522

RIGHT TO STRIKE

/. Mallikarjuna Sharma*

THE RECENT observation of Shah, J., of the Supreme Court to the

effect that 'no fundamental statutory or equitable moral right to strike
exists with the government employees', 1 which though ostensibly directed
against the government employees is generally deemed to be a broadside
against the labour in general, has virtually stirred up a hornet's nest.
Labour and employees organizations in the country have risen in protest
against this obiter dicta and prominent human rights activists also
denounced the same. Even the then Attorney General of India, Soli
Sorabjee, decried these comments in no uncertain terms and also desired
a larger bench of the Supreme Court to review the same and remedy the
mischief. True to the maxim 'adversity has its own sweet fruit', this has
given an occasion and cause for the toiling people of India to rise
concertedly for the vindication of their long cherished rights of collective
bargaining and for making a forceful demand to the ruling classes to
amend the Constitution to include the right to strike, as also the right to
work, as a justiciable and constitutionally protected, if not a fundamental
right. In this background, it would be worthwhile here to go in some
detail into the historical and legal particulars concerning the right to
strike.
Strike, which means 'concerned stoppage of work by workers done
with a view to improving their wages or conditions, or giving vent to a
grievance or making a protest about something or the other, or supporting
or sympathizing with other workers in such endeavour' 2 is an age-old
weapon in the hands of the working classes in their 'encounters' with
the might of capital. But for the effective wielding of thus weapon on
national and international scales by jthe labouring classes, the toiling
people would not have seen the light of even an 8-hour working day,
minimum subsistence wages, other necessary and fair allowances and
benefits for the amelioration of their degrading conditions. It is a weapon
which has excavated and fortified the 'dignity of labour' and given the
necessary encouragement and fillip to the downtrodden to be able 'to

* Advocate, Andhra Pradesh High Court.

\. T K. Rangarajan Appellant v. Government of Tamil Nadu and others, (2003)
6 SCC 581
2 Halsbury 's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol.47 at 469 (paia 567)
2004J RIGHT TO STRIKE 523

stand up and look straight into the eyes o f the masters of mammon -
the modern slave-owners. It would suffice to state here that the very
emergence of May day as the internationally celebrated holiday cum
homage day of the working classes owes its origin to the heroic and
sacrificing strike struggles of the Chicago workers in the late nineteenth
century. The United Nations Organization as also the International Labour
Organization has, time and again, espoused the cause of this right for
the labour. Nowadays it is a precious right embodied in, and protected
by the constitutions of some countries of the world but in many other
countries it is a statutorily recognized right of the workers and other
employees.
It is true that Marxist and socialist leaders and activists primarily
look at strikes as a potent weapon in the hands of the proletariat in its
class war against the bourgeoisie though they also stress on the human
rights and dignity aspect of that form of struggle. However, during the
course of a hundred years or more the working classes in all countries
have come to cherish this form of struggle as a part of their inalienable
right to survival and a form of protest against inhuman and degrading
conditions. It has come to be recognized that the workers as a class
should be allowed to have and exercise this right to strike, subject of
course to certain legal provisions and conditions. It has been considered
and recognized as a part of the basic human rights of the toiling people,
which could not be abridged or taken away except for over-weighing,
statutorily declared public purposes. As such it has indirectly found a
place in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations
Organization by way of assertion of every one's right to work, right to
just and favourable remuneration and right to form and join trade unions
as also the right to rest, leisure, leave etc. and the right to fair living
conditions with the necessary social benefits. Articles 23, 24 and 25 of
the Universal Declaration run as follows:
Article 23:
1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of
employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to
protection against unemployment.
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal
pay for equal work.
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable
remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence
worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by
other means of social protection.
4. Everyone has the right to form and join trade unions for the
protection of his interests
524 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LA W INSTITUTE [Vol. 46 : 4

Article 24:
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable
limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.
Article 25:
1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for
the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment,
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and
assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock,
shall enjoy the same social protection.
However, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights entered into by several state parties adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966, which has been
subscribed to and ratified by India also, explicitly speaks about the right
to strike. Article 8 of the covenant lays down as follows:
Article 8:
1. The State Parties to the present Covenant undertake to
ensure:
(a) The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the
trade union of his choice, subject only to the rules of the
organization concerned, for the promotion and protection of
his economic and social interests. No restrictions may be
placed on the exercise of this right other than those
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security or public order
of for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others;
(b) The right of trade unions to establish national federations or
confederations and the right of the latter to form or join
international trade union organizations;
(c) The right of the trade unions to function freely subject to no
limitations other than those prescribed by law and which are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security or public order or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others;
(d) The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity
with the laws of the particular country.
2004] RIGHT TO STRIKE 525

2. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful

restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the
armed forces or of the police or of the administration of the
State.
3. Nothing in this Article shall authorize State Parties to the
International Labour Organization Convention of 1948
concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right
to Organize to take legislative measures which would prejudice,
or apply the law in such a manner as would prejudice, the
guarantees provided for in that Convention.
India is a member state of the International Labour Organization
and has ratified about 36-37 of its conventions. But it has not ratified
Convention No. 87 of 1948 concerning freedom of association and
protection of the right to organize as also the Convention No. 98 of
1949 concerning right to organize and collective bargaining, both of
which conventions assure the right to effective collective bargaining
(which includes right to strike, though not expressly stated) by the
employees and also mention that such rights are also available to the
public servants in government administration as also to members of the
armed forces and police subject of course to restrictions in laws made in
that behalf by the concerned member states in their specific conditions.
In contrast, Pakistan and Bangladesh, generally decried as countries
groaning under military rule or perverse democracy, ratified the said
conventions long back. But it would be instructive to note that the ILO
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, made at its
86 th Session, Geneva, June 1998, categorically states that:
[A]ll Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions
in question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of
membership in the Organization to respect, to promote and to
realize, in good faith and in accordance with the Constitution,
the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the
subject of those Conventions, namely: (a) freedom of association
and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour;
(c) the effective abolition of child labour; and (d) the elimination
of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.
It would also be useful to note that conventions are obligation
creating instruments as distinguished from recommendations, and once
a convention is ratified by a member state, it becomes obligatory for
such member state to bring in an appropriate national law giving effect
to the provisions of the convention within a period of 12-18 months. In
any event, the right to collective bargaining, including the right to strike,
526 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LA W INSTITUTE [Vol. 46 : 4

is recognized and protected by the above said conventions, even for the
members of armed forces and police subject, of course, to such
'restrictions and limitations as per law of the land, but it is also laid
down in these conventions that the said law must not be such or so
applied as to impair the guarantees (of freedom of association, right to
collective bargaining etc.) mentioned in the conventions. Likewise, one
can note that even in the above-quoted article 8 of the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the right to collective bargaining
and the right to strike are incorporated as absolute rights, rights per se,
even for members of armed forces, police and members of the
administration of the state, though the respective member states can
impose lawful restrictions on such rights. It is obvious that a restriction
cannot be such as to totally negate the guaranteed right. As such India
as a ratifying signatory of these covenants and conventions is bound to
recognize and provide for the right to collective bargaining and right to
strike even to the members of armed forces, or of police or of
administration of state (i.e. government employees), subject to restrictions
it might impose by law but that law should not be such as to totally
deprive such persons of these guaranteed rights
Indians boast to be the world's largest democracy and have the
longest Constitution of the world, acclaiming it as second to none in its
worth, nobility and greatness. But actually we lack constitutional
protection of many important human and democratic rights such as this
right to effective collective bargaining including the right to strike
whereas even small and politically-not-so-significant third world countries
have incorporated these rights in their Constitutions. For example, article
32 of the Constitution of Rwanda, a very small African State, lays
down: "The right to strike shall be exercised within the laws by which it
is regulated. It may not infringe upon the freedom to work." Likewise,
article 42 of Ethiopia's Constitution provides for the right to strike for
the workers and also enjoins the state to provide such right, subject to
any restrictions, even to government employees. Similarly, article 34 of
the Constitution of Angola not only guarantees the right to strike for the
workers but also prohibits lockouts in absolute terms. The South African
Constitution (article 23) also gives the workers the right to strike in
absolute terms. Brazil, the biggest Latin American country, has
guaranteed the right to strike under article 9 of its Constitution. In
Europe, Greece (article 23), Hungary (article 70C), Macedonia (article
38), Poland (article 59), Portugal (article 57), Slovakia (article 37), etc.
have all constitutionally protected the right to strike. Coming to Asia,
even avowedly capitalist countries like Japan (article 28) and South
Korea (article 33) have constitutionally guaranteed the right of workers
to organize and to bargain and act collectively. All the above countries
have also guaranteed the right to work in their Constitutions. In contrast,
2004] RIGHT TO STRIKE 521

it is really sad and shameful that except for feeble references to the
necessity of making effective provisions for securing the right to work
and of an obligatory endeavour by state to secure work, living wages,
etc. there is no right to collective bargaining by workers or the right to
strike included in the Indian Constitution.
However, the right to strike has been statutorily recognized, though
not positively and directly but in an indirect manner, by the labour
statutes in the country. Chapter V of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(Act 13 of 1947) entitled 'Strikes and Lock-outs' provides for the
essentials of these two rights - one for the workmen and the other for
the employers - as if on an equal plane as the legislation 'is calculated
to ensure social justice to both employers and employees and advance
the progress of industry by bringing about the existence of harmony and
cordial relationship between the two parties of industry'. It is quite
another thing that the Act is generally interpreted as a social welfare
legislation to better the lot of the workmen. Section 2(1) of the Act
defines 'lock-out'; 2(q) defines 'strike'. Sections 22 and 23 deal with
specific and general prohibition of strikes and lock-outs, section 24
explains about illegal strikes and lock-outs and their consequences and
section 25 prohibits any sort of financial and other aid to such illegal
endeavours. In doing so, chapter V of the Industrial Disputes Act lays
down certain implicit parameters, which define the legality and justness
of the right to strike. Then section 18 of the Trade Unions Act confers
civil immunity to registered trade unions and their members from any
possible action for damages, etc. arising from the breach of contract
said to have occurred due to a strike. And this also means that a strike is
not treated as a breach of contract enabling the employer to terminate
the contract of service merely on that basis.
Moreover, in a catena of decisions, the various high courts in India
as well as the Supreme Court itself have adverted to and positively
affirmed the right to strike insofar as workmen are concerned. Chinnappa
Reddy, J., then Judge, Andhra Pradesh High Court (later elevated to
Supreme Court) had most emphatically asserted the positive nature of
this right by saying: - 3
[T]he right to strike is labour's ultimate weapon and in the
course of a hundred years it has emerged as the inherent right of
every worker. It is an element which is of the very essence of
the principle of collective bargaining and as stated by an eminent
English judge (Lord Denning in Morgan v. Fry, (1968) 3 WLR

3. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Employees Union v.

Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, 1970 Labour and Industrial
Cases 1225.
528 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LA W INSTITUTE [Vol, 46 : 4

506 at 516)the right to strike is 'an implication read into the

contract by modern law as to trade disputes.' The nature of the
right is such that, it cannot in my view, be abridged or taken
away save in strict conformity with the provisions of statute
providing for such abridgment or taking away.
Prior to that in dealing with a case of lock-out, Gajendragadkar, L,
of the Supreme Court had made these significant observations:- 4
Lock-out can be described as the antithesis of a strike. Just as a
strike is a weapon available to the employees for enforcing their
industrial demands, a lockout is a weapon available to the
employer to persuade by a coercive process the employees to
see his point of view and to accept his demands. In the struggle
between capital and labour the weapon of strike is available to
the labour and is often used by it, and so is the weapon of
lockout available to the employer and can be used by him. The
use of both the weapons by the respective parties must, however,
be subjected to the relevant provisions of the Act. Chapter V,
which deals with strikes and lockouts, clearly brings out the
antithesis between the two weapons and the limitations subject
to which both of them must be exercised.
Further, the courts have also gone into the questions of legality and
justifiability of strikes and the mutual interdependence as also
independence of these two phenomena. In one case, the apex court held
that once a strike was declared illegal it could no longer be deemed as
justified:- 5
The tribunal, having held that the strike was illegal, proceeded
to discuss the question whether it was justified, and came to the
conclusion that it was 'perfectly justified'. In the first place, it
is a little difficult to understand how a strike in respect of a
public utility service, which is clearly illegal, could at the same
time be characterized as 'perfectly justified'. These two
conclusions cannot in law co-exist. The law has made a
distinction between a strike which is illegal and one which is
not, but it has not made any distinction between an illegal strike
which may be said to be justifiable and one which is not
justifiable. This distinction is not warranted by the act, and is
wholly misconceived specially in the case of employees in a
public utility service. Every one participating in an illegal strike,

4. Kairbetia Estate, Kotagiri v. Rajamanicakam and others, (1960) fl LLJ 275

(SC) at 278.
5. Sinha, CS., India General Navigation and Railways Co Ltd v. Their Workmen,
[1960] I LLJ 13 (22) (SC).
2004] RIGHT TO STRIKE 529

is liable to be dealt with departmentally, of course, subject to

the action of the department being questioned before an industrial
tribunal, but it is not permissible to characterize an illegal strike
as justifiable.
However, in a later case, 6 Krishna Iyer, J., took a different view and
tried to distinguish the above case saying:-
[T]his Court did observe that if a strike is illegal, it cannot be
called 'perfectly justified'... [but] between the perfectly justified
and unjustified strike, the neighborhood is distant. ... mere
illegality of the strike does not per se spell unjustifiability.
And then relying on the following observations in the Crompton Greaves
case:- 7
It is well-settled that in order to entitle the workmen to wages
for the period of strike, the strike should be legal as well as
justified. A strike is legal if it does not violate any provision of
the statute. Again, a strike cannot be said to be unjustified unless
the reasons for it are entirely perverse or unreasonable. Whether
a particular strike was justified or not, is a question of fact
which has to be judged in the light of the facts and circumstances
of each case.
However, the apex court did caution against any hasty and precipitate
actions by either the workmen or the employers leading to industrial
anarchy and chaos, and advised both parties to use their legitimate
weapons of strike or lock-out but sparingly:- 8
The strike, as a weapon, was evolved by the workers as a form
of direct action during their long struggle with the employers. It
is essentially a weapon of last resort being an abnormal aspect
of employer-employee relationship and involves withdrawal of
labour disrupting production, services and the running of the
enterprise. It is a used by the labour of their economic power to
bring the employer to see and meet their viewpoint over the
dispute between them. The cessation or stoppage of work whether
by the employees or by the employer is detrimental to the
production and economy and to the well being of the society as
a whole. It is for this reason that industrial legislation, while not
denying the right of workmen to strike has tried to regulate it

6. Gujarat Steel Tubes v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, [1980] 1 LLJ
137 (SC).
7. Jaswant Singh, J., Crompton Greaves Ltd. v. The Workmen, [1978] II LLJ 80
(82) (SC).
8. Sawant, J., Syndicate Bank v. K Umesh Nayak, [1994] II LLJ 836 849 (SC).
530 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LA W INSTITUTE [Vol 46 : 4

along with the right of the employer to lock-out and has also
provided machinery for peaceful investigation, settlement,
arbitration and adjudication of the disputes between them. The
strike or lock-out is not to be resorted to because the concerned
party has a superior bargaining power or the requisite economic
muscle to compel the other party to accept its demand. Such
indiscriminate use of power is nothing but assertion of the rule
of 'Might is Right'. Its consequences are lawlessness, anarchy
and chaos in the economic activities, which are most vital and
fundamental to the survival of the society. Such action, when
the legal machinery is available to resolve the dispute, may be
hard to justify. This will be particularly so when it is resorted to
by the section of the society, which can well await resolution of
the dispute by the machinery provided for the same. The strike
or lock-out, as a weapon, has to be used sparingly for redressal
of urgent and pressing grievances when no means are available
or when available means have failed, to resolve it. It has to be
resorted to, to compel the other party to the dispute to see the
justness of the demand. It is for this reason that the industrial
legislation such as the Act places additional restrictions on strikes
and lock-outs in public utility services.
Another important point to note is that whether it is a strike or a
lock-out, the sui generis nature of the employee does not get obliterated.
In a foreign decision it is aptly stated:- 9
Neither strike nor lock-out completely terminates, when this is
its purpose, the relationship between the parties. The employees
who remain to take part in the strike or whether the lock-out do
so that they may be ready to go to work again on terms to which
they shall agree - the employer remaining ready to take them
back on terms to which he shall agree. Manifestly then, pending
a strike or a lock-out, and so to those who have not finally and
in good faith abandoned it, a relationship exists between
employer and employee that is neither that of the general nature
of employer and employee, nor again that of employer looking
among strangers for employees or employees seeking from
strangers employment.
And this principle has been recognized and affirmed by the apex
court when it stated that if employees absent themselves from work
because of a strike, in enforcement of their demands, there can be no
question of abandonment of their employment by them. And that if the

9. Iron Molders Union v. Allts Chalmers, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 3}5, cited by Ludwig
Teller, Labor Disputes & Collective Bargaining, Vol. 1, S. 79, at 237-238.
2004J RIGHT TO STRIKE 53 1

strike was in fact illegal, the employer may take disciplinary action
against the workmen under the standing orders or otherwise and dismiss
them. 10 The same ratio was reiterated in another decision the Supreme
Court:- 11
While it is an accepted principle of industrial adjudication that
workmen can resort to strike in order to press for their demands
without snapping the relationship of employer and employee, it
is equally a well-accepted principle that the work of the factory
cannot be paralyzed and brought to a standstill by an illegal
strike, in spite of legal steps being taken by the management to
resolve the conflict. The management has the right in those
circumstances to carry on the work of the factory in furtherance
of which it would employ other workmen and justify its action
on merits in any adjudication the dispute arising therefrom
But this does not give any warrant for 'mass dismissals' - legal or
illegal, justified or unjustified. It is patently illegal and unjust to effect
any such dismissals without individual enquiry as per the principles of
natural justice. The Supreme Court did not countenance such mass
dismissals of 230 employees in the case of Swadeshi Industries Ltd. v.
Its Workmen, one main reason for confirming the reinstatement order of
the lower tribunal in that case being the legality and justifiability of the
strike: - 12
The position, therefore, is that the conclusion of the Appellate
Tribunal that the strike was not illegal and that it was justified
remains unassailable. It was within a few days after the strike
was launched that a general order terminating the services of all
the workmen was made. The Appellate Tribunal thought that
this order was made vindictively and mala fide, the purpose
being to break the strike and weaken the position of the mazdoor
union. Before use the Company's Counsel has tried to suggest
that these 230 members were guilty of violent activities. If that
was the reason for which their services were sought to be
terminated, it was necessary that it should be decided as a matter
of fact by proper enquiry after giving reasonable opportunity to
each workman to show the contrary that he was so guilty of
violence. But no enquiry was held, no charge sheet was framed

10. Mudholkar. J., Express Newspaper (P) Ltd. v. Michael Mark, [1962] II LLJ
220 (SC).
11. Jaganmohan Reddy, J., Oriental Textile Finishing Mills v. Labour Court,
[1971] II LLJ 505 at 510 (SC).
12. Das Gupta, J., Swadeshi Industries Ltd, v. Its Workmen, (I960) II LLJ 78
(SC).
532 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LA W INSTITUTE [Vol. 46 : 4

and none of these 230 workmen had an opportunity to show that

he was not guilty of any violence. Indeed the very manner in
which a general order terminating the services of all workmen
was made shows that the termination was intended to be the
punishment not for any violent conduct or any other misconduct
but for the mere fact of taking part in the strike. Besides no
attempt has been made to prove by satisfactory evidence before
the tribunal the charge that any of their workmen was guilty of
violence. In these circumstances the order of reinstatement made
by the Appellate Tribunal is fully justifiable.
But even in case of an illegal and unjustifiable case, not all the striking
workmen can be placed on the same footing and as such 'mass
dismissals', by means of a hastily brought about ordinance in the recent
case of the Tamil Nadu government employees were violative of
principles of natural justice and hence totally unjust and illegal. As
Rajeev Dhavan has rightly pointed out 13 that the Supreme Court while
obliquely hitting out at the right to strike of employees as such, did not
bestow sufficient attention to this important and disturbing feature of
'mass dismissals' by ordinance. And such processes, if not effectively
countered, may lead the country to an 'Ordinance Raj' plunging it into
the darkness of dictatorship in the place of the much wanted Traja Raj'
dispensing the light of real democracy. It is also to be noted that it was
precisely because the Supreme Court had noticed the stark injustice and
unjustifiability of such mass dismissals that it worked to see the
reinstatement of most of the employees and also ordered speedy enquiries
as regards such of those employees who wrere not reinstated because of
charges of violence, incitement to strike and disturbances, etc. Yet its
silence and inaction as regards the draconian Act and ordinance, hastily
and precipitately brought in by the Tamil Nadu Government and that
too with retrospective effect, 14 to suppress the struggle of the employees
and its non-response to the real demands of the struggle and the real
injustices against which the employees rebelled was in no way correct
or proper. The Supreme Court ought to have by itself taken up the
question of justice, constitutionality and legality of the said Act and
ordinance which were challenged in the instant development and
pronounced its considered verdict instead of leaving the employees to
work out their remedies before a non-functional administrative tribunal

13. Rajeev Dha\an, 'The Right to Strike" The Hindu 22 August 2003.
14. Unfortunately there is no protection in our law - constitutional or statutory -
against ex-post facto laws being made and implemented. Contrast Art, 1, s. 9 of the
American Constitution in which it is clearly laid down: "No Bill of Attainder or ex
post facto Law shall be passed.1'
2004J RIGHT TO STRIKE 533

or an unwilling high court leading to much delay and causing them

intense agony.
To conclude, it may be asserted that the right to strike as part and
parcel of effective collective bargaining is too valuable for the working
people of the country to be left without constitutional protection and as
such must be embodied as a constitutional and justiciable right. From
the foregoing discussion it is also clear that right to strike in absolute
terms exists for the members in public administration, i.e., government
employees too, though it may be subjected to various restrictions. In
this background, the absolute prohibitions in the conduct rules of the
government employees of the various state governments as also of the
central government, on which aspect the Supreme Court relied most in
castigating the Tamil Nadu government employees strike as illegal ab
initio,15 should be considered wrong and unjust as they are contrary to
the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights to which India is a ratifying signatory. As such all the
democratic and freedom-loving persons of the country, not to speak of
the toiling people alone, should take this occasion of the controversy
created by the undesirable comments of Shah, J., of the Supreme Court
to forge together a powerful mass movement to demand and agitate to
compel the ruling authorities, the Parliament in particular, to include
the right to work and the right to strike in the Constitution as justiciable
rights. And lawyers, who have always been in the forefront of the national
movement, and also several just and radical social movements should
take the lead in educating and organizing the masses to this noble end.
They should also urge and impress upon the Supreme Court to review
its faulty judgment and lay down the correct position of law in this
regard in the light of the international bills of rights and our country's
commitments as a ratifying signatory to many of them.

15. Rule 22 of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1973; Rule
4 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964; Rule 7 of the Central
Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 etc.