LORENZO

ELIZABETH EUSEBIO-CALDERON, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

G.R. No. 158495. October 21, 2004

FACTS: The trial court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa in the consolidated Criminal cases No 1190-M-95, 1191-M-95, and 1192-M-95.
The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration for lack of merit which the trial
court denied, hence the petitioner appealed the judgment of the trial court to the Court
of Appeals, which the latter reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court.
An instant petition for review was made by the petitioner raising the following errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to consider that on the face of the Decision
rendered by the Presiding Judge of RTC – Branch 17, Malolos City, that interest checks
were dismissed but found the appellant guilty with respect to the principal loan checks in
the three cases above mentioned.
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to consider that the whole transactions that
transpired between appellant and private appellees covered a period lasting in years
whereby private appellees charged appellant highly usurious interests which under
current jurisprudence maintains that usurious interests are void.
3. With utmost due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals failed to consider that
under the sorry state of affairs which petitioner experienced when the instant three
criminal cases were pending before RTC – Branch 79, Malolos City, that private
respondents should have filed a separate civil complaint for their alleged claim of Sum
of Money.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals err in finding the appellant civilly liable to
complainants with respect to the interest in the principal loan despite the dismissal of
the interest checks by the Regional Trial Court.

RULING: In a criminal case, an appeal throws the whole case wide open for review.
Issues whether raised or not by the parties may be resolved by the appellate court.
When petitioner appealed her conviction, the dismissal of the interest checks by the
lower court did not preclude the Court of Appeals from reviewing such decision and
modifying her civil liability. The appeal conferred upon the appellate court full jurisdiction
and rendered it competent to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty and cite the proper provision of the penal law.

MANLY SPORTWEAR MANUFACTURING, INC., vs. DADODETTE ENTERPRISES

AND/OR HERMES SPORTS CENTER,
G.R. No. 165306. September 20, 2005

FACTS: Special Investigator Salcedo of the NBI applied for a search warrant before the
RTC of Quezon based on the information that Dadodette Enterprises and/or Hermes
Sports Center were in possession of goods, the copyright of which belonged to Manly
Sportswear Manufacturing Inc.
The judge of RTC of Quezon City has found reasonable grounds that a violation of
Sections 172 and 217 of RA 8293 has been committed, hence the former issued a
search warrant.
Respondents thereafter moved to quash and annul the search warrant contending that
the same is invalid since the requisites for its issuance have not been complied with.
They insisted that the sporting goods manufactured by and/or registered in the name of
MANLY are ordinary and common hence, not among the classes of work protected
under Section 172 of RA 8293.
The trial court granted the motion to quash and declared the Search Warrant null and
void on its finding that the copyrighted products of Manly are unqualified for protection
under Section 172 of RA 8293.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court has gravely abused its discretion in declaring in the the
hearing for the quashal of the search warrant that the copyrighted products of MANLY
are not the original creators subject to the protection of RA 8293.

RULING: No. The power to issue search warrants is exclusively vested with the trial
judges in the exercise of their judicial function. As such, the power to quash the same
also rests solely with them. After the judge has issued a warrant, he is not precluded to
subsequently quash the same, if he finds upon reevaluation of the evidence that no
probable cause exists.
Inherent in the courts’ power to issue search warrants is the power to quash warrants
already issued. In this connection, this Court has ruled that the motion to quash should
be filed in the court that issued the warrant unless a criminal case has already been
instituted in another court, in which case, the motion should be filed with the latter. The
ruling has since been incorporated in Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
In the instant case, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
entertained the motion to quash considering that no criminal action has yet been
instituted when it was filed. The trial court also properly quashed the search warrant it
earlier issued after finding upon reevaluation of the evidence that no probable cause
exists to justify its issuance in the first place.