15, 1996, the SEC issued an order stating: (s/t) HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA

xxx xxx xxx Associate Justice 5

VIEWED in this light Atty. Cesar Manalaysay,
Manuel D. Recto and Atty. Pelagio T. Ricalde are
hereby DECLARED GUILTY OF CONTEMPT and are
correspondingly ORDERED to pay a fine of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) Pesos each upon finality
of this Order for willfully disobeying and
disregarding the July 8, 1996 Order of this
Commission. Atty. Cesar Manalaysay is likewise
BARRED from practicing his law profession before
this commission for a period of sixty (60) days
from date hereof and Mr. Recto and Atty. Ricalde
are, by this ORDER, prohibited and barred from
acting as President/Chairman and Secretary
respectively of Interport Resources, Inc. within the
same period. This Order shall be immediately
On May 2, 1997, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision. However, on June 11, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion.
Hence, this appeal.
On September 10, 1997, the Court required respondents to comment
on the petition within ten (10) days from notice. 6 On October 7, 1997,
respondents filed their comment. 7 In the main, respondents submit
that contempt is criminal in character and their exoneration from a
charge of contempt amounts to an acquittal from which an appeal
would not lie. 8
At issue in this petition is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred, as
a matter of law, in setting aside the order of the SEC finding

1
respondents guilty of contempt for disobeying its temporary restraining
order to desist from holding the annual stockholders meeting of the
Interport Resources Corporation scheduled on July 9, 1996.
We agree with respondents that the charge of contempt partakes of
the nature of a criminal offense. 9 The exoneration of the contemner
from the charge amounts to an acquittal from which an appeal would
not lie.
A distinction is made between a civil and criminal contempt. Civil
contempt is the failure to do something ordered by a court to be done
for the benefit of a party. A criminal contempt is any conduct directed
against the authority or dignity of the court. 10
Petitioners argue that the contempt committed by respondents was
civil in nature, as the temporary restraining order the SEC issued was
for the benefit of a party to a case. The contention is untenable.
"Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil
in their nature; that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of
some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the
thing required." 11 "In general, civil contempt proceedings should be
instituted by an aggrieved party, or his successor, or someone who
has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected." 12 If the
contempt is initiated by the court or tribunal exercising the power to
punish a given contempt, it is criminal in nature, and the proceedings
are to be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules
applicable to criminal cases. The State is the real prosecutor. 13
"The real character of the proceedings in contempt cases is to be
determined by the relief sought or by the dominant purpose. The
proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is
primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily
compensatory or remedial." 14
"But whether the first or the second, contempt is still a criminal
proceeding in which acquittal, for instance, is a bar to a second
prosecution. The distinction is for the purpose only of determining the
character of punishment to be administered." 15
In this case, the contempt is not civil in nature, but criminal, imposed
to vindicate the dignity and power of the Commission; hence, as in
criminal proceedings, an appeal would not lie from the order of
dismissal of, or an exoneration from, a charge of contempt." 16
At any rate, the SEC order directing respondents to show cause why
they should not be cited in contempt was highly improper. The Court
of Appeals issued on July 8, 1996, a temporary restraining order
against the order of the SEC of June 28, 1996 directing the Interport
Resources Corporation to desist from holding the stockholders'
meeting on July 9, 1996. Contrary to the view of petitioners, the effect
of the temporary restraining order of the Court of Appeals directing the
SEC to desist from enforcing its own TRO was to allow such meeting to
proceed as scheduled. More, the Court of Appeals in its final decision
nullified the SEC's order. 17 Hence, there was no willful disobedience to
a lawful order of the SEC. Respondents were not guilty of contempt.
While the SEC is vested with the power to punish for contempt, 18 the
salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be
exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, 19 and on the
corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. 20 The courts and
other tribunals vested with the power of contempt must exercise the
power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal,
because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as
persons but for the functions that they exercise. 21
In this case, the SEC issued the citation for contempt sua sponte.
There was no charge filed by a private party aggrieved by the acts of
respondents. Strictly speaking, there was no disobedience to the SEC's
temporary restraining order. The Court of Appeals enjoined that order.
2
Consequently, respondents' act in proceeding with the scheduled
stock-holders' meeting was not contumacious as there was no willful
disobedience to an order of the SEC. 22 The disobedience which the
law punishes as constructive contempt implies willfulness. For, at
bottom, contempt is a willful disregard or disobedience. 23
The SEC was rather hasty in asserting its power to punish for
contempt. The chairman and commissioners of the SEC must exercise
the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-
restraint. 24
Finally, the penalty imposed exceeded those authorized in the powers
of the SEC 25 in relation to the 1964 Revised Rules of Court as
amended. 26 If the contempt was committed against a superior court
or judge, the accused may be fined not exceeding thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000.00) or imprisoned not more than six (6) months, or
both. The SEC suspended respondent Manalaysay from the practice of
law in the SEC, a power vested exclusively in the Supreme Court. 27
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition for review
on certiorari and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in GA-
G.R. SP No. 41400, promulgated on April 14, 1997.1âwphi1.nêt
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1771             May 27, 2004
(Formerly A.M. OCA-IPI No. 99-842-RTJ)
SALVADOR SISON, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., Presiding Judge, and TEODORO
S. ALVAREZ, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City,
Branch 253, respondents,
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant administrative complaint arose when Salvador Sison, a
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) traffic enforcer,
filed a verified Complaint 1 dated October 12, 1999, charging Judge
Jose F. Caoibes, Jr. and Sheriff Teodoro Alvarez of the Regional Trial
Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 253, with grave abuse of authority.
In turn, the complaint stemmed from an Order2 dated September 15,
1999 in Criminal Case No. 99-0023 which the respondent judge issued,
requiring the complainant to appear before him to explain a traffic
incident involving his son and the complainant. The said Order reads,
thus:
Per information from the authorized driver of the Presiding
Judge of this Court on September 8, 1999, at about 3:00
o’clock in the afternoon of said date, said authorized driver,
while on board the official car of the undersigned on an
official errand was flagged by the accused along the Epifanio
delos Santos Avenue while he was positioning the car he
was driving to the right lane as he was then to make a right
turn; that after he stopped, he was told by the accused that
swerving to the right lane was prohibited when it appeared
that the sign therefore was still far off and not readily visible
to the naked eye; that nonetheless, he introduced himself as
the authorized driver of the undersigned, his son in fact, and
showed to the accused the calling card of the undersigned
with a notation in (sic) the dorsal portion thereof introducing
the bearer of the card and requesting for assistance from
law enforcers, and accordingly begged that he be allowed to
proceed on his way considering that there was no danger to
 limb, life and property occasioned by his alleged traffic
violation; that notwithstanding such introduction and plea,
the accused confiscated the driver’s license of the authorized
driver, even bragging in the process that he did the same to
somebody who introduced himself as a lawyer the day
before.
The aforementioned actuation of the accused, if true, is not
only indicative of his arrogance and deliberate disregard of
the usual respect, courtesy and accommodation accorded to
a court of law and/or its representative but is one
constitutive of indirect contempt under Section 3,
paragraphs (c) and (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
specially considering that the authorized driver of the
Presiding Judge of this Court was then on official errand.
WHEREFORE, within a non-extendible period of twenty-four
(24) hours from receipt hereof, the accused is ordered to
show cause why he should not be cited as in contempt of
court and dealt with accordingly. The Branch Sheriff of this
Court is authorized and ordered to serve a copy of this Order
upon the accused immediately and to make a return of his
proceedings thereon. After receipt of this Order, the accused
is ordered to personally file his comment in Court, within the
period allowed him herein.
SO ORDERED.4
Because of the complainant’s failure to appear before the respondent
judge as directed, the latter, after verifying that the said order was
duly served on the complainant, issued another Order5 dated
September 22, 1999 for the complainant’s arrest and commitment, and
for the latter to appear for hearing before his sala on September 29,
1999. The respondent sheriff then served the order on the
complainant. On the scheduled hearing, the complainant appeared and
executed an affidavit 6 admitting to the court that he made a mistake
and that it was all a misunderstanding. The respondent judge,
thereafter, lifted the September 22, 1999 Order.7
In his complaint, the complainant alleged inter alia the following:
6. That on September 28, 1999, at around 6:00 P.M., the
undersigned complainant was greatly surprised when
respondent TEODORO ALVAREZ came and arrested him
without any warrant of arrest, only on orders of the
respondent Judge, and he was ordered to board a motor
vehicle and was brought to the respondent Judge in Las
Piñas City who ordered him detained in the Las Piñas City
Jail. When he was arrested, he was not able to call his family
to inform them where he was because he failed to return
home in the evening;
7. That the next day, September 29, 1999, respondent
Teodoro Alvarez informed him that there will be a hearing of
his indirect contempt charge before the sala of the
respondent Judge in Las Piñas City. During the hearing, the
complainant was made to admit by the respondent Judge
that he made a mistake in apprehending his driver-son[,]
conscious that he committed the gravest abuse of his
authority, and perhaps in anticipation of the legal action the
undersigned complainant may take against him after he is
discharged from detention. Thus, after the complainant
admitted his mistakes under duress, and upon appeal by his
counsel assuring the respondent Judge that the same
incident may not be repeated, the complainant was ordered
discharged from detention at around 3:30 P.M. on
September 29, 1999;
8. That the undersigned complainant did not know of any
offense he had committed, except for his issuing a traffic
violation receipt to the driver-son of the respondent Judge
3
which he is tasked by law to do so for those found violating
traffic rules and regulations;
9. That if the act of issuing a traffic violation receipt for a
traffic violation within the city limits of Mandaluyong City by
the complainant is considered by the respondents as an
offense, then complainant should be tried for the said
offense in Mandaluyong City, and not in Las Piñas City where
the respondent judge has no jurisdiction;
10. That to the ordinary and lowly understanding of the
undersigned complainant, the acts of respondents in
arresting him without any warrant of arrest before a charge
of indirect contempt is heard constitute the gravest ABUSE
OF AUTHORITY ever committed by the respondents; and
11. That the manner the respondents are administering
justice in Las Piñas City is despotic and barbaric in the sense
that they take the law into their own hands without due
regard for the rights of the others.8
The complainant, thus, prayed that the respondents be summarily
dismissed from the service.
In his comment, the respondent judge vehemently denied the
accusations against him, contending that he was merely preserving the
dignity and honor due to the courts of law. The respondent narrated
that on September 8, 1999, he ordered his son, Jose R. Caoibes III, to
go to the Pasig City Regional Trial Court to secure certain records.
While on his way there, he was flagged down by the complainant for
an alleged traffic violation. Caoibes III explained to the complainant
that he was on an errand for his father, the respondent judge, to
which the complainant reportedly uttered, "Walang Judge, Judge
Caoibes sa akin; kahapon nga, abogado ang hinuli ko."
The respondent judge also alleged that he initiated the complaint for
contempt pursuant to the following provisions of the Revised Rules of
Court: a) Section 3(d) and Section 4 of Rule 71; b) Section 5(c) of Rule
135; and, c) the last paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 71.
According to the respondent judge, the complainant’s allegation that
he failed to contact any relative is belied by the fact that during the
hearing of September 29, 1999, the complainant was assisted by Atty.
Eduardo P. Flores of the MMDA, as evidenced by the transcript of
stenographic notes9 taken during the proceedings. The respondent
prayed that the instant complaint be dismissed for lack of legal or
factual basis.
For his part, the respondent sheriff admitted that he personally served
copies of the respondent judge’s orders on the complainant, but
averred that he was merely performing his duties as deputy sheriff of
the court. As such, he did not commit grave abuse of authority in the
performance of his functions.10
Thereafter, the complainant executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay ng
Pagbawi ng Reklamo dated November 26, 2002, where he indicated
that he was no longer interested in pursuing the administrative
complaint against the respondent judge. The complainant recanted his
earlier claim, averring that the respondent judge’s son did not in fact
enter a one-way street and that he was standing by the September 29,
1999 Affidavit he executed during the hearing. He then requested that
his complaint be duly withdrawn.11
Pursuant to the recommendation12 of the Court Administrator, the
Court, in a Resolution13 dated April 2, 2003, resolved to (a) dismiss the
instant administrative complaint against Sheriff Teodoro Alvarez for
lack of merit; and (b) refer the matter against respondent Judge
Caoibes, Jr. to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals for raffle
among the Associate Justices of the Court, and for investigation, report
and recommendation. The case was, thereafter, raffled to Associate
Justice Lucas P. Bersamin. The Investigating Justice, thereafter,
submitted his Sealed Report dated February 26, 2004.
According to the Investigating Justice, although the complainant never
appeared to prove the charges against the respondent judge, the facts
averred in the complaint appear to be substantially correct and true.
Thus, the respondent judge abused his authority to charge and punish
any person for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.14 The Investigating Justice recommended that the
respondent be admonished and warned, pursuant to Section 10(1),
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and Section 11(c) of the same rule.
The respondent judge anchors the justification of his acts against the
complainant on Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, viz:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon
within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the
performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, or judgment of a court, including
the act of a person who, after being dispossessed
or ejected from any real property by the judgment
or process of any court of competent jurisdiction,
enters or attempts or induces another to enter
into or upon such real property, for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession, or in
any manner disturbs the possession given to the
person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with
the processes or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt under section 1 of
this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a
court, and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person
or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of
an order or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the
court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from
holding him in custody pending such proceedings.
Thus, the power to declare a person in contempt of court and in
dealing with him accordingly is an inherent power lodged in courts of
justice, to be used as a means to protect and preserve the dignity of
the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein, and the
administration of justice from callous misbehavior, offensive
personalities, and contumacious refusal to comply with court
orders.15 Indeed, the power of contempt is power assumed by a court
or judge to coerce cooperation and punish disobedience, disrespect or
interference with the court’s orderly process by exacting summary
punishment. The contempt power was given to the courts in trust for
4
the public, by tradition and necessity, in as much as respect for the
courts, which are ordained to administer the laws which are necessary
to the good order of society, is as necessary as respect for the laws
themselves.16 And, as in all other powers of the court, the contempt
power, however plenary it may seem, must be exercised judiciously
and sparingly.17 A judge should never allow himself to be moved by
pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his
duties.18
At first blush, it would seem that the respondent judge was justified in
holding the complainant for contempt, due to the latter’s refusal to
comply with the judge’s Order of September 15, 1999. However, it is
not lost upon this Court that the complainant was not a party to any of
the cases pending before the RTC, Branch 253. What triggered the
contempt charge was, in fact, the traffic violation incident involving the
respondent judge’s son. Furthermore, the record shows that when the
complainant filed his reply to the charge as required by the respondent
judge, the same was refused by some staff member in the
latter’s sala.19
In Cortes v. Bangalan,20 we held that a judge may not hold a party in
contempt of court for expressing concern on the judge’s impartiality
through a motion for voluntary inhibition, even if the latter may have
felt insulted therein. The Court also declared, thus:
…[W]hile the power to punish in contempt is inherent in all
courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to
uphold due administration of justice, judges, however,
should exercise their contempt powers judiciously and
sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of
utilizing their contempt powers for correction and
preservation not for retaliation and vindication.21
We agree with the Investigating Justice when he opined that the
respondent judge should have refrained from ordering the arrest and
detention of the complainant, since the incident involved his own son,
and the matter was very personal to him. The fact that the respondent
judge insisted that the complainant personally file his comment in
court gives rise to doubts as to the motive behind it; as the
Investigating Justice puts it, the requirement of personal filing was
deliberately inserted so that the respondent could confront and harass
the complainant.22
We also agree with the following ruminations of Justice Bersamin:
…[T]he respondent judge obviously resented the refusal of
Sison to let off Caoibes III from the traffic violation
apprehension. The refusal of Sison was apparently
aggravated by the son’s reporting to the father that Sison
had supposedly made the remarks of  Walang judge, judge
Caoibes sa akin; Kahapon nga, abogado ang hinuli ko. …
...
The respondent Judge was not justified to so consider the
act and remarks of Sison as thereby displaying arrogance
towards and deliberate disregard of the usual respect,
courtesy and accommodation due to a court of law and its
representative. First of all, the refusal of Sison and the
supposed remarks should not cause resentment on the part
of the respondent Judge (whom Sison most likely did not yet
know at the time) because he knew, as a public official
himself, that Sison was only doing his duty of enforcing
evenly the particular traffic regulation against swerving into
a one-way street from the wrong direction, regardless of the
office or position of the violator’s father. Secondly, the
respondent Judge should have had the circumspection
expected of him as a judge to realize that the remarks of
Sison were invited by Caoibes III’s attempt to bluffhis way
out of the apprehension because he was the son of an RTC
judge. Hence, the respondent Judge would have no grounds
 to cite Sison for contempt of court. And, thirdly, the
respondent Judge and his son should have challenged the
issuance of the traffic violation receipt pursuant to the
pertinent rules if they did not agree with the basis of the
apprehension and also administratively charged Sison for
any unwarranted act committed. Since neither was done by
them, but, on the contrary, both ultimately accepted the
validity of the apprehension, as borne out by the retrieval of
the driver’s license after September 29, 1999 by paying the
fines corresponding to the traffic violation, then it follows
that the respondent Judge had the consciousness that his
son was at fault, instead of Sison.
…[T]he respondent Judge claimed at the hearing that his
son "was at that time working with (sic) me as my personal
driver;" and that his errand was to secure some papers from
the Regional Trial Court in Pasig City involved in a "personal
case" which the respondent Judge had "filed against a bank
for specific performance and damages, and since I just
suffered a mild stroke at that time, specifically on June 10,
1999, and the incident took place (sic) September, I could
not at that time personally go to Pasig to secure the
documents I needed for the next hearing of the case so I
had to send my son."
The foregoing renders clear that the respondent Judge had
no legitimate basis by which to consider Sison’s
apprehension of his son as indirect contempt. As indicated
earlier, the act complained against must be any of those
specified in Sec. 3, Rule 71, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;
otherwise, there is no contempt of court, which requires that
the person obstructed should be performing a duty
connected with judicial functions. As such, the respondent
Judge acted oppressively and vindictively.
Parenthetically, it is odd that the respondent Judge would
even propose herein that Caoibes III, already 25 years at
the time of the apprehension, was serving his father as the
latter’s personal driver, albeit not officially employed in the
Judiciary. Most likely, therefore, Caoibes III might not be
doing anything for his father at the time of his apprehension
but was in the place for his own purposes.23
The act of a judge in citing a person in contempt of court in a manner
which smacks of retaliation, as in the case at bar, is appalling and
violative of Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates
that "a judge should so behave at all times to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."24 The very
delicate function of administering justice demands that a judge should
conduct himself at all times in a manner which would reasonably merit
the respect and confidence of the people, for he is the visible
representation of the law.25 The irresponsible or improper conduct of
judges erodes public confidence in the judiciary; as such, a judge must
avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof.26
We do not agree, however, that the respondent judge should be
merely reprimanded for his actuations. The Court has not been blind to
the improper use by judges of the erstwhile inherent power of
contempt which, in fine, amounts to grave abuse of authority. The
penalty imposed by the Court in such cases ranges from a fine of
P2,500;27 one month’s salary;28 suspension from the service without
pay for a period of three months;29 and even the ultimate penalty of
dismissal from the service.30
Furthermore, we take judicial notice that the respondent judge was
previously sanctioned by the Court for violating Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, where he was meted a fine of P20,000. 31 He was
found guilty of serious impropriety unbecoming a judge, for delivering
fistic blows on a complainant judge. To our mind, the instant case falls
under "similar conduct," which the Court avowed would be dealt with
more severely if repeated, and of which the respondent was duly
5
warned. The respondent was, likewise, found guilty of gross ignorance
of procedural law and unreasonable delay in the issuance of an order
of execution, where he was meted a fine of P30,000;32 and delay in
resolving a motion to dismiss in a civil case pending before his sala
where he was, likewise, fined P40,000.33
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr.,
Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 253, GUILTY of serious
impropriety unbecoming a judge for violating Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, and is hereby DISMISSED from the service with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government or any of
its instrumentalities including government-owned and controlled
corporations.
This decision is immediately executory. The respondent
is ORDERED to cease and desist from discharging the functions of his
Office. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent’s
personnel records.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150949             June 21, 2007
JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL,* Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. BENJAMIN S. FORMOSO and SPOUSES BENITO SEE and
MARLY SEE, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Decision1 dated September 12, 2001 and Resolution dated November
15, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65652.
The facts are:
On April 15, 1994, Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc. (Sharcons)
bought from Evanswinda Morales a piece of land consisting of 33,130
square meters in Paliparan, Dasmariñas, Cavite. The property is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-278479 issued in
her name by the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City.
Thus, TCT No. T-278479 in Evanswinda’s name was cancelled and in
lieu thereof, TCT No. T-511462 was issued in the name of Sharcons.
However, when the latter’s workers tried to fence and take possession
of the lot, they were prevented by the caretaker of spouses Joseph
and Enriqueta Mapua. The caretaker claimed that spouses Mapua are
the owners of the land. Sharcons verified the status of the title and
found that TCT No. T-107163 was indeed registered in the names of
spouses Mapua as early as July 13, 1979.
On January 25, 2000, Sharcons filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite a complaint for quieting of title,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2035-00. Impleaded as defendants were
spouses Mapua, Evanswinda Morales, and the Register of Deeds of
Trece Martires City.
In their answer, spouses Mapua alleged, among others, that all the
documents relied upon by Sharcons are spurious and falsified.
In the course of the proceedings, or on July 9, 2001, Judge Dolores L.
Español, petitioner, issued an Order stating that Benito See and Marly
See, president and treasurer, respectively, of Sharcons, and its
counsel, Atty. Benjamin Formoso, respondents, have used a spurious
certificate of title and tax declaration when it (Sharcons) filed with the
RTC its complaint for quieting of title. Consequently, petitioner
declared respondents guilty of direct contempt of court and ordered
their confinement for ten (10) days in the municipal jail of Dasmariñas,
Cavite.
Petitioner’s Order is partly reproduced as follows:
From the foregoing circumstances, this Court is of the view
and so holds that the instant case is a callous and blatant
imposition of lies, falsehoods, deceptions, and fraudulent
manipulations, through the extensive use of falsified
documents by the plaintiff corporation and its former
counsel, Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, defendant Evanswinda
C. Morales and even the Geodetic Engineer who connived
with this private group on one hand, and some officials and
employees of the government agencies responsible for the
processing and issuance of spurious or falsified titles, on the
other. Unless these fraudulent operations are put to a
complete and drastic halt, the Courts are at the mercy of
these unscrupulous people for their own personal gain.
Using the presumption that whoever is in possession and
user of falsified document is the forger thereof (Gamido v.
Court of Appeals, 25 SCRA 101 [1995]), let the appropriate
falsification charges be filed against Benito See and Marly
See together with Evanswinda C. Morales. Thus, let a copy
of this Order be forwarded to the National Bureau of
Investigation and the Department of Justice for their
appropriate action. As regards Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso,
let a copy of this Order be forwarded to the Bar Confidant’s
Office, Supreme Court. Manila.
Further, Benito See and Marly See, President and Treasurer
of Sharcons Builders Phils. Inc., respectively, and Atty.
Benjamin S. Formoso, counsel for Sharcons until March 13,
2001, are declared and held in contempt for foisting
falsehoods and using falsified and spurious documents in the
pursuit of their nefarious activities pursuant to the instant
case filed before this Court. Let the corresponding Warrants
of Arrest be issued against the aforesaid respondents who
should serve ten (10) days of detention at the Dasmariñas
Municipal Jail, Cavite.
Likewise, the title issued to Sharcons Builders Philippines,
Inc., under TCT No. T-511462 allegedly issued on November
11, 1994, being spurious, is hereby cancelled, it having been
derived from another spurious title with TCT No. T-278479
allegedly issued to Evanswinda C. Morales on December 29,
1989. The Declaration of Real Property No. 4736 is likewise
hereby cancelled for being spurious. Let a copy of this Order
be forwarded to the Registry of Deeds for its implementation
with respect to the two (2) titles for cancellation and to the
Assessor’s Office of the Municipality of Dasmariñas, Cavite,
to stave off the proliferation of these spurious instruments.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant case is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, whereas, the private
defendant’s counterclaims, which need further
substantiation, are likewise dismissed. However, the said
private defendants are not precluded from pursuing their
rightful course(s) of action in the interest of justice.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner stated that in determining the merits of Sharcons' complaint
for quieting of title, she "stumbled" upon Civil Case No. 623-92 for
cancellation of title and damages filed with the RTC, Branch 20, Imus,
Cavite, presided by then Judge Lucenito N. Tagle.2 Petitioner then took
judicial notice of the judge’s Decision declaring that Sharcons' TCT and
6
other supporting documents are falsified and that respondents are
responsible therefor.
On July 12, 2001, petitioner issued warrants of arrest against
respondents. They were confined in the municipal jail of Dasmariñas,
Cavite. That same day, respondents filed a motion for bail and a
motion to lift the order of arrest. But they were denied outright by
petitioner.
Respondents then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65652. On July 19,
2001, the Court of Appeals granted the petition.
On September 12, 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, finding the instant
petition to be meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED.
Respondent judge’s July 9, 2001 Order, insofar as it declared
herein petitioners in direct contempt and ordered their
incarceration for ten (10) days, as well as the Warrant of
Arrest, dated July 12, 2001, and the Order of Commitment,
dated July 13, 2001, which the respondent judge issued
against the persons of the herein petitioners, are hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Judge Español erred in taking
cognizance of the Decision rendered by then Judge Tagle in Civil Case
No. 623-92 since it was not offered in evidence in Civil Case No. 2035-
00 for quieting of title. Moreover, as the direct contempt of court is
criminal in nature, petitioner should have conducted a hearing. Thus,
she could have determined whether respondents are guilty as charged.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals
denied the same in its Resolution of November 15, 2001.
Hence, this petition.
The basic question before us is whether petitioner erred in ruling that
respondents are guilty of direct contempt of court for using falsified
documents when Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting of title.
The early case of In re Jones3 defined contempt of court as "some act
or conduct which tends to interfere with the business of the court, by a
refusal to obey some lawful order of the court, or some act of
disrespect to the dignity of the court which in some way tends to
interfere with or hamper the orderly proceedings of the court and thus
lessens the general efficiency of the same." It has also been described
as "a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such
conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law
into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigants or their
witnesses during litigation."4 Simply put, it is despising of the
authority, justice, or dignity of the court. 5
The offense of contempt traces its origin to that time in England when
all courts in the realm were but divisions of the Curia Regia, the
supreme court of the monarch, and to scandalize a court was an
affront to the sovereign.6 This concept was adopted by the Americans
and brought to our shores with modifications. In this jurisdiction, it
is now recognized that courts have the inherent power to
punish for contempt on the ground that respect for the courts
guarantees the very stability of the judicial institution. 7 Such
stability is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings,
to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts,
and, consequently, to the very administration of justice.8
Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
 SEC. 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. – A person
guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as
to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same,
including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities
toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a
witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when
lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in
contempt by such court and punished by a fine not
exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial
Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine
not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment, not
exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a lower court.
In Narcida v. Bowen,9 this Court characterized direct contempt as one
done "in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct
the administration of justice." It is a contumacious act done facie
curiae and may be punished summarily without hearing. 10 In other
words, one may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt at the very
moment or at the very instance of the commission of the act of
contumely.
Section 3, Rule 71 of the same Rules states:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon
within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be
heard by himself or by counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of court in the performance of
his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person
who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real
property by the judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces
another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in
any manner disturbs the possession given to the person
adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the
processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court and
acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property
in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process
of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to
prevent the court from issuing process to bring the
respondent into court, or from holding him in custody
pending such proceedings.
Indirect or constructive contempt, in turn, is one perpetrated outside
of the sitting of the court and may include misbehavior of an officer of
a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
7
order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a
court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful interference with the
process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt, or
any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct
or degrade the administration of justice.11
We agree with petitioner that the use of falsified and forged
documents is a contumacious act. However, it constitutes indirect
contempt not direct contempt. Pursuant to the above provision, such
act is an improper conduct which degrades the administration of
justice. In Santos v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI,12 we
ruled that the imputed use of a falsified document, more so where the
falsity of the document is not apparent on its face, merely
constitutes indirect contempt, and as such is subject to such
defenses as the accused may raise in the proper proceedings. Thus,
following Section 3, Rule 71, a contemner may be punished only after
a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity has been given
to the accused to be heard by himself and counsel. 13 Moreover, settled
is the rule that a contempt proceeding is not a civil action, but a
separate proceeding of a criminal nature in which the court exercises
limited jurisdiction.14 Thus, the modes of procedure and the rules of
evidence in contempt proceedings are assimilated as far as practicable
to those adapted to criminal prosecutions.15 Perforce, petitioner judge
erred in declaring summarily that respondents are guilty of direct
contempt and ordering their incarceration. She should have conducted
a hearing with notice to respondents.
Petitioner, in convicting respondents for direct contempt of court, took
judicial notice of the Decision in Civil Case No. 623-92, assigned to
another RTC branch, presided by then Judge Tagle. Section 1, Rule
129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. –  A court shall take
judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political
history, forms of government, and symbols of nationality,
the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the
world and their seals, the political constitution and history of
the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative,
executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the
laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions.
In Gener v. De Leon,16 we held that courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of records of other cases even when
such cases have been tried or pending in the same court. Hence, we
reiterate that petitioner took judicial notice of the Decision rendered by
another RTC branch and on the basis thereof, concluded that
respondents used falsified documents (such as land title and tax
declaration) when Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting. Verily, the
Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that respondents are not guilty of
direct contempt of court.
Meanwhile, the instant petition challenging the Decision of the Court of
Appeals granting the writ of habeas corpus in favor of respondents has
become moot. We recall that respondents were released after posting
the required bail as ordered by the Court of Appeals. A writ of habeas
corpus will not lie on behalf of a person who is not actually restrained
of his liberty. And a person discharged on bail is not restrained of his
liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.17
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65652
are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 205956               February 12, 2014
P/SUPT. HANSEL M. MARANTAN, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO and MONIQUE CU-UNJIENG
LA'O, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition to cite respondents in contempt of Court.
Petitioner P/Supt. Hansel M. Marantan (Marantan) is the respondent in
G.R. No. 199462,1 a petition filed on December 6, 2011, but already
dismissed although the disposition is not yet final. Respondent
Monique Cu-Unjieng La'O (La ‘O) is one of the petitioners in the said
case, while respondent Atty. Jose Manuel Diokno (Atty. Diokno) is her
counsel therein.
G.R. No. 199462 relates to Criminal Case Nos. 146413-PSG, 146414-
PSG and 146415-PSG, entitled "People of the Philippines v. P/SINSP
Hansel M. Marantan, et al.," pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 265 (RTC), where Marantan and his co-accused are
charged with homicide. The criminal cases involve an incident which
transpired on November 7, 2005, where Anton Cu-Unjieng (son of
respondent La’O), Francis Xavier Manzano, and Brian Anthony Dulay,
were shot and killed by police officers in front of the AIC Gold Tower at
Ortigas Center, which incident was captured by a television crew from
UNTV 37 (Ortigas incident).
In G.R. No. 199462, La’O, together with the other petitioners, prayed,
among others, that the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman
downgrading the charges from murder to homicide be annulled and
set aside; that the corresponding informations for homicide be
withdrawn; and that charges for murder be filed.
In the meantime, on January 6, 2013, a shooting incident occurred in
Barangay Lumutan, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon,
where Marantan was the ground commander in a police-military team,
which resulted in the death of thirteen (13) men (Atimonan incident).
This encounter, according to Marantan, elicited much negative
publicity for him.
Marantan alleges that, riding on the unpopularity of the Atimonan
incident, La’O and her counsel, Atty. Diokno, and one Ernesto
Manzano, organized and conducted a televised/radio broadcasted
press conference. During the press conference, they maliciously made
intemperate and unreasonable comments on the conduct of the Court
in handling G.R. No. 199462, as well as contumacious comments on
the merits of the criminal cases before the RTC, branding Marantan
and his co-accused guilty of murder in the Ortigas incident.
On January 29, 2013, this interview was featured in "TV Patrol," an
ABS-CBN news program. Marantan quotes2 a portion of the interview,
as follows:
Atty. Diokno
8
So ang lumabas din sa video that the actual raw footage of the UNTV
is very long. Ang nangyari, you see the police officers may nilalagay
sila sa loob ng sasakyan ng victims na parang pinapalabas nila that
there was a shootout pero ang nangyari na yon e tapos na, patay na.
Ernesto Manzano
Kung sinasabi nilang carnapper dapat huliin nilang buhay yong mga
mahal naming sa buhay and kinasuhan pero ang ginawa nila, sila
mismo na ang nagbigay ng hatol.
Monique Cu-Unjieng La’o
Sinasabi nila na may kinarnap siya, tinutukan ng baril, hindi magagawa
yong kasi kilala ko siya, anak ko yon e x x x he is already so arrogant
because they protected him all these years. They let him get away
with it. So even now, so confident of what he did, I mean confident of
murdering so many innocent individuals.
Atty. Diokno
Despite the overwhelming evidence, however, Supt. Marantan and
company have never been disciplined, suspended or jailed for their
participation in the Ortigas rubout, instead they were commended by
their superiors and some like Marantan were even promoted to our
consternation and disgust. Ang problema po e hangang ngayon, we
filed a Petition in the Supreme Court December 6, 2011, humihingi po
kami noon ng Temporary Restraining Order, etc. – hangang ngayon
wala pa pong action ang Supreme Court yong charge kung tama ba
yong pag charge ng homicide lamang e subalit kitang kita naman na
they were killed indiscriminately and maliciously.
Atty. Diokno
Eight years have passed since our love ones were murdered, but the
policemen who killed them led by Supt. Hansel Marantan the same
man who is involved in the Atimonan killings – still roam free and
remain unpunished. Mr. President, while we are just humble citizens,
we firmly believe that police rub-out will not stop until you personally
intervene.
Ernesto Manzano
Up to this date, we are still praying for justice.
Monique Cu-Unjieng La’o
Ilalaban namin ito no matter what it takes, we have the evidence with
us, I mean everything shows that they were murdered.
(Emphasis supplied by petitioner)
Marantan submits that the respondents violated the sub judice rule,
making them liable for indirect contempt under Section 3(d) of Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, for their contemptuous statements and improper
conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade
the administration of justice. He argues that their pronouncements and
malicious comments delved not only on the supposed inaction of the
Court in resolving the petitions filed, but also on the merits of the
criminal cases before the RTC and prematurely concluded that he and
his co-accused are guilty of murder. It is Maranta’s position that the
press conference was organized by the respondents for the sole
purpose of influencing the decision of the Court in the petition filed
before it and the outcome of the criminal cases before the RTC by
drawing an ostensible parallelism between the Ortigas incident and the
Atimonan incident.
The respondents, in their Comment,3 argue that there was no violation
of the sub judice rule as their statements were legitimate expressions
of their desires, hopes and opinions which were taken out of context
and did not actually impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of
justice in a concrete way; that no criminal intent was shown as the
utterances were not on their face actionable being a fair comment of a
matter of public interest and concern; and that this petition is intended
to stifle legitimate speech.
The petition must fail.
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to
the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue,
influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A
violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under
Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,4 which reads:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.
– x x x a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished
for indirect contempt:
xxx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice[.]
The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in
nature.5 This form of contempt is conduct that is directed against the
dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an
act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the
court into disrepute or disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in
criminal contempt, and no one can be punished for a criminal
contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to
commit it.6
For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really
appear" that such does impede, interfere with and embarrass the
administration of justice.7 What is, thus, sought to be protected is the
all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a
pending case.8 The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that
courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune
from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon
evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts
should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.91âwphi1
The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them
to conduct their business unhampered by publications and comments
which tend to impair the impartiality of their decisions or otherwise
obstruct the administration of justice. As important as the maintenance
of freedom of speech, is the maintenance of the independence of the
Judiciary. The "clear and present danger" rule may serve as an aid in
determining the proper constitutional boundary between these two
rights.10
The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence
of the comment must be "extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high" before an utterance can be punished.
There must exist a clear and present danger that the utterance will
harm the administration of justice. Freedom of speech should not be
impaired through the exercise of the power of contempt of court
unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question make a serious
and imminent threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute
an imminent, not merely a likely, threat.11
The contemptuous statements made by the respondents allegedly
relate to the merits of the case, particularly the guilt of petitioner, and
the conduct of the Court as to its failure to decide G.R. No. 199462.
9
As to the merits, the comments seem to be what the respondents
claim to be an expression of their opinion that their loved ones were
murdered by Marantan. This is merely a reiteration of their position in
G.R. No. 199462, which precisely calls the Court to upgrade the
charges from homicide to murder. The Court detects no malice on the
face of the said statements. The mere restatement of their argument
in their petition cannot actually, or does not even tend to, influence
the Court.
As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the respondents' comments
reveals that they were simply stating that it had not yet resolved their
petition. There was no complaint, express or implied, that an
inordinate amount of time had passed since the petition was filed
without any action from the Court. There appears no attack or insult
on the dignity of the Court either.
"A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional
protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns
a judicial proceeding still pending in the cou1is, upon the theory that in
such a case, it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair
administration of justice."12 By no stretch of the imagination could the
respondents' comments pose a serious and imminent threat to the
administration of justice. No criminal intent to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice can be inferred from the
comments of the respondents.
Freedom of public comment should, in borderline instances, weigh
heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases. 13 The
power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its
nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of
justice.14 In the present case, such necessity is wanting.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182738               February 24, 2014
CAPITOL HILLS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. and PABLO B.
ROMAN, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL O. SANCHEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the March 13, 2008 Decision 1 and April 28,
2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
100911, which affirmed the September 3, 2007 Resolution 3 of the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 226.
The relevant facts are as follows:
On July 1, 2002, respondent Manuel O. Sanchez (respondent), a
stockholder of petitioner Capitol Hills Golf & Country Club, Inc.
(Corporation) filed a petition for the nullification of the annual meeting
of stockholders of May 21, 2002 and the special meeting of
stockholders of April 23, 2002.4 Petitioners, along with their co-
defendants, filed an Answer with Counterclaims5 and, thereafter, a
Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Defendants’ Affirmative
Defenses,6 which was denied on August 9, 2002 7 by Hon. Apolinario D.
Bruselas, Jr., then Presiding Judge of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
93, now a member of the Court of Appeals.
On August 12, 2002, respondent filed a Motion for Production and
Inspection of Documents, which the court granted in an Order dated
September 10, 2002 directing, thus:
On motion of the plaintiff, without objection from the defendants, and
pursuant to Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-
Corporate Controversies, in relation to Rule 27 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the defendants are ordered to produce and make
available for inspection and photocopying by the plaintiff the following
documents:
1. The list of stockholders of record as of March 2002;
2. All proxies, whether validated or not, which have been
received by the defendants;
3. The specimen signatures of all stockholders as contained
in the Stock and Transfer Book or on the stub of the stock
certificate; and
4. The tape recording of the stockholders’ meeting on April
23, 2002 and May 21, 2002.
The production, inspection and photocopying must be undertaken in
the office premises of defendant corporation within reasonable
business hours of a business day before the pre-trial with costs to be
shouldered by the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration9 (MR) of the August 9,
2002 Order, which denied their motion for preliminary hearing.
Subsequently, they filed a Supplement to Defendants’ Motion for
Reconsideration,10 attaching therewith an alleged certification issued
by the National Printing Office to support their contention of lack of
cause of action on the grounds, among others, that the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of
1996, as amended, has not been duly published in accordance with
law and jurisprudence. Pending resolution of the MR, petitioners filed
on January 21, 2003 a Motion for Deferment of Implementation of the
September 10, 2002 Order.11
For his part, respondent, on October 7, 2002, filed an Omnibus Motion
to immediately allow him to inspect and photocopy the documents and
to compel petitioners to deposit with the court the documents subject
of the September 10, 2002 Order.
On December 9, 2002, then Presiding Judge Bruselas issued an
Order12 denying petitioners’ MR of the Order dated August 9, 2002 and
considered respondent’s omnibus motion as a reiteration of his earlier
motion for inspection and production of documents; thus, the
immediate implementation of the September 10, 2002 Order was
simultaneously ordered.
Petitioners elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari
assailing the Orders dated August 9, 2002 and December 9, 2002.
However, the CA denied the same in its Decision dated June 29, 2004.
Petitioners’ MR was likewise denied on November 3, 2004. A petition
for review was filed before this Court, but We denied it per Resolution
dated January 10, 2005.
In the meantime, respondent sought to enforce the September 10,
2002 Order. The supposed inspection on September 30, 2002 was not
held per the trial court’s Order dated September 27, 2002.13 The
January 22, 2003 inspection also did not push through after petitioners
and their co-defendants again moved for its deferment.14 When the
court eventually denied their motion on June 16, 2003, respondent set
the inspection to August 1, 2003.15 On said date, however, Atty. Matias
V. Defensor, then Corporate Secretary of the Corporation, was alleged
10
to be out of town and petitioner Pablo B. Roman, Jr. (Roman)
purported to have shown no willingness to comply with the
directive.16 The matter was reported to the trial court, which merely
noted respondent’s Report and Manifestation.17 On November 3, 2003,
respondent moved for the issuance of an order for immediate
implementation of the September 10, 2002 Order, as reiterated in the
Order dated June 16, 2003, but the court denied the same in its May
24, 2004 Order.18 Respondent’s motion for issuance of writ of
execution suffered the same fate when the trial court denied it on
February 10, 2005.19
When this Court settled petitioners’ challenge to the Orders dated
August 9, 2002 and December 9, 2002, respondent filed a
Manifestation with Omnibus Motion for Clarification and to Resolve
Plaintiff’s Pending Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution and
to Set the Case for Pre-Trial Conference.20 Acting thereon, Judge
Ramon Paul L. Hernando, likewise now a member of the Court of
Appeals, who took over Branch 93 after the appointment of Judge
Bruselas to the CA, issued the July 10, 2006 Order, 21 which directed
the immediate execution of the September 10, 2002 Order, and set the
case for pre-trial.
On February 9, 2007, Judge Hernando issued an Order 22 inhibiting
himself from handling the case in view of his "close friendship relation"
with petitioners’ counsel and ordering the transmittal of the records of
the case to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle to another sala.
The case was subsequently re-raffled to RTC Branch 90 presided by
Judge Reynaldo B. Daway, who likewise voluntarily recused himself
from the case per Order23 dated July 13, 2007. Finally, on July 30,
2007, the case was re-raffled to RTC Branch 226 presided by Judge
Leah S. Domingo Regala.24
On November 28, 2006, the parties agreed to defer the pre-trial
conference until the actual conduct of the inspection of
records/documents on December 12, 2006.25 Before said date,
however, petitioners and their co-defendants moved to hold the
inspection to January 11, 2007, which the court granted.26
During the January 11, 2007 inspection, the only document produced
by the Acting Corporate Secretary, Atty. Antonio V. Meriz, and one of
the staff, Malou Santos, was the Stock and Transfer Book of the
Corporation. They alleged that they could not find from the corporate
records the copies of the proxies submitted by the stockholders,
including the tape recordings taken during the stockholders’ meetings,
and that they needed more time to locate and find the list of
stockholders as of March 2002, which was in the bodega of the
Corporation.27 This prompted respondent to file a Manifestation with
Omnibus Motion praying that an order be issued in accordance with
Section 3, Paragraphs (a) to (d) of Rule 29 of the Rules of Court
(Rules), in relation to Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of
Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act
No. 8799 (Interim Rules).
On September 3, 2007, the trial court issued a Resolution, the
concluding portion of which ordered:
In order to give both the plaintiff and defendants one last chance to
comply with the order dated September 10, 2002, this Court reiterates
the said order:
"On motion of the plaintiff, without objection from the defendants, and
pursuant to Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-
Corporate Controversies[,] in relation to Rule 27 of the 1997 Rule[s] of
Civil Procedure, the defendants are ordered to produce and make
available for inspection and photocopying by the plaintiff the following
documents:
1. The list of stockholders of record as of March 2002;
 2. All proxies, whether validated or not, which have been
received by the defendants;
3. The specimen signatures of all stockholders as contained
in the Stock and Transfer Book or on the stub of the stock
certificate; and
4. The tape recording of the stockholders’ meeting on April
23, 2002 and May 21, 2002.
The production, inspection and photocopying must be undertaken in
the office premises of defendant corporation within reasonable
business hours of a business day before the pre-trial with costs to be
shouldered by the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED."
This Court orders the defendants to strictly comply with this order.
Failure of the defendants to comply with all the requirements of the
order dated September 10, 2002 will result in this court citing all the
defendants in contempt of court. This Court shall order defendants
solidarily to pay a fine of ₱10,000.00 for every day of delay to comply
with the order of September 10, 2002 until the defendants shall have
fully and completely complied with the said order.
Further sanctions shall be meted upon defendants should the Court
find that defendants have been in bad faith in complying with the
order of September 10, 2002 despite the order of this Court.
Both plaintiff and counsel, as well as defendants and counsel, are
therefore ordered to meet on November 13, 2007 at the corporate
offices of defendant firm between 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. so that
faithful compliance with the order of September 10, 2002 may be
done, otherwise, this Court shall allow the plaintiff to present evidence
to prove their prayer in their Manifestation with Omnibus Motion filed
on January 31, 2007 and issue a resolution based on the same
accordingly.
SO ORDERED.28
Petitioners questioned the aforesaid Resolution via Petition for
Certiorari (With Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction).29 In resolving the petition, the CA ruled
that there is no indication that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. According to the
appellate court, the September 3, 2007 Resolution was issued
pursuant to Section 3,30 Rule 3 of the Interim Rules, with the
suppletory application of Section 1,31 Rule 27 of the Rules. It noted
that, except for the sanctions contained therein, the assailed
Resolution merely reiterated the September 10, 2002 Order of Judge
Bruselas, which petitioners did not dispute in accordance with Section
2,32 Rule 3 of the Interim Rules or via petition for certiorari. The CA
further held that petitioners were not denied due process as they were
able to move for a reconsideration of the September 10, 2002 Order,
but not opted to file the same with respect to the September 3, 2007
Resolution.
Anent the argument against the threatened imposition of sanction for
contempt of court and the possible payment of a hefty fine, the CA
opined that the case of Dee v. Securities and Exchange
Commission33 cited by petitioners is inapplicable, since the September
3, 2007 Resolution merely warned petitioners that they would be cited
for contempt and be fined if they fail to comply with the court’s
directive. Moreover, it said that the penalty contained in the
September 3, 2007 Resolution is in accord with Section 4,34 Rule 3 of
the Interim Rules, in relation to Section 3,35 Rule 29 of the Rules.
Petitioners moved to reconsider the CA Decision, but it was denied.36
11
Before Us, petitioners contend that the "threatened imminent action"
by the RTC to penalize them sua sponte or without regard to the
guideline laid down by the Court in Engr. Torcende v. Judge
Sardido37 is not proper and calls for the exercise of Our power of
supervision over the lower courts. Likewise, citing Panaligan v. Judge
Ibay,38 among others, they claim that the threatened citation for
contempt is not in line with the policy that there should be wilfullness
or that the contumacious act be done deliberately in disregard of the
authority of the court.
We deny.
A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a
court39 or commits any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly,
to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice40 may be
punished for indirect contempt. In particular, Section 4, Rule 3 of the
Interim Rules states that, in addition to a possible treatment of a party
as non-suited or as in default, the sanctions prescribed in the Rules for
failure to avail of, or refusal to comply with, the modes of discovery
shall apply. Under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules, if a party or an
officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey an order to
produce any document or other things for inspection, copying, or
photographing or to permit it to be done, the court may make such
orders as are just. The enumeration of options given to the court
under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules is not exclusive, as shown by the
phrase "among others." Thus, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 41 We
said:
To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise
untrammeled and efficacious, the law imposes serious sanctions on the
party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the action or
proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against
the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or
agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses
incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the
matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of
the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party
support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out
pleadings or parts thereof; staying further proceedings.42
If adjudged guilty of indirect contempt, the respondent who committed
it against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank
may be punished with a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos, or
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both.43 In this case, the
threatened sanction of possibly ordering petitioners to solidarily pay a
fine of ₱10,000.00 for every day of delay in complying with the
September 10, 2002 Order is well within the allowable range of
penalty. 
As far as the proceedings for indirect contempt is concerned, the case
of Baculi v. Judge Belen44 is instructive:
x x x Under the Rules of Court, there are two ways of initiating indirect
contempt proceedings: (1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) by a
verified petition.
In the Matter of the Contempt Orders against Lt. Gen. Jose M.
Calimlim and Atty. Domingo A. Doctor, Jr. (Calimlim) clarified the
procedure prescribed for indirect contempt proceedings. We held in
that case:
In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be followed.
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provide the procedure
to be followed in case of indirect contempt. First, there must be an
order requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be
cited for contempt. Second, the respondent must be given the
opportunity to comment on the charge against him. Third, there must
be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge and consider
respondent’s answer. Finally, only if found guilty will respondent be
punished accordingly. (Citations omitted.)
As to the second mode of initiating indirect contempt proceedings, that
is, through a verified petition, the rule is already settled in Regalado v.
Go:
In cases where the court did not initiate the contempt charge, the
Rules prescribe that a verified petition which has complied with the
requirements of initiatory pleadings as outlined in the heretofore
quoted provision of second paragraph, Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court, must be filed.
The Rules itself is explicit on this point:
xxxx
In contempt proceedings, the respondent must be given the right to
defend himself or herself and have a day in court – a basic
requirement of due process. This is especially so in indirect contempt
proceedings, as the court cannot decide them summarily pursuant to
the Rules of Court. As We have stated in Calimlim, in indirect contempt
proceedings, the respondent must be given the opportunity to
comment on the charge against him or her, and there must be a
hearing, and the court must investigate the charge and consider the
respondent’s answer.45

In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced
initiated.1âwphi1 To the Court’s mind, the September 3, 2007
by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true
Resolution could be treated as a mere reiteration of the September 10,
copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full
2002 Order. It is not yet a "judgment or final order of a court in a case
compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil
of indirect contempt" as contemplated under the Rules. The penalty
actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or
mentioned therein only serves as a reminder to caution petitioners of
are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for
the consequence of possible non-observance of the long-overdue order
contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed,
to produce and make available for inspection and photocopying of the
heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders
requested records/documents. In case of another failure or refusal to
the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for
comply with the directive, the court or respondent could formally
joint hearing and decision. (Emphasis added.)
initiate the indirect contempt proceedings pursuant to the mandatory
requirements of the Rules and existing jurisprudence.
Thus, where there is a verified petition to cite someone in contempt of
court, courts have the duty to ensure that all the requirements for
Even if We are to treat the September 3, 2007 Resolution as a
filing initiatory pleadings have been complied with. It behooves them
"judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt," this
too to docket the petition, and to hear and decide it separately from
would still not work to petitioners’ advantage. Section 11, Rule 71 of
the main case, unless the presiding judge orders the consolidation of
the Rules of Court lays down the proper remedy from a judgment in
the contempt proceedings and the main action.
indirect contempt proceedings. It states:

But in indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by the

Sec. 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay.––The
court, the above rules, as clarified in Regalado, do not necessarily
judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt may
apply. First, since the court itself motu proprio initiates the
be appealed to the proper court as in criminal cases. But execution of
proceedings, there can be no verified petition to speak of. Instead, the
the judgment or final order shall not be suspended until a bond is filed
court has the duty to inform the respondent in writing, in accordance
by the person adjudged in contempt, in an amount fixed by the court
with his or her right to due process. This formal charge is done by the
from which the appeal is taken, conditioned that if the appeal be
court in the form of an Order requiring the respondent to explain why
decided against him he will abide by and perform the judgment or final
he or she should not be cited in contempt of court.
order.

In Calimlim, the Judge issued an Order requiring the petitioners to

The recourse provided for in the above-mentioned provision is clear
explain their failure to bring the accused before the RTC for his
enough: the person adjudged in indirect contempt must file an appeal
scheduled arraignment. We held in that case that such Order was not
under Rule 41 (Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts) and post a bond
yet sufficient to initiate the contempt proceedings because it did not
for its suspension pendente lite.46 Obviously, these were not done in
yet amount to a show-cause order directing the petitioners to explain
this case. Instead, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
why they should not be cited in contempt. The formal charge has to be
65 of the Rules and did not post the required bond, effectively making
specific enough to inform the person, against whom contempt
the September 3, 2007 Resolution final and executory.
proceedings are being conducted, that he or she must explain to the
court; otherwise, he or she will be cited in contempt. The Order must
express this in clear and unambiguous language. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The
March 13, 2008 Decision and April 28, 2008 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100911, which affirmed the September 3,
xxxx
2007 Resolution of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 226,
are AFFIRMED.
Second, when the court issues motu proprio a show-cause order, the
duty of the court (1) to docket and (2) to hear and decide the case
SO ORDERED.
separately from the main case does not arise, much less to exercise
the discretion to order the consolidation of the cases. There is no
petition from any party to be docketed, heard and decided separately A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366               February 4, 2015
from the main case precisely because it is the show-cause order that [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ]
initiated the proceedings.
JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant,
What remains in any case, whether the proceedings are initiated by a vs.
verified petition or by the court motu proprio, is the duty of the court JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES, Respondent.
to ensure that the proceedings are conducted respecting the right to
due process of the party being cited in contempt. In both modes of
DECISION
initiating indirect contempt proceedings, if the court deems that the
answer to the contempt charge is satisfactory, the proceedings end.
The court must conduct a hearing, and the court must consider the MENDOZA, J.:
respondent’s answer. Only if found guilty will the respondent be
punished accordingly. For consideration is the Report and Recommendation 1 of Justice Maria
Elisa Sempio Diy (Justice Diy), Court of Appeals, Cebu City, submitted

12
to this Court pursuant to its January 14, 2013 Resolution, 2 referring the
complaint filed by Jill M. Tormis (Jill) against respondent Judge
Meinrado P. Paredes (Judge Paredes), Presiding Judge, Branch 13,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City, for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The Facts
In her Affidavit/Complaint,3 dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged
Judge Paredes with grave misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge
Paredes in Political Law Review during the first semester of school year
2010-2011 at the Southwestern University, Cebu City. She averred that
sometime in August 2010, in his class discussions, Judge Paredes
named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis),then
Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC),Cebu City, as one of the judges involved in the marriage
scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class that
Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and
ignorant of the law.
Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions
not only once but several times. In one session, Judge Paredes was
even said to have included in his discussion Francis Mondragon Tormis
(Francis),son of Judge Tormis, stating that he was a "court-noted
addict."4 She was absent from class at that time, but one of her
classmates who was present, Rhoda L. Litang (Rhoda), informed her
about the inclusion of her brother. To avoid humiliation in school, Jill
decided to drop the class under Judge Paredes and transfer to another
law school in Tacloban City.
Jill also disclosed thatin the case entitled "Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge
Tormis"5 (Lachica v. Tormis), her mother was suspended from the
service for six (6) months for allegedly receiving payment of a cash
bail bond for the temporary release of an accused for the warrant she
had issued in a case then pending before her sala. Judge Paredes was
the one who reviewed the findings conducted therein and he
recommended that the penalty be reduced to severe reprimand.
Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse
than that committed by her mother. She averred that on March 13,
2011, Judge Paredes accepted a cash bail bond in the amount of Six
Thousand Pesos (₱6,000.00) for the temporary release of one Lita
Guioguio in a case entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Lita
Guioguio,"docketed as Criminal Case No. 148434-R,6 then pending
before Branch 8, MTCC, Cebu City (Guioguio case).
Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned
for his actuations.
Comment of Judge Paredes
In his Comment,7 dated October 28, 2011, Judge Paredes denied the
accusations of Jill. He stated thatJudge Tormis had several
administrative cases, some of which he had investigated; that as a
result of the investigations, he recommended sanctionsagainst Judge
Tormis; that Judge Tormis used Jill, her daughter, to get back at him;
that he discussed in his class the case of Lachica v. Tormis, but never
Judge Tormis’ involvement in the marriage scams nor her sanctions as
a result of the investigation conducted by the Court; that he never
personally attacked Judge Tormis’ dignity and credibility; that the
marriage scams in Cebu City constituted a negative experience for all
the judges and should be discussed so that other judges, court
employees and aspiring lawyers would not emulate such misdeeds;
that the marriage scams werealso discussed during meetings of RTC
judges and in schools where remediallaw and legal ethics were taught;
that he talked about past and resolvedcases, but not the negative
tendencies of Judge Tormis; that there was nothing wrong in
discussing the administrative cases involving Judge Tormis because
these cases were known to the legal community and some were even
published in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and other
legal publications; and that when he was the executive judge tasked to
13
investigate Judge Tormis, he told her to mend her ways, butshe
resented his advice.
Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still his student, she
did not complain about or dispute his discussions in class regarding the
administrative liabilities of her mother; that the matter was not also
brought to the attention of the Dean of Southwestern University or of
the local authorities; that he admitted saying that Judge Tormis had a
son named Francis who was a drug addict and thatdrug dependents
had no place in the judiciary; and that he suggested thatFrancis should
be removed from the judiciary.
He denied, however, having stated that Francis was appointed as court
employee as a result of the influence of Judge Tormis. She is not an
influential person and it is the Supreme Court who determines the
persons to be appointed as court employees. JudgeTormis, however,
allowed her drug dependent son to apply for a position in the judiciary.
Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes
admitted that he personally accepted a cash bail bond of 6,000.00 for
the temporary release of Lita Guioguio onMarch 13, 2011. He claimed
though that the approval of the bail bond was in accordance with
Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC which allowed executive
judges to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters on
weekends, official holidays and special days. Judge Paredes explained
that he merely followed the procedure. As Executive Judge, he issued
a temporary receipt and on the following business day, a Monday, he
instructed the Branch Clerk of Court to remit the cash bond to the
Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the
cash bond and issued an official receipt. It was not his fault that the
Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond only in the
afternoon of March 21, 2011.
Lastly, Judge Paredes averred thatthe discussions relative to the
administrative cases of Judge Tormiscould not be the subject of an
administrative complaint because it was not done in the performance
of his judicial duties.
Reply of the Complainant
In her Verified-Reply,8 dated November 23, 2011, Jill countered that
her mother had nothing to do with the filing of the present complaint;
that she was forced to leave her family in Cebu City to continue her
law studies elsewhere because she could no longer bear the
discriminating and judgmental eyes of her classmates brought about
by Judge Paredes’ frequent discussions in class of her mother’s
administrative cases; that her mother was indeed one of the judges
implicated in the marriage scams, but when Judge Paredes discussed
the matter in his classes, the case of her mother was not yet resolved
by the Court and, thus, in 2010, it was still premature; and that Judge
Paredes was aware that administrative cases were confidential in
nature.
Jill claimed that the intention to humiliate her family was evident when
Judge Paredes branded her brother, Francis, as a "drug addict."
Rejoinder of Judge Paredes
In his Rejoinder,9 dated December 2, 2011, Judge Paredes asserted
that it was not premature to discuss the marriage scams in class
because the scandal was already disclosed by Atty. Rullyn Garcia and
was also written in many legal publications, and that the drug
addiction of Francis was known in the Palace of Justice of Cebu City.
In its Report,10 dated September 12, 2012, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) stated that the conflicting allegations by the
parties presented factual issues that could not be resolved based on
the evidence on record then. Considering the gravity and the sensitive
natureof the charges, a full-blown investigation should be conducted
by the CA.
On January 14, 2013, pursuant tothe recommendation of the OCA, the
Court referred the administrative complaint to the Executive Justice of
the CA, Cebu Station, for investigation, report and recommendation
within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records.11
On March 26, 2013, the case was raffled to, and the records were
received by, Justice Diy. Thereafter, the appropriate notices were
issued and the confidential hearings were conducted. Afterwards,
Justice Diy received the respective memoranda of the parties.
In her memorandum,12 Jill contended that Judge Paredes’ act of
discussing Judge Tormis’ cases in class where she was present was an
open display of insensitivity, impropriety and lack of
delicadezabordering on oppressive and abusive conduct, which fell
short of the exacting standards of behavior demanded of magistrates.
She asserted that the defense of Judge Paredes that he could not be
made administratively liable as the act was not made in the
performance of his official duties did not hold water because a judge
should be the embodiment of whatwas just and fair not only in the
performance of his official duties but also in his everyday life.
Jill also averred that Judge Paredes violated the subjudicerule when he
discussed the marriage scam involving Judge Tormis in 2010 because
at that time, the case was still being investigated; that the
administrative case relative to the marriage scam was decided only on
April 2, 2013; that Judge Paredes was not the Executive Judge ofthe
MTCC when he received the cash bail bond in the Guiguiocase; that he
could not prove that the executive judge of the MTCC was unavailable
before accepting the cash bail bond; and that the assertion of Judge
Paredes of his being an anti-corruption judge and a lone nominee of
the IBP Cebu City Chapter to the Foundation of Judicial Excellence did
not exculpate him from committing the acts complained of. In his
Reply-Memorandum,13 Judge Paredes reiterated the allegations
contained in his previous pleadings. He added that the marriage scams
scandalized the Judiciary and became public knowledge when Atty.
Rullyn Garcia of the OCA held a press conference on the matter; that,
hence, every citizen, including him, may comment thereon; that in the
hierarchy of rights, freedom of speech and expression ranked high;
that Judge Tormis never intervened in the present case; that ifhe
indeed made derogatory remarks against Judge Tormis, she should
havefiled a criminal action for oral defamation; and that calling for the
ouster of drug addicts could not be considered an abuse, but was
meant for the protection of the Judiciary.14
In her Report and Recommendation, Justice Diy found Judge Paredes
guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. She opined that his use of
intemperate language during class discussions was inappropriate. His
statements in class, tending to project Judge Tormis as corrupt and
ignorant of the laws and procedure, were obviously and clearly
insensitive and inexcusable.
Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge Paredes that his
discussions of the administrative case of Judge Tormis in class was an
exercise of his right to freedom of expression. She cited the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary15 which urged members
of the Judiciary to be models of propriety at all times. She quoted with
emphasis Section 6 which stated that "Judges, like any other citizen,
are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly,
but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in
such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary."16
Justice Diy likewise rejected Judge Paredes’ position that he could not
be held administratively liable for his comments against Judge Tormis
and Francis as these were uttered while he was not in the exercise of
his judicial functions. Jurisprudence,17 as well as the New Code of
Judicial Conduct, required that he conduct himself beyond reproach,
not only in the discharge of his judicial functions, but also inhis other
professional endeavors and everyday activities.
14
Justice Diy found merit in Jill’s allegation that Judge Paredes violated
the subjudicerule when the latter discussed the marriage scams
involving Judge Tormis in 2010 when the said issue was still being
investigated. She cited, as basis for JudgeParedes’ liability, Section 4,
Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
As regards Judge Paredes’ receipt of the cash bail bond in relation to
the Guioguiocase, Justice Diy absolved him ofany liability as the charge
of grave misconduct was not supported by sufficient evidence. She
accepted Judge Paredes’ explanation that he merely followed the
procedure laid down in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC
when he approved the bail bond.
Based on these findings, Justice Diy came up with the following
recommendations, thus:
The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed Judge Paredes
is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. Conduct unbecoming of a
judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the
Revised Rules of Court, penalized under Section 11 (c) thereof by any
of the following: (1) a Fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not
exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4)
Admonition with warning.
Inasmuch as this is Judge Paredes’ first offense and considering the
factual milieu and the peculiar circumstances attendant thereto, it is
respectfully recommended that Judge Paredes be meted out with the
penalty of REPRIMAND with a warning that a repetition of the same or
a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.18
The Court’s Ruling
The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of Justice Diy
except as to the penalty.
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves
any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the
law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave
misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in
the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully
uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for
another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.19
To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to
and be connected with the performance of his official
duties.20 Considering that the acts complained of, the remarks against
Judge Tormis and Francis, were made by Judge Paredes in his class
discussions, they cannot be considered as "misconduct." They are
simply not related to the discharge of his official functions as a judge.
Thus, Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct, much less
for grave misconduct.
Discussion of a subjudicematter, however, is another thing.
On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 ofthe New Code of Judicial
Conduct provides: CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or
could come before them, make any comment that might reasonably be
expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the
manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment
in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or language befitting a magistrate. Indeed, Judge Paredes demonstrated
issue. (Emphasis supplied) conduct unbecoming of a judge.

The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis,
the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, whose condition and personal circumstances, as properly observed by
influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. 21 The Justice Diy, had no relevance to the topic that was then being
rationale for the rule was spelled out in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. discussed in class, it strongly indicated his intention to taint their
Sanchez,22 where it was stated that it is a traditional conviction of reputations.
civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous
The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was
influence; thatfacts should be decided upon evidence produced in
never denied by Judge Paredes who merely justified his action by
court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced
invoking his right to freedom of expression. Section 6, Canon 4 of the
by bias, prejudice or sympathies.23 Notably, when Judge Paredes
New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other
discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the
citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. Such right, however, is
investigation relative to the said case had not yet been concluded. In
not without limitation. Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code also imposes a
fact, the decision on the case was promulgated by the Court only on
correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of
April 2, 2013.24 In 2010, he still could not make comments on the
expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that
administrative case to prevent any undue influence in its resolution.
preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one of
independence of the Judiciary. In the exercise of his right to freedomof
the judges involved, was in contravention of the subjudicerule. Justice
expression, Judge Paredes should uphold the good image of the
Diy was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge Paredes violated
Judiciary ofwhich he is a part. He should have avoided unnecessary
Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
and uncalled for remarks in his discussions and should have been more
circumspect inhis language. Beinga judge, he is expected to act with
The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of greater circumspection and to speak with self-restraint. Verily, Judge
Judge Paredes for discussing the marriage scams in his classes seemed Paredes fell short of this standard.
noble, his objectives were carried out insensitively and in bad taste.
The pendency of the administrative case of Judge Tormis and the
The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he
publicity of the marriage scams did not give Judge Paredes
cannot be held administratively liable for his negative portrayal of
unrestrained license to criticize Judge Tormis in his class discussions.
Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions. Judge Paredes
The publicity given to the investigation of the said scams and the fact
should be reminded of the ethical conduct expected of him asa judge
that it was widely discussed in legal circles let people expressed critical
not only in the performance of his judicial duties, but in his
opinions on the issue. There was no need for Judge Paredes to "rub
professional and private activities as well. Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of
salt to the wound,"25 as Justice Diy put it.
the Code mandates:

Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary

CANON 2
comments tending to project Judge Tormisas a corrupt and ignorant
INTEGRITY
judge in his class discussions, was correctly found guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge by Justice Dy.
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial
office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
requires judges to exemplify propriety at all times. Canon 4 instructs:
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure thatnot only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
CANON 4
observer.
PROPRIETY

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
xxx
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept
personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular,
judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the
dignity of the judicial office.
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would
preserve the dignity, independence and respect for himself, the Court
and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial
temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. Heshould choose
his words and exercise more caution and control inexpressing himself.
In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.
Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-
tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide
remarks and sarcastic comments. He is required to always be
temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language.26
people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary.1âwphi1 Justice must not
merely be done but must also be seen to be done. (Emphases
supplied)
Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in
or out of the court, should not be tolerated for he is not a judge only
occasionally. It should be emphasized that the Code of Judicial Ethics
mandates that the conduct of a judge mustbe free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial
duties, but also to his behavior outside his salaand as a private
individual. There is no dichotomy of morality, a public official is also
judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order
to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. A judge’s official life
cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence.
Thus, being a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely
and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He should personify judicial
integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of
a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life
should be above suspicion.27

Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio
In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the
case,Justice Diy correctly found that it cannot be regarded as grave
propriety required by the Code and to use temperate and courteous
misconduct. The Court findsmerit in the position of Judge Paredes that

15
the approval, as well as the receipt, ofthe cash bail bond, was in
accordance with the rules. Thus:
Finally, the Investigating Officer disagrees with Jill’s allegation that
Judge Paredes committed grave misconduct when he personally
received cash bailbond in relation to the Guioguio case. Judge Paredes
justified his action by stating that he was merely following the
procedure set forth in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC,
which authorizes executive judges to act on petitions for bail on
Saturdays after 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Sundays, official
holidays, and special days. Said rule also provides that should the
accused deposit cash bail, the executive judge shall acknowledge
receipt of the cash bail bond in writing and issue a temporary receipt
therefor. Considering that Judge Paredes merely followed said
procedure, he cannot beheld administratively liable for his act of
receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case.
Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond
under Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Under said provision, the bail bond may be filed either with
the court where the case is pending, or with any Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of the place of arrest, or with any judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court or the Municipal Trial Court of the place of arrest.
Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that
executive judges are authorized to exercise other powers and
prerogatives which are necessary or incidental to the performance of
their functions in relation to court administration. In the instant case,
Judge Paredes was merely exercising powers incidental to his functions
as anExecutive Judge since he was the only judge available when Lita
Guioguio posted bail. Notably, Lita Guioguio’s payment for cash bail
bond was made on a Sunday. In addition, the judge assignedto the
court where the Guioguio case was then pending and the executive
judge of the MTCC, Cebu City were not available to receive the bail
bond. Judge Paredes was the only judge available since the practice
was for one judge to be present on Saturdays. However, there was no
judge assigned for duty during Sundays.
Relative to the matter above-discussed, the insinuation made by
complainant Jill of any irregularity reflected in the issuance of the two
(2) orders of release of different dates is not backed up by sufficient
evidence.28
Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under
Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and penalized under Section
11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than
₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand;
and (4) Admonition with warning.
Considering that this is the first offense of Judge Paredes, the
appropriate penalty under the circumstances is admonition.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Meinrado P. Paredes, Presiding
Judge of Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge and
ADMONISHES him therefor.
SO ORDERED.
July 26, 2017
G.R. No. 199825
BRO. BERNARD OCA, BRO. DENNIS MAGBANUA, CIRILA N.
MOJICA, ALEJANDRO N. MOJICA, JOSEFINA PASCUAL,
SILVESTRE PASCUAL AND ST. FRANCIS SCHOOL OF GENERAL
TRIAS, CAVITE, INC., Petitioners
vs.
LAURITA CUSTODIO, Respondent
16
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the May 25,
2011 Decision2 and the December 19, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31985. The assailed Decision affirmed
theRegional Trial Court Decision,4 which found petitioners Bro. Bernard
Oca, Bro. Dennis Magbanua, Cirila N. Mojica, Alejandro N. Mojica,
Josefina Pascual, Atty. Silvestre Pascual, and St. Francis School of
General Trias, Cavite, Inc. (petitioners) guilty of Indirect
Contempt.1âwphi1 The assailed Resolution denied petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration.5
This indirect contempt case stemmed from an intra-corporate
controversy among the Board of Trustees of petitioner St. Francis
School of General Trias, Cavite, Inc. (St. Francis School).6
St. Francis School was established with the assistance of the La Salle
brothers on July 9, 1973 by respondent Laurita Custodio (Custodio),
petitioner Cirila N. Mojica (Cirila), petitioner Josefina Pascual
(Josefina), Monsignor Felix Perez, and Brother Vernon Poore.7 These
five (5) incorporators served as St. Francis School's Board of Trustees
until the latter two (2) passed away.8
Without a written agreement, the La Salle brothers agreed to give the
necessary supervision to establish the school's academic foundation.9
On September 8, 1988, the incorporators and the La Salle brothers
formalized their arrangement in a Memorandum of Agreement, under
which De La Salle Greenhills (La Salle) would supervise the academic
affairs of St. Francis School to increase enrollment. La Salle appointed
supervisors to sit in the Board of Trustees without voting rights.10
In 1998, petitioner Bro. Bernard Oca (Bro. Oca) became a member of
St. Francis School as a La Salle-appointed supervisor. He sat in the
Board of Trustees and was later elected as its Chairman and St.
Francis School's President.11 In 2000, petitioner Bro. Dennis Magbanua
(Bro. Magbanua) was also admitted as a La Salle-appointed
supervisor.12 He sat as a trustee and was later elected as Treasurer of
St. Francis School.13
Sometime in August 2001, the members of the Board of Trustees
came into a disagreement regarding the school's administrative
structure and La Salle's supervision over the school. Cirila, Josefina,
Bro. Oca, and Bro. Magbanua wanted to expand the scope of La Salle's
supervision to includematters relating to the school's finances,
administration, and operations.14
This was opposed by Custodio. 15 After several incidents relating to the
disagreement, Custodio filed a complaint against St. Francis School,
Bro. Oca, and Bro. Magbanua on June 7, 2002 with Branch 23,
Regional Trial Court, Trece Martires, Cavite. She alleged that Bro. Oca
and Bro. Magbanua were never qualified to sit in the Board of
Trustees.16 She also prayed for a Temporary Restraining Order to
prevent Bro. Oca from calling a special membership meeting to remove
her from the Board of Trustees.17
This case was dismissed.18 Custodio was subsequently removed from
the Board of Trustees and as Curriculum Administrator.19
Custodio filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal but
eventually withdrew her appeal to file a new suit instead.20
On October 3, 2002, Custodio again filed a complaint against
petitioners for violating the Corporation Code with Branch 21, Regional
Trial Court, Imus, Cavite.21 She sought to disqualify Bro. Oca and Bro.
Magbanua as members and trustees of the school and to declare void
all their acts as President and Treasurer, respectively.22 She likewise
prayed for a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary
injunction to enjoin the remaining board members from holding
meetings and to prevent Bro. Oca and Bro. Magbanua from
discharging their functions as members, trustees, and officers of St.
Francis School.23 This case was docketed as SEC Case No. 024-02.24
On October 8, 2002, the Regional Trial Court heard Custodio's prayer
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.25
The day after the hearing, Custodio filed a Manifestation and Motion
dated October 9, 2002. She alleged that after the hearing for the
Temporary Restraining Order, the counsel for petitioners went to St.
Francis School to instruct several parents not to acknowledge
Custodio's administration as she had been removed as a member,
trustee, and curriculum administrator and that her complaint had been
dismissed. The parents were also allegedly directed to pay the
students' matriculation fees exclusively to petitioner Alejandro N.
Mojica (Alejandro), son of petitioner Cirila. Alejandro held office at the
Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc. which was allegedly owned by the
family of petitioner Josefina.26 This meeting allegedly caused 15
teachers to hold a strike, which nearly disrupted classes and caused
parents to request the early dismissal of their children for fear that
violence would ensue.27 Custodio reiterated her prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order. She moved that the hearing be converted into an
injunction hearing or that a status quo order be issued to allow her to
continue functioning as school director and curriculum administrator.28
Custodio also filed a Motion for Clarification praying that the trial court
clarify to whom the school's fees should be paid while her Complaint
and Manifestation and Motion were still pending. Petitioners allegedly
manifested that the payment of matriculation fees must be made to
Alejandro. However, Custodio pointed out that Alejandro was not the
school cashier and that the Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc. was not
authorized to receive payments for St. Francis School. She also
manifested that prior to October 8, 2002, the school cashier was Ms.
Herminia Reynante (Reynante).29 This Motion was set for hearing on
October 18, 2002.30
On October 21, 2002, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order
designating Reynante to act as school cashier "with authority to collect
all fees" and, together with Custodio, "to pay all accounts."31 The trial
court also directed all parties in the case to submit a report on and to
turn over to Reynante all money previously collected, thus:
Regarding the collection of matriculation fees and other
collectibles, Ms. Herminia Reynante is hereby designated by the Court
to act as cashier of the school to the exclusion of others with authority
to collect all fees and, together with plaintiff Laurita Custodio, to pay
all accounts.  Said authority shall continue until the matter of the
application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
is heard and resolved. This is hereby ordered so that an orderly
operation of the school will be achieved.
Plaintiff and defendants, as well as Mr. Al Mojica, are directed to turn-
over to Ms. Herminia Reynante all money previously collected and to
submit a report on what have been collected, how much, from whom,
and the dates collected  Effective October 22, 2002, Ms. Herminia
Reynante shall submit to the Court, to the plaintiff and to all the
defendants a monthly report of all receivables collected and all
disbursements made.
32
SO ORDERED.  (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that they would
have proven that Reynante lacked the moral integrity to act as court-
appointed cashier had they been given the opportunity to be heard.33
34
On January 3, 2003, the Regional Trial Court denied reconsideration.
17
On February 21, 2003, petitioners filed an Explanation, Manifestation
and Compliance. They alleged that they partially complied with the
October 21, 2002 Order by submitting an accounting on the tuition fee
collections and by turning over to Reynante a manager's check in the
amount of P397,127.64 payable to St. Francis School. 35 The amount
allegedly represented the school's matriculation fees from October to
December 2002.36 However, they alleged that Reynante refused to
accept the check and required that the amount be turned over in cash
or in a check payable to cash. Thus, petitioners placed the check in the
custody of the Regional Trial Court for safekeeping.37
Custodio filed a Comment dated February 26, 2003.38 Custodio
manifested that petitioners did not even substantially comply with the
October 21, 2002 Order because it excluded from its accounting and
turnover the following amounts:
1) ₱4,339,601.54 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No.
239 of the Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc.;
2) ₱5,639,856.11 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No.
459 of the Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc.;
3) ₱92,970.00 representing fees paid by the school canteen;
and
4) All other fees collected from January 2003 to February 19,
2003.39
Custodio also claimed that petitioners violated the trial court order that
only she and Reynante were authorized to pay the outstanding
accounts of St. Francis School. Petitioners allegedly made salary
payments to four (4) employees who had resigned. 40
On March 24, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued another
Order41 directing petitioners to fully comply with its earlier order to
submit a report and to turn over to Reynante all the money they had
collected:
This treats of defendants' explanation, manifestation and compliance
and plaintiff's comments thereto.
A pernsal of the allegations of defendants' pleading shows that they
merely turned-over a manager's check in the amount of ₱397,127.64
representing money collected from the students from October 2002 to
December 2002. The Order of October 21, 2002 directed plaintiff and
defendants, as well as, Mr. Al Mojica to turn-over to Ms. Herminia
Reynante all money previously collected and to submit a report on
what have been collected, how much, from whom and the dates
collected.
Defendants and Mr. Al Mojica are hereby directed, within ten days
from receipt hereof, to submit a report and to turn-over to Ms.
Herminia Reynante all money collected by them, more particularly:
(1) ₱4,339,601.54 deposited in Special Savings
Deposit No. 239 (Rural Bank of Gen. Trias, Inc.);
(2) ₱5,639,856. l 1 deposited in Special Savings
Deposit No. 459 (Rural Bank of Gen. Trias, Inc.);
(3) ₱92,970.00 representing amount paid by the
school canteen;
(4) Other fees collected from January 2003 to
Febrnary 19, 2003; and
 (5) Accounting on how and how much defendants
are paying Ms. Daisy Romero and three (3) other
teachers who already resigned.
SO ORDERED.42
Petitioners filed a Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, Exception
and Motion on April 18, 2003, praying, among others, that the trial
court issue an order excluding from its March 24, 2003 Order the
amounts which were not covered in its October 21, 2002 Order.43
On August 5, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order denying
all motions raised in petitioners' Manifestation, Observation,
Compliance, Exception and Motion and declared that they had not
complied with the March 24, 2003 Order:44
This treats of defendants' manifestation, observation, compliance,
exception and motion dated April 18, 2003, plaintiff's
comment/opposition and defendants' rejoinder thereto filed on July 2,
2003.
Defendants are asking the Court first to set aside its orders dated
October 21[, 2002] and March 24, 2003 for having been issued
"without notice and hearing" and in "acting without or in excess of its
authority/jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction" ...
With respect to the first matter, the motion is denied for being a
prohibited pleading under Section 8 of the Interim Rules of Procedure
for Intra-Corporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC). The motion
which assails the two questioned orders is actually a motion for
reconsideration but worded differently - "motion to set aside March 24,
2003 Order" but both have the same purpose and objective and that is
to reconsider the order(s).
....
On the contrary, the court found out that defendants have not
complied with the order of the court dated March 24, 2003 directing
defendants and Mr. Al Mojica to submit a report and to turn over to
Ms. Herminia Reynante all money collected by them, more particularly:
1. ₱4,339,601.54 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 239 (Rural
Bank of Gen. Trias, Inc.)
2. ₱5,639,856.11 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 459 (Rural
Bank of Gen. Trias, Inc.)
3. ₱92,970.00 representing amount paid by the school canteen.
4. Other fees collected from January 2003 to February 19, 2003.
5. Accounting on how and how much defendants are paying Ms. Daisy
Romero and the three (3) other teachers who already resigned.
Accordingly, the defendants and Mr. Al Mojica are hereby directed to
comply with the aforementioned order of March 24, 2003, within ten
days from receipt hereof.
....
SO ORDERED.45
In the meantime, La Salle served Custodio a notice dated January 4,
2003, that they were terminating the Memorandum of Agreement with
St. Francis School.46
18
On August 21, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order granting
Custodio's Manifestation and Motion dated October 9, 2002 and issuing
a status quo order47 allowing Custodio to discharge her functions as
school director and curriculum administrator.48 The trial court ruled in
favor of Custodio when it found that petitioners had already
established another school, the Academy of St. John (Academy of St.
John) in Sta. Clara, General Trias, Cavite:49
This treats of plaintiff's manifestation and motion praying that the
court "immediately issue a temporary restraining order ... where
plaintiff will be allowed to continue discharging the functions of a
school director and curriculum administrator ... "
During the hearing of the said motion and manifestation on October
11, 2002, both parties and counsel agreed before the court that no
incident similar to what happened on October 8, 2002 will occur while
the motion is being heard.
Plaintiff and defendants presented evidence, testimonial and
documentary, to prove their respective causes. It took them nine
months to present their evidence before the matter was submitted for
the court's resolution.
After a thorough review of all the evidences presented by both parties,
the Court is inclined to rule in favor of the plaintiff. The [pieces of]
evidence of both parties are convincing. But, the factor that convinced
the Court to rule in favor of plaintiff was the information conveyed to
the court by plaintiff and admitted by defendants, through their
counsel, that another school named Academy of St. John, a new La
Sallian Supervised School in Sta. Clara, General Tria[s], Cavite, was
opened by defendants Josefina A. Pascual and Cirila N. Mojica and
their respective families. In a brochure handed by plaintiff's counsel to
the court during the hearing on June 17, 2003 with a heading of
Academy of Saint John, De La Salle[-] Supervised, General Tria[s],
Cavite, it said that "such idea was conceived as a result of the
corporate problems and the never ending dispute in a former La
Salle[-]supervised school that finally brought confusion and havoc in
the said community."
It further said that "alarmed with the impending loss of the La Salle
Supervision which they both thought of leaving it as a legacy to the
youth, Mrs. Pascual and Mrs. Mojica together with their respective
families were convinced to continue their mission of spreading quality
education etc."
It appears from the brochure that defendants Pascual and Mojica have
set up another school in the same municipality where the St. Francis
School is located. The name of the school is Academy of St. John. The
Academy of St. John likewise offers the same courses as th[ose]
offered by St. Francis [S]chool. Needless to state, this action of
defendants Pascual and Mojica is very inimical to the interest of St.
Francis School as the Academy of St. John put up by the
aforementioned defendants is in direct competition with St. Francis
School. In other words, a conflict of interest now exists insofar as
defendants Pascual and Mojica are concerned in view of their
establishment of the Academy of St. John which is of the same kind
and of the same nature of business as that of St. Francis School. One
cannot serve two masters a[t] the same time. And as already
intimated above, considering that there are now two competingschools
in the same locality where defendants Pascual and Mojica hold an
interest, they cannot be expected to give their full devotion and
cooperation to one without being disloyal and unfaithful to the other.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion is granted.
Accordingly, a status quo order is hereby issued wherein the plaintiff is
hereby allowed to continue discharging her functions as school director
and curriculum administrator as well as those who are presently and
actually discharging functions as school officer[s] to continue
performing their duties until the application for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order is resolved.
SO ORDERED.50
Petitioners filed their Motion for Clarification,51 They alleged that the
bulk of the money ordered to be turned over to Custodio and Reynante
was allotted to St. Francis School's teachers' retirement fund.
Considering that it must be preserved, petitioners raised several
queries. They wanted to know if Custodio and Reynante would use the
money for other purposes other than for the teachers' retirement
benefit and if Custodio and Reynante would be required to file a bond
to guaranty its safekeeping and exclusive use as teacher's retirement
compensation. Finally, they asked who would be held liable in case of
Custodio and Reynante's unlawful use of this fund.52
On September 2, 2003, Custodio filed the Petition to Cite Respondents
in Contempt of Court53 under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. 54 She
likewise prayed that an order be issued reiterating the Orders dated
October 21, 2002, March 24, 2003, and August 5, 2003.55
In response to petitioners' Motion for Clarification, the trial court issued
an Order dated October 8, 200356 clarifying that the retirement fund
was to be held in trust by Custodio and Reynante. It also directed
Custodio and Reynante to file a bond of ₱300,000.00 each.57 Later, it
ordered petitioners to comply with the mandate in the March 24, 2003
and August 5, 2003 Orders and directed them to disclose to the court
the total amount of the fund deposited and reserved for teachers'
retirement benefit and its bank details:58
This treats of the motion for clarification filed by the defendants
through counsel.
The motion sprung from the Order dated March 24, 2003 and again
reiterated in the Order of August 5, 2003 which required the
defendants and Mr. Al Mojica to turn-over to Ms. Herminia Reynante all
the money which [is] in their possession enumerated in the aforesaid
orders.
Considering that the bulk of the money pertains to the teacher[s']
retirement funds, defendants seek to clarify (1) for what purpose the
funds will be used by the plaintiff and Ms. Reynante; (2) whether the
funds will be turned-over to the plaintiff and Ms. Reynante without
them having to put up a bond as a security for the protection of the
teachers; and (3) whether defendants will be held liable civilly and
criminally, in case of unlawful use and disbursement of the funds.
Teachers' retirement funds are funds principally set aside for the
purpose of the retirement of the teachers. As such, these funds cannot
be used for any other purpose other than that for which it is intended.
Thus, neither the plaintiff nor Ms. Reynante may use this amount for
the operation of the school. They should hold the same in trust for the
beneficiaries of the same.
As to whether the plaintiff and Ms. Reynante shall be required to put
up a bond as a security for the protection of the teachers before they
receive the teachers' retirement funds, the same is not only correct but
also proper. Considering that they will hold these funds in trust for the
retiring teachers, they should be required to file a bond to guarantee
their obligations as trustees of these funds. Accordingly, the plaintiff
and Ms. Herminia Reynante are hereby directed to file a bond in the
amount of ₱300,000.00 each.
As to whether the defendants will be held liable, civilly and criminally,
in case of unlawful use and disbursement of the teachers' retirement
funds, the answer is in the negative. A person cannot be held liable for
his action when such was done in compliance with the lawful order of
the court. Besides, considering that the plaintiff and Ms. Reynante are
required to file a bond, the bond shall guarantee for whatever damage
the retiring teachers may incur by reason of the unlawful use and
disbursement of the funds.
19
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the defendants are hereby
ordered to comply with the mandate contained in the order dated
March 24 and August 5, 2003.
Defendants are further directed to inform the court of the total amount
of the funds deposited reserved for teachers' retirement, and in what
bank and under what account the same is deposited.
SO ORDERED.59
On October 10, 2003, petitioners filed their Petition
for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals to question the Regional Trial
Court's Orders60 dated August 5, 2003, August 21, 2003 and October
8, 2003. Eventually, this was elevated to this Court and was docketed
as G.R. No. 174996.61
Meanwhile, trial commenced for the contempt case. Custodio
presented as her lone witness, Joseph Custodio (Joseph), St. Francis
School's finance and property resource development administrator.
Petitioners did not present any witness.62
In its Decision63 dated February 6, 2008, Branch 90, Regional Trial
Court, Dasmariñas, Cavite found petitioners guilty of indirect contempt
for failing to comply with the Orders dated October 21, 2002 and
March 24, 2003 and ordered them to jointly and severally pay a fine of
₱30,000.00.64 It likewise directed them to account for the amount that
they had paid the four (4) teachers who had already resigned:65
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the respondents, namely: Bro. Bernard Oca, Bro. Dennis
Magbanua, Ms. Cirila N. Mojica, Mrs. Josefina Pascual, Al N. Mojica,
Atty. Silvestre Pascual and St. Francis School of General Trias, Cavite,
GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT of Court against the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite for their failure to comply with the
Orders of the Court dated October 21, 2002 and March 24, 2003, and
they are hereby ordered to pay a FINE, jointly and severally, in the
amount of Php30,000.00 for the restoration of the dignity of the Court
and to comply with the Orders of the Court dated October 21, 2002
and March 24, 2003 within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
judgment.
....
SO ORDERED.66
In its May 25, 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court Decision.67 It found that it was sufficiently established that
petitioners did not remit all the money they had previously collected
despite the trial court's October 21, 2002 Order, which they admitted
to be lawful.68
It found that the March 24, 2003 Order merely reiterated the October
21, 2002 Order directing the payment of all money they had collected
and specified the amounts to be remitted.69 It noted that the trial court
already clarified which funds to turn over but petitioners still refused to
obey the orders.70
The Court of Appeals ruled that defying the trial court orders
amounted to contumacious conduct, which "tended to prejudice St.
Francis School's operations due to lack of operational funds."71
The Court of Appeals also noted that petitioners did not deny that the
Motion for Clarification dated October 14, 2002 was heard on October
18, 2002; thus, contradicting their claim that they were not afforded
an opportunity to be heard.72
The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration in its Resolution dated
December 19, 2011.73
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review via Rule 45 arguing that they
complied with the October 21, 2002 Order in good faith and that the
validity of the March 24, 2003 and August 5, 2003 Orders were being
assailed in a separate case with this Court.74 Likewise, they contended
that there was reasonable doubt on their guilt and that the Court of
Appeals erred in failing to dismiss the petition with respect to
petitioners Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre Pascual (Atty. Silvestre) who
were not parties in SEC Case No. 024-02 where the assailed orders
were issued.75
Petitioners held that to be cited for contempt, the contemnor must be
guilty of willful disobedience.76 However, they did not disobey the trial
court orders.77 They insisted that they had complied in good faith
because the trial court October 21, 2002 Order only pertained to the
school's matriculation fees and not any other fees.78 They claimed that
the October 21, 2002 Order was a response to Custodio's Motion for
Clarification dated October 14, 2002, which only requested that the
matriculation fees be turned over to Reynante.79 Thus, they averred
that it was reasonable for them to conclude that the subject of the
turnover was the matriculation fees only.80
Petitioners further claimed that in Custodio 's Comment to their
February 19, 2003 Explanation, Manifestation and Compliance,
Custodio surreptitiously included a prayer for the turnover of other
funds.81 They attested that Custodio's Comment became a litigated
motion that should have been set for hearing by the trial
court.82 However, the trial court did not set a hearing or require the
filing of a responsive pleading.83 They insisted that they were denied
due process because the trial court's March 24, 2003 Order expanded
the scope of its October 21, 2002 Order and required the turnover of
additional sums which were not included in the October 21, 2002
Order.84
Petitioners insisted that the lack of due process and the expansion of
the scope of the October 21, 2002 Order rendered the trial court
March 24, 2003 and August 5, 2003 Orders unlawful.85 They
questioned these orders in GR. No. 17 4996 and insisted that their
resort to legal remedies showed that they acted in good faith. They
argued that to be charged with indirect contempt, the violated order
must have been a lawful order.86 Since the validity of the trial court
orders was being questioned in GR. No. 174996, the Court of Appeals'
ruling was premature as it should have waited for this Court's finding
on the orders' validity before charging them with indirect contempt.87
Petitioners asserted that these circumstances showed that there was
reasonable doubt on their guilt and their acquittal was warranted.88
Lastly, they held that Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre ought to be
dropped as parties in the petition for indirect contempt as they were
not parties in the intra-corporate controversy filed with the trial court
and were not subject to its jurisdiction. Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre
could not have been aware of the trial court's orders. They averred
that there was no showing that they acted in conspiracy with the other
petitioners and that their guilt could not be assumed or based on mere
inference.89
In its March 5, 2012 Resolution, this Court denied the Petition on the
ground that the issues raised were factual in nature and petitioners
failed to raise any reversible error on the part of the Court of
Appeals.90
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.91
In its February 18, 2013 Resolution, this Court set aside its March 5,
2012 Resolution and ordered Custodio to file a Comment.92
Custodio filed her Comment93 arguing that there was clear and
contumacious defiance of the trial court orders and that the guilt of
petitioners was established beyond reasonable doubt.94
20
Custodio posited that petitioners only remitted the matriculation fees in
the amount of ₱397,127.64. They did not render a report on the
amount or turned over any other amounts. They only partially
complied with the trial court orders.95
Custodio pointed out that petitioners paid the salaries of four (4)
teachers who had already resigned despite the trial court order that
only Custodio and Reynante were authorized to settle St. Francis
School's accountabilities.96
Custodio argued that petitioners did not refute the evidence she
presented but merely attested that the orders only pertained to
matriculation fees.97
Custodio ave1Ted that petitioners were afforded due process. She
pointed out that her Motion for Clarification dated October 14, 2002
was set for hearing on October 18, 2002, which was attended by
petitioners' counsel.98
Custodio claimed that petitioners' Explanation, Manifestation and
Compliance dated February 19, 2003 was heard by the trial court.
Thus, petitioners were not denied due process when she filed her
Comment. If petitioners wanted to assail the Comment, they could
have easily filed a Reply.99
Custodio insisted that the trial court March 24, 2003 Order was a
clarification, not an expanded version, of its October 21, 2002 Order.
Custodio reasoned that the March 24, 2003 Order was not even among
the orders they questioned in G.R. No. 174996; thus, showing that
they were not acting in good faith. She insisted that their claim of lack
of due process was merely an afterthought after they were directed
several times to comply with the trial court orders.100
Similarly, Custodio claimed that the August 5, 2003 Order of the
Regional Trial Court was not a violation of petitioners' right to due
process. It was issued in connection with their motion to set aside the
March 24, 2003 Order, which was heard. Moreover, the August 5,
2003 Order was a mere reiteration of the March 24, 2003 Order.101
Custodio held that the trial court orders are deemed valid and are
entitled to respect while they are not yet reversed by a higher court.102
Custodio averred that despite the trial court's rulings on the issues
raised, petitioners insisted on filing prohibited pleadings under A.M.
No. 01- 2-04-SC, or the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate
Controversies. These pleadings by petitioners were their (i) Motion for
Reconsideration dated November 8, 2002, (ii) Explanation,
Manifestation, and Compliance dated February 19, 2003, (iii)
Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion dated
April 18, 2003, and (iv) Motion for Clarification dated September 1,
2003.103
Custodio posited that in filing these pleadings, petitioners abused court
processes as they served no purpose other than to avoid compliance
with the trial court orders.104
She claimed that Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre were equally guilty of
indirect contempt. Despite the fact that they were not parties to the
complaint, Alejandro collected the matriculation fees for the school
while Atty. Silvestre, as a member of the Board of Trustees, was
empowered to cause compliance of court orders.105
Lastly, Custodio pointed out that petitioners' raising of factual issues
was not proper in a Petition for Review on Certiorari.106
Petitioners filed their Reply.107
Later, the parties filed their respective Memoranda.108
Meanwhile, on December 3, 2014, during the pendency of this indirect to the good order of society, is as necessary as respect for the laws
contempt case, this Court issued a Decision in G.R. No. 174996, which themselves.116 (Citations omitted)
found that the assailed Orders dated August 5, 2003 and October 8,
2003 of the Regional Trial Court were valid. The dispositive portion of
There are two (2) types of contempt of court: (i) direct contempt and
the December 3, 2014 Decision read:
(ii) indirect contempt.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.

Direct contempt consists of "misbehavior in the presence of or so near
The assailed Decision dated September 16, 2005 and the Resolution
a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before [it]." 117 It
dated October 9, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
includes: (i) disrespect to the court, (ii) offensive behavior against
79791 are hereby AFFIRMED in part insofar as they upheld the
others, (iii) refusal, despite being lawfully required, to be sworn in or
assailed August 5, 2003 and October 8, 2003 Orders of the trial court.
to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition. It
They are REVERSED with respect to the assailed August 21,
can be punished summarily without a hearing.118
2003 Status Quo  Order which is hereby SET ASIDE for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion. The trial court is further
DIRECTED to resolve respondent's application for injunctive relief with Indirect contempt is committed through any of the acts enumerated
dispatch. under Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court:

SO ORDERED.109 (a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his [or

For resolution is whether petitioners are guilty of indirect contempt.
To resolve this, it is important to determine:
First, whether petitioners are guilty of willful disobedience;
Second, whether petitioners can refuse to follow the orders of the
Regional Trial Court on the premise that their legality is being
questioned in this Court; and
Finally, whether Alejandro N. Mojica and Atty. Silvestre Pascual are
equally guilty of indirect contempt despite the fact that they are not
parties to the complaint.
I
her] official duties or in his [or her] official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or
judgment of a court,  including the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or
process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any
manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be
entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section
1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as

This Court rules that petitioners Oca, Magbanua, Cirila, and Josefina
such without authority;
are guilty of indirect contempt. There is a contumacious refusal on
their part to comply with the Regional Trial Court Orders.
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
Contempt of court is willful disobedience to the court and disregard or
defiance of its authority, justice, and dignity.110 It constitutes conduct (g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the
which "tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by
of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due him [or her].119 (Emphasis supplied)
administration of justice" or "interfere with or prejudice parties[']
litigant or their witnesses during litigation."111
Indirect contempt is only punished after a written petition is filed and
an opportunity to be heard is given to the party charged.120
All courts are given the inherent power to punish contempt. 112 This
power is an essential necessity to preserve order in judicial
In the case at bar, petitioners were charged with indirect contempt
proceedings and to enforce the due administration of justice and the
through "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order,
court's mandates, orders, and judgments.113 It safeguards the respect
orjudgment of a court."
due to the courts and, consequently, ensures the stability of the
judicial institution.114
II
In Sison v. Caoibes, Jr.:115
Petitioners insist that they have complied with the October 21, 2002
Order in good faith as they have already turned over the matriculation
Thus, the power to declare a person in contempt of court and in
fees to Reynante.121 They claim that this Order pertained to the
dealing with him accordingly is an inherent power lodged in courts of
matriculation fees only, excluding any other fees, as it was issued in
justice, to be used as a means to protect and preserve the dignity of
connection with Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated October 14,
the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein, and the
2002, which requested that the matriculation fees be turned over to
administration of justice from callous misbehavior, offensive
Reynante.122 Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated October 14, 2002
personalities, and contumacious refusal to comply with court orders.
allegedly did not cover other fees.123
Indeed, the power of contempt is power assumed by a court or judge
to coerce cooperation and punish disobedience, disrespect or
interference with the court's orderly process by exacting summary However, the October 21, 2002 Order did not pertain to matriculation
punishment. The contempt power was given to the courts in trust for fees only:
the public, by tradition and necessity, in as much as respect for the
courts, which are ordained to administer the laws which are necessary Regarding the collection of matriculation fees and other collectibles,
Ms. Herminia Reynante is hereby designated by the Court to act as

21
cashier of the school to the exclusion of others with authority to collect
all fees and, together with plaintiff Laurita Custodio, to pay all
accounts.  Said authority shall continue until the matter of the
application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
is heard and resolved. This is hereby ordered so that an orderly
operation of the school will be achieved.
Plaintiff and defendants, as well as Mr. Al Mojica, are directed to turn-
over to Ms. Herminia Reynante all money previously collected and to
submit a report on what have been collected, how much, from whom
and the dates collected.  Effective October 22, 2002, Ms. Herminia
Reynante shall submit to the Court, to the plaintiff and to all the
defendants a monthly report of all receivables collected and all
disbursements made.
SO ORDERED.124 (Emphasis supplied)
The wording of the October 21, 2002 Order is clear that the amounts
do not pertain only to the matriculation fees but
to all  collectibles, all  fees, and all  accounts. It also states that
petitioners were to render a report and turn over all  the amounts they
had previously collected. It does not state that only matriculation fees
were to be handed over.
Likewise, the subject of Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated
October 14, 2002 did not solely cover matriculation fees. Her prayer
sought to clarify "where the matriculation fees and other fees  should
be paid pending the hearing of the Complaint and the Manifestation
and Motion."125 She also prayed for other just and equitable
reliefs.126 Thus, the trial court ordered that all  amounts be turned over
to Reynante for the orderly operation of the school.127 Understandably,
the school would operate better if all accounts were handled by one
(1) person and not divided into two (2) arguing factions.
Petitioners insist that Custodio's Comment to their February 19, 2003
Explanation, Manifestation and Compliance surreptitiously included a
prayer for the turnover of other funds, making it a litigated
motion.128 Petitioners claim that they were denied due process because
the trial court did not set it for hearing. 129 Moreover, in its March 24,
2003 Order, the trial court allegedly required the turnover of additional
sums which were not included in the October 21, 2002 Order.130
This Court finds that the subsequent trial court orders did not unduly
expand the scope of the October 21, 2002 Order as petitioners argue.
The October 21, 2002 Order itself already directed that all fees  be
turned over to Reynante.
Furthermore, Custodio's Comment dated February 26, 2003 simply
argued that petitioners did not comply with the October 21, 2002
Order because they did not remit the following amounts:
1) ₱4,339,601.54 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 239 of the
Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc.;
2) ₱5,639,856.ll deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 459 of the
Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc.;
3) ₱92,970.00 representing fees paid by the school canteen; and
4) All other fees collected from January 2003 to February 19, 2003.131
Custodio pointed out that petitioners paid the salaries of four (4) other
employees who had already resigned, violating the court order that
only Reynante and Custodio were authorized to pay the outstanding
accounts of St. Francis School.132
Thus, it cannot be said that Custodio inserted a surreptitious prayer for
the turnover of funds not included in the October 21, 2002 Order. She
22
simply stated that petitioners failed to substantially comply with the
October 21, 2002 Order and specified the other amounts that
petitioners needed to turn over.133 When she prayed for the turnover of
the other amounts, she merely sought petitioners' compliance of the
trial court October 21, 2002 Order.134
The trial court reiterated this in its March 24, 2003 Order and specified
more particularly the amounts that needed to be remitted. It stated:
A perusal of the allegations of defendants' pleading shows that they
merely turned-over a manager's check in the amount of P397,127.64
representing money collected from the students from October 2002 to
December 2002. The Order of October 21, 2002 directed plaintiff and
defendants, as well as, Mr. Al Mojica to turn-over to Ms. Herminia
Reynante all money previously collected and to submit a report on
what have been collected, how much, from whom and the dates
collected.
Defendants and Mr. Al Mojica are hereby directed, within ten days
from receipt hereof, to submit a report and to turn-over to Ms.
Herminia Reynante all money collected by them, more particularly:
1. ₱4,339,601.54 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 239 (Rural
Bank of Gen. Trias, Inc.);
2. ₱5,639,856. l 1 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 459 of
(Rural Bank of Gen. Trias, Inc.);
3. ₱92,970.00 representing amount paid by the school canteen;
4. Other fees collected from January 2003 to February 19, 2003;
5. Accounting on how and how much defendants are paying Ms. Daisy
Romero and three (3) other teachers who already resigned.
SO ORDERED.135
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court did not unduly expand the
scope of the October 21, 2002 Order when it issued its March 24, 2003
Order.
However, despite its clear wording, petitioners still did not comply with
the March 24, 2003 Order. Instead, they filed a Manifestation,
Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion on April 18, 2003,
praying that the trial court exclude the other amounts, which were
allegedly not included in the October 21, 2002 Order.136
The trial court denied petitioners' Manifestation,
Observation,Compliance, Exception and Motion in its August 5, 2003
Order for being a differently worded motion for reconsideration, which
is a prohibited pleading under Section 8 of the Interim Rules of
Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-
SC).137 The trial court noted that petitioners still had not complied with
its March 24, 2003 Order and reiterated that they must submit a report
and turn over all the money they had collected.138
Still, petitioners refused to comply.
On August 21, 2003, the trial court granted Custodio's Manifestation
and Motion dated October 9, 2002. It issued a status quo order
allowing Custodio to discharge her functions as school director and
curriculum administrator because it found that petitioners had already
established a new school.139
However, petitioners still did not comply despite this Order. Instead,
they filed their September 1, 2003 Motion for Clarification, raising
questions on Custodio's use of the turned over money, Custodio's and
Reynante's bonds as guaranty to the money's exclusive use as
teachers' retirement fund, and petitioners' liability in case of Custodio's
misuse of this amount.140
This prompted Custodio to petition the trial court to cite petitioners in
indirect contempt.141
The trial court responded to petitioners' Motion for Clarification dated
September 1, 2003 and issued its October 8, 2003 Order, agreeing
that the retirement fund would be merely held in trust by Custodio and
Reynante.142 It also directed Custodio and Reynante to file a bond of
₱300,000.00 each. Again, it ordered petitioners to comply with the
mandate in its March 24, 2003 and August 5, 2003 Orders and
directed them to inform the court the total amount of the money
deposited and reserved for teachers' retirement and its bank account
details.143
Thus, the question of whether petitioners were denied due process has
already been settled.
This Court notes that petitioners' justification for refusing to turn over
the stated amounts was that the amounts constituted teachers'
retirement fund, which consequently did not belong to St. Francis
School and was not covered by the assailed Orders. 149 However, the
trial court lent credence to Joseph's testimony that the amounts
deposited in the Special Savings Accounts were funds for the
operations of the school.150
In any case, whether the amounts are for the teachers' retirement
fund or the school's operation fund, the trial court had determined who
was to have custody over these amounts during the pendency of the
intra-corporate case. Thus, it is not for petitioners to choose which
amounts to turn over.

Nonetheless, petitioners still did not comply.  Instead, they argued in III

the contempt proceeding that the March 24, 2003 and August 5, 2003
Orders were unlawful and were being questioned in G.R. No. 174996.
The same principle applies to petitioners' argument that the trial court
They claimed that their availment of legal remedies showed their good
orders were being questioned in G.R. No. 174996.
faith.144

In intra-corporate controversies, all orders of the trial court are

All these acts show petitioners' contumacious refusal to abide by the
immediately executory:151
orders of the trial court.

Section 4. Executory nature of decisions and orders.  - All decisions and

Again, the trial court did not exclude any other kind of money in its
orders issued under these Rules shall immediately be executory except
October 21, 2002, March 24, 2003, and August 5, 2003 Orders, all of
the awards for moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's
which directed petitioners to turn over all  monies.145 Petitioners,
fees, if any. No appeal or petition taken therefrom shall stay the
however, still insisted that they had complied because they had
enforcement or implementation of the decision or order, unless
remitted the matriculation fees. Even after clarification, petitioners
restrained by an appellate court. Interlocutory orders shall not be
were defiant.
subject to appeal.

The trial court also noted that even after petitioners had already
Questioning the trial court orders does not stay its enforcement or
established another competitor school and Custodio and Reynante had
implementation. There is no showing that the trial court orders were
already posted bond, petitioners still refused to comply.146
restrained by the appellate court.

The trial court reiterated the orders to turn over the amounts at least
thrice. Petitioners' filing of numerous pleadings reveals their
contumacious refusal to comply and their abuse of court processes.
Their defense that they were denied due process deserves little
consideration. Petitioners had attended hearings and had filed several
pleadings showing that they were given several opportunities to
present their position on the matter. All these were considered before
the trial court rendered its orders.
Hence, petitioners could not refuse to comply with the trial court
orders just because they opined that they were invalid. It is not for the
parties to decide whether they should or should not comply with a
court order. Petitioners did not obtain any injunction to stop the
implementation of the trial court orders nor was there an injunction to
prevent the trial court from hearing and ruling on the contempt
case.152 Petitioners' stubborn refusal cannot be excused just because
they were convinced of its invalidity. Their resort to the processes of
questioning the orders does not show that they are in good faith.

In Oca vs. Custodio,147 this Court ruled on the validity of the trial court
August 5, 2003 and October 8, 2003 Orders:
With regard to the right to due process, we have emphasized in
jurisprudence that while it is true that the right to due process
safeguards the opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence
one may have in support of his claim or defense, the Court has time
and again held that where the opportunity to be heard, either through
verbal arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the party can "present
its side" or defend its "interest in due course," there is no denial of due
process because what the law proscribes is the lack of opportunity to
be heard.
Petitioners likewise cannot invoke the principle of judicial courtesy.
Judicial courtesy is exercised by suspending a lower court's
proceedings although there is no injunction or an order from a higher
court.153 The purpose is to avoid mooting the matter raised in the
higher court.154 It is exercised as a matter of respect and for practical
considerations.155
However, this principle applies only if the continuation of the lower
court's proceedings will render moot the issue raised in the higher
court.156

In the two (2) cases involved, there are two (2) separate issues. In
In the case at bar, we find that petitioners were not denied due
G.R. No. 174996, the issue was whether the orders of the trial court
process by the trial court when it issued the assailed Orders dated
were valid. In this indirect contempt case, the issue is whether
August 5, 2003, August 21, 2003 and October 8, 2003. The records
petitioners willfully disobeyed the orders of the trial court. Although
would show that petitioners were given the opportunity to ventilate
this Court may find the orders invalid in G.R. No. 174996, the
their arguments through pleadings and that the same pleadings were
petitioners may still be cited in contempt for their contumacious refusal
acknowledged in the text of the questioned rulings. Thus, petitioners
and defiance of the trial court orders. Therefore, the finding of indirect
cannot claim grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court on
contempt will not render moot this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 174996.
the basis of denial of dueprocess.148 (Citation omitted)

23
This Court has acknowledged the trial court's power to cite parties in
indirect contempt for their refusal to follow its orders, although the
validity of the orders is being questioned in another proceeding.
In Roxas v. Tipon,157 this Court found a party guilty of contempt
although the disobeyed order was the subject of a pending petition
before the Court of Appeals:
The issue of indirect contempt needs further discussion because while
the Order of the RTC to allow audit of books of HEVRI has been
rendered moot, it does not change the fact that at the time that the
Order was a standing pronouncement, petitioners refused to heed it ...
....
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting
in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a
willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders, but such
conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the
due administration of justice. Contempt of court is a defiance of the
authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to
bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to
interfere with or prejudice parties-litigant or their witnesses during
litigation. The asseverations made by petitioners to justify their refusal
to allow inspection or audit were rejected by the trial court.
....
The RTC initiated the contempt charge. In the Order dated 9 January
2002, petitioners were directed to appear in court and to show cause
why they should not be held in contempt of court for their refusal to
allow Financial Catalyst, Inc. to audit the books of HEVRI. Petitioners
filed an urgent motion for reconsideration claiming that said order was
the subject of a pending petition before the Court of Appeals and that
they can only be cited for contempt by the filing of a verified
petition.  The RTC denied the motion and reiterated in its Order on 26
April 2002 explaining that it chose to initiate the contempt charge.
The RTC acted on the basis of the unjustified refusal of petitioners to
abide by its lawful order.  It is of no moment that private respondents
may have filed several pleadings to urge the R TC to cite petitioners in
contempt. Petitioners utterly violated an order issued by the trial court
which act is considered contemptuous. Thus, in Leonidas v. Judge
Supnet,  the MTC's order to the bank to show cause why it should not
be held in contempt, was adjudged as a legitimate exercise of the
MTC's judicial discretion to determine whether the bank should be
sanctioned for disregarding its previous orders.158 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
In this case, petitioners were given several opportunities to comply
with the trial court orders. Even after the trial court clarified which
funds to turn over, they still refused to obey. While petitioners
questioned the legality of these orders, they are immediately
executory. Moreover, the parties do not have the power to determine
for themselves what should and should not be excluded from the
orders. Their failure to turn over the amounts showed petitioners'
defiance and disregard for the authority of the trial court.
Petitioners argue that contempt proceedings are similar to criminal
proceedings, and thus, there must be proof beyond reasonable doubt
of their guilt.159
The punishment for contempt is classified into two (2): civil contempt
and criminal contempt.
Civil contempt is committed when a party fails to comply with an order
of a court or judge "for the benefit of the other party." 160 A criminal
contempt is committed when a party acts against the court's authority
24
and dignity or commits a forbidden act tending to disrespect the court
or judge.161
This stems from the two (2)-fold aspect of contempt which seeks: (i)
to punish the party for disrespecting the court or its orders; and (ii) to
compel the party to do an act or duty which it refuses to perform.162
In Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations:163
Due to this twofold aspect of the exercise of the power to punish
them, contempts are classified as civil or criminal. A civil contempt is
the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge
for the benefit of the opposing party therein;  and a criminal contempt,
is conduct directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a
judge, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority or dignity
of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act. Where the
punishment imposed, whether against a party to a suit or a stranger,
is wholly or primarily to protect or vindicate the dignity and power of
the court, either by fine payable to the government or by
imprisonment, or both, it is deemed a judgment in a criminal case.
Where the punishment is by fine directed to be paid to a party in the
nature of damages for the wrong inflicted, or by imprisonment as a
coercive measure to enforce the performance of some act for the
benefit of the party or in aid of the final judgment or decree rendered
in his behalf, the contempt judgment will, if made before final decree,
be treated as in the nature of an interlocutory order, or, if made after
final decree, as remedial in nature, and may be reviewed only on
appeal from the final decree, or in such other mode as is appropriate
to the review of judgments in civil cases. . . . The question of whether
the contempt committed is civil or criminal, does not affect the
jurisdiction or the power of a Court to punish the
same ....164 (Emphasis supplied)
The difference between civil contempt and criminal contempt was
further elaborated in People v. Godoy:165
It has been said that the real character of the proceedings is to be
determined by the relief sought, or the dominant purpose, and the
proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is
primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily
compensatory or remedial.
Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature
of criminal or quasi-criminal actions. They are punitive in nature, and
the Government, the courts, and the people are interested in their
prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve the power and vindicate the
authority and dignity of the court, and to punish for disobedience of its
orders. Strictly speaking, however, they are not criminal proceedings
or prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved is also a
crime. The proceeding has been characterized as sui
generis,  partaking of some of the elements of both a civil and criminal
proceeding, but really constituting neither. In general, criminal
contempt proceedings should be conducted in accordance with the
principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such
procedure is consistent with the summary nature of contempt
proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules that govern
criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt,
that the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in
regular criminal cases, and that proceedings under statutes governing
them are to be strictly construed. However, criminal proceedings are
not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial
rights of the accused are preserved.
Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil
in their nature; that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of
some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the
thing required.  As otherwise expressed, a proceeding for civil
contempt is one instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of a
private party to an action and to compel obedience to a judgment or
decree intended to benefit such a party litigant.  So a proceeding is one
for civil contempt, regardless of its form, if the act charged is wholly
the disobedience, by one party to a suit, of a special order made in
behalf of the other party and the disobeyed order may still be obeyed,
and the purpose of the punishment is to aid in an enforcement of
obedience.  The rules of procedure governing criminal contempt
proceedings, or criminal prosecutions, ordinarily are inapplicable to
civil contempt proceedings  ...
In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an
aggrieved party, or his successor, or someone who has a pecuniary
interest in the right to be protected. In criminal contempt proceedings,
it is generally held that the State is the real prosecutor.
Contempt is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the
defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is on the prosecution
to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In proceedings for civil
contempt, there is no presumption, although the burden of proof is on
the complainant, and while the proof need not be beyond reasonable
doubt, it must amount to more than a mere preponderance of
evidence. It has been said that the burden of proof in a civil contempt
proceeding lies somewhere between the criminal "reasonable doubt"
burden and the civil "fair preponderance" burden.166 (Citations omitted)
Civil contempt proceedings seek to compel the contemnor to obey
acourt order, judgment, or decree which he or she refuses to do for
the benefit of another party. It is for the enforcement and the
preservation of a right of a private party, who is the real party in
interest in the proceedings. The purpose of the contemnor's
punishment is to compel obedience to the order. Thus, civil contempt
is not treated like a criminal proceeding and proof beyond reasonable
doubt is not necessary to prove it.167
In the case at bar, the dispositive portion of the Decision of the trial
court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the respondents, namely: Bro. Bernard Oca, Bro. Dennis
Magbanua, Ms. Cirila N. Mojica, Mrs. Josefina Pascual, Al N. Mojica,
Atty. Silvestre Pascual and St. Francis School of General Trias, Cavite,
GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT of Court against the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite for their failure to comply with the
Orders of the Court dated October 21, 2002 and March 24, 2003, and
they are hereby ordered to pay a FINE, jointly and severally, in the
amount of Php30,000.00 for the restoration of the dignity of the Court
and to comply with the Orders of the Court dated October 21, 2002
and March 24, 2003 within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
judgment.
....
SO ORDERED.168
While the nature of the punishment imposed is a mixture of both
criminal and civil, the contempt proceeding in this case is more civil
than criminal.
The purpose of the filing and the nature of the contempt proceeding
show that Custodio was seeking enforcement of the trial court orders
in the intra-corporate controversy because petitioners refused to
comply. Hence, this is a civil contempt case, which does not need
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
This Court has ruled that while the power to cite parties in contempt
should be used sparingly, it should be allowed to exercise its power of
contempt to maintain the respect due to it and to ensure the
infallibility of justice where the defiance is so clear and contumacious
and there is an evident refusal to obey.169
25
This Court finds that it was sufficiently proven that there was willful
disobedience on the part of petitioners. Therefore, petitioners ought to
be cited in contempt.
IV
However, this Court rues that the charges against Alejandro and Atty.
Silvestre ought to be dismissed.
While they were not parties to SEC Case No. 024-02, the trial court
ruled that they were guilty of indirect contempt on the following
premise:
The latter Orders are directed to "ALL" the defendants in SEC Case No.
024-02, namely: Bro. Bernard Oca, Bro. Dennis Magbanua, Ms. Cirila
N. Mojica, Mrs. Josefina Pascual and St. Francis School; while the
respondent Al N. Mojica was particularly mentioned in the said orders
in view of the fact that it was he that collected matriculation fees, as a
cashier. With respect to Atty. Silvestre Pascual, the latter was
impleaded in this case because he was a member of the Board of St.
Francis School at the time the petition was filed, and he is empowered
to cause compliance with these Orders. His failure to prove that he has
the intention to comply with the subject orders showed his
acquiescence to the collective act of defiance.170
In Ferrer v. Rodriguez,171 this Court ruled that a non-litigant may be
cited in contempt if he or she acted in conspiracy with the parties in
violating the court order:
Nevertheless, persons who are not parties in a proceeding may be
declared guilty of contempt for willful violation of an order issued in
the case if said persons are guilty of conspiracy with any of the parties
in violating the court's order.
"In a proceeding to punish for criminal contempt for willful
disobedience of an injunction, the fact that those disobeying the
injunction were not parties eo nomine  to the action in which it was
granted, and were not personally served, is no defense, where the
injunction restrains not only the parties, but those who act in
connection with the party as attorneys, agents, or employees, and the
parties accused, with knowledge of the order and its terms, acting as
the employees of a party, willfully violate it." (People ex rel.  Stearns,
et al. vs.  Marr, et al., 74 N.E. 431.)172
However, there is no evidence of conspiracy in this case. The powerto
punish contempt must be "exercised cautiously, sparingly, and
judiciously."173 Without evidence of conspiracy, it cannot be said that
the non-litigants are guilty of contempt.
This Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence of conspiracy to
hold both Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre liable for contempt.
Alejandro merely collected the matriculation fees as a designated
cashier who worked in the Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc. He neither
exercised power over the money nor had the authority to order how it
would be kept or disposed. Moreover, it has been established that the
matriculation fees had already been turned over to Reynante.
Atty. Silvestre was indeed a member of the Board of Trustees.
However, decisions of the Board of Trustees are not subject to the
control of just one (1) person. While a board member may protest, the
majority of the board may overrule him or her. Thus, it is not correct
to say that a board member is empowered to cause compliance of the
trial court orders. It does not matter if Atty. Silvestre was unable to
prove his intention to comply with the orders. The burden of proving
contempt is upon complainants and there is no presumption of guilt in
contempt proceedings such that the party accused of contempt must
prove that he is innocent.174
In the absence of proof of conspiracy, it cannot be said that Alejandro
and Atty. Silvestre are guilty of contempt.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 25, 2011
Decision175 and December 19, 2011 Resolution176 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31985 are AFFIRMED. However, the
complaint against Alejandro Mojica and Atty. Silvestre Pascual is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
March 7, 2018
OCA IPI No. 17-4663-RTJ
ATTY. BERTENI C. CAUSING and PERCIVAL CARAG
MABASA, Complaints
vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE LORENZO R. DELA ROSA, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 4, Manila, Respondent
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before the Court is the Complaint 1 dated January 6, 2017 filed before
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by Atty. Berteni C. Causing
(Atty. Causing) and Percival Carag Mabasa a.k.a. Percy Lapid (Mabasa)
against respondent Judge Jose Lorenzo R. Dela Rosa (respondent
Judge Dela Rosa), Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
(Br.) 4, Manila.
Antecedents
Atty. Causing and his client, Mabasa (Complainants), charged
respondent Judge Dela Rosa with gross ignorance of the law, gross
misconduct and gross incompetence for reversing2 the dismissal of
Criminal Case Nos. 09-268685-86 entitled People v. Eleazar, et
al. (Libel Cases), wherein Mabasa was one of the accused.
Complainants alleged that the Libel Cases were dismissed by former
Acting Presiding Judge Gamor B. Disalo (Judge Disalo) in an
Order3 dated April 13, 2015 on the ground that the right of the
accused to speedy trial had been violated. The prosecution filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the April 13, 2015 Order before the RTC
Br. 4 Manila, now presided by respondent Judge Dela Rosa.
Respondent Judge Dela Rosa granted the prosecution's Motion for
Reconsideration in the assailed Resolution4 dated November 23, 2015
(November 23, 2015 Resolution), the pertinent portions of which read:
xxxx
In opposition thereto, counsel for the accused cites double jeopardy.
However, several settings of this Court showed that the resetting was
on motion of counsel for the accused and hence with the consent of
the accused. Further, the questioned Order dated April 13, 2015 has
not yet attained finality, so double jeopardy is not yet attached.
Further, the records of this case would show that the accused is not
entirely without blame as to why this case has been pending. Aside
from that, the accused filed a Motion to Quash as well as accused’s
Motion for Reconsideration thereto resulting in the conduct of the
arraignment only in the last year of September.
26
The prosecution should be given its day in court. To deny the Motion
For Reconsideration is a (sic) deny to prosecute on the part of the
prosecution.5
Complainants questioned respondent Judge Dela Rosa's November 23,
2015 Resolution granting the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration
because, according to them, it was elementary for respondent Judge
Dela Rosa to know that the prior dismissal of a criminal case due to a
violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial is equivalent to a
dismissal on the merits of the case and, as such, granting the
prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration was tantamount to a violation
of the constitutional right against double jeopardy. 6 Complainants
averred further that it was unacceptable, given respondent Judge Dela
Rosa's position and the presumption of his knowledge of the law, for
him to have disregarded a rule as elementary as the constitutional
right of an accused against double jeopardy.7
Complainants also criticized respondent Judge Dela Rosa's act of
referring to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Atty. Causing's
two (2) separate posts on his Facebook and blogspot accounts about
the subject criminal cases. They reasoned that respondent Judge Dela
Rosa should have first required Atty. Causing to show cause why he
should not be cited in contempt for publicizing and taking his posts to
social media. Atty. Causing emphasized that the posts were presented
using decent words and thus, it was incorrect for respondent Judge
Dela Rosa to refer his actions to a disciplinary body such as the IBP.
Atty. Causing further asserted that he did not violate the sub
judice8 rule because this rule cannot be used to preserve the
unfairness and errors of respondent Judge Dela Rosa.9
In a 1st Indorsement10 dated January 16, 201 7, the OCA directed
respondent Judge Dela Rosa to file his Comment within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof.11
In his Comment12 dated March 13, 2017 (Comment), respondent Judge
Dela Rosa averred that he had already reversed the November 23,
2015 Resolution as early as June 20, 2016 - or way before the filing of
the Complaint on January 6, 2017 - when he issued a Resolution13 of
even date, which states:
x x x While the records of the cases will show delay also attributable to
the defense and that this court was acting in the spirit of fairness, the
April 13, 2015 Order of Hon. Disalo should be upheld to the prejudice
of fairness. Being caught between a rock and a hard place, liberality is
afforded to the accused. x x x
xxxx
As the records would show that the Hon. Judge Disalo dismissed these
cases on the right of speedy trial, double jeopardy attaches. Hence,
this Court's Resolution dated November 23, 2015 is recalled and set
aside. The dismissal dated April 13, 2015 as dictated in the Order of
Hon. Judge Disalo is reinstated.
While the right of due process of the State may have been
circumvented, the interest of the private complainants with regard to
the civil aspect of the cases is protected as the dismissal of the subject
criminal cases is without prejudice to the pursuit of civil indemnity.14
Respondent Judge Dela Rosa explained in his Comment that he had
issued the November 23, 2015 Resolution because, after studying the
records, he discovered that Complainants caused much of the delay in
the proceedings.15
Respondent Judge Dela Rosa then enumerated in his Comment the
instances wherein Complainants caused the delay in the proceedings in
the Libel Cases:
 1. While the warrant of arrest for Mabasa was issued on May
28, 2009, it was only one (1) year and four (4) months after
or on September 28, 2010 that Mabasa was detained;16
2. Mabasa filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 30,
2010;17
3. The aiTaignment and pre-trial of the cases were reset
after then Presiding Judge Marcelino L. Sayo, Jr. (Judge
Sayo) issued an Order dated April 6, 2011, which indicated
that Mabasa, through counsel, moved that the scheduled
arraignment and pre-trial be reset in order "for the parties to
settle the civil aspect of these cases"·18
4. The counsel of Mabasa filed an Urgent Motion for
Deferment dated June 9, 2011 requesting again for the re-
scheduling of the arraignment and pre-trial;19
5. The pre-trial of the case was again rescheduled in an
Order dated August 24, 2011 by the lower court due to the
absence of Mabasa’s co-accused, Johnson L. Eleazar;20
6. Mabasa filed a Motion to Quash dated October 11, 2011,
citing the court's lack of jurisdiction;21
7. The lower court, in an Order dated June 27, 2012,
rescheduled again the arraignment and pre-trial, citing the
absence of the private prosecutor, Mabasa and his counsel;22
8. Judge Sayo thereafter issued an Order dated November
28, 2012, directing the issuance of warrants of arrest against
Mabasa and co- accused Gloria Galuno due to their
continued non-appearance in court;23
9. In an Order dated December 12, 2012, Judge Sayo lifted
the warrants of arrest against Mabasa and his other co-
accused in the Libel Cases after their counsel admitted that
their non-appearance in the previous hearing was due to the
fault of their counsel's law office;24
10. The hearing of the case on June 30, 2014 was
rescheduled after Mabasa moved for the resetting of the
case due to the absence of his counsel;25
11. In an Order by Judge Disalo dated August 11, 2014,
counsel for Mabasa was absent again. Mabasa was finally
arraigned after the court appointed one of the lawyers from
the Public Attorney’s Office as counsel de oficio for
Mabasa;26
12. The Commissioner's Report dated September 23, 2014
stated that the preliminary conference failed to push through
due to the absence of Mabasa and his counsel;27 and
13. The initial date of the presentation of the prosecution
evidence was set on April 13, 2015 by the branch clerk of
court. Notably, the cases against Mabasa would be
dismissed on the same day.28
Respondent Judge Dela Rosa emphasized that the day the Libel Cases
were dismissed, i.e., on April 13, 2015, was actually the date set for
the first actual trial of the cases. He stressed that the delay of almost
five (5) years in the subject cases was attributable more to Mabasa
than anyone else.29
Respondent Judge Dela Rosa claimed that the November 23, 2015
Resolution was issued in good faith and after evaluation of the
evidence submitted by each party. He denied that the same was
27
motivated by bad faith, ill will, fraud, dishonesty, corruption or caprice.
In fact, Respondent Judge issued this as a matter of fairness - that is,
to give the private complainants in the Libel Cases an opportunity to
pursue against Mabasa and his co-accused the civil aspect of the Libel
Cases.30
Finally, respondent Judge Dela Rosa stressed how the filing of this
administrative complaint against him - on January 6, 2017, or after he
had already reversed the November 23, 2015 Resolution through his
June 20, 2016 Resolution -is pure harassment.31
OCA Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation32 dated June 28, 2017, the OCA
recommended that the administrative complaint against Judge Dela
Rosa be dismissed for lack of merit.
After considering the allegations in the Complaint and respondent
Judge Dela Rosa’s Comment, the OCA found that in the absence of any
proof that respondent Judge Dela Rosa was ill-motivated in issuing the
November 23, 2015 Order and that he had, in fact, issued his June 20,
2016 Resolution reversing himself, the charge of gross ignorance of
the law should be dismissed.
The OCA ratiocinated as follows:
The main issue in this administrative complaint is rooted in respondent
Judge's issuance of the Order dated 23 November 201 [5], reversing
the previous one dismissing the criminal cases on the ground of
violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial. Respondent
Judge has already admitted that he made a mistake in issuing
the said order as this would have constituted a violation of the
right of the accused against double jeopardy. To rectify his
error, he granted the motion for reconsideration filed by the
accused.
Although not without exceptions, it is settled that the function of a
motion for reconsideration is to point out to the court the error that it
may have committed and to give it a chance to correct itself.
In "Republic of the Philippines v. Abdulwahab A. Bayao, et al. "33 , the
Court explains the general rule that the purpose of a motion for
reconsideration is to grant an opportunity for the court to rectify any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal
and factual circumstances of the case. The wisdom of this rule is to
expedite the resolution of the issues of the case at the level of the trial
court so it can take a harder look at the records to come up with a
more informed decision on the case.34 (Emphasis supplied)
The OCA found that the records of the case show that respondent
Judge Dela Rosa admitted that he had erred in issuing the November
23, 2015 Order, but that he had rectified such mistake. 35 The OCA held
that this is precisely why our judicial system has remedies for both the
party-litigants and the court to avail of if need be.36 The OCA asserted
that it would be absurd to still hold respondent Judge Dela Rosa liable
despite his rectification through his June 20, 2016 Resolution.37
As to the referral by respondent Judge Dela Rosa to the IBP of Atty.
Causing' s act of posting matters pertaining to the pending criminal
case on the internet, the OCA disagreed with Atty. Causing's argument
that respondent Judge Dela Rosa should have first required him to
show cause for having done so.38 The OCA explained that respondent
Judge Dela Rosa cannot just exercise his contempt powers on a whim,
if not haphazardly, if he believes that he has other remedies to resort
to, just like in this case.39
The Court’s Ruling
In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby adopts and approves the
findings of facts and conclusions of law in the above-mentioned OCA
Report and Recommendation.
Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled
jurisprudence.40 A judge may also be administratively liable if shown to
have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in
ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law and
jurisprudence.41
The Court however has also ruled that "not every error or mistake of a
judge in the performance of his official duties renders him liable."42
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order,
decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties
must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must also
be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or
some other like motive. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are
not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are
erroneous.43
The Court agrees with the OCA that it would be absurd to hold
respondent Judge Dela Rosa liable for his November 23, 2015 Order
when he had himself rectified this in his subsequent June 20, 2016
Order. To rule otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable,
for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.44 To
hold otherwise "would be nothing short of harassing judges to take the
fantastic and impossible oath of rendering infallible judgments."45
Furthermore, nothing in the records of the case suggests that
respondent Judge Dela Rosa was motivated by bad faith, fraud,
corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering his decision.
Other than their bare assertions, Complainants failed to substantiate
their allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be
presumed46 and this Court cannot conclude bad faith intervened when
none was actually proven.47
The Court likewise finds no merit in Complainants' allegation that
respondent Judge Dela Rosa should have first required Atty. Causing
to show cause for his act of posting matters pertaining to the pending
criminal case on the internet.1âwphi1 The Court agrees with the OCA
that respondent Judge Dela Rosa's act of referring the matter to the
IBP, an independent tribunal who exercises disciplinary powers over
lawyers, was a prudent and proper action to take for a trial court
judge. The Court has explained, in the case of Lorenzo Shipping
Corporation v. Distribution Management Association of the
Philippines,48 that judges' power to punish contempt must be exercised
judiciously and sparingly, not for retaliation or vindictiveness, viz.:
x x x [T]he power to punish for contempt of court is exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and only occasionally
should a court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect
without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. As
judges[,] we ought to exercise our power to punish contempt
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in
view of utilizing the power for the correction and preservation of the
dignity of the Court, not for retaliation or vindictiveness.49
In fine, the administrative charge against respondent Judge Dela Rosa
should be, as it is hereby, dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against
respondent Presiding Judge Jose Lorenzo R. Dela Rosa, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 4, Manila is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
28
June 11, 2018
A.C. No. 11173 (Formerly CBD No. 13-3968)
Re: CA-G.R. CV No. 96282 (SPOUSES BAYANI AND MYRNA M.
PARTOZA vs. LILIAN* B. MONTANO and AMELIA
SOLOMON), Complainant
vs.
ATTY. CLARO JORDAN M. SANTAMARIA, Respondent
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A recalcitrant lawyer who defies the directives of the court "must
deservedly end in tribulation for the lawyer and in victory for the
higher ends of justice."1
The administrative liability of a lawyer who repeatedly ignores the
directives of the Court of Appeals (CA) is properly resolved in this case.
Factual Antecedents
A civil action for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage, Reconveyance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-710729
and Damages2 was filed by the spouses Bayani and Myrna M. Partoza
(spouses Partoza) against Lilia B. Montano and Amelia T. Solomon.
The case was dismissed3 by the Regional Trial Court.
On November 25, 2010, a Notice of Appeal 4 was filed by the counsel
on record, Atty. Samson D. Villanueva (Atty. Villanueva). The appeal
was docketed as CA G.R. CV No. 96282 and in a Notice 5 dated March
25, 2011, the CA required the submission of the Appellant's Brief
pursuant to Rule 44, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
On April 27, 2011, however, Atty. Villanueva filed his Withdrawal of
Appearance;6 subsequently, a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Appellant's Brief7 dated May 19, 2011, was also filed. Atty. Villanueva's
Withdrawal of Appearance carried the conformity of the appellant's
attorney-in-fact, Honnie M. Partoza (Honnie) who, on the same
occasion, also acknowledged receipt of the entire records of the case
from Atty. Villanueva.
Thereafter, respondent Atty. Claro Jordan M. Santamaria (respondent)
submitted an Appellant's Brief8 dated July 4, 2011.
In a Resolution9 dated August 4, 2011, the CA directed Atty. Villanueva
to submit proof of authority of Honnie to represent appellants as their
attorney-in-fact and the latter's conformity to Atty. Villanueva's
Withdrawal of Appearance; in the same resolution, the CA also
required respondent to submit his formal Entry of Appearance, viz.:
CA G.R. CV No. 96282 Sps. BAYANI P. PARTOZA and MYRNA
M. PARTOZA vs. LILIA B. MONTANO
and AMELIA T. SOLOMON
Before acting on the counsel for appellant's Withdrawal of Appearance,
[Atty. Villanueva ] is directed to submit within live (5) days from notice
the proof of authority of Honnie M. Partoza to represent the appellants
and to signify his conformity to the Withdrawal of Appearance. In the
meantime, the Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellants' Brief is
granted in the interest of justice.
[Respondent] is directed to submit within five (5) days from notice his
formal Entry of Appearance as counsel for appellants and to secure
and submit to this Court also within the same period the written
conformity of his clients to his appearance as their counsel. Likewise,
said counsel is also directed to furnish this Court the assailed R TC
Decision that should have been appended to the Appellant's Brief also
within the same period.
Atty. Villanueva then filed a Manifestation with Motion10 dated August
31, 2011 explaining that he communicated with Ronnie and with
appellants as well, but was informed that appellants were residing
abroad (in Germany at the time). He then requested for a period of 15
days, or until September 15, 2011, to comply with the CA's Resolution.
On March 20, 2012, the CA issued a Resolution granting the
Manifestation and Motion filed by Atty. Villanueva, and ordered the
latter to show cause, within 10 days from notice, why he should not be
cited in contempt for his failure to comply with the CA's Resolution of
August 4, 2011; and why the Appellant's Brief filed by respondent
should not be expunged from the rollo of the case and the appeal
dismissed for his failure to comply with the August 4, 2011 Resolution.
On September 5, 2012 the CA, in another Resolution,11 declared that:
1) as shown by the Registry Return Receipt dated April 4, 2012,
respondent received the copy of its March 20, 2012 Resolution; 2) on
June 19, 2012, the Judicial Records Division reported that no
compliance with the March 20, 2012 Resolution had been filed by
respondent; and 3) respondent was, for the last time, directed to
comply with the March 20, 2012 Resolution within five days from
notice and to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for
his failure to comply with the CA's Resolutions, dated August 4, 2011
and March 20, 2012; and why the Appellant's Brief filed by him should
not be expunged from the rollo of the case and the appeal be
dismissed.
All these directives by the CA were ignored by the respondent.
Thus, in a Resolution12 dated October 25, 2012, the CA cited
respondent in contempt of court and imposed on him a fine of
₱5,000.00. In the same Resolution, the CA once again directed
respondent: (1) to comply with the requirements of a valid substitution
of counsel and to file his formal Entry of Appearance within five days
from notice; and (2) to show cause, within the same period, why the
Appellant's Brief filed should not be expunged from the rollo of the
case and the appeal be dismissed for his failure to comply with the
Rules of Court.
Respondent paid no heed to this Resolution.
So it was that the CA, in a Resolution 13 dated September 17, 2013,
referred the unlawyerly acts of respondent to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner
In his Answer 14 of November 13, .2013, respondent contended: (1)
that the spouses Partoza sought his opinion regarding their case and
later on requested that he handle their appeal before the CA; (2) that
he advised the spouses Partoza to infon11 Atty. Villanueva of their
decision to engage the services of a new counsel; (3) that he relied on
the Withdrawal of Appearance filed by Atty. Villanueva and then
prepared the Appellant's Brief; (4) that he was not aware of the
authority of Honnie to represent spouses Partoza as well as of Honnie's
conformity to the Withdrawal of Appearance by Atty. Villanueva; (5)
that he believed that he had no personality to represent the spouses
Partoza in the case, and to address the problems/compliances
pertaining to applicant's appeal; and (6) that it was still Atty.
Villanueva who should have continued to represent the spouses
Partoza.
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The Investigating Commissioner Michael G. Fabunan (Investigating
Commissioner) found respondent liable for willful disobedience to the
lawful orders of the CA and recommended that he be suspended from
the practice of law for six months. The investigating Commissioner
gave the reasons for the said recommendation in his Report and
Recommendation, 15 viz.:
The act of respondent in not filing any of the compliances required of
him in the 4 August 2011. 20 March 2012.1âwphi1 5 September 2012,
and 25 October 2012 Resolutions of the [CA] despite due notice.
emphasized his contempt and total disregard of the legal proceedings.
for which he should be held liable.
xxxx
Granting that he [was] not aware of the problem between Atty.
Villanueva and [ Honnie] he could have explained this fact by
complying with the court resolutions and not just ignored them on the
premise that he has no personality to represent the [spouses Partoza]
The compliances required of the respondent by the [CA] are provided
under the rules for a valid substitution of counsel and validity of the
appeal and may not be disregarded.
The nonchalant attitude of the respondent cannot be left
unsanctioned. Clearly, his acts constitute willful disobedience of the
lawful orders of the [CA], which under Section 27. Rule 138 or the
Rules of Court is a sufficient case for suspension. x x x
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
The IBP Board of Governors resolved 16 to adopt and approve the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
In its Report 17 elated March 18, 2016, the Office of the Bar Confidant
informed this Court that no petition for review or motion for
reconsideration has been filed by either party. Thus, pursuant to
Section 12(c) of Rule 139-8 of the Rules of Court, this case is now
before us for final action.
Issue
Whether or not respondent is administratively liable.
Our Ruling
This Court adopts the findings of fact of and the penalty recommended
by, the IBP Board of Governors.
This Court explained the crucial role played by lawyers in the
administration of justice in Sabado v. Villaruel. Jr., 18 viz.:
While it is true that lawyers owe entire devotion' to the cause of their
clients, it cannot he emphasized enough that their first and primary
duty is not to the client but to the administration or justice.' Canon 12
of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that 'A lawyer shall
exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.' x x x This is a fundamental principle
in legal ethics and professional responsibility that has iterations in
various forms:
xxxx
Because a lawyer is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the
administration of justice. any act of a lawyer that obstruct, perverts, or
impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and
justifies disciplinary action against him. (citations omitted)
There is no dispute that respondent did not comply with five
Resolutions of the CA. His actions were definitely contumacious. By his
repeated failure, refusal or inability to comply with the: CA resolutions,
respondent displayed not only reprehensible conduct but showed an
utter lack of respect for the CA and its orders. Respondent ought to
know that a resolution issued by the CA, or any court for that matter,
is not a mere request that may be complied with partially or
selectively.

Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the
court. In particular; Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
states that it "is the duty of an attorney [t]o observe and maintain the
respect due to courts of justice and judicial officer." In addition. Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "[a] lawyer
shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal process." Also, Canon 11 provides that a
"lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others."

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme

Court: grounds therefor.- A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearring as an attorney for a party to a case without authority [to
do so]. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers constitutes
malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)

This Court, in Anudon v. Cefra19 citing Sehastian v. Atty. Bajar,20 held

that a lawyer's obstinate refusal to comply with the court’s orders not
only betrayed a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscored
his disrespect towards the court’s lawful orders which was only too
deserving of reproof

"Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and

processes, and this deference is underscored by the fact that willful
disregard thereof may subject the lawyer not only to punishment for
contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well." 21 In this case,
respondent deliberately ignored five CA Resolutions, thereby violating
his duty to observe and maintain the respect due the courts.

In one case,22 the Court suspended a lawyer from the practice of law

for one year for having ignored twelve (12) CA Resolutions. The Court
found that the said lawyer's conduct gave the impression that he was
above the duly constituted judicial authorities of the land, and looked
down on them with a patronizing and supercilious attitude. In this
case, we find the penalty of suspension for six (6) months, as
recommended by the IBP, commensurate under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Claro Jordan M. Santamaria

is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective
upon his receipt of this Resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's personal

records as attorney, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country through the Office of the Court
Administrator

SO ORDERED.

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