Castillo vs. Cruz, G.R. No.

182165 (2009)

Facts
Respondent Amanda Cruz, who along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased
a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property,
despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which intended to
utilize it for local projects. Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property,
however. Insisting that the RTC Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from
repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment
for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats. Thus, respondents filed a motion for
writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.

Issue
1. Whether or not Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property rights.
2. Whether or not Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when there is a criminal case already
filed.

Ruling
On the first issue, the Court ruled in the negative. Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of
Amparo and Habeas Data provides that the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to
life, liberty and security, and the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or
omissions.
Secretary of National Defense v Manalo teaches: “As the Amparo Rule was intended to address
the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. Tapuz vs. Del Rosario also
teaches: What is not is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a
writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, reposndents must meet the threshold requirement
that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission.
Evidently, the present controversy arouse out of a property dispute between the Provincial Government
and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on
respondents’ right to life, liberty, and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners’
entry into the property.

It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or
continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations of petitioners will not suffice to prove
entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was present. In fact,
respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest.

On the second issue, respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data
should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested
in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by
respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data.
Melissa Roxas vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155 (2010)

Facts
In the September 7, 2010 Decision of the Supreme Court,[1] after finding that the
failure of the petitioner to present substantial proof as to the respondents' responsibility anent her
abduction and torture was in part attributable to the lack of extraordinary diligence on the part of existing
police and military investigations, this Court ordered the conduct of further investigations, this time, to
be spearheaded by the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as the designated lead investigating agency
for purposes of this petition. The CHR was then required to submit a report of its investigations as well
as a recommendation to the Court of Appeals which, in the meantime, retained jurisdiction of this case.
Finally, the Court of Appeals was directed to monitor the investigations and submit to the Court its own
report and recommendation, for its consideration and, ideally, final disposition.

Issue
Can the Court of Appeals conduct a summary hearing to require the personal
appearance of confidential witnesses interviewed by the CHR and affirm their allegations under oath?

Ruling

The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Court pointed out that “while the CHR investigations have
already been concluded, no additional evidence tending to implicate any of the public respondents in the
abduction and torture of the petitioner have materialized. CHR Resolution (IV) No. A2010-130 is quite
clear that the evidence gathered during the CHR investigations were still not sufficient to identify any of
the respondents, or anyone in particular for that matter, as the persons responsible for petitioner's
abduction. Neither did the ocular inspections of various military facilities and firing ranges in Pampanga,
conducted by the CHR, definitively point that petitioner was detained in any of them.”

The Court agreed that bringing the persons interviewed in the CHR-Region III
confidentialreports or at the least, the CHR field investigators themselves, before a summary hearing before
the Court of Appeals will serve as a huge step towards identifying the persons behind the abduction and
torture of petitioner. Certainly, it may aid an on-going investigations by pointing them at an alternative, if
not the right direction. Before disposing of this case once and for all, the Court must ensure that each and
every possible lead or theory was pursued and verified, and no stone left unturned.
Meralco vs. Lim, G.R. No. 184769 (2010)

Facts
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at
the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO). An anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering
Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is
assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads: Cherry Lim: MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG
BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA
BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO,
LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB…. Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of
MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the matter to the Plaridel Station of the
Philippine National Police. By Memorandum, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s
Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in
Muntinlupa as “A/F OTMS Clerk,” effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of “… reports that there
were accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly
compromise [her] safety and security.” Respondent, by letter addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula,
Vice-President, appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and
misgivings on the matter, claiming that the “punitive” nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due
process. Citing the gruelling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and
violation of the provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Respondent
thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer. No response to her request having
been received, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan.
Issue
Whether or not a labor-related issue is within the parameters of the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data.
Ruling

The Court ruled in the negative. Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with
MERALCO’s Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for
information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of
habeas data. Writ habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when
the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a
property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondent’s
reservations on the real reasons for her transfer  a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of
one’s employment  are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction
over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters. In another vein, there
is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of
respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. Her posture unwittingly
concedes that the issue is labor-related.
 RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,
vs
ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014 (Third Division)

FACTS: In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several
pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments. Thereafter, some of their
classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded said
pictures. She showed the said pictures to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action. Later, STC found Tan et al to have
violated the student’s handbook and banned them from “marching” in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.

The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining the school from
barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said students.

Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data
against the school. They argued, among others, that:

1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends Only.” They, thus, have a reasonable
expectation of privacy which must be respected.

2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent. Escudero,
however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials.
Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were intruded upon;

3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital images happened at
STC’s Computer Laboratory;

They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and have
such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy. The Cebu RTC eventually denied the
petition. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper on the ground that there in an actual or threatened violation of
the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in the case.

HELD: YES it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper. Contrary to the arguments

of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal killing or enforced
disappearance; and

2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in the business of “gathering,
collecting, or storing data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party”.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances.
Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or
entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.

On the Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)

The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy tools, and the user makes use of such
privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy (right to informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy
must be respected and protected.

In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such privacy tools. Evidence would show that
that their post (status) on Facebook were published as “Public”.

Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a user’s posts on his “wall” (profile page):

a. Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
b. Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;
c. Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
d. Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and
e. Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must choose any setting other than “Public”. If it is
true that the students concerned did set the posts subject of this case so much so that only five people can see them (as they claim),
then how come most of their classmates were able to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In fact, it was their classmates
who informed and showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use the privacy
settings of Facebook hence, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures of them scantily clad.

STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the pictures cannot be considered illegal.
As it appears, it was the classmates of the students who showed the picture to their teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said
pictures, merely delivered them to the proper school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline their students
according to the standards of the school (to which the students and their parents agreed to in the first place because of the fact that
they enrolled their children there).