Cases Digest Art. III - Sec. 16 - 22

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Atty. Norieva de Vega

Second Trimester, SY 2016-2017
Article III
Bill of Rights
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies.
1. GONZALES V. SANDIGANBAYAN - 199 SCRA 299
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to review the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan.
F: Nov. 11, 1975: An affidavit-complaint was filed against Felix Gonzales (former BFAR Director) by Antonio Baltazar for
malversation of public funds and property involving the alleged illegal use of M/V Albacora. Dec. 16, 1976: City Fiscal’s
Office issued a resolution finding a prima facie case. It was dismissed after petition for review with the Ministry of Justice.
Another complaint-affidavit was filed against Gonzales for illegal use of M/V Albacora and loss of the Otoshi-Ami net
(“Lambaklad”). Mar. 16, 1984: Ombudsman issued a resolution recommending the preliminary investigation of only the
loss of the Lambaklad. Illegal use of M/V Albacora was dismissed. Oct. 8, 1984: As a result of the preliminary
investigation, the Special Prosecutor recommended dismissal, which was approved. Oct. 24, 1984: Motion for
reconsideration by Baltazar.
Feb. 28, 1987: Special Prosecutor issued resolution ordering the preliminary investigation of the charge for illegal use of
the government vessel and negligence in failing to recover the fishing net. It modified the Mar. 16, 1984 resolution. Jan. 8,
1988: Resolution recommending the dismissal of the cases. Feb. 8, 1988: Motion for Reconsideration by Baltazar. Mar. 20,
1989: Reversal of resolution. May 5, 1989: Information for violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019. May 7, 1990: Amended
information.
Gonzales moved for dismissal claiming that there has been a long delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation. (6 years) That there has been a violation of his right to a speedy disposition of a case.
I: Whether there was violation of the right to speedy disposition of a case.
R: No violation of right to a speedy disposition of cases.
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF A CASE, LIKE THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL, IS DEEMED VIOLATED
ONLY:
1. When the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays;
2. When unjustified post-ponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or
3. When without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his
case tried.
BALANCING TEST - IN DETERMINING WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN A VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO A
SPEEDY TRIAL OR A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES, THE CONDUCT OF BOTH THE PROSECUTION AND
DEFENDANT ARE WEIGHED, AS WELL AS THE FOLLOWING FACTORS CONSIDERED:
1. Length of the delay;
2. Reason of the delay;
3. Defendant’s assertion or non-assertion of his right; and
4. Prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay.
Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 1 of 27

In the present case, it will be noted that it was only on August 22, 1988 when the complaint including Roberto Palanca as
an accused, together with herein petitioner, was filed. The original information charging petitioner and Palanca with a
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, was filed on May 5, 1989. After the filing of said
information, petitioner filed several motions before the Office of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan seeking
reconsideration and re-evaluation of the case and praying for the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
13563 during the pendency of the resolution of these motions. Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan ordered the conduct of a
preliminary investigation against Palanca and, subsequently, the amended information was filed. It is, therefore, apparent
and irremissible that the delay is equally chargeable to petitioner. Hence, he cannot now seek the protection of the law to
cover up for his own actuations or benefit from what he now considers the adverse effects of his own conduct in the case.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
PROTECTED NOT PROTECTED

The act of writing (cannot be compelled) – Official documents in the custody of government
Bermudez v. Castillo offices such as the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) [may be subject of
(Cannot be compelled) to testify in a committee subpoena duces tecum] – Almonte v. Vasquez
created by the President to investigate the accused’s
unexplained wealth – Cabal v. Kapunan Malaki’s wallet, identification card, residence
certificate and keys [object evidence] – People v.
Urine test if it immaterial to the offense charged (in Malimit
this case it was extortion) – Dela Cruz v. People
Substance emitting from body – US v. Tan Teng
When summoned as a resource person to a legislative

inquiry, even if there are pending criminal cases in
the courts involving the same subject – Standard
Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks
A. Right against self-incrimination
2. BERMUDEZ V. CASTILLO - 64 PHIL 483
N: ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Malpractice.
F: The Office of the Solicitor General was conducting an investigation against Leodegario D. Castillo in connection with
an administrative case. In support of his defense, Castillo filed 6 letters which he stated were Mariel Bermudez’s -- which
Bermudez denied. Determined to show that the letters were Bermudez’s, he required her to copy them in her own
handwriting in the presence of the investigator. Bermudez refused, invoking her right not to incriminate herself.
I: Whether or not Bermudez can invoke right against self-incrimination?
R: Yes. Bermudez is entitled to the privilege against self-incrimination. Art. III provides that “No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself”. This extends to all cases, be they criminal, civil, or administrative. The reason
for the privilege to avoid and prohibit the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a
person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. If such is its purpose,
then the evidence must be sought elsewhere; and if it is desired to discover evidence in the person himself, then he must
be promised and assured at least absolute immunity by one authorized to do so legally, or he should be asked, once for
all, to furnish such evidence voluntarily without any condition.
In this case, before it was attempted to require the Bermudez to copy the six documents, she had sworn to tell the truth
before the investigator authorized to receive statements under oath, and under said oath she asserted that the documents
in question had not been written by her. Were she compelled to write and were it proven by means of what she might

write later that said documents had really been written by her, it would be impossible for her to evade prosecution for
perjury.
3. CABAL V. KAPUNAN, JR. - 6 SCRA 1059
N: ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
F: A complaint was filed charging Manuel F. Cabal (Chief of Staff of the AFP) with graft, corrupt practices, unexplained
wealth and other reprehensible acts. The President created a committee to investigate the unexplained charge against
Cabal. In the investigation, Cabal was ordered to take the witness stand and be sworn as a witness for the complainant.
Cabal refused, invoking his right against self-incrimination. It was contended that since the investigation was
administrative, the right against self-incrimination does not apply.
I: Whether right to self-incrimination may be applied too property forfeiture proceedings?
R: Yes.
Prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness against himself applies only to criminal, quasi-
criminal proceedings, and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason of
the commission of an offense. But, not a proceeding in the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature.
In this case, while the committee was created to investigate an administrative charge of unexplained wealth, the purpose
was to apply the RA 1379 (Anti-Graft Law), which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or
employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary and his other lawful income. The forfeiture of the property
partakes the nature of a penalty. As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal,
hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal cases to be witnesses against themselves is applicable.
4. ALMONTE V. VASQUEZ - 244 SCRA 286
N: PETITION for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the Supreme Court.
F: Almonte was the former Commissioner of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB). Villamor C. Perez
is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The Ombudsman issued a subpoena duces tecum in
connection with an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had
been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen,
was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, and also sent to several government offices, including the OMB.
In their defense, Almonte and Perez denied that there were “ghost agents” since the agency was cleared by COA. Finding
the denial unsatisfactory, the Ombudsman issued a subpoena duces tecum to the Chief of the EIIB's Accounting Division
ordering him to bring "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as
vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. In addition, the Ombudsman ordered Elisa Rivera (Chief of the
Records of the EIIB) to produce before the investigator "all documents relating to Personnel Service Funds, for the year
1988, and all documents, salary vouchers for the whole plantilla of the EIIB for 1988, within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof." Almonte and Perez moved to quash the subpoena on the ground that it is a violation of their guaranteed right
against self- incrimination.
I: Whether there was violation of the right against self-incrimination?
R: No violation. The documents required to be produced are public records and the subpoena duces tecum is directed to
government officials in whose possession or custody the documents are. Moreover, if, as Almonte and Perez claims, the
disbursement by the EIIB of funds for personal service has already been cleared by the COA, there is no reason to object
to the examination of the documents.
5. PEOPLE V. MALIMIT - 264 SCRA 167
N: APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Juan, Southern Leyte, Br. 26.

F: 8:00pm: Onofre Malaki was attending to his store while his houseboy, Edilberto Batin, on the other hand, was busy
cooking chicken for supper at the kitchen located at the back of the store. When the houseboy returned to the store, he
was shocked to find bloodied employer sprawled on the floor. A farmer who was about to go to Malaki’s store to
purchase fertilizer saw the Jose Encarnacion Malimit walking out of the store holding a bloodied bolo. Malimit’s wanted
the wallet of Malaki to be excluded from the evidence against him on the ground that the investigating policemen to
whom he pointed out the place where he hid Malakis wallet, did not inform him of his constitutional rights. Malimit was
convicted of special complex crime of robbery with homicide
I: Whether the wallet should not be included as he was not informed of his right against self-incrimination when he
pointed out where he hid the wallet he stole?
R: NO, The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental law finds no application in this case
Infractions thereof render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial
investigation.
In Holt vs. United State: This right is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications
from him x x x. A prohibition against legal process to extract from the accused’s own lips, against his will, admission of
his guilt. It does not apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement
but an object evidence. Admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and not otherwise
excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.
Concededly, Malimit was not informed of his right to remain silent and to have his own counsel by the investigating
policemen during the custodial investigation. Neither did he execute a written waiver of these rights in accordance with
the constitutional prescriptions. Nevertheless, these constitutional short-cuts do not affect the admissibility of Malaki’s
wallet, identification card, residence certificate and keys for the purpose of establishing other facts relevant to the crime.
Thus, the wallet is admissible to establish the fact that it was the very wallet taken from Malaki on the night of the
robbery. The identification card, residence certificate and keys found inside the wallet, on the other hand, are admissible
to prove that the wallet really belongs to Malaki.
6. UNITED STATES V. TAN TENG - 23 PHIL 145
N: APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Lobingier, J.
F: Tan Teng was charged with the crime of rape. The victim was 7 years old at the time. The victim’s sister discovered that
the victim had gonorrhea, which led to the victim telling her that she had been raped. The defendant was arrested and
taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing and examined. The policeman who examined the defendant swore
that his body bore every sign of the fact that he was suffering from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The
policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of
Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made of the same. The result of the examination showed that the
defendant was suffering from gonorrhea. Tan Teng contends that the result of the scientific examination of the substance
taken from his body when he was arrested was not admissible as proof that he had gonorrhea. Admitting the same as
evidence would violate his right against self-incrimination.
I: Whether the bodily substance taken and examined from the accused may not be admitted as evidence for violating
right against self-incrimination.
R: No violation of Tan Teng’s right against self-incrimination. The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to
be a witness against himself, is prohibition of use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him;
not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. The right is simply a prohibition against legal process
to extract from the defendant’s own lips, against his will, an admission of guilt. Not merely compulsion, but testimonial
compulsion. The main purpose of the prohibition is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial or
upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a
crime.
In this case, Inspection of the accused’s body does not violate the privilege because it does not call upon him for his
testimonial responsibility.

In this case, the accused was not compelled to make any admission or answer any questions. The mere fact that an object
was found upon his body was examined seems no more to infringe the rule than would the introduction of stolen
property taken from the person of the thief.
7. DELA CRUZ VS. PEOPLE – 730 SCRA 655
N: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
F: The NBI received a complaint from Corazon Absin and Charito Escobido, claiming that Ariel Escobido (Corazon’s live-
in partner and Charito’s son) was picked up at 1am by persons believed to be police officers, allegedly for selling drugs.
Corazon and Charito were given a number, which when they called, they were instructed to go to the Gorordo Police
office. In the police office, a certain “James” demanded P100,000 for the release of Ariel. The NBI organized an
entrapment operation and in a Jollibee branch, they were able to apprehend Jaime Dela Cruz. Dela Cruz was subjected to
a forensic exam and was required to submit a urine sample. His request to be allowed to call his lawyer before the taking
of the sample was denied. Dela Cruz tested positive for shabu and was charged and convicted with violation of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act (RA 9165). Dela Cruz now questions the constitutionality of the drug test, claiming
it violated his right against self-incrimination. The lower courts claimed that that a suspect cannot invoke his right to
counsel when he is required to extract urine because, while he is already in custody, he is not compelled to make a
statement or testimony against himself.
I: Whether the taking of the urine sample for a drug test violated the right against self-incrimination.
R: The drug test was not valid. In order for a non-testimonial compulsion to be allowed, the evidence must be material to
the cause of the arrest, which was not in this case, as a urine sample is not related to extortion, the crime of which Dela
Cruz was arrested for.
Cases where non-testimonial compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the pieces of evidence obtained were all
material to the principal cause of the arrest. Right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it
may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his
guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. Essence of the right against self-incrimination is
testimonial compulsion. The giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act.
Hence, it has been held that:

1. A woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her
pregnancy;
2. An accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body
for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;
3. To expel morphine from his mouth;
4. To have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints.
5. To be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable
the foregoing things to be done.
In this case, a urine sample is not material to the charge of extortion. It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have
his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising
his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under
those circumstances. In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons
regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made.
8. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK VS. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS - 541 SCRA

546
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.
F: Petitioners are the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operations Officer, Country Head of Consumer Banking, General
Manager for Credit Card and Personal Loans, Chief Financial Officer, Legal and Compliance Officer, former Trust and

Investment Services Head, Country Tax Officer, Head of Corporate Affairs, Head of Banking Services, Head of Client
Relationships, and the Head of Global Markets of SCB-Philippines.
They were subpoenaed by one of the permanent committees of the Senate to appear and testify in an inquiry pursuant to
a resolution entitled “DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES,
TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, INTO THE ILLEGAL SALE OF UNREGISTERED AND
HIGH-RISK SECURITIES BY STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, WHICH RESULTED IN BILLIONS OF PESOS OF
LOSSES TO THE INVESTING PUBLIC.”
Petitioners allege that due to pending criminal and civil actions with the Court of Appeals, covering the same subject, to
compel them to testify in the legislative inquiry would violate their constitutional right against self-incrimination.
I: Whether the petitioners may invoke their right against self-incrimination to justify non-appearance in the subject
legislative inquiry?
R: No. As regards the issue of self-incrimination, the petitioners, officers of SCB-Philippines, are not being indicted as
accused in a criminal proceeding. They were summoned by respondent merely as resource persons, or as witnesses, in
a legislative inquiry. As distinguished by this Court—[An] accused occupies a different tier of protection from an
ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as
each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness
stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. Concededly, this right of the accused against self-incrimination is
extended to respondents in administrative investigations that partake of the nature of or are analogous to criminal
proceedings. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law; and to all cases in
which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not. However, in this case, petitioners
neither stand as accused in a criminal case nor will they be subjected by the respondent to any penalty by reason of
their testimonies. Hence, they cannot altogether decline appearing before respondent, although they may invoke the
privilege when a question calling for an incriminating answer is propounded.
The Court cited Sinclair v. United States: “It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel disclosures
for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of pending suits; but the authority of that body, directly or through its
Committees, to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own constitutional power is not abridged because the
information sought to be elicited may also be of use in such suits.”
The prosecution of offenders by the prosecutorial agencies and the trial before the courts is for the punishment of persons
who transgress the law. The intent of legislative inquiries, on the other hand, is to arrive at a policy determination, which
may or may not be enacted into law.
Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the respondent, as with the other Committees of the
Senate or of the House of Representatives, cannot penalize violators even if there is overwhelming evidence of criminal
culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or remedial legislation, respondent can only recommend
measures to address or remedy whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may
include in its Report a recommendation for the criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable. At best, the
recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such a Report would be persuasive, but it is still up to the
prosecutorial agencies and the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.
Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted.
Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.

(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee
or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by
law.
A. Cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment; excessive fines
9. PEOPLE V. ESTOISTA - 93 PHIL 647
N: APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First. Instance of Lanao. Nolasco, J.
F: While shooting wild roosters with Bruno’s his father, gun, Alberto Estoista accidentally shot their servant. He was
charged with homicide through reckless imprudence and illegal possession of firearms. He was convicted only of illegal
possession of firearms. He was sentenced to imprisonment of 5-10 years and a fine as provided by RA 4. Estoista now
claims that the punishment was cruel and unusual.
I: Whether the penalty imposed was cruel and unusual.
R: Punishment was not cruel. Confinement from 5-10 years for possessing of carrying firearm is not cruel or unusual,
having due regard to the prevalent conditions which the law proposes to suppress or curb. The rampant
lawlessness against property, person, and even the very security of the Government, directly traceable in large
measure to promiscuous carrying and use of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which in normal circumstances
might appear excessive. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty
to be obnoxious to the Constitution.
The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. To come under
the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of
the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community." Having in mind the necessity for a radical measure and the
public interest at stake, we do not believe that 5 years' confinement for possessing firearms, even as applied to
appellant's and similar case, can be said to be cruel and unusual, barbarous, or excessive to the extent of being shocking
to public conscience.
Nevertheless, Court stated that 6 months was commensurate and just for Estoista’s offense, taking into consideration his
intention and the degree of malice, rather than that it fringes the constitutional prohibition against the affliction of cruel
and unusual punishment. While the Court orders the penalty of 5 years, it recommends to the President, through the
Secretary of Justice that the penalty be reduced to 6 months. This is consistent with Art. 5 of the RPC, providing for the
remedy when the penalty imposed is too harsh.
In its Resolution of the MR:

It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the
Constitution. "The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual." (24 C.
J. S., 1187-1188.) Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be
"flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense
of the community." Having in mind the necessity for a radical measure and the public interest at stake, we do not
believe that five years' confinement for possessing firearms, even as applied to appellant's and similar cases, can be
said to be cruel and unusual, barbarous, or excessive to the extent of being shocking to public conscience.
10. CORPUZ VS. PEOPLE – 724 SCRA 1
F: Danilo Tangcoy and Lito Corpuz entered an agreement in which Corpuz would sell Tangcoy’s jewelry on commission
basis. In the agreement, Tangcoy would turn over several pieces of jewelry to Corpuz to be sold, then Corpuz would turn
over the proceeds of the sale reclusion temporal or, if unsold, give back the jewelry, within 60 days. The 60 days passed
without Corpuz remitting the proceeds or returning the jewelry. Despite Tangcoy’s demands, Corpuz failed to do either.

Corpuz was charged and convicted of Estafa and was sentenced to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional in its
medium period as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of in its minimum period as maximum, and to pay P98,000. CA:
Indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prisión mayor, as
maximum, plus 1 year for each additional P10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. The rest of the decision stands..
I: Whether the penalty imposed was cruel and inhuman punishment.
R: The validity of the penalty for crimes involving property came up, which the legislature had pegged to the value of the
money and property in 1930 when the RPC was enacted. It was claimed that the penalty constituted cruel and inhuman
punishment. Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the provision of the
law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present action.
All penalties are generally harsh, being punitive in nature. Whether or not they are excessive or amount to cruel
punishment is a matter that should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to apply the law, especially
when they are clear and not subject to any other interpretation than that which is plainly written.
Not only is it violative of due process, considering that the State and the concerned parties were not given the
opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked
collaterally because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally, more so in the present
controversy wherein the issues never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code.
The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment. Not
rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount. It applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded
as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on
the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the
Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. To
come under the ban, the punishment must be “flagrantly and plainly oppressive,” “wholly disproportionate to the
nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.”
Cruel as it may be, it is for the Congress to amend the law and adapt it to our modern time. The situation is not without
remedy however, as such is provided in Art. 5 of the RPC.
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered
by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties.—Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may
deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall
report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to
believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may
be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this
Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the
injury caused by the offense.
B. Effect of abolition on application of penal laws
11. PEOPLE V. MUÑOZ - 170 SCRA 107
N: APPEAL from the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City. Garcia, J.
F: Muñoz, Millora, Tayaba, Mislang, and 7 other unidentified men, most of them bodyguards of the town mayor, went
out in a jeep at the behest of one of them who had complained of having been victimized by cattle rustlers. They killed
three people. Each of the 3 killings constituted the crime of murder, qualified by treachery.
I: Whether the framers meant to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition
against the death penalty? (Previously: RT Max – RP – Death)

R: NO. A reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly
declares the abolition of the death penalty. The Court, in People v. Masangkay and People v. Atencio, divided the
modified penalty into 3 new periods, the limits of which were specified in People v. Intino, as follows: the lower
half of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium;
and reclusion perpetua as the maximum. The Court now hereby reverses the current doctrine providing for 3 new
periods for the penalty for murder as reduced by the Constitution. Instead, we return to our original interpretation and
hold that Art. III, Sec. 19(l) does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Art. 248 of the RPC except only
insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium
and minimum penalties remains unchanged. (Now: RT Max – RP – RP)
C. Death Penalty
12. PEOPLE V. BON – 506 SCRA 169
N: APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
F: 8 Informations for rape were filed against Alfredo Bon. RTC convicted him for all 8 counts of rape. 8 death sentences
were imposed. The CA however, modified the decision, convicting Bon of 6 counts of rape and 2 counts of attempted
rape. RA 9346 prohibited the imposition of the death penalty in the Philippines.
I: What penalties should be imposed on Bon?
R: For the 6 counts of rape: Reclusion perpetua. Because of RA 9346, the death penalty can no longer be imposed. Sec. 2
of RA 936 provides that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. The sovereign
people through RA 9346 banned the death penalty. Only by an Act of Congress can it be reborn.
For the 2 counts of attempted rape: Prision mayor. RA 9346 removed “death” from Art. 71 of the RPC, in effect
appropriately downgrading the proper penalties attaching to accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies
to the level consistent with the rest of the penal laws. “Death” as utilized in Art. 71 of the RPC, shall no longer form part
of the equation in graduation of penalties. For example, in the case of Bon, the determination of his penalty for attempted
rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the
maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead, prision
mayor. To do otherwise, if RA 9346 would be construed in such a way as to limit its effects only to matters concerning the
physical imposition of the death penalty, an anomalous situation would arise, wherein, a principal and accomplice would
be subject to the same penalty in some felonies.
We cannot find basis to conclude that Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to retain the operative effects of the death penalty in the
graduation of the other penalties in our penal laws. Munoz cannot enjoin us to adopt such conclusion.
As to sentences not yet handed down, or affirmed with finality, the application is immediate. Henceforth, “death,” as
utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties.
For example, in the case of appellant, the determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two
degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his penalty shall
no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead, prision mayor. The Court declared that its
ruling was to be applied retroactively.
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
A. Imprisonment for debt
13. LOZANO V. MARTINEZ - 146 SCRA 323
N: PETITION to review the order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 52. Nitafan, J.

F: The constitutionality of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) is being questioned, claiming that it offends the constitutional
provision forbidding the imprisonment for debt. These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under
the statute. The defendants in those cases moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts
charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial
courts, except in one case, which is the subject of G.R. No. 75789, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional
and dismissed the case, The parties adversely affected have come to us f or relief.
I: Whether BP22 is unconstitutional for violation of prohibition for imprisonment for debt.
R: BP 22 does not violate the prohibition against imprisonment for debt. The freedom of contract which is
constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not
lawful.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non- payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not
as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the
legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to
be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
The Court found that the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power of the State, which includes penalizing,
through Congress, acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare and classifying them as malum prohibitum. The
enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a
worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
Thus, it is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
LAWFUL SUBJECT: The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong
to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousand-fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
LAWFUL MEANS: BP 22. There are occasions when the police power of the state may even override a constitutional
guaranty. For example, there have been cases wherein we held that the constitutional provision on non-impairment of
contracts must yield to the police power of the state. Whether the police power may override the constitutional inhibition
against imprisonment for debt is an issue we do not have to address. This bridge has not been reached, so there is no
occasion to cross it. We hold that BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
A. Attachment of jeopardy
14. PEOPLE V. YLAGAN - 58 PHIL 851
N: APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas. De Vera, J.
F: The provincial fiscal filed an information charging Elisea Ylagan of serious physical injuries. Upon arraignment,
defendant pleaded not guilty. The private prosecutor, with the concurrence of the deputy provincial fiscal, moved for the
dismissal of the case, which was granted. Ylagan’s lawyer said nothing about the dismissal. 11 days later, the acting
provincial fiscal filed another information, charging Ylagan of the same offense of serious physical injuries. After another
preliminary investigation, the case was again forwarded to the CFI, where the information filed in the justice of the peace
court was reproduced.

Upon arraignment, the defendant entered a plea of double jeopardy. After hearing, the court sustained the plea and
dismissed the case. Hence, the Government’s appeal, arguing that the previous case brought against the Ylagan was
dismissed with her consent.
That the phrase "without the consent of the accused", used in section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
should be construed to mean "over the objection of the accused" or "against the will of the accused".
I: Whether there is double jeopardy in this case?
Ruling: Yes. Sec. 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendant in a criminal prosecution is in legal
jeopardy when placed on trial under the following conditions:
1. In a court of competent jurisdiction;
2. Upon a valid complaint or information;
3. After he has been arraigned; and
4. After he has pleaded to the complaint of information.
Mere silence of the defendant or his failure to object to the dismissal of the case does not constitute consent within the
meaning of Sec. 28. The right not to be put in jeopardy a second time for the offense is as important as the other
constitutional right of the accused in a criminal case. Its waiver cannot, and should not, be predicated on mere silence.
Rationale: there is no provision or principle of law requiring such a condition for the existence of legal jeopardy. All that
the law requires is that the accused has been brought to trial "in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint
or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, after issue properly joined."
Under our system of criminal procedure, issue is properly joined after the accused has entered a plea of not guilty. The
mere calling of a witness would not add a particle to the danger, annoyance, and vexation suffered by the accused, after
going through the process of being arrested, subjected to a preliminary investigation, arraigned, and required to plead
and stand trial. The rule against double jeopardy protects the accused not against the peril of second punishment, but
against being again tried for the same offense.
Counsel for the government, however, contends that the previous case brought against the appellee was dismissed with
her consent, on the theory that the phrase "without the consent of the accused", used in section 28 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, should be construed to mean "over the objection of the accused" or "against the will of the accused". We cannot
accept such a theory. We believe it a sound rule to lay down, that the mere silence of the defendant or his failure to object
to the dismissal, of the case does not constitute a consent within the meaning of section 28 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. The right not to be put in jeopardy a second time for the same offense is as important as the other
constitutional rights of the accused in a criminal case. Its waiver cannot, and should not, be predicated on mere silence.
15. PEOPLE V. BALISACAN - L 26376, 17 SCRA 1119
N: APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte.

F: Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide. Upon being arraigned, entered a plea of guilty. In doing so, he
was assisted by counsel, however, he was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances (self-defense
and voluntary surrender). During which, the accused testified to the effect that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense
because the latter was strangling him. The lower court acquitted him based on the evidence he presented, without
changing the original plea of guilty, to not guilty. The court a quo acquitted Balicasan. Thus, the People appealed.
I: Whether the appeal place Balisacan in double jeopardy?
R: Appeal did not place Balisacan in double jeopardy. The existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy.
True, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. However, he later testified, in the course of being allowed to prove
mitigating circumstances. Said testimony, therefore had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty. The court a quo should
have required him to plead anew on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This
was not done.
It follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal,
there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein. Furthermore, the court a quo decided the case upon the

merits without giving the prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the
defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted without due process of law. And for lack of this fundamental prerequisite, its
action is perforce null and void. The acquittal, therefore, being a nullity for want of due process, is no acquittal at all, and
thus cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy.
The court a quo decided the case upon the merits without giving the prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence
or even to rebut the testimony of the defendant. Thus, the acquittal was a nullity for want of due process and cannot
constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy.
16. CUDIA V. COURT OF APPEALS - 284 SCRA 173
N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
F: Cudia was arrested for possessing an unlicensed revolver. The City Prosecutor filed an information against him
for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. On his arraignment before the Angeles City RTC Branch 60, petitioner
pleaded not guilty. During pre-trial, the court said that, contrary to the information, Cudia had committed the offense in
Mabalacat, and not in Angeles City.
The case was re-raffled to a branch assigned to criminal cases involving crimes committed outside of the city (Angeles
City RTC Branch 56). Subsequently, however, the Provincial Prosecutor also filed an information charging Cudia with the
same crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, likewise raffled to Angeles City RTC Branch 56. This
prompted the city prosecutor to file a Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw the Information, stating "that thru inadvertence
and oversight, the Investigating Panel was misled into hastily filing the Information in this case, it appearing that
the apprehension of the Cudia in connection with the illegal possession of unlicensed firearm and
ammunition was made in Mabalacat, within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga" and that the
Provincial Prosecutor had filed its own information against the accused, as a result of which 2 separate informations
for the same offense had been filed against Cudia. Motion to Dismiss was granted.
I: Whether there was double jeopardy.
R: No double jeopardy. In order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be
present:
1. A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
2. The first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and
3. The second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof.
In determining when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it is necessary to prove the existence of the
following:
1. Court of competent jurisdiction;
2. Valid complaint or information;
3. Arraignment;
4. Valid plea;
5. The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused.
With respect to the second requisite of valid complaint or information, however, it is the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pampanga, who should prepare informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City, and
not the City Prosecutor. Since the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information
would not be a bar to petitioner's subsequent prosecution.
Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by
the prosecution. As the first information was fatally defective for lack of authority of the officer filing it, the instant
petition must fail for failure to comply with all the requisites necessary to invoke double jeopardy.

In light of the foregoing principles, there is thus no breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice putting an
accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense for the simple reason that the absence of authority of the City
Prosecutor to file the first information meant that petitioner could never have been convicted on the strength thereof.
17. LEJANO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , G.R. NO. 176389, 18 JANUARY 2011
N: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.
F: December 2010: The Court reversed the judgment of the CA and acquitted the accused in this case, Hubert
Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and
Gerardo Biong of the charges against them on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the victims, moved for the Court to reconsider its decision.
I: Whether the Court should reconsider its decision.
R: Court should not reconsider.
As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double jeopardy. To
reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has
already been absolved.
If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power
and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of
resources, stamina, and the will to fight. Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is
possible.
The Court cited People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan: “The provision therefore guarantees that the State shall not be
permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.”
The Court also held that Galman v. Sandiganbayan (cited by the complainant) is inapplicable to this case
because in Galman, the trial was a sham. Complainant did not allege in this petition that the Supreme Court had
conducted a phony deliberation.
But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its
discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail
the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Court’s appreciation of the evidence and
assessment of the prosecution witnesses’ credibility. He ascribes grave error on the Court’s finding that Alfaro was not a
credible witness and assails the value assigned by the Court to the evidence of the defense. In other words, Vizconde
wants the Court to review the evidence anew and render another judgment based on such a re- evaluation.
This is not constitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to secure Webb, et al’s conviction. The
judgment acquitting Webb, et al is final and can no longer be disturbed.
18. YSIDORO V. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, G.R. NO. 171513, FEBRUARY 6, 2012
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
F: Ysidoro, as Municipal Mayor of Leyte, was charged before the Sandiganbayan for withholding and failing to
give RATA and productivity pay to Nierna S. Doller, (Municipal Social Welfare and Development Officer), without any
legal basis. Sandiganbayan acquitted Ysidoro. It then denied the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration. The People
filed a petition questioning the validity of the judgment acquitting Ysidoro of the criminal charge.
I: Whether appeal should be barred by ruled on double jeopardy.

R: Yes. The Supreme Court held that there are three procedural remedies in order for a party to appeal a decision of a trial
court in a criminal case before the Supreme Court:
Ordinary Appeal Petition on Certiorari Petition for certiorari

Section 3, Rule 122 Rule 45 Rule 65 (Special civil action)
Resolves factual Limited generally to Strictly confined to the determination of the propriety of the trial
and legal issues the review of legal court’s jurisdiction—whether it has jurisdiction over the case and if so,
issues whether the exercise of its jurisdiction has or has not been attended by
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In People v. Nazareno, the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy proscribes appeals of
judgments of acquittal through the remedies of ordinary appeal and a Rule 45 petition. The Constitution has expressly
adopted the double jeopardy policy and thus bars multiple criminal trials, thereby conclusively presuming that a
second trial would be unfair if the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a previous final judgment.
Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the government has
already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s culpability. After failing to persuade the
court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials
applies and becomes compelling.
That the second opportunity comes via an appeal does not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of
reason, justice and conscience. However, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be properly invoked in a Rule 65
petition, predicated on 2 exceptional grounds:
1. A judgment of acquittal rendered with grave abuse of discretion by the court; and
2. Where the prosecution had been deprived of due process.
The rule against double jeopardy does not apply in these instances because a Rule 65 petition does not involve a review of
facts and law on the merits in the manner done in an appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not examine
and assess the evidence of the parties nor weigh the probative value of the evidence. It does not include an inquiry on the
correctness of the evaluation of the evidence. A review under Rule 65 only asks the question of whether there has
been a validly rendered decision, not the question of whether the decision is legally correct. In other words, the focus
of the review is to determine whether the judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds.
B. Termination of jeopardy
19. BULAONG V. PEOPLE - 14 SCRA 746
N: PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

F: In 1956 Agaton Bulaong and others were charged before the CFI of Laguna with the crime of rebellion. Meanwhile
Congress enacted the Anti-Subversion Act (RA 1700), which took effect in 1957. In 1958, Agaton Bulaong was
arrested. On October 1, 1958, the information for rebellion filed with the CFI of Laguna was amended. On the same date
another information was filed before the CFI of Manila charging Bulaong of the crime of subversion defined in Sec. 4 of
the Anti-Subversion Act. The case for subversion is still pending in the CFI of Manila; while the case for rebellion has
already been decided by the CFI of Laguna adversely against the accused. CA affirmed the decision of the CFI of Laguna.
Bulaong contends that rebellion as defined in Art. 134 of the RPC is a lesser cognate offense to that defined in Sec. 4 of RA
1700.
He further contends that since the facts alleged in the informations for rebellion and subversion are the same he
cannot be legally prosecuted for both offenses without being placed twice in jeopardy of being punished for the
same acts.
I: Whether or not accused Bulaong can interpose the defense of double jeopardy in this case in view of the filing against
him of the information for subversion in the Court of First Instance of Manila which allegedly involves the same facts
obtaining in this case

R: No double jeopardy. Under Section 9, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, the defense of double jeopardy is available to the
accused only where he was either convicted or acquitted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his consent. Such is not the situation in this case. For accused has not been convicted or acquitted in the case filed
in the Court of First Instance against him for subversion. Neither was the said case dismissed or terminated without his
consent, for as stated, it is still pending in said court. Needless to say, it is the conviction, acquittal of the accused or
dismissal or termination of the case that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same
or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information.
20. BUSTAMANTE V. MACEREN - 48 SCRA 155

N:
N: ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
F: Gregorio was accused of serious physical injuries. During arraignment, accused entered a plea of guilty, and after
proving the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense and 3 ordinary mitigating circumstances,
petitioner was sentenced to serve 1 year imprisonment. On the very same day, the judgment above-quoted was
promulgated and the accused expressly waived his right to appeal. Bustamante started serving his sentence.
3 days later, the Provincial Fiscal of Laguna filed a motion for Modification of Penalty. Upon receipt of said motion,
accused’s counsel on the same day filed a Motion for Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty and Waiver of Commitment. Defense
of double jeopardy was also raised. Judge Coquia set the trial on the merits.
A new judge (Maceren) held a new hearing of the case on the merits and thereafter rendered a new judgment
against Bustamante declaring him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, and sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
I: Whether the withdrawal of the plea of guilty by petitioner could amount to a waiver of double jeopardy.
R: The reopening of the case violates Bustamante’s right against double jeopardy.
A decision becomes final upon:

1. The expiration of the period to perfect an appeal, or
2. When the offense has been partially or totally satisfied, or
3. When the defendant expressly waived his right to appeal.
In this case, Gregorio has already begun serving sentence; thus, the decision has become final. A judgment of conviction
can only be modified or set aside before it has acquired finality. The act of re-opening a case that has already become final
violates the accused’s right against double jeopardy. The trial judge thus erred in not accepting the plea of double
jeopardy; and considering that Gregorio has already served the full term, he is entitled to be released already.
Under Sec. 10, Rule 117 of the revised Rules of Court, the defense of double jeopardy is waivable, and if not raised or set
up at the proper time, is deemed waived. But the same rule provides that if the defendant learns after he has pleaded
or has moved to quash on some other ground that the offense for which he is now charged is an offense for which
he has been pardoned, or of which he has been convicted or acquitted or been in jeopardy, the court may in its
discretion entertain at any time before judgment a motion to quash on the ground of such pardon, conviction, acquittal or
jeopardy.
Considering that defense counsel raised the question of double jeopardy in favor of petitioner during the new
trial and before Judge Maceren rendered judgment based on said new trial, it is believed that the above principle
can be applied to this case by analogy and that said judge, in the exercise of his discretion, should have entertained
said plea of double jeopardy in the interest of justice, especially since at the time such plea was made, petitioner
had already fully served the one-year straight sentence imposed upon him by Judge Coquia, and was already
entitled to be released from custody after such full service of his penalty under said judgment.
21. PEOPLE V. OBSANIA - 23 SCRA 1249

N: APPEAL for review of an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. Masaquel, J.
F: Willy Obsania was charged for having raped a 14-year old girl, while armed w/ a dagger, and in the rice fields along
the street. The information failed to expressly allege the existence of “lewd designs” w/c is inherent in all crimes against
chastity. Obsania was arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and moved for the dismissal of the case due to a defective
information. The court granted the motion and dismissed the case. Hence, the appeal.
I: Whether the present appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy.
R: NO. One of the requirements for double jeopardy includes the “dismissal or termination of the original
case must be without the express consent of the defendant”.
The accused admits that the controverted dismissal was ordered by the trial judge upon his motion to dismiss. The
order of dismissal in this case did not terminate the action on the merits and it is not a dismissal which amounted to an
acquittal because of the failure to prosecute or the Government did not have a case against an accused, who, in the
first place, is presumed innocent.
The accused cannot question the jurisdiction of the court by moving for the dismissal of the case and then later invoke
double jeopardy – w/c requires among others that the case be brought before a court of competent jurisdiction. In this
case, the accused motioned for the dismissal of the case; he cannot now raise the defense of double jeopardy, because the
dismissal of the case was w/ his consent – in fact, at his instance.
The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine qua non conditions: first, the dismissal
must be sought or induced by the defendant personally or through his counsel; and second, such dismissal
must not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal.
22. RIVERA, JR. V. PEOPLE - 189 SCRA 331
N: PETITION to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Br. 3. Bautista, Jr., J.
F: Marcelino G. Rivera, Jr. was arrested and detained for allegedly attempting to transport marijuana to Manila. A case for
violation of Sec. 4, Art. III of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act) was filed against him. He was arraigned and pleaded “not
guilty”. On Apr. 5, 1989, 1st witness for the prosecution, Cpl. Victorio Afalla, partially testified. Hearing was reset to May
3, 1989 and June 6, 1989. But, due to absence of the prosecution witness and non-availability of the allegedly confiscated
marijuana specimen, the hearings were postponed to Jun. 8, 1989. On Jun. 8, 1989, for the same reasons, hearing was re-set
to Feb. 27, 1990. On Feb. 27, 1990, Capt. Lina Sarmiento, the Forensic chemist, who was supposed to present the marijuana
specimen, failed to appear, despite notice. Hence, Rivera moved for dismissal case which was denied. Hearing was re-set
to Mar. 28, 1990. On Mar. 28, 1990, when the case was called, Capt. Lina Sarmiento, was not around, necessitating a 2nd
call. During the 2nd call, He was still not around. Rivera moved for dismissal, invoking his right to speedy trial. The
judge verbally granted the motion.
However, while the subsequent calendared cases set for the day were in progress, and less than an hour after the verbal
order of dismissal, Capt. Lina Sarmiento arrived. Upon satisfactory explanation, the Judge set aside the verbal order of
dismissal and rescheduled the case against Rivera.
Rivera now questions the new order of Judge, setting aside the verbal order of dismissal. He claimed that that the verbal
order of dismissal made in open court amounted to an acquittal, which was immediately final and executory, and that the
Judge could not set it aside without violating his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
I: Whether or not the verbal order of dismissal was final and could no longer be set aside by the Judge without violating
Rivera’s right against double jeopardy?
R: No. The verbal order of dismissal was not final. The judgment and the order of dismissal was not written personally
and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him. Where there is a valid information and the accused has been
arraigned, an order of dismissal issued by the court, motu propio, in the course of a trial of a criminal case, whether based
on the merits or for failure of a prosecution witness to appear, has the effect of a judgment of acquittal and double
jeopardy attached.

Order is also immediately executory. However, the order of dismissal must be written in the official language, personally
and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him conformably with Rule 120.
In this case, order was merely dictated in open court by the Judge. There was no showing that the verbal order was
reduced in writing and duly signed by him. Therefore, the verbal order did not yet attain the effect of a judgment of
acquittal.
23. CUISON V. COURT OF APPEALS - 289 SCRA 159
N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
F: On Feb 1989, Presiding Judge of the RTC of Pangasinan rendered a decision finding accused Cuision guilty of the crime
of double homicide and sentenced him to suffer from 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and 1
day with the accessories provided by law and to pay the costs. Accused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of victim1
of P30k and another P30k for the heirs victim without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
On appeal, CA modified the civil indemnity from P30k to P50k in July 1991. The accused elevated the decision on petition
for review but SC denied the petition. The case was remanded to RTC for promulgation of decision. The RTC Judge
promulgated the decision of CA only with respect to the modified civil indemnity but did not commit the accused to jail
to commence the sentence of sentence Prosecutor reported the matter to SolGen and requested a motion for clarification
be filed to clarify the decision of CA on July 1991 where the disposition provides.
CA on August 1995 rendered a resolution which provides, In the dispositive portion of this Court’s decision, We simply
modified the appealed decision of the court a quo in one respect only—the increase of the indemnity to be paid by the
appellant to the heirs of the victims from P30,000.00 to P50,000. Acting on the motion to clarify, it was said that the CA
affirmed the decision with regard to the penalty of imprisonment. Respondent Judge then set the promulgation of the
decision anew.
Accused filed a motion to set aside the promulgation on the ff grounds:

 That the judgment in said case was already promulgated on April 1995 and therefore there is nothing to
promulgate anymore
 To pursue with the scheduled promulgation will violate the accused’s constitutional right agaisnt jeopardy
I:Whether the resolution of CA in 1995 which clarified the dispositive portion of the original decision be considered as an
amendment, alteration or modification of the decision?
R: NO. To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the ff must be proven:

1. a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
2. the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
3. the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof
Further, legal jeopardy attaches only:

1. upon a valid indictment;
2. before a competent court;
3. after arraignment;
4. when a valid plea has been entered; and
5. the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused
Petitioner contends that “the promulgation on April 1995 of the CA has effectively terminated the criminal cases against
the petitioner x x x. Thus, petitioner claims that the first jeopardy attached at that point.
SC is not persuaded. As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of indemnity. Hence, a
decision in such case disposes of both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an accused. Here, trial court
promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal.

CA questioned Decision did not modify or amend its July 1991 Decision. It merely ordered the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction and the full execution of the penalty it had earlier imposed on petitioner.
24. SALCEDO V. MENDOZA - 88 SCRA 811
N: PETITION for review on certiorari of the order of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro.
F: Provincial Fiscal filed a criminal information of homicide through reckless imprudence against the herein petitioner
Leopoldo Salcedo. Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty and the case was then set for trial. Three
postponements of the trial on the case transpired mostly attributed to the prosecution. Accused moved for the dismissal
of the criminal case against him invoking his constitutional right to speedy trial and respondent Judge issued
an order dismissing the case. Prosecution filed an MR, which was denied. Another MR was filed. The trial court issued
an order requiring both parties to submit within 5 days from that date their respective pleadings. However, the parties
failed to comply with the said order and thereafter, respondent Judge entered the order setting aside the order of
dismissal and ordering that the case be set for trial. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order
alleging that the dismissal of the criminal case against him was equivalent to an acquittal and reinstatement of
the same would place him twice in jeopardy for the same offense, which was denied.
I: Whether there is double jeopardy.
R: YES. The dismissal of a criminal case predicated on the right of the accused to speedy trial, amounts to an
acquittal on the merits which bars the subsequent prosecution of the accused for the same offense. The respondent
Judge dismissed the case, upon the motion of the petitioner invoking his constitutional right to speedy trial, because
the prosecution failed to appear on the day of the trial after it had previously been postponed twice. The effect of such
dismissal is at once clear, following the established jurisprudence, a dismissal predicated on the right of the accused
to speedy trial upon his own motion or express consent, amounts to an acquittal which will bar another prosecution
of the accused for the same offense This is an exception to the rule that a dismissal upon the motion or with the
express consent of the accused will not be a bar to the subsequent prosecution of the accused for the same offense.
The Court cited its decision in People v. Salico: “Such dismissal is not in reality a mere dismissal although it is generally so called,
but an acquittal of the defendant because of the prosecution’s failure to prove the guilt of the defendant, and it will be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense even though it was ordered by the Court upon motion or with the express consent of the defendant, in
exactly the same way as a judgment of acquittal obtained upon the defendant’s motion”
25. ORIENTE VS. PEO - 513 SCRA 348
F: An Information was filed with the RTC charging the petitioner with the crime of Murder. Upon arraignment,
petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The RTC rendered a Decision
convicting the petitioner of the crime of Homicide, sentencing him to a jail term of 6 Months of Arresto Mayor as
minimum and 4 and 1. Day of Prision Correctional as maximum. However, before the judgment became final and
executory, the RTC issued an Order motu proprio setting aside the said judgment because of a mistake in the
“judgment proper”. The RTC promulgated its second Decision increasing the penalty to 4 Years, 2 Months and 1 Day
of Prision Correccional as minimum and 8 Years and 1 Day of Prision Mayor as maximum. Finding that the RTC erred
in finding that 2 mitigating circumstances were present, the CA modified the penalty imposed by the RTC.
I: Whether the act of the RTC in promulgating 2 decisions placed accused in double jeopardy?
R: NO. Courts have the inherent power to amend their decisions to make them conformable to law and justice. The
change in the penalty by the RTC did not involve the consideration of any new evidence but a mere “correction” of the
penalty imposed to conform with the RPC and The ISL. The TC modified the penalty before petitioner could perfect his
appeal from the first decision.
As the Solicitor General correctly noted, the trial court modified the penalty in its Decision dated November 15, 1999
before the petitioner could perfect his appeal from the first Decision dated November 4, 1999 which was promulgated on

November 10, 1999. Noteworthy is that it was the RTC’s second Decision dated November 15, 1999 which the petitioner
elevated on appeal to the CA. It is well settled that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he
waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy, and, as discussed above, throws the whole case open to the
review of the appellate court, which is then called to render judgment as the law and justice dictate, whether favorable or
unfavorable, and whether they are made the subject of assigned errors or not. This precept should be borne in mind by
every lawyer of an accused who unwittingly takes the risk involved when he decides to appeal his sentence.
26. PACOY VS. CAJIGAL - 534 SCRA 338
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
F: An Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not
guilty to the charge of Homicide. However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge
issued another Order, directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as having
qualified the crime to Murder. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of double jeopardy. Petitioner
alleged that in the Information for Homicide that when the case for Homicide was terminated without his express
consent, the subsequent filing of the Information for Murder in lieu of Homicide placed him in double jeopardy. Motion
denied, prompting petitioner to file Motion for Reconsideration. In granting the MR, respondent judge found that a close
scrutiny of Art. 248 of the RPC shows that “disregard of rank” is merely a generic mitigating circumstance which should
not elevate the classification of the crime of homicide to murder.
R: NO. In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal amendment
and not a substantial amendment or a substitution. The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the
amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally
stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made; and when any evidence the accused might have
would be inapplicable to the complaint or information. Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the
amended Information are identical with those of the original Information for Homicide, there could not be any effect
on the prosecution’s theory of the case; neither would there be any possible prejudice to the rights or defense of
petitioner.
Dismissal of the first case contemplated presupposes a definite or unconditional dismissal which terminates the case. And
for the dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of acquittal. The respondent judge's Order
was for the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information but not to dismiss the same upon the filing of a new
Information charging the proper offense. Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent
judge merely ordered the amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of the original Information. To repeat,
it was the same original information that was amended by merely crossing out the word “Homicide” and writing the
word “Murder,” instead, which showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case. In addition, a reading of the
Order showed that the respondent judge granted petitioner's MR, not on the ground that double jeopardy exists, but on
his realization that “disregard of rank” is a generic aggravating circumstance which does not qualify the killing of the
victim to murder. Thus, he rightly corrected himself by reinstating the original Information for Homicide. The requisite of
double jeopardy that the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second is not present, considering that petitioner
was neither convicted nor acquitted; nor was the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
C. Same offense; ordinance and states
27. PEOPLE V. RELOVA - 148 SCRA 292
N: PETITION for certiorari and mandamus to review the orders of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Br. II. Relova,J.
F: The police searched the ice plant owned by Opulencia and they discovered electric wiring, devices and contraptions
had been installed without necessary authority from city government. The Assistant City Fiscal filed an information
against Opulencia for violation of a city ordinance which prohibits unauthorized wiring installations. Opulencia
pleaded not guilty and filed motion to dismiss on the ground that the crime had already prescribed (offense

charged was a light felony which prescribes 2 months from discovery thereof). Lower court dismissed the case. Acting
City Fiscal filed another information for theft of electric power. Opulencia filed Motion to Quash upon the ground of
double jeopardy. Judge Relova granted motion and dismissed the case. Motion for Reconsideration having been denied,
hence this appeal.
R: YES. A person who was charged for violating a city ordinance for having installed a metering device to
lower his electric bills which was dismissed for prescription of the offense may not be charged again for theft of
electric power under the RPC.
The SC held that where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different
statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged: the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged.
In contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the
critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have
given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which
constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have
given rise to the offense charged under a statute.
The question of identity or lack of identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential elements of each of the two
offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved. The
question of identity of the acts which are claimed to have generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a
national statute must be addressed, in the first instance, by examining the location of such acts in time and space. When
the acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each other in time and space as to be reasonably
regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and where those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a
continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately characterized as an integral whole
capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and a
national statute).
In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the same time frame: from November 1974 to February 1975.
During this period, the accused Manuel Opulencia installed or permitted the installation of electrical wiring and devices
in his ice plant without obtaining the necessary permit or authorization from the municipal authorities. The accused
conceded that he effected or permitted such unauthorized installation for the very purpose of reducing his electric power
bill. This corrupt intent was thus present from the very moment that such unauthorized installation began. The
immediate physical effect of the unauthorized installation was the inward flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice
plant without the corresponding recording thereof in his electric meter. In other words, the "taking" of electric current was
integral with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices.
The identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded
as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first
offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. Thus, for the constitutional
plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the
technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of an accused person by multiple
prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or
overlapping sets of technical elements.
By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused by a common intent or
design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced, as it were, to produce as
many different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find.
It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the information for violation of the Batangas City
Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that
offense. Under the Rules of Court, an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense.

Since the dismissal of the case against Opulencia for violation of an ordinance already amounted to an acquittal, he
can no longer charged with an offense punishable under a statute arising from the same act.
28. PEOPLE V. CITY COURT OF MANILA - 154 SCRA 175
N: PETITION for certiorari to review the order of the City Court of Manila, Br. VI.
F: Respondent Agapito Gonzales, together with Roberto Pangilinan, was accused of violating Sec. 7, in relation
to Section 11, RA 3060 (publicly exhibit and cause to be publicly exhibited which motion pictures have never been
previously submitted to the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures for preview, examination and partnership, nor
duly passed by said Board, in a public place) and Article 201 (3) of the RPC (publicly exhibit, indecent and immoral
motion picture scenes, to wit: motion pictures of the 8 mm. size, in color, depicting and showing scenes of totally
naked female and male persons with exposed private parts doing the sex act in various lewd and obvious positions,
among other similarly and equally obscene and morally offensive scenes, in a place open to public view) in 2 separate
informations filed with the City Court of Manila. Gonzales argues that conviction or acquittal in, or dismissal or
termination of a first case is not necessary, so long as he had been put in jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted in
the first case of the same offense.
R: NO. The 2 informations with which the accused was charged, do not make out only one offense. The 2 offenses are
different and distinct from each other. The gravamen of the offense defined in RA 3060 is the public exhibition of any
motion picture which has not been previously passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures. The motion picture
may not be indecent or immoral but if it has not been previously approved by the Board, its public showing
constitutes a criminal offense. On the other hand, the offense punished in Art. 201 (3) of the RPC is the public
showing of indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts, or shows, not just motion pictures. The nature of both offenses
also shows their essential difference. The crime punished in RA 3060 is a malum prohibitum in which criminal intent
need not be proved because it is presumed, while the offense punished in Art. 201 (3) of the RPC is malum in se, in which
criminal intent is an indispensable ingredient. Considering these differences in elements and nature, there is no
identity of the offenses here involved for which legal jeopardy in one may be invoked in the other. Evidence
required to prove one offense is not the same evidence required to prove the other. The defense of double jeopardy
cannot prosper. Where 2 different laws (or articles of the same code) define 2 crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is
no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the other.
I1: Whether or not respondent may be charged with two crimes that arose from the same act?
I2: Whether or not respondent had waived his right to file an MTQ based on double jeopardy?
I3: Whether or not the People had the right to appeal?
H1: Yes
H2: No
H3: Yes
R1: It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. Not all of the requisites are present.
The two (2) Informations with which the accused was charged, do not make out only one offense, contrary to private
respondent's allegations. In other words, the offense defined in section 7 of Rep. Act No. 3060 punishing the exhibition of
motion pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures does not include or is not included in the
offense defined in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishing the exhibition of indecent and immoral motion
pictures.
The two (2) offenses do not constitute a jeopardy to each other. A scrutiny of the two (2) laws involved would show that
the two (2) offenses are different and distinct from each other.

The gravamen of the offense defined in Rep. Act No. 3060 is the public exhibition of any motion picture which has not
been previously passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures. The motion picture may not be indecent or immoral,
but if it has not been previously approved by the Board, its public showing constitutes a criminal offense. While the
offense punished in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code is the public showing of indecent or immoral plays, scenes,
acts, or shows, not just motion pictures.
The nature of both offenses also shows their essential difference. The crime punished in Rep. Act No. 3060 is a malum
prohibitum in which criminal intent need not be proved because it is presumed, while the offense punished in Article 201
(3) of the Revised Penal Code is malum in se, in which criminal intent is an indispensable ingredient.
Considering these differences in elements and nature, there is no identity of the offenses here involved for which legal
jeopardy in one may be invoked in the other. Evidence required to prove one offense is not the same evidence required to
prove the other.
As aptly put in People v. Doriquez:

"It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical
offenses. A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one
provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a
dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other.
R2: As to failure to file MTQ before plea:

Under the 1985 Rules, the provision now reads as follows:
"Failure to move or quash or to allege any ground therefore. The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to
quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege
the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds for a motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense
charged, lack of jurisdiction, extinction of the offense or penalty, and jeopardy. x x x"
The above, being an amendment favorable to the accused, the benefit thereof can be extended to the accused-respondent.
However, whatever benefit he may derive from this amendment, is also illusory. For, as previously noted, there is no
double jeopardy that gave rise to a valid motion to quash.
R3: People’s right to appeal

The People (petitioner) rightly appealed the dismissal. For, as ruled in People v. Desalisa:
"As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of a case after arraignment and plea of the defendant to a valid
information shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the complaint or
information (Sec. 9, Rule 113). However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by
the trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent,
of the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of
the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be
found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt
or innocence of the defendant. "
D. Rule on "supervening facts"
29. MELO V. PEOPLE - 85 PHIL 766
N: ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.
F: Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged with frustrated homicide. The accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
On the evening of the same day, the injured party died from his wounds. An amended information was filed charging the
accused with consummated homicide. The accused filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double
jeopardy, motion that was denied by the respondent court; hence, the instant petition for prohibition to enjoin
the respondent court from further entertaining the amended information.
R: NO. An offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily included in another offense, for the purpose
of determining the existence of double jeopardy, when both offenses were in existence during the pendency of the first

prosecution, for otherwise, if the second offense was then inexistent, no jeopardy could attach therefor during the first
prosecution, and consequently a subsequent charge for the same cannot constitute second jeopardy. This rule of
identity does not apply, however when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for
the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted
for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after
conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in
jeopardy.
The general rule is that when there is identity between two offenses, a person has a right not to be placed in double
jeopardy.
However, the rule of identity does not apply, when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first
prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to
be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent or where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which
the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time,
constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.
The court gave an example analogous to the facts in this case: where the accused was charged with physical injuries and
after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in
jeopardy.
Same Offense
The phrase same offense, under the general rule, has always been construed to mean not only that the second offense
charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information, but also that the two offenses are identical. There is
identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to
warrant a conviction for the other. This so-called "same-evidence test" which was found to be vague and deficient, was
restated by the Rules of Court in a clearer and more accurate form. Under said Rules there is identity between two
offenses not only when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, but also when the second offense is an
attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the first information.
Also, the SC repealed its ruling in People v. Tarok as followed in People v. Villasis:
If, in obedience to the mandate of the law, the prosecuting officer files an information within six hours after the accused is
arrested, and the accused claiming his constitutional right to a speedy trial is immediately arraigned, and later on a new
fact supervenes which, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a more serious offense, under the Tarok
ruling, no way is open by which the accused may be penalized in proportion to the enormity of his guilt. Furthermore,
such a ruling may open the way to suspicions or charges of collusion between the prosecuting officers and the accused, to
the grave detriment of public interest and confidence in the administration of justice, which cannot happen under the
Diaz ruling.
30. PEOPLE V. BULING - 107 PHIL 712
N: APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Leyte. Cloribel, J.
F: Accused was charged with the crime of less serious physical injuries. The accused pleaded guilty to the complaint and
was thereafter found guilty. On the same day he began to serve his sentence and has fully served the same. However, the
injured party's injuries did not heal within the period estimated, and so the Provincial Fiscal filed an information against
the accused charging him of serious physical injuries. After trial the accused was found guilty.
I: Is the prosecution and conviction of the accused for less serious physical injuries a bar to the second prosecution for
serious physical injuries? In other words, has a new fact supervened, like death in the case of Melo vs. People, which
changes the character of the offense into one which was not in existence at the time the case for less serious physical
injuries was filed?
R: YES. The Court does not believe that a new fact supervened, or that a new fact has come into existence. Where the
exact nature of the injury could have been discovered, but was not, because of the incompetence of the physician;
the subsequent discovery of the real extent of the injury would not be a supervening act. If the X-ray examination
discloses the existence of a fracture on January 17, 1957, that fracture must have existed when the first examination
was made on December 10, 1956. There is, therefore, no new or supervening fact that could be said to have

developed or arisen since the filing of the original action. The wound causing the delay in healing was already in
existence at the time of the first examination, but said delay was caused by the very superficial examination then
made. Had an X-ray examination taken at the time, the fracture would have certainly been disclosed.
There was no supervening event. The physician who made the first examination could not have seen the fracture at the
distal end of the right arm, because such physician did not conduct an x-ray over the same. The victim’s wounds failed to
heal during the time estimated by the first physician. Thus, a second examination was made, which included an x-ray,
which led to the discovery of the fracture. If the X-ray examination disclosed the existence of a fracture when the second
examination was made, that fracture must have existed when the first examination was made. There was, therefore, no
new or supervening fact that could be said to have developed or arisen since the filing of the original action, which would
justify application of the rule of double jeopardy.
We take this opportunity to invite the attention of the prosecuting officers that before filing informations for physical
injuries, thorough physical and medical examinations of the injuries should first be made to avoid instances, like the
present, where by reason of the important Constitutional provision of double jeopardy, the accused can not be held to
answer for the graver offense committed.
Judgment below reversed. The defendant was acquitted.
Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
A. Ex Post Facto Laws
31. PEOPLE V. JABINAL - 55 SCRA 602
N: APPEAL from a judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas. Endaya, J.
F: The accused was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The accused appealed
raising the issue of the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of the ruling in People vs. Mapa.
The accused admitted that he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition without the requisite license or
permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an
appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent
from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to
possess and carry the firearm in question. He cited the jurisprudence in Macarandang and Lucero as basis
for his exoneration. However, a later ruling in the Mapa case has abandoned the doctrine laid down in Macarandang and
Lucero. When appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent
by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down in Macarandang (1959)
and Lucero (1958). The decision in Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967.
I: Whether appellant should be convicted in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine
in Mapa.
R: NO. The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law
originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that law
thus construed intends to effectuate.
The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time
appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and arraigned. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in
the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine
should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the
faith thereof. Considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and
authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under
which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit
therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done
was held not to be punishable.

The SC held that the appellant was conferred his appointment as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to
possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal
liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant
must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be
punishable.
B. Bills of Attainder
32. PEOPLE V. FERRER - 48 SCRA 382
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.Certiorari.
F: The Anti-Subversion Act : Outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and other subversive associations;
and punishes any person who knowingly, willfully, and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a
member of the Party or of any other similar subversive organization.
The constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion Act is being questioned, condemning it to be a bill of attainder because: It
“tars and feathers” the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) as a continuing menace to the freedom and security of
the country; its existence, a clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines. Congress usurped the
power of the judge and assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any of the forms or
safeguards of judicial trial. It has expressly created a presumption of organization guilt which the accused can never hope
to overthrow.
I: Is the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder?
Ruling: No. The Anti-Subversion Act is not a bill of attainder and therefore, constitutional.
Bill of attainder - A legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Essence: Substitution of a legislative act for a
judicial determination of guilt. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative
intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder.
When the Anti-Subversion Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist
Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the
Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition against
membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" is used solely for definitional
purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization
having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.
Were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the
law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be
judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its
basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force, deceit, and other illegal means and place the country
under the control and domination of a foreign power.
Only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to
inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder.
But, But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially
noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make such determination.
In many occasions, the SC has found the CPP as an illegal association, the objective of which is to overthrow the
Philippine government by armed struggle and to establish in the Philippines a communist form of government similar to
Soviet Russia and Red Russia.
Finally, in order to be considered a bill of attainder, the law must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. If a statute is
a bill of attainder it is also an ex post facto law. With the Anti-Subversion Act however, the prohibition applies only to

acts committed after the approval of Act. Only those who “knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves
with, become or remain member of the CPP and/ or its successors or of any subversive association after June 20, 1957 are
punished.
The SC upheld the validity of the Anti-Subversion Law, declaring that it is not a bill of attainder.
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative
for a judicial determination of guilt. Historically, bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and
political minorities, and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite
class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder.
DOESN’T PUNISH WITHOUT JUDICIAL HEARING
Upon examination of the law, the SC found that under the same, guilt must still be judicially established. The
Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that
they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to
overthrow the existing Government by force, deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under the control and
domination of a foreign power.
The contention would be correct if the statute were construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific
intent to further the unlawful goals of the Party. But the statute specifically requires that membership must be knowing or
active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party.
POLICE POWER
Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to render it a bill
of attainder. Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a
group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. State has
the (police) power to prohibit certain persons from engaging in certain activities: A statute prohibiting partners or
employees of securities underwriting firms from serving as officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a
legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be subject to the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the
national economy, has been declared not to be a bill of attainder. Similarly, a statute requiring every secret, oath-bound
society having a membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of such
society which fails to register or remains a member thereof, was declared valid even if in its operation it was shown to
apply only to the members of the Ku KIux Klan.
In the Philippines the validity of section 23 '(b) of the Industrial Peace Act, requiring labor unions to file with the
Department of Labor affidavits of union officers "to the effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and that
they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or
unconstitutional method," was upheld by this Court.
ANTI-SUBVERSION ACT DOESN’T APPLY RETROACTIVELY
Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of the prohibition
against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct.
Those who were members of the Party or of any other subversive association at the time of the enactment of the law, were
given the opportunity of purging themselves of liability by renouncing in writing and under oath their membership in the
Party. The law expressly provides that such renunciation shall operate to exempt such persons from penal liability. The
penalties prescribed by the Act are therefore not inescapable.
BASIC GUIDELINES TO BE OBSERVED IN ANY PROSECUTION UNDER THE ACT:

(1) In the case of subversive organizations other than the Communist Party of the Philippines,
a. That the purpose of the organization is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and to
establish in this country a totalitarian regime under the domination of a foreign power;
b. That the accused joined such organization; and
c. That he did so knowingly, willfully and by overt acts; and
(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines

a. That the CPP continues to pursue the objectives which led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government by illegal means for the purpose of placing
the country under the control of a foreign power;
b. That the accused joined the CPP; and
c. That he did so willfully, knowingly and by overt acts.
33. PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN - 211 SCRA 241
N: PETITION for certiorari to review the resolution of the Sandiganbayan.
F: Two letter-complaints were filed by Teofilo Gelacio questioning the issuance to Governor Paredes of a free patent title
when he was still the provincial attorney in 1976. Gelacio averred that by taking advantage of his public position, Paredes
influenced and induced the Land Inspector of the Bureau of Lands, to issue Paredes a free patent over a land which
Paredes knew is already reserved for a school. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution granting the motion to quash filed
by Paredes on the ground of prescription of the offense charged. BP 195, approved on March 16, 1982, amended Sec. 11 of
RA 3019 by increasing from 10 to 15 years the period for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
I: Whether the prescription of the offense charged against Paredes is 15 years?
R: NO. BP 195 may not be given retroactive application to the "crime" which was committed by Paredes in January 1976
yet, for it would be prejudicial to the accused. It would deprive him or the substantive benefit of the shorter (10 years)
prescriptive period under Sec. 11, RA 3019, which was an essential element of the "crime" at the time he committed it.
Protection from prosecution under a statute of limitation is a substantive right. To apply BP Blg. 195 to Paredes would
make it an ex post facto law for it would alter his situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a
crime that had already been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed.
Since an ex post facto law is prohibited by our Constitution (Sec. 22, Article III, 1987 Constitution), the Sandiganbayan
committed no reversible error in ruling that Paredes may no longer be prosecuted for his supposed violation of RA 3019
in 1976, 6 years before BP 195 was approved on March 16, 1982. The new prescriptive period under that law should apply
only to those offenses which were committed after the approval of BP 195.
“An ‘ex post facto law’ is defined as a law which provides for the infliction of punishment upon a person for an act done
which, when it was committed, was innocent; a law which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was
committed; a law that changes the punishment or inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it
was committed; a law that changes the rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than was required at the
time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender; a law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a right which, when done, was lawful; a law which
deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful protection to which they have become entitled, such as the protection of
a former conviction or acquittal, or of the proclamation of amnesty; every law which, in relation to the offense or its
consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage.

Cases Digest Art. III - Sec. 16 - 22

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

Atty. Norieva de Vega

1. GONZALES V. SANDIGANBAYAN - 199 SCRA 299

I: Whether there was violation of the right to speedy disposition of a case.

R: No violation of right to a speedy disposition of cases.

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 1 of 27

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

PROTECTED NOT PROTECTED

When summoned as a resource person to a legislative

A. Right against self-incrimination

2. BERMUDEZ V. CASTILLO - 64 PHIL 483

N: ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Malpractice.

I: Whether or not Bermudez can invoke right against self-incrimination?

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 2 of 27

3. CABAL V. KAPUNAN, JR. - 6 SCRA 1059

I: Whether right to self-incrimination may be applied too property forfeiture proceedings?

4. ALMONTE V. VASQUEZ - 244 SCRA 286

N: PETITION for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the Supreme Court.

I: Whether there was violation of the right against self-incrimination?

5. PEOPLE V. MALIMIT - 264 SCRA 167

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 3 of 27

6. UNITED STATES V. TAN TENG - 23 PHIL 145

N: APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Lobingier, J.

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 4 of 27

7. DELA CRUZ VS. PEOPLE – 730 SCRA 655

Hence, it has been held that:

8. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK VS. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS - 541 SCRA

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 5 of 27

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 6 of 27

A. Cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment; excessive fines

9. PEOPLE V. ESTOISTA - 93 PHIL 647

N: APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First. Instance of Lanao. Nolasco, J.

I: Whether the penalty imposed was cruel and unusual.

In its Resolution of the MR:

10. CORPUZ VS. PEOPLE – 724 SCRA 1

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 7 of 27

I: Whether the penalty imposed was cruel and inhuman punishment.

B. Effect of abolition on application of penal laws

11. PEOPLE V. MUÑOZ - 170 SCRA 107

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 8 of 27

12. PEOPLE V. BON – 506 SCRA 169

N: APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

I: What penalties should be imposed on Bon?

A. Imprisonment for debt

13. LOZANO V. MARTINEZ - 146 SCRA 323

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 9 of 27

14. PEOPLE V. YLAGAN - 58 PHIL 851

N: APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas. De Vera, J.

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 10 of 27

I: Whether there is double jeopardy in this case?

15. PEOPLE V. BALISACAN - L 26376, 17 SCRA 1119

N: APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte.

I: Whether the appeal place Balisacan in double jeopardy?

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 11 of 27

16. CUDIA V. COURT OF APPEALS - 284 SCRA 173

N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

I: Whether there was double jeopardy.

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 12 of 27

N: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.

I: Whether the Court should reconsider its decision.

R: Court should not reconsider.