1

Confucian “Pragmethics” and the“Ruler-People” (民-

主) relationship
A Comparative Perspective of Confucian Political Wisdom
By Haiming Wen (Renmin University of China)

Confucian “pragmethics” as an ethical theory stems from a practical reconstruction of

traditional Confucian art of governing. This sort of reconstruction involves
restructuring and reformulation of political wisdom rooted in practical experience,
and, in essence, is an extension of the traditional Confucian ethics. This paper argues
that in Confucian pragmethics an ethical act emerges as a powerful creative
momentum of an incipient intention, thus an act can be evaluated as ethically
“Confucian” at the very instant the intention is initiated. The incipient intention then
evolves into an ethical act and further, on a practical level, into a concrete expression
of the incipient intention in the realm of actual political practice.

Historically, Confucianism would make no clear distinction between the Confucian

“orthodox tradition of the Way” ( 道 统 daotong), “academic tradition” ( 学 统
xuetong), and political tradition ( 政 统 zhengtong)1. As a result, various scholars
propose a different understanding of what really best defines the Confucian politics. A
definite feature of traditional Confucianism is the concern about the conscience of the
“the ruler”, or, whether the “ruler” actually reveals a “Confucian” conscience when
confronted with “the people”. This paper, however, adopts the opinion that the
Confucian politics, of course without neglecting the proper care for the ruler’s
conscience, primarily emphasizes the relationship between “the ruler” and “the
people”, and especially the incipient moment of interaction, when this relationship is
being initiated, whether the ruler’s perception of the people transcends his privileged
status and extends to the people as a relational entity.

Resumimg a discussion of a ruler-and-ruled relationship might perhaps seem

1
The concept of daotong emerged in context of other dao’s of various schools of thought during the
Warring States period and can be neither understood nor appreciated outside of that context. What
constitutes the highest value in Confucianism is its organic growth and fruitful practice in a social
context. This is why there is something transcendent and liberal to it and this is how it merges with a
concrete cultural and historical experience. As such, Confucianism unsurprisingly tends to produce
exemplary human charatcters and behaviours, first embodied by Confucius himself who fused his very
self with dao as he understood it. This manner of “socially contextual” self-cultivation caused a
breakthrough in the way Chinese culture was since to develop. If we assess daotong through the lens of
the metaphysical and transcendent dao, on the one hand, the standards seem just much too strict, so
that not even the legendary sage kings would be up to the task; yet, on the other, daotong exhibits a
certain liberal tinge so that anyone who practiced virtue/moral excellence de ( 德 ) and learning, and
proved himself worthy in history, can be counted in. Not one’s status but one’s moral excellence instead
serves as the foremost prerequisite. Starting from Confucius, daotong began to part ways with
zhengtong and merge with xuetong. This resulted in enrichment of daotong and setting clear criteria for
a further development of xuetong. Daotong and zhengtong, paradoxically, are both mutually inclusive
and exclusive. In the context of wangdao (the kingly Way or the Way of Humane Authority) they overlap,
in the context of badao (the hegemonic rule ot the Way of Inhumane Authority) they diverge. Political
involvement is invariably inscribed in Confucian doctrine, and as such Confucianism must simply
interact with zhengdao. Although daotong was developed as a philosophical term only by Confucian
scholars of the Song Dynasty, the idea had already appeared in the age of Confucius. Dao has become
an essential concept for all philosophical schools, each interpreting dao in its unique but logical way.
 2

sentimentally anachronistic and misaddressed, suitable for historians of politics rather

than contemporary political pragmatists. Nothing could be further from the truth. As
this paper aims to demonstrate, in the contemporary world of globalized politics
certain pragmatic aspects of political wisdom and practice of classical Confucianism
may actually offer a wealth of inspiring new ideas applicable in contemporary
political theories. After all, even in present-day politics, we can hardly avoid a certain
tension between the intentions of the governing (“the ruler”) and the governed (“the
ruled”, the people). Democracy particularly underscores the prominent role of the
governed, the people, and hence public opinion accounts for a significant part of the
totality of political wisdom whereas the voice of the governing, whose role,
nevertheless, remains crucial and sometimes even decisive, has frequently been
downplayed if not deliberately neglected.

Ethics originates from the study and analysis of interpersonal relationships. When the
target of the study is defined as various relationships between people of a different
social class or political status, ethics becomes political ethics, and a political discourse
becomes ethical. For centuries political ethics had been broadly discussed as a
yardstick of proper conduct of the governing minority in respect to the governed
majority. Scholars and academics had tried to define its aims, meaning and form.
Undoubtedly, the superior politics is neither achievable nor sustainable without a
superior ethical conduct, and the best governance is based on the governance of the
well-intentioned minority over the well-intentioned majority. The ideal aim of
supreme politics can be reached only through the ethical conduct of the governing and
ethically conscious cooperative response of the governed.

In the following part of the paper, I would like to propose that Confucian Pragmethics
as an ethical system rooted in traditional Confucianism might in fact prove conducive
to establishing a Confucian-based system of modern Chinese political ethics. To
defend that claim, I will present a theoretical discussion of Confucian politics and a
democracy in terms of ethics and demonstrate how the two systems can constructively
“resonate” on the ethical level. I will also attempt to reformulate the traditional
Confucian political ethics in terms of its practical applicability against the backdrop of
Dewey’s Pragmatism.

A contemporary struggle to revert the ruler-ruled relationship

The Confucian political wisdom is rooted in the integration of political theory and
political practice. Practice, on the other hand, constitutes a natural extension of the art
of governing, so that it is fair to say that at the very core of Confucian political
wisdom lies the actual art of governing. Traditionally, Confucianism is then a form of
a political philosophy.

Contemporary "Political Confucianism" has essentially dominated the present-day

Confucian research and discourse. It is, however, important to keep in mind that the
so-called "political Confucianism” does not cover the entirety of Confucian
philosophical thought, although many scholars tend to perceive it as such. In fact,
 3

most of their discussions are focused on their own political concerns, and even regard
political problems as entirely falling within the scope of the Confucian philosophy as
a whole. In the contemporary “Confucian” political discourse, the relationship
between "the ruler" (the governing) and "the people" (the governed) has so far
attracted little attention. As a matter of fact, since its re-emergence at the dawn of
modernity, Confucian political philosophy has been struggling to contemporize and
reformulate the relationship between "the ruler" and "the people". By ignoring this
fact one practically undercuts the very roots of the traditional Confucian wisdom of
governing and negates the value of experience which Confucian political wisdom has
acquired through modern political practice.

In modern-day China, there have been numerous attempts to transform the traditional
concept of the "ruler-people” relationship, amongst them probably most emblematic
being the Revolution of 1911 and the ensuing Liberal Movement still active till this
day. One of the common academic views presents the Revolution of 1911 as "a
nationalist coup d’etat driven by a patriotic zeal to oust the Manchurian dynastic rule,
which due to favorable historical and political climate, succeeded in overthrowing the
corrupt and inept regime, yet failed to establish a new system for effective social
integration”2. Dewey came to China just at the time warlords ran amok taking
advantage of rampant chaos in which new social institutions would fall apart even
before they could be properly established. Dewey’s timing could not be better.
Revolution was at a full throttle. It appeared that the ideals of freedom and democracy
he was hoping to implant would fall on a fertile ground and thrive. People needed
radical changes and liberal intellectuals were bent on reform. They strongly believed
that the country, despite its weakness and overall disarray it plunged into, can be
rebuilt and people’s lives improved as long as a civil war and foreign aggression are
prevented.

From the present-day perspective, it might be difficult to defend a claim that

revolution is a historical necessity. The occurrence and development of revolutions is
basically irrational, and any revolutionary movement can be essentially understood as
an act of replacement of one political establishment by another through military
interference and conflict, and as such, can be actually viewed as a military struggle of
two military powers, one substituting the other. Historically, China has always been a
military state, and yet the earliest modern Chinese revolutionaries, and in particular
the intellectual elite highly acclaimed for their magnificent revolutionary
contributions, appeared to ignore this obvious point. When engaging in actual politics,
they failed to recognize the military strength as an essential revolutionary factor. As a
result, their actions were random and blindfolded, as, for example, the Hundred Days'
Reform or the Revolution of 1911, when the leaders might indeed take credit for
elaborating an ideological framework, yet their failure to get the army involved and
create loyalist military forces practically left no prospects for success of their
2
Su Gongqin, Xinghai geming shi ershi shiji duo zai duo nan shidai de kaiduan in a journal Tansuo yu
zhengming,2011, nr. 8 (萧功秦：《 辛亥革命是二十世纪多灾多难时代的开端》，《探索与争鸣》2011
年 8 期)
 4

ambitious and lofty plans. The 1911 Revolution, therefore, became a military action
without actual leadership, which directly resulted from a continuous growth of the
ethnic Han military in the late Qing Dynasty and the final destruction of the declining
Manchu military force. Zeng Guofan’s ( 曾 国 藩 ) and Li Hongzhang’s ( 李 鸿 章 )
military campaigns aimed at suppression of rebellions and uprisings during the final
years of decline of the Qing Dynasty, Yuan Shikai's ( 袁 世 凯 ) scuffling with the
warlords, or the Kuomintang and the Communist Party's brutal struggle for control
over New China, are all part of a long process of disintegration and reintegration of
the Chinese military forces of ethnic Han. This process is homologous with the
progressive dismemberment of historical China, the long-term involvement of foreign
powers being a significant factor. It is in this process that the focus gradually began to
shift from “the ruler” to the “people”, whereby a small but influential group from
within “the people” established itself as “the ruler” (a new ruling elite) through the
new military authority.

Confucianism’s fiasco in making its way into actual politics is nothing recent, and
indeed a “historical” constant. Libertarian intellectuals primarily discuss
constitutional law, and some, not unlike the modern neo-Confucians, would also focus
on the public opinion, emphasizing the market economy as a fundamental
transformative factor. They assume that in theory events or policies concerning the
people would ultimately transform according to their expectations, yet in reality it
seldom happens. Ito Hirobumi's stark opposition against Free Civil Right Movement
( 自 由 民 権 運 動 , Jiyū Minken Undō) prompted by the Meiji government (1880’s)
exemplifies distinctly how enlightened scholars and their benign libertarian policies
may easily crumble when confronted with influential yet conservative politicians 3.
The advocates of constitutionalism hope that the supreme political authority abide by
the constitution, and ardently campaign for various forms of a tripartite political
system. They perceive the constitution as a restrictive regulatory device to restrain the
supreme political authority from abusing power, and to that end establish a
parliamentary body and a complex administrative system of checks and balances.
However, the noble intentions of these intellectuals fail to materialize due their
superficial understanding of the Western constitutional thought and the actual reasons
why a western parliament is indeed capable of limiting the powers of the president or
the prime minister.

How then is the European parliamentary system so efficient in curbing autocratically-

minded “rulers”? King Charles I’s tragic demise offers a classic example. Charles
deeply believed in his “divine” right to rule and attempted to run politics bypassing
the Parliament. His arbitrary taxation policies in particular caused an enormous

3
Hirobumi was one of the most influential figures in Japanese politics during the Meiji era. Even after his
resignation as the prime minister, he still managed to maintain much of his political power as the head of
the new Privy Council. Conservative-minded and dedicated to samurai traditions, Hirobumi rejected
some of the European constitutional values promoted by Japanese intellectuals as unfit for Japan. He
enforced a constitutional clause guaranteeing a recognition of Emperor’s authority through his divine
descent, thus shattering the hopes of progressive thinkers to build a libertarian democracy based on a
European model.
 5

resistance among the privileged nobility and bourgeoisie who formed the core of the
parliamentary body. The government members established a coalition and raised an
army to depose the recalcitrant monarch. After years of civil strife, the king’s forces
were ultimately defeated by Oliver Cromwell, the monarch convicted of high treason
and sentenced to ignoble and humiliating death by decapitation. The stunning victory
of the parliamentary forces was possible only because the members of the parliament
were in fact some of the most influential and powerful people in England, capable of
raising their own armies and controlling large portions of the country’s economic and
human resources. Thus, at its very origin, the parliamentary system in Europe
established a supremacy over the “ruler”, becoming the actual “ruling” force, while
the political authority of the head of the state, whether a monarch or a president,
became nominal and symbolic. In fact, the parliament took over much of the role of a
traditional monarch, becoming de facto a supreme political power of the state. Many
liberal thinkers either choose to ignore or indeed misunderstand this fundamental
difference between the Occident and the Orient, and therefore repeatedly advocate the
western model of parliamentary democracy as a universally valid political formula
embodying the true spirit of civilizational progress.

Sun Yat-sen’s attempt to implant the European parliamentary model in modern China
understandably did not work out as hoped for. The actual power rested not with the
progressive and liberal-minded nobility, intellectuals or bourgeoisie but with Yuan
Shikai, a powerful military leader with a conservative mindset still deeply rooted in
the imperial era. As a result, the reforms quickly foundered. Although historically
China did indeed develop its own peculiar system of checks and balances, a distinct
separation of powers within the government had never materialized. An effective
restriction of imperial power, although not impossible, was more of an exception than
a rule: the monarch had never been truly stripped of his unlimited authority.

The Confucian tradition has consistently employed an ethical principle of “rectifying

what is wrong in the ruler’s mind”4. The peculiar institution of Confucian litterati
established a system of benign reprimand to restrict the excesses and rectify the errors
of a benighted monarch, a system which unfortunately might only work with a
“corrigible” ruler and therefore, without economic and military support, was simply
doomed to fail, lacking any coercive means to keep the monarch in check. When
dealing with an incorrigible ruler, traditional Confucianists would quickly run out of
options other than persisting in benign reprimand and praying that things will
somehow change, the erring emperor converts to the ways of the sage kings and
attains the ideal of “inner sagehood and outer kingliness” ( 内圣外王)5. This sort of
4
革君心之非. This well-known phrase is originally ascribed to Mencius (Mencius, Li Lou I: 人不足與適也，政
不足間也。惟大人為能格君心之非。君仁莫不仁，君義莫不義，君正莫不正。一正君而國定矣。」 (“It is
not enough to censure a ruler over those who have been appointed to office, nor is it enough to criticize
the policies of his government. Only a great man can correct what is wrong in the ruler’s mind. If the
ruler is humane, everyone will be humane. If the ruler does what is right, everybody will do what is right.
If the ruler is correct, everybody will be correct. Once the ruler is rectified, the state will be settled.”,
Mencius, transl. by Irene Bloom, Columbia University Press, NY 2009, p. 102)
5
The Dao Companion to Classical Confucianism explains the phrase as “sagely qualities in one’s inner
self and kingly virtues toward the outside world” (p. 145). This well-known ideal finds its most eloquent
 6

cultivation of a ruler’s ethos and its inherent paradox have become one of the essential
themes for modern neo-Confucian scholars. At its core, the appeal to the ruler’s
conscience may still offer a valid option when people beleaguered by oppressive and
all-too-powerful government are intent on changing the status quo without bloody
insurgency with no chances to succeed.

The political liberalism pleading for the rights of the people arrived in China nearly
one hundred years ago. And on numerous occasions it did indeed broadly and
aggressively advocate for a stronger representation of the popular voice. Its actual
effects on political practices, however, remained insignificant. Whether in the 1980’s
there actually occurred a liberal movement in China is quite questionable. Against the
backdrop of trauma and turmoil of the so-called Cultural Revolution, this movement
certainly emerges as a cultural renaissance with a liberal tinge, but not necessarily a
liberal movement sensu stricto. Liberalism as such entered into politics only in the
wake of the great economic development in the 1990’s, paving the way for the
ensuing rise of social awareness and new cultural trends. The economists became the
new “philosophers” of the age, and the market-oriented liberalism which they avidly
endorsed gradually rose to prominence in the realm of culture. If liberalism later
suffered a setback, it was because after the economic crisis of 2008 it came under
scrutiny and lost credit not only in China but across the globe. It became clear that
liberal economic models were by no means a panacea to world’s economic problems,
a universal and infallible formula for wealth and prosperity. In many countries state
capitalism staged a comeback as economic liberalism began to decline and lose
supporters.

Theoretical transformation of the ruler-ruled relationship

One of the core problems of the relationship between “the ruler” and “the people" in
classical Confucianism is the conceptual reformulation of “the Way of the Humane
Authority” ( 王 道 wangdao)6. Numerous scholars tend to discuss only wangdao
entirely oblivious to how it might actually be related to “the Way of the Hegemonic
Rule” (霸道 badao). Well, there is of course nothing wrong about believing that once
in remote antiquity three “righteous” dynasties, Xia, Shang, and Zhou, had ruled over
China, but one has to keep in mind that the age of monarchy is long gone, so
ruminating over the glorious past in search of ideal models of “rulership” or
governance seems to be anachronistically misplaced. Mankind is not planning on re-
establishing monarchy any time soon. Besides, a form of rulership as highly idealized
as Confucianism proposes has always posed a problem of practical application. Not
even Mencius found a proper way for the implementation of Confucian ideals in the
actual political practice. Instead, the wangdao he advocated evolved into a
transcendent path to spiritual perfection, in modern philosophical discourse referred to
as “spiritual immament transcendence”, and became an essential part of Confucian

expression in Zhongyong: “bringing oneself to completion, and thereby bringing to completion one’s
fellow man and all existing things”.
6
More literally understood as “the (noble) Ethos of the Monarch”,
 7

discursive tradition. A famous dispute about “kingship” between two most prominent
Confucian scholars of all times, Zhu Xi and Chen Liang, was thus characterized by
purely academic speculations and theoretical conjectures rather than a genuine, down-
to-earth concern for feasible political solutions.

If we wish to carry their dispute a step further, we need to start from an understanding
that any discussion of “kingly governance” should inevitably involve a prior
discussion of “hegemonic rule”, the two are essentially inseparable. It often happens
that a “hegemonic rule”, understood here as a forceful military takeover through a
physical elimination of an inept predecessor, is a necessary step to winning the throne,
becoming a founder of a new ruling clan, a new dynasty. This creates conditions for
absolute authoritarian power and characterizes quite well the sort of political
ambience that Confucian thinkers had to operate in. Thus, their efforts naturally
tended to focus on “democratizing” the “hegemon” to convert him into the actual
king. This process of “democratizing” the “hegemon” in practice meant establishing a
constructive and productive equilibrium between the desires of an all-powerful “ruler”
and desires of demos, the people. Modern democracy, however, is perceived as a
process of “democratizing” the system, i.e. working out an equilibrium of desires of
different individual units of the demos. The question of the “ruler” entirely disappears
from the picture.

Despite all efforts of countless generations of Confucian litterati China has never seen
an ideal, truly Confucian sage-king and, as monarchy has been replaced by other
forms of government, it is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future. In a
globalized, modern world, there is no center, and China can no longer view herself as
the “central state”, the center of the known world. With the rise of the Western nation-
states and the European conquest of the world, China was likewise compelled to
follow the suit and model itself as a modern nation-state 7. Thus, if we somehow
continue our Confucian discussion of “the way of the king”, we must both de-
anachronize it and expand its context beyond our limited locality.

Why then would the confucian “Way of the Humane Authority” take root in "the
people" rather than "the king" ? Wangdao implies governing through ren or, in other
words, through ethical and moral excellence and efficacy 德 de. It differs from the
“unkingly Way”(the Way of Inhumane Authority) through the nature of king’s
intentions which ideally should reflect the welbeing of the entire country and its
people. Yet, has this kind of a traditional wangdao ever in history truly held its footing
upon the people? Isn’t it rather that it has been based on the King’s benevolent
initiative as an intentional engagement with people’s needs? Modern scholars seem to

7
The nation-state is an independent political entity. The co
ncept of a nation-state is relatively modern. It emerged in XIX and early XX century Europe in the wake
of various ethnic and cultural groups seeking the right to self-determination and autonomy. It differs from
the traditional empire or kingdom in XVIII century Europe in that the loyalties of the members of a
nation-state lie not with the king but the "compatriots" who share a common cultural and often ethnic
identity, and the system formed by them.
 8

fiddle with the ancient concenpt of min ben 民本, “people (not the ruler) as the root”,
and emphasize its alleged correlation with western democratic ideas while reiterating
that wangdao is founded upon the people. If it indeed is, wouldn’t it then be more
correct to rebaptize “the Way of the Humane Authority” as “the Way of the People’s
Authority” ( 民 道 mindao)? Alas, neither in traditional sources nor even in
contemporary historical research has this term ever gained any legitimacy, which
poses a serious obstacle to juxtaposing it with the Way of the King8.

The proponents of a contemporary Confucian political system have invested much

effort in theoretical re-evaluation and reformulation of the relationship between “the
ruler” and “the people” while borrowing and incorporating such traditional ideas and
concpets as "the Great Unity" (大一统 da yi tong，which was in fact interpreted by
the Gongyang School of Confucianism as the sole manifestation of Dao) , "the Three
Bonds (Principles)" initiaited by Dong Zhongshu, Kang Youwei’s "Explorations of
Reforms advocated by Confucius”, Jiang Qing’s "Political Confucianism", Kang
Xiaoguang’s "Confucian Constitutionalism", or Gan Yang’s concept of tong san tong
(binding Three Unities). Never before have Confucian political ideas raised such a
fervent academic interest or lead to so many disputes and opinions. Before Kang
Youwei, the traditional Chinese political system was exceptionaly stable. Afterwards,
however, the Confucian ideal of “the Great Unity” evolved into a new political order
as a result of the rise to prominence of the Chinese military class. Consequently, the
question how to reconcile this new order with the demands of the already mature
market economy has become the main theme in the modern Confucian ethical
discourse focused on resolving "the ruler-the people” conundrum. The political
reforms initiated by liberal economists in China in 1990’s, despite a few setbacks,
have steadily continued on their course to a construction of a constitutional
government, the tripartite system of power, and free elections.

The most radical proponents of liberalization entirely dismiss any rationale of the
current political system in China, aiming to directly transplant Western political
liberalism. Some scholars go even as far in their reformative zeal as to claim that the
process of eradication of old and obsolete governing traditions has not yet come to an
end, the current system of government lacks legitimacy, rationale and justification.
They propose a shock therapy by exactly copying the western political models of
governance. Fortunately, Chinese intellectual elite now better informed about
domestic and foreign politics seldom buys into such naïve ideas. Less radically-

8
The Western concept of Communitarianism has indeed much in common with the Chinese concept of
mindao , yet it does not share the same level of popularity as Communitarianism in the West. mindao,
as its Chinese “counterpart”, whaterver the reason might be, is difficult to be established as a sibstantial
concept. wangdao, on the other hand, as a valuable Chinese cultural ideal, is so deeply ingrained in a
Chinese national character that it can never really become extinct. Because it exists in Chinese people’s
hearts and minds, even in absence of the state a certain sense of wangdao cannot simply disappear, so
that the question whether wangdao can be restored is simply misconstrued. Refer to Gan Chunsong,
Chonghui wangdao: Rujia yu shijie zhixu, Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 2012 (干春松：《重回王道：
儒家与世界秩序》，华东师范大学出版社).
 9

minded thinkers come forward with various concepts of a constitutional government,

suggesting that China first needs to have a new constitution and a constitutional law
enabling gradual liberalization and democratization of the system based on a
government elected in free elections which nominally represents the people (the
electorate) and hearkens to their will. The new middle class and the intellectual elite,
who identify with the development of market economy, are particulary inclined to
favor this less extreme route to political reforms.

Prominent Confucian scholars too had joined the chorus of reformers, suggesting a
number of political and ethical solutions to improve a debated legitimacy of the
political process. Jiang Qing, for example, by attempting to revive the idea of
institutionalizing Confucianism as the state religion independent and superior to
political power went even further than Confucius, Dong Zhongshu, or Kang Youwei 9.
Jiang Qing proposes that a “hegemonic” political establishment must be replaced by a
constitutional monarchy with a tricameral legislature composed of the House of the
People, the House of Ru, and the House of the Nation, with a Confucian Acedemy
overseeing the correct implementation of Confucian principles and values in political
process. This ambitious project depends on gathering a social consensus to attain “the
Great Confucian Unity” (大一统 da yi tong). He admits that there has been a liberal
element in Confucianism, yet the Confucians’ critique of pragmatic politics in action
has proved rather feeble and even a martyrdom of a few idealists might not
necesseraily have been motivated by a genuine desire for freedom. By arguing that
China might adopt Confucianism as a state religion without hegemony just like any
other western democracy Jiang seems to dismiss China’s unique historical and
political context on a logical level putting China on par with any modern Western
polity. One must, however, remember that, as modern history has proved, a tricameral
system, even if somehow feasible, does not necessarily guarantee the absence of
autocracy. By emphasizing the primacy of Confucianism as ru jiao, a transcendent
and sacred canon of beliefs on par or even superior to western Christianity, Jiang
seems to defy the Confucian tradition of 先 学 理 后 信 仰 xian xueli hou xinyang
(reason before faith). He appears to assume that it was simply enough for the ancients
to study the Confucian scriptures to develop a religious appreciation of their content
that evolved into faith. And yet Confucians of the Song and Ming dynasties clearly
proved that their path to Confucianism was rather rational than religiously inspired 10.
Besides, his staunch opposition to Western learning alienates Confucianism and strips
it of the ability to continue its constructive dialogue with western religions. If
9
Kang Youwei founded a Confucian Religious Society. During China’s brief experiment with
parliamentary debate in the newly established Republic of China, the society twice proposed
institutionalizing Confucianism as the state religion but narrowly failed to garner the required two-thirds
majority of the vote in the national assembly. Kang, however, did not elaborate a detailed program of
implementing the constitutional monarchy based on Confucianism as the state religion. (Jiang Qing, A
Confucian Constitutional Order, Princeton Univesity Press 2013). Jiang Qing promotes the idea of
religious superiority of Confucinism over the actual political power in his article Rujia de
shengmingzhidao yu zhengjiao chuantong, published online:
http://www.confucius2000.com/admin/list.asp?id=1269 (儒家的生命之道与政教传统——蒋庆先生谈儒家
的心性学统、道统与政统).
10
They were in and out of Taoism and Buddhism seeking the proper path of spiritual development to
finally make a rational choice which brought them back to Confucianism.
 10

Confucianism as a religion, according to Jiang, first must “Confucianize today’s

China’s political orders” and further become “re-established” in the civil society 11, he
apparently intends to employ religious beliefs to change “Realpolitik”.

It is in this sense that Jiang Qing endorses “the tradition of a Lineage of Dao” or
“Confucian orthodoxy” ( 道 统 daotong) through which different Chinese
philosophers tried to characterize the spirit of a living culture rooted in a long history.
Just as once dao tong emerged as a response to the rise of Buddhism, at present its
reemergence in a new attire would serve to ensure a proper counterbalance to the
westernization ramapant in everyday life and politics in particular. Yet, in view of
several centuries of overwhelming influence that Western learning exerted on
numerous aspects of Chinese culture, resorting to dao tong as a viable formula for
modern political system in China would not only defy reason but turn out as nothing
more than “spiritual self-complacency” (精神胜利). In modernity, Confucianism has
long lost its privileged status, and one may legitimately doubt whether at present there
actually exists any theoretical or practical means to promote it in a secular or
mundane enough manner palatable to the majority of the contemporary Chinese. If
not, the Lineage of Dao stripped of its traditional garb and spirit can hardly be the
guardian of the 政统 zheng tong, “Confucian” democratic system of governance12. If
the reformulated dao tong is intended to appeal only to the spiritual and moral
authority of the people, then regrettably one must but conclude that a moment when
the moral spirit among the common folk truly guided zheng tong most likely had
never materialized in Chinese history. As a counterpart to the popular western concept
of human rights, Jiang Qing further proposes a Confucian term of “sacred rights” ( 圣
权 shengquan), which is equivalent to the idea of tianjue (天爵), “honors bestowed
by Heaven” introduced by Mencius.

Yet another path is that of the “new left” intelligentsia in China. These thinkers
dismiss liberal democracy trying instead to find a workable compromise with the
Chinese reality. What divides them amounts to a clash between hallowed tradition and
sheer pragmatism. While one group emphasizes the value of the Confucian tradition,
convinced that Confucianism must remain inseparable from the Chinese political
system, the other adheres to national realism, insisting that adaptability to actual
circumstances comes before ideological orthodoxy. Many doctrines claim to represent
and defend the interests of the people, plead for the people’s rights, yet the lack of
consensus, doctrinal discrepancies and differences, make it very difficult for the
majority to follow. With such a multitude of different theories, some even making
exaggerated claims at “saving the nation and the country”, all of which appear
acceptably reasonable, how can one choose a better one to establish a system of
political ethics for the future?

First of all, if we choose construction, we must abandon any idea of a revolution:

11
Jiang Qing, Zhengzhi ruxue, 254.
12
As defined by Mou Zongsan.
 11

revolutions are usually irrational, they naturally resist rational thinking and rational
analysis, and besides, reason confronted with revolutionary zeal, a whirlpool of
violence and bloodshed, comes up as feeble and futile. Therefore, the present-day
advocates of radical changes in the political system in China would wish to achieve
such changes without radical means characteristic of violent and bloody peasant
uprisings in China’s historical past. Liberally-minded, they expect western liberal
political formulas to be smoothly transplanted on Chinese soil and implemented in
Chinese governance. They devise a scenario of a “velvet revolution” with Chinese
characterisitics, ignoring or underestimating absolutely crucial historical
preconditions which reduce the feasibility of such an event to a mere wishful thinking.

The emerging middle class in China has come to realize the pointlessness of
questioning the legitimacy of the current political establishment. They have
automatically legitimized the government on an “existential” basis: it is legitimate
because it is there. It is an objective fact which they simply cannot do away with, and
also it is precisely this political establishment that has set a foundation for the market
economy in China and offered an opportunity for a new middle class to amass their
wealth. On the other hand, in the unique conditions which the developing market
economy has created, common people have become more familiar with western
political systems where the freedom of public expression is viewed as the main
yardstick for the legitimacy of the government. Some began to believe that this
political ideal accords with an ancient Confucian tradition of 天听自我民听 tian ting
zi wo min ting, ”what Heaven hears comes from what people hear.”13 In their opinion,
China needs to proceed with a swift transition to political mechanisms more
compatible with the market economy14. The truth is, however, that the public opinion
in the West is not necessarily compatible with the particular interests of the state, a
state founded upon strong economy and a powerful military is generally quite stable,
yet the public critique is mainly aimed at the policies of the government in office
rather than the invisible string-pullers behind the scenes.
(西方的民意与政权权力基本分开，基于国家经济和军事实力的国家权力基础一
般都相当稳定，而民意反馈主要针对现政府的政策，而较少针对“民”之
“主”，即隐形的真正掌权者)
The way Confucian constitutionalism attempts to combine the advantages of
Confucianism with the liberal democratic system essentially amounts to cooking a
steak seasoned scantily with a few Chinese spices: it’s not even a fusion food. Our

13
Which translates to the obligation of the ruler to hear the voice of the people.
14
The issue of fairness, justice and democracy between people can be allegorized as the art of dealing
with traffic jams. If an accident happens, regardless of the severity of the situation, however one comes
to deal with it, one thing is certain: everyone involved must relinquish some of their rights to
accommodate others. Roads are designed and maintained in such a way as to prevent accidents or to
ensure as much fairness and justice as possible if an accident indeed occurs. There is an objective
asymmetry between the car and the road as individual entities. On this level, no absolute equality is
possible, which is simply determined by specific individual differences. So to prevent accidents from
happening, individuals need to accept differences, stay alert, and drive carefully to minimize the
possibility of a collision. In a sense, how to design a traffic environment with rules that make sense and
are acceptable to most drivers can be likened to designing a polity with ethics and rules acceptable to
most people in order to achieve justice for the greatest number of people. This, in fact, is the central
thesis that we've been discussing.
 12

liberal Democrats readily embrace it since while it embodies precisely what they
stand for - the ideology of western liberal democracy – it shows after all some
“symbolic” respect for the Chinese national characteristics. And that migt just be fine.
However, they should not ignore China's unique political context: since antiquity, our
system of governance has been based on the prevailing military might, and different
political regimes sought legitimation primarily through an armed struggle and final
annihilation of the rival in the battlefield. The popular saying 顺乎天而应乎人 shun
hu tian er ying hu ren (“follow the mandate of heaven and comply with people’s
wishes”) perfectly attests to this truth by justifying violent revolutions against
previous hegemonic rule. And it is well instantiated by numerous peasant revolts
throughout Chinese history that would time and again overthrow dynasties and
enthrone new monarchs.

In present-day China any attempt to launch modern reforms without considering a

fundamentally military background of the political establishment must necessarily
lack a firm ground to hold on to. Most political theorists commit just that fault - they
merely draw attention to problems in Chinese politics. Confucianism advocates the
political ideal of 仁 人 治 国 ren ren zhi guo ("benevolent kings governing the
country"). Confucianists pin their hope on the goodness of the ruler dogmatically
trusting in natural human goodness. The well-being of the ruled could be ensured as
long as the rulers make the most of their benevolence (ren) which they are supposed
to nurture and cultivate. And yet, in reality even the best ruler may have evil
inclinations, and there is virtually no guarantee that these inclination will never be let
loose. A Confucian political theory contains a paradox. On the one hand, it is too
idealistic to efficiently cope with the-ruler-and-the-ruled relationship. On the other, it
is very realistic. It is precisely because Confucianism sees clearly through the-ruler-
and-the-ruled relationship and deeply empathizes with the ruled that it resorts to the
conscience of the ruler as the guarantee to save the kingdom from turmoil.

As a realist, I see rather meagre prospects for designing a political system rooted in
the practice of Confucian orthodoxy, considering that never in our history has it been
actually implemented and existed merely as a kind of sublime political ideal or
humanistic idiosyncrasy of the literati. Throughout more than two thousand years of
Chinese history, our monarchs, who founded their country and legitimized their power
by military force, seldom felt compelled to resort to dao tong – the orthodox
transmission of Confucian values or Confucian orthodoxy which is viewed by modern
Confucian thinkers as foreshadowing constitutionalism. We smoothly do away with
the so-called crisis of political legitimacy in China if we brush aside the challenges
thrusted on us by European and American polities and their concept of freedom and
democracy. Yet, these challenges continue to confound and trouble contemporary
Chinese political theorists who hope to resolve the issue of China's political
legitimacy by a wholsale import of the western liberal democracy. Unfortunately, by
doing so, they unwittingly reveal insufficient and superficial understanding of the
legitimacy of the Western political system and Western political ethics.
 13

The legitimacy of public opinion in Europe and the United States is characterized by
public elections. The people are invested with the right to renew their representatives,
that is, the members of Parliament, as a guarantee that the electees properly represent
the interests of the electorate and the principle "by the people" and , "for the people"
enshrined in the Constitution is fully respected. What, however, poses a problem is the
"of the people". Does the actual “people” possess direct power or control over the
state affairs? It is the parliament composed of the so-called representatives that does
(but are they truly “of the people”?) and the president elected by the people who is
granted with substantial political authority yet who might be simply replaced in the
next round of elections if he performs poorly. The way the Western political system is
designed is not necessarily based on the will of the people, but merely leaves a narrow
niche where this will can find a limited scope for actual representation and realization.
One might indeed argue that, to a certain extent, this design indirectly inherits the
antithetic social structure in the European middle ages with the people representing
one polarity and the religious establishment such as clerics, bishops and popes, the
other.

The people will basically remain peaceful and cause no trouble provided that they
enjoy social equality and life is easy to live. The true difficulty in Chinese politics
derives from the fact that political parties and factions that prove incapable to find
backing in the military simultaneously showing contempt for violence, such as the
Donglin Party in the late Ming Dynasty and the democratic parties in the period of the
Republic of China, can hardly survive. Whether in China or any other country,
invariably it is the economic and military forces that stand behind the real political
power. Without the military forces at the foundation, the civic parties composed of the
intellectual elite can hardly obtain a chance to really represent the interests of the
people. In Europe and North America the capitalists first gained control over the
national military and the economic and political lifeline, and only then embarked
upon a gradual transfer of a (non-essential) part of their political rights to ordinary
people and allowed them to participate in political discourse. However, in essence, it
is still the capital that controls all social and political mechanisms, and the actual
power will never be transferred to the people unless the people accumulate monopoly
capital thus rendering themselves capable of tipping the balance of power on their
own behalf. Understandably, the capitalists will never allow for it to happen. Any
other country trying to merely mimic the western political model without
understanding the actual purpose of the sysyem of checks and balances, will end up
nowhere. In China, a supra-millitary coalition government can hardly materialized
due to a non-neutrality of the military: it usually takes sides. And if the multi-party
system brings about the internal division of the army and domestic instability, it will
be a blatant violation of both the national and the people’s interests15.

15
Fang Chaohui 方朝晖 believes that Party rivalry as a characteristic of Chinese political culture will
inevitably lead to a large-scale political and social unrest, possibly leading to a physical disintegration of
the state, as it did before in China and elsewhere across Asia ( e.g. the emergence of Taiwan, Thailand,
the Philippines and South Korea). Besides, ethnic rifts will consume enormous social resources,
 14

To claim that the Chinese nation is primarily built on Chinese culture would be an
overstatement. Culture itself cannot determine the development of a nation. This
culture may tread a certain unalterable path, follow its ever-lasting dao, be recorded in
its sacred canonical scriptures that survived millenia, yet, beyond doubt, various
legislations of the past Chiense dynasties appear more often than not to have been
based on the particular needs of the monarch and ruling class rather than the cultural
spirit these canonical scriptures, the hallowed classics, embody. Any serious thought
to actually institutionalize Confucianism as a polity in modern-day China, while it has
never fully occurred at any time in Chinese history, is entirely utopian. Confucianism
has long lost its nationwide popularity. To constitutionalize Confucianism now and
supervise the Confucian system of democratic governance (zheng tong) by means of
tong dao might be a noble and sublime idea, and that is regrettably what it will always
remain, just an idea.

A culturally advanced society with Confucian characteristics has its own tradition and
follows its own political models, there is absolutely no need for it to adopt precarious
western models based on the principle of separation of powers. When social conflicts
become intense so that even one’s right to subsistence is threatened, the people will
certainly rise up; and once they do and succeed in their effort to gain control of the
state, after peace is restored, poeple will inevitably expect to participate in community
life and pursue political rights. However, the principle of “fixing rights and duties”
( 定分 )16 in traditional Confucianism damages polity by harming the interests of the
lower strata of the society, the underprivileged and marginalized, since it assumes that
the rights are predetermined according to a rigid etiquette which is self-contained and
does not need to evolve. This remains in fundamental conflict with the modern society
based on plurality and egalitarianism where social roles and status are fluid and
susceptible to rapid changes. It would be virtually impossible to remedy social
conflicts and disputes by “fixing rights and duties" in a “Confucian” mode.

The common understanding of liberalism in mainland China is rather quite simplistic

and superficial. Confucianism, Legalism and Taoism – the three main systems of
indigineous political thought - all developed their own concepts of government or
political dao which were indeed put to some use throughout Chinese history. Yet, if
coated with freedom and democracy, these systems simply turn into a nodescript
hybrid. There is no easy answer to the question how to let the people rule in an open
society.

The fundimental tenet of Confucian pragmatism is that the rulers should devote
themselves to "politics of kindness" ( 善 良 政 治 shanliang zhengzhi) rather than

seriously drag down or even entirely disable the development of the whole society. See also: Fang
Zhaohui, Wemingdehuimie yu xinsheng (文明的毁灭与新生)，2011, p. 340, Beijing, Zhongguo renmin
daxue chubanshe 2011.
16
Or “having an established lot”, which includes a fixed social role and a set of duties and obligations
one should not overstep by aiming higher.
 15

"system of kindness" (善良制度 shanliang zhidu) and employ the political system in
service of politics rather than politics in service of the political system. The system
cannot guarantee efficiency or effectiveness, but politics of kindness possibly can.
Kind-hearted rulers could improve the political system and implement the politics of
kindness. Realistic political goals and ideal political goals should never be confused.
Political idealism pursues absolute justice while realism can only search for the
maximum welfare of possibly the largest number of groups of interests but not all (for
example, some citizens, such as convicted criminals, may be deprived of some public
benefits). On a separate note, public benefit does not fall within the conceptual scope
of ideal goals shared by the people such as justice or “the Great Harmony” (da tong)
which may be entirely unattainable, but is commensurable with people’s common
intrests. For politicians, who by nature of their office are challenged with concrete
problems that require concrete and timely solutions, overemphasizing ideal goals
might lead to a practical cul-de-sac17.

Conclusion
The ruler-and-the-ruled relationship is one of the important components of the
Confucian ethical and political philosophy, and on that level Confucianism will
continue its dialogue with Western liberal democracy in the future. It is impossible
and unnecessary for Confucianism to completely incorporate the western model of
liberal democracy. The Neo-Confucian thinkers, such as Mou Zongsan, with much
zeal and unreleting effort attemped to drape the old concept of “ 内 圣 外 王 ” nei
sheng wai wang in a modern garb but in the process of constant revising,
reformulating, and editing the old political wisdom of dealing with the-ruler-and-the-
ruled relashionship somehow switched places with the western liberal democratic
ideology, disappearing without a trace. Enamoured with liberal ideas, they failed to
properly address the problem.

An alternative to previous theoretical attempts might be the Confucian “pragmethics”

(儒家实意伦理, i.e. ethics based on Confucian pragmatism). This theory can prove
instructive for transforming the current discourse on contemporary Chinese political
ethics and provide a novel analytical framework for mechnisms that drove specific
individual in specific historical times to implementing certain political ideas. The
Confucian pragmethics on a theoretical level enables the an effective response to the
main problems of Contemporary Confucian political philosophy, such as the
relationship between Confucianism and constitutionalism, the Humane Governance
(wang dao), or social justice. On a practical level, the Confucian pragmethics may
teach us that in modern political ethics stringent dogmatism will not work, and as we
steadily continue to improve our political system, the intentions of those who govern

17
Fang Zhaohui maintains that the combination of Confucianism and Democratic Constitutionalism is an
“artificial” problem. Democracy and Constitutionalism are products of specific historical conditions and
have no universal value. Confucianism does not need to somehow coalesce with democratic
constitutionalism system. Fang Zhaohui, Wemingdehuimie yu xinsheng (文明的毁灭与新生)，2011, p.
178 - 179, Beijing, Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe 2011.
 16

(the Confucian 主 or "the ruler") should sometimes take precedence over the system
representative of the governed (民 , the people or the "the ruled"). This is a valuable
truth that classical Confucian political wisdom urges us to respect in the contemporary
political context.