CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is the body responsible for the conduct

of general elections in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic (from 1999 to date). It was established by the

provisions of the 1999 Constitution as amended and it has successfully conducted five

consecutive successful general elections. INEC has constitutional powers and the Electoral Act

2010 mandates the Commission to undertake responsibilities of conducting elections and

registration as well as monitoring political parties and their activities. Political party financing is

a difficult task to monitor and regulate even in advanced democracies as a result of the

allegations of corrupt practices involved and the absence of a strong legal mechanism for the

monitoring. ( Augustine Adah, 2014) Less than four months to the 2015 general elections in the

country, stakeholders are getting worried over INEC's inability to monitor sources of large

amount of money being spent by political parties during campaigns. It is alleged that politicians

have budgeted large sum of money for the 2015 general elections. That was why on October 28

Independent Advocacy Project (IAP) in collaboration with One Voice a Non- Governmental

organizations organized a one day stakeholders' workshop in Lagos to brainstorm on the way

forward. The gathering attracted leaders of several civil societies' organizations and the media.

This is a research work is on the role and effectiveness or otherwise of INEC in monitoring

political parties’ campaign expenditure during the 2015 General Elections.

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 The issue of political party finance has been acknowledged as having a complex nature

globally (Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002). It is complex because of the inability of existing mechanisms

put in place by different countries to adequately monitor how political parties raise funds and

spend them. Examples exist to show that monitoring the finances of political parties is a problem

even in advanced democracies. For instance, there have been problems in observing the financial

dealings of political parties in the United Kingdom (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1989; Fisher, 2000); the

United States (Alexander, 1989, McSweeney, 2000); Canada (Palthiel, 1989); Germany

(Saalfeld, 2000); Italy (Ciaurro, 1989) and so on. Notwithstanding this intricacy, it does not

diminish the ability of any country to develop a system that is capable of subduing the negative

influence of money on its electoral process. This explains why despite the convolution associated

with political party financing, democracy in the countries listed above as examples, has

flourished for centuries.

The functions of political parties have already been explicated elsewhere by scholars and,

therefore, need no replication here (Ukase, 2006; Heywood, 2007; Salih, 2003; Randall, 1988;

Clapham, 1985 and Kura, 2011). Be that as it may, Heywood (2007: 276) has listed the broad

functions of political parties to include the following: representation, elite formation and

recruitment, goal formation, interest formation and aggregation, socialization and mobilization

and organization of government. Granted that political parties are often defined by a central

function – that of filling political offices and the wielding of governmental power, their impact

on the political system is substantially broader and more complex. In this connection, there are

dangers in sweepingly generalizing about the functions of parties. For instance, while political

parties open to electoral contests and competitions are perceived as bastions of democracy,

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regime parties that enjoy a monopoly of the political and democratic process are seen as

instruments of manipulation and control.

That said, money is critical if political parties must be seen to be performing their statutory

obligations within their respective spaces. Without the necessary funds, it would be certainly

difficult for politicians and political parties to articulate and showcase their ideas and visions to

the electorate. Political parties, therefore, require funds to be able to sell their programmes and

manifestoes to the public. It is only by so doing that the electorate can make informed choices

about which political party to support or not. Underscoring the importance of funding,

Doorenspleet (2003: 182) states that, “funding determines the number of campaign staff, the

number of vehicles to reach voters in the country, the amount of advertising on radio and

television, and so on.” In a nutshell, funding can substantially aid party institutionalization.

Unfortunately, party funding, especially campaign financing globally but particularly in

most African countries is fraught with despicable levels of corruption. For example, Hopkin

(cited in Kura, 2011: 271-272) argues that the manner in which parties fund their activities has

been quite embarrassing. He stressed that series of corruption scandals have affected parties and

their leaders. He pointed out that in Italy, France, Belgium, Spain, Germany and the United

Kingdom (UK), parties have been involved in funding scandals and violation of funding

regulations. Similarly, studies have evidently documented the growing increase in corruption

through political party funding (Hopkin cited in Kura: 272).

In Africa, the issue of party/ campaign financing is also fraught with a lot of controversies

and scandals. For example, studies have shown that in some countries such as South Africa and

Botswana, where private and foreign donations to political parties are not subject to any

regulations, the dominant (ruling) parties have continued to attract substantial domestic and

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foreign donations to the detriment of the opposition parties (Doorenspleet; 182). Apart from the

fact that these ruling parties have better access to public and private funding, they also have

better access to state resources, thereby increasing their opportunity for further electoral success.

Nigeria has had its own fair share of campaign funding palaver. For instance, since the return of

democratic governance in 1999, party/campaign financing have remained an issue of conjecture.

Granted that some efforts have been made to reform laws regulating political campaigns and

party funding, campaign financing and their abuses thereof have remained a recurring decimal.

It is against this background that this research critically interrogates political parties and

election/campaign financing in Nigeria, with specific emphasis on the two main presidential

candidates (President Goodluck Jonathan of the People’s Democratic Party PDP and General

Mohammadu Buhari of the All Progressive Congress [APC]) in the 2015 general elections. This

research also provides answers to the following questions: what are the constitutional and

statutory limits of political parties with respect to campaign financing?

Have political parties kept faith with these regulations? What institution(s) are charged with

the responsibility of monitoring the compliance of political parties with these regulations and

have they been able to effectively carry out these statutory obligations? What can be done to

strengthen institutional checks on campaign financing in Nigeria? These and other variegated

issues are the main thrust of this paper. For the purpose of achieving the above, this research is

divided into seven sections. Following the introduction, section two treats conceptual issues,

while chapter three examines the constitutional and statutory limits/restraints to campaign

financing. Section four analyses the historical trajectory of campaign financing in Nigeria since

1999, while section five specifically x-rays the experience in 2015. Section six provides realistic

4
policy options and recommendations that would help in checking and monitoring campaign

financing. Section seven concludes the research.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The meaning of political finance is often unclear, eliciting conflicting and varying explanations

from scholars and politicians, therefore needs some clarification. It must be noted that

conventional definitions of political corruption (such as the use of public offices for unauthorized

private gains) often do not apply to corrupt political financing. It has been argued albeit

successfully that the use of public office for private gain does not apply to all forms of political

fund raising (Duscinsky: 190). It is felt that, challengers to respective political offices are by

definition outside of public office, but may still accept money in exchange for promise to misuse

public office or grant special offers or assistance to those who supposedly assisted them during

electioneering campaigns, at the detriment of the community or state after they emerged

victorious at the polls or during electoral contests.

This in itself poses a serious problem in the polity especially during the post-election period.

For instance, Duscinsky differentiates between ordinary political corruption and corruption in the

field of political financing thus: “the difference between ordinary political corruption and

corruption in the field of political financing is that, in the latter case, money is not necessarily

used for private gain, but rather for the gain of a political party or of a candidate” Gutmann and

Thompson (2004)

Generally speaking, references in common parlance to “corrupt” financing could be categorized

into the following

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 Political contributions that are inconsistent or contravene existing and extant laws on

campaign financing: This include illegal donations which are often regarded as scandalous, even

if there is no suggestion that the donors obtained any improper benefit in return for their

contributions.

The use for campaign or party objectives of money that a political office holder has received

from a corrupt transaction: Here, all that differentiates corrupt campaign funding from other

forms of political corruption is the use to which the bribe is put by the bribe taker. For instance,

instead of taking corrupt money for personal uses, the bribe taker gives part or all the proceeds to

his her party or campaign chest. Diane Tucker, Dawn Teo (2008)

Unauthorized use of state resources for partisan political purposes: This is a common

noticeable feature of ruling parties’ campaigns in established and developing democracies alike.

For example, in parts of Africa and Soviet Union, long term victory allows a dominant party

better access to state resources available to office holders at the national and state levels. Such

funds are blatantly used for electioneering purposes. Mike R. Horwitz (2017)

Contributions from disreputable sources: It is a general presumption that tainted sources are

likely to have tainted motives. Grants/financial assistance received from disreputable sources by

political parties during electioneering periods create the impression that such assistance was

granted in exchange of favour or promises of future favour (See Doorenspleet; 182).

All the forms of corrupt campaign funding described above have to do with parties and

election campaigns and are certainly of interest to us in this paper. Nigeria, particularly, has had

its own fair share of the challenges of handling the various ramifications of campaign financing

since the return of democratic governance in 1999. Despite available extant laws on campaign

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and political financing, the State has not been able to grapple with the antics of politicians and

this should not only worry us but should also be of interest to all and sundry.

Even though in some instances INEC was found to be a complementary factor in the

irregularities and malpractices that took place in the electoral process in Nigeria, the entire

process was hijacked and subverted by the politicians who overpowered all efforts put in by

INEC in making the elections presentable and credible as well as acceptable. Politicians turned

politics into war and strove to win at all costs using all forms of manipulative activities such as

vote buying, excessive spending above the set limit, hiring thugs, rigging and other forms of

corrupt practices in the electoral process. In the real sense of it, while there might be dubious and

corrupt behaviour from the INEC in the conduct of general elections in Nigeria, the activities and

attitudes of politicians made it extremely difficult for INEC to have the freedom of conducting a

credible and acceptable election at the national and international levels.

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The following are the objectives of this study

1. To examine the effect and the challenges of monitoring political party campaign

financing in Nigeria by INEC.

2. To asses INEC and the challenges of monitoring political party campaign financing in

Nigeria.

3. To define the possibilities and challenges INEC has in monitoring political party

campaign financing in Nigeria.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

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 1. What is the effect and the challenges of monitoring political party campaign financing in

Nigeria by INEC?

2. Why are there challenges in monitoring political party campaign financing in Nigeria by

INEC?

3. What are the possibilities and challenges INEC has in monitoring political party

campaign financing in Nigeria?

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The result of the study will be significant to the electorate and Nigeria in general. It is important

to stress from the onset that there is a hiatus in research on issues of campaign and party funding

generally but particularly in Nigeria. Despite extensive studies on virtually all aspects of political

parties, researchers appear to have paid little or no attention on financial issues, especially

campaign finances (Fisher and Eisenstadt, 2004). In fact, studies hardly exist on our shelves on

campaign/election financing of political parties and their implications for our political and

democratic trajectory. That said, what then is party or campaign finance? The narrowest meaning

of the term is “money for electioneering” (Duschinsky, 2006: 189). However, because political

parties play a crucial role in election campaign in many parts of the world and because it is hard

to sometimes draw a distinct line between the campaign costs of party organizations and their

routine expenses, party funds are sometimes considered as “campaign finance” too.

1.6 SCOPE AND DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY

The study basically deals with INEC and the challenges of monitoring political party campaign

financing in Nigeria and in the 2015 General Elections, INEC under the leadership of a reputable

Professor of Political Science, Attahiru Mohammed Jega, succeeded in conducting an election

8
that was seen as credible and fair, unprecedented in the history of the Nigerian Fourth Republic.

Perhaps, some of the factors that contributed to the success of INEC in conducting a credible

election in 2015 were the introduction of card readers for electronic voting which drastically

curbed rigging and other irregularities in addition to the emergence of a strong opposition party,

APC which squarely challenged PDP in the polls. Other issues that contributed to the success of

the elections included the insecurity issue, corruption, poverty, unemployment and the desire of

Nigerians to do away with the sixteen (16) years of PDP rule.

This study deals with the aspect of INEC and challenges of monitoring political party campaign

financing in Nigeria. The study is however limited by the fact that Nigeria operate a multy party

system of Government it will be difficult to study the whole political party all over the country.

1.7 OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

INEC: Independent National Electoral Commission

CHALLENGES: An instigation or antagonization intended to convince a person to perform an

action they otherwise would not.

MONITORING: The act of detecting the presence of signals, such as electromagnetic radiation,

sound or visual signals, and the measurement thereof with appropriate measuring instruments.

POLITICAL PARTY: A political organization that subscribe to a certain ideology and seeks to

attain political power through representation in government.

CAMPAIGN: A series of operations undertaken to achieve a set goal.

FINANCING: A transaction that provides funds for a business.

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REFERENCES

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Augustine Adah (2014), Senior Correspondent. ( Daily Independent)

Alexander. D. (1989), Urban Landslides. (University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA)

Clapham, C. (1985), Third World Politics: An Introduction (London and Sydney: Croom Helm).

Doorenspleet, R. (2003), “Political Parties, Party Systems and Democracy in Sub-Saharan

Africa” in Salih, A (ed), African Political Parties (London: Pluto Press)

Duschinsky, M.P. (2006), “Party Political Funding” in Stapenhurst, R. Johnston, N and Pelizo, R

(eds), The Role of Parliament in Curbing Corruption (Washington D.C: The World

Bank).

Fisher, J. and Eisenstadt, T.A. (2004), “Introduction: Comparative Party Finance.” Party

Politics, Vol 10. No.6.

Heywood, A. (2007), Politics (New York: Palgrave Foundations).

Hopkin, J. (2006) “Conceptualizing Political Clientelism: Political Exchange and Democratic

Theory,” Paper Presented at the Annual Conference of American Political Science

Association (APSA), Panel: Conceptual Analysis: Unpacking Clientelism, Governance

and Neoliberalism, Loews Philadelphia and the Pennsylvania Convention Centre,

Philadelphia.

 Diane Tucker, Dawn Teo (3 November 2008). "Off The Bus: Obama Campaign Rewrites

Fundraising Rules by Selling Merchandise"

Kura, S.Y.B. (2011), “Political Parties and Democracy in Nigeria: Candidate Selection, Campaign

and Party Financing in People’s Democratic Party” in Journal of Sustainable Development in

Africa, Vol. 13, No. 6.

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 McSweeney. (2000), The fallacy of "national culture" identification (Royal Holloway,

University of London

Pinto-Duschinsky. (2002), Journal of Democracy (Johns Hopkins University Press).

Palthiel, K. Z. (1989), “Canadian Election Expense Legislation, 1963 – 85: A Critical Appraisal

or was the Effort Worth it?” in Alexander, H. E. (ed.) Comparative Political Finance in the

1980s, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 51–75.

Randall, V. (ed) (1988), Political Parties in the Third World (London: Sage Publications).

Ukase, P.I. (2006), “Political Parties and the Sustenance of Democracy in Nigeria” in Journal of

Research and Contemporary Issues (JRCI), Vol 2, No. 1&2.

CHAPTER TWO

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 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 INTRODUCTION

The debate about party funding and campaign finance has generally revolved around the negative

effects of “uncontrolled, undisclosed and opaque political finance” as a major challenge to the

integrity of elections in emerging and mature democracies alike. According to the outgoing chair

of Nigerian Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Professor Attahiru

Muhammadu Jega, transparency of political and election campaign finance is central to a vibrant

and sustainable democracy (INEC, 2015:5). It has a decisive effect on operations and quality of

democracy operative in country. Thus, the issue of party and or campaign finance remains

integral to sanitize Nigeria’s growing electoral democracy given the corrosive influence of

money and abuse of state and administrative resources (SAR) on our electoral geography

(Salman, 2015).

Money exerts far-reaching influence on our electoral democracy as it is required for the running

of political parties and for the candidates to finance their campaigns (Adetula, 2014:7;

Onyekpere, 2013:1). But the challenge has often been how to reduce the undue influence of

money so that it does not subvert the will of the people and the democratic process. Perhaps this

explains the reason why our electoral laws usually place limitations on the amount of money an

individual or entity can donate for election campaigns and maximal ceiling candidates can spend

in relation to different categories of electable offices in the country such as presidential,

gubernatorial elections amongst others.

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 Campaign finance is defined as the collection of funds and expenditure in relation to election

campaign (INEC, 2015:7). The Political Party Finance Handbook (PPFH) developed by the

INEC describes campaign expenditure as any expenditure incurred by a party for the purposes;

that is solely for the purpose, of enhancing the standing of or promoting electoral success for a

party at a forthcoming or future elections. This includes issuing disparaging materials relating to

another party or its candidates. Thus, for the purpose of monitoring media spending, campaign

expenditure is conceptualized as “expenditure incurred by or behalf of a registered political party

or candidate to promote the party and candidate at an election or in connection with future

elections, including expenditure that has the aim of damaging the prospects of another party or

candidate”(OSJI, 2005).

This conceptualization not only includes expenditure incurred by a political party or

individual candidates, but also spending on behalf of political parties or candidates by third

parties, such as their support groups, hidden advertisements by state and public institutions, or

institutions supported by the state. Evidently, third party spending is somehow treated as both

income and expenditure. This is important in order to guide in developing template for tracking

campaign advertorials in the newspapers. More often than not, third party spending is often used

as a way of evading legal limits on campaign expenditure, but it could also be a perfectly

legitimate form of political expression for individuals and organizations (OSJI, 2005). Therefore,

the line between legitimate and questionable third party spending is not always clear. The

approach favoured in the literature is focusing on campaign outputs and estimating their costs or

market value.

2.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

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2.1.1 Financing Political Parties in Nigeria: A Glance at the Pre-2015 Era

The years that preceded the 2015 general elections in Nigeria as it affects financing political

parties were enmeshed in practices that obstructed the emergence of a viable democracy through

free and fair elections (Aluaigba, 2009b). The pre-2015 period particularly during the 1999, 2003

and 2007 general elections, the issue of political party finance was in a messy state because the

laws regulating it were loosely defined while political parties had access to unwarranted sources

of raising money including the public purse. The scenario slightly changed during the 2011 and

2015 elections due to series of reforms carried out by the Professor Attahiru Jega-led INEC. Let

us briefly look at three key areas in the era under discussion here up to 2015; these areas include

the legal framework for financing political parties in Nigeria, sources of funds available to

political parties and some unethical practices these parties indulged in while sourcing and

expending their funds. The legal framework stipulating the rules and regulations that political

parties must adhere to are contained in Nigeria‟s 1999 constitution and the Electoral Act 2010.

On its part, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 in Section 225(2)

specifically requires the political parties to disclose their sources of funds and their manner of

expenditures. Peerenboom, Randall (2004). The areas touched by the constitution are sources of

funds to parties, declaration of assets and annual account statements. The Constitution is silent

on other details like specific amounts parties can receive as donations and how much is to be

expended for campaigns.

The Electoral Act 2010 on the other hand, is more detailed than the Constitution about party

finances. The Act provide details in Sections 86, 91 and 93 on monitoring the finances of

political parties by the INEC, limitations on election expenses and penalties for violators, and

disclosure of sources of funds by parties respectively. Specifically, in Section 91(9) the Act
15
limits the amount of donations to parties by stating that “an individual or other entity shall not

donate more than N1m to any candidate”. In the same section, the Act limits the expenses on

elections into various political offices to a maximum of N1 billion for president, N200 million

for governor, N40 million for senate, N10 million for state assembly and local government

chairman, and N1million for councilor. Punch, September 13, (2018) Furthermore, on

disclosures, the Act categorically states that “a political party shall not accept any monetary or

other contribution exceeding N100,000 unless it can identify the source of the money or other

contribution to the Commission [INEC]”. All these provisions are supposed to guide political

parties in their conduct during any electioneering period and help the INEC in monitoring the

parties to ensure compliance to these standards. How well these provisions were adhered to

before the 2015 elections will be discussed further.

Prior to 2011, the sources of funds available to political parties were twofold, namely public

and private sources. During this era, political parties in Nigeria received funds from the public

purse in form of grants from the INEC to the extent that in 2008, the then 50 parties received as

much as N300 million from the electoral body (Bisalla and Jimoh cited in Aluaigba, 2009a) to

finance their activities. However, when Professor Attahiru Jega was appointed the chairman of

the INEC in June 2010, he introduced a number of reforms in INEC. One of the reforms was a

stoppage to financing political parties by the INEC. The justification for this change was to

forestall the evolution of very weak political parties that existed only to collect the INEC‟s

annual grant without substantive contribution to, and impact on the electioneering process in

Nigeria. Following this development, parties were left with only one option that is, to generate

funds from private sources. As shown in Figure 1 below, a recent study has confirmed that

private sources make-up the bulk of the financial resource of political parties in Nigeria. These

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sources include donations from friends, corporate donations, donations from Nigerians abroad,

anonymous sources, loans and so on.

It is noteworthy to point out that it is in the process of generating funds from these private

sources that often provide avenues for political parties to engage in fraudulent and corrupt

financial practices. This is because, as averred by Walecki (2003: 3), the “restrictions imposed

on political parties and individual candidates by funding regulations often create loopholes

allowing for irregular political finance”. This applies to the Nigerian case where individual

politicians and political parties capitalize on the lapses in the provisions of the 1999 Constitution

and the Electoral Act 2010 regarding political finance to commit unlawful acts. The most

common unethical practices political parties and individual politicians in Nigeria indulge in

include but not limited to illegal expenditure including vote buying, funding from infamous

sources, selling appointments, honors, or access to information, abuse of state resources,

demanding contributions from public servants and activities that contravene political finance

regulations. Other financial irregularities are political contributions for favors, contracts or policy

change, forcing private organizations to pay „protection money‟, limiting access to funding for

opposition parties and the like (Walecki, 2003; Saffu, 2003; Bryan and Baer, 2005 and Orji, Eme

and Nwoba, 2014). These illegal practices have been orchestrated during all the elections

conducted in the Fourth Republic in Nigeria from 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 to 2015. For instance,

in 1999, at the fundraising dinner of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), the candidate who

eventually became its flag bearer turned-in over N400 million (Saffu, 2003: 23) well above the

amount stipulated by the then existing electoral law. In its assessment report of the January 2003

primary elections, the Transition Monitoring Group, a coalition of civil society organizations

bitterly complained that during the primaries by the PDP, the All Nigerian Peoples Party

17
(ANPP), the All Progressives‟ Grand Alliance (APGA), the National Democratic Party (NDP)

and the United Nigeria People‟s Party (UNPP), “there was widespread bribery of delegates with

sacks stuffed with money to influence their votes” (cited in Orji, Eme and Nwoba, 2014: 7). On

November 15, 2008, the PDP organized a fund raising ceremony to construct a new secretariat in

Abuja. At the occasion, businessmen such as Femi Otedola and Aliko Dangote were reported to

have contributed N1 billion and N3 billion respectively, while Strabag, one of the construction

companies in Nigeria donated N100 million.

There was an anonymous donation of N100 million (Okocha and Taiwo, 2008). Despite the

fact that these and other donations to political parties contravened the electoral laws, no action

was instituted by the INEC to prosecute the ailing parties and individuals either because the

electoral body did not monitor the parties or lacked the will and capacity to take legal action

against them. As it will be demonstrated in the next section of this paper, electioneering events

leading to the 2015 general elections were not different from the episodes presented above and

cannot be absolved from similar financial misconducts.

2.1.2 How Well Did INEC Monitor Political Party Campaign Funds Prior to the 2015

Elections?

In order to answer this question, let us quickly highlight the trend of events relating to

fundraising by political parties preparatory to the 2015 general elections to clearly appreciate the

trajectory of the process. In doing this, we will stress the nature of funds generated by parties,

whether they adhered to existing laws or contravened them and the efforts (if any) made by the

INEC to monitor the fund-raising process. A total of 28 political parties (see Appendix) were

registered by the INEC to partake in the 2015 general elections. Expectedly, following the lifting

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of the ban on campaign activities on November 16, 2014 in line with the INEC‟s election

timetable; all political parties sprang into action. It must be noted that despite the long list of

recognized parties, two major ones dominated the political terrain. They were the then ruling

party the PDP and the erstwhile major opposition party, the All Progressive Congress (APC).

Their dominance of the electioneering process before the 2015 elections was exhibited by the

political maneuver of some „smaller‟ parties who declared their allegiance to either of the two

mega parties by adopting their presidential candidates. For instance, the Accord Party (AP), the

Alliance for Democracy (AD), the Labour Party (LP), the New Nigeria Peoples Party (NNPP),

the Progressive Peoples Alliance (PPA), etc. all adopted the former President Goodluck Jonathan

of the PDP as their presidential candidate (Thisday, March 12, 2015; Daily Post, February 7,

2015 and Premium Times, February 4, 2015). The scheming by some of the parties was to ensure

victory in the 2015 elections or at least to identify with the party that was likely to emerge

victorious after the polls.

Following the alignments and re-alignments by the 28 political parties, they, apart from

jostling internally to produce their party flag bearers at different levels, they embarked on

aggressive fundraising drive to finance their campaigns. However, as already mentioned above,

the attention was focused on the two major parties, the PDP and the APC. A look at how these

two parties raised their campaign funds suffices at this point. The main public fundraising event

by the PDP was held on Saturday December 20, 2014 at a dinner in the old Banquet Hall of the

Presidential Villa, Abuja. During the occasion, N21.27 billion was raised via donations from

individuals, corporate bodies, key sectors and state governments. For instance, individuals who

donated at the dinner included Professor Jerry Gana, N5 billion; Chief Tunde Ayeni, N1 billion;

Sam Egwu, N1 million; Halima Jubril, N5 million, etc. Some corporate bodies that made

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donations at the dinner were Cizaly Limited, N250 million; Ajuji Best Western Hotel, N1

million; Cifex, N10 million; Shelter Development Limited, N250 million; Emzor, N50 million;

SIFAX, N100 million and so on. Donations also came in from different sectors of Nigeria‟s

economy; they were from the construction sector, N310 million; transport sector, N1 billion; real

estate sector, N4 billion; energy sector, N500 million; auto sector, N450 million; food and

agriculture, N500 million; oil and gas N5 billion, etc. On the part of state governments, the 21

PDP states governors donated a total of N1.05 billion to the campaign fund (Thisday, December

21, 2014; The Nation, December 21, 2014; The Focus, December 21, 2014; Punch, December

21, 2014; PM News, December 21, 2014).

There were also numerous donations from anonymous and unidentified sources simply

classified as friends or associates of the PDP. Due to colossal amounts of money donated to the

party which clearly breached the 1999 Constitution and the Electoral Act 2010 the event

generated some reactions from members of the public. For example, Professor Jonah Onuoha in

an interview with the Punch newspaper on January 4, 2015 made a critical assessment of the

PDP fundraising as follows: But if you look at the recent fundraiser for President Goodluck

Jonathan‟s 2015 re-election bid, its all too easy to see there is a problem. The electoral act

stipulates that a presidential candidate cannot raise more than N1bn for his or her campaign.

Therefore, what we are contending with here is not the fundraiser but the amount generated - the

amount cannot be justified. The law is very clear on the amount of money to be donated. What

we have seen in that fundraiser is a clear violation of the electoral law. Other issues like whether

those who donated money for the president are corrupt people or not do not arise here. I will

admit that they have a right to raise money for campaigns but the Peoples Democratic Party will

have some explanations to do about the amount donated to it.

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 The APC, one of the major political parties that participated in the 2015 elections also delve

into fund raising for its campaign. Its method however, differed from its counterpart the PDP.

The method adopted by the APC was what it called “crowd funding platform” in which members

of the public were free to make donations through direct deposit and purchase of recharge cards.

Through this strategy, on December 24, 2014, the party raised a total of N54, 415,386.70. The

actual target of the APC was to generate N50 billion in all; out of this amount, it was “set to raise

N10billion from the general public through direct contribution. Another N40billion will come

from donations and contributions from the party‟s elected members including state governors

[and APC members of the national and state assemblies] to take the money being shopped for to

N50 billion” (Vanguard, February 22, 2015). The inclusion of APC state governors and members

of the national and state assemblies as donors to the party‟s campaign funds raises questions on

how compliant it was with the Electoral Act 2010 and the 1999 Constitution that forbids elected

public office holders from making donations to political parties.

Arising from the foregoing illustration that shows the fragrant contravention of Nigeria‟s

electoral laws by the two key political parties that participated in the 2015 general elections, the

questions that beg for answers are, did INEC make effort to monitor the process of fund-raising

by these parties? If the electoral body indeed monitored the parties, did it apply the penalties as

prescribed by the Electoral Act 2010 against these two political parties and any other ailing one

for subverting the electoral laws? A consideration of some aspects of monitoring the finances of

political parties by the INEC will show some strives the body has made in the past to ascertain

the state of finances of these parties. If we take the issue of auditing of political parties‟ accounts

for example, the INEC has attempted to audit the parties‟ accounts and publish the reports in line

with Section 89(4) of the Electoral Act 2010. In the 2011 audit report of political parties that was

21
published (see http://www.inecnigeria.org/?page_id=18), the INEC indicted all the then existing

55 parties for their inability to properly keep their books of accounts as enshrined in Section

93(2) of the electoral act (Vanguard, February 20, 2013).

The indictment demonstrated INEC‟s willingness to keep the parties on their toes with

regards to transparency and accountability in their finances. The electoral body went further to

delist or deregister some of the political parties thus, reducing the number of parties to 28 in

readiness for the 2015 elections. In order to provide a structure for monitoring political parties‟

finances before the 2015 polls, the INEC further established a department to monitor the

campaign expenses of parties (Daily Post, November 18, 2014).

However, despite these bold steps that the INEC took, there are still overarching questions

that the body should provide answers to. Has the electoral body penalized the PDP and its

presidential candidate in the 2015 elections, former President Goodluck Jonathan for receiving

far above N1 billion from individuals and business entities as shown earlier in this paper, in

contravention to Section 91(9) of the Electoral Act 2010? Has the APC been prosecuted for not

revealing those who contributed to its multi-billion naira fund? Orji, Eme and Nwoba (2014: 4)

further questions: Did the Commission place any limit on the amount of contribution which

individuals or cooperate agencies made to political parties in the course of fund raising for the

[2015] elections? Do all political parties have records of all contributions to their campaign

funds? Does INEC have a record, which shows the total expenses of all the political parties for

the purposes of invoking the provisions of section 84, 92 and 93 sub sections (2), (3) and (6) of

the 2004, 2006 and 2010 Electoral Acts? What steps have been taken to sanction corporate

bodies that contributed to the campaign funds of political parties in total disregard of the

22
provisions of section 38 (2) of the Company and Allied Matters Act (1990), which prohibits

donations or gifts of any of its property or funds to a political party or association.

These and many other questions have revealed one important point, namely that the INEC

has the will to monitor the finances of political parties but lacks the capacity to do so. In 2005,

almost a decade before the 2015 elections, the electoral umpire admitted clearly that “there are

no available records on the exact amount of money spent by candidates and political parties”

(INEC, 2005: 9). This lays bare the INEC‟s weakness in cleansing the financial threshold of

political parties in Nigeria in order to make the electoral process in the country more transparent

and accountable at tandem with universally acceptable standards.

2.1.3 Roadblocks to Monitoring the Finances of Political Parties in Nigeria

There is a vast cache of literature on the multifaceted problem of monitoring the finances of

political parties in Nigeria specifically (Ilo, 2004; Adeyi, 2008; Walecki, 2008; Aluaigba, 2009a

and 2009c) and generally worldwide (Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002; Biezen, 2003; Ferdinand, 2003;

Institute for Democracy in South Africa, 2003; Bryan and Baer, 2005; Ghana Center for

Democratic Development, 2005; Johnston, 2005 and Ohman, 2014). Most of these data point to

the difficulty or near impossibility of fully checking how parties generate, and spend their money

due to certain factors that are either unique to Nigeria or are common across countries. In other

countries especially in advanced democracies of the west, notwithstanding the menacing effect

of these factors on financial practices by political parties; certain mechanisms have been

developed to forestall the palpable denigration of financial regulations by political parties. But in

Nigeria, coupled with the tender character of her democracy, these obstacles have ganged up to

23
asphyxiate efforts at enhancing transparency and accountability in the processes through which

political parties acquire funds to finance their activities.

What are some of these roadblocks to efforts at ensuring that there exist relative translucent

financial conduct by political parties in Nigeria? One of the prominent obstacles facing attempts

by the INEC to monitor the finances of political parties in Nigeria is lack of capacity by the

electoral body itself. The INEC lacks adequate manpower and skilled staff who will practically

track the expenditures of the 28 political parties considering that all the parties are expected to

have offices in all the 36 states of the country plus the Federal Capital Territory and the 774 local

government areas. Journal of Democracy 16 (July 2005) This problem is further compounded

during electioneering periods when all the parties engage in political activities at local, state and

national levels simultaneously. This demands a large pool of personnel (which the INEC

presently lacks) to sufficiently watch how political parties raise their funds and the ways they

spend them at all levels. There is a barrier posed by the expensive nature of Nigeria‟s electoral

process in terms how much candidates aspiring to contest for political offices have to pay to

secure their party‟s ticket to run for an election. Prior to the 2015 elections, the cost of

nomination forms by the PDP was N22 million, while the APC charged N25.5 million per

nomination form.

One of the APC candidates in its primaries, General Muhammadu Buhari had to take a bank

loan in order to pay for the forms (Vanguard, October 17, 2014). The implication of this political

trend is that, politics is inadvertently commercialized because if politicians have to borrow to pay

the very exorbitant rates for their parties‟ registration to contest elections on their platforms, they

(the politicians) will source funds from any means including vile ones to pay in order to contest

24
and it will be difficult for INEC to verify such sources. Logically, when they win elections into

any public office, the tendency is to recoup the money they spent during elections, thus

compounding the phenomenon of political corruption in Nigeria. This development enhances the

misdemeanor associated with the Nigerian political elite and has rendered democracy in the

country ironic (Aluaigba, 2002) because elected office holders seek to pursue their interest rather

than that of the electorate that voted them into office.

Similar to the above is the complex nature of Nigerian politics and party campaign process. It

is a common political practice in Nigeria for a candidate running for election into a given office

during campaigns to pay visit as homage to godfathers, traditional rulers, religious leaders, etc. to

solicit their support. During such visits, discussions are often held behind closed doors where

whatever transpires is unknown to the public. For example, in similar meetings in the South-

West before the 2015 polls by the former President Jonathan while seeking re-election, “a

handful of Obas received as high as $250,000 each, while the least paid were traditional rulers of

small towns who were given $10,000 each” (Punch, March 15, 2015). The point is that this kind

of campaign expenditures is difficult to track because of the conditions under which they are

expended and this explains why the INEC was unable to monitor and consequently prosecute any

political party or its candidate despite glaring evidences of super campaign expenditures in the

build-up to the 2015 elections. Another obstacle encumbering the effective monitoring of

campaign expenditures by political parties relates to the elephantine privileged position ruling

political parties usually occupy in Nigeria. A political party controlling power at the centre

wields tremendous influence on the political landscape to the extent that it becomes a near

impossibility to question what its leader, the ruling president and by the same token, the party

does. In this instance, it therefore becomes very difficult to draw a demarcation line between

25
what a president does for the generality of the people and his/her political party. This confusion

definitely creates room for the diversion of state resources (especially state funds) to serve the

interest of the ruling political party to the disadvantage of other parties; this happens at all levels

of government. In the pre2015 electioneering activities “the ruling PDP held series of partisan

political meetings in the State House (Presidential Villa), including a fund-raising dinner for the

President/PDP, or using presidential aircrafts, motorcade (convoys of SUVs), state house

facilities and other paraphernalia, including deploying publicly paid presidential aides/staffers

for electioneering campaign purposes” (The Nation, February 12, 2015). At the state level for

example, the APC controlled Rivers State Government almost denied the PDP the usage of the

state-owned Adokiye Amiesiemeka 40,000 capacity stadium in Port Harcourt for the PDP

presidential rally. Earlier, before the 2007 general elections, the ruling PDP used state funds, the

police and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) to harass opposition parties

and candidates that were likely contenders for the presidency (Human Rights Watch, 2007). This

kind of scenario is antagonistic to any effort at monitoring how state funds are utilized.

Funding constraints is one of the commonest problems virtually every organization faces

and the INEC is not an exception. Preparatory to the conduct of the 2015 plebiscite, the INEC

itself identified “insecurity, lack of adequate funding, attitude of the political class and inactive

citizenry” (Premium Times, August 29, 2014) as the four major hindrances to the conduct of free

and fair elections. The practical demonstration of the INEC‟s financial woes was when the

electoral body demanded N93 billion but only N45 billion was approved by the National

Assembly (Daily Trust, April 14, 2014). The amount approved was a far cry from what the

commission needed to adequately prepare for the 2015 elections in terms of procuring materials,

training and emoluments for adhoc staff, training of its staff in the political parties‟ campaign

26
monitoring unit, etc. This was one of the likely reasons that the expenses of political parties

during the campaigns were not properly monitored because of non-availability of adequate

trained staff to cover the entire vast country. The lack of funds coupled with other factors such as

the dependence of the INEC on the executive where the President appoints the chairman of the

commission diminishes the will power of any INEC chairman to raise questions and investigate

the financial dealings of the president‟s ruling party. This makes the monitoring of campaign

finances of political parties in Nigeria an uphill task.

2.1.4 The Antidotes

Monitoring how much political parties expend during campaigns is significant for the growth of

democratic culture in emerging democracies. If such funds are left unregulated, there cannot be a

fair ground for candidates and political parties to compete during elections. In short, it will

amount to “inviting two people to participate in the race, with one participant turning up with a

bicycle, and the other with a sports car” (Ewing cited in Walecki, 2003: 7).

This is true because not all parties have equal economic prowess. There is thus, the need to

find concrete remedies to the problem created by uncontrolled party finances in Nigeria. But how

can we go about this? Some suggestions are made here. From all practical indications, the

burden and task of covering Nigeria entirely for the sake of monitoring the expenditures of

political parties is a gargantuan one that the INEC alone cannot handle. It is therefore, suggested

that a Special Advisory Council or agency on financing political parties in Nigeria separate from

the INEC should be established to relieve the body the yoke of monitoring political parties. The

council or agency can work in collaboration with the INEC. However, if the INEC should

continue with the herculean responsibility of overseeing the finances of parties, then, the

27
capacity of its newly established unit for monitoring the finances of political parties needs to be

beefed up. It should have well trained and adequate staff in addition to proper funding and

logistic support. The unit can work in alliance with the State Security Service (SSS) for

intelligent information gathering on the financial activities of political parties. The role of Civil

Society Organizations (CSOs) in fighting corruption in Nigeria is indispensable (Mohammed and

Aluaigba, 2012) and in the case of monitoring political parties‟ expenses, it is even more

desirable (Ohman, 2013: 124).

The INEC can work in collaboration with Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and

Community Based Organizations (CBOs) that are dispersed in all nooks and crannies of Nigeria.

One CSO can be selected to cover each of the 774 local governments in Nigeria and with modest

training and material support from INEC, proper monitoring of the financial conduct of existing

political parties will be achieved. However, in deciding which CSO to work with, INEC should

be very cautious about the credibility and integrity of the ones to be selected. This is significant

in order to avoid selecting CSOs that are often loyal to a particular political party and may end

up serving the interest of that party rather than that of the INEC. The very active role of the so-

called NGO, the Transformation Ambassadors of Nigeria (TAN) in the former President

Goodluck Jonathan‟s reelection bid during the 2015 elections raised questions on the character

of Nigerian NGOs that are required to be neutral and independent. Furthermore, CSOs can assist

the INEC in creating awareness in the electorate on the dangers of over-reliance on money rather

than ideology by political parties to attract voters‟ support. This will raise political awareness

and enhance informed choices by voters during elections. As a follow-up to the above proposal,

the deployment of technology is one way of monitoring party campaign expenses with ease. Just

as the case of monitoring elections through the use of internet-based platforms such as text

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massaging through mobile cell phones, facebook, twitter, etc. has proved useful in tracking

electoral malpractices; the same strategy can be applied for monitoring the expenditures of

parties on elections. If the INEC builds a network of CSOs all over the country, the reliance on

this form of technology will make instant tracking political party finances an attainable feat.

It is important to make the political parties part of the solution. The problem created by

unlawful expenditures on campaigns emanates from the political parties themselves and can be

solved by involving them by the INEC in the process of finding a cure for the political ailment.

The INEC should work closely with all the political parties by enhancing their capacity for

disclosures. The political parties should be educated on the significance of instituting reliable

book keeping culture and virile internal control mechanisms.

This will simplify the task of rendering annual accounts by parties and obtaining financial

data from them by the INEC. The mass media has a great role to play in enhancing transparency

in political party finances. The utility quotient of this tool will be very high if investigative

journalism is adopted by all practicing journalists to publish and expose all irregularities

committed by any political party.

Whatever, unlike normal press reporting whose validity can sometimes be contested by those

who might felt such reportage exaggerate, distort or under represent what really happened, for

example, adverts are different. Adverts are paid for by the sponsors which enable the individuals

and or groups to say what they want to say the way they would want their audience to receive the

information (Albert 2010:11). Thus political advertising provides the candidates and their

parties’ avenue to persuade voters to vote for them. The placement of political advertising in the

newspapers is one of the means by which political parties and candidates for elections

29
communicate directly with the electorate. Accordingly, it is one way by which election campaign

financing can be monitored since it constitutes one of electioneering campaign outputs with cost

outlays attached. Thus, the primary objective of this paper is to share findings from monitoring

spending on print media advertorials during the 2015 presidential electioneering campaigns

period in Nigeria. In the absence of full disclosure and lack of transparency in party funding,

political advertising and publicity in the press remain almost the only means of independently

estimating the amount of money spent on any significant component of campaign expenditure in

the country. Albert and Marco, 2010) Accordingly, spending on advertising is a particularly

attractive target for monitoring because it often constitutes a substantial expense, and it can be

monitored with a high degree of accuracy, as there is an observable record of expenditure (the

advertisements themselves).

2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.2.1 Theory of Political Parties

In defining political parties, Mohammed Salih has distinguished between the formalist and

substantive definitions of the concept. According to him, while the formalist definition of

political parties allows us to generalize about some universally assumed functions of political

parties, the substantive approach allows us to tease out the peculiarity of African political parties

as products of the socio-economic and political culture of their respective countries (Salih: 3).

Relying on Weiner (1967: 1-2), Salih espouses the formalist definition thus:

Parties are instruments of collective human action and creatures of political elite – either

politicians trying to control governments or government elites trying to control the masses. In

competitive systems, parties are organized by politicians to wins elections; in authouritarian

30
systems, parties are organized to affect the attitudes and behaviour of the population. In both

instances, an organizational structure must be forged. Money must be raised, cadres recruited,

officers elected or selected and procedures for internal governing established and agreed upon. In

fact party building has a logic of its own.

Although the substantive approach brings out the peculiarity of African political parties, the

formalist approach cited above is generic and captures much about Western and African political

parties. However, our point of departure is that there is no basis isolating African political parties

from the broader conceptualization of the term. This is because, Weiner’s contention that

“political parties are organized for the deliberate purpose of controlling state power and that they

have specific organizational structure, procedures, leadership, members, ideology, finance, etc.is

true for all political parties, Western and non-Western” (Cited in Salih: 3).

Heywood (2003: 272); Leacock (cited in Agarwal, 2008: 389); The African Leadership

Forum (2001: 3), Kura (2011), Ukase, P.I. and Geri, T.G. (2012; 33-33), and a host of many

other scholars view political parties more within the context of controlling governmental power.

For instance, Heywood (2003: 272) view a political party as a group of people that are organized

for the purpose of winning governmental power, by electoral means. He is, however, quick to

caution that political parties should not be confused with pressure groups as it is often the case.

This is because the functions of a political party is entirely different from that of pressure groups.

Political parties are also organizations whose members have values, ideals and aspirations in

common and at least participate in the organized contests/struggles for political power (Kura:

268).

Coleman and Roseberg defined political parties as associations formally organized with the

explicit and declared purpose of acquiring and to some extent maintaining legal control, either

31
singly or in coalition or electoral competition with other associations over the personnel and the

policy of the government of an actual or perspective sovereign state (cited in Kura:268). The

definition of the African Leadership Forum is also apt. According to them:

A political party is defined as an aggregate of people united by a common and collective desire

to capture political power and authourity within a legitimate and legal political framework by

canvassing for votes in a democratic polity (African Leadership Forum, 2000:3).

However one views it, there are certain common denominators in all these definitions elucidated

above; that of acquiring power and maintaining legal control of their respective spaces.

2.2.2 Theory of Campaign Financing

It is important to stress from the onset that there is a hiatus in research on issues of campaign and

party funding generally but particularly in Nigeria. Despite extensive studies on virtually all

aspects of political parties, researchers appear to have paid little or no attention on financial

issues, especially campaign finances (Fisher and Eisenstadt, 2004). In fact, studies hardly exist

on our shelves on campaign/election financing of political parties and their implications for our

political and democratic trajectory. That said, what then is party or campaign finance? The

narrowest meaning of the term is “money for electioneering” (Duschinsky, 2006: 189). However,

because political parties play a crucial role in election campaign in many parts of the world and

because it is hard to sometimes draw a distinct line between the campaign costs of party

organizations and their routine expenses, party funds are sometimes considered as “campaign

finance” too. According to this perspective, party funds go beyond campaign expenses but also

involve the cost of maintaining permanent offices, payment of salaries of staff, carrying out

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policy research; and engaging in political education, voter registration, and other regular

functions of parties (Duschinsky, 2006: 189). Besides, it is also felt that beyond campaigns and

parties, money is spent on direct political purposes such as political foundations and other

organizations. These organizations, though legally distinct from parties, are allied to them and

advance their interests. They are responsible for the costs of political lobbying, newspapers and

media expenses advertisements that are created and paid for to promote a partisan line. They also

take care of the costs of litigation in politically relevant cases involving their parties.

Be that as it may, generalizing and/ or merging campaign and political financing as

Duschinsky has done, especially in our context, is likely to create some confusion for us. This is

because why some countries have separate laws for both campaign and political finance, other

countries have unified laws for them. In Nigeria, for example, there are separate laws which

delineates campaign and political finances, and merging them would, therefore, create some

ambiguities in our analysis.

2.3 EMPERICAL FRAMEWORK

Globally, there are no shortages of regulations governing campaign money. It must interest us to

note that most of these regulations were introduced as responses to the dimensions and

magnitude of scandals witnessed in the countries concerned. The frequency with which new laws

regulating the injection of money into politics are introduced are a clear indications of the

challenges of making workable and implementable laws by various countries. It should also be

noted, however, that the range of issues relating to aspects of campaign and party financing are

so variegated that some of the provisions relating to same are contained in broader laws about

elections such as the constitution or electoral laws. Sometimes, they are also included in anti-

33
corruption legislations or media laws. Laws about voluntary associations and organizations may

also contain provisions containing aspects of political financing. Given that there are plethora of

laws on political financing, there are usually many laws in various countries that deals with this

subject. The existence of multiplicity of separate laws often complicate the task of regulatory

body or bodies responsible for enforcing these laws. Essentially, the main provisions of

political/campaign financing are centered on the following areas:

i. Prohibition against corrupt and illegal practices (such as vote buying).

ii. Financial deposits for candidates for public office

iii. Disclosure rules

iv. Spending limits

v. Contribution limits

vi. Bans on certain types of contributions (such as foreign contributions, anonymous

contributions, or contributions from business corporations).

vii. Political broadcasting rules

viii. Rules concerning the funding of internal party contest.

ix. Rules concerning the declaration of assets by candidates for public office

x. Measures to control the use of public resources for campaign purposes

In Nigeria, there are various constitutional and other legal instruments guiding the operation of

political parties, especially as it relates to campaign financing. These include the 1999

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended, the 2002 and 2006 Electoral Acts,

34
and 2010 Electoral Act as amended. Others include the statutory rules of the Independent

National Electoral Commission (INEC) and other informal rules. These laws provide copious

provisions of the extent and limitation of political parties with respect to campaign/political

financing. The constitution, for instance, is the first grund-norm governing the activities of

political parties in the country. Some studies have already made available detailed provisions of

the rules and regulations governing the internal and external operations of political parties

derived from the 1999 Constitution, therefore, we shall not allow that detain us here (See section

222-229 of the 1999 Constitution as amended). What is of utmost interest is the limitations

placed on political parties especially with respect to their funding activities by the 1999

Constitution.

For instance, section 225 sub section 2 of the 1999 Constitution is unambiguous on the finances

of political parties. It states that:

Every political party shall submit to the Independent National Electoral Commission a detailed

annual statement and analysis of its sources of funds and other assets together with a similar

statement of its expenditure is such form as the commission may require.

Sub sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the same provision are even more forthcoming on the roles of INEC

in checking the financial dealings and status of political parties. For instance, sub-section 3 states

that no political party shall -

(a) Hold or possess any funds or other assets outside Nigeria; or

(b) Be entitled to retain any funds or assets remitted or sent to it from outside Nigeria.

Sub-section 4 states that:

35
Any funds or other assets remitted or sent to a political party from outside Nigeria shall be paid

over or transferred to the commission within twenty-one days of its receipt with such information

as the commission may require.

Sub-section 5 further states that:

The Commission shall have power to give directions to political parties regarding the books or

records of financial transactions which they shall keep and, to examine all such books and

records.

Significantly, section 226 sub-section 1 permits INEC to mandatorily prepare and submit

annually to the National Assembly a report of the accounts and balance sheet of every political

party. In preparing its report, sub-section 2 of the same provision empowers INEC to:

Carry out investigations as will enable it form an opinion as to whether proper books of account

and proper records have been kept by any political party, and if the Commission is of the opinion

that proper books and accounts have not been kept by a political party, the Commission shall so

report.

It is also important to examine the provisions of section 228 of the 1999 Constitution,

especially as it deals with public funding of political parties and punishment for those that

contravene sections 221, 225 (3) and 227 of this constitution. To be specific section 228 states

inter-alia:

The National Assembly may by law provide-

(a) for the punishment of any person involved in the management or control of any political party

found after due inquiry to have contravened any of the provisions of sections 221, 225 (3) and

227;

36
(b) for the disqualification of any person from holding public office on the ground that he

knowingly aids or abets a political party in contravening section 225 (3) of this constitution;

(c) for an annual grant to the Independent National Electoral Commission for disbursement to

political parties on a fair and equitable basis to assist them in the discharge of their functions;

and

(d) for the conferment on the Commission of other powers as may appear to the National

Assembly to be necessary or desirable for the purpose of enabling the commission more

effectively ensure that political parties observe the provisions of this part of the chapter.

These are constitutional instruments aimed at closely monitoring and supervising the

activities of the income and expenditure of political parties. There are, however, some gaps,

especially in the implementation of these provisions. Looking at the provision of section 228, it

is clear that the framers of the 1999 Constitution bestowed on the National Assembly the powers

to make laws to provide for the type of punishment that should be imposed on politicians and

political parties that contravene the aforementioned provisions, but it has been difficult for INEC

to enforce this law. Similarly, section 228 (c) is unambiguous on the provision of public funding

to political parties on equitable basis, to assist them in the discharge of their functions. Also, the

National Assembly has enacted relevant laws to give effect to this provision but the extent of

implementation is difficult to ascertain. In the same vein, section 226 (1) requires INEC so report

to the National Assembly when political parties fail to keep proper books and accounts. The

fundamental question is, what is the National Assembly expected to do when a political party

contravene this provision? Does the Commission or National Assembly have the powers to

punish erring political parties? Truth of the matter is that INEC has not been performing this

constitutional functions since the return of democratic governance in 1999 as checks would

37
indicate; neither has the National Assembly been proactive in putting the Commission on its toes

to comply with these provisions.

The provision of public funds (sometimes referred to as subsidies) to political parties as

provided for in section 228(c) of the 1999 Constitution is very important in this analysis. This is

because it is not only aimed at assisting political parties in carrying out their activities, but also

an attempt at preventing them from getting funding from questionable and suspicious sources.

The introduction of public subsidies to political parties and individual candidates commenced in

the late 1950s and has been sustained by many countries, despite few efforts by countries such as

Italy and Venezuela to abolish or limit existing subsidies (Duschinsky: 192). Research conducted

reveals that by 2002, 59 percent of countries had laws providing for some direct public funding

of parties and there candidate (see

www.moneyandpolitics.net/researchpubs/pdf/financing_politics.pdf, p.72).

State subsidy or aid is especially common in Western Europe and in countries that emerged from

the Soviet bloc. It is less common in Asia, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. Examples of countries

that provide state subsidies to political parties in Africa include: Nigeria, Benin, Malawi,

Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa. Those that do not provide subsidies include Botswana,

Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius and Senegal (Doorenspleet, 2003: 182). The type and scale

of funding also varies from country to country. For example, in some countries these subsidies

are limited to election campaign activities, while in others it extends to other activities between

and beyond elections. In some African countries, cash-strapped governments have completely

eliminated subsidies to political parties, despite providing for it in their laws.

Perhaps, one area where the National Assembly has given effect to the 1999 Constitution is

in the area of the enactment of Electoral Acts. It is a statutory requirement in regulating the

38
activities of political parties in Nigeria, particularly during general elections. The Electoral Act is

enacted by the National Assembly based on recommendations of INEC. It is usually enacted

before any general elections and provisions of the Electoral Act guide the conduct of such an

election. Since the return of democratic governance in 1999, the National Assembly has passed

several Electoral Acts. These includes the 2002, 2006 and 2010 (and some amendments) which

guided the conduct of the 2003, 2007, 2011 and the 2015 general elections. It is important to note

that there was no Electoral Act for the 2015 general elections, as INEC relied on the 2010

Electoral Act as amended to guide and regulate the conduct of that election. In this entire

process, INEC is key because it is empowered by the 1999 Constitution to implement provisions

of the Electoral Act. Let us briefly examine some of the provisions of these Electoral Act,

particularly the 2010 Act as amended, which guided and regulated the conduct of the 2015

elections, especially as it affected campaign financing.

For example, the 2002 Electoral Act, which guided the conduct of the 2003 general elections

had an ambiguous provision, especially as it relates to election expenses. For instance, section

84(2) stated that:

Election expenses incurred by a Political Party for the management or the conduct of an election

shall not exceed in the aggregate the sum determined by multiplying 20 naira by the number of

names appearing in the final voters’ list for each constituency where there is a candidate

sponsored by the political party.

This provision was not just ambiguous but also very confusing. For instance, it attempted to

address campaign financing within respective constituencies but failed to address the finances for

presidential and gubernatorial candidates. This is because presidential and gubernatorial

candidates have the entire country or state as their constituencies. Besides, a cursory

39
interpretation of that provision would suggest that for constituency elections, candidates were not

expected to spend monies in excess of the number of people registered by INEC within that

constituency. What this meant is that if a state constituency had fifty thousand voters, this would

be multiplied by N20, which would amount to N1 million only. Most state and federal

constituencies did not have up to that number of voters in their registers. In addition, section

79(2) required political parties to submit all campaign expenses to INEC, not later than 90 days

from the date of the elections. More worrisome was the penalty to be imposed on political parties

that flouted that provision. For example, political parties in breach of this provision were liable

upon conviction to a fine of N100, 000, payable jointly or severally by the leaders of the political

party. This penalty was so mild that it would have been more profitable to breach this provision,

all things being equal.

To make the electioneering process relatively transparent, the 2006 Electoral Act tried to

address the ambiguity in the 2002 Electoral Act by clearly stipulating the maximum limits of

campaign expenses by candidates for respective political offices. For instance, section 93(1-12)

of the 2006 Electoral Act clearly stipulates the ceiling of elections expenses. This is intended to

curtail the influence of money in electioneering process. Also, table 1 reveals that presidential

candidates had the highest spending limit of N500 million during electioneering campaigns,

while governorship candidates had a ceiling of N100 million. Next in that order were candidates

for Senate and House of Representatives who could not spend more than N20 million and N10

million respectively. Contestants into State Houses of Assembly had N5 million spending limits,

while Local Government chairmanship and councillorship position spending ceiling were put at

N5 million and N500, 000.00 respectively. The same Act (section 93(9) also limited individual

and corporate donations to any contestant to N1 million. A novelty in this law is the limit of

40
individual and corporate donations to any candidates put at not more than N1 million [see

Section 93(9) of the 2006 Electoral Act].

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Adeyi, E. M. (2008), “Funding of Political Parties and Candidates in Nigeria: Analysis of the

Past and Present” in Adetula, V. A. O. (ed.), Money and Politics in Nigeria, Abuja:

International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES).

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Aluaigba, M. T. (2002), “The Irony of Democracy: The Nigerian Experience” in Kamilu, S. F.

(ed.) Democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Myths, Realities, Challenges and

Prospects, Kano: Triumph Publishing Company, pp. 78 – 103.

Aluaigba, M. T. (2009a), “Financing Political Parties in Africa: The Nigerian Experience, 1999 –

2008” in The Researcher: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Spring, Vol. XXII, No. 2, The

Jackson State University, Jackson, MS USA, pp. 104–127.

Aluaigba, M. T. (2009b), “The Travails of an Emerging Democracy: The Turbulent 2007

General Elections in Nigeria” in Mambayya House Journal of Democratic Studies,

December, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 23 – 38.

Aluaigba, M. T. (2009c), “The Strangled Route to Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria” in Jega,

A. M.; Wakili, H. and Zango, I. M. (eds.) Consolidation of Democracy in Nigeria:

Challenges and Prospects, Kano: Aminu Kano Centre for Democratic Research and

Training, Mambayya House, pp. 53 – 83.

Adetula, Victor (2014), “Party Funding Since 1999” in Centre for Democracy and Development

Working Paper: CDD/WKP/003.

Biezen, I. (2003), Financing Political Parties and Election Campaigns – Guidelines, Strasbourg

Cedex: Council of Europe, December.

Bryan, S. and Baer, D. (eds.) (2005), A Study of Party Financing Practices in 22 Countries,

Washington DC: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. Centre for

Democratic Research and Training, Mambayya House, Bayero University, Kano, (2008),

Research Report on Financing Political Parties in Nigeria, 1999 – 2007.

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Emelonye, U. (2004), “Political Finance in Nigeria: A Policy Agenda for Reform” in Obiorah,

N. (ed.) Political Finance and Democracy in Nigeria: Prospects and Strategies for

Reform, Lagos: Centre for Law and Social Action (CLASA), pp. 43–78.

Eze, Onyekpere (2013). Spending to Rule (A Report on Campaign Finance and Use of State

Administrative Resources in the Ondo State 2012 Gubernatorial Election). Abuja Centre

for Social Justice.

Ferdinand, P. (2003), “Party Funding and Political Corruption in East Asia: The Cases of Japan,

South Korea and Taiwan” in Austin, R. and Tjernström, M. (ed.), Funding of Political

Parties and Election Campaigns Handbook Series, Stockholm: International Institute for

Democracy and Electoral Assistance, pp. 56–66.

Fisher, J. (2000), “Party Finance and Corruption: Britain” in Williams, R. (ed.) Party Finance

and Political Corruption, London: Macmillan Press Limited, pp. 15–36.

Gunther, R. and Diamond, L. (2001), “Types and Functions of Parties” in Diamond, L. and

Gunther, R. (eds.) Political Parties and Democracy, Baltimore: The John Hopkins

University Press, pp. 3–39.

Human Rights Watch, (2007), “Abuse of State Power”, available at:

http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/nigeria0407/6.htm. Accessed: June 23,

2015.

43
Ilo, U. J. (2004), “Political Finance Regulation in Nigeria: The Legal Framework” in Obiorah,

N. (ed.), Political Finance and Democracy in Nigeria: Prospects and Strategies for

Reform, Lagos: Centre for Law and Social Action (CLASA).

Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), (2003), “Regulation of Private Funding to

Political Parties” IDASA Position Paper, October, available at:

http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/documents/file42df7428983b5.pdf Accessed:

June19, 2015.

Johnston, M. (2005), “Political Finance Policy, Parties, and Democratic Development” in Gould,

J. (ed.), Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives,

Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI).

Mohammed, H. and Aluaigba, M. T. (2012), “Networking in the Anti-Corruption Crusade in

Nigeria: The Role of Civil Society Organizations” in Mohammed, H.; Aluaigba, M. T.

and Kabir, A. (eds.) Corruption, Governance and Development in Nigeria: Perspectives

and Remedies, Kano: Aminu Kano Centre for Democratic Research and Training, pp.

500 – 522.

Ohman, M. (ed.) (2013) Training in Detection and Enforcement (TIDE) Political Finance

Oversight Handbook, Washington DC: International Foundation for Electoral Systems

Ohman, M. (2014), “Africa” in International IDEA, Funding of Political Parties and Election

Campaigns: A Handbook on Political Finance, Stockholm: International Institute for

Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

44
Oji, R. O.; Eme, O. I. and Nwoba, H. A. (2014), “Political Party Funding in Nigeria: A Case of

Peoples Democratic Party” in Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review

(Nigerian Chapter), Vol. 2, No. 11, pp. 1–18.

Open Society Justice Initiative (2005). Monitoring Election Campaign Finance: A Handbook for

NGOs. New York: Open Society Institute.

Palthiel, K. Z. (1989), “Canadian Election Expense Legislation, 1963 – 85: A Critical Appraisal

or was the Effort Worth it?” in Alexander, H. E. (ed.) Comparative Political Finance in

the 1980s, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 51–75.

Pinto-Duschinsky, M. (1989), “Trends in British Political Funding, 1979–84” in Alexander, H.

E. (ed.) Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s, Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, pp. 24–50.

Pinto-Duschinsky, M. (2002), “Financing Politics: A Global View” in Journal of Democracy,

Vol. 13, No. 4, October, pp. 71–86.

Saalfeld, T. (2000), “Court and Parties: Evolution and Problems of Political Funding in

Germany” in Williams, R. (ed.) Party Finance and Political Corruption, London:

Macmillan Press, pp. 89–121.

Saffu, Y. (2003), “The Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns in Africa” in Austin,

R. and Tjernström, M. (eds.) Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns

Handbook Series, Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral

Assistance, pp. 21–32.

45
Salman, Tunde (2015), “Campaign Finance and Abuse of Incumbency”; Daily Independent

February, 2015.

Walecki, M. (2003), “Political Money and Political Corruption: Considerations for Nigeria”

available at: http://www.ifes.org/publications/political-money-and-political-corruption-

considerationsnigeria. Accessed: June 18, 2015.

Walecki, M. (2008), “Political Money and Corruption: Limiting Corruption in Political Finance”

in Adetula, V. A. O. (ed.), Money and Politics in Nigeria, Abuja: International

Foundation for Electoral System (IFES).

Daily Post, November 18, 2014, available at: http://dailypost.ng/2014/11/18/inec-

setsdepartment-monitor-parties-campaign-expenditure/ Accessed: June 12, 2015.

Daily Post, February 7, 2015, available at: http://dailypost.ng/2015/02/07/accord-party-

adoptsjonathan-presidential-candidate/ Accessed: June 3, 2015

PM News, December 21, 2014, available at:

http://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2014/12/21/jonathan-raises-n21-2-billion-for-2015

election/ Accessed: June 11, 2015.

Premium Times, August 29, 2014, available at:

http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/167476nigeria-2015-jega-lists-4-challenges-to-

successful-elections.html Accessed: June 2, 2015.

46
Premium Times, February 4, 2015, available at:

http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/morenews/176232-olu-falaes-party-sdp-adopts-

jonathan-presidential-candidate-gov-aliyuforgives-buhari.html Accessed: June 14, 2015.

Punch, January 4, 2015, available at: http://www.punchng.com/politics/crossfire/pdp-

mustexplain-n21bn-donation-onuoha/ Accessed: June 10, 2015.

Punch, December 21, 2014, available at: http://www.punchng.com/news/govs-

businessmenothers-donate-n21-27bn-to-jonathan/ Accessed: June 10, 2015.

Punch, March 15, 2015, available at: http://www.punchng.com/news/jonathan-rains-dollars-

onsouth-west-obas/ Accessed: June 20, 2015.

Thisday, December 21, 2014, available at: http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/pdp-raises-

n21billion-for-2015-election-campaign/197320/ Accessed: June 18, 2015.

Thisday, March 12, 2015, available at: http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/labour-party-

adoptsjonathan-as-presidential-candidate/203869/ Accessed: June 21, 2015.

The Nation, December 21, 2014, available at: http://thenationonlineng.net/new/naira-rain-

pdpraises-billions-jonathan/ Accessed: June 20, 2015.

The Nation, February 12, 2015, available at:http://thenationonlineng.net/new/campaign-

financeabuse-incumbency/ Accessed: June 15, 2015.

Vanguard, Febuary 2, 2013, available at:http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/02/auditedaccounts-

inec-indicts-pdp-cpc-53-others/ Accessed: June 15, 2015.

47
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) (2015). Political Party Finance Handbook.

Abuja: INEC Publication.

Vanguard, October 17, 2014, available at: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/10/jonathanblasts-

buhari-says-buhari-promising/ Accessed: June 15, 2015.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCCTION

This chapter is aimed at identifying the various methods of gathering information and the

research method and design, population and sampling, data collection instrument and method of

data analysis, reference that was employed in this present researched project.

3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

48
The research method adopted for this study is survey. The choice of this method was informed

by the fact that the survey technique is the most commonly used by behavioral scientists.

According to Tejumaiye (2003), analytical survey which is sometimes called exploratory survey

attempt to determine whether there are causal relationships between certain kinds of behavior

and various social and demographic cum psychographic characteristics of people. In survey,

researchers often use it to test their hypothesis about what causes certain kinds of behavior.

Babbie (2007), states that survey is a research method that researchers use to get information

about certain groups of people who are representatives of some larger groups of interest to them.

3.3 POPULATION OF STUDY

The selected population of study for this research work is the staff of Independent National

Electoral Commission Lagos State headquarters at Prof A Awojobi Avenue, Iwaya with an

estimated population of over three hundred staff and non staff workers. Independent National

Electoral Commission is an independent body that is responsible in conducting announcing of

election result which is the primary subject of our research project and will be the most

preferable area to carry out this research study.

3.4 SAMPLING DESIGN AND PROCEDURE

The sampling design adopted for this study is the purposive sampling. Due to the large

population of Lagos state, Independent National Electoral Commission was selected purposively.

Purposive sampling of 200 working staff was selected because it allows the researcher to select

respondents for the purpose of the study. They were selected regardless of Age, Sex,

Qualification, Marital status or Working experience but as an adult who knows the role of INEC

in monitoring political party campaign financing in Nigeria

49
3.5 SAMPLING SIZE AND DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE/INSTRUMENT

The sample size for this study is 200 respondents. The self-administered questionnaire was used

in data gathering. The questionnaire adopted the close-ended format which makes for greater

uniformity of responses and it makes the responses easily quantifiable for analysis

3.6 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS

The use of statistical illustration, such as Frequencies and percentages was employed in this

study. The use of this method enabled the Data to be represented in a simplified manner for ease

of understanding.

3.7 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF INSTRUMENT

The Test Retest reliability otherwise known as coefficient of stability which is the degree at

which scores and consistent over time, is used. It is obtained by administering the same test to

the same group of individuals on two occasions and correlates the paired scores. For example, a

physical fitness test may be given again the following week. If the test is reliable, each

individuals relative position on the second administration of the test will be near his or her

relative position on the first administration of the test. The validity also include face validity,

concurrent validity, discriminant validity and predictive. Coursemates and the supervisor were

the main succor for the use of face validity.

50
REFERENCE

Tejumaye, A. (2003). Mass communication research: an introduction. Lagos: Gabi concept

limited.

Babbie, E. (2007), The Early Practice of Social Science Research Methods, California: Belmont

Wadsworth Publishing Company

51
 CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on the analysis of relevant data. It deals with the analysis and interpretation

of collected data so as to come to a definite conclusion for rational decision making.

4.2 DATA PRESENTATION

Table 4.2.1: Sex of the respondents

52
 SEX FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE

Male 120 60

Female 80 40

TOTAL 200 100

Table 1 above shows that 80 respondents representing 40% were females while 120 respondents

representing 60% were male.

Thus, there are more males respondents than females in the office of Independent Electoral

Commission.

Table 4.2.2: Age distribution of respondents

AGE RANGE FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE

18 - 25 52 26

26 - 35 83 44

36 - 45 40 20

45 - Above 25 15

TOTAL 200 100

53
From the data, majority of the respondents were from ages 26-35 years which is 44%, 52

respondents representing 26% were from 18-25 years and 40 respondents from 36-45

representing 20%, the least 25 respondents with the age of 45 and above represent 15%.

Table 4.2.3: Marital status of respondents

STATUS FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE

Married 73 33

Single 127 67

TOTAL 200 100

The above table shows that the 127 respondents representing 67% are single while 73

respondents representing 33% were either engaged or married.

Table 4.2.4: Educational qualification of respondents

QUALIFICATION FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE

WASC/GCE/SSCE 80 40

Bsc/HND 30 20

54
 NCE/OND 70 30

Dr/Masters 20 10

TOTAL 200 100

The above table shows that 70 respondents representing 30% have only NCE/OND education, 30

respondents representing 20% also have Bsc/HND while 20 respondents representing 10% have

degree Dr/Masters and 80 respondents representing 40% have WASC/GCE/SSCE certificate.

The main feature of the personal characteristics of the respondents is the fact that majority of

them are city dwellers and literate.

Research question I was inquiring about the role of INEC and the challenges of monitoring

political party campaign financing in Nigeria.

Research question: What is the important of INEC and the challenges of monitoring political

party campaign financing in Nigeria?

55
Questions 6,7,8, 9 and 10 of the interview schedule were meant to gather data for research

question 1. Question 6 was to find out the membership of the respondents organization or

association in the society.

Table 4.3.1: Showing the response of respondents on one of the challenges of INEC

monitoring political party campaign financing in Nigeria is due to corruption .

OPTION FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE

Agree 84 50

Strongly Agree 66 25

Undecided 30 15

Disagree 20 10

TOTAL 200 100

This Table shows that 84 respondents representing 50% agreed that corruption is one of the

challenges INEC faces in monitoring political party financing , 66 respondents indicating 25%

strongly agree, 30 respondents representing 15% are undecided, while 20 of the respondents

representing 10% disagreed squarely.

56
.

Table 4.3.2: Showing response of respondents on whether if INEC has been monitoring

political party financing in the past

OPTION FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE

Yes 100 50

No 40 20

Undecided 60 30

TOTAL 200 100

This table shows that 100 respondents representing 50% believes INEC has been monitoring

political parties campaign financing in the past, 60 respondents representing 30% are undecided,

while 40 respondents representing 20% disagreed that it has been.

Table 4.3.3: Showing response of respondents on political party campaign financing not

monitored might truncate electoral process

OPTION FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE

Agree 80 40

Strongly Agree 60 30

Undecided 20 10

Disagree 40 20

57
 TOTAL 200 100

Table4.3.3 shows that 80 respondents representing 40% agree that political party campaign

financing might truncate electoral process if not monitored, 60 respondents representing 30%

strongly agreed on it, 40 respondents representing 20% disagree, while 20 respondent

representing 10% are undecided which means majority agreed.

Table 4.3.4: Showing respondents response on INEC has been active in conducting election

in Nigeria

OPTION FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE

Agree 80 50

Strongly Agree 40 15

Undecided 30 10

Disagree 50 25

TOTAL 200 100

This Table shows that 80 respondents representing 50% agreed that INEC has been actively

participatory in conducting election, 50 respondents representing 25% disagreed, 40 respondents

representing 15% strongly agree that it has, while 30 respondents representing 10% are

undecided.

Table 4.3.5: Showing respondents response on ruling political party disburse un account

public money to finance its political campaign

58
 OPTION FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE

Agree 90 50

Strongly Agree 50 25

Undecided 20 10

Disagree 40 15

TOTAL 200 100

This Table shows that 90 respondents representing 50% agreed that political party use the

avantage of being in power to disburse public funds to its campaign financing, 50 respondents

representing 25% strongly agreed, 40 respondents representing 15% disagree that it is not, while

20 respondents representing 10% are undecided.

4.4 ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS

ANSWER TO RQ1: Showing response of respondents on political party campaign

financing not monitored might truncate electoral process?

The study found out that 80 respondents representing 40% agree that political party campaign

financing might truncate electoral process if not monitored, 60 respondents representing 30%

strongly agreed on it, 40 respondents representing 20% disagree, while 20 respondent

representing 10% are undecided which means majority agreed.

59
ANSWER TO RQ2: Showing respondents response on INEC has been active in conducting

election in Nigeria?

The study indicate that 80 respondents representing 50% agreed that INEC has been actively

participatory in conducting election, 50 respondents representing 25% disagreed, 40 respondents

representing 15% strongly agree that it has, while 30 respondents representing 10% are

undecided.

ANSWER TO RQ3: Showing the respondents response on has poverty alleviation program

directly or indirectly affected the lives of the common man on the street positively

This study shows that 90 respondents representing 50% agreed that political party use the

avantage of being in power to disburse public funds to its campaign financing, 50 respondents

representing 25% strongly agreed, 40 respondents representing 15% disagree that it is not, while

20 respondents representing 10% are undecided.

60
 CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This study examines INEC and the challenges of monitoring political party campaign financing

in Nigeria, Lagos state, however the chapter deals with the summary of findings,

recommendation and conclusion.

5.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This study focuses on INEC and the challenges of monitoring political party campaign financing

in Nigeria, in summary, therefore, the following findings and observation were noted:

● 80 respondents representing 40% agree that political party campaign financing might

61
 truncate electoral process if not monitored, 60 respondents representing 30% strongly

agreed on it, 40 respondents representing 20% disagree, while 20 respondent representing

10% are undecided which means majority agreed.

● 80 respondents representing 50% agreed that INEC has been actively participatory in

conducting election, 50 respondents representing 25% disagreed, 40 respondents

representing 15% strongly agree that it has, while 30 respondents representing 10% are

undecided.

● 90 respondents representing 50% agreed that political party use the avantage of being in

power to disburse public funds to its campaign financing, 50 respondents representing

25% strongly agreed, 40 respondents representing 15% disagree that it is not, while 20

respondents representing 10% are undecided.

5.3 CONCLUSION

In conclusion this study have shown INEC and the challenges of monitoring political party

campaign financing in Nigeria, the population of this study is the staff of Independent National

Electoral Commission headquarter in Lagos Prof A Awojobi Avenue, Iwaya of Lagos state

Nigeria, the population which comprises of male, female, adult, youth and adolescent from

different category of age range. This study was finally concluded that corruption and nepotism

have been the challenges INEC faces in monitoring political party campaign financing, most

especially Nigeria in whole which has met the first research objective. To clarify the research

objective, this study have also ascertain that 80 respondents representing 50% agreed that INEC

has been actively participatory in conducting election, 50 respondents representing 25%

disagreed, 40 respondents representing 15% strongly agree that it has, while 30 respondents

representing 10% are undecided. 90 respondents representing 50% agreed that political party use

62
the avantage of being in power to disburse public funds to its campaign financing, 50

respondents representing 25% strongly agreed, 40 respondents representing 15% disagree that it

is not, while 20 respondents representing 10% are undecided. These are some important factors

discovered on the course of this research study. With all the research and the data ascertain this

has clarified and convince the researcher that it is of the conclusion that corruption, nepotism and

power have tremendously hindered INEC on monitoring political party financing in Nigeria of a

whole and such is my conclusion.

5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

To strengthen existing mechanisms on campaign finances, certain measures must necessarily be

put in place. First, legislators have a critical role to play in this whole process, especially in

strengthening existing legislations where some gaps exist. For instance, in strengthening existing

laws, legislators should ensure that candidates that have exceeded their spending limits during

campaign are prosecuted and upon conviction, are disqualified from contesting in future

elections. Such a stiff penalty would dissuade politicians from flouting laws on campaign

financing.

Second, legislators are frequently able to play a useful role in the formulation of

political/campaign finance laws. Such laws are complex and technical, yet they are often enacted

in haste and without sufficient detailed information. Unclear definitions of terms such as

“election campaign,” “party finance,” “political finance,” “expenditure” frequently make laws

63
complex and unenforceable (Duschinsky, 2006:195-196). In this connection, legislators may

play a more positive role if they closely study legislations introduced or passed in other

countries, and also critically examine the loopholes and the disadvantages encountered by such

legislation.

Third, we need to reiterate once again that much of the challenges we face have to do with that of

law enforcement. Here also legislators may help to ensure that the campaign finance law is

workable and enforceable by exerting considerable amount of pressure on the government to

make financial provisions to allow the enforcement of the law by relevant authourities. This is

very important because quite often, new laws are accompanied with heavy administrative

expenses on enforcement bodies without the same time providing the resources needed by the

authourity to permit it to carry out its new work (Duschinsky, 2006:196).

Fourth, legislators must necessarily have to strengthen their oversight duties by ensuring that

regulatory and enforcement agencies carry out their constitutional functions and responsibilities.

If laws are passed by legislators, it is their constitutional responsibility to call the government

and its relevant agencies to account for any failure to implement campaign finance laws. For

example, laws requiring the submission and publication of financial statements by parties and

candidates are simply ignored with impunity. It is felt that legislators’ ability to ask enforcement

agencies critical and probing questions, especially on the extent of compliance of political parties

with the law may exert the necessary pressure on the government to ensure that relevant agencies

are keeping up to speed with their responsibilities.

In addition, INEC must see its role beyond that of organizing elections after every four years. Its

roles also include enforcing regulatory laws on political party and campaign financing. It is true

that it might be difficult for INEC to enforce provisions of section 91(2) of the 2010 Electoral

64
Act as amended, which deals with the maximum election expenses to be incurred by a political

party. That does not mean that efforts should not be made by the appropriate authourities. Where

a public travesty has been made, offenders should be punished (Utomi, 2015). The commission

should ensure that political parties submit their audited campaign expenses as prescribed by law

and same analyzed with a view to exposing and punishing those donors and candidates that have

flouted the law. It is also necessary to make the penalty stiffer on those candidates that are in

breach of this law.

Furthermore, the media and civil society organization (CSOs) have a key role to play in

sanitizing and closing loopholes in campaign finance legislations. There is need to adequately

train media practitioners in the provisions of the electoral act so that they can appropriately

enlighten the public and also expose erring political parties and their candidates who violate the

Act. CSOs are also in a better position to monitor political/campaign financing of respective

political parties and their candidates and bring same to public knowledge. For example, CSOs

and the media can carry out detailed investigations on individual and corporate donors during

fund raising, taking into cognizance their previous philanthropic posture vis a vis their support to

these candidates. They can also interrogate the tax return of these donors with a view to

revealing whether they own such amount of money. Both the media and CSOs are also well

positioned to put legislators and INEC on their toes when they fail to perform their oversight

duties and also enforce campaign finance legislations.

65
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 Appendix

NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERISTY OF NIGERIA, LAGOS

School of Social Science,

Dept. of Political science,
National Open University,
Mccarthy, Obalende,
Lagos.
.
The Director
Political science,
Lagos.

Dear Respondent,

RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

I am a student of the above mentioned institution. I am carrying out a research on“INEC AND

THE CHALLENGES OF MONITORING POLITICAL PARTY FINANCING CAMPAIGN IN

NIGERIA.”The research is required for a partial fulfillment of the award of Bachelor of Science

in Political science. Please respond to these questions to help me achieve the objectives of this

75
research work. Your Response is strictly for research purposes and shall be treated with utmost

confidentiality.

Thank you.

……………………………..
SARAH MUSA
Researcher

SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

Please tick (√) as appropriate

1. Sex: (a) Male ( ) (b) Female ( )

2. Age: (a) 20-30 ( ) (b) 31-40 ( ) (c) 41-50 ( ) (d) 51 & above ( )

3. Education: (a) WASC/GCE ( ) (b) OND/NCE ( ) (c) BA/BSC/HND ( ) (d) Postgraduate

Degree/Diploma ( ) (e) Others (specify)……………………………………..

4. Marital Status: (a) Single ( ) (b) Married ( ) (c) Divorced ( ) (d) Separated ( ) (e)
Widowed ( )

5. Work experience: (a) < five years ( ) (b) 6-10yrs ( ) (c) 11-20yrs ( ) (d) 21 yrs and
above. ( )

SECTION B:

Please tick the option that appropriately represents your opinion.

Key: Strongly Agree – SA, Agree – A, Undecided – U, Disagree – D, Strongly Disagree – SD

76
S/N 1 2 3 4 5

1 One of the challenges of INEC monitoring political party campaign

financing in Nigeria is due to corruption

2 INEC has been monitoring political party financing in the past

3 Political party campaign financing not monitored might truncate

electoral process

4 INEC has been active in conducting election in Nigeria

5 Ruling political party disburse un account public money to finance its

political campaign

6 Inasmuch the vast poverty alleviation program in the country, Nigeria

yet lack infrastructural facilities

7 Government need to introduce more program to eradicate poverty in

the system, majorly from the grass root.

8 Effective Poverty alleviation program can improve healthcare, high

employment, adequate infrastructural facilities

9 It is estimated that 80 percent of Nigeria Population is living below

improved poverty line

10 It is said that Traders mone was for Political purpose

11 One of the disadvantage of inadequate Poverty alleviation program in

Nigeria is as a result of massive corruption in the system

77
78