ALPHARD MARITIME

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

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3. INTELLIGENCE A ND WEATHER UPDATE

Dated: 19– AUGUST – 2016

3.1 Recent Piracy Activity

A) PIRACY CRIME FOR THE ROLLING WEEK.

The following incidents in the High Risk Area have been received

There have been no uncorroborated or unverified reports of maritime crime or piracy from the Indian
Ocean HRA during the last seven days.
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B) PIRACY CRIME FOR THE ROLLING MONTH.

The following incidents in the High Risk Area have been received

Initial reports indicate a MV was fired upon while transiting the Southern Red Sea in the vicinity of Hanish Island,
an embarked PMSC returned fire. The vessel is safe. (Source: UKMTO)

Intelligence analysis: On 22 July, initial reports indicate a cable laying vessel was fired upon while operating the
Southern Red Sea in the vicinity of Hanish Island, Two skiffs approached the vessel and an exchange of fire took
place been personnel on the skiffs and the embarked PMSC. This incident has now been classified as a non-piracy
related incident. This is the first report of a merchant vessel being fired upon in the area for some time.
However, in March a yacht seeking shelter at Jazirat al Hanish al Kubra Island was fired upon from shore.

C) ALERTS RECEIVED
NIL

D) Alerts received from deployed teams

NIL
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3.2 -A HRA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE FORECAST

PERIOD OF FORECAST: 12 – 18 AUGUST 2016.

DESCRIPTION: There have been no reports of piracy, attempted piracy or maritime crime across the area
during the last seven days.

Peace talks in Kuwait have been suspended for at least one month, consultations out with official talks will
continue during that time. In the meantime a major offensive has started against al Houthi forces in Nihm
district, Sana’a governorate. The Saudi-led air coalition supported the Hadi government forces, which seized
Mt. Manara in central Nihm and are attempting to take control of a major road leading into Sana’a, Yemen’s
capital. The Saudi-led coalition conducted airstrikes on Sana’a city on 09 August. The strikes are the first on the
capital city, which is controlled by the al Houthi-Saleh alliance, since an UN-brokered ceasefire began in April
2016. The strikes targeted the presidential compound, a Special Forces camp in western Sana’a the al Arqoub
military camp in Khawlan district south of the capital, Mount Khadam northeast of the capital, and a Republican
Guard base in Arhab district. The Republican Guards are loyal to former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh and al Houthi leadership plan to convene parliament in Sana’a on
13 August in order to hold a vote on the newly created Supreme Political Council. The vote seeks to legitimise
the Council, which was established by a power-sharing agreement between the al Houthi political wing, Ansar
Allah, and former President Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) party on 28 July.

ANALYSIS: The conformation of the breakdown in UN sponsored peace talks in Kuwait comes as no surprise.
Throughout the latest round of talks the unwavering stance by the Hadi delegation, that the only route towards
peace was with the al-Houthi/Saleh alliance adhering to the terms of UN resolution 2216 (the withdrawal and
disarmament of their forces) was at best, unlikely. During this latest round of talk’s coalition and Hadi forces
have been taking up positions around Sana’a. The commencement of airstrikes on strategic positions within the
city looks to be in preparation for an assault by ground forces on the capital.

CONCLUSION: Despite UN Special Envoy Cheikh Ahmed’s hopes of continued dialog outside of official talks, the
fighting in Yemen has intensified once again. Preparations for an all-out attack on the Sana’a look to be in
place. Coalition airstrikes on Sana’a and al-Houthi camps in areas around Taiz are paving the way for large scale
battles in the very near future.
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The Southwest Monsoon is now in full effect across the region. Conditions for small craft operations are now
either at the limits or outside limits. The likelihood of attack by Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean is assessed as
LOW. The NATO Shipping Centre has created three recognition guides that feature information on local pattern
of life activity and vessels within the HRA, all crew and guards are recommended to study these guides before
transiting the area. This can be found on the NSC website http://www.shipping.nato.int/Pages/NSC.aspx

Intelligence advises all Masters to remain a MINIMUM of 300 NM off the East coast of Somalia. Vessels
considered more vulnerable (low freeboard, low speed and little physical protection) should consider increasing
this distance from shore as well as exploring the provision of Intelligence’s transit route risk assessments.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
All vessels transiting the Horn of Africa should register with MSC HoA and UKMTO.

1. All vessels are recommended to operate at a heightened state of readiness while navigating in the region,
maintaining strict 24-hour anti‐piracy visual and radar watches and actively implement recommended anti‐piracy
measures.

2. Early assessment/detection will allow vessels to take evasive measures to prevent boarding and provide ample
time to request assistance.

3. Vessels should regularly report their Position/Course/Speed (PCS) to UKMTO. Although under attack and in a
stressful situation, vessels must also ensure they check their positional information to avoid misdirection of
International Force assets. Vessels are to report all attempted and actual attacks and suspicious sightings to
UKMTO, MSCHoA and the IMB PRC.

4. If attacked vessels are to contact in the following order

UKMTO Dubai: +971 50 552 3215 ukmto@eim.ea
MSCHOA: +44 (0) 1923 958547 opscentre@mschoa.org
IMB PRC +60 3 20310014 imbkl@icc‐ccs.org
NATO Shipping Centre: +44 (0) 1923 956 574
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3.2 -B GOG- WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE FORECAST

PERIOD OF FORECAST: 12 – 18 AUGUST 2016.

DESCRIPTION: There have been no reports of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region during the last seven days.
There have however, been incidents of local maritime criminal activity. On 05 August Marshall Islands flagged
product tanker MT Harley was boarded and robbed of oil while alongside in Lagos, Nigeria. Panamanian flagged
bulk carrier MV King Beans was boarded while at anchor near Pointe Noire, Congo on 07 August.

Intelligence ANALYSIS: The frequency of incidents similar in nature to that of MT Harley in Lagos port has
increased in recent weeks, with three tankers reporting that they have been boarded overnight while
alongside, by criminals armed with knives. In the two previous incidents in July, the criminals fled the scene
empty handed when lookouts raised the alarm. Unfortunately, during the early hours of 05 August the
approach of four robbers went unnoticed by crew on board MT Harley, one of whom was subsequently
threatened and held hostage, while a quantity of oil was syphoned onto a waiting boat.

Shortly after midnight on 07 August in Pointe Noire, Congo, two thieves boarded the bulk carrier MV King
Beans, in the outer anchorage area. The raid went unnoticed initially but as the pair broke into the Bosun’s
store, an alarm was activated. At that stage, the crew approached the store and the men fled the scene empty
handed in a waiting boat.

Crews can prevent their vessels from being boarded, and therefore the situation escalating into intimidation or
violence toward them, by shouting a loud audible alarm before criminals make their way onboard. Direct
physical confrontation with local thieves should be avoided, as they invariably carry knives, and will threaten
crew in order to make sure that they can escape with stolen items.

The last serious case of piracy in the region occurred on 07 July, when the Captain and Chief Engineer were
kidnapped from supply vessel MV King Joseph 1 80 NM southwest of Bayelsa State, Nigeria.

CONCLUSION: It is possible that one gang has been responsible for all three of the recent incidents in Lagos
port, and that further overnight raids will continue there until these thieves are detained. As with Lagos, Pointe
Noire has seen an increase in petty theft recently, with three robberies from vessels at anchor being reported
during July, prior to this incident. Dryad recommends vessels avoid what is in effect an Exclusion Zone, based
on a 90 NM radius of the Agbami Terminal (03 28N 005 34E).
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The map highlights the locations of attacks that have occurred off Bayelsa State during 2016. Dryad warns
mariners of all commercial vessels to be vigilant to the approach of other vessels, and report any suspicious
sightings to local authorities, raising the alarm in the event of any incidents. Operators should carefully consider
whether the vessel needs to transit within 90NM of Agbami Terminal. If operating inside the area vessels
should minimise VHF transmissions, and either reduce power to or turn off AIS. Recommendations outlined in
the IMO endorsed Interim Guidelines for Owners, Operators and Masters for protection against
piracy in the region should be maintained throughout. All ships are requested to report any incident to the IMB
PRC + 60320310010 or + 60320310014 imbkl@icc-ccs.org / piracy@icc-ccs.org

The Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade-Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GoG) became

operational on 20 June. Operators and Masters wishing to contact them may do so by the following means:
Email: watchkeepers@mdat-gog.org Intelligence Maritime encourages vessels to report to the new authorities
in UK and France when transiting Gulf of Guinea waters with immediate effect.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Owners and operators of vessels entering Nigerian waters are to be aware of the Nigerian Maritime
Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) statement with reference to the employment of security
guards.

2. All vessels are recommended while operating within 200 NM of shore to observe security and anti-piracy
measures in accordance with IMO endorsed ‘Interim Guidelines for Owners, Operators and Masters for
protection against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region’ and BMP 4, operating in a heightened state of
readiness and maintaining a strict 24-hour anti-piracy visual and radar watch. Intelligence recommends
extra vigilance during the hours of darkness.

3. While at anchor or at berth in Gulf of Guinea ports, upper deck patrols consisting of a minimum of two
personnel are to be carried out. All essential access points are to be locked.

4. Vessels should proceed to and from open sea at maximum speed, timing arrival for berth availability or pilot
rendezvous.

5. Early assessment/detection will allow vessels to take evasive measures to prevent boarding and provide
ample time to request assistance.
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6. In the event of the vessel being boarded, the ship’s company is to keep calm and should not provoke their
attackers into the use of violence.

7. All incidents are to be reported to local authorities and the IMB PRC +60 3 20310014 imbkl@icc-ccs.org /
piracy@icc-ccs.org. MTISC – GoG can be contacted either by email (info@mtiscgog.org) or telephone (+233
(0)302 718227 / (0)260 561633 / (0)248 060789). The Lagos Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
(RMRCC) can be contacted through the following 24/7 operated emergency numbers: • Mobile: +234 (0)
803 068 5167 (Leave out (0) when calling from outside Nigeria). • Land line: +234 (1) 730 6618 (Include (1)
when calling outside Lagos, and include +234 when calling outside Nigeria)

ALERTS RECEIVED FOR GOG

NIL
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WEATHER ANALYSIS
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WEATHER FORECAST
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3.4 RECOMMENDATIONS / ADVICE

Registration & Incident Reporting:

As per Section 5 of BMP4, early registration with MSCHOA before entering the HRA and initial
and regular reporting to UKMTO are highly recommended to ensure military authorities are
aware of a vessel’s passage and vulnerabilities.

Continued Vigilance and the use of BMP:

For reporting possible acts of piracy, UKMTO is primary point of contact in accordance with BMP4.
A reminder that without providing this information in a timely manner, UKMTO, MSC (HOA)
cannot pass data onto warships in the region.

It is imperative that merchant vessels remain vigilant at all times in transit and/or
at anchorage and fully implement protection measures set down in BMP4 across the whole High
Risk Area (HRA) as it can make the critical difference of being approached, attacked, or pirated.
BMP4 highly recommends maintaining best possible vessel speed when transiting the HRA to
deter pirate boarding’s.

Masters should provide as much information as possible about the incident. If Masters are able to
take pictures and/or video of the suspicious activity safely, please provide these via email to
UKMTO at ukmto@eim.ae , NATO Shipping Centre (NSC) at info@shipping.nato.int or MSCHOA
at postmaster@mschoa.org . This information w i l l be used by Counter Piracy forces. Pictures
supplied from an attack on a merchant vessel have previously led to the rapid release of a
pirated dhow.

Fishing recognition pointers are essential to be aware of and include:

Skiffs will often chase fish in the wake of merchant vessels.

May be seen to be acting aggressively when warning merchant vessels of where nets are laid and
connected by floats.
Use of fluorescent lighting at night – may resemble weaponry from a distance
Fishermen can be aggressive and will defend their nets.
Fishermen often carry weapons for self-protection – have historically fired weapons in the
air to make a merchant vessel alter course to protect their fishing interests.
Can move erratically chasing shoals of fish (mainly tuna) – often stop/start activity.
Dhow based fishing often deploys skiffs by day. Look out
for fishing marker flags.
No evidence of “swarm” attacks – pirate skiffs may hide amongst fishing groups. There are other
armed actors in the seas area – people, drugs, and weapons smuggling to and from other
territories.

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