Ancona, Byzantium and the Adriatic, 1155-1173

Author(s): David Abulafia

Source: Papers of the British School at Rome, Vol. 52 (1984), pp. 195-216
Published by: British School at Rome
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 ANCONA, BYZANTIUM AND THE ADRIATIC, n 55-1173
I

The resistanceof theAdriaticportofAncona to a Germanimperialsiegein 1173

rapidlycameto be celebratedas a heroicact ofdefianceagainsttheItalianambitions
ofFrederickBarbarossa.It has been suggestedthatthethirteenth-century romance
ofJean de Lanson (or L' An^on) takesas its sourceof inspirationthe struggleat
Ancona,thoughit transposes the date back to the reignof Charlemagne.1 As late
as the 1490sinscriptions erectedto honourtwo heroes of the siege, the priestJohn
and thewomanStamira,are said stillto have been visible - thoughofcoursethere
is no guaranteetheinscriptions werecontemporary withthe originalevents.2Less
thanthirty years afterthesiegea north Italian and
lawyer rhetorician, Buoncompagno
da Segni,foundin thedefenceofAnconaa themeworthy ofstylish presentation; his
Liberde Obsidione of
Ancone, 1201, is not merely a historical record based on eye-
witnessaccounts - often,no doubt,eitherrustyor much refurbished - but also a
celebration ofthedefenceofRoman ItalyagainstbarbarianGermany.3 In the 1190s
Anconaonceagain had to assertitselfagainst a German and
emperor againstjealous
neighbours in theMarches; recenteventswereprominent in Buoncompagno's mind
he
when wrote.4 Thus some of Buoncompagno'sadmiring remarks about the size
and importance of Ancona may be anachronistic,based on his knowledge the
of
townin 1201; all thesame, there are strikingpointsof contact between hisexplana-
tionofwhy the Germans came to Ancona and the evidence in both German and
Greeksources from the 1150s onwards. Even Buoncompagno's theme of Roman-
Italian libertyparallelsthe attitudeof anotherdistinguished orator,the Byzantine
litterateurEustathios, archbishop of Thessalonika. Eustathios addressed an orationto
his master,EmperorManuel Komnenos,in about 1174, in whichhe praisedthe
inhabitantsof Ancona,fortheyhad struggledto enhancethe powerof the true
Romans (of Constantinople)againstthe barbarianinvadersof Italy.5Eustathios
describesthe CountessAldruda of Bertinoro, who had raised Manuel's standard

\J.Courayedu Pare, 'Recherchessur la chansonde "Jehande Lanson",' MelangesJ. Havet:

recueilde travauxd'erudition(Paris, 1895), 325-54; R. Bossuat, Manuel bibliographique
de la litter
ature
àge (BibliothèqueElzévirienne,Etudes et Documents,Melun, 1951), 56, no. 556.
du moyen
francaise
2Palermo Giangiacomi, Anconae Vitalia contro dei tempi,guerredi Lombardia,
Barbarossa; ricostruzione
cronacadelBuoncompagno (Ancona,s.d. [1927]), 198. Writtenin a floridstyle,thisworkadds littleof
ofAncona's relationswithBarbarossa.
real value to theinterpretation
Liber de ObsidioneAncone[a. 1173], ed. Giulio C. Zimolo, (Rerum Italicarum
zBuoncompagni
Scriptores,ser. 2, vi, parte 3), [hereafter:Buoncompagno];G. C. Zimolo, 'Di un nuovo codice
delP"Assediodi Ancona" di Maestro Boncompagno,con altre notizie sul codice di Cleveland',
storicoitalianoper il Medio Evo, lv (1941), 207-21; Eva Matthews Stanford, 'The
Bullettinodell'Istituto
Lombard Cities,Empireand Papacy in a Cleveland Manuscript',Speculum, xii (1937), 203-8; and
Giangiacomi,op. cit., 205-98 foran Italian translation
of the chronicle.
4Buoncompagno, 50.
5'EustathiiThessalonicensisOratio ad Manuelem imperatorem',in: W. Regel, ed., Fontes
rerumByzantinarum,i. 1, Rhetorumsaeculi XII orationespoliticae (Petropoli, 1892), 92-125. See
also: P. Lamma, 'Aldruda,contessadi Bertinoro,in un panegiricodi Eustazio di Tessalonica',in:
P. Lamma, Orientee Occidente nell'altomedioevo:studistoricisulledueciviltà(Padua, 1968), 383-94; repr.
from: Attie Memoriedella Deputazionedi StoriaPatriaper la Provinciadi Romagna,n.s., iii (1951/2), 59-72.

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 196 DAVID ABULAFIA

alongsideher own, who had spurredher knightsforwardand had helped save

Ancona.
Byzantineinterestin the eventsat Ancona had long excitedattentionamong
historians.6
Buoncompagno, as wellas theGreeksources,indicatethathighByzantine
weredespatchedto thecitywithlargesumsofmoney.For somehistorians
officials
the episodeofAncona signified that'Byzanzkehrtnach Italienzurück';7Ancona
thusbecamea Byzantinebase in twelfth-century and administered
Italy,garrisoned
by Byzantines,local lords and a communalgovernment whichhad placed itself
undertheauthority, or at leastprotection,oftheBasileus.Anotherviewmightsee
in Ancona a jumping-off point fromwhich the Byzantineemperorintendedto
launch one or all of severalcampaigns,militaryand diplomatic : a campaignfor
recognitionas sole Roman emperor,by the papacy; a campaignto destabilizethe
areas of Lombardycontrolledby FrederickBarbarossa;a campaignto win the
loyaltyof the Adriatictownsfurther south,in NormanApulia.8 In otherwords,
Anconaitself-forall itssymbolicimportance as a townwhichhad 'returned'to the
trueRoman empire - was not thesole targetof Manuel Komnenos'ambitions.To
theseexplanationsof Ancona's significance to Byzantiumshould be added the
opportunity to use Ancona as a counter-weight againstVenice,whoseown loyalty
to Constantinople was increasingly tenuousduringthe 1150s and 1160s;9 and,
perhaps,the wide ambitionof bringingonce again underByzantinecontrollarge
segments oftheAdriaticwhichhad been lostto Hungary,Venice and the Slavs.10
The 1150snot onlysaw the creationof a linkbetweenAncona and theByzantine
6Amongrecentdiscussionssee: A. Carile, 'L'assedio di Ancona del 1173. Contributoalla storia
politica e sociale della città nel secolo XI P, Atti e Memoriedella Deputazione di Storia Patria per le
Marche, vii (1971-3), 23-57; and a laterversionofthesame article,'FedericoBarbarossa,i veneziani
e l'assediodi Ancona del 1173',StudiVeneziani, xvi (1974), 3-31; S. Borsari,'Ancona e Bisanzionei
secoli XlI-XIir, in: AnconaRepubblicaMarinara. FedericoBarbarossa e le Marche. Attidel Convegnodi
Ancona,19-20 aprile1969 (Città di Castello, 1972), 67-76; P. Schreiner,'Der Dux von
Studistorici,
Dalmatienund die BelagerungAnconasimJahre 1173. Zur Italien-und BalkanpolitikManuels I.',
Byzantion,xli (1971), 285-311. See now also J. F. Leonhard, Die SeestadtAncona im Spatmittelalter
(Bibliothekdes DeutschenHistorischenInstituísin Rom, lv, Tubingen, 1983), 38-85. This book
appeared afterthe textof thisarticlewas complete.Leonhard providesmuch preciseinformation
about theByzantinepresencein Ancona,but he does notdevelophisdiscussionofthewiderAdriatic
connectionsin theway pursuedhere.
Italiensim 12. Jahrhundert
7P. Lamma, 'Byzanz kehrtnach Italien zurück', in Beitragezur Geschichte
undForschungen,
(Vortràge Sonderbandix, 1971), 37-51.
8Forthe widercontext:P. Lamma, Comneni 2 vols. (Rome, 1955-7), i. 254-9, 275,
e Staufer,
293-301; ii. 121-3, 147,239, 249, 251-2; P. Classen'La politicadi Manuele Gomnenotra Federico
Barbarossa e le città italiane', Popolo e Stato in Italia nell'Età di FedericoBarbarossa- Alessandriae la
Lega Lombarda.Relazioni e communicazioni al XXXIII congresso storicosubalpinoper la celebrazionedel Vili
della Fondazionedi Alessandria,Alessandria1968 (Turin, 1970), 263-79.
Centenario
9H. F. Brown,'The Venetiansand theVenetianQuarterin Constantinople, to theclose of the
century',JournalofHellenicStudies,
twelfth xl (1920), 68-88.
10J.Ferluga, Vizantiskaupravain Dalmaciji(Serbian Academyof Sciences,Monographccxci,
Belgrade,1957); Italian transí,with revisionsas: V Amministrazione bizantinain Dalmazia (Società
vénetadi storiapatria,Venice, 1978); J. Ferluga,'La Dalmazia fraBisanzio,Venezia e l'Ungheriaai
tempidi Manuele Comneno',StudiVeneziani, xii (1970), 63-83; repr.inJ. Ferluga,Byzantium onthe
Slavs (fromtheVHthto theXHth Centuries)
and theSouthern
Balkans. Studieson theByzantineAdministration
(Amsterdam,1976), 193-213. [Referencesare givento botheditionsin theform:p. 63/193,and so
forth.]See now also J. V. A. Fine, TheEarlyMedievalBalkans(Ann Arbor,1983).

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 ANCONA, BYZANTIUM AND THE ADRIATIC, 1155-1173 197

court;theyare also theyearswhenDalmatia,on thecoastoppositeAncona,became

a targetforByzantineexpansion.On the otherhand,JadranFerlugahas insisted
that'anche nella grandepoliticadi Manuele,rivoltaversol'Italia e l'Ungheria,la
Dalmazia rimaseuno dei problemidel tuttomarginali'.11 In otherwords,a connec-
tionbetweeneventsin Anconaand eventsin Dalmatia cannotbe assumed.
But Ancona in the second half of the twelfthcenturywas also a rising
commercial power.Buoncompagno and theByzantinesourcesagreethatVenicefelt
greatodiumforitsnewcompetitor; in 1173theVenetiansdespatcheda fleetto help
BarbarossasubdueAncona.This militaryaid is all the morestriking sincein 1173
theVenetianswerealso lendingsupportto theLombardLeague,and workinghard
to dislodgeGermanarmiesfromnorthernItaly.12The Venetians,by supporting
Frederick,also committedthemselves againstManuel Komnenos,and it is clear
thatByzantine hostilitytoVenetianinterests,bothin Dalmatiaand in Constantinople
inducedtheopportunist
itself, allianceofDoge and western emperor.Onlytwoyears
beforethe greatsiege of Ancona,Venetianpropertyin Constantinople had been
confiscatedbyManuel'scommand;and throughout the1160stheVenetianshad been
buildinga friendly relationshipwiththeNormankingsofSicily.13 It is clear,then,
thatthesiegeof 1173is a dramaticepisodein a morecomplexsetofdiplomaticand
militaryties,extending farbeyondAnconaitself;and itis unfortunate thathistorians
have concentrated so heavilyupon theeventsof 1173itselfthatseveralfundamental
problemsconcerning theroleofAnconain Byzantineand Venetianpolicyhavebeen
passed over hurriedly. In thefirstplace,whatwas thereal natureofthetiebetween
Ancona, and the local nobilitywho aided Ancona, on the one hand and the
government in Constantinople on theother? It willbe seen thatByzantineofficials
concernedwiththe administration ofDalmatia werepresentat Ancona on several
occasions;so it has to be askedhow thestatusofAnconacomparedwiththatofthe
autonomousByzantinecitiesof Dalmatia itself,such as Zadar (Zara) and Split
(Spalato).14And,ofcourse,it mustnotbe assumedthatthenorth-east Italiannobles
who supportedAncona necessarilyenteredinto the same relationshipwith
Constantinople as did the beleagueredcity.A secondquestionis whatthe motive
was behindtheformation ofa bondbetweenAnconaand Constantinople. Historians
have been satisfiedwitha single,simpleanswer - forinstance, argumentthat
the
Anconaservedas a Byzantinebase foroperationsagainstNormanterritory further
south.But thereweremajorchangesin Byzantinepolicy towards the Normans and
also towardsVenice,Hungaryand the Dalmatiantowns;thus, even afterthe link
withAncona was formed,the reasonformaintainingit mightnot alwayshave
remainedthesame.Manuel'saimsweremodified, buthe stayedfirmin hisadhesion
to Ancona,and in his oppositionto FrederickBarbarossa.And thelongerAncona
supportedhisinterests, thekeenerhe was to repayAnconawithfavours;loyaltywas
itsown reward,but therewas money,privileges, honourstoo.

nFerluga,'Dalmazia fraBisanzio5,p. 83-213. But compareSchreiner,'Dux von Dalmatien',cit.

12P. Munz, FrederickBarbarossa: a studyin medievalpolitics(London, 1969), 328.
13David Abulafia: The Two Italiesi economierelationsbetweentheNormanKingdomof Sicily and the
NorthernCommunes (Cambridge,1977), 133-6.
14Forwhich,see Ferluga,Amministrazione, ontheBalkans,
and the articlescollectedin Byzantium
especially'Bisanzioe Zara', 173-92.

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198 DAVID ABULAFIA

II

At therootoftheByzantineinvolvement in Anconalay nota conflictwithFrederick

Barbarossa,but hope of co-operation withhim. In theyearsimmediately afterhis
accession(1152) Manuel Komnenosapparentlyhopedto reactivatetheagreements
made at Constantinople duringtheSecond Crusadeby Frederick's predecessor and
relative,ConradIII.15 These agreements includeda joint attackon southernItaly,
and a marriagealliance betweenthe Hohenstaufen and the Komnenoi,in which
whateverthe termmeant,was promisedto the Byzantinesas dowry.
'Itccàìoc,
Probablythis was an elegantly-conceived understanding to share betweenthe
Byzantinesand the Germansrule over Roger IPs kingdomof Sicily; the western
landswouldgo to Conrad,and Apuliawouldbe restored to Greekruleas the'theme'
The Venetianstoo promisedto participatein the invasionof Apulia,
of 'Itocàìcc.
promptedby RogerIPs lightning invasionofCorfuand hisattackon Greeceat the
timeoftheSecond Crusade.But by 1152 theVenetiansbeganto see thattheirbest
interestswereservedby an Adriaticwhoseexitwas controlledby no singlepower;
theNormandangerhad recededas soonas Corfuwas recoveredby theByzantines,
and a newdangerthreatened iftheByzantinesoccupiedthetownsofApulia.16Thus,
despiteManuel'sembassiesto thewest,theByzantines foundit difficult
to persuade
theirGermanand Venetianalliestolendthesupportwhichhad oncebeenpromised.
Fromthefirst, Frederickseemsto have regardedthe Byzantineswithpathological
mistrust; he saw thempartlyas thebetrayers oftheSecond Crusade,but above all
as presumptuous rivalsfortheimperialhonourswhich,in hiseyes,had beenforfeited
by theperfidious Greeksand bestowedon thetruedefenders oftheRoman heritage
and theRoman faith.17
In consequence,theByzantineattackon southernItaly,in 1155,triedto take
advantageofotheraid thanGerman.The deathofRogerII, in 1154,revivedattempts
by local lords, some of them already dispossessedand in exile, to shake off
central control by the Norman crown; several exiles were at the court of
EmperorManuel.18The Apulian townsmen, fortheirpart,saw in the Byzantine
invasiongreaterhope of securingthe municipalautonomytheyhad lost afterthe
NormanconquestofsouthernItaly; presumably theyaspiredto a statussimilarto
thatoftheByzantine Adriatictowns,suchas Dubrovnik.Withhalf-hearted Venetian
supportthe Byzantineswere able to seize a long line of Apulian coastal towns,

15Lamma,'Byzanz' 45.
it is not entirelyclear whetherCorfuwas recoveredas quicklyas the Greeksources
16Strictly,
relate.Compare TheItinerary ofBenjamin of Tudela,ed. M. N. Adler,(London, 1907), 10, withthe
propagandaof the courtencomiasts:M. Mathieu, 'La Sicile normandedans la poesie byzantine',
BollettinodelCentrodi Studifilologicie linguistici
siciliani,ii (1954), 1-28. Maybe Corfu was recaptured by
the Sicilians in the 1150s. Ralph-Johannes Lilie, Handel undPolitikzwischendembyzantinischen Reichund
denitalienischenKommunen Venedig,Pisa undGenuain derEpochederKomnenen undderAngeloi(1081-1204),
(Amsterdam,1984), 194-5, does, however,insist(on the basis of evidencefromaround 1200) that
CorfuremainedByzantine;but someinterruption cannotreallybe ruledout. Lilie's book appeared
whenthisarticlewas alreadyin the press:forAncona,see especiallvdp. 441-2, 446-7, 472, 496-7.
17A.A. Vasiliev,History
oftheByzantine Empire,2 vols. (Madison,Wisconsin,1952), ii. 424.
18SeebelowforthecareerofAlexanderofGravina,a familiarfigureat thewesternand eastern
imperialcourts.

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 ANCONA, BYZANTIUM AND THE ADRIATIC, 1155-1173 199

includingthe specialprizeof Bari, a major centreof Byzantinegovernment until

1071. The Byzantinesalsolandedtroopsin ItalianportsnorthoftheNormanSicilian
Initiallythiswas simplyto providemilitarybases fromwhichByzantine
frontier.
armiescould be sent into Pescara and the Apulian towns.The exact range of
Byzantineoperationsnorthof the frontier is unclear: Chalandonprobablyover-
estimatedthe extentof Byzantineinterference in the portsof the Marches- he
assumedthatFano was occupiedor usedbytheGreeks.19 But,evenaftertheSicilians
counterattacked,and recoveredtheApuliantowns,Byzantium continuedtomaintain
a presencenorthofthefrontier ofthe Regno. By 1157 a particulartown,Ancona,
becamethereal focusoftheirItalian activities.
The ByzantinecourthistorianKinnamosexplainshow Ancona acquiredthis
specialfunction:
Manuel despatchedAlexios[Axouch],who thenboretheofficeofprotostrator, to Ancona tolay
claim again to Italy, as if froma base. For the men therehad previouslytakenoaths to the
emperor,thatwhiletheywouldnotwillinglyfightagainsttheGermans'king,theywouldguard
likethemselvestheemperor'smoneyand thoseoftheRomanshe wouldsend.Whytheemperor
was persuadedto this,I willforthwithrelate: whenhe was campaigningon Corfu,he recognized
theVenetians'nationas maliciousand stubborn,and thoughtit veryimportantto lay claim to
Ancona. Therebyhe mightto a large extenthumblethe Venetians'prideand fromtherevery
easilywage warsin Italy. ThereforeAlexioswentwithmuchmoneyto Ancona.20

This passagepresentsa numberofproblemsofinterpretation. Anconais seen as a

in therecovery
forward-station of'Italy',butonceagainitis unclearwhether iTOCÀia
meansNorman-held Apulia or whether the wholeofthepeninsulais As will
intended.
be seen the
shortly, view at the German courtwas thatManuel was to
pretending
use Anconain orderto recoverApulia,butthathe reallyintendedto seize a line of
Adriatictowns.Rahewin,in his continuationof Otto of Freising'saccount of
Barbarossa'scareer,statesthatByzantineagentsin Ancona had covertintentions:
quo adversusWillehelmumSiculum largitionepecuniae milites,qui solidariivocantur,colli-
quod saepiusantehacattentatum
gerent,re autemvera,ut civitatesmaritimas, novimus,seu vi,
seu dolo, sub Graecorumredigerentditionem.21

The implication hereseemstobe thatManuelisindeedcompeting againstRahewin's

masterin an attemptto make real again east Roman ratherthan west Roman
dominionoverpartsofItaly; and the 'civitatesmarítimas'are not,apparently,
just
theApulianportsruledbyWilliamofSicily,buta wholeseriesofAdriatictowns.For
Rahewin,Anconawasthebasefromwhichtolayclaimto ItalywhichKinnamoshad
described.On the otherhand,it is clear that,between1155 and the early1160s,
Manuel's allies did indeed use Ancona as a base fromwhichto attackNorman
: AndrewcountofRupecanina,a Normanexile,led raidsintotheRegno,
territory

19Chalandon,ii. 205.
20Io. Kinnamos, Epitomererumab Joanneet Alexio Comnenogestarum,{CorpusScriptorum
Historiae
Bonn, 1836), 170; citedfromthetranslation
Byzantinae, by CharlesM. Brand, TheDeedsofJohnand
ManuelComnenus, byJohnKinnamos (New York, 1976), 130. An earlierattemptto utiliseAncona as a
base (1149) is describedby Kinnamos,102. See on thisLeonhard,SeestadtAncona, 42-6.
21Rahewinin Otto ofFreising,Opera(MGH us. schol.,Hannover,1867), ii. 190.

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200 DAVID ABULAFIA

and thepapacyinveighedagainstmercenary armieswhichcrossedthePetrinelands

in orderto reachtheirtargetsin theKingdomofSicily.22
Kinnamosmakestwo statements about the natureof the tie betweenAncona
and Manuel Komnenoswhichhave considerablesignificance. The Anconitans had
takenan oathwhichnonetheless exemptedthemfroman obligationtofight Frederick
Barbarossa.Eustathiosof Thessalonika,in his panegyricon Anconaand Manuel's
Italian allies, states: ccKéÀeuoToi tco BacriÀei ¿eSouAevKcccriv
; voluntarily,without
beingcommanded,theysubmitted to theByzantineemperor.23 Thus theByzantine
landingson thecoastofthe Marches,in 1155,do notseemto have consistedofan
unwelcomeoccupation,at leastat Ancona. It seemslikely,therefore, thatAncona
first'submitted'or sworeitsoathin 1155,at about thetimeoftheGreeklandings.
The secondremarkofKinnamoswhichhelpsexplainthenatureofthelinkbetween
Byzantiumand the Marchesis thereference to 'the emperor'smoney'.Indeed,the
editorofBuoncompagno's Liberdeobsidione, G. C. Zimolo,assumedthatthismoney
was used not simplyto wage wars,but also as a bribe to buy the loyaltyof the
Anconitans.24 It is knownthat Ancona receivedsums of moneyfromManuel
Komnenosafterthesiegeof 1173; someof thoseat courtcommentedadverselyon
theemperor's generosity.25 Butit is also clearthatManuel disbursedmoneyto other
Italian townsthanAnconaduringthe 1150s:FrederickPs chancellor,Rainald von
Dassel,encountered a groupofcitizensofRavennain 1158; threehundredmen,he
says, 'ab Ancona reuertentes et aurum, quod acceperant,secum deferentes.'26
Rainald's encounterwithManuel's alliesin the regionbetweenRavenna and
Anconahas notreceivedtheattention it deserves.The Germanchancellor'sreport,
sent to FrederickBarbarossa,indicatesthat Manuel consistently employedthe
methodsassociatedfor centurieswith Byzantinediplomacy - bribery,a certain
amountof subversion, too- withthe aim of creatinga pro-Greekpartyin north-
easternItaly. Althoughthe long-standing fidelityof Ancona to his cause was
Manuel'sgreatest success,theGreekemperor'sefforts in theregionaroundRavenna
and Ferraraveryslowlyachievedvaluableresults, in the 15 yearsbetweenRainald's
expeditionand the siege of Ancona in 1173.27Rainald's mission,like thatof the
Byzantineagentsin Italy,was to tryto wintheloyaltyofthetownson theAdriatic
flankofItaly; fromBologna(wherehe had been holdingconsultations withseveral
cardinals)he travelled to Ravenna. A warm receptionby thearchbishop provednot
to mean that Ravenna was behind Barbarossa; a leading citizen,Guglielmo
Traversano,describedas cpotestas siveprefectus', had alreadyleft,accompaniedby

22Ghalandon,ii. 251-2.
p. Ill; Carile, 'L'assedio', p. 50-1.
23Eustathios,
24Buoncompagno, p. 35 n.
25Io. Aloysius Van Dieten, ed., NicetaeChoniataeHistoria{CorpusFontiumHistoriaeByzantinae,Series
xi (1-2), Berlinand New York, 1975), 202.
Berolensis,
26Rainald von Dassel to Frederick I, in: Registrumoder merkwürdige
Urkunden
für die deutsche
gesammeltund herausgegebenvon H. Sudendorf,3 vols. (Jena and Berlin,1849-54), ii.
Geschichte,
131-3; forthehistoryoftheMSS, see Sudendorf,
ii. pp. v-x. Almosttheentiretextis reproducedby
H. Simonsfeld,
Jahrbücherdesdeutschen
Reiches
unter
Friedrich/.,i. 1152 bis 1158 (Leipzig, 1908),622-9,
Anm. 88-106.
27Theadhesionof GuglielmoMarchesella,Aldruda di Bertinoroand othersis describedby
Buoncompagno,27-31; cf.NiketasGhoniates,202; Eustathios, passim,etc.

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 ANCONA, BYZANTIUM AND THE ADRIATIC, 1155-1173 201

'totaqueeiusdemcivitatisnobilitas',on a visitto Ancona.The aim ofthisvisitwas

cpecuniam a Grecorecepturi
etiuramentum, quod ab eisexpostulabatur,
prestaturi5.28
This 'Greek'was almostcertainly AlexiosAxouch,theByzantineofficial mentioned
by Kinnamos; he had alreadybeen activein the defenceofByzantineinterests in
Dalmatia. And Alexios,or his successor,was clearlysuccessfulin securingthe
loyaltyofRavenna,at leastforthemoment:'iuratumestenimab eis eidemGreco,
qui Anconemoratur,quod ipsi personameius et rescontraomnemhominemtueri
debeantac manutenere'.29 The defenceofthepersonofByzantineofficials in Ancona
seemsto have beena consistent elementin oathsswornby Italian confederates of
Manuel Komnenos.In 1158,1167and, above all, 1173it was attempts to securethe
personofa 'Greek'residentin Anconawhichled Anconato resistGermanforces.30
RainaldvonDassel,shockedat theattitudeoftheRavennanobility, leftthecityin a
smallparty,onlyto encounterTraversanoand threehundredmen (or so he says);
he claimsthathis own troopof ten knightsput the pro-Byzantine partyto flight,
and thathe capturedGuglielmoTraversano,hissonPietroand 'aliosvi.de melioribus
Rainald continuedsouthwardsto Rimini,wherehe was well received,
ciuitatis'.31
and gathereda troopof men together:the destinationwas troublesome Ancona.
The captureoftheTraversaricreateda welcomeclimateoffear:
Videritistotamterramtremeré. Tantusenimterror omnibusa minimousquead maximum
invasit,quod etiamilli, qui in munitissimis et castriserant,captiet ligatiesse
civitatibus
videbantur.Totaenimterraclamabatdicens:Ex quo Ravennates, qui dominiterraedicuntur,
captisunt,quisde caeteropoter itevaderede manibustantorum ligatorum?32
Thus Pesaro,Fermo,Senigagliamade no attemptto resistthe Germanchancellor.
Ancona,ofcourse,did notsubmit,and Rainald startedto preparea siege.The
Anconitans requestedthe'Greek',whois describedas 'thesonoftheMegas
therefore
Domestikos',to meet Rainald and tryto reach a settlement.33 Presumablythey
wishedto make it clear that- as Kinnamossaid- 'theywould not willinglyfight
againsttheGermans'king'.34 to Rainald von Dassel
The 'Greek'sentas hisemissary
a certainCountAlexander,who is probablyAlexanderof Gravina,memberof an
important familyof Normanexiles,loyal servantsof the Komnenoi.35 Finally,the
'Greek'himselfemerged,surrounded byhissoldiersand announcedwithdrumsand
a displayofflags.The intentionwas to over-aweRainald, and Byzantinemethods
seemtohavesucceeded: Rainaldsimplysaysthat'ipsesatiscompeten teretmanifeste

28Sudendorf, ii. 131.

29Sudendorf, loc. cit.
30ThusRomuald of Salerno,Chronicon^ ed. C. A. Garufi(Rerum italicarumscriptores, ser. 2,
vii, 1), 265, indicates.
31Sudendorf, ii. 132.
32Sudendorf, loc. cit.
33<Filium videlicetMegal. domest.'is whatSudendorfgives(ii. 132) but bothhis MSS are post-
medieval.
34Kinnamos,170.
35<Quimissoad noscomitéAlex.' (Sudendorf, ii. 132); on thispassage,see Ghalandon,ii. 253 n.;
cf.Ghalandon,ii. 190-1, 198,205, 216, 280-1, foraspectsofhis career.Dr. J. S. F. Parkerinformed
me thathisresearcheson Byzantine-Sicilian relationsled himto identify morethanone Alexanderof
Gravinain the mid-twelfth century,presumablyfatherand son.

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202 DAVID ABULAFIA

se excusavit,asserensse et totampecuniamdominisui ad beneplacitumnostrum

expositurum'.36 Possiblythisis intendedto mean thatthe 'Greek'dangledin front
of Rainald promisesthat Byzantinegold would be put to uses which served
Barbarossa'sinterests in Italy; in otherwords,thatManuel was nottryingto bribe
theItaliansto desertBarbarossa,butwas workingto fulfil theconditions laid down
in hisagreements withConradIII tenyearsearlier.And the'Greek'also managed
to ensurethattheAnconitanswerenotpunishedfortheirinitialrefusalto comply
withRainald'sdemands: theysworeRainald an oath,aboutwhichhe tantalisingly
states£quodvobisvivavocecumaliismultis,quae scriberelongumforet, dicemus'.37
Butit is fairlycertainthatAnconapromisednotto takeup armsagainstBarbarossa
and notto forman alliancewithhisenemies.Precisely becausetheByzantines could
pointto pastpacts,albeitin abeyance,betweenthemselves and theGermanrulers,
Rainald was unable to punishAncona forits adherenceto Manuel Komnenos.
Besides,Rainald mayseriously have believedthathisownemperormightsomeday
see,orin somewaybenefit from,theGreekemperor's gold.Putdifferently, Rainald's
successin dealingwiththe Byzantineofficialat Ancona was paper-thin.He had
preservedhis own emperor'shonour,by securingan oath of some typefromthe
Anconitans, but he had notshownhimself able to haltthegradualaccumulationof
Byzantine influence in theMarchesand Romagna.His letterto Frederick Barbarossa
places thebestpossibleconstruction on an embarrassing event,in whichRainald's
bravado was more than out-matchedby the 'Greek's' diplomacy.It is hardly
surprising that Rainald rapidlyturnsthe subject-matter of his letterin a more
promising direction:he had securedfromRavenna an oath offidelity, 'quod CC.
annitransacti sunt,quod Ravennanulliimperatorem fidelitatem
fecit'.He concludes
withnewsof'Wilhelmustyrannus Siciliae' and ofthepapal curia.38
In 1158 Rainald von Dassel mighthave believedthatManuel and Frederick
had a commonenemyin NormanSicily:onlya yearearlierNormanSicilianfleets
had raidedthe coastsof Greece,wreakinghavoc in Negropontand broachingthe
Bosphorus.39 But in fact the eventsof 1157 were the last stage in the Sicilian-
Byzantineconflict;Manuel's defeat in Apulia encouragedslow but realistic
reconsideration of Byzantineopportunities to underminethe Sicilian'nrupavvos';
and, betweenthe acquisitionofhis base at Anconaand the attackon thatbase by
German armiesin 1167, the Byzantineemperorcame to accept the realityof
Normanrulein Sicilyand Apulia. The firststageis approximately contemporary
withRainaldvonDassel'sexpeditionto Ancona.In about 1158an initialagreement
was reached betweenManuel and William I of Sicily. Accordingto Kinnamos
Williamwroteto theemperor,saying'we ask thatyou makea treatyand conclude
thiswar' (sincetheadvantagelay in certainrespects withtheNormanfleet,Manuel
could noteasilyrefuse).

36Sudendorf,ii. 132.
37Sudendorf,loc. cit.
38Sudendorf,ii. 133.
39GliAnuales
Pisanidi Bernardo
Maragone
> ed. M. Lupo Gentile(Rerumitalicarumscriptores,
ser.
2, vi, 2), 17.

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 ANCONA,BYZANTIUM AND THE ADRIATIC, 1155-1173 203
Afterhe had repeatedlyperusedthisletter,theemperoragreedwithwhatit said; whenhe had
receivedtheByzantinecaptivesand recoveredwhatspoilofwar therewas, and in additionhad
obtainedoathsfromWilliamthathe wouldbe hisallyformattersin thewest,Manuel endedthe
war.40

ObviouslyAnconacouldno longerfunction as a command-centre forNormanexiles

intenton raidingtheSicilianKingdom.On theotherhand,Greco-Sicilian relations
did not simplyturnfrombad to good: the attemptedmarriagealliance between
WilliamII and Manuel's daughter(1167/8)nevercame to fruition, and Manuel
was disconcerted by Sicilian success in wooing the Venetians.41But Siciliansand
Byzantines worked towards common objectives in some areas: the defence of the
LombardLeague; thedefeatofBarbarossa.Manuel's giftsofgold wererivalledby
theKingofSicily's;buttheprincipalcontrast betweentheirattitudes totheLombard
League lay in theirrelations with Venice.
RelationsbetweenManuel and Frederickdeteriorated stillfurtherafterthe
papal schism of 1162. There is evidence in the Byzantine chronicles that the
Komneniancourtfollowedthe disputesbetweenBarbarossaand the popes with
interest evenbeforethatdate.42And, althoughit is no longerthoughtthatManuel
sought cometo Rome to be crownedemperorofeastand westby Pope Alexander
to
III, it is clearthatManuel used moneyand pactsto sustainMilan, and eventually
theMarquisofMontferrat, againstBarbarossa.43 The three-week siegeofAnconain
summer,167,1 needsto be seen in thislight.The German emperoronceagainsought
to extractfromAnconathetreasure he believedwasbeingpumpedintotheLombard
League; he wantedtoo to capturethe Byzantinerepresentative or representatives
thenin the city.44But he soon saw that Ancona would not succumbto a land
blockade; on threesidesthe cityhas accessto the sea, and seizureofAncona was
impossiblewithouta fleet.So Barbarossadid the next best thing:he agreed to
accepta largesumof money,whichotherwise, presumably,wouldhave been sent
to his enemies,and withdrew hisarmies;also he tookhostages.On theotherhand,
he had learnedAncona'sdefensive secret,and whennexthe attackedAncona six
yearslater, it was by means of a combined land and sea assault.45
From 1158 Ancona fulfilled severalvaluable functions, in Byzantineeyes.In
the firstplace, Byzantiumhad, in a certainsense,returnedto Italy: therewere
representatives ofManuelKomnenosin thecity,at leaston certaincriticaloccasions;

40Kinnamos,172-5.
41J.S. F. Parker,'The attemptedByzantinealliance with the Norman Kingdom (1166-7)',
PBSR, xxiv (1956), 86-93: Abulafia,Two Italies,133, 141.
42Classen, 277.
43Agood discussionof the coronationquestion is providedby Parker,86; Cf. Boso, Liber
ed. L. Duchesne (Paris, 1886-92),ii. 415, 419.
Pontificalis,
44M.Natalucci,'L'assedio di Anconanel 1167%Ancona Marinara,cit. 79-94; Lamma,
Repubblica
Comnenie Staufer,ii. 147; Giangiacomi,129.Butwhethertherereallywereimportant Byzantineagents
in Ancona on thisoccasionmustremaindoubtful ; the 8oO£of Dalmatia was in temporary retreat
aftera Hungarianadvance intocentralDalmatia,and it is uncertainwho actuallywas SoO£in 1167:
Ferluga,'La Dalmazia fraBisanzio5,p. 77/207.
45Otherexpeditionsby the Germanrulersinto Italy provedthe necessityforaccess to fleetsif
they were to achieve their objectives: compare the assaults on southernItaly planned by
Barbarossa- Abulafia,Two Italies,123-33.

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204 DAVID ABULAFIA

it willbe seenlaterwhetherthereis evidencethatAnconahad acceptedManuel as

itsoverlord.In thesecondplace, Anconahad becomea focusforItalian noblesor
communesseekingan alternativeprotector in the easternratherthanthe western
emperor - a róle Ancona did not entirelysuccessfully fulfil,especiallyafterthe
submissionof Ravenna to Barbarossa.In the thirdplace, Ancona stood some
distancenorthof the borderwith the Norman kingdom,and the presenceof
Byzantineofficialsthere,ratherthanin Apulia,indicatedin visibletermsthefuture
intention ofManuel to avoiddirectinterference in southItalianaffairs, and to abide
bythetrucewithWilliamofSicily.46 ButAnconadid represent an attemptat direct
interferencein theaffairsoftheRegnum Italicum;Barbarossasaw thecityas partof
hisItalianterritory,
and in thisrespectmerelyre-enacted theclaimsofhispredecessor
LotharIII, whohad besiegedAnconain the 1130s.47 Historically,Anconawas part
not of the Regnum Italicum but of the patrimony of the church,but in the twelfth
century thepapacyhad littleor no influence on itsaffairsand itscitizensshowedno
especialloyaltyto thepopes.The tiesbetweenAnconaand thepapal curiabecame
close onlyin the thirteenth century.It is worthadding thatforBarbarossaand
LotharIII, as forthelaterpopes,theattraction ofAnconamayhavelain notmerely
in the townitself.Financial and politicalbenefitsfromcontrolover the whole
March ofAnconamightbe substantial, and a gatewaysouthwards to theNorman
Abruzziand, ultimately, to Apulia wouldbe gained.

Ill

The strugglefor masteryover Ancona involvedalso a struggleforcommercial

mastery, in whichthe Venetianshad long been the principalprotagonists. Their
supportforBarbarossain 1173 was the culminationof a conflictexpressedin the
past throughdiplomacyand defensivealliancesagainstAncona. In 1141 Venice
assuredthe citizensof Pesaro and Fano thatit would defendtheirinterests if the
Anconitansinterferedin theirfreedomofaction.48The pactsof 1141were themselves
part of a steadyexpansionof Venetianinvolvement in the internalaffairsof the
Adriatictowns;at thesametime,theIstriantownsbowedto Venetiandemandsfor
feudalservice,but theneighbours ofAnconawerealloweda muchlightercontribu-
tionto Venice'snaval needs.49In 1151 theVenetiansand theAnconitanscame to
blows,buttheconflict did notlastlong,and was settleda yearlaterbya commercial
treaty,allowingthemenofAnconafreepassagein Venetianlands.50The natureof
thetreatyindicatesthenatureoftheconflict : an attemptby Veniceto suppressthe
incipientcommercial ofAncona,to excludeall possiblerivalsfromtheupper
activity

46Abulafia,Two Italics,133.
47Lamma,Comneni e Staufer,
i. 301-2.
48Archivo di Stato,Venice, Codex diplomaticusLanfranchi,1100-1199,anno 1141,p. 1: and
ibid.. Liber Pactorumi. f. 187v-188r.
49Ibid.,Codex diplomaticusLanfranchi,anno 1145, 160; Liber Pactorum,f. 139r-v.
50G.Luzzatto,'I più antichitrattatitra Venezia e le cittàmarchigiane',NuovoArchivio
Veneto,
n.s.,vi (1906), 7-8, 49-50. See also Leonhard,Seestadt
Ancona, 33-4.

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 ANCONA, BYZANTIUM AND THE ADRIATIC, 1155-1173 205

Adriatic.Buoncompagnoda Segni statesas a matterof fact that the Venetians

'semperquodam specialiodio Anchonamoderunt';51he is a relativelyimpartial
witnessto a dislikewhichtheVenetianchroniclers confirm:
vigorously
Oderant enimVeneti Anconitanos,turnpropterinimiciciasque intereos fuerant,cum etiam
Veneciarumsuscipiebant.52
propterinimicoseorumGrecos,quos ipsiin odiumet contrarietatem

Buoncompagnopointselsewhereto the scale of thisrivalry:it was not,it seems,

simplyan instanceofcompetition formastery overtheupperor middleAdriatic,but
a case of competition in long-distancetradealso. Buoncompagnomay,of course,
presenttoviewherean anachronistic imageofAncona'stradingconnections, reading
intotheconflict of 1173elementsofcompetition whichhe could see clearlyenough
in 1201.He statesthat,at thetimeofthesiegeof 1173,'multiAnchonitani aberant,
qui causa negotiandi erantinAlexandria, in urbeConstantinopolitana etRomania'.53
The emphasison Greece and Constantinople is striking,and it is likelythat the
Anconitansreceiveda tradingprivilegefromManuel Komnenosduringthe 1150s
or 1160s. In the fifteenth centurythere was an active Anconitancolony in
Constantinople, basedaroundthechurchofSt. Stephen;and itis oftenassumedthat
thiscolonydescendsfromtwelfth-century forebears.54Zimolo even suggeststhatit
was Manuel's privileges whichgave theinitialimpetusto Anconitanmerchants to
tradeoverseas,and thatbeforeth^ibus. etipsum> vel\d no maritime muscles.55 Butthis
interpretationis foundedon theatissuisautementes aedievaltradewas (in essence)the
Levanttradein luxurygoods; it . momentthatAnconahad other
earlierin datethan1173generalmeaning^ provideda capitalbaseformore
interests,
ambitiousenterprises. ntage°f opporturj. hayepjaye¿ a jesssignificant
Certainly, otlesssuccesstlhan the Venetians,Genoeseand
role in Byzantineand otherlon^
Pisans; possiblyAncona benefit^Moi^msenurgecjsionof Venice fromtradewith
Constantinople and RomaniaafteTVT/ 1, 8u¥attempts to placeAnconaon a parwith
its greaterrivals,as a full-blooded'Repubblica Marinara Italiana' are certainly
exaggerated.56
AntonioCarile has suggestedtheexistencewithintheAnconitanaristocracy of
elementswhichpossessedprimarily commercialinterests, functioning alongside an
establishedfeudalnobility;he postulates, therefore,activeoverseastradingpartner-
shipsdecadesbeforethesiegeof1173.57This argument is basedmoreon theanalogy

"Buoncompagno,13.
DucumVeneticorum,
52Historia MGH. SS. xiv,81.
ed. H. Simonsfeld,
17.
53Buoncompagno,
del Mare, del Terzinale e della Dogana e Patti condiverse
54C. Ciavarino, ed., StatutiAnconitani nazioni,
i (Ancona,1896),61 : 'de lo datioche se de pagareda quelli che vai en Costantinopoliperla chiesade
SanctoStefanode Costantinopoli'. See nowA. Pertusi,'The Anconitancolonyin Constantinople and
the reportof its consul,Benvenuto,on the fall of the city',Charanis ofPeter
Studies:essaysin honour
Charanis,ed. A. E. Laiou-Thomadakis,(New Brunswick,1980), 199-218,suggesting thatin thelate
twelfth-century the churchof St. Stephen at Constantinoplewas already a base for Anconitan
merchants.
"Buoncompagno,12 n.
56Suchan attemptcharacterizesAnconaRepubblica Marinara,cit., thoughone contributoris
especiallyrebellious:G. Franceschini, 'Ancona e le repubblichemarinare',56-9.
57Carile,'FedericoBarbarossa',9-17.

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206 DAVID ABULAFIA

presentedby the other Italian ports of the twelfthcentury,which are better

documented.What is clear is that Ancona displaysratherprecociouspolitical
development, forming a consularcommuneby 1128.A 'paginarecordationis5 ofthat
yearshowstheconsulsofAnconadecreeingthatthemonksofthehouseofSt Mary
on the Tremitiislands,togetherwiththeirfamuli,may come by ship to Ancona,
withouthavingto pay the usual taxes.Theyare,however,liable to pay twowhole
cheesesand one meal (prandium) to thoseresponsible forlevyingporttaxes.58This
documentthus indicatesthat the communeof Ancona already possessedsome
controlover the movementof shippinginto the home port; therewere officials
assignedto collectdues; and therewerelinks- not necessarily - between
lucrative
Anconaand islandsin thesouthern Adriatic,in NormanItaly.In the 1160sAncona
may have been a beneficiary of a moreambitiousline ofcommunications through
theAdriatic.The Pisansseemto have triedto construct a routethroughAnconato
Splitand Dubrovnik,reachingthenceDurazzo and theVia Egnatia.59Whetherso
cumbersome is unclear,especiallyin thefaceofVenetianhostility;
a routeflourished
but therewerePisan ambassadorsin the Adriaticin 1169. It is thuspossiblethat
AnconitantradewithConstantinople consistednotonlyoflong-haulshipping,sent
around the Peloponneseand throughthe Aegean; shorterroutesto Byzantine
Dalmatiaand the'theme5 ofDurazzo,or to theIonianislesand theGulfofCorinth,
may have been the primecommercialsuccessof Ancona, at least in the twelfth
century.In the thirteenth centuryAnconitanmerchants certainlydid reachmuch
further:thereare papal privilegesfortradein the Levant (in the 1240s) and a
privilegefromthe regentof the KingdomofJerusalem(in 1257); and Anconitans
appearin Cyprus,Caffaand elsewhere.60 A treatybetweenAnconaand Dubrovnik,
of 1199,almostcertainly muchpostdatestheestablishment ofclosecommercialties
betweenthetwoAdriaticports;apartfromthesignsfrom1169,it wasquitecommon
fortheRagusansto drawup a treatyto recordan existing stateofaffairs,
ratherthan
to indicatethecreationofnew tradingconditions. 61
Ancona did not possessan extensivecontado,butjostledwithJesi and other
neighbours in attemptsto controlthe Marches;notsurprisingly, theinhabitantsof
Jesi,Osimo and otherrivalsof Anconajoined withglee in the siege of 1173.62
Becausethecontadowas so small,Anconawas dependenton outsidesuppliesofthe
oflife.As Buoncompagnostatesgenerally:
necessities

58Armando Petrucci, ed., Codicediplomaticodel monastero

benedettino
di S. Maria di Tremiti{1005-
1237), 3 vols. (Fontiper la storiad'Italia, xcviii,Rome, I960), iii. 277-8.
59GinoGuarnieri,'Intornoalle relazionicommercialimarittime nel Medio Evo frala Toscana e
gli scali adriaticiDalmati', Archivio
storicoitaliano,cxxv (1967), 352-64: David Abulafia,'Dalmatian
Ragusa and theNormanKingdomofSicily',Slavonic andEast European Review,liv (1976), 414-5, 422
and n. 45; J. Radonic, Actaet diplomata ragusina, i (Belgrade,1934), 17-18. An agreementof 1188
betweenPisa and Zadar, thenunderHungariancontrol,is printedby Guarnieri,361-2; thissuggests
thatPisan attemptsto win access to Adriaticmarketspersistedintothelate twelfth century.
60DavidAbulafia,'The Anconitanprivilegesin thekingdomofJerusalemand the Levant trade
of Ancona', The Italian communes
in thecrusadingkingdom : a colloquium
ofJerusalem at theVanLeer Institute,
May 1984 (Genoa, forthcoming).
Jerusalem,
'Dalmatian Ragusa', 418.
61Abulafia,
82Buoncompagno,15-17.

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 ANCONA, BYZANTIUM AND THE ADRIATIC, 1155-1173 207

Quoniam civitatesque suntin portibusconstitute

vix possuntde labore propriofrumentum et
anonam haberead sufficientam cum pluresconstetesse in illis nautas et mercatores.63

He assignsa populationof 10,000inhabitants to Anconain 1173,whichis a much

smallerfigurethanmostscholarswouldoffer forcontemporary Genoa (perhapsfive
timesas large) or Venice (up to ten times).64But thereis no knowingwhether
Buoncompagnohas pluckeda sum out ofthe air, as ifto say: therewereplentyof
hungrymouthsduringthe siege. It may be assumed that the Venetianswere
especiallyirkedby Anconitaninvolvement in theAdriaticgraintrade,overwhich,
as late as themid-thirteenth century,Venetiancontrolwas notyetassured.65 Thus
Ancona'srivalrywithVenicehas to be understood notas directconcurrence on the
major Venetianshippinglines acrossthe Mediterranean, nor even as a struggle
betweentwopowerful maritime townsforcommandofthecentralAdriatic;Ancona
threatened Venice becauseit managedto maintaincontrolofits own supply-lines,
and thereby undermined thatmonopolyovermovements ofAdriaticgrain,saltand
wood which Venice had already successfully imposedin Istria and the upper
Adriatic.66
Clearly,theVenetiansdid notneedtofearintensive competition fromAnconitan
capital in overseasmarkets. At most they might fear that the merchantsofAncona
mightacquireprivileges in Byzantine tradeanalogous to theirown.As early as 1111
theByzantineemperorhad triedto balance thehandsomeprivileges grantedin the
1080sto theVenetianswithlessgenerousbut verytempting grantsto thePisans.67
This worrywas themorerealin the 1160sbecauseoftheincreaseddistancebetween
Byzantineand Venetianpoliticalinterests; besides,Pisanlinksto Anconamayhave
been seen as an extensionof the threatposed by the 1111 chrysobull in favourof
Pisa. By Manuel Komnenos'reigntheGreekemperors had developedto a fineskill
the art of balancingItalian tradinginterests againstone another:the 1150s,for
instance,saw embassiesofhopefulGenoesepatricians,anxiousto securechrysobulls
fromConstantinople.68 When,in 1171,Manuel swungthebalance hardagainstthe
Venetians,and confiscated theirgoods,thereis no hintin thesourcesthathe banned
themout of affection forhis Anconitanfriends;a Venetian chroniclesuggests,
rather,thattheVenetiansweresuspectbecauseoftheirincreasingly heartyrelations
withWilliamII ofSicily.69Manuel'sown relationswithWilliamdeteriorated after
1168,whenthe proposedSiculo-Greekmarriagewas cancelled,partlybecause the
Siciliansinsistedon impossibleterms.70 Kinnamosindicates,too,thattheVenetians

68Buoncompagno, 17.
64Buoncompagno, 23.
65F.C. Lane, Venice:a maritime (Baltimore,1973), 63-5.
republic
66Intensecompetitionfor the resourcesof the Bosnian hinterland - slaves, metals, forest
-
products can also be postulated.See F. W. Garter, 'Dubrovnik: the earlydevelopmentof a pre-
industrialcity',SlavonicandEast European Review,xlvii (1969), 354-68.
67G.M. Brand,Byzantium confrontstheWest,1180-1204 (Cambridge,Mass., 1968), 206-21.
68Abulafia,Two Italies,89-90.
6«AndreaDandolo, Cronica, ed. E. Pastorello,(Rerum italicarumscriptores, ser. 2, xii, pt. 1),
249; Abulafia,Two Italies,141-2.
70Parker, 86-93; Dandolo, loe. cit.

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208 DAVID ABULAFIA

had becomean unrulyelementin Constantinople, holdingthemselves above the

law, and indulgingin nefarious attackson rivalcommunities of Italian merchants;
Kinnamosis, admittedly, prejudiced,but he givesa clear idea of courtthinking
about theVenetians.71
In expellingthe Venetians,Manuel was not tryingto propelthemtowards
Barbarossa.Even in 1171,theprospectofVenetianco-operation withthegreatfoe
of the Lombardsmusthave seemedveryremote.On the otherhand, Manuel did
risklossofByzantineinfluencein theAdriatic,in townssuch as Dubrovnikwhich
becamea preyto Venetianambitions.After1171therewas nothingto preventthe
Doge fromlaunchingan attackon Byzantinesubjectsin Dalmatia; it will be seen
shortlyhow farDalmatia counted,at thistime,in Manuel's calculations.In 1172
theDoge's fleet,outwardboundto ravageByzantine lands,triedto seizeDubrovnik;
the citizensof Dubrovnikingeniously declaredthattheywerethe King of Sicily's
men,and no longerManuel's; and so theVenetiansdesistedfromfurther attacks.72
Venicedid not,ofcourse,abandonitsattempts to entercloserelationswithWilliam
ofSicily,thoughitwasonlyafterthesiegeofAnconathata treatybetweenWilliamII
and theRepublicwas signed(1 175);73beforethat,theVenetianscontinuedto trade
on good terms,buttheirco-operation withBarbarossawas probablya sticking-point
in attemptsto acquire special commercialprivileges.But the loss offreeaccessto
Greekwatersonlyintensified Venetiandependenceon tradein Sicily,Apulia,Syria
and even the westernMediterranean;a return,at least in large numbers,to
Constantinople was forthe momentout of the question.74It was thusespecially
gallingto find,in 1173,thatthemerchants ofAnconahad readyaccessto markets
whichwere actuallyclosed to themselves, but whichtheyhad done so much to
stimulate intoexistence, oftradewithItaly.It is therefore
at leastas centres interesting
tofindthatVenetianswitha substantial grudgeagainstManuelparticipated actively
in thesiegeofAnconain 1173. Romano Mairano,thewealthymerchantwho has
oftenbeen seen as an incipient'merchant-capitalist', lostgoods at the timeof the
expulsionfromConstantinople; or TotusMundus,only
one ofhis ships,the Kóct|ìos
just managedto escape fromthe GoldenHorn,crowdedwithrefugees. Two years
latertheshipreappeared,and helpedto bombardAncona:
Posueruntnamque in medio portusnavemolim Romani Mairani, que pre sua magnitudinea
numquamea maior fuit
plurimistotusmundusyperbolicedicebatur;quoniam,ut ferebatur,
alicubi visa.75

The attackon Ancona cannot,in otherwords,be understoodoutsidethe wider

framework relations.
ofVenetian-Byzantine

71Kinnamos, 280-2.
72Abulafia,'Dalmatian Ragusa', 419-22, fora possibleexplanation.Lilie, 493-4, disagrees,but
failsto see thefullpoint.
78Abulafia,Two Italies,142-4, whichfails,however,to take into account the complicationof
Venetianinvolvement againstAncona.
"Abulafia, Two Italies,144, 147-9.
75Buoncompagno, 14; forthe earlierhistoryof the ship see Zimolo's remarks,ibid., 15 n, and
des Kapitalismusin Venedig(Stuttgart, 1905).
R. Heynen, Zur Entstehung

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 ANCONA, BYZANTIUM AND THE ADRIATIC, 1155-1173 209

IV

Manuel Komnenos'attitudeto eventsin theAdriaticwas conditionedby another

setofcircumstances, whichto somedegreealso involvedAncona.The extensionof
VenetianruleoverpartsofDalmatiain the1080s- at thetimeofAlexiosKomnenos'
chrysobull- createda potentialconflictofinterestsbetweenthe Byzantinegovern-
mentand the Venetianrepublic.The Doge was recognisedin Constantinople as
'Dux Dalmatiae'; since,both as duke of Venice and duke of Dalmatia he was
technicallyregardedas a Byzantineofficial(6ou£),the Komnenoisaw in their
recognition oftheVenetianclaimto authority overDalmatia theexerciseofremote
Byzantine suzerainty over the upper Adriatic.76 Between 1080 and 1160 the
Byzantineemperors did not make seriousattempts to recoverdirectauthority
over
the Dalmatian towns,whichin any case had long possessedan unusualdegreeof
autonomy;but a fewof the southernmost towns,such as Dubrovnik,managedto
escape Venetianinterference and retainedcloserlinksto Constantinople.77
Venice
was able to restrictthe commercialfreedomof the northand centralDalmatian
towns,but it had to deal withan increasingly troublesome competitorduringthe
earlytwelfth century:theHungariancrown.Zadar (Zara) and Split(Spalato) were
the main targetsofHungarian- Venetianrivalry,and althoughVenice managedto
retaintheformer base, SplitfellunderHungarianrulefrom1133.78The Venetians
werenot,therefore, entirely in theirattemptto holdtheDalmatiancoast;
successful
and thisfailure,added to Hungarianpressureon the Byzantineterritories around
Belgrade,encouragedManuel to intervenedirectlyin Dalmatia. The existenceof
tiesbetweentheHungariancourtand theSicilian,as well as thegrowingthreatof
troublefromtheSerbs,made it important to demonstrate thatByzantineauthority
in thenorthern Balkanswas morethannominal.79 In the 1160sManuel succeeded
in pushingtheHungariansback fromtheDalmatiancoast,and in reconstructing a
Byzantine'theme'in theeasternAdriatic,undera Byzantine(ratherthanVenetian)
5o05ofDalmatia. VictoryovertheHungariansat Zemun (Zeugmin,1165) and at
the Save (1167) securedforfifteen yearsthe Dalmatian theme.80The first5o05,
Nikephoros Chaluphès,seemsto have heldcentralDalmatia and perhapsalso some
hinterlandregions;capturedin 1166,he was succeededby {kyrIzanacio', Sou^ of
Dalmatiaand Dioclea.81ByApril1171,Constantine Doukas had become6oO£,and,

76Ferluga,'La Dalmazia fraBisanzio',p. 71/201;cf.Ferluga,Amministrazionebizantino,passim,

wheretoolittleemphasisis placed on theByzantineviewthattheVenetianswere(technically)60OA01
oftheempire.VenetianrightsoverDalmatia werefirstenforcedat thestartoftheeleventhcentury,
and weregivenmoredetailedrecognition of1082/4,forwhichsee Brown,'Venetians',
in thechrysobull
70.
77Ferluga,Amministrazione,250; cf.270 n.
78Ferluga,'La Dalmazia fraBisanzio',p. 73/203;cf.S. Guldescu,History
ofmedieval Croatia(The
Haeue, 1964), 190-1,246.
79Abulafia.Two Italies,83 n. 62.
'La Dalmazia fraBisanzio',pp. 66-8/196-8;74-5/204-5.
80Ferluffa,
81Ferluga,'La Dalmazia fraBisanzio',pp. 75-6/205-6.Guarnieri,'Intornoalle relazioni'prints
a documentof 1169whichmentions'JohannecomitéSpalati' (p. 360) ; presumably, as in Dubrovnik,
- cf.Abulafia,'Dalmatian Ragusa', 423-5.
a countoflocal origincontrolledinternalaffairs

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210 DAVID ABULAFIA

as Schreinerhas shown,he remained8ou^ afterthesiegeofAncona,based at Split.

Accordingto a Byzantinesource,he was actuallypresentin Ancona duringthe
siege, as Manuel's emissary;a Greek necrology,preservedin the Bibliothèque
Nationalein Paris,describeshow the ae^aoTÓsGonstantine was sentto resistthe
Germansand Venetiansat Ancona.82His authority seemsto have extendedover
Dioclea (roughlymodernMontenegro),and perhapsas far southas Durazzo.83
ConstantineDoukas is not mentionedin the descriptions of the siege of Ancona
providedby Kinnamosand NiketasChoniates,but he appearsin Italian sources.
Maragone'sPisanAnnalsreferto a Byzantineemissary in Ancona(and Pisaninterest
in eventsat Anconais no surprise)
. Betterstill,Buoncompagno mentionsConstantius
or Constantinus,a 'protosevasto','imperatorisconstantinopolitani legatus'.
Accordingto Buoncompagno,he recompensedthe Anconitansforthe expensesof
the siege.He is presentedas the representative of a rulerof extraordinary wealth,
whohad senthimto Italyto purchasetheloyaltyofthecities - an imagenotgreatly
differentfromthatofhis precursor in Ancona,AlexiosAxouch:
Imperabatenimtunein urbe constantinopolitana serenissimusHemanuel,qui miseratistumin
Italia, ut compararetquasdam civitateset bona civium,et eisdempostmodumsuo nomineomnia
redeeretin feudum.84

In fact,as has been seen,thisprocesshad begunlong beforeConstantineDoukas

arrivedin 1173.Whether,also,Buoncompagno isjustifiedin presentingConstantine
as an ambassadorratherthan a militarycommanderis hard to say. Bernardo
Maragone,writing beforeBuoncompagno, doessee Constantine as a military
leader.
And Buoncompagno'sportrayalof the Byzantineemissary,risingto addressthe
populumanchonitanum, is certainlyin largemeasurean orator'sfantasy, withitsrefer-
encesto Spartanheroismand its vividnauticalmetaphors.The same is no doubt
trueofConstantine's supposeddeclamations in Greek,and ofthewaythat,'appre-
hendensmanu dextrabarbam, coram omnibusdixit . . .'- the stereotypeof a
Greek.85It is possibleto takemuchmoreseriously Buoncompagno's insistencethat
Constantine pumpedfundsintoAncona,a themeconfirmed in Byzantinesources.
Buoncompagnosays:
Hie eniminfinitam expenditpecuniampro sua et civitatisliberatione,et in omnibusmaximum
prestititpatrociniumAnchonitanis.(Nam quicquid, occasione obsidionis,ante vel postea
expenderat,usque ad novissimumquadrantemrestituiiuniversis).86

82Schreiner,'Dux von Dalmatien',286-7; Carile, T'assedio', 46-7; Ferluga,'La Dalmazia fra

Bisanzio',p. 77/207;fortheobituarynoticesee: B. de Montfaucon,Palaeographia graeca(Paris, 1708),
47; and comparethe entryin D. I. Polemis, The Doukai: a contribution to Byzantine
prosopography,
(London, 1968), §222,p. 191.
83Montfaucon, 47 and Schreiner,286-7. Accordingto the necrology, he was named 5oükoc kocì
ápx"nyóv of all AioKAriqc,
Aocàuoctìcc 'AppavicckocìlTraÀa0pa>.For the significance
Xop(3orria of these
referencesto Dioclea, Dalmatia, Croatia,Albania and Split,see Ferluga,Amministrazione,262; 'La
Dalmazia fraBisanzio',p. 77/207.
6*Annales Pisani,59; Buoncompagno,34.
85Buoncompaeno, 35-9.
86Buoncompagno, 35.

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 ANCONA, BYZANTIUM AND THE ADRIATIC, 1155-1173 211

And Constantine is made to speakon thistheme:

himself
'Recordeminitamdembeneficiorum potentis,sublimis,excelsiEmmanuelisImperatoris,qui
facietin capite omniumplatearum uestrarumcurrereflumenaureum,de cujus fluentispotu
replebiminidivitiarum.'87
As Constantine was well aware,it was his personthattheGermanarmysoughtto
seize, and he had to persuadethe Anconitansthatit was againsttheirinterests to
surrender him.Anconahad told Manuel in 1157thatit wouldnot 'willingly5 fight
the Germanruler,and Constantineseemsto have convincedthe citizensthatthe
threatwas reallyto themas well.88Buoncompagnoindicatesthat,apartfromthe
Venetians,'omnesquotquoteranta confinio Apulieusque Ariminum'had cometo
settleold scoreswithAncona; therewere also Tuscans,Spoletansand Romagnol
troops.89 Byzantium, was indeedfora timeAncona'ssole hope in 1173,thoughas
will be seen theAnconitansand Greeksmanagedto mobiliseotherItaliansin its
defence.
The YugoslavhistorianFerlugaseparatesByzantineinvolvement in Italy,or
indeedHungary,fromtheByzantinerecovery in Dalmatia. Of Dalmatia in 1154/5
he says: 'Bisanzionon sembraaffattointeressarsi della sua sortene prenderlain
considerazione comeeventualebase perl'offensiva italiana.'90Butit wouldbe hard
to insistthatthisstatement holdstruefortheyearsaround1173.The appearanceof
Constantine Doukas at Anconais an important reminder thatthe5oü£ofDalmatia
couldnotignoreeventson theoppositesideoftheAdriatic.Buoncompagno hintsat
the factorsinvolvedwhen he remarksof Ancona: 'nam et aliqua pars Sclavonic
potestin multaserenitate aerisex eodemloco videri.'91It made thegreatest senseto
assign to a Byzantine commander alreadyoccupied in eastern Adriaticaffairsa
watching briefoverthe western Adriaticalso. But there is no evidencethatthe SoO£
ofDalmatia was regardedas governororpotestas ofByzantineAncona.Anconahad
no Byzantinegovernor,and had no need ofone. At most,theremay have been a
Byzantinegarrison, buteventhatwouldhave beenpresentbyconsent;theevidence
available concernsAlexiosAxouchin 1158,and suggeststhattheremayonlyhave
been a ceremonialguard,whichaccompaniedAlexiosto and fromAncona.92Thus
Ancona'sassociationto Manuel was based on voluntarysubmission.Manuel did
not- whateverhis long-term - seek to createa Byzantinethemein the
intentions
March of Ancona,workingoutwardsto encompassthoseothertownswithwhose
citizenshe certainlyhad somelinks:Ravenna, Ferrara,the coastal townsof the
Adriatic.Eustathiosof Thessalonika,in his panegyricof Manuel, pointsto the
advantagesto Manuel in possessing voluntaryallies of thistype: theyare all the
morereliablein theirloyaltyto theemperor, becausetheyhave chosenhimthrough
theirgoodjudgment.
'It is no matterforsurprise',he argues,'ifour ownpeopleact thiswaytowards
themostmightyemperor,and it wouldbe a marvelifit wereotherwise. But thata
8'Buoncompagno,37.
88Cf.Kinnamos,170.
89Buoncompagno, 18.
90<LaDalmazia fraBisanzio',p. 83/213,n. 92.
"Buoncompagno,10.
ii. 132: 'exivitad nos cum omnibussoldariissuis'.
92Sudendorf,

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212 DAVID ABULAFIA

nationso farfromConstantinople comesto fightalongsideour own men,thisis

somethingworthmarvellingabout'; dcKéÀsucrroi tco BcccnÀei 93 The
5e5ouÀeUKcccnv.
Anconitans,singlyand as a community,enteredinto qnÀiccv, friendship, with
Byzantium, but as Ài£ious,
liegemen,oftheBasileus.It has been shownby Ferluga
that Manuel Komnenosunderstood,as his grandfather Alexios had done, the
significanceofwesternliegehomage,and was glad to encouragewesternprinces,or
indeedItalian merchants, to accepthimas theirsuzerainlord. In otherwords,the
Anconitanswere not treatedas Byzantinesubjects,expectedto obey Byzantine
formsofpoliticalpractice;therewas no intention ofintegrating themintothetheme
ofDalmatia.94
This realisticassumptionthatAncona shouldbe allowed to preserveits own
autonomyfreefromByzantineinterference meantthatConstantineDoukas could
offeronlyencouragement and funds.The lady Aldrudaof Bertinorowas as much
involvedin planningand leadingthe resistanceto the Germansas was the Greek
emissary.But ConstantineDoukas was not presentat the siege merelybecause
Dalmatia and Ancona weremoreor less withinsightof one another; therewas a
pointofcontactbetweenManuel'sinterests on eithersideoftheAdriatic.Manuel's
use ofAnconawas not,as has beenseen,consistent: he rapidlyabandonedhisplans
to sendraidsintoApulia,forinstance.A newfactorenteredintohiscalculationsby
1173: the outrighthostilityof Venice. Manuel's Dalmatian policyplaced direct
pressureon Venetian interests in the easternAdriatic.Split was the base of the
Byzantine5ou£,but the Venetiansstillheld partsof the coast southof Zadar.95
Encouragement to Ancona presenteda further irritantto Venetianinterests in the
centralAdriatic,thistimecommercialas well as political.Manuel sat astride the
-
centralAdriatic,and though for want of a fleet of his own- he could not impede
Venetiannaval movements, he did manageto restrict thedirectexerciseofVenetian
suzeraintyto the northernAdriatic.And this,too, at a time when Venice still
aspiredto politicaland commercialcontrolof areas muchfurther south,such as
Dubrovnik.Thus Manuel was able to achieve two ends: to erode the territorial
strengthofVenicewithintheAdriatic,and to erodeitscommercialstrength within
theheartlands ofByzantium itself,
by the cancellation ofitsprivilegesand the seizure

112; Lamma, 'Aldruda',389, n. 1.

93Eustathios,
94J.Ferluga, 'La Ligesse dans l'empire byzantin: contributionà l'étude de la féodalitéà
Byzance', Recueil des travauxde VInstituíd' Etudes byzantines,vii (Belgrade, 1961), 97-124; repr. in
Byzantium andtheBalkans,cit.,399-425; see p. 120/422foran exampleofa GenoeseAtriosof Manuel
Komnenos; amongthe Genoese,it mightbe argued,individualacts ofhomageto theBasileustook
the place of the communalsubjectionto which (at least in the 1080s) the Venetianswereliable, as
8ouAoT ofthe emperor.Similarly,see Leonhard,Seestadt Ancona, 58-63, 79-81.
95Zadarhad been 'capital' ofByzantineDalmatia in earliercenturies:Ferluga,'Bisanzioe Zara',
189; forthe use of Split by ConstantineDoukas, see T. Smiciklas,Codexdiplomatics regniCroatiae,
Dalmatiae etSlavoniae,ii, DiplomaticasaeculiXII continentes
(1101-1200), (Zagreb, 1904), 130-1 ; Ferluga,
'La Dalmazia fraBisanzio',p. 76-206.JanetE. Buerger,'Late medievalglazed potteryin Italy and
surroundingareas: with specificdetail fromthe excavationsin the cathedralin Florenceand in
Diocletian's Palace in Split', Ph.D. dissertation,
Columbia University,1978 (repr. by University
Microfilms, Ltd.), attributessome potteryfinds,Byzantinein character,to theperiodofByzantine
rulein Split: pp. 109, 165-6.However,Dr David Whitehouseinforms me thattheattributionofthese
piecesis stilldoubtful.

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 ANCONA, BYZANTIUM AND THE ADRIATIC, 1155-1173 213

ofits merchants. This is not to say thatthe primemotiveforByzantineexpansion

wastoplacea stranglehold on Venice;thisstranglehold wasa by-productofManuel's
successagainsttheHungariansin Dalmatia and againstGermanarmiesin Ancona.
Constantine Doukas' seven-month stintat Anconawas a legitimateinterruption
of
his dutiesas 8ou£ofDalmatia,becausetherewerecommonfeaturesin thedefence
ofeast and westAdriaticports.96
Yet it was notreallythroughConstantine's aid thatAnconamanagedto hold
offtheGermanthreat.Therewerenoblelords(and a lady) fromnorth-eastern Italy
whohelpedthecity.Romuald,archbishop ofSalerno,writing
at theNormanSicilian
court,givesa succinctaccountofevents:
Anconam cum Venetis tempore longo obsedit, credebat enim Grecum quemdam
Gonstantinopolitani imperatorisnuntium,qui in eadem civitateerat,cum sua pecunia capere;
sed quia cives eiusdemcivitatiei viriliterresistebant,
et comitissade Berthenoracum Willelmo
de Markysellanobili Ferrariensicatanio, cum magna multitudinemilitumet peditumad
succursumeiusdemcivitatisveniebat,non potuitquod intendebatpurficere,sed recepta ab
Anconitanismagna pecunia,ab obsidionerecessit.97

Buoncompagno describeshowAnconitanlegatessoughtalliesin north-eastern Italy

(presumably by approachingtheknownenemiesofthosetownsand lordswho had
joined the Germansiege). GuglielmoMarchesellamanaged to trickthe lord of
Ravenna,PietroTraversano(an actorin theeventsof 1158) and to takean army
fromthe Ferrararegionsouthwardsto Ancona.98The FrangipaneCountessof
whoheldlandsthroughout
Bertinoro, a vastswatheofnorth-eastern Italy,led troops
fromthe regionof Ravenna; her lands lay in Forli,Forlimpopoli, Rimini,Imola,
Faenza, Bologna, Cesena and other
several places." Her reward seemsto havebeen,
apart from money, some highlyflattering passagesin the encomium of Eustathios
ofThessalonika;he describesher as a powerfulruler,able to send manytroopsto
Manuel's aid, but more than that- she came herself,flyingher bannersand
proclaiming as herlordthegreatemperorManuel:
I seek to imagineher; each of you will imagineher as you wish,... we shall see the noble
approachour Solomonand admirehiswisdomand greatvalour.100
princess,our ally,reverently
GuglielmoMarchesella'srewardwas impressive,too.He visitedConstantinople,
and
was made to siton theemperor'srighthand; and he receivedhandsomegifts:
In suo quidemrecessuaurea vasa et argenteaei largitusestimperator,et insupertotáureossibi
fecitliberaliterexhiberi,de quibus omnia, que pro facto Anchonitanorumobligaverat,a
debitorumvinculoexsolvit.101

96Cf.Schreiner,303.
9'Romuald of Salerno,265.
98Buoncompagno, 29-30; cf. Sudendorf,ii. 131-2.
"Buoncompagno,42 : 'originemcontraxerat inUrbede nobileprosapiaFraiapanum.'A. Theiner,
Codexdiplomaticus domimi S. Sedis(Rome, 1861), i. 13-14,§ xv (1 144), forAldruda'sestates;
temporalis
forher ancestryin thepowerfulRoman familyofFrangipane,see Carile, 'L'assedio', 48-9; in 1170
Otto Frangipanemarrieda nieceofManuel Komnenosat Veroli,in thepresenceofPope Alexander
III - thisniece,Eudochia,concededlands to AlexanderIII (ArchivioSegretoVaticano,A. A. Arm.
I-xviii, § 3672). Aldruda'sadhesionto the anti-German, pro-Greekpartyis therefore no surprise.
100Eustathios,113-4; Lamma, 'Aldruda',392.
10buoncompagno,46-7.

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214 DAVID ABULAFIA

He receivedgold-adorned robes,horses,a pavilion,a banner,and returned to Italy

coveredin honours.Accordingto some Latin sources,he was also grantedlordship
overAnconauntilhisdeath;buthowlonghe livedand whether in factthesesources
are accurate is impossibleto say.102The citizensof Ancona are describedby
Buoncompagnoconferring 'magnificadona' upon Guglielmo,but not lordship.103
ZimoloarguedthatManuel could not have grantedhimAnconaas a fief,because
Byzantineemperorswerenot familiarwiththatformof lordship.Yet it has been
seenthattheydid understand theidea ofliegehomage,and it is likelythatManuel
conferred at leasta title,suchas marquis,upon GuglielmoMarchesella.104 It is far
fromclear thatManuel's relationship withAnconawas such thathe was expected
to choosea protector or overlordforthecity.
The citizensofAnconaapparentlybenefited fromimperialgenerosity,too.The
communeseemsto have been handsomely recompensed forits expenditureduring
thesiege:
6' SITI TOÚTOIS OCTOC
BCCCTIÀSÙS 61KOS eCttppCXvOels TCOV
TOÚS TE 'AyKCOVÍTOCSETTCCÍVOUS
yEyovoTcov á|jeí|36Tai, kccítoís ìctottoàìtocistco yévei TcoiíccícovéyKpívccscnravTcc
Traps^siv, òcra oi dcnei^fj te kocìSi/verràkockeívovsSeov ocíteív. 'AÀÀà
CrrncrxveiTcxi
KCCÌTÒ XPUCTÍOVTTOÀÀOnTÀCCCTlOV
TTETTOtJUpE.105
Fromthisit can be concludedthattheAnconitansreceivedspecialprivileges in the
Byzantineempire,as if citizensofAncona weresubjectsresidentin the Byzantine
townsproper,(io-oiroAiTats . . .) Thus after1173 theAnconitans
tco yévEicPcopiaícov
were stillable to claim commercialadvantagesin Constantinople and Romania;
whethertheirspecialstatussurvivedtheLatin massacreof 1182and theVenetian-
Frankishconquestof 1204remainsuncertain.Equally,it is unclearwhether Ancona
retaineditslinksto theByzantineadministrators ofDalmatia,or whether itscitizens
renewedtheiroathsto Manuel or his successors. The last evidencethatByzantine
administration stillfunctioned in the 'theme'of Dalmatia and Croatiadatesfrom
1180,afterwhichthe Hungariansrecoveredmuchof centralDalmatia.106During
the 1180sDubrovnikremainedin theNormanSiciliancamp,and Durazzo and the
Ionianislesalsofellto Sicilianattacks.107Thus thearea ofByzantine influence in the
a
Adriaticcontractedto almostnothing,withinonly dozen years of thegreatsiege
ofAncona.Peace betweenBarbarossaand thepapacy,as well as withSicily,led to
thedissolutionoftheLombardLeague,and Anconafounditselffreefromthedanger
of Germanassault.By the timeHenryVI renewedthatassault,in the 1190s,the

102Discussion by Zimolo,in Buoncompagno,47 n.

103Buoncomoacno, 46.
104Gompare Zimolo in Buoncompaeno.47 n., and Ferluea, 'Ligresse', cit.
105Niketas Choniates,202.
106Ferluga, 'La Dalmatia fraBisanzio',p. 79/209,forreferences to 'RogerioSlauoni', 'Rogerius
Slavonedei et imperialigraciaDalmatieet Ghroatieducas'; thereis littledoubtthatthisis theRoger
Slavus who rebelledagainsttheauthorityofthe King of Sicily(his relative)in 1161 and was exiled
soon after-Ferluga, 'Ligesse', 118 (and 420), Ghalandon,ii. 280, 283-5. For his earliercareer:
David Abulafia,'The Crownand the EconomyunderRoger II and his successors',Dumbarton Oaks
Papers,xxxvii(1983), 13.
107Abulafia, 'Dalmatian Ragusa', 423.

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 ANCONA, BYZANTIUM AND THE ADRIATIC, 1155-1173 215

Byzantinelinkoffered no chanceofre-activation;and Anconabegan to remember

that it stood in the patrimonyof St Peter.108Thus the ties to Constantinople,
commercialones apart,musthave been muchloosenedor sunderednotlong after
1173.
Owing to the loss of Ancona's medievalarchives,it is impossibleto adopt
criteriawithwhichto gauge Ancona'sdependenceon Constantinople. Thereis no
evidencethatdocumentsweredated by the regnalyearof Manuel Komnenos,as
were the Latin chartersof ConstantineDoukas issuedin Split.109It is normalto
pointout how strongwas Byzantineinfluence on thedesignofAncona'scathedral,
but (thoughparallelsarevisiblewithDalmatianchurchesofaboutthesameperiod),
thecathedralofSan Ciríacois, in essence,a Romanesquestructure. The porticoof
thechurchofSanta Maria in Anconaalso showssomeByzantineinfluence, but the
wholefacadepostdatesthesiegeof 1173,and is nearerin date to Buoncompagno.110
In otherwords,Byzantiumleftno verytangiblelegacyin Ancona,exceptforthe
factthatthecityhad managed,withtheaid ofGreekmoney,to staveoffa seriesof
threatsto its independence.What remainedfromthe 'Byzantineperiod' was an
autonomousAncona, unhamperedby Venetianor Germaninterference; and by
Buoncompagno's timethelinkswithConstantinople seemto have beenremembered
lessclearlythanthetiesto theFrangipanecountessand herFerrareseally.111

The Germanassaultson Anconain 1158, 1167, 1173weredramaticmomentsin a

stableand close relationship whichbound the Anconitansto Constantinople. But
thatis notto saytheByzantines continuallyextractedthe same advantagefrom their
linkwithAncona. They used Ancona in manyways,as a leveragainstSicilians,
Germansand Venetians - even,perhaps,as an indirectleveragainsttheHungarians
and theiralliesin Dalmatia. Manuel Komnenosdid notuse Anconaas a toolin the
a task.
creationofa ByzantineAdriatic;thereis no evidencehe aspiredto so difficult
a largenumberofindividualobjectivesin theAdriatic,and the
His aim was to fulfil
presenceof Anconitansloyal to Byzantiumwas one of the few constantsin the

108Buoncompagno does not mentionByzantinelinks with Ancona in his discussionof later

assaultson Ancona: see especiallyp. 50.
ii. 130-1, 138.
109Smiciklas,
386-7, wheretheporticoofS. Maria is described
110Forthebuildings,see Giangiacomi,Ancona,
as 'facciatarománico-bizantina'.
11buoncompagno, 34, implies that Ancona was a 'feudum'of Manuel Komnenos,but he
introducesthe link betweenAncona and Constantinoplein an oblique way- his primeaim is to
introduceConstantineDoukas,and place somefinewordsin hismouth.In thenineteenth centurythe
siege of Ancona (then dated to 1174 ratherthan 1173) was the subjectof a numberof romantic
works: G. Cannonieri, V assediodi Anconadell'anno1174 per Cristianoarcivescovo
di Magonza, luogotenente
di Barbarossa(Florence,1848), has what purportsto be a 'ConclusioneStorica' by F. Soragni (pp.
225-40); cf. Giangiacomi,396 and 403-4 fora similarwork. Cannonieri'swork reads as a bad
pasticheof Manzoni; itsfantastictale ofGuglielmoGosia and his belovedVirginiais, alas, without
any historicalfoundation.

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216 DAVID ABULAFIA

ByzantinerelationwithAncona. The loyaltyof the Anconitanscan forits partbe

explainedbothas a rejectionofGermanpretensions to rulethe Marchesand as an
attempt to consolidateAncona's commercial positionin rivalrywith the much
greaterpower of Venice. In the late twelfthcenturyAncona needed a strong
protector;otherAdriatictownsturnedto different masters- theRagusansactually
rejectedtheirByzantineoverlordin favourof a Sicilianone; later,in Zadar, the
Hungarianswouldbe welcomeonce again. Whatwas important was thataccessto
theAdriaticshippingroutesshouldbe availableevento Venice'senemies.The siege
of 1173 thussymbolises Ancona'ssuccessnot merelyagainstinvadingarmiesbut
againstrivalmerchants.
In a sense,therefore,
Anconaprofessed loyaltyto Constantinopleas a meansto
guaranteeits autonomy.In acknowledging Manuel as overlord,the Anconitans
soughtfreedom frominterference.Paradoxically,Ancona'ssubmission enhancedits
freedom in Italyand theAdriatic.112
David Abulafia

112Mythanksare due to the FacultyofArchaeology,Historyand Lettersof the BritishSchool

at Rome fora grantin aid ofresearch,whichenabledme to makeextensiveuse oftheVaticanLibrary
(and Archives)and thelibraryoftheGermanHistoricalInstitutein Rome,as wellas to visitAncona.

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