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The qualitative risk assessment of an electrolytic

hydrogen generation system

Naoya Kasai a,*, Yuki Fujimoto b,1, Ikuya Yamashita c,2,

Hisashi Nagaoka c,2
a
Yokohama National University, 79-5 Tokiwadai, Hodogaya-ku, Yokohama, 240-8501, Japan
b
Japan Industrial and Medical Gases Association, Success Shibadaimon Building, 2-8-13 Shibadaimon, Minato-Ku,
Tokyo, 105-0012 Japan
c
Honda R& D Co., Ltd., 4630, Oaza Shimo-Takanezawa, Haga-Machi, Haga-gun, Tochigi-ken, 321-3321 Japan

article info abstract

Article history: A risk assessment for an electrolytic hydrogen generation system was carried out. The
Received 30 January 2016 potential accident scenarios for the system were evaluated with a hazard and operability
Received in revised form study (HAZOP) and failure mode effect analysis (FMEA). Brainstorming sessions were
23 May 2016 conducted to evaluate the possibility of each potential accident scenario. In the severity
Accepted 26 May 2016 analysis for each potential accident scenario, the jet flame length was estimated based on
Available online 30 June 2016 an empirical formula using reference data. The blast pressure was mainly estimated by
using the results of the reference. The risks of all potential hazards with and without the
Keywords: implementation of various safety measures were analyzed using risk matrices. It is clear
Electrolytic hydrogen generation that with the safety measures in place, the risk levels of all system hazards are acceptable.
system © 2016 Hydrogen Energy Publications LLC. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Risk assessment
Hazard and operability study
Failure mode effect analysis

electrolysis. In water electrolysis method, H2 is typically

Introduction
Global environmental issues such as global warming have led
to an urgent need to transition to a “hydrogen society.” By
employing H2 as an energy carrier, electricity can be generated
in power stations or fuel cell vehicles without the emission of
CO2. However, H2 is potentially hazardous due to its wide
explosion limit range and low ignition energy. Moreover,
because H2 is the smallest molecule, it easily leaks from
sealing parts such as valves and flanges. H2 is generated from
water or hydrocarbons using various processes such as water
generated under high pressure conditions to improve the ef-
ficiency, so that risk assessment is required for safe use of the
equipment.
Numerous studies on the various risks associated with H2
use have been carried out, including those focused on
hydrogen fueling stations [1e21], unintended release of H2
[22e24] and H2 jet flames [25,26] and the H2 concentration
layer adjacent to the celling [27e29].
Based on the configurations and specifications of the pro-
totype system, the configurations and specifications of the
system of electrolysis process of water for the analysis of the

* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ81 45 339 3979; fax: þ81 45 339 4011.
E-mail address: n-kasai@ynu.ac.jp (N. Kasai).
1
Tel.: þ81 3 5425 2255; fax: þ81 3 5425 2256.
2
Tel.: þ81 28 677 3311.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2016.05.231
0360-3199/© 2016 Hydrogen Energy Publications LLC. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
 i n t e r n a t i o n a l j o u r n a l o f h y d r o g e n e n e r g y 4 1 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 1 3 3 0 8 e1 3 3 1 4 13309

Pure
water
III
a I
3
Hydrogen gas- Condenser Adsorption Accumulator
Oxygen gas- Electrolytic liquid separator column
liquid separator hydrogen
b device
A
1
2 II
Air Exhaust Pressure
c d Exhaust
oxygen gas reducing
with air valve Water seal – water
Pressure type safety ii
i device Exhaust
reducing
valve hydrogen
gas

Fig. 1 e Configuration of the high pressure hydrogen gas generation system with electrolyzer. In Fig. 1, solid lines and
Roman numerals are used for the H2 piping, and thick dotted lines and small letters are used for the water piping. Thin
dotted lines and Arabic numerals are used for the piping carrying O2 or air. Bold lines and capital letters indicate piping in
which the pressure is 82 MPa.

study was considered. To contribute to develop a regulation of
electrolytic hydrogen generation systems, authors carefully
built the system for the analysis based on the prototype sys-
tem so that it can represent various electrolytic hydrogen
generation systems. The H2 inventory of the system for the
analysis was intentionally made larger than that which would
be used in the prototype system. A hazard and operability
study (HAZOP) and failure mode effect analysis (FMEA) were
carried out on an electrolytic hydrogen generation system
arranged for the study. Potential accident scenarios were then
analyzed. The risk level of each scenario with and without the
implementation of various safety measures was evaluated.
Method and material
Electrolytic hydrogen generation system
The configuration of the electrolytic H2 generation system
considered in this study is shown in Fig. 1. Each piping line
generally has a pressure indicator and a filter to remove
impurities. The biggest advantage of this system is that, in
contrast to conventional systems, the H2 pressure can be
increased to 82 MPa without the use of a compressor, while
the O2 is maintained at atmospheric pressure.
Table 1 shows the specifications of the various types of
piping employed in the system. As shown in Fig. 1 and Table 1,
the O2 gaseliquid separator supplies pure water to an elec-
trolytic H2 generation device and exhausts the O2 returned
from the device. A H2 gaseliquid separator, a condenser, and
an absorption column enhance the purity of hydrogen by
removing moisture from the H2 gas. Then, H2 gas flows to the
accumulator at a pressure of 82 MPa. A water seal-type safety
device is used to safely exhaust H2 gas. The total H2 inventory
in piping I and II is 40 Nm3 and that of piping III, including the
devices, is 700 Nm3. Under normal conditions, piping i and ii
do not contain H2. When an accident occurs, the 82 MPa H2 gas
is vented through the piping in the direction II / i / ii.
Similarly, water with 82 MPa is vented through the piping in
the direction A / c / d. Each piping line that handles high-
pressure fluids is equipped with safety measures such as a
safety valve and a pressure indicator. The entire system

Table 1 e Specifications of piping used in the system. Roman numerals, small letters, Arabic numerals and capital letters
indicate the piping of Fig. 1, respectively.
Piping Contents of Pressure Hydrogen inventory Configuration
system piping [MPa] [Nm3]
1 Air 0.1 e Check valve included
2 Oxygen gas e Vent line
3 Oxygen gas e Safety valve and shut-off valve included
a Water e Check valve included
b Water e Check valve and shut-off valve included
c Water 0.9 e Safety valve included
d Water 0.1 e Shut-off valve included
i Hydrogen gas 0.5 Small amount Shut-off valve included
ii Hydrogen gas 0.1 Small amount Vent line
I Hydrogen gas 82 40 Check valve and safety valve included
II Hydrogen gas Vent line
III Hydrogen gas 700 Back pressure valve, check valve, and safety valve included
A Water Back pressure valve included
13310 i n t e r n a t i o n a l j o u r n a l o f h y d r o g e n e n e r g y 4 1 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 1 3 3 0 8 e1 3 3 1 4

FMEA , HAZOP Possibility Possibility

i ii iii iv i ii iii iv
Decide the leakage mode V 18 1 22 40 V 2
(diameter, pressure, and H2 inventory)
IV IV 44

Severity
Severity
III III
Estimation of blast pressure II 21 3
II 2 4 18
and flame length
I 3 2 23 I 19 6 3

Rank of severity and possibility (a) Without safety measures (b) With safety measures

Fig. 3 e Risk matrices generated for the study. Red, orange,

Evaluation of risk with and
and light green indicate high, medium, and low risk
without safety measures
categories. The numbers listed in the matrices are the
Fig. 2 e Flowchart of risk assessment. FMEA and HAZOP ranked numbers of the scenarios. Upper case and lower
mean Failure Mode and Effect Analysis and Hazard and case Roman numerals mean the severity and the
Operability Study. possibility of an accident. (For interpretation of the
references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 2 e FMEA failure modes of the system.
FMEA failure mode rules used to rank probability and severity, because a risk
Hydrogen embrittlement Open/close failure of automatic assessment of compressed H2 at 80 MPa was carried out in
valve those studies. A flowchart of the risk assessment method is
Chloride stress corrosion Open/close failure of control valve shown in Fig. 2. HAZOP and FMEA were employed as the risk
cracking analysis methods. Based on the potential accident scenarios
Corrosion Open/close failure of check valve
established by HAZOP and FMEA, the leakage mode (e.g.,
Fatigue Pressure indicator failure
leakage diameter, pressure, and H2 inventory of the
Loosening of threaded joints Temperature indicator failure
Weld defect Safety valve failure hydrogen) and the possibility of an accident were decided.
Defect Filter clogging The blast pressure and the jet flame length were estimated
Deterioration of sealing Filter damage based on the results and empirical formulas of the reference
material [1e3]. From the results, the severities of the accidents were
Gland leakage Start/stop failure ranked. The risks with and without the implementation of
Seat leakage Voltage indicator failure
safety measures for potential accident scenarios were
Damage of a polymer
electrolyte
evaluated.

Table 3 e Criteria for severity ranking. Roman numerals mean the severity of an accident.
Severity rank Blast pressure (kPa) Jet flame length (m)
V Severe Severe damage to building and >34 >6
facilities outside the site
Fatalities outside the site >100 >6
IV Significant Significant damage to building and 6.9e34 e
facilities outside the site
Fatalities inside the site >100 2e6
III Moderate Moderate damage to building and facilities outside the site 3.4e6.9 e
Injuries outside/inside the site 16e100 1e2
II Minor Minor damage to building and facilities outside the site 1e3.4 e
Minor injuries outside/inside the site 2e16 0.3e1
I Negligible Negligible damage to building and facilities outside the site <1 <6
Negligible injuries outside/inside the site <2 <0.3

including the device and line before the accumulator was
analyzed in this study.
Risk assessment
We employed the same risk assessment method as that used
in Refs. [1e3], including the definition of risk level and the
Risk analysis
HAZOP is a brainstorming method to identify hazards of the
system with guide words. The deviation of the parameters,
such as pressure increase in the operation are analyzed by
using the guide words, and then the accident scenarios are
analyzed. FMEA is also a brainstorming method to identify
 i n t e r n a t i o n a l j o u r n a l o f h y d r o g e n e n e r g y 4 1 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 1 3 3 0 8 e1 3 3 1 4 13311

Parameter Pressure Guide word More

Deviation Pressure increase
Trigger phenomenon Fire at hydrogen station

Leakage mode Large hydrogen leak from fracture in piping

Scenario Safety measures

The device or piping is heated by
1
fire at the hydrogen station
Temperature of the device or piping
2
increases
Monitoring of pressure in the system
Pressure in the device or piping Interlocks based on pressure
3
increases monitoring
Safety valve
The strength of the material of the
4
device or piping decreases
5 Destruction of the device or piping Hydrogen sensor
6 Leakage of hydrogen
7 Ignition
Fire wall/protection wall against
8 Fire/explosion
hydrogen explosion

Pressure of the system at the failure point (MPa) 82

3
H2 inventory of the system at the failure point (Nm ) 700
Diameter of the leakage point (mm) 10
Jet flame length (m) 36

Possibility Severity Risk

Without safety measures ii V H
With safety measures i IV M

Fig. 4 e HAZOP results sheet. Upper case and lower case Roman numerals mean the severity and the possibility of an
accident. H and M mean the high and the medium risk levels.

hazards with the failure modes of elements of the system. The
consequences and the possibilities of accidents are qualita-
tively evaluated with both methods.
In the study, HAZOP was used primarily to analyze hazards
originating from the internal characteristics of the system,
such as pressure and temperature, while, FMEA was used pri-
marily to analyze hazards based on the failure modes of each
element of the system. Therefore, all of the system hazards
were identified with the combination of HAZOP and FMEA.
HAZOP was carried out with temperature, pressure,
voltage, and the chemical composition of the gas as the de-
viation parameters, and the guide words were more and less.
Based on the deviation, the causes of the deviation and trigger
phenomena of the accident, the potential accident scenarios,
and the safety measures were then analyzed.
The failure modes examined by FMEA are shown in Table 2.
The potential accident scenarios and safety measures were
then analyzed with the failure modes.
For both methods, the possibility of an accident was eval-
uated based on the material and the function of the accident
region. When the severities of the accidents were evaluated,
the diameters of the defects considered were 10 mm, 1 mm,
and 0.2 mm based on the analyzed potential accident sce-
narios. Moreover, by considering the pressure and H2 in-
ventory in the accident region, the blast pressure and jet flame
length produced by the accident were estimated to evaluate
the severity of the accidents. The risk of each hazard was
evaluated based on the possibility and the severity of the
accident.
Estimation of jet flame length and blast pressure
Because high-pressure H2 is used the system, when the gas is
ignited, the H2 jet flame should be taken into account. The jet
flame length was analyzed with the following empirical for-
mula [30], which applies when the jet pressure is greater than
0.3 MPa:
13312 i n t e r n a t i o n a l j o u r n a l o f h y d r o g e n e n e r g y 4 1 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 1 3 3 0 8 e1 3 3 1 4

Device Check valve

Trigger phenomenon Malfunction of check valve at piping line I of Fig. 1

Leakage mode Small leakage at the joint of the piping due to internal high pressure

Scenario Safety measures

Check valve cannot be opened during Maintenance of check valve
1
startup of the electrolyzer
A section of the system remains sealed
2
under operation
Monitoring of pressure in the system
3 Pressure in piping increases Interlocks based on pressure monitoring
Safety valve
Hydrogen gas leaks at the joints of the Hydrogen sensor
4
piping Ventilating fan
5 Ignition
Fire wall/protection wall against
6 Fire/explosion
hydrogen explosion

Pressure of the system at the failure point (MPa) 82

3
H2 inventory of the system at the failure point (Nm ) 40

Diameter of the leakage point (mm) 1

Jet flame length (m) 3.6

Possibility Severity Risk

Without safety measures iv V H
With safety measures i IV M

Fig. 5 e FMEA results sheet. Upper case and lower case Roman numerals mean the severity and the possibility of an
accident. H and M mean the high and the medium risk levels.

The severities of the consequences were classified based

FL ¼ 399:2dP0:5
(1)
where FL is the jet flame length (mm), d is the diameter of the
defect emitting the hydrogen jet (mm), and P is the jet pres-
sure (MPa).
In the case of scenarios and hazard conditions, the blast
pressure was estimated using the results of the reference
because the leak diameter, H2 pressure and H2 inventory in
this study were similar to those used in a previous study based
on experiments. Otherwise, for scenarios for which there was
no suitable data to evaluate the blast pressure, the maximum
severity of the accident was adopted.
Ranking the possibility and severity of consequences
We qualitatively determined the possibility of consequences
based on the scenarios and the specifications of the leakage
region and assigned four levels: i is Improbable (one occur-
rence in several thousand years or less), ii is Remote (one
occurrence in several hundred years), iii is Occasional (one
occurrence in several decades), and iv is Probable (one
occurrence in several years or more).
on the jet flame lengths and blast pressures listed in Table 3.
Risk matrices constructed with and without the imple-
mentation of safety measures are shown in Fig. 3. The risk was
categorized into high, medium, and low. In the matrices, red,
orange, and light green indicate high, medium, and low risk
levels. A high risk level refers to a risk that is not acceptable, a
medium risk level refers to a risk that is unacceptable other
than when risk reduction cannot be achieved by a reasonably
practical action, and a low risk level refers to a risk that is
acceptable. By evaluating the risks with and without the
implementation of safety measures, the effectiveness of
various safety measures employed to prevent accidents were
evaluated.
Results and discussion
We analyzed 16 accident potential scenarios with HAZOP, one
of which is shown in Fig. 4. The parameter and guide word
used in the HAZOP study were pressure and more,
 i n t e r n a t i o n a l j o u r n a l o f h y d r o g e n e n e r g y 4 1 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 1 3 3 0 8 e1 3 3 1 4
respectively. The trigger phenomenon was a fire in the
hydrogen station and the potential accident scenario was the
heating of the device including piping due to the fire. As a
result, the pressure of the device increased and the strength of
the material of the device decreased, leading to a large
hydrogen leak following destruction of the device. The
hydrogen gas then ignited resulting in an explosion and/or
fire. In the section where the accident occurs, the pressure of
the system was 82 MPa and the inventory of the system was
700 Nm3. In this scenario, the diameter of the hole in the H2
gas piping was 10 mm. The blast pressure was determined
according to the maximum damage based on a similar hazard
condition previously evaluated [1]. The jet flame length
caused by the leaking H2 gas was estimated to be 36 m using
Eq. (1). From Table 3, the severity of accident was classified as
Category V. The possibility of accident was Category ii. The
level of risk without the implementation of safety measures
was Category H. After evaluating the effect of safety measures
by analyzing the process of the scenario and safety measures,
the possibility and severity of accident are Category i and IV,
respectively, and the risk level was Category M.
We analyzed 117 potential accident scenarios with FMEA,
one of which is shown in Fig. 5. The trigger phenomenon was a
malfunction of the check valve in the piping I line (see Fig. 1).
The potential accident scenario of Fig. 5 was as follows: The
check valve could not be opened during startup of the elec-
trolyzer, so that this section of the system remained sealed
under operation. This led to increased pressure in the piping,
causing small H2 gas leaks at the joints of the piping. The H2
gas then ignited, resulting in fire and/or explosion. In the
section involved in the accident, the pressure of the system
was 82 MPa, and the H2 inventory was 40 Nm3. The diameter of
the leakage point was 1 mm. Using Eq. (1), the resulting jet
flame length was estimated to be 3.6 m. Because there was no
suitable data to evaluate the blast pressure, the maximum
severity case was adopted. The severity of this particular ac-
cident was Category V (Table 3), the possibility was Category
iv, and the risk level without safety measures was Category H.
Based on an evaluation of the effect of safety measures by
analyzing the process of the scenario and safety measures, the
possibility and severity of accident were Category i and IV,
respectively, and the risk level was Category M.
Finally, the authors analyzed 133 potential accident sce-
narios, and ranked all hazards of the system in Fig. 3. A total of
99 potential accident scenarios were in the high risk category
when safety measures were not implemented, and 19 safety
measures against the potential accident scenarios were sug-
gested. Because several of the safety measures, such as the
use of titanium in the electrolyzer stack to prevent corrosion,
casing of the electrolyzer system, the use of an anchor bolt for
the electrolyzer stack, and the adoption of stainless steel
piping and pipe racks, were estimated to be intrinsic safety
measures, 35 scenarios with the above safety measures
implemented did not appear in the risk matrix displayed on
the right-hand side of Fig. 3.
Some of the safety measures are shown in Figs. 4 and 5.
After taking these safety measures into account, two hazards
still remained in the high-risk category: the crashing of an
aircraft/helicopter or collapse of a crane into the facility, both
of which are unpreventable using any practical safety
13313
measures. With the exception of these two cases, it is clear
that the risk associated with all of the investigated hazards
decreased with the implementation of safety measures, and
the risks of the system are acceptable because the risk levels
are Category M or L.
Conclusions
In this study, risk assessment for an electrolytic hydrogen
generation system was carried out with HAZOP and FMEA. We
analyzed 133 potential accident scenarios. The effectiveness
of safety measures was evaluated by performing the analysis
with and without safety measures. The risks for all hazards
with and without the safety measures were then evaluated
using risk matrices. The results show that the potential risks
associated with the system are acceptable if the suggested
safety measures are employed.
Acknowledgments
The research was carried out under consignment by the New
Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization.
The authors would like to thank Mr. Ogawa for useful dis-
cussion and his comments.
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