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Dalan Nelson

PHIL 422

24 April 2023

Conversion and Personal Identity: The Human Existence

Imagine you find a photograph of yourself from ten years ago and you start to consider

how you’ve changed. It’s immediately obvious that your physical appearance has changed, but

that isn’t the least of the changes you’ve undergone. Your understanding of the world, your

goals, your taste, even your beliefs are different from that person in the photo. Memories of who

you were start to flood your mind, and for some memories you think, “It makes sense that I

would do, think, or believe ‘x’ based on the circumstances I was in.” For other memories,

however, you think “I would never, under any circumstances do, think, or believe ‘x.’ How in

the world could I ever have believed that was correct?” Would it be correct for you to say that

you are a different person from the person in the photograph? Although one could take this

question from a metaphysical standpoint—talking about how often cells and tissues are replaced,

or the psychology behind memory—I will be taking it from an epistemic standpoint, which

requires an understanding of the nature of identity, memory, and personal transformation.

The idea of conversion—the word I will be using throughout this paper to denote radical

change of personal identity—raises a number of important issues related to the self. The question

of whether it is possible to completely disassociate from one’s past self, challenges our

assumptions about the stability of personal identity and the relationship between past and present

selves. In this paper I will explore a few different viewpoints on conversion before making the

argument that not only is conversion possible, but that it is a natural part of human experience

that needs to be recognized and accepted.

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Background

Memory is a major issue when it comes to the idea of conversion. Tyler Burge talked

about two ways of thinking about memory in the Dewey Lectures III section IX. One way of

thinking about memory is in terms of whether or not we identify with the memories. For

example, someone might adopt a memory of an event that they didn’t experience. This is an idea

that originated with Shoemaker that is called quasi-memory. Burge gives the example of

someone watching a home video and thinking that the person portrayed in the video is them,

when it is not. When this happens, the person might adopt the memory of whatever is happening

in the video and it can become part of their memory archive, even though the person in the video

is someone else. Burge says, “Through quasi-memory, an individual could identify an attitude

instance that is not the individual’s own in a de re way. The individual could make a brute error

in self-attributing the quasi-remembered psychological state.” (Burge, 2011) Another example of

this kind of mistake is that my mom tells the same stories about my siblings and me all the time,

including some stories about me before I can remember, such as when I was a baby. Although

the memory didn’t come from me, I now remember the events as if they are my own memories.

This would be considered quasi-memory because I am falsely identifying with memories that are

not my own.

The other aspect of memory that Burge brings up is false memory. In this case, the issue

doesn’t lie with someone wrongfully attributing a memory to themselves, it lies with wrongfully

not attributing a memory to themselves. Burge gives the example of schizophrenia. In some

cases of schizophrenia, an individual may have memories of events that occurred under the

influence of a different personality. Burge says, “Some schizophrenics think that their thoughts

are inserted into their minds by others. They deny that their thoughts, which they cite correctly,
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are their own.” (Burge, 2011) These people have the memory, and metaphysically speaking it

was them acting in the memory, but they don’t identify with the memory because they think it

was someone else acting. We can think of these situations as fitting within a table: normal

memories are those that belong to an individual that they identify as being their own;

schizophrenic memories are those that belong to an individual that they do not identify as being

their own; and quasi-memories are those that do not belong to an individual that they nonetheless

identify as being their own. But what would go in the fourth space, the one occupied by

memories that do not belong to an individual that they don’t identify with? The first answer that

comes to mind would be other people’s memories that the individual recognizes as not being

their own, but I suggest that another kind of memory can live here. I suggest that memories from

before a conversion will also take up this space. These would then be memories that the

individual has that are not actually their own, because they have undergone such a fundamental

change, memories that they rightfully don’t identify as their own. This brings us to the idea of

forensic identity.

In “Getting Our Stories Straight: Self-Narrative and Personal Identity,” Marya

Schechtman talked about “forensic identity,” an originally Lockean idea. Forensic identity is that

what gives someone an identity is an autobiographical set of memories that create a narrative of

their life. “The narrative self-constitution view of forensic identity, roughly put, holds that

someone constitutes herself as a forensic person and creates her identity as such by forming an

autobiographical narrative—a story of her life.” (Schechtman, 2009) For example, I know who I

am beyond just knowing that I occupy a body and that I have a mind and that I can think. My

identity is made up of memories of riding my bike when I was ten, and burning an apple pie in

Volgograd when I was twenty, changing my major for the third time to philosophy just a year
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ago. I have, as Schechtman put it, “a background understanding of oneself as the protagonist of

an ongoing life story and…process one’s experience in the context of that story.” She continues,

“This last point is important. It is essential to realize that having a narrative is a matter not just of

passively knowing one’s story but of interpreting one’s situation and deliberating in the light of

it.” (Schechtman, 2009) I not only have a group of memories, but I also have a sort of self that

identifies with each of them, that strings them up into a narrative of myself. This string-like

narrative is what makes up my identity. But what of our very first example? What about

memories that do not fit into the category of belonging to me and being identified as my own?

When thinking about quasi-memory and schizophrenia, these disrupt the personal

narrative in that quasi-memory does not belong to the individual and therefore creates a sort of

false-identification of oneself, and in the case of schizophrenia, the memory is not accepted as

one’s own and therefore cannot be added to the personal narrative or the personal-identity.

Additionally, Schechtman provides a case of Alzheimer's as an example. After losing major

portions of their memories, many Alzheimer’s patients find it difficult to connect with their past

selves as introduced to them through photographs, friends, or family members. They no longer

have those portions of their self-narrative to build their personal identity and their personal

identity is instead made up of only what they can remember.

When putting conversion within Schechtman’s definition of the narrative self-

constitution view of forensic identity, we can easily identify cases outside of mental illness and

quasi-memory that would change our personal narratives. Schetchman puts it this way, “It is

essential that one see one’s actions as flowing from one’s plans, projects, intentions, beliefs, and

desires, if these are to be the actions of a forensic person.” (Schechtman, 2009) Outside of

mental illness and quasi-memory, there are instances of looking back at oneself and not being
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able to explain why one acted the way they did—not having or understanding the “plans,

projects, intentions, beliefs, and desires” that one had in the past, such as with the our example in

the introduction to the paper.

Religion—Christianity in particular—has a lot of interesting things to say about

discarding certain parts of our personal narrative. In “The Phenomenology of Conversion,” Paul

DiGeorgio talks about the fundamental role that conversion plays in our lives, using the New

Testament story of the apostle Paul as a case study. DiGeorgio is a strong advocate for

conversion, saying that, “When my self shifts or changes, sometimes it is because I am grasping

a new personal identity. I am redefining for myself that person whom I consider myself to be.”

(DiGeorgio, 2021) The way he explains highlights the commonality of the act of conversion.

Extreme change is something that is a natural part of human existence. This isn’t just a change of

appearance or even a change of beliefs and goals, when we change, we are grasping an entirely

new personal identity.

This is a common idea within the Bible. 2 Corinthians 5:17 says “Therefore if anyone is

in Christ, he is a new creature; the old things passed away; behold, new things have come.”

(King James Bible, 1769/2008) This fits even better with the narrative self-constitution view of

forensic identity when we consider the Christian view that not even God remembers certain parts

of our narratives as indicated in Isaiah 43:25 “I, I am he who blots out your transgressions for my

own sake, and I will not remember your sins,” and Hebrews 8:12 “For I will be merciful toward

their iniquities, and I will remember their sins no more.”(King James Bible, 1769/2008)

DiGeorigio’s use of the apostle Paul as an example further goes to strengthen the idea of

identifiable memory making up our personal identities.

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The story of Paul (originally named Saul) starts with him as an antagonist against early

Christians. The story follows that on the road to Damascus, Saul was stopped by a heavenly

vision that reprimanded him for his ill treatment of the Christians. Because of this experience,

Saul eventually leaves his old life, his job, goals, beliefs, and even his name behind to become a

Christian missionary. This is an interesting case where conversion happens all at once, where up

to this moment we have dealt exclusively with conversion that takes place over some period of

time. What makes this case even more interesting is that Paul’s change was so extreme that he no

longer even identified himself by the same name, and when he talked about himself later, he said

he was a different person.

Analysis

One aspect of conversion that is important to note is the distinction between identifiable

and non-identifiable memory of self. As a reminder, I have defined conversion in this paper as

being a radical change of personal identity. There are plenty of cases where someone will have a

memory of believing something that they no longer believe, but that doesn’t necessarily mean

that they don’t identify with the memory. Far more often than the initial case of the paper, people

will remember doing, thinking, or believing something that they no longer do, think, or believe

and they will understand why they did what they did under those circumstances. This would still

be a case of identifying with a memory because the individual would be seeing their actions as

“flowing from one’s plans, projects, intentions, beliefs, and desires,” as stated by Schechtman

above. A case of non-identifiable memory would be one similar to the first case of the paper,

where an individual looks back at actions, thoughts, or beliefs and can’t understand how they

would ever do, think, or believe such things.

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One example, as explored above, would be that of a religious conversion. Examples of

religious conversion can range from mild to extreme, with some conversions involving not just

changes in action and belief but in demeanor and personality of the person involved. Baptism has

long been seen as a symbol of death and rebirth as expressed in Romans 6:4, “Therefore we are

buried with him by baptism into death: that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the

glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life.” (King James Bible,

1769/2008) This symbolism has been so long accepted that many people use the phrase “born

again Christian” to denote those who have been baptized. All of this indicates extreme change.

The death of the past self and the birth of an entirely new person.

This kind of extreme change doesn’t just happen in spiritual contexts, though, another

example in our modern world are transgender people. As part of the LGBTQ+ community, I

have many transgender and non-binary friends who have undergone major changes in their lives

even outside of physical changes. I have friends who identified with their birth gender and birth

names when they were younger, not always feeling comfortable with them, but at least

identifying with them. Those same friends now couldn’t feel further from the ways they

identified as children and teens. They have different personalities, different beliefs about

themselves, and different ways of identifying themselves with others. It’s common in the

transgender community to call one’s birth name their “dead name” once they have changed their

name to one that suits them better. This is significant in denoting that the past them is dead, and

that they are a new person.

But one need not be a Christian or transgender to undergo conversion. Thinking back on

the first example of this paper of looking at a photo from ten years ago and feeling so different

that one doesn’t even identify with the person in the photo is an example of a standard sort of
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conversion. I see it as common to discard pieces of personal narrative that no longer fit with the

person that we are. This doesn’t even need to be a year-long process, as with the example of the

apostle Paul conversion can happen rapidly, although it seems to happen over longer spaces of

time more often.

The issue of conversion does have some ethical implications which are important to

address. Although it’s natural for humans to undergo these major changes epistemically, it seems

like there is still some sort of metaphysically continuity of self that keeps people accountable for

their actions. I think that religions, in general, have a good view on the moral implications of

conversion: most religions argue that even after major personal change, we have an obligation to

make amends for the things we’ve done wrong, but also that people, after change, deserve

forgiveness for what their past selves have done. I do think, however, that more research would

need to be done on the moral applications of natural conversion.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that personal transformation of identity, outside of mental

illness, can introduce the possibility for someone to entirely dissociate themselves from their past

self. This type of conversion challenges assumptions about the stability and continuity of

personal identity, however, I believe that it is a natural part of human existence that needs to be

recognized and accepted. Through the analysis of literature and personal examples, I have shown

that this dissociation from the past self can occur in both religious and non-religious contexts.

Additionally, I have explored the ethical and moral implications of this dissociation, suggesting

that religions can provide guidance on making amends and forgiving past actions. Overall, this

paper highlights the importance of recognizing and accepting personal transformation and

dissociation from the past self as a natural part of human existence.

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Cited Sources

Burge, Tyler (2011). The Dewey Lectures 2007: Self and Self-Understanding. Journal of

Philosophy 108 (6-7).

DiGeorgio, P. (2021). The Phenomenology of Conversion (Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne

University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1974.

King James Bible. (2008). Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1769)

Schechtman, M. (2009). Chapter Four. In Personal identity and fractured selves: Perspectives

from philosophy, ethics, and Neuroscience (pp. 65–92). essay, Johns Hopkins University

Press.