POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

Atty. Norieva de Vega

Second Trimester, SY 2016-2017

NOTES & CASES

Article IX
Constitutional Commissions

Art. IX-A

A. COMMON PROVISIONS

Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.

Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other
office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active
management or control of any business which, in any way, may be affected by the functions of his
office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any
franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

A. Prohibition to Hold Other Office

 FUNA V. CSC – G.R. NO. 191672, NOVEMBER 25, 2014

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.

F: President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed Francisco T. Duque as Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). PGMA then issued EO 864 designating Duque as an ex officio member of the Board of
Directors/ Trustees of the GSIS, PhilHealth, Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), and Home
Development Mutual Fund (HDMF). This is in pursuance of the Administrative Code which provides in Sec.
14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V: Section 14. Membership of the Chairman in Boards.—The Chairman shall be a
member of the Board of Directors or of other governing bodies of government entities whose functions affect
the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and
employees, such as the Government Service Insurance System, Foreign Service Board, Foreign Trade Service
Board, National Board for Teachers, and such other similar boards as may be created by law. Dennis Funa filed
a petition challenging the constitutionality of Duque’s designation, claiming that violates Sec. 1 and 2 or Art.
IX-A of the Constitution. That the designation violates the independence of the CSC and violates the
prohibition imposed upon members of constitutional commissions from holding any other office or
employment.

I: Does the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair the independence of the CSC and violate the constitutional
prohibition against the holding of dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Constitutional Commissions?

H: Yes

R:
Art. IX-A provides:
Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
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Section 2. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or
employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or control
of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially
interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the
Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

GR: All appointive officials in the civils service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions.

Sec. 7 (par. 2), Art. IX-B: xxx Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries..

Exception: The President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. May hold
another office or employment in the government only when authorized by the Constitution.

Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet position (i.e., President, the Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants), Duque was thus covered by the general rule.

He can hold any other office or employment in the Government during his tenure if such holding is allowed
by law or by the primary functions of his position.

However, consistent with the Administrative Code, the CSC Chairman’s membership in a governing body is
dependent on the condition that the functions of the government entity where he will sit as its Board member
must affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials
and employees. While powers and functions associated with appointments, compensation and benefits affect
the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and
employees, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are also tasked to perform other corporate powers
and functions that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and functions, whether personnel-related
or not, are carried out and exercised by the respective Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC
and HDMF, he may exercise these powers and functions, which are not anymore derived from his position
as CSC Chairman, such as imposing interest on unpaid or unremitted contributions, issuing guidelines for
the accreditation of healthcare providers, or approving restructuring proposals in the payment of unpaid
loan amortizations.

EX OFFICIO Means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official character
merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position."

It likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority other than that conferred by the office." An ex officio member of a board is one
who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. The
ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the
official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position.

Reason: These services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.

Section 3. The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by law and shall not
be decreased during their tenure.

Section 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in
accordance with law.
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Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations
shall be automatically and regularly released.

A. Fiscal Autonomy

 CSC V. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET – JULY 22. 2005

D: “Automatic release” of approved annual appropriations to the Civil Service Commission, a

constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should be construed to mean that no
condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. This conclusion is consistent with the above-cited June 3,
1993 Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a “no report, no release” policy
against the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution.

Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commissions of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that petitioner may be
subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place
petitioner and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not
granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution. The
agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be given priority in the release of
their approved appropriations over all other agencies not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall.

The phrase “subject to availability of funds” in paragraph 4 of the guiding principles on the Constitutional
Mandate on the Judiciary’s Fiscal Autonomy as contained in the Court’s Resolution in A.M. No. 92-9-029-SC
does not contradict the present ruling that the funds of entities vested with fiscal autonomy should be
automatically and regularly released, a shortfall in revenues notwithstanding—what is contemplated in the
said quoted phrase is a situation where total revenue collections are so low that they are not sufficient to cover
the total appropriations for all entities vested with fiscal autonomy; Considering that the budget for agencies
enjoying fiscal autonomy is only a small portion of the total national budget, only in the most extreme
circumstances will the total revenue collections fall short of the requirement of such agencies

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Mandamus

F: Petitioner (CSC) filed a petition for mandamus seeks to compel the respondent (DBM) to release the balance
of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the
constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy. Petitioner claim that the budget for 2002 is 285k but what was
released is only 279k (it was short for about 6k). Petitioner believed that the 6k was intentionally withheld by
the respondent based on its “no report, no release” policy which provides that allocations for agencies are
withheld pending their submission of the documents. Petitioner contends that the application of the "no
report, no release" policy upon independent constitutional bodies is a violation of the principle of fiscal
autonomy and, therefore, unconstitutional.

Respondent contends that the delay in releasing the balance of petitioner’s budget was not on account of any
failure on petitioner’s part to submit the required reports; rather, it was due to a shortfall in revenues

I: Whether the no report, no release may be enforced against CSC?

H: NO.

R: Such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A),
Section 5 of the Constitution which provides that “The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their
approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released”

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In a previous case (Province of Batangas v. Romulo), it was held that automatic release connotes something
mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. Thus, in this case, LGUs are not required to perform any act to
receive the "just share" accruing to them from the national coffers.

Similarly, in this case, "automatic release" of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional
commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund
releases to it may be imposed.

With regard to respondent’s justification for the withholding of funds from petitioner as due to a shortfall in
revenues, the same does not lie because the alleged shortfall is totally unsubstantiated and even assuming that
there was indeed such a shortfall that does not justify non-compliance.

Section 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and
practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules, however, shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights.

A. Rules of procedure

 ARUELO, JR. V. COURT OF APPEALS - 227 SCRA 311

D: CONSTITUTIONALLY SPEAKING, THE COMELEC CAN NOT ADOPT A RULE PROHIBITING THE
FILING OF CERTAIN PLEADINGS IN THE REGULAR COURTS. THE POWER TO PROMULGATE
RULES CONCERNING PLEADINGS, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN ALL COURTS IS VESTED ON
THE SUPREME COURT (CONSTITUTION, ART VIII, SEC. 5 [5]).

N: Petition for certiorari and prohibition under rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, to set aside the Decision
of the Court of Appeals

F: Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the respondent therein only
five days from receipt of summons within which to file his answer to the petition (Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and
that this five-day period had lapsed when Gatchalian filed his answer. According to him, the filing of motions
to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day period, or
give Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his answer.

I: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
it allowed respondent Gatchalian to file his pleading beyond the five-day period prescribed in Section 1, Rule
13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure

H: No. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings are governed by
the Revised Rules of Court.

R: Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the
regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the
filing of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the
COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability — These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings brought before
the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of general
or limited jurisdiction.

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It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to
dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests or quo warranto cases pending before the
regular courts.

Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the
regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is
vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).

 MACALINTAL V. COMELEC – 405 SCRA 614

D: It is repugnant to the Constitution to require the COMELEC to submit the IRR for approval by the
Congress.

The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president
for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.—Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC
to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach “on the power
of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners for
the said positions.” The provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as
part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation
of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of
Congress.

By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003,Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon
the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no
option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.

F: After 15 years since the Constitution has been ratified, Congress has finally provided for an Absentee Voting
system. It passed RA 9189 entitled the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Atty. Macalintal as member of
Phil. Bar sought a declaration from the Court that certain provisions of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003 are unconstitutional
Atty. Macalintal specifically questions the provision requiring the COMELEC to submit the IRR of the Law to
Congress for its approval:

SEC. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules. The Commission shall issue the necessary rules
and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of
this Act. The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval.

SEC. 25 The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor and evaluate the
implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Commission.

I: WON it is repugnant to the Constitution to allow the Comelec, an independent constitutional body, to
submit its IRR on the law to Congress?

H: Yes

R: By virtue of Section 19 of RA 9189, Congress has empowered the COMELEC to issue the necessary rules
and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act. The provision follows the usual
procedure in drafting rules and regulations to implement a law the legislature grants an administrative
agency the authority to craft the rules and regulations implementing the law it has enacted. In recognition of
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the administrative expertise of that agency in its particular field of operation. Once a law is enacted and
approved, the legislative function is deemed accomplished and complete. The legislative function may spring
back to Congress relative to the same law only if that body deems it proper to review, amend and revise the
law, but certainly not to approve, review, revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC. By vesting itself
with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the
constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Congress, in both provisions, arrogates unto itself a
function not specifically vested by the Constitution. Both provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the
independence of the COMELEC. The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an
independent body except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its decisions, orders
and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power
to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising
supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It
is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its
functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less
responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this court also. It should be allowed
considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great
objective for which it was created free, orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice
of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not
interfere.

Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A
case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself.
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

How Commissions Decide

 ESTRELLA V. COMELEC – 428 SCRA 315

D: Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure was lifted from Section 7, Article IX-A of the
Constitution which provides: SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision
or resolution. x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied). The provision of the Constitution is clear that it should
be the majority vote of all its members and not only those who participated and took part in the
deliberations. Under the rules of statutory construction, it is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. Since the above-quoted
constitutional provision states “all of its members,” without any qualification, it should be interpreted as
such.

The COMELEC En Banc shall decide a case or matter brought before it by a majority vote of “ALL ITS
MEMBERS,” and not majority of the members who deliberated and voted thereon—had the framers
intended that it should be the majority of the members who participated or deliberated, it would have
clearly phrased it that way.

N: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.

F: Romeo M. Estrella (petitioner) and Rolando F. Salvador (respondent) were mayoralty candidates in Baliuag,
Bulacan during the May 14, 2001 Elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent as

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winner. Petitioner thereafter filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan an election protest. RTC
annulled respondent’s proclamation and declared petitioner as the duly elected mayor of Baliuag. Respondent
appealed the RTC decision to the COMELEC. Petitioner later moved for the inhibition7 of Commissioner
Ralph C. Lantion, a member of the COMELEC Second Division which was denied. But Commissioner Lantion
later on inhibited in the case. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari questioning the COMELEC Second
Division Status Quo Ante Order.

COMELEC En Banc issued the questioned Status Quo Ante Order.

Five (5) members including Commissioner Lantion participated and stated that "his previous voluntary
inhibition is only in the SPR cases and not in the EAC" and "as further agreed in the Second Division, [he] will
not participate in the Division deliberations but will vote when the case is elevated [to the] en banc." Of the
five Commissioners, Commissioner Borra dissented.

Petitioner argues that Commissioner Lantion’s vote in the assailed order should be disregarded because of his
previous inhibition in a similar case and in the same case in the Division level, thus making said assailed order
null and void as it was not concurred by the required majority.

I: W/N the Status Quo Ante Order is Valid.

H: No,

R:
COMELEC= 7 Incumbent Members.
In this case only five of the seven incumbent members participated (Abalos; Tangcangco; Javier; Borra; and
Lantion). Out of 5 who participated, FOUR (4) voted for issuance (Abalos; Tangcangco; Javier; and Lantion)
and 1 dissented (Borra)

For COMELEC En Banc to arrive at a decision; Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. – (a) When sitting en banc,
four (4) Members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of transacting business. The
concurrence of a majority of the Members of the Commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a
decision, resolution, order or ruling.

Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance of the questioned order, thus
leaving three (3) members concurring therewith, the necessary votes of four (4) or majority of the members of
the COMELEC was not attained. The order thus failed to comply with the number of votes necessary for the
pronouncement of a decision or order, as required under Rule 3, Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure stated above.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Status Quo Ante Order dated November 5, 2003 issued
by the COMELEC En Banc is hereby NULLIFIED.

 MATEO V. COURT OF APPEALS – 247 SCRA 284

D: Revised Circular No. 1-91 as amended by Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 which took effect on
June 1, 1995, final resolutions of the Civil Service Commission shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals.
In any event, whether under the old rule or the present rule, Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to
entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by the Civil Service Law.

N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

F: Upon complaint of some Morong Water District (MOWAD) employees, petitioners, all Board Members of
MOWAD, conducted an investigation on private respondent Edgar Sta. Maria, then General Manager. Private

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respondent was placed under preventive suspension and Maximo San Diego was designated in his place as
Acting General Manager. He was later dismissed.

Private respondent filed a Special Civil Action for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction
before the RTC challenging his dismissal by petitioners.

Petitioners, in turn, moved to dismiss the case on two (2) grounds: (1) the court had no jurisdiction over
disciplinary actions of government employees which is vested exclusively in the Civil Service Commission;
and (2) quo warranto was not the proper remedy. Respondent Judge Arturo Marave denied the MTD and the
MR.

I: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the special civil case involving dismissal of an employee of quasi-
public corporation.

H: We hold that it has no jurisdiction.

R: There is no question that MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 198, known as the provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended. In Davao City Water District
v. Civil Service Commissions 8 the Court en banc ruled that employees of government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Indeed, the established rule is that the hiring and firing of employees of government-owned and controlled
corporations are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations.

PD 807, EO 292, and Rule II, Sec. 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the CSC spell out the
initial remedy of private respondent against illegal dismissal. They categorically provide that the party
aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination of
services may appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days. Thereafter, private respondent could go on
certiorari to this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the Civil
Service Commission. So We held in Mancita v. Barcinas, viz:

[N]o appeal lies from the decision of the Service Commission, * and that parties aggrieved thereby may
proceed to this Court alone on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, within thirty (30) days from
receipt of a copy thereof, pursuant to section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution. We quote:

Sec. 7. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the party within thirty days from receipt of
a copy thereof.

The Civil Service Commission under the Constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the
Civil service and as such, its judgments are unappealable and subject only to this Court's certiorari
judgment.

Mancita, however, no longer governs for under the present rule, Revised Circular No. 1-91 as amended by
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 which took effect on June 1, 1995, final resolutions of the CSC
shall be appealable to the CA. In any event, whether under the old rule or present rule, Regional Trial
Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by the
Civil Service Law.

 AMBIL V. COMELEC -344 SCRA 358

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D: Only final decisions, orders and resolutions by the COMELEC en banc may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by an aggrieved party. Interlocutory orders or decisions by the COMELEC in division
are not appealable to the Supreme Court on certiorari. A decision, order or resolution of a division of the
Comelec must be reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en
banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. THE PRE-REQUISITE FILING OF A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS MANDATORY. In this case, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari with the supreme court, challenging a notice (an interlocutory order) issued by the COMELEC First
Division, without waiting for a promulgation of the case or filing a motion for reconsideration should he have
been aggrieved by the same. The petitioner failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies before the
COMELEC. Thus, the petition was dismissed.

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition

F: Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. (petitioner) and Jose T. Ramirez (respondent) were candidates for the position of
Governor of Eastern Samar. Petitioner was declared the winner by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
Respondent filed an election protest with the Commission on Elections, challenging the results. The case was
assigned to the First Division. Initially, Commissioner Guiani prepared and signed a proposed resolution of
the case. Before the same was promulgated, however, Commissioner Guiani retired. Thereafter, petitioner and
respondent received a purported resolution promulgated by Commissioner Guiani and Tancangco, which was
in favor of respondent. Four days later, the First Division declared such resolution a useless scrap of paper that
should be ignored by the parties as there had not yet been a promulgation of the Resolution of the case. Days
later, the Comelec First Division issued an order setting the promulgation of the resolution in the case on April
6, 2000 at 2PM. However, on that same date, Ambil filed a motion to cancel the promulgation, challenging the
purported Guiani resolution. The COMELEC, acting on the motion, postponed the promulgation until the
matter raised was resolved. Two months later, two members of the First Division sent a joint memorandum to
the presiding Commissioner recommending the promulgation of the Guiani resolution and to allow any
aggrieved party to challenge the same through a Motion for Reconsideration before the Commission en banc
or through a certiorari case before the Supreme Court. The COMELEC first division, through the presiding
Commissioner issued an order setting the promulgation of the resolution in the case on June 20, 2000 at 2PM.
Without waiting for the promulgation of the resolution, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court, challenging the said order setting the promulgation of the resolution of the case with a prayer
to prohibit the COMELEC First Division from promulgating the purported Guiani resolution and to
deliberate the case anew and promulgate a resolution reached in the case after such re-deliberation.

I: Whether or not interlocutory orders by the COMELEC in division are appealable through certiorari to the
Supreme Court?

H: No

R: The Supreme Court interpreted Section 7, Article 9-A of the Constitution to mean FINAL orders, rulings
and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The
decision must be a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, not of a division . The Supreme
Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of
the COMELEC. The mode by which a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC en banc may be elevated to
the Supreme Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, which requires there be no appeal,
or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration is a
plain and adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a
ground for dismissal of the petition.

A decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a
motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory.
Article IX-B, Section 3: “The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
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controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.”

Exceptions that have been recognized to the rule on certiorari cases dispensing with a motion for
reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition do not apply to election cases where a motion for
reconsideration is mandatory by constitutional fiat to elevate the case to the COMELEC en banc, whose final
decision is what is reviewable via certiorari before the Supreme Court.

The Court differentiated between the present case and its ruling in Kho v. Commission on Elections. In that
case, the COMELEC First Division had admitted an answer with counter-protest of the respondent after the
period to file the same had expired. The COMELEC First Division had denied the prayer of petitioner in that
case for the elevation of the case to the en banc because the orders of admission were mere interlocutory
orders. Hence, the aggrieved party therein had no choice but to seek recourse in the Supreme Court.

In this case, what was questioned was a mere notice of the promulgation of the resolution. Thus, the filing of
the instant petition before this Court was premature for failure to exhaust adequate administrative remedies
available before the COMELEC.

The Supreme Court did say, however, that the Guiani resolution was void since Guiani had resigned
before the resolution had been promulgated; the fact that it was void was affirmed by the declaration of the
First Division that the same was a useless scrap of paper.
---
HELD: The SC dismissed the case for prematurity. It ruled that it has no power to review via certiorari, an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections. “The instant
case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases dispensing with a
motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition. In truth, the exceptions do not apply to election
cases where a motion for reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case to the
Comelec en banc, whose final decision is what is reviewable via certiorari before the Supreme Court.

The SC declared the resolution signed by Commissioner X as void for various reasons. First, one who is no
longer a member of the Commission at the time the final decision or resolution is promulgated cannot validly
take part in that resolution or decision. Second, the Clerk of the 1st Division denied the release or
promulgation of the resolution on 2/14/00 resolution. Third, the 1st Division even later said that the parties
should ignore the resolution since it was not yet promulgated. Lastly, Commissioner Z could not have affixed
her signature on the resolution, since on the same date an order was issued where she said that she still
wanted to see both positions before making her decision.

Section 8. Each Commission shall perform such other functions as may be provided by law.

Art. IX-B
A. Civil Service Commission ("CSC")

Section 1.
1. The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of a
Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity
for public administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in
the elections immediately preceding their appointment.
2. The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of
those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for
five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment
10
 to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Section 2.
1. The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters.
2. Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be
determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-determining,
primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination.
3. No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law.
4. No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any
electioneering or partisan political campaign.
5. The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.
6. Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such protection as may be
provided by law.

Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall
establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and
rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and
institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the
President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.

Section 4. All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and
defend this Constitution.

Section 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government
officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the
qualifications required for, their positions.
Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election, shall within one year after such election, be
appointed to any office in the Government or any Government-owned or controlled corporations
or in any of their subsidiaries.

Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to
any public office or position during his tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.

Section 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or
indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the
Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.

11
 Scope
 CSC VS. ALFONSO - G.R. NO. 179452, JUNE 11, 2009

D: AS THE CENTRAL PERSONNEL AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE CSC HAS JURISDICTION
TO SUPERVISE THE PERFORMANCE OF AND DISCIPLINE, IF NEED BE, ALL GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING THOSE EMPLOYED IN GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS SUCH AS PUP. Accordingly, all PUP officers and
employees, whether they be classified as teachers or professors pursuant to certain provisions of law, are
deemed, first and foremost, civil servants accountable to the people and answerable to the CSC in cases of
complaints lodged by a citizen against them as public servants. Admittedly, the CSC has appellate
jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided by government departments, agencies and instrumentalities.
However, a complaint may be filed directly with the CSC, and the Commission has the authority to hear
and decide the case, although it may opt to deputize a department or an agency to conduct the investigation

N: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

F: Respondent Larry M. Alfonso is the Director of the Human Resources Management Department of PUP.

On July 6, 2006, Dr. Zenaida Pia, Professor IV in PUP-Sta. Mesa, and Dindo Emmanuel Bautista, President of
Unyon ng mga Kawani sa PUP, jointly filed an Affidavit-Complaint against Alfonso for violation of Republic
Act (RA) No. 6713, charging the latter with grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
Service, and violation of Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. The affidavit-complaint was lodged before
the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

It was alleged that Alfonso repeatedly abused his authority as head of PUP’s personnel department when the
latter prepared and included his name in Special Order Nos. 0960 and 1004 for overnight services, ostensibly
authorizing him to work for 24 hours straight from May 16 to 20, May 22 to 27 and May 29 to June 2, 2006. As a
result thereof, Alfonso made considerable earnings for allegedly working in humanly impossible
conditions 24 hours straight daily, for three consecutive weeks.

Respondent averred he only rendered overnight work for 7 days out of the dates mentioned and it was
pursuant to S.O. No. 1004, series of 2006, and that an entry such as "Day 17, arrival 8:00 PM; Day 18, departure
8:00 AM" connoted only a day of overnight work and not continuous two (2) days of rendition of services.

CSC however formally charged Alfonso with grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the Service, and imposing a 90-day preventive suspension against him.

Respondent filed an MR and averred it is CSC-NCR regional office that has jurisdiction. Motion was denied.
On a subsequent MR, he then asserted it is the PUP Board of Regents that has exclusive authority to appoint
and remove PUP employees pursuant to RA 4670.

CSR-NCR directed PUP to implement preventive suspension. On appeal, CA reversed.

I: Whether CSC has jurisdiction to hear the case against respondent Alfonso.

H: YES.

R: Section 2(1) and Section 3, Article IX-B of our Constitution, are clear, as they provide that:
Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
Sec. 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a
career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness,
and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human
resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate
12
conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its
personnel programs.

As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has jurisdiction to supervise the performance of
and discipline, if need be, all government employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters such as PUP. We are not unmindful of certain special laws that
allow the creation of disciplinary committees and governing bodies in different branches, subdivisions,
agencies and instrumentalities of the government to hear and decide administrative complaints against their
respective officers and employees. Be that as it may, we cannot interpret the creation of such bodies nor the
passage of laws such as – R.A. Nos. 8292 and 4670 allowing for the creation of such disciplinary bodies – as
having divested the CSC of its inherent power to supervise and discipline government employees,
including those in the academe. To hold otherwise would not only negate the very purpose for which the
CSC was established, i.e. to instill professionalism, integrity, and accountability in our civil service, but
would also impliedly amend the Constitution itself.

 PNOC-EDC V. LEOGARDO- 175 SCRA 26

D: Thus, under the present state of the law, the test in determining whether a government-owned or
controlled corporation is subject to the Civil Service Law is the manner of its creation such that government
corporations created by special charter are subject to its provisions while those incorporated under the
general Corporation Law are not within its coverage.

We hold, therefore, that the PNOC-EDC, having been incorporated under the general Corporation Law, is a
government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor
Code. This is apparently the intendment in the NASECO case notwithstanding the fact that the NASECO
therein was a subsidiary of the PNB, a government-owned corporation.

N: PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Department of Labor and Employment

F: PNOC-EDC is a subsidiary of PNOC. It filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) a
clearance application to dismiss the services of Vicente, a contractual employee for the commission of a crime
(Alarms and Scandals during a Christmas Party). MOLE initially granted the clearance but subsequently
revoked it and ordered petitioner to reinstate Vicente. Petitioner appealed on the ground that MOLE has no
jurisdiction over PNOC-EDC since it is a GOCC.

I: WON the PNOC-EDC’s employees are governed by the Labor Code

H: YES.

R: Under the laws then in force (1973 Constitution), employees of government-owned and/or controlled
corporations were governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. However, the above doctrine
has been supplanted by the present Constitution (1987 Constitution).

Thus, under the present state of the law, the test in determining whether a government-owned or controlled
corporation is subject to the Civil Service Law is the manner of its creation such that government corporations
created by special charter are subject to its provisions while those incorporated under the general Corporation
Law are not within its coverage.

We hold, therefore, that the PNOC-EDC having been incorporated under the general Corporation Law, is a
government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor
Code.

 PHILIPPINE FISHERIES V. NLRC – 213 SCRA 621

13
D: The petitioner is a government-owned or controlled corporation with a special charter. This places it
under the scope of the civil service. However, the guards are not employees of the petitioner. The contract of
services explicitly states that the security guards are not considered employees of the petitioner. There being
no employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and the security guards, the jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission may not be invoked in this case.

N: PETITION to review the resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission.

F: Petitioner is a GOCC created by PD. 977. It entered into a contract with Odin Security Agency for security
services in its Iloilo Fishing Port Complex. The contract states that for the services provided the GOCC will pay
them salaries; also it has a 1 year renewable period unless terminated by either of the parties. During the
effectivity of the agreement, respondent requested an adjustment to the contract rate to comply with Wage
Order No. 6, which states:

“SECTION 9. In the case of contracts for construction projects and for security, janitorial and similar services,
the increases in the minimum wage and allowance rates of the workers shall be borne by the principal or client
of the construction/service contractor and the contracts shall be deemed amended accordingly, subject to the
provisions of Section 3(c) of this Order.”

Also with reference to Sec. 7, Par. C of the Security Services Contract:

“The terms and conditions herein set forth shall be modified by the applicable provisions of subsequent laws
or decrees, especially as they pertain to increases in the minimum wage and occupational benefits to workers.”

The requests for adjustment were repeated and ignored by the petitioner. This caused the respondent to file a
complaint for unpaid amount of readjustment with the Labor Arbiter. The LA dismissed the case saying that
since the petitioner is a GOCC then it is under the scope and jurisdiction of the CSC. This was raised on appeal
to the NLRC and the body entered a decision and granted reliefs to the respondent. A motion for
reconsideration was filed and denied by the NLRC hence this case.

I: Whether or not the NLRC failed to observe due process and if the relief granted was legal. Assuming that
there was due process, the NLRC erred in declaring the contract for security services void.

H: NLRC was correct.

R: Petitioner is a GOCC and therefore under the scope of the civil service. However, the guards are not
employees of the petitioner since the contract explicitly states this. Since there is no employer employee
relationship, the jurisdiction of the CSC may not be invoked in this case. The petitioner is merely job
contracting which makes him an indirect employer by virtue of the contract. The liability is joint and
solidary with that of the contractor under Articles 106, 107, and 109 of the Labor Code, which puts these
matters under the scope of the NLRC. The NLRC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
assuming jurisdiction to set aside the Order of dismissal by the Labor Arbiter.

Undeniably, services were rendered already and the petitioner benefitted from said contract for 2 years now.
The petitioner is therefore estopped from assailing the contract.

Appointments

 SANTIAGO, JR. V. CSC- 178 SCRA 733

D: There is “NO MANDATORY NOR PEREMPTORY REQUIREMENT IN THE (CIVIL SERVICE LAW)
THAT PERSONS NEXT-IN-RANK ARE ENTITLED TO PREFERENCE IN APPOINTMENT. WHAT IT

14
DOES PROVIDE IS THAT THEY WOULD BE AMONG THE FIRST TO BE CONSIDERED FOR THE
VACANCY, IF QUALIFIED, AND IF THE VACANCY IS NOT FILLED BY PROMOTION, THE SAME
SHALL BE FILLED BY TRANSFER OR OTHER MODES OF APPOINTMENT.

One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but it
does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested right
to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such person to the next
higher position.

THE POWER TO APPOINT IS A MATTER OF DISCRETION. The appointing power has a wide latitude
of choice as to who is best qualified for the position (Ocampo vs. Subido, L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72
SCRA 443). To apply the next-in-rank rule peremptorily would impose a rigid formula on the appointing
power contrary to the policy of the law that among those qualified and eligible, the appointing authority is
granted discretion and prerogative of choice of the one he deems fit for appointment.

True, the Commission is empowered to approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to
positions in the civil service and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate
eligibility or required qualification (paragraph (h), Section 9, P.D. No. 807). However, consistent with our
ruling in Luego vs. CSC (L-69137, 5 August 1986, 143 SCRA 327), “all the commission is actually allowed to
do is check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required
qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other criterion is
permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when it acts on, or as the decree says, “approves” or
“disapproves” an appointment made by the proper authorities. x x x To be sure, it has no authority to
revoke the said appointment simply because it believed that the private respondent was better qualified for
that would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely (in the appointing authority).”

N: PETITION for certiorari to review the resolution of the Civil Service Commission.

F: Customs Commissioner Wigberto Tanada extended to Narciso Y. Santiago a permanent promotional

appointment from Customs Collector I to Customs Collector III. Leonardo Jose, a Customs Collector II,
protested, claiming that he was the next-in-rank to the position of Collector of Customs III. The Civil Service
Commission revoked Santiago’s promotion. Hence, the present petition.

I: Whether or not the next-in-rank rule applies in making appointments?

H: No.

R: One who is next in rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but it
does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested right to
the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such person. The power to
appoint is a matter of discretion. The appointing power has a wide latitude of choice as to who is best qualified
for the position. To apply the next-in-rank rule peremptorily would impose a rigid formula on the appointing
power contrary to the policy of the law that among those qualified and eligible, the appointing authority is
granted discretion and prerogative of choice of the one he deems fit for appointment. CSC Resolution No. 83-
343 provides: Section 4. An employee who holds a next-in- rank position who is deemed the most competent
and qualified, possesses an appropriate civil service eligibility, and meets the other conditions for promotion
shall be promoted to the higher position when it becomes vacant.

However, the appointing authority may promote an employee who is not next-in-rank but who possesses
superior qualifications and competence compared to a next-in-rank employee who merely meets the
minimum requirements for the position.

The Customs Commissioner, in giving his reason for promoting Santiago, provided that there was no official
record of any activity that recommends Jose for promotion. In contrast, Santiago had been credited with the
15
seizure of millions of pesos worth of smuggled shipments, as well as being the recipient of several citations for
exemplary performance.

Finally, while it is true that the Commission is empowered to approve all appointments, whether original or
promotional, to positions in the civil service and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the
appropriate eligibility or required qualification, all the commission is actually allowed to do is check
whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required
qualifications.

If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to
be employed by the Commission when it acts on, or as the decree says, "approves" or "disapproves" an
appointment made by the proper authorities.

IT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO REVOKE THE SAID APPOINTMENT SIMPLY BECAUSE IT BELIEVED

THAT THE JOSE WAS BETTER QUALIFIED FOR THAT WOULD HAVE CONSTITUTED AN
ENCROACHMENT ON THE DISCRETION VESTED SOLELY (IN THE APPOINTING AUTHORITY).

 AQUINO V. CSC- 208 SCRA 240

D: IT IS WELL-SETTLED THAT ONCE AN APPOINTMENT IS ISSUED AND THE MOMENT THE

APPOINTEE ASSUMES A POSITION IN THE CIVIL SERVICE UNDER A COMPLETED
APPOINTMENT, HE ACQUIRES A LEGAL, NOT MERELY EQUITABLE RIGHT (TO THE POSITION),
WHICH IS PROTECTED NOT ONLY BY STATUTE, BUT ALSO BY THE CONSTITUTION, AND
CANNOT BE TAKEN AWAY FROM HIM EITHER BY REVOCATION OF THE APPOINTMENT, OR BY
REMOVAL, EXCEPT FOR CAUSE, AND WITH PREVIOUS NOTICE AND HEARING.

There is also authority for the rule that when the appointing power has once acted and the appointee has
accepted the office and done what is required of him upon its acceptance, his title to the office becomes
complete, and he can then be removed only in the regular way (Mechem, Law of Public Offices and
Officers, Sec. 461, p. 294, citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (U.S.) 137). The appointing power can not
effect his removal indirectly by rescinding or revoking his appointment after it is complete.

There is thus reasonable ground for the rule that the moment the discretionary power of appointment has
been exercised and the appointee assumed the duties and functions of the position, the said appointment
cannot be revoked by the appointing authority on the ground merely that the protestant is more qualified
than the first appointee, subject however to the condition that the first appointee should possess the
minimum qualifications required by law. Otherwise, the security of tenure guaranteed by Article IX-B,
Section 2 par. (3) of the 1987 Constitution would be rendered meaningless if the appointing authority is
allowed to flip-flop in exercising its discretionary power of appointment.

While a protest is a mode of action that may be availed of by the aggrieved party to contest the appointment
made, the protest must be “for cause” or predicated on those grounds provided for under Section 19 par. (6)
of the Civil Service Law (P.D. 807), namely: (1) that the appointee is not qualified; (2) that the appointee is
not the next-in-rank; and (3) in case of appointment by transfer, reinstatement, or by original appointment,
that the protestant is not satisfied with the written special reason or reasons given by the appointing
authority.

We have defined the concept of “for cause” in connection with removal of public officers in the case of De
los Santos v. Mallare, G.R. No. L-3881, August 31, 1950, 87 Phil. 289, as follows: “It means for reasons which
the law and sound public policy recognized as sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not
merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is implied
that officers may not be removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of removal, or without any

16
cause. Moreover, the cause must relate to and affect the administration of the office, and must be restricted
to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public.”

The ground relied upon by petitioner in his protest that he is more qualified than private respondent in
terms of education, experience and training does not fall within the meaning of “for cause” contemplated
by Article IX-B, Section 2 par (3) of the 1987 Constitution which would warrant the revocation, if not
removal, of the appointment of private respondent. Neither does it fall under the grounds of appeal
contemplated under Section 19 par. (6) of the Civil Service Law (P.D. 807). Therefore, the protest of
petitioner did not adversely affect the approval of the appointment of private respondent.

THERE CAN BE NO APPOINTMENT TO A NON-VACANT POSITION. THE INCUMBENT MUST

FIRST BE LEGALLY REMOVED OR HIS APPOINTMENT VALIDLY TERMINATED (COSTIN V.
QUIMBO, G.R. NO. L-32271, JANUARY 27, 1983, 120 SCRA 159. AN APPOINTMENT TO AN OFFICE
WHICH IS NOT VACANT IS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO

While it is true that the appointing authority has a wide latitude of discretion in making his choice in the
selection and appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions in the civil service, We cannot, however,
give a stamp of approval to such a procedural irregularity in extending appointments, as in the instant case,
to the prejudice of the right to security of tenure of the incumbent to the position.

N: PETITION for certiorari to review the resolution of the Civil Service Commission.

F: Petitioner (Aquino) was designated as Property Inspector and In-Charge of the Supply Office performing
the duties and responsibilities of the Supply Officer I. 2 years after, Division Superintendent of City Schools of
San Pablo City issued a promotional appointment to private respondent (De la Paz) as Supply Officer I in the
DECS Division of San Pablo City. The Civil Service approved her appointment as permanent. Petitioner filed a
protest questioning the qualification and competence of private respondent. DECS Secretary Quisumbing
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner and revoked the appointment of private respondent and appointed
Aquino as Supply Officer 1. Private respondent appealed with CSC. CSC revoked the appointment of
petitioner Aquino and restored private respondent de la Paz to office as Supply Officer I.

I: Whether CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking the appointment of petitioner Victor A.
Aquino as it found private respondent Leonarda de la Paz better qualified.

H: NO

R: Petitioner invokes the ruling in the case of Santiago v. CSC, where the Court ruled that CSC has no
authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular
position for that would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the appointing
authority. The CSC cannot exceed its power by substituting its will for that of the appointing authority.

SC however said that the Santiago case does not apply to the instant case. In this case, the CSC revoked the
appointment of the successful protestant (AQUINO), principally because the right to security of tenure of the
prior appointee, (DE LA PAZ) had already attached. It must be noted that public respondent CSC did not
direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. It merely restored the appointment of private respondent
who was first appointed to the contested position.

It is well-settled that once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the
civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable right (to the position),
which is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either
by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with previous notice and hearing.

Thus, when the appointing power has once acted and the appointee has accepted the office and done what is
required of him upon its acceptance, his title to the office becomes complete, and he can then be removed only
17
in the regular way. The appointing power can not effect his removal indirectly by rescinding or revoking his
appointment after it is complete.

Also the ground relied upon by petitioner in his protest that he is more qualified than private respondent in
terms of education, experience and training does not fall within the meaning of "for cause" (requirement for
valid protest)

"For cause" means for reasons which the law and sound public policy recognized as sufficient warrant for
removal, that is legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion
may deem sufficient. It is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of those vested with the
power of removal, or without any cause. Moreover, the cause must relate to and affect the administration of
the office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and
interests of the public."

Neither does it fall under the grounds of appeal contemplated under Section 19 par. (6) of the Civil Service
Law
(1) that the appointee is not qualified;
(2) that the appointee is not the next-in-rank; and
(3) in case of appointment by transfer, reinstatement, or by original appointment, that the protestant is not
satisfied with the written special reason or reasons given by the appointing authority

 CSC V. SALAS – 274 SCRA 414

F: Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR Chairman as Internal Security Staff (ISS) member and assigned to the
casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. His employment was terminated by the PAGCOR Board for loss of
confidence, after a covert investigation yielded an alleged involvement of Salas in proxy betting. Salas
requested reinvestigation from the PACGOR Board, which was denied. Appeals to the MPSB and CSC were
denied saying that being a confidential employee by operation of law (PD1869) his term only in fact expired
upon loss of confidence by the appointing power. The CA however reversed the mentioned rulings and
adjudged Salas to not be a confidential employee after applying the “proximity rule”. Petitioners raise 4
grounds: (1) Sec 16. PD. 1869 creating the PACGOR expressly provides that all employees of the casinos and
related services shall be classified as confidential appointees; (2) PAGCOR vs. Court of Appeals, et al. which
classified PAGCOR employees as confidential appointees; (3) CSC Resolution No. 91-830 declared employees
in casinos and related service as confidential appointees by operation of law; and (4) His functions as a
member of the ISS. The Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision with the finding that herein
respondent Salas is not a confidential employee, hence he may not be dismissed on the ground of loss of
confidence.

I: Whether Salas, a member of the PACGOR’s Internal Security Staff is a confidential employee

H: No

R: "Section 16 of PD 1869 insofar as it exempts PAGCOR positions from the provisions of Civil Service Law
and Rules has been modified by the 1987 Constitution and EO 292. However, the same cannot be said with
respect to the last portion of Section 16, which provides that "all employees of the casino and related
services shall be classified as 'confidential' appointees." There were two instances when a position may be
considered primarily confidential:

First, when the President, upon recommendation of the CSC Commissioner has declared the position to be
primarily confidential; and, second, when by the nature of the functions of the office there exists "close
intimacy" between the appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.

18
At first glance, it would seem that the instant case falls under the first category by virtue of the express
mandate under Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869.

“In Nature”
The Court explicitly decreed that executive pronouncements, such as Presidential Decree No. 1869, can be no
more than initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict. According to the transcripts in the
passage of the bill, it is the nature of the position that determines whether it is policy-determining or primarily
confidential." The matter should be left to the "proper implementation of the laws, depending upon the nature
of the position to be filled", and if the position is "highly confidential" then the President and the CSC
Commissioner must implement the law. The words “in nature” is used in Section 2, Article XII- of the old
Constitutions, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260 and Section 1 of the General Rules in the implementing rules
of P.D. 807. Despite the deletion of the phrase “in nature” in the 1987 Constitution and the RAC, the Pinero
doctrine still applies, as can be gleaned from the deliberations by the Constitutional Commission. The CSC
itself ascribes to this view as may be gleaned from its resolution which stated that "the declaration of a
position as primarily confidential if at all, merely exempts the position from the civil service eligibility
requirement.

Proximity Rule
Where the position occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between
them is no longer predominant. The functions of Salas: to prevent irregularities, misbehavior, illegal
transactions and other anomalous activities; report unusual incidents and related observations in accordance
with established procedures; prevention, documentation or suppression of any unwanted incidents at the
gaming and non-gaming areas etc do not involve "such close intimacy" between him and the appointing
authority – the Chairman of PAGCOR, as would insure "freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal
trust, albeit requiring honesty and integrity in their exercise. The fact that, sometimes, private respondent may
handle ordinarily "confidential matters" or papers which are somewhat confidential in nature does not suffice
to characterize his position as primarily confidential. The case of PAGCOR vs. CA upheld the dismissal of
PAGCOR employees declared to be confidential simply because the validity of the PD 1869 was not
questioned therein. Although appointed by the Chairman, ISS members do not directly report to the Office
of the Chairman in the performance of their official duties. An ISS member is subject to the control and
supervision of an Area Supervisor who, in turn, only implements the directives of the Branch Chief
Security Officer. The latter is himself answerable to the Chairman and the Board of Directors. The position
of an ISS member belongs to the bottom level of the salary scale of the corporation, being in Pay Class 2
level only, whereas the highest level is Pay Class 12.

Security of Tenure
o HERNANDEZ V. VILLEGAS- 14 SCRA 544

D: Officials and employees holding primarily confidential positions continue only for so long as
confidence in them endures. The termination of their official relation can be justified on the ground of loss
of confidence because in that case their cessation from office involves no removal but the expiration of the
term in office.

F: 1955: Atty. Villegas, a civil service eligible was appointed Director for Security of the Bureau of Customs
(BOC). 1956: He was sent by the BOC to the US for further studies and returned to the Philippines a year after.
When he returned to Philippines, James Keefe as holding the position of Acting Director for Security. Hence
Atty. Villegas was assigned temporarily as Arrastre Supervisor. 1958: Secretary of Finance Jaime Hernandez
proposed to the President to make the current positions of Keefe and Villegas permanent. The President
approved. The Directorship is a confidential position. Arrastre Supervisor is a classified position. Atty. Villegas
filed a petition for quo warranto with CFI Manila. The defense of DOF and Executive Secretary is that the
Directorship is a confidential position. Hence, terminable at the will of the appointing power. CFI and CA
both ruled in favor of Atty. Villegas. Both agreeing that he was being demoted from Director to Supervisor

19
I: WON it is valid to transfer Atty. Villegas from Director of Security to Arrastre Superintendent?

H: No.

R: That Villegas' removal from the office of Director for Security is without cause and is therefore illegal.
There are 3 classes of positions:
o Policy-determining
o Primarily confidential
o Highly Technical
They are exempt to the rule requiring appointments in the Civil Service to be made on the basis of merit and
fitness as determined from competitive examinations. But that the Constitution does not exempt the holders of
3 positions from the operation of the principle emphatically and categorically enumerated in section 4 of
Article XII: “No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as
provided by law.”

Appointees in the 3 positions are not terminable at will by the appointing power.

However, for confidential position: The termination of their official relation can be justified on the ground
of loss of confidence because in that case their cessation from office involves no removal but merely the
expiration of the term of office. But the point is that as long as confidence in them endures—and it has been
shown that it has been lost in this case—the incumbent is entitled to continue in office.

o ASTRAQUILLO V. MANGLAPUS- 190 SCRA 280

F: Petitioner was appointed by the President on July 22 1986 as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
and Chief of Mission to the United Arab Emirates. He occupied the post for two years before he was accused,
along with his wife and cousin-in-law of improper interference with the Philippine Labor Attaché’s functions.
An investigation was made, and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs recommended to the President the
termination of petitioner’s services as ambassador. The recommendation was “APPROVED by authority of the
President”. He was then notified of the termination of his services effective immediately, and the designation
of Counsellor Donato Felicio as Charges D’Affaires.

He challenged his removal from the post, citing that the Foreign Affairs Secretary had no power as department
head and without prior authorization of the President, to terminate his services, he being a presidential
appointee; he claims that under the Foreign Service Code of 1983, his removal could only be predicated upon
good cause duly established at a hearing of which he was entitled to notice and an opportunity to defend.

I: WoN a cause must be explicitly stated pursuant to the Foreign Service Act or the Civil Service Law?

H: No.

R: The Civil Service Law, PD 807, classified employment in the Government into “career” and “non-career”
service.

Section 5 – Career Service Section 6 – Non-Career

Service

1. Entrance based on merit Characterized by 1. Entrance on bases other

and fitness, to be than those of the usual test

20
determined as far as of merit and fitness utilized
practicable by competitive for the career service; and
examinations, or based on
highly technical 2. Tenure which is limited to
qualifications a period specified by law, or
which is coterminous with
2. Opportunity for that of the appointing
advancement to higher authority or subject to his
career positions pleasures, or which is
limited to the duration of a
3. Security of tenure particular project for which
purposes employment was
made.

1. Open Career positions Particular Positions falling 1. Elective officials and their
for appointment to which under said classification personal or confidential
prior qualifications in an staff;
appropriate examination is
required; 2. Department Heads and
other officials of Cabinet
2. Closed Career positions rank who hold positions at
which are scientific or the pleasure of the President
highly technical in nature; and their personal or
these includes the faculty confidential staff(s);
and academic staff of state
colleges and universities 3. Chairman and members of
and scientific and technical commissions and boards
positions in scientific or with fixed terms of office
research institutions which and their personal or
shall establish and maintain confidential staff;
their own merit systems;
4. Contractual personnel or
3. Positions in the Career those whose employment in
Executive Service, namely: the government is in
Undersecretary, Assistant accordance with a special
Secretary, Bureau Director, contract to undertake a
Assistant Bureau Director, specific work or job,
Regional Director, Assistant requiring special or technical
Regional Director, Chief of skills not available in the
Department Service and employing agency, to be
other officers of equivalent accomplished within a
rank as may be identified specific period, which in no
by the Career Executive case shall exceed one year,
Service Board, all of whom and performs or
are appointed by the accomplishes the specific

21
 President; work or job, under his own
responsibility with a
4. Career officers, other minimum of directions and
than those in the Career supervision from the hiring
Executive Service, who are agency; and
appointed by the President,
such as the Foreign Service 5. Emergency and seasonal
Officers in the Ministry of personnel.
Foreign Affairs;

5. Commissioned officers
and enlisted men of the
Armed Forces which shall
maintain a separate merit
system;

6. Personnel of
governmentowned or
controlled corporations,
whether performing
governmental or
proprietary functions, who
do not fall under the non-
career service; and

7. Permanent laborers,
whether skilled, semi-
skilled, or unskilled.

Petitioner clearly pertains to the Non-Career Service. His appointment to the Foreign Service was made on
“bases other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the career service, his entrance was not
based on merit and fitness determined by competitive examinations or based on qualifications. This being so,
his tenure was coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure.

Regarding his appointment as chief of mission, the Court held that it simply meant that as ambassador
extraordinary and plenipotentiary, he was being placed in charge of the embassy or legation therein.

Regarding the argument that his separation from service is illegal because it was not effected by the President,
the Court held that it was the President who ordered their removal. The record shows that the President
approved the recommendation of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs for the termination of their services.

o GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS- AUGUST 15, 2000

D: A REASSIGNMENT WITH NO DEFINITE PERIOD OR DURATION IS DEFINITELY VIOLATIVE OF

THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE

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N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

F: Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent, Division of City Schools, QC, by
the then Pres. Cory Aquino. Secretary Gloria recommended to the Pres. Aquino that the Icasiano be
reassigned as Superintendent of the MIST [Marikina Institute of Science and Technology], to fill up the
vacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent, Mr. Bannaoag F. Lauro. The President approved the
recommendation of Sec. Gloria. A copy of the recommendation for petitioner’s reassignment, as approved by
Pres. Aquino, was transmitted by Sec. Gloria to Director Rosas for implementation. Director Rosas, informed
the petitioner of his reassignment. Icasiano requested Sec. Gloria to reconsider the reassignment, but the latter
denied the request. Icasiano prepared a letter to Pres. Aquino, asking for a reconsideration of his reassignment,
and furnished a copy of the same to the DECS. However, he subsequently changed his mind and refrained
from filing the letter with the Office of President. However, Sec. Gloria filed this instant petition.

I: Whether the reassignment of private respondent from School Division Superintendent of QC to Vocational
School Superintendent of MIST is violative of his security of tenure?

H: After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the CA that the reassignment of petitioner to MIST
"appears to be indefinite". The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of Sec. Gloria for Pres. Fidel V.
Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications and experience"
being "an expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is
more than temporary as the private respondent has been described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an
expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private
respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent replacement is found as no period is specified
or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no
definite period or duration. Such feature of the reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security
of tenure of the private respondent. As held in Bentain:

"Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil service. The
mantle of its protection extends not only to employees removed without cause but also to cases of
unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal removals.

While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employees’ prior
consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure
him away from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation.
Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are
in the Civil Service.”

Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be violative of his security of tenure, the
order for his reassignment to the MIST cannot be countenanced.

o DIMAYUGA V. BENEDICTO- JANUARY 16, 2002

D: Security of tenure in the career executive service (“CES”) is acquired with respect to rank, and not to
position. Persons who are not qualified for the positions to which they have been appointed do not have a
right to security of tenure until they have qualified for such position. In this case, the petitioner was
appointed to a position that was initially not a part of the career executive service. However, upon its inclusion
to the CES, petitioner, not being qualified, would have only acquired the right to security of tenure had she
become qualified. Otherwise, the fact that her appointment was permanent would only allow her to occupy
such position until the appointing authority would replace her with someone who has required eligibility
therefor. Having no security of tenure to the position she had been appointed to, her petition was dismissed.

23
F: Chona M. Dimayuga (Petitioner) was issued a permanent appointment as Executive Director II of the Toll
Regulatory Board by the then Secretary of Public Works & Highways. At the time, the position of Executive
Director II was not deemed part of the career executive service, that is, until less than a year later, when it was
included therein. During her tenure, she became the subject of several administrative and criminal complaints
that led to two suspensions. After the expiration of the second suspension, a Department Order was issued
which ‘temporarily detailed’ petitioner to the Office of the Secretary of the DPWH. Viewing the temporary
detail as a demotion, petitioner went on a leave of absence as a gesture of protest. In the meantime, petitioner
sent a letter to the Career Executive Service Board to clarify her status. The CESB replied with the opinion that
the subsequent inclusion of a position in the Career Executive Service did not change the status of the
appointee to such position. While on leave, petitioner received a letter that then President Estrada had
appointed someone else to the position of Executive Director II of the Board. A Memorandum was issued by
then Executive Secretary declaring that non-career officials/personnel or those occupying political positions
were deemed coterminous with the outgoing Administrations and that such persons should vacate their
positions unless specifically retained.

Since she had been effectively removed from her position, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto before
the Court. One of her allegations was that her removal violated her right to security of tenure. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petitioner’s suit.

I: Whether or not petitioner had the right to security of tenure?

H: No

R: The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals, citing its decision in length, including: “The
subsequent inclusion of her position under the CES, however, did not automatically qualify her for the said
position as she lacked the required eligibility. At most, the permanent status accorded to her appointment
would only allow her to occupy said position until the appointing authority would replace her with someone
who has the required eligibility therefor.”

The Supreme Court examined CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21 dated 1994, the subject of which is the
coverage of the career executive service. Section 4 thereof states:
“Status of Appointment of Incumbents of Positions Included Under the Coverage of the CES. Incumbents of
positions which are declared to be Career Executive Service positions for the first time pursuant to this
Resolution who hold permanent appointments thereto shall remain under permanent status in their respective
positions. However, upon promotion or transfer to other Career Executive Service (CES) positions, these
incumbents shall be under temporary status in said other CES positions until they qualify.

The Supreme Court cited its decision in Cuevas v. Bacal, (involving the Chief Public Attorney position which
requires CES Rank Level 1, but the appointee only had CESO III rank) which emphasized two salient points:
First, in order to qualify an appointment as permanent, the appointee must possess the rank appropriate to the
position. Failure in this respect will render the appointment merely temporary. In Atty. Bacal’s case, it was
ruled that she did not acquire tenure since she had only a CESO III rank; and that she was not appointed CESO
I which was the requisite eligibility for the position of Chief Public Attorney.

Second, security of tenure in the career executive service (“CES”) is thus acquired with respect to rank, and not
to position. The guaranty of security of tenure to members of the career executive service does not extend to
the particular positions to which they may be appointed—a concept which is applicable only to first and
second-level employees in the civil service—but to the rank to which they are appointed by the President.

The Supreme Court also cited its decision in De Leon v. Court of Appeals, the private respondent therein, like
herein petitioner Dimayuga, was not a career executive service officer, yet he was issued a permanent
appointment as Department Legal Counsel which is a career executive service position. A dispute arose when
the private respondent therein was reassigned as “Director III (Assistant Regional Director)” of Region IX. We
subsequently rendered judgment in that case of De Leon finding that the therein private respondent’s security
24
of tenure was not violated: “…A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot
be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an
acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be
regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.”

Abolition of Office
 MAYOR V. MACARAIG- 194 SCRA 672

D: A recognized cause for removal or termination of employment of a Government officer or employee is the
abolition by law of his office as a result of reorganization carried out by reason of economy or to remove
redundancy of functions, or clear and explicit constitutional mandate for such termination of employment.6
Abolition of an office is obviously not the same as the declaration that that office is vacant. While it is
undoubtedly a prerogative of the legislature to abolish certain offices, it cannot be conceded the power to
simply pronounce those offices vacant and thereby effectively remove the occupants or holders thereof from
the civil service. Such an act would constitute, on its face, an infringement of the constitutional guarantee of
security of tenure, and will have to be struck down on that account. It cannot be justified by the professed
“need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom invested with adjudicatory powers and functions, and
to upgrade their qualifications, ranks, and salaries or emoluments

F: RA No. 6715 Declaring Vacant “all positions of the Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor
Arbiters of the present National Labor Relations Commissions”. The old positions were declared vacant
because of the “need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom invested with adjudicatory powers and
functions, and upgrade their qualifications, ranks and salaries or emoluments.”

I: Whether the provisions of RA No. 6715 are constitutional? Whether or not RA 6715 has worked such an
abolition of the petitioners’ offices, expressly or impliedly

H: No. The petitioners have the right to remain in office until the expiration of the terms for which they have
been appointed, unless sooner removed “for cause provided by law.”

A recognized cause for removal or termination is the abolition by law of his office as a result of reorganization
carried out by reason of economy or to remove redundancy of functions, or clear and explicit constitutional
mandate for such termination of employment.

ABOLITION OF OFFICE IS NOT THE SAME AS DECLARING THAT OFFICE IS VACANT. THE
LATTER WOULD CONSTITUTE AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF
SECURITY OF TENURE.

Right to Organize
 SSS EMPLOYEES V. COURT OF APPEALS- 175 SCRA 686

D: Framers of the organic law intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only
without including the right to strike.

F: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands concerning the
implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restraining order
pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made
reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the
National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that
the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are
not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.
25
I: Whether SSS employers have the right to strike?

H: No.

R: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among
workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand,
Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and
strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by
Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that
“prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees joins
under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees
to strike they are prohibited from doing so.

In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government employees” and
that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created
under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service
Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector
Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor disputes
within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of a writ of injunction to
enjoin the strike is appropriate.

Double Compensation
 PERALTA V. MATHAY- 38 SCRA 296

D: NO DOUBLE COMPENSATION UNLESS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

“No officer or employee of the government shall receive additional or double compensation unless
specifically authorized by law.” This is to manifest a commitment to the fundamental principle that a
public office is a public trust. It is expected of a government official or employee that he keeps uppermost
in mind the demands of public welfare. He is there to render public service. He is of course entitled to be
rewarded for the performance of the functions entrusted to him, but that should not be the overriding
consideration. The intrusion of the thought of private gain should be unwelcome. The temptation to further
personal ends, public employment as a means for the acquisition of wealth, is to be resisted. That at least is
the ideal. There is then to be an awareness on the part of an officer or employee of the government that he
is to receive only such compensation as may be fixed by law. With such a realization, he is expected not to
avail himself of devicus or circuitous means to increase the remuneration attached to his position. It is an
entirely different matter if the legislative body would itself determine for reasons satisfactory to it that he
should receive something more. If it were to be thus though, there must be a law to that effect. So the
Constitution decrees.

N: APPEAL from a decision of the Auditor General.

F: Petitioner Peralta, a trustee of GSIS, was granted an optional retirement gratuity of P40k. Of that amount, he
wasn’t able to collect the 7k (living allowance, incentive bonus and Christmas bonus) by reason that such items
were not passed in audit. Respondent Auditor General Mathay stated that such items are considered as
additional compensation, since a trustee’s remuneration is fixed by law at a per diem of P25 for every board
meeting attended.

26
I: Whether the cost of living allowance as well as incentive and Christmas bonuses paid to petitioner Pedro G.
Peralta, a Trustee of the Government Service Insurance System, hereinafter called the GSIS, did fall within
such a ban?

H: YES

R: There is additional compensation when for one and the same office for which a compensation has been
fixed, there is added to such fixed compensation an extra reward in the form, for instance a bonus. A "per
diem" is commonly identified with the daily allowance for each day an officer or employee was away from his
home base.

But when a per diem or an allowance is given as reimbursement for expenses incident to the discharge of an
officer’s duties. It is not considered as an additional compensation prohibited by the Constitution.

“Per diem” is commonly identified with the daily allowance “for each day he (an officer or employee) was
away from his home base.” Its usual signification is thus that of a reimbursement for expenses incurred in the
performance of one’s duties. If employed in a statute, as in this case, in the concept of remuneration, however,
there must be, to justify an additional compensation, a specific law that so provides. Otherwise, fidelity to the
constitutional command is lacking.

Cost of living allowance. If it could rightfully be considered as in the nature of a reimbursement rather than
additional emoluments or perquisites, then the ruling of respondent Auditor General cannot find support in
the Constitution.

An allowance to take care of expenses incurred by an official to enable him to fulfill his task cannot be looked
upon as an additional compensation. Such a principle does not come to the aid of petitioner though. He was
unable to show that the cost of living allowance received by him was in the nature of a reimbursement. It did
amount then to an additional compensation.

 SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS- 345 SCRA 553

D: For the purpose of computing or determining petitioner’s separation pay under Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 7924, his years of service in the Judiciary should be excluded and his separation pay should be solely
confined to his services in the Metropolitan Manila Authority. The SC agrees with the CA and CSC that for the
purpose of computing or determining petitioner’s separation pay under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924, his years
of service in the Judiciary should be excluded and that his separation pay should be solely confined to his
services in the MMA. The separation pay must relate only to the employment thus affected.

N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

F: Santos, an appointed judge of the MeTC of Quezon City, retired in 1992 and acquired his retirement gratuity
under RA 910. In 1993, he was appointed Director III of the Traffic Operation Center of the MMA. In 1995, the
MMA was reorganized and renamed as MMDA. Santos, in 1996, was voluntarily separated from the service
and was entitled to separation benefits equivalent to 1 ¼ monthly salary for every year of service as provided
under Sec. 11 of the MMDA Law.”

I: Whether Santiago is entitled to a separation benefit computed from the years of service as Metc judge to
Director III because the retirement gratuity he received under RA 910 is not considered as double
compensation?

H: The retirement benefits which Santiago had received or has been receiving, under RA 910, do not constitute
double compensation. But, to credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation of his separation
pay under RA 7924 would be to countenance double compensation for exactly the same services.

27
The petitioner cannot take refuge under the second paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution,
which provides:

Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.

This provision simply means that a retiree receiving pension or gratuity can continue to receive such pension
or gratuity even if he accepts another government position to which another compensation is attached.

Indeed, the retirement benefits which petitioner had received or has been receiving under R.A. No. 910, as
amended, do not constitute double compensation. He could continue receiving the same even if after his
retirement he had been receiving salary from the defunct MMA as Director III thereof. This is but just because
said retirement benefits are rewards for his services as MeTC Judge, while his salary was his compensation for
his services as Director III of the MMA.

However, to credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation of his separation pay under R.A. No.
7924 notwithstanding the fact that he had received or has been receiving the retirement benefits under R.A.
No. 910, as amended, would be to countenance double compensation for exactly the same services,i.e., his
services as MeTC Judge. Such would run counter to the policy of this Court against double compensation for
exactly the same services. More important, it would be in violation of the first paragraph of Section 8 of Article
K-B of the Constitution, which proscribes additional, double, or indirect compensation.

 SINGSON VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT - 627 SCRA 36

D: Unlike salary which is paid for services rendered, the Representation and Transportation Allowance
(RATA) is a form of allowance intended to defray expenses deemed unavoidable in the discharge of office;
The Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) is paid only to certain officials who, by the
nature of their offices, incur representation and transportation expenses.

What National Compensation Circular (NCC) No. 67 seeks to prevent is the dual collection of
Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) by a national official from the budgets of “more
than one national agency

N: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals

F: The Philippine International Convention Center, Inc. (PICCI) is a government corporation whose
stockholder is the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). Petitioners are members of the PICCI and officials of the
BSP. PICCI By-Laws authorized petitioners to receive P1,000 per diem each for every meeting attended.
Pursuant to Monetary Board (MB) Resolution No. 15, amended by MB Resolution No. 34, the BSP granted
additional monthly Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA), in the amount of P1,500. The
PICCI Corporate Auditor issued a Notice of Disallowance, disallowing in audit the payment of RATA as there
was double payment of RATA in violation of Sec. 8, Art. IX-B.

I: Whether Representation and Transportation Allowance constitute double compensation?

H: NO.

R: Aside from the per diem that they have been receiving from the BSP, the grant of P1,500 RATA to each of
the petitioners for every board meeting they attended, in their capacity as the BOD of PICCI, in addition to
their P1,000 per diem, does not run afoul the constitutional proscription against double compensation. Section
8, Article IX-B of the Constitution provides that no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall
receive additional, double or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without

28
the consent of the Congress, any present emolument, office or title of any kind from any foreign government.
Pensions and gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double or indirect compensation.

The RATA is distinct from salary (as a form of compensation). Unlike salary which is paid for services
rendered, the RATA is a form of allowance intended to defray expenses deemed unavoidable in the discharge
of office. Hence, the RATA is paid only to certain officials who, by the nature of their offices, incur
representation and transportation expenses. Also, what is prohibited is the dual/ multiple collection of RATA
from the budgets of 2 or more national agencies. When national official is on detail with another national
agency, he should get his RATA only from his parent national agency and not from the other national agency
he is detailed to.

RATA granted by the BSP and the additional RATA also granted by the BSP did not constitute double
compensation.

Art. IX-C

Section 1.

1. There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners

who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective positions in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.

2. The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those
first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and
the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
1. Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
2. Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction.
1. Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
2. Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election
officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
3. Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the
exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
4. Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in
addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and
29
 accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects
shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or
unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are
supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
5. Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties,
organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections, constitute interference in
national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of
their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be
prescribed by law.
6. File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or
exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of
election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.
7. Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including
limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and
penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
8. Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to,
its directive, order, or decision.
9. Submit to the President and the Congress, a comprehensive report on the conduct of each
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate
its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
banc.

Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment
or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public
utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation
shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates
in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws,
rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of
the Commission.

Section 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of
the people, subject to the provisions of this Article.

Section 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except
for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

Section 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system,
shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of
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canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in
accordance with law.

Section 9. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election period shall
commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter.

Section 10. Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment
and discrimination.

Section 11. Funds certified by the Commission as necessary to defray the expenses for holding
regular and special elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls, shall be provided in
the regular or special appropriations and, once approved, shall be released automatically upon
certification by the Chairman of the Commission

B. Comelec

Qualifications and Prohibitions

 BRILLIANTES V. YORAC- 192 SCRA 358

D: The Constitutional Commissions, although essentially executive in nature, are not under the control of
the President in the discharge of their functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings
under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders
and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution in Article
IX-A, Section 7

The choice of a temporary chairman of the COMELEC, is within the discretion of the Commission itself,
and such discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines.
The situation could have been handled by the members of the Commission on Elections themselves
without the participation of the President, however well-meaning. In the choice of the Acting Chairman,
the members of the Commission on Elections would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as
they themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them
and not the President to make

F: Petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines of Associate Commissioner
Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide,
who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d' etat
attempt. Petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an
internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of
the Philippines violates their independence. He cites the practice in this Court, where the senior Associate
Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice in the absence of the Chief Justice. No designation from the President of
the Philippines is necessary.

Solicitor General argues that no such designation is necessary in the case of the Supreme Court because the
temporary succession cited is provided for in Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. HOWEVER, there is no
such arrangement,in the case of the Commission on Elections. Thus, the designation made by the President of
the Philippines should be sustained for reasons of "administrative expediency," to prevent disruption of the
functions of the COMELEC.

I: Whether the President can appoint “temporary or acting commissioner”?

H: No.

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R: In view of the status of the Commission on Elections as an independent constitutional body xxxArticle IX-
C, Section 1(2) provides “In no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity." Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the
control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these
Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of
its own discretion.

The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That
discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines.

The Court also said that expediency is a dubious justification. It may also be an overstatement to suggest that
the operations of the Commission on Elections would have been disturbed or stalemated if the President of the
Philippines had not stepped in and designated an Acting Chairman. There did not seem to be any such
problem. In any event, even assuming that difficulty, we do not agree that "only the President (could) act to fill
the hiatus,"

Also, the lack of a statutory covering the situation in this case is not a justification for the President of the
Philippines to fill it by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. This is still a
government of laws and not of men. The problem allegedly sought to be corrected, if it existed at all, did not
call for presidential action. The situation could have been handled by the members of the Commission on
Elections themselves without the participation of the President, however well-meaning.

Lastly, in choosing the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most likely have
been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and
the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make.

 CAYETANO V. MONSOD- 201 SCRA 296

D: The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . .

The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is
clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission’s judgment. In the instant case, there is no
occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs
prayed, for has been clearly shown.

N: PETITION to review the decision of the Commission on Appointments.

F: Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec. The Commission on
Appointments confirmed the appointment despite Cayetano's objection, based on Monsod's alleged lack of the
required qualification of 10 year law practice. Cayetano filed this certiorari and prohibition. The 1987
constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates

32
for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

I: Whether CA exceeded its authority in

H: NO. The power of the CA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by the president is
mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment is essentially within the discretion of whom it is so
vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualification required by law. From
the evidence, there is no occasion for the SC to exercise its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the CA.
Additionally, consider the following;
1. If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court
reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the
negative.
2. In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer
is likewise clear.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients, and other works where the work done involves the determination of the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions (PLA vs. Agrava.) The records of the 1986
constitutional commission show that the interpretation of the term practice of law was liberal as to consider
lawyers employed in the Commission of Audit as engaged in the practice of law provided that they use their
legal knowledge or talent in their respective work. The court also cited an article in the January 11, 1989 issue
of the Business Star, that lawyers nowadays have their own specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors,
etc., that because of the demands of their specialization, lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet
them. These days, for example, most corporation lawyers are involved in management policy formulation.
Therefore, Monsod, who passed the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group from 1963-1970, then
worked for an investment bank till 1986, became member of the CONCOM in 1986, and also became a member
of the Davide Commission in 1990, can be considered to have been engaged in the practice of law as lawyer-
economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, etc.

Powers and Functions

 LDP V. COMELEC- FEBRUARY 24, 2004

D: The broad power granted to the COMELEC by the Constitution includes the ascertainment of the identity
of a political party and its legitimate officers.

To resolve the simple issue of determining who as between the Party Chairman and the Secretary General
has the authority to sign certificates of candidacy of the official candidates of the party, the COMELEC
need only to turn to the Party Constitution–it need not go so far as to resolve the root of the conflict
between the party officials.

F: This involves the case of the political party Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino’s (LDP) internal squabbling
for leadership. LDP Party President Edgardo Angara wrote to COMELEC that only he or his authorized
representative can endorse the certificate of candidacy of the party’s official candidates. Angara also
manifested to Comelec that LDP’s Secretary General, Boots Aquino was placed on indefinite forced leave.

Aquino filed a comment that the Party President does not have the authority to impose disciplinary sanctions.
Then there were reports that Aquino suspended Angara back, which the former denied. Apparently, Angara
was uniting the LDP with Erap’s Puwersa ng Masang Pilipino (PMP). They wanted a united opposition to field
33
candidates to fights against GMA in the 2004 elections. Aquino did not want this. A Certificate of Nomination
of Sen. Panfilo Lacson as LDP candidate for President was filed with the COMELEC signed by Rep. Boots
Aquino as LDP Secretary General.

The solomonic solution of the Comelec is to recognize both factions: LDP Angara wing and LDP Aquino
wing. Both can field local and national candidates and are entitled to copies of certificates of canvass. The even
numbered precincts will go to Angara-wing while the odd-numbered will go to Aquino

I: Who as between the Party Chairman and the Secretary General has the authority to sign certificates of
candidacy of the official candidates of the party? – The party chairman

R: The COMELEC correctly stated that the ascertainment of the identity of political party and its legitimate
officers is a matter that is well within its authority. The source of this authority is no other than the
fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and function to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
In the exercise of such power and in the discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with ample
wherewithal and considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of
the great objectives for which it was created to promote free, orderly and honest elections.

Under Article IX-C, Section 2, of the Constitution to decide all questions affecting elections, register and
regulate political parties, and insure orderly elections. Court cannot help but be baffled by the COMELEC’s
ruling declining to inquire into which party officer has the authority to sign and endorse certificates of
candidacy of the party’s nominees

By creating the two wings, the COMELEC effectively diffused the LDPs strength and undeniably emasculated
its chance of obtaining the Commissions nod as the dominant minority party. COMELEC need only to turn to
the Party Constitution. The LDP’s Constitution states that the Party Chairman is the Chief Executive Officer of
the Party, whose powers and functions include signing documents for and on behalf of the party. The
Secretary General, on the other hand, assists the Party Chairman in overseeing the day-to-day operations of
the Party and only when empowered by the Party Chairman, is he to sign documents for and on behalf of the
Party.

Therefore, the Sec Gen has only a delegated power, which originally pertains to the Party Chairman.

As if to rationalize its folly, the COMELEC invokes the constitutional policy towards a free and open party
system.46 This policy, however, envisions a system that shall “evolve according to the free choice of the
people,”47 not one molded and whittled by the COMELEC. When the Constitution speaks of a multi-party
system, it does not contemplate the COMELEC splitting parties into two. For doing just that, this pretender to
the throne of King Solomon acted whimsically and capriciously. Certiorari lies against it, indeed.
WHEREFORE, the assailed COMELECResolution is ANNULLED and the Petition is GRANTED IN PART.
Respondent Commission on Elections is directed to recognize as official candidates of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino only those whose Certificates of Candidacy are signed by LDP Party Chairman
Senator Edgardo J. Angara or his duly authorized representative/s.

 SISON V. COMELEC- MARCH 3, 1999

D: Presentation of evidence before the COMELEC is not at all indispensable in order to satisfy the
demands of due process. Under the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7166, particularly Section 18 thereof
all that is required now is that the COMELEC shall dispose of pre-proclamation controversies “on the basis
of the records and evidence elevated to it by the board of canvassers.” This is but in keeping with the
policy of the law that cases of this nature should be summarily decided and the will of the electorate as
reflected on the election returns be determined as speedily as possible.

34
F: It appears that while the election returns were being canvassed by the Quezon City Board of Canvassers but
before the winning candidates were proclaimed, petitioner commenced suit before the COMELEC by filing a
petition seeking to suspend the canvassing of votes and/or proclamation in Quezon City and to declare a
failure of elections. The said petition was supposedly filed pursuant to Section 63 of the Omnibus Election
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended) on the ground of "massive and orchestrated fraud and acts
analogous thereto which occurred after the voting and during the preparation of election returns and in the
custody or canvass thereof, which resulted in a failure to elect."4

While the petition was pending before the COMELEC, the City Board of Canvassers proclaimed the winners of
the elections in Quezon City, including the winning candidate for the post of vice mayor. On June 22, 1998, the
COMELEC promulgated its challenged resolution dismissing the petition before it on the ground (1) that the
allegations therein were not supported by sufficient evidence, and (2) the grounds recited were not among the
pre-proclamation issues set forth in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 7166

I: 1. Whether the grounds are valid?

R: Under the pertinent codal provision of the Omnibus Election Code, there are only three (3) instances where
a failure of elections may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the
date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election
in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and
during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof such
election result in a failure to elect on account of force majuere, violence, terrorism , fraud, or other
analogous causes. We have painstakingly examined petitioner's petition before the COMELEC but found
nothing therein that could support an action for declaration of failure of elections. He never alleged at all that
elections were either not held or suspended. Furthermore, petitioner's claim of failure to elect stood as a bare
conclusion bereft of any substantive support to describe just exactly how the failure to elect came about.

I 2. W/N petitioner was deprived of his right to due process that he was not allowed to present his evidence
before the COMELEC to support his petition

H: NO

R: First, we note that his citation of Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code as basis for his right to present
evidence is misplaced. The phrase after due notice refers only to a situation where the COMELEC decides and,
in fact, takes steps to either partially or totally suspend or annul the proclamation of any candidate-elect. Verba
legis non est recedendum. From the words of the statute there should be no departure. The statutory provision
cannot be expanded to embrace any other situation not contemplated therein such as the one at bar where the
COMELEC is not taking any step to suspend or annul a proclamation.

Second, presentation of evidence before the COMELEC is not at all indispensable in order to satisfy the
demands of due process. Under the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7166, particularly Section 18 thereof
all that is required now is that the COMELEC shall dispose of pre-proclamation controversies on the basis
of the records and evidence elevated to it by the board of canvassers. This is but in keeping with the policy of
the law that cases of this nature should be summarily decided and the will of the electorate as reflected on the
election returns be determined as speedily as possible. What exactly those records and evidence are upon
which the COMELEC based its resolution and how they have been appreciated in respect of their sufficiency,
are beyond this Courts scrutiny. But we have reason to believe, owing to the presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty and the precept that factual findings of the COMELEC based on its
assessments and duly supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, that the COMELEC
did arrive at its conclusion with due regard to the available evidence before it. That this is so can, in fact, be
gleaned from petitioners own allegation and admission in his petition that the election returns themselves
as well as the minutes of the Canvassing Committees and the City Board of Canvassers x x x are in the
possession of the COMELEC. He even cites paragraph (g), Section 20 of the Omnibus Election Code to
35
validate such allegation. Hence, it is not really correct to say that the COMELEC acted without evidentiary
basis at all or that petitioner was deprived of his right to due process.

 SAMBARANI V. COMELEC- SEPTEMBER 15, 2004

D: The functions of the COMELEC under the Constitution are essentially executive and administrative in
nature. It is elementary in administrative law that “courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed
to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the
special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.” The authority given to COMELEC to declare a
failure of elections and to call for special elections falls under its administrative function.

The prohibition on conducting special elections after thirty days from the cessation of the cause of the
failure of elections is not absolute. It is directory, not mandatory, and the COMELEC possesses residual
power to conduct special elections even beyond the deadline prescribed by law. The cannot defeat the right
of suffrage of the people as guaranteed by the Constitution. The COMELEC erroneously perceived that the
deadline in Section 6 is absolute. The COMELEC has broad power or authority to fix other dates for special
elections to enable the people to exercise their right of suffrage. The COMELEC may fix other dates for the
conduct of special elections when the same cannot be reasonably held within the period prescribed by law.

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

F: In the 15 July 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections (elections), Sambarani,
Miraato, Abubacar, Mascara and Dayondong ran for re-election as punong barangay in their respective
barangays, namely: Occidental Linuk, Pindolonan Moriatao Sarip, Talub, New Lumbacaingud, and Tatayawan
South (five barangays), all in Tamparan, Lanao del Sur.

Due to a failure of elections in 11 barangays in Lanao del Sur, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5479
setting special elections on 13 August 2002 in the affected barangays in Lanao del Sur including the five
barangays. On 14 August 2002, Acting Election Officer Esmael Maulay (EO Maulay) issued a certification that
there were no special elections held on 13 August 2002.

Consequently, Sambarani, Miraato, Abubacar, Mascara and Dayondong (joint-petitioners) filed a Joint Petition
seeking to declare a failure of elections in the five barangays and the holding of another special election. The
Joint Petition attributed the failure of the special elections to EO Maulays non-compliance with COMELEC
Commissioner Mehol K. Sadains (Commissioner Sadain) directive. Commissioner Sadain had directed EO
Maulay to use the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) 2001 computerized Voters List and the
Voters Registration Records of the Provincial Election Officer during the December 2001 registration of new
voters.

COMELEC’s RULING: The COMELEC agreed with petitioners that the special elections held on 13 August
2002 in the five barangays failed. The COMELEC, however, ruled that to hold another special election in these
barangays as prayed for by petitioners is untenable. The COMELEC explained that it is no longer in a position
to call for another special election since Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that special elections
shall be held on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, but not later than thirty days after
cessation of the cause of such postponement. The COMELEC noted that more than thirty days had elapsed
since the failed election.

The COMELEC also pointed out that to hold another special election in these barangays will not only be
tedious and cumbersome, but a waste of its precious resources. The COMELEC left to the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG) the process of appointing the Barangay Captains and Barangay
Kagawads as well as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Chairmen and SK Kagawads in these barangays in
accordance with the Local Government Code of 1991 and other related laws on the matter.

36
Petitioners contend that COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
Denying the prayer to call for another special election in subject barangays, Directing the DILG to proceed
with the appointment of the barangay captains, barangay kagawads, SK chairmen and SK kagawads in the
subject barangays; and Not declaring the petitioners as the rightful incumbent barangay chairmen of their
office until their successors have been elected and qualified.

I: Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when they
denied the holding of special election based on their interpretation of Sec. 6 of the Omnibus Election Code?

H: Yes. We rule that COMELECs reasons for refusing to hold another special election are void.

On Whether To Call Another Special Election

Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall. Indisputably, the text and intent of this constitutional provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary
and incidental powers for it to achieve its primordial objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections.

The functions of the COMELEC under the Constitution are essentially executive and administrative in
nature. It is elementary in administrative law that courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed
to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the
special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. The authority given to COMELEC to declare a
failure of elections and to call for special elections falls under its administrative function.

The marked trend in our laws has been to grant the COMELEC ample latitude so it can more effectively
perform its duty in safeguarding the sanctity of our elections. But what if, as in this case, the COMELEC
refuses to hold elections due to operational, logistical and financial problems? Did the COMELEC gravely
abuse its discretion in refusing to conduct a second special Barangay and SK elections in the subject
barangays?

Neither the candidates nor the voters of the affected barangays caused the failure of the special elections. The
COMELEC's own acting election officer, EO Maulay, readily admitted that there were no special elections in
these barangays. The COMELEC also found that the Provincial Election Supervisor of Lanao del Sur and the
Regional Election Director of Region XII did not contest the fact that there were no special elections in these
barangays.

An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. It
involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. The right of suffrage is
enshrined in the Constitution because through suffrage the people exercise their sovereign authority to
choose their representatives in the governance of the State. The fact that the elections involved in this case
pertain to the lowest level of our political organization is not a justification to disenfranchise voters.

The Court construed Section 6 (Omnibus Election Code) in Pangandaman v. COMELEC, as follows
In fixing the date for special elections the COMELEC should see to it that: 1.] it should not be later than thirty
(30) days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or suspension of the election or the failure to
elect; and, 2.] it should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in
the failure to elect. The first involves a question of fact. The second must be determined in the light of the
peculiar circumstances of a case. Thus, the holding of elections within the next few months from the
cessation of the cause of the postponement, suspension or failure to elect may still be considered
reasonably close to the date of the election not held.

The prohibition on conducting special elections after thirty days from the cessation of the cause of the
failure of elections is not absolute. It is directory, not mandatory, and the COMELEC possesses residual
37
power to conduct special elections even beyond the deadline prescribed by law. The deadline in Section 6
cannot defeat the right of suffrage of the people as guaranteed by the Constitution. The COMELEC
erroneously perceived that the deadline in Section 6 is absolute. The COMELEC has broad power or
authority to fix other dates for special elections to enable the people to exercise their right of suffrage. The
COMELEC may fix other dates for the conduct of special elections when the same cannot be reasonably
held within the period prescribed by law.

Unlike Section 6, Section 45 does not state that special elections should be held on a date reasonably close to
the date of the election not held. Instead, Section 45 (Omnibus Election Code)states that special elections
should be held within thirty days from the cessation of the causes for postponement. Logically, special
elections could be held anytime, provided the date of the special elections is within thirty days from the time
the cause of postponement has ceased.

In this case, the cause of postponement after the second failure of elections was COMELECs refusal to hold a
special election because of (1) its erroneous interpretation of the law, and (2) its perceived logistical,
operational and financial problems.

On Whether the DILG may Appoint the Barangay and SK Officials

Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9164 (RA 9164) provides:

Sec. 5. Hold Over. All incumbent barangay officials and sangguniang kabataan officials shall remain in office
unless sooner removed or suspended for cause until their successors shall have been elected and qualified.
The provisions of the Omnibus Election Code relative to failure of elections and special elections are hereby
reiterated in this Act.

RA 9164 is now the law that fixes the date of barangay and SK elections, prescribes the term of office of
barangay and SK officials, and provides for the qualifications of candidates and voters for the SK elections.

As the law now stands, the language of Section 5 of RA 9164 is clear. It is the duty of this Court to apply the
plain meaning of the language of Section 5. Since there was a failure of elections in the 15 July 2002 regular
elections and in the 13 August 2002 special elections, petitioners can legally remain in office as barangay
chairmen of their respective barangays in a hold-over capacity. They shall continue to discharge their powers
and duties as punong barangay, and enjoy the rights and privileges pertaining to the office. True, Section 43(c)
of the Local Government Code limits the term of elective barangay officials to three years. However, Section 5
of RA 9164 explicitly provides that incumbent barangay officials may continue in office in a holdover capacity
until their successors are elected and qualified.

Section 5 of RA 9164 reiterates Section 4 of RA 6679 which provides that [A]ll incumbent barangay officials xxx
shall remain in office unless sooner removed or suspended for cause xxx until their successors shall have been
elected and qualified. Section 8 of the same RA 6679 also states that incumbent elective barangay officials
running for the same office shall continue to hold office until their successors shall have been elected and
qualified.

The application of the hold-over principle preserves continuity in the transaction of official business and
prevents a hiatus in government pending the assumption of a successor into office. As held in Topacio Nueno
v. Angeles, cases of extreme necessity justify the application of the hold-over principle.

 DATU ABAS KIDA VS. SENATE – G.R. NO. 196271, FEBRUARY 28, 2012

D: The COMELEC does not have the power to hold special elections. Its power is limited to enforcing and
administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. Thus, absent any law
authorizing COMELEC to hold special elections, said body cannot be compelled to do the same. In this case,
the petitioners proposed that COMELEC hold a special election for applicable positions for which would be

38
effective during the duration of the interim period between the originally and the new schedule of the ARMM
elections. One of their arguments was that since COMELEC had been given the power to postpone elections
in certain circumstances, it could exercise the same to the case at bar by analogy. The Supreme Court
disagreed, ruling that such circumstances were limited to extralegal and unforeseen events, which does not
include a law passed by Congress. Thus, since Congress did not fix a date for a special election, COMELEC
does not have the power to hold the same.

N: PETITIONS assailing the validity of R.A. No. 10153.

F: The petitioners question the constitutionality of Republic Acts passed by Congress, which aim to
synchronize the regional elections (specifically, ARMM) with the national, congressional and other local
elections (except for barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections). Such laws included provisions applicable
during the interim period or the gap between when the elections were originally scheduled to take place and
when the elections were re-scheduled to take place in order to achieve synchronization. Some petitioners
alleged that the proper action should have been to compel the COMELEC to hold a special election for such
interim period.

I: Whether or not the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional?

H: NO

R: The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as evident from, and exemplified
by, the provisions of the Constitution that fix the date of the elections usually accompanied by the phrase
“unless otherwise provided by law.” These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on
any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except
when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may
have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and
setting another date—May 13, 2011—for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional
and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its
legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the other elections.

The constitutional power of the COMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress to call for, and to set the
date of, elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election. Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to
a specific statutory grant.

While the COMELEC was granted the power to postpone elections to another date under Section 8, BP 881,
such power is limited to specific circumstances, such as: “(a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c) loss or destruction of
election paraphernalia or records, (d)force majeure, and (e) other analogous causes of such a nature that the
holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision.”
Under Section 6, BP 881, circumstances that would allow postponement also include: (a) force majeure, (b)
violence, (c)terrorism, (d) fraud, or (e)other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been
held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or
after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect. As in Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses
instances where the elections do not occur or had to be suspended because of unexpected and unforeseen
circumstances.

In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is by law—i.e., by congressional policy—and is
pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local elections. By no stretch of the
imagination can these reasons be given the same character as the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or
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Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal causes that obstruct the holding of elections. Courts, to be
sure, cannot enlarge the scope of a statute under the guise of interpretation, nor include situations not
provided nor intended by the lawmakers. None of the sections above apply to the case at bar. Thus, the
Supreme Court has no legal basis to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections.

 PANGILINAN V. COMELEC- 228 SCRA 36

D: The Commission on Elections has exclusive original jurisdiction over election contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials.

While the COMELEC has exclusive original jurisdiction over election contests of all elective regional,
provincial and city officials, the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives is the sole judge over
election contests of all its members.

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

F: Petitioner Pangilinan and Private respondent Belmonte were both candidates for congressman in the 4th
legislative district of Quezon City. However respondent was alleged to have violated the Omnibus Election
Code by giving money and other material considerations to influence, induce or corrupt the voters (giving
sacks of rice, ticket to Hong Kong, etc). Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend the Canvass and
Proclamation of Belmonte but COMELEC ignored the said motion.

COMELEC argued that they are not able to judge on pre-proclamation cases involving members of House of
Representatives under Section 15 of R.A. 7166 and COMELEC Resolution 2413 stating that no pre-
proclamation cases for election of President, Vice-President, Senator and Members of House of Representatives
shall be allowed on matters relating to preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and appreciation of the
election returns or certificate of canvass except for manifest errors.

However, petitioner said that the said Section 15 is unconstitutional for violating Section 3, Article IX-C of the
Constitution which provides that COMELEC en banc shall hear and decide pre-proclamation controversies
without further distinction as to whether it is an election for Congress or local electives.

I: Whether Section 15 is unconstitutional for violating Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution.

H: Court ruled that Section 3, Article IX-C should be read in relation to Section 2, Article IX-C which states that
COMELEC has jurisdiction only on election contest of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials. At the
same time, Section 17, Article VI provides that election contests among Members of the Congress shall be
heard and decided by HRET.

Further, since Belmonte was already a member of the Congress, petitioner should file any other issues to the
HRET.

 ROQUE, JR. V. COMLEC - GR NO. 188456, SEPTEMBER 10, 2009

D: The first function of the Comelec under the Constitution—and the Omnibus Election Code for that
matter—relates to the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relating to the conduct of
elections to public office to ensure a free, orderly and honest electoral exercise.

The Comelec is an independent constitutional body with a distinct and pivotal role in our scheme of
government. In the discharge of its awesome functions as overseer of fair elections, administrator and lead
implementor of laws relative to the conduct of elections, it should not be stymied with restrictions that
would perhaps be justified in the case of an organization of lesser responsibility. It should be afforded
ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in devising means and initiatives that would enable it to
40
accomplish the great objective for which it was created—to promote free, orderly, honest and peaceful
elections. This is as it should be for, too often, Comelec has to make decisions under difficult conditions to
address unforeseen events to preserve the integrity of the election and in the process the voice of the
people. Thus, in the past, the Court has steered away from interfering with the Comelec’s exercise of its
power which, by law and by the nature of its office properly pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a clear showing
of grave abuse of discretion on Comelec’s part, as here, the Court should refrain from utilizing the
corrective hand of certiorari to review, let alone nullify, the acts of that body.

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.

F: Petitioners Roque et al filed seeks to nullify the COMELEC award of 2010 Elections Automation Project to
TIM and Smartmatic on the ground that it could lead to a disastrous failure of elections. Petitioners argued
that the contract constitutes as an abdication by the COMELEC of its election-related mandate under the
Constitution, which is to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. This is indicated
in Art. 3.3 of the contract where it specifically states:

SMARTMATIC, as the joint venture partner with the greater track record in automated elections, shall be in
charge of the technical aspects of the counting and canvassing software and hardware, including transmission
configuration and system integration. SMARTMATIC shall also be primarily responsible for preventing and
troubleshooting technical problems that may arise during the elections.

I: Whether there is an abdication by the COMELEC of its Constitutional functions.

H: NO

R: The first function of the COMELEC under the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code for that matter
relates to the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relating to the conduct of elections to
public office to ensure a free, orderly and honest electoral exercise. The RFP (Request for Proposal), which
forms an integral part of the automation contract, states the requirement of a complete solutions provider
which can provide effective overall nationwide project management service under COMELEC supervision and
control.

Sec. 6.7 of the contract also states: Subject to the provisions of the General Instructions to be issued by the
Commission En Banc, the entire processes of voting, counting, transmission, consolidation and canvassing of
votes shall be conducted by COMELECs personnel and officials, and their performance, completion and final
results according to specifications and within the specified periods shall be the shared responsibility of
COMELEC and the PROVIDER.

The role of Smartmatic TIM Corporation is basically to supply the goods necessary for the automation project,
such as but not limited to the PCOS machines, PCs, electronic transmission devices and related equipment,
both hardware and software, and the technical services pertaining to their operation. As lessees of the goods
and the back-up equipment, the corporation and its operators would provide assistance with respect to the
machines to be used by the Comelec which, at the end of the day, will be conducting the election thru its
personnel and whoever it deputizes.

 ARROYO V. DOJ - G .R. NO. 199082 , 23 JULY 2013

D: Under the present law, the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the
Department of Justice (DOJ), now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of
election offenses.

N: MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.

41
F: The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint committee with the Department of
Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies
committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections.

The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint Committee and
Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases composed
of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. In its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that
manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South
Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein
petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral
sabotage.

After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution ordering that information/s
for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed against GMA, et al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel
Arroyo, among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and of Joint Order
No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.

I: Whether the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid? Whether Joint Order No. 001-2011 is
constitutional?

H: The creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid. Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not violate the equal
protection clause.

R: Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the powers and functions of the Comelec. The
grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the
enforcement and administration of all election laws is intended to enable the Comelec to effectively insure to
the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections. The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in
the Comelec was reflected in Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code.

Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is vested exclusively with
the Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same provision of law the authority to avail itself of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the
exclusive jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation had been lodged with the Comelec, the prosecutors
had been conducting preliminary investigations pursuant to the continuing delegated authority given by the
Comelec.

Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team,
should be viewed not as an abdication of the constitutional body’s independence but as a means to fulfill its
duty of ensuring the prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of
ensuring a free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

ON equal protection

Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is in violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because its sole purpose is the investigation and prosecution of certain
persons and incidents. They insist that the Joint Panel was created to target only the Arroyo Administration as
well as public officials linked to the Arroyo Administration.

While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary investigation, not all respondents
therein were linked to GMA as there were public officers who were investigated upon in connection with their

42
acts in the performance of their official duties. Private individuals were also subjected to the investigation by
the Joint Committee.

The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men,
it does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons under like circumstances and
conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

 CAGAS V. COMELEC - G.R. NO. 209185, OCTOBER 25, 2013

D: The Constitution recognizes that the power to fix the date of elections is legislative in nature, which is
shown by the exceptions in previously mentioned Constitutional provisions, as well as in the election of
local government officials.

The Constitution, however, grants the COMELEC the power to “[e]nforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.” The
COMELEC has “exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct
of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections.” The text and intent of Section
2(1) of Article IX(C) is to give COMELEC “all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.”

It is thus not novel for this Court to uphold the COMELEC’s broad power or authority to fix other dates for
a plebiscite, as in special elections, to enable the people to exercise their right of suffrage. The COMELEC
thus has residual power to conduct a plebiscite even beyond the deadline prescribed by law. The date 28
October 2013 is reasonably close to 6 April 2013, and there is no reason why the plebiscite should not
proceed as scheduled by the COMELEC.

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition

F: House Bill No. 4451, creating the province of Davao Occidental, was signed into a law as RA 10360 (Charter
of the Province of Davao Occidental). RA 10360 provides that the date for holding the plebiscite:

Sec. 46. Plebiscite. – The Province of Davao Occidental shall be created, as provided for in this Charter, upon
approval by the majority of the votes cast by the voters of the affected areas in a plebiscite to be conducted and
supervised by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within sixty (60) days from the date of the effectivity
of this Charter.

As RA 10360 was only published on Jan. 12, 2013, it only had until Apr. 6, 2013 to conduct the plebiscite.
COMELEC had suspended the conduct of all plebiscites because of the preparations for the May 13, 2013
National and Local Elections.
COMELEC then decided to hold the plebiscite simultaneously with the Oct. 28, 2013 Barangay Elections to
save on expenses.

Marc Douglas Cagas IV filed a Petition for Prohibition, claiming that the COMELEC is without authority to
hold a plebiscite this coming October 28, 2013 for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental because
Section 46 of Republic Act No. 10360 has already lapsed.

I: Did the COMELEC act without or in excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it resolved to hold the plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao
Occidental on 28 October 2013, simultaneous with the Barangay Elections?

H: No.

43
R: The COMELEC possesses residual power to conduct special elections beyond the deadline prescribed by
law. The April 6, 2013 deadline cannot defeat the right of suffrage of the people as guaranteed by the
Constitution. The COMELEC’s power to administer elections includes the power to conduct a plebiscite
beyond the schedule prescribed by law.

The Constitution does not specify a date as to when plebiscites should be held. This is in contrast with its
provisions for the election of members of the legislature in Section 8, Article VI18 and of the President and
Vice-President in Section 4, Article VII.

The Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." The COMELEC has "exclusive
charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of
ensuring free, orderly and honest elections."

The text and intent of Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) is to give COMELEC "all the necessary and incidental
powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

The Omnibus Election Code provides the COMELEC the power to set elections on another date in cases of
serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force
majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election
should become impossible.

The tight time frame in the enactment, signing into law, and effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, coupled with the
subsequent conduct of the National and Local Elections on 13 May 2013 as mandated by the Constitution,
rendered impossible the holding of a plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao Occidental on or
before 6 April 2013 as scheduled in R.A. No. 10360.

COMELEC’s burden in the accreditation and registration of candidates for the Party-List Elections was
considered. The logistic and financial impossibility of holding a plebiscite so close to the National and Local
Elections is unforeseen and unexpected, a cause analogous to force majeure and administrative mishaps
covered in Section 5 of B.P. Blg. 881.

The COMELEC is justified, and did not act with grave abuse of discretion, in postponing the holding of the
plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao Occidental to 28 October 2013 to synchronize it with the
Barangay Elections.

The legal compass from which the COMELEC should take its bearings in acting upon election controversies is
the principle that " clean elections control the appropriateness of the remedy." In fixing the date for special
elections the COMELEC should see to it that:
1. It should not be later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or
suspension of the election or the failure to elect; and
2. It should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in the
failure to elect.The first involves a question of fact.
This must be determined in the light of the peculiar circumstances of a case. Thus, the holding of elections
within the next few months from the cessation of the cause of the postponement, suspension or failure to elect
may still be considered "reasonably close to the date of the election not held."

 GOH V. BAYRON – 742 SCRA 303

D: ONE OF THE SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS OF THE COMELEC IS TO CONDUCT

RECALL ELECTIONS. WHEN THE COMELEC RECEIVES A BUDGETARY APPROPRIATION FOR ITS
"CURRENT OPERATING EXPENDITURES," SUCH APPROPRIATION INCLUDES EXPENDITURES TO

44
CARRY OUT ITS CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS, INCLUDING THE CONDUCT OF RECALL
ELECTIONS.

N: Petition for Certiorari

F: Alroben J. Goh (Goh) filed before the COMELEC a recall petition, against Mayor Lucilo Bayron, the
incumbent Mayor of Puerto Princesa City, due to loss of trust and confidence brought about by "gross
violation of pertinent provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross violation of pertinent
provisions of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials, Incompetence, and other related
gross inexcusable negligence/dereliction of duty, intellectual dishonesty and emotional immaturity as Mayor
of Puerto Princesa City."

COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9864, affirming the recommendation of the Office of the Deputy Executive
Director (ODEDO). ODEDO found the petition seeking the recall of Mayor Bayron sufficient in form and
substance. However, Resolution No. 9864 suspended all proceedings under the recall petition because the
Financial Services Department (FSD) of the COMELEC raised an issue as to the funding of the entire process of
recall. The COMELEC Chairman and all COMELEC Commissioners signed Resolution No. 9864 without any
separate opinion.

On MR by Mayor Bayron, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9882 suspending any proceeding relative to recall
as the recall process, as stated in said Resolution, does not have an appropriation in the General
Appropriations Act of 2014 (2014 GAA) and the 2014 GAA does not provide the COMELEC with legal
authority to commit public funds for the recall process. Unlike Resolution No. 9864, five COMELEC
Commissioners signed Resolution No. 9882 with a comment or a separate opinion. Itt reasoned that he conduct
of recall is one of several constitutional mandates of the Commission. Unfortunately, it cannot now proceed
with the conduct of recall elections as it does not have an appropriation or legal authority to commit public
funds for the purpose.

Hence, this petition assailing the two resolutions.

I: Whether the COMELEC can suspend the conduct of holding of a recall election by reason of lack of
appropriated funding?

H: NO.

R: The 2014 GAA provides the line item appropriation to allow the COMELEC to perform its constitutional
mandate of conducting recall elections. There is no need for supplemental legislation to authorize the
COMELEC to conduct recall elections for 2014.

Despite Resolution No. 9882's statement about the alleged failure of the 2014 GAA to provide for a line item
appropriation for the conduct of recall elections, we hold that the 2014 GAA actually expressly provides for a
line item appropriation for the conduct and supervision of recall elections. This is found in the Programs
category of its 2014 budget, which the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 is a "line item for the
'Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites.'"

A careful review of the Commission's budget under the 2014 GAA reveals that it does not have any
appropriation or line item budget (line item) to serve as a contingency fund for the conduct of recall elections.
While the Commission has a line item for the "Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes
and plebiscites" under the Program category of its 2014 budget in the amount of Phpl,401,501,000.00, the said
amount cannot be considered as "an appropriation made by law" as required by the Constitution Footnote 4 -
Arl. VI, Section 29 (I)] nor a contingent fund provided under the LGC considering that the said line item is
legally intended to finance the basic continuing staff support and administrative operations of the Commission
such as salaries of officials and ·employees as well as essential office maintenance and other operating
expenses. As such, it cannot be used for the actual conduct of recall elections. (Emphasis supplied)
45
However, contrary to the COMELEC's assertion, the appropriations for personnel ser-Vices and maintenance
and other operating expenses falling under "Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and
plebiscites" constitute a line item which can be augmented from the COMELEC's savings to fund the conduct
of recall elections in 2014. The conduct of recall elections requires only operating expenses, not capital outlays.
The COMELEC's existing personnel in Puerto Princesa are the same personnel who will evaluate the
sufficiency of the recall petitions. and conduct the recall elections

Jurisdiction
 SARMIENTO V. COMELEC- 212 SCRA 307

D: In the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, pre-proclamation cases are classified as Special Cases and in
compliance with the above provision of the Constitution, the 2 Divisions of the Commission are vested
with the authority to hear and decide these special cases. Rule 27 governs Special Cases, Specifically,
Section of the said Rule provides that appeals from rulings of the Board of Canvassers are cognizable by
any of the Divisions to which they are assigned and not by the Commission en banc. DECISION OF THE
COMELEC EN BANC VOID IF THE CASE IS INCLUSIVE OF PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY
NOT FIRST RESOLVED BY A DIVISION.

ALL PRE-PROCLAMATION CASES PENDING BEFORE THE COMELEC SHALL BE DEEMED

TERMINATED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TERM OF THE OFFICE INVOLVED, and the rulings of the
Board of Canvassers concerned shall be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a regular
election protest by the aggrieved party. HOWEVER, PROCEEDINGS MAY CONTINUE WHEN ON THE
BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE THUS FAR PRESENTED, THE COMMISSION DETERMINES THAT THE
PETITION APPEARS MERITORIOUS AND ACCORDINGLY ISSUES AN ORDER FOR THE
PROCEEDING TO CONTINUE OR WHEN AN APPROPRIATE ORDER HAS BEEN ISSUED BY THE
SUPREME COURT IN A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari to review the resolutions of the COMELEC.

F: Special civil actions for certiorari were filed under Rule 65 seek to set aside the Resolutions of respondent
(COMELEC) in 9 Special Cases. Petitioners contends that these resolutions were issued with grave abuse of
discretion because the Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first
referring them to any of its Divisions.

I : Whether COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion?

H: YES

R: Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions
shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

Thus, it is clear that election cases include pre-proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be
heard and decided by a Division of the Commission. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the
authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance.

Further, in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, pre-proclamation cases are classified as Special Cases and 2
divisions of the Commission are vested with the authority to hear and decide these Special Cases.

46
Section 9 of the said Rule provides that appeals from rulings of the Board of Canvassers are cognizable by any
of the Divisions to which they are assigned and not by the Commission en banc.

And only when a motion to reconsider the decision or resolution of the Division was filed within 5 days
from promulgation. The Clerk of Court of the Division shall within 24 hours notify the Presiding
Commission and certify the case to Commission en banc.

 FLORES V. COMELEC- 184 SCRA 484

D: The decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be appealed to
the regional trial court, must be declared unconstitutional.

Decisions of the COMELEC on election contests involving municipal and barangay offices shall be final
and not appealable applies to questions of fact.

N: PETITION for certiorari to review the judgment of the Commission on Elections

F: Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of canvassers as having the highest number of votes for
kagawad on the March 1989 elections, in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus proclaimed punong
barangay in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. 6679. However, his election was protested by private
respondent Rapisora, who placed second in the election with one vote less than the petitioner. The Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong barangay in place of the
petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the latter’s total. Flores appealed to the RTC, which affirmed
the challenged decision in toto. The judge agreed that the four votes cast for “Flores” only, without any
distinguishing first name or initial, should all have been considered invalid instead of being divided equally
between the petitioner and Anastacio Flores, another candidate for kagawad. The total credited to the
petitioner was correctly reduced by 2, demoting him to second place.

The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on the ground that it had no power to
review the decision of the RTC, based on Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that decisions of the RTC in a protest
appealed to it from the municipal trial court in barangay elections “on questions of fact shall be final and
non-appealable”. In his petition for certiorari, the COMELEC is faulted for not taking cognizance of the
petitioners appeal.

I: Whether or not the decisions of Municipal or Metropolitan Courts in barangay election contests are subject
to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC considering Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679?

H: The dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely different and more significant ground, to wit,
Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall “Exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction”. Municipal or Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited jurisdiction,
their decisions in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
COMELEC under the afore-quoted section. Hence, the decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, should have been appealed directly to the COMELEC and not to the RTC. Accordingly, Section 9 of
Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a
barangay election case should be appealed to the RTC, must be declared unconstitutional.

 PEOPLE V. HON. DELGADO- 189 SCRA 715

D: "What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions' of the COMELEC reviewable on
certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the
47
COMELEC and taken cognizance of by said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers."

Aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide election contests and
administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to
conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code
before the competent court.

When the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an
election offense and upon aprima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the proper
court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition
of said case must be subject to the approval of the court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation
of the case without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by the court. The records of the
preliminary investigation required to be produced by the court must be submitted by the COMELEC. The
trial court may rely on the resolution of the COMELEC to file the information, by the same token that it
may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, in the
issuance of the warrant of arrest. Nevertheless the court may require that the record of the preliminary
investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance
of a warrant of arrest. The refusal of the COMELEC or its agents to comply with the order of the trial court
requiring them to conduct a reinvestigation in this case and to submit to the court the record of the
preliminary investigation on the ground that only this Court may review its actions is certainly untenable.

N: PETITION for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Toledo City

F: 1988: Comelec received complaint for allege several violation of the Omnibus election code by several
people in Cebu. The Provincial Election Supervisor was tasked to conduct preliminary investigation. After
finding of prima facie cases, the Comelec filed 15 Informations before RTC Toledo City. Comelec tasked its
Regional Election Director to prosecute these cases

Respondents filed MR and a petition for the suspension of the service of the warrants of arrest on the ground
of lack of preliminary investigation. RTC judge granted the motion and ordered Comelec to conduct a
reinvestigation of said cases and to submit report within ten (10) days after termination thereof

COMELEC protested on the ground that it is an independent constitutional body, whose actions on election
matters may be reviewed only on certiorari by the Supreme Court.

Judge Delgado contended that since the cases were filed in his court by the COMELEC as a public prosecutor,
and not in the exercise of its power to decide election contests, it has authority to order a reinvestigation

I: WON only the Supreme Court that may review the decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the
COMELEC?

H: No

R: Aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide election contests and
administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to
conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code
before the competent court.

Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of
an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the proper
court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case.

48
Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court.

The COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless so
ordered by the court.

The records of the preliminary investigation required to be produced by the court must be submitted by the
COMELEC.

The trial court may rely on the resolution of the COMELEC to file the information, by the same token that it
may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, in the
issuance of the warrant of arrest.

Nevertheless the court may require that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy
itself that there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

Also as the petition is brought by the Comelec in the name of the People of the Philippines, it must secure the
consent of the Solicitor General.

 PEOPLE V. JUDGE INTING- 187 SCRA 788

D: COMELEC IS EMPOWERED TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS IN CASES

INVOLVING ELECTION OFFENSES FOR THE PURPOSE OF HELPING THE JUDGE DETERMINE
PROBABLE CAUSE AND FOR FILING AN INFORMATION IN COURT.

N: PETITION to review the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City

F: On February 6, 1988, Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of
Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), for allegedly transferring her, a
permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and
without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by law. COMELEC directed
Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, Provincial Election Supervisor of Dumaguete City:
1. To conduct the preliminary investigation of the case
2. To prepare and file the necessary information in court
3. To handle the prosecution if the evidence submitted shows a prima facie case
4. To issue a resolution of prosecution or dismissal as the case may be

After a preliminary investigation of Barba's complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, on
September 26, 1988, he filed with the respondent trial court a criminal case for violation of section 261, Par. (h),
Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor. In an Order dated September 30, 1988, the respondent court
issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC Mayor. It also fixed the bail at five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) as recommended by the Provincial Election Supervisor. However before Mayor Regalado could be
arrested the trial court set aside its order on the grounds that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine
probable cause. Atty. Lituanas filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was quashed by the trial courts.

I: Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses
have to be coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of
the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists?

H: No.
R: Preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination
of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in

49
nature. It is part of the prosecution's job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly
called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge.

Article IX Sec 2 of the constitution states that The COMELEC has the power to investigate but also prosecute
violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations
in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for
filing an information in court. Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparent that the respondent trial court
misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed by the Provincial Election
Supervisor. As indicated above what the respondent trial court should have done was to enforce its September
30, 1988 order, to wit: It should have said probable cause exists, issued a warrant of arrest and placed bail at
Php 5,000. The order to get the approval of the Provincial Fiscal is not only superfluous but unwarranted.

 JARAMILLA V. COMELEC- 414 SCRA 337

D: ELECTION CASES INCLUDING PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES SHOULD FIRST BE

HEARD AND DECIDED BY A DIVISION OF THE COMELEC, AND THEN BY THE COMMISSION EN
BANC IF A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE DIVISION IS FILED.

When the case demands only the exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative functions, such as the
correction of a manifest mistake in the addition of votes or an erroneous tabulation in the statement of
votes, the COMELEC en banc can directly act on it in the exercise of its constitutional function to decide
questions affecting elections.

COMELEC has authority to suspend the reglementary periods provided by the rules, or the requirement of
certification of non-forum shopping in the interest of justice and speedy resolution of the cases before it.

COMELEC is not constrained to dismiss a case before it by reason of non-payment of filing fees;
COMELEC has discretion whether to entertain the petition or not in case of non-payment of legal fees.

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari

F: Antonio Suyat and Alberto J. Jaramilla both ran for the position of Member of the Sangguniang Bayan in the
Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur in the May 14, 2001 elections. On May 16, 2001, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Sta. Cruz, proclaimed the winning candidates for the offices of Mayor, Vice-Mayor and eight (8)
members of the Sangguniang Bayan. The Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation shows the
following results and ranking with respect to the members of the Sangguniang Bayan, to wit:

Name of Candidates Total Votes Obtained

1-6 is irrelevant
7. JARAMILLA, Alberto Jimeno 4,815
8. CORTEZ, Ireneo Habon 4,807

In the tabulated results issued by the Election Officer and Chairperson of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Sta. Cruz, it is shown that [respondent Suyat] obtained Four thousand seven hundred seventy nine (4,779)
votes and was ranked no. 9.

Upon review by Suyat, he discovered that Jaramilla was credited with only 23 votes per Election Return from
Precinct No. 34A1. However, when the figures were forwarded to the Statement of Votes by Precinct, Jaramilla
was credited with 73 votes for Precinct No. 34A1 or fifty (50) votes more than what he actually obtained. If the
entry were to be corrected, the affected candidates would be ranked as follows:
7. CORTEZ, Ireneo Habon 4,807
8. SUYAT, Antonio 4,779
9. JARAMILLA, Alberto 4,765

50
In a petition, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion/Petition is hereby GRANTED. The proclamation of
Respondent ALBERTO J. JARAMILLA is ANNULLED.

I: Whether the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction to decide on the merits of the case?

H: Yes.

R: Article IX-C of the Constitution states in part that:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions
shall be decided by the Commission en banc

As stated in the provision, and in line with the Courts recent pronouncement in Milla v. Balmores-Laxa,
election cases including pre-proclamation controversies should first be heard and decided by a division of the
COMELEC, and then by the commission en banc if a motion for reconsideration of the division is filed.

It must be noted however that this provision applies only in cases where the COMELEC exercises its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, and not when it merely exercises purely administrative functions.
This doctrine was laid out in Castromayor v. COMELEC, and reiterated in subsequent cases. Accordingly,
when the case demands only the exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative functions, such as the
correction of a manifest mistake in the addition of votes or an erroneous tabulation in the statement of
votes, the COMELEC en banc can directly act on it in the exercise of its constitutional function to decide
questions affecting elections.

The Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors in the case at bar alleges an erroneous copying of figures from
the election return to the Statement of Votes by Precinct. Such an error in the tabulation of the results, which
merely requires a clerical correction without the necessity of opening ballot boxes or examining ballots,
demands only the exercise of the administrative power of the COMELEC. Hence, the Commission en banc
properly assumed original jurisdiction over the aforesaid petition.

 BUAC V. COMELEC- 421 SCRA 92

D: The COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions contesting the results of plebiscites under its power to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of a plebiscite under Article IX-C,
Section 2(1) of the Constitution. Implied in said power is the power to check and verify the true results of
the plebiscite either through a pre-proclamation case or through revision of ballots. In this case, private
respondent questioned the jurisdiction of COMELEC over a petition contesting the result of the plebiscite held
in Taguig the subject of which was the conversion of Taguig from a municipality to a city. In the original result
proclaimed, the NO votes won and it was proclaimed that the people rejected the conversion.

A case assailing the regularity of the conduct of a plebiscite does not fit the kind of a case calling for the
exercise of judicial power—it does not involve the violation of any legally demandable right and its
enforcement. In the case at bar, the conduct of the Taguig plebiscite is the core of the controversy. This is a
matter that involves the enforcement and administration of a law relative to a plebiscite. It falls under the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX (C) of the Constitution which gives it the power
“to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of a x x x plebiscite x x x.”

Another reason why the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to resolve disputes involving plebiscite results
should be upheld is that such a case involves the appreciation of ballots which is best left to the COMELEC

51
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Mandamus

F: On April 25, 1998, the COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in Taguig, Metro Manila on the conversion of this
municipality into a highly urbanized city as mandated by Republic Act No. 8487. The residents of Taguig were
asked this question: “Do you approve the conversion of the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila into a
highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Taguig, as provided for in Republic Act No. 8487? ”

On April 26, 1998, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC), without completing the canvass of sixty-four
(64) other election returns, declared that the “No” votes won, indicating that the people rejected the conversion
of Taguig into a city.

However, upon order of the COMELEC en banc, the PBOC reconvened and completed the canvass of the
plebiscite returns, eventually proclaiming that the negative votes still prevailed.

Alleging that fraud and irregularities attended the casting and counting of votes, private respondents, filed
with the COMELEC a petition seeking the annulment of the announced results of the plebiscite with a prayer
for revision and recount of the ballots. The COMELEC treated the petition as an election protest, docketed as
EPC No. 98-102. It was raffled to the Second Division.

Petitioner intervened in the case. He then filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction over an action involving the conduct of a plebiscite. He alleged that a plebiscite
cannot be the subject of an election protest.

The COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution granting petitioner’s motion and dismissing the petition
to annul the results of the Taguig plebiscite for lack of jurisdiction. The COMELEC en banc affirmed this
Resolution.

Accordingly, on April 19, 2004, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order in EPC No. 98-102
constituting the committees for the revision/recount of the plebiscite ballots.

On April 28, 2004, the revision/recount proceedings commenced and upon its termination, the Committees on
Revision submitted their complete and final reports.

Thereafter, the COMELEC Second Division set the case for hearing. As no witnesses were presented by
petitioner, the parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda, which they did.

Petitioner contends that “the revision of the plebiscite ballots cannot be relied upon for the determination of
the will of the electorate” because “the revision is incomplete. He claims that:

“Based on the Final Report of the Committee on Revision for each of the eight (8) Revision Committees, the
revision of ballots yielded a total of 15,802 votes for ‘Yes’ and a total of 12,602 votes for ‘No.’ The revision
committee thus canvassed only a total of 28,404 ballots.

As shown by the records, the COMELEC considered not only the total number of votes reflected in the Final
Canvassing Report of the Taguig PBOC, but also the voting results based on (1) the physical count of the
ballots; (2) the returns of the uncontested precincts; and (3) the appreciation of the contested ballots, all
summed up and tallied as follows:

Affirmative Negative
Total Number of Votes Per PBOC Canvassing Report 19,413 21,890
Minus: Number of Invalid Votes 253 419
Minus: Number of Votes Deducted from the
Plebiscite Returns After Physical Count (Table D) 0 2,024
52
Plus: Number of Votes Added After Physical Count 1,936 0
(Table D)
Plus: Credited Claimed Ballots 9 13
Total 21,105 19,460

I: Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions contesting the results of plebiscites?

H: YES

R: First, the issue in the case at bar is the determination of the sovereign decision of the electorate of
Taguig. The purpose of this determination is more to protect the sovereignty of the people and less to
vindicate the private interest of any individual. Such a determination does not contemplate the clash of private
rights of individuals and hence cannot come under the traditional jurisdiction of courts.

Second, a plebiscite involves the expression of the public will on a public issue. The determination of the
public will is a subject that does not fit the jurisdiction of civil courts, for civil courts are established essentially
to resolve controversies between private persons.

Third, if jurisdiction is given to the regular courts, the result will not enhance the orderly administration of
justice. Any regional trial court from every nook and corner of the country will have jurisdiction over a
petition questioning the results of a nationwide plebiscite. Bearing in mind that the jurisdiction of these courts
is limited only within their respective judicial regions, the difficulties that will attend their exercise of
jurisdiction would be many if not unmanageable.

Fourth, the intent of the Constitution and election laws is to subject only contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of elected officials—from the barangay to the President of the Philippines—to the
exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial powers of courts or administrative tribunals. Contests which do not
involve the election, returns and qualifications of elected officials are not subjected to the exercise of the
judicial or quasi-judicial powers of courts or administrative agencies. Clearly, controversies concerning the
conduct of a plebiscite appertain to this category. In the case at bar, the conduct of the Taguig plebiscite is the
core of the controversy. This is a matter that involves the enforcement and administration of a law relative to a
plebiscite. It falls under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX (C) of the Constitution
which gives it the power “to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of a x x x
plebiscite x x x.”

Fifth, the Court agreed with the OSG: “To enforce means to cause to take effect or to cause the performance
of such act or acts necessary to bring into actual effect or operation, a plan or measure. When we say the
COMELEC has the power to enforce all laws relative to the conduct of a plebiscite, it necessarily entails all the
necessary and incidental power for it to achieve the holding of an honest and credible plebiscite .
Obviously, the power of the COMELEC is not limited to the mere administrative function of conducting the
plebiscite. The law is clear. It is also mandated to enforce the laws relative to the conduct of the plebiscite.
Hence, the COMELEC, whenever it is called upon to correct or check what the Board of Canvassers
erroneously or fraudulently did during the canvassing, can verify or ascertain the true results of the
plebiscite either through a pre-proclamation case or through revision of ballots.”

Sixth, the conduct of plebiscites and determination of their results have always been, since the country’s first
Constitution and election laws, with the COMELEC and not the regular courts.

Seventh, the MR by private respondent was filed out of time.

 PEOPLE V. BASILLA- 179 SCRA 87

53
D: The investigation and prosecution of election offenses are, in an important sense, more important than
the maintenance of physical order in election precincts. Without the assistance of provincial and city fiscals
and their assistants and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the
prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses committed before or in the course of
nationwide elections would simply not be possible, unless, perhaps, the COMELEC had a bureaucracy
many times larger than what it actually has. Moreover, the prosecution officers designated by the
COMELEC become deputies or agents of the COMELEC and pro tanto subject to the authority, control and
supervision of the COMELEC in respect of the particular functions covered by such deputation. The acts of
such deputies within the lawful scope of their delegated authority are, in legal contemplation, the acts of
the COMELEC itself. The only limitation the Constitution itself places upon the COMELEC’S authority
over its deputies relates to the enforcement of such authority through administrative sanctions. Such
sanctions—e.g., suspension or removal—may be recommended by the COMELEC to the President (Sec. 2
[8], Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution) rather than directly imposed by the COMELEC, evidently, to pre-empt
and avoid potential difficulties with the executive department of the Government where the prosecution
and other officers deputized are ordinarily located.

N: PETITION for certiorari to review the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate

F: After May 1987 congressional elections in Masbate, complaints for violations of Section 261 of the Omnibus
Election Code (BP Blg. 881) were filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate against the private
respondents, Jolly Fernandez, then Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Governor, against the spouses Jaime
and Adoracion Tayong — for vote-buying; Ladislao Bataliran against Salvacion Colambot —for vote buying;
and PC/Sgt Arturo Rebaya against Melchor Yanson, for carrying of deadly weapon, filed in the Regional Trial
Court, Respondent Judge Henry Basilla motu proprio dismissed the three (3) informations filed by the
Provincial Fiscal, giving the following justification:

The record shows that the complainant filed the complaint with the fiscal and not with the COMELEC. The
COMELEC did not investigate the case.The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines says: "Sec. 2(6) of
Art. IX (C) The Commission on Election shall exercise the following powers and functions:
; investigate and, when appropriate prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or omissions,
constituting election frauds offenses, malpractices."

The Omnibus Election Election Code of the Philippines (BP Blg, 881) says:
Sec. 265. Prosecution. — The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to
prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government;
Provided, however, that in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months
from his filing, the complaint may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice.
for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted. (Sec. 182, 1978, EC; and Sec. 66. BP 697)
In the landmark case of De Jesus vs. People, the the Supreme Court ruled:

The grant to the COMELEC of the power. among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative to the
conduct of election and the concomitant authority to investigate andprosecute election offenses is not without
compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to
ensure the free, and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result i ii the frustration of the true
will of the people and make a mere Idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to
vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses committed by
public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear
constitutional mandate.

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, inasmuch as the election offense was not investigated and
prosecuted by the COMELEC. the case is motu proprio dismissed.

54
I: Whether Commission on Elections has authority to deputize the chief state prosecutors, provincial and city
fiscals and their assistants, under Sections 2 (4) and (8), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution?

Whether Comelec did deputize such prosecution officers to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints
for alleged violation of election laws and to institute criminal informations therefor?

H: The Petition must be granted.

R: There is no dispute that the Comelec is vested with power and authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code and to prosecute such
offenses in court under Section 265.

We note that while Section 265 of the Code vests "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary investigation of
election offenses and to prosecute the same upon the Comelec, it at the same time authorizes the Comelec to
avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the Government. Section 2 of Article IX-C of the 1 987
Constitution clearly envisage that the Comelec would not be compelled to carry out all its functions directly
and by itself alone.

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of
voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
(8) recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of
any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.

The concurrence of the President with the delegation by Comelec of the prosecuting arms of the Government,
was expressed in general terms and in advance in Executive Order No. 134, entitled "Enabling Act for the
Elections for members of Congress on May 11, 1987, and for other purposes."

The contention of private respondents that the deputation by the Comelec of the prosecuting arms of the
Government would be warranted only before the elections and only to ensure tree, honest, orderly, peaceful
and credible elections, that is, to perform the peace-keeping functions of policemen, lack substance. There is
nothing in Section 2 (4) of Article IX-C of the Constitution which requires such a pinched niggardly
interpretation of the authority of the Comelec to appoint as its deputies, officials or employees of other
agencies and instrumentalities of the government. The prompt investigation and prosecution and disposition
of election offenses constitute an indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections. The investigation and prosecution of election offenses are, in an important sense, more
important than the maintenance of physical order in election precinct. 'without the assistance of provincial
and city fiscals and their assistants and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the Department of
Justice, the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses committed before or in the
course of nationwide elections would simply not be possible, unless, perhaps, the Comelec had a
bureaucracy many times larger than what it actually has. Moreover, the prosecution officers designated by
the Comelec become deputies or agents of the Comelec and pro tanto subject to the authority, control and
supervision of the Comelec in respect of the particular functions covered by such deputation. The acts of
such deputies within the lawful scope of their delegated authority are, in legal contemplation, the acts of the
Comelec itself. The only limitation the Constitution itself places upon the Comelec's authority over its deputies
relates to the enforcement of such authority through administrative sanctions. Such sanctions-e.g., suspension
or removal-may be recommended by the Comelec to the President (Sec. 2 [8], Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution)
rather than directly imposed by the Comelec, evidently, to pre-empt and avoid potential difficulties with the
55
executive department of the Government where the prosecution and other officers deputized are ordinarily
located.

All this the respondent Judge disregarded when he motu proprio dismissed the criminal informations filed in
this case. The cases he cited in his identical orders — De Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA 760 (1983) and Corpus, et
al. v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281 (1987) can offer him no comfort at all; for these cases do not relate to the
authority of the Comelec to deputize the regular prosecution arms of the Government for the investigation and
prosecution of election offenses and those cases are not in conflict with our ruling here.

Petition Granted.

 TAN V. COMELEC- 237 SCRA 353

D: The COMELEC’s mandate includes its authority to exercise direct and immediate supervision and
control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any national or local law
enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law to perform duties relative to
the conduct of elections. In order to help ensure that such duly deputized officials and employees of
government carry out their respective assigned tasks, the law has also provided that upon the COMELEC’s
recommendation, the Secretary of the Department of Justice shall take appropriate action, whether to
suspend or remove from office the officer or employee who may, after due process, be found guilty of
violation of election laws or failure to comply with instructions, orders, decisions or rulings of the
COMELEC.

Prior to making recommendation, it is the COMELEC, being in the best position to assess how its
deputized officials and employees perform or have performed in their duties that should conduct the
administrative inquiry.

THE COMELEC MERELY MAY ISSUE A RECOMMENDATION FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION BUT
THAT IT IS THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT TO WHICH THE CHARGED OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE
BELONGS WHICH HAS THE ULTIMATE AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE THE DISCIPLINARY PENALTY.

N: PETITION for review of an order of the Commission on Elections

F: Petitioner Tan is the incumbent city prosecutor of Davao City, and was designated by the petitioner to be
the Vice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers of Davao City. Based on the canvassed votes, Garcia was
proclaimed the winning candidate for the Congressman of District 2 of Davao City. Respondent Alterado, also
a candidate, filed numerous cases questioning the validity of the proclamation, alleging unlawful, erroneous,
and irregular canvassing.

HRET dismissed the electoral protest filed by the respondent. Ombudsman likewise dismissed the criminal
complaint for falsification of public documents filed by the respondent. Still pending is an administrative
charge instituted before the COMELEC against the City Board Canvassers for misconduct and gross
incompetence of duty.

Petitioner alleged lack of jurisdiction of the COMELEC, he being under the executive department.

I: Whether COMELEC has jurisdiction

H: YES.

R: The COMELEC's authority under Section 2(6-8), Article IX, of the Constitution is virtually all-encompassing
when it comes to election matters. It should be stressed that the administrative case against petitioner, taken

56
cognizance of by, and still pending with, the COMELEC, is in relation to the performance of his duties as an
election canvasser and not as a city prosecutor. The COMELEC's mandate includes its authority to exercise
direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees, including
members of any national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government, required by
law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections.

The COMELEC, being in the best position to assess how its deputized officials and employees perform or have
performed in their duties that should conduct the administrative inquiry. To say that the COMELEC is without
jurisdiction to look into charges of election offenses committed by officials and employees of government
outside the regular employ of the COMELEC would be to unduly deny to it the proper and sound exercise of
such recommendatory power and, perhaps more than that, even a possible denial of due process to the official
or employee concerned.

 PANLILIO V. COMELEC - GR NO. 181478, JULY 15, 2009

D: The remedy to assail an interlocutory order of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Division is
neither to file a motion for reconsideration for certification to the COMELEC En Banc nor to elevate the
issue to the Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; It is the same
COMELEC’s Division which issued the interlocutory order who should resolve the motion for
reconsideration of the order.

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc shall decide motions for reconsideration only of
“decisions” of a Division, meaning those acts having a final character.

The Court states the rules in election protests cognizable by the COMELEC and courts of general
jurisdiction, as follows: The rule in this jurisdiction is clear and jurisprudence is even clearer. In a string of
categorical pronouncements, we have consistently ruled that when there is an allegation in an election
protest that would require the perusal, examination or counting of ballots as evidence, it is the ministerial
duty of the trial court to order the opening of the ballot boxes and the examination and counting of ballots
deposited therein.

Filing of a protest before the Board of Election Inspectors is not a condition sine qua non before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) acquires jurisdiction over the present election protest

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

F: Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
nullification of the following issuances of the COMELEC:
(1) COMELEC Second Division Order1 dated July 23, 2007 giving due course to respondent Lilia G.
Pineda’s election protest and, inter alia, directing the revision of ballots of the protested precincts of the
Province of Pampanga;
(2) COMELEC Second Division Order2 dated August 1, 2007 denying petitioner Governor Eddie T.
Panlilio’s motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order; and
(3) COMELEC En Banc Order3 dated February 6, 2008 denying petitioner’s omnibus motion to (a) certify
his said motion for reconsideration to the COMELEC En Banc; and (b) stay Order dated August 7, 2007
directing the collection of ballot boxes in the contested precincts.

The parties herein were two of the contending gubernatorial candidates in the province of Pampanga during
the May 14, 2007 national and local elections. On May 18, 2007, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Pampanga proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected governor of Pampanga having garnered the highest
number of votes of Two Hundred Nineteen Thousand Seven Hundred Six (219,706) votes with a winning
margin of One Thousand One Hundred Forty-Seven (1,147) votes over the 218,559 votes of private respondent.

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On May 25, 2007, private respondent filed an election protest against petitioner based on the following
grounds:
a) Votes in the ballots lawfully and validly cast in favor of protestant were deliberately misread and/or
mis-appreciated by the various chairmen of the different boards of election inspectors;
b) Thousands of votes of protestant such as "NANAY BABY", her registered nickname were intentionally
and/or erroneously not counted or tallied in the election returns as votes validly cast for the protestant;
c) Valid votes legally cast in favor of protestant were considered stray;
d) Ballots containing valid votes for protestant were intentionally and erroneously mis-appreciated or
considered as marked and declared as null and void;
e) Ballots with blank spaces in the line for governor were just the same read and counted in favor of
protestee;
f) Ballots prepared by persons other than the voters themselves and fake or unofficial ballots wherein the
name of protestee was written illegally, read and counted in favor of the latter;
g) Groups of ballots prepared by one (1) person and/or individual ballots prepared by two (2) persons
were purposely considered as valid ballots and counted in favor of protestee;
h) Votes that are void because the ballots containing them were pasted with stickers or because of pattern
markings appearing in them or because of other fraud and election anomalies, were unlawfully read
and counted in favor of the protestee; and,
i) Votes reported in numerous election returns were unlawfully increased in favor of the protestee, while
votes in said election returns for the protestant were unlawfully decreased ("dagdag-bawas"), such that
the protestee appeared to have obtained more votes than those actually cast in his favor, while the
protestant appeared to have obtained less votes than the actually cast in her (protestant’s) favor; and,
j) Moreover, buying of votes and other forms of vote-buying were resorted to by protestee in order to
pressure voters to vote for him or not to cast their votes for the protestant herein.

On June 12, 2007, petitioner filed his answer with counter-protest and counterclaims. On July 23, 2007, the
COMELEC, Second Division, issued the first assailed order giving due course to private respondent’s election
protest and directed among others, the revision of ballots pertaining to the protested precincts of the Province
of Pampanga.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order but the same was denied by the same
Division, in the second challenged Order dated August 1, 2007. On August 1, 2007, private respondent filed
her compliance stating that she deposited with the COMELEC Four Million Eight Hundred Eighty Six pesos
(P4,000,886.00) pursuant to the July 23, 2007 Order.

On August 8, 2007, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (1) to certify his earlier motion for reconsideration at
the COMELEC En Banc; and (2) to stay the COMELEC’s order directing the collection of ballot boxes.
Thereafter, on August 16, 2007, petitioner filed an urgent motion to hold in abeyance the retrieval and
collection of ballot boxes.
On February 6, 2008, the COMELEC En Banc issued the third assailed Order, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, protestee Eddie Panlilio’s Omnibus Motion dated August 7, 2007 is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Consequently, the Order of the Commission (Second Division) dated August
16, 2007 ordering the Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) of Pampanga to defer the inventory, sealing and
transmittal of the contested ballot boxes involved in this case is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

In arriving at such a disposition, the COMELEC En Banc ratiocinated that the assailed orders of the COMELEC
Second Division were interlocutory orders, which are not one of the orders required by Section 5 (C) Rule 3
and Section 5 Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure to be certified to the Commission en banc for
resolution.

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Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari contending that the COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his omnibus motion and in failing to
dismiss the alleged sham election protest filed by private respondent against him:
Petitioner insists that the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion when it denied his omnibus motion
to certify his earlier motion for reconsideration and to stay the order directing the collection of ballot boxes of
the contested precincts in the province of Pampanga. He argues that Section 5, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, on which the omnibus motion was anchored, clearly mandates the Presiding Commissioner of
the Division of the COMELEC to certify the case to the COMELEC En Banc once a motion for reconsideration
is filed, regardless of whether the order or resolution sought to be reconsidered is an interlocutory order or a
final one.

I: Whether there was grave abuse of discretion.

H: No

R: Since the COMELEC’s Division issued the interlocutory Order, the same COMELEC Division should
resolve the motion for reconsideration of the Order. The remedy of the aggrieved party is neither to file a
motion for reconsideration for certification to the COMELEC En Banc nor to elevate the issue to this Court via
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 5, Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure governs motions for reconsideration of decisions of a COMELEC Division, as follows:

SEC. 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed of. - Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four (24) hours
from the filing thereof, notify the presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter
certify the case to the Commission en banc.

In Gementiza v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained the import of this rule in this wise:
Under the above-quoted rule, the acts of a Division that are subject of a motion for reconsideration must have a
character of finality before the same can be elevated to the COMELEC en banc. The elementary rule is that an
order is final in nature if it completely disposes of the entire case. But if there is something more to be done in
the case after its issuance, that order is interlocutory.

Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raised before the COMELEC en banc. Section 3, Article
IX-C of the 1987 Constitution mandates that only motions for reconsideration of final decisions shall be
decided by the COMELEC en banc, thus: SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in Division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

It is clear from the foregoing constitutional provision that the COMELEC En Banc shall decide motions for
reconsideration only of "decisions" of a Division, meaning those acts having a final character. Here, the
assailed Second Division order did not completely dispose of the case, as there was something more to be
done, which was to decide the election protest. Being interlocutory, the assailed Second Division orders may
not be resolved by the COMELEC En Banc.

Furthermore, the present controversy does not fall under any of the instances of which the COMELEC En Banc
can take cognizance. Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
SEC. 2. The Commission En Banc. – The Commission shall sit en banc in cases hereinafter specifically
provided, or in pre-proclamation cases upon a vote of a majority of the members of the Commission, or in all
other cases where a division is not authorized to act, or where, upon a unanimous vote of all the Members of a
Division, an interlocutory matter or issue relative to an action or proceeding before it is decided to be referred
to the Commission en banc.

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This case is not among those specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in which the
COMELEC may sit en banc. Neither is it one where a Division is not authorized to act nor one where the
members of the Second Division have unanimously voted to refer the issue to the COMELEC En Banc. Thus,
the COMELEC En Banc is not the proper forum where petitioner may bring the assailed interlocutory Orders
for resolution.

The July 23, 2007 Second Division Order was not a final disposition of the case. It was an interlocutory order,
which resolved an incidental matter and which did not put a complete end to the controversy. Accordingly,
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the said order was correctly resolved by the COMELEC Second
Division, which issued the assailed order. Hence the COMELEC En Banc cannot be faulted for issuing its
February 6, 2008 Order denying petitioner’s Omnibus Motion to certify his motion for reconsideration to the
COMELEC En Banc and to stay the order for the collection of ballot boxes.

Petitioner would next argue that the August 21, 2007 COMELEC Second Division’s Order denying his motion
for reconsideration was attended by serious irregularities, warranting a closer review by the COMELEC En
Banc. According to petitioner, despite his thirty-nine page motion for reconsideration filed on July 31, 2007, the
COMELEC Second Division sweepingly disposed of the same motion and issued an order denying the subject
motion the following day, or on August 1, 2007, an order that was signed by the Presiding Commissioner only.
A cursory reading of the motion for reconsideration8 shows that the grounds raised therein were a mere
rehash of the ground raised in his Answer,9 which prayed for the dismissal of the election protest. There was
no point in reiterating and discussing anew the issues previously resolved. Instead of assailing the COMELEC
Second Division for immediately resolving petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, it should be commended
for doing so.

This Court has emphasized that in this species of controversy involving the determination of the true will of
the electorate, time is indeed of paramount importance – second to none, perhaps, except the genuine will of
the majority. To be sure, an election controversy, which by its very nature touches upon the ascertainment of
the people’s choice as gleaned from the medium of the ballot, should be resolved with utmost dispatch,
precedence and regard to due process. The considerations that dictate early on the expeditious disposition of
election protests hold true today. The term of an elective office is short. There is the contestant’s personal stake
which generates feuds and discords. Above all is the public interest. A title to public elective office must not be
left long under a cloud. The efficiency of public administration should not be impaired. It is thus
understandable why pitfalls that may retard the determination of election contests should be avoided. Courts
should heed the imperative need for dispatch. Obstacles and technicalities that fetter the people’s will should
not stand in the way of a prompt termination of election contests. For the same reason, COMELEC’s rules of
procedure for the verification of protests and certifications of non-forum shopping should be liberally
construed, and COMELEC’s interpretation of such rules in accordance with its constitutional mandate should
carry great weight.
Quintos v. Commission on Elections ruled as follows:
We agree with the Solicitor General that the alleged lack of verification of private respondents’s Manifestation
and motion for Partial Reconsideration is merely a technicality that should not defeat the will of the electorate.

The COMELEC may liberally construe or even suspend its rules of procedure on the interest of justice,
including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending before the COMELEC.

We also see no irregularity in the fact that the Order dated August 1, 2007 was signed only by the Presiding
Commissioner of the Second Division. He acted within the authority vested in him by Section 6, Rule 2 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides:

SECTION 6. Powers and Duties of the Presiding Commissioner. – The powers and duties of the Presiding
Commissioner of a Division when discharging its functions in cases pending before the Division shall be as
follows:
(a) To issue calls for the sessions of the Division;
(b) To preside over the sessions of the Divisions;
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 (c) To preserve order and decorum during the sessions of the Division;
(d) To sign interlocutory resolutions, orders or ruling and temporary restraining orders in cases
already assigned to the Division;
(e) To decide all questions or order, subject to appeal to the full Division; and
(f) To take such other measures as he may deem proper upon consultation with the other members of
the Division.

Petitioner’s claim – that the COMELEC Second Division’s Order dated August 1, 2007 denying his motion for
reconsideration is defective because the order does not contain the facts and the law on which it is based –
deserves scant consideration. The issuance of a minute order/ resolution has long been sanctioned in this
jurisdiction. The minute Order of August 1, 2007, which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,
reiterated the COMELEC Second Division’s earlier Order dated July 23, 2007, which sufficiently stated the
facts and the law on which it was based.

Petitioner likewise imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in giving due course to
private respondent’s election protest. Petitioner insists that the election protest is a sham and is insufficient in
form and substance.

In Miguel v. COMELEC,13 the Court belittled the petitioner’s argument that the protestant had no cause of
action, as the allegations of fraud and irregularities, which were couched in general terms, were not sufficient
to order the opening of ballot boxes and counting of ballots. The Court states the rules in election protests
cognizable by the COMELEC and courts of general jurisdiction, as follows:

The rule in this jurisdiction is clear and jurisprudence is even clearer. In a string of categorical
pronouncements, we have consistently ruled that when there is an allegation in an election protest that would
require the perusal, examination or counting of ballots as evidence, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to
order the opening of the ballot boxes and the examination and counting of ballots deposited therein.
In a kindred case, Homer Saquilayan v. COMELEC,14 the Court considered the allegations in an election
protest, similar to those in this case, as sufficient in form and substance.

Again, in Dayo v. COMELEC,15 the Court declared that allegations of fraud and irregularities are sufficient
grounds for opening the ballot boxes and examining the questioned ballots. The pronouncement is in
accordance with Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code, which reads:

Judicial counting of votes in election contest. – Where allegations in a protest or counter-protest so warrant, or
whenever in the opinion of the court in the interests of justice so require, it shall immediately order the book of
voters, ballot boxes and their keys, ballots and other documents used in the election be brought before it and
that the ballots be examined and the votes recounted.

In this case, the COMELEC Second Division found that the allegations in the protest and counter-protest
warranted the opening of the contested ballot boxes and the examination of their contents to settle at once the
conflicting claims of petitioner and private respondent.

In an election case, the election tribunal has an imperative duty to ascertain, by all means within its command,
who is the real candidate elected by the electorate. Indeed, the Court frowns upon any interpretation of the
law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of votes in an election,
but also the correct ascertainment of the results.16

Lastly, petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in giving due course to the election protest, notwithstanding that private respondent failed to
raise her objections first before the Board of Election Inspectors.

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The filing of a protest before the Board of Election Inspectors is not a condition sine qua non before the
COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over the present election protest. Jurisdiction is conferred only by law and
cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties.
Section 2(2), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, reads:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications
of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

The COMELEC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials. Since the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitioner’s election protest, it
has the authority to issue the assailed Orders.17

We quote with approval the COMELEC’s ratiocination on this matter:

As to the assertion of Protestee that objections should have been first raised before the Board of Election
Inspectors, the same holds no water. Such failure is not fatal to her instant protest case as the same is not a
requirement precedent to the acquisition by the Commission of jurisdiction over the case.

Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to an
excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. We
find none in this case.

BEDOL V. COMELEC - GR NO. 179830, DECEMBER 3, 2009

D: The Commission on Elections possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its
constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions of
paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx (6) xxx;
investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

The quasi-judicial power of the Commission on Elections embraces the power to resolve controversies
arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation
controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications, while its quasi-
legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to
exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress.

The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of
fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by
the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the administrative
agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact
to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the
law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the
administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of
discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected, it is elementary that in the
proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.

62
Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind the
allegations of massive fraud during the elections in Maguindanao.

The effectiveness of the quasi-judicial power vested by law on a government institution hinges on its
authority to compel attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the hearings or proceedings; To
withhold from the Commission on Elections the power to punish individuals who refuse to appear during
a fact-finding investigation, despite a previous notice and order to attend, would render nugatory the
COMELEC’s investigative power, which is an essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure the
conduct of honest and credible elections.

The powers of the board of canvassers are not purely ministerial—the board exercises quasi-judicial
functions, such as the function and duty to determine whether the papers transmitted to them are genuine
election returns signed by the proper officers.

The board exercises quasi-judicial functions, such as the function and duty to determine whether the
papers transmitted to them are genuine election returns signed by the proper officers. When the results of
the elections in the province of Maguindanao were being canvassed, counsels for various candidates
posited numerous questions on the certificates of canvass brought before the COMELEC. The COMELEC
asked petitioner to appear before it in order to shed light on the issue of whether the election documents
coming from Maguindanao were spurious or not. When petitioner unjustifiably refused to appear,
COMELEC undeniably acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions.

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

F: Lintang Bedol was the Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the province of Mindanao. Due
to allegations that fraud attended the conduct of elections in Maguindanao, the COMELEC created Task Force
Maguindanao to conduct a fact-finding investigation on the conduct of elections and certificates of canvass
from Maguindanao. Bedol was required to appear before the Task Force, but failed to do so. He also came out
on national newspapers in an exclusive interview with the ‘Inquirer’ and GMA-7, with a gleaming 45 caliber
pistol strapped to his side, and in clear defiance of the Commission posted the challenge by saying that “those
that are saying that there was cheating in Maguindanao, file a case against me tomorrow, the next day. They
should file a case now and I will answer their accusations.” COMELEC held Bedol in contempt. Bedol
questions the COMELEC’s jurisdiction to initiate or prosecute the contempt proceedings against him. He
claimed that the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction in initiating the contempt proceedings when it was
performing is administrative functions as National Board of Canvassers -- not its quasi-judicial functions.

I: Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to initiate or prosecute the contempt proceedings against
Bedol?

H: Yes.

R: COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its constitutional duty to enforce
and administer all election laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the
1987 Constitution, which reads: (6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of
election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

The provision gives COMELEC all the necessary and incidental power for it to achieve the objective of holding
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COMELEC MAY BE CLASSIFIED INTO:

1) Administrative - Refers to the enforcement and administration of election laws.
2) Quasi-legislative - Refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws
and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress.

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3) Quasi-judicial -Embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of
election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications.

It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide
in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.

The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which
is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to
or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying
out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for
their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.

The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the
truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in Maguindanao.

The effectiveness of the quasi–judicial power vested by law on a government institution hinges on its authority
to compel attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the hearings or proceedings.

Arnault v. Nazareno: Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and
also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is
essential to obtain what is needed.

To withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals who refuse to appear during a fact-finding
investigation, despite a previous notice and order to attend, would render nugatory the COMELEC’s
investigative power, which is an essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure the conduct of honest
and credible elections.

 IBRAHIM VS. COMELEC - G.R. NO. 192289, JANUARY 8, 2013

D: Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution in part substantially provides that any decision, order or
ruling of any of the Constitutional Commissions may be brought for review to the Supreme Court on
certiorari within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. The orders, ruling and decisions rendered or issued
by the COMELEC en banc must be final and made in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
power. Further, Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states that it shall govern the review of final
judgments and orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.

A pre-proclamation controversy is defined in Section 241 of the OEC as referring to “any question
pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate
or by any registered political party or coalition of parties before the board or directly with the Commission,
or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns.” Section 243 of the OEC restrictively enumerates
as follows the issues which can be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered
with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof
as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code;
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are
obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
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 (d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results
of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.

The simple purpose and duty of the canvassing board is to ascertain and declare the apparent result of the
voting while all other questions are to be tried before the court or other tribunal for contesting elections or
in quo warranto proceedings.

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition

F: Petitioner Kamarudin Ibrahim (Ibrahim) filed his certificate of candidacy to run as municipal Vice-Mayor.
Thereafter, respondent Rolan G. Buagas (Buagas), then Acting Election Officer in the said municipality,
forwarded to the COMELECs Law Department (Law Department) the names of candidates who were not
registered voters therein. The list included Ibrahim’s name.

Consequently, COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution dated December 22, 2009 disqualifying Ibrahim for not
being a registered voter of the municipality where he seeks to be elected without prejudice to his filing of an
opposition. It prompted Ibrahim to file Petition/Opposition but was denied by the COMELEC en banc
through a Resolution dated May 6, 2010. In this resolution, the COMELEC declared that the Resolution dated
December 22, 2009 was anchored on the certification, which was issued by Buagas and Acting Provincial
Election Supervisor of Maguindanao, Estelita B. Orbase, stating that Ibrahim was not a registered voter of the
municipality where he seeks to be elected.

On the day of the election, during which time the Resolution dated May 6, 2010 had not yet attained finality,
Ibrahim obtained the highest number cast for the Vice-Mayoralty race. However, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBOC), which was then chaired by Buagas, suspended Ibrahim’s proclamation. Thus, this
petition.

I: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
resolutions.

H: The petition is meritorious.

R: The COMELEC en banc is devoid of authority to disqualify Ibrahim as a candidate for the position of Vice-
Mayor.

In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through the herein assailed resolutions, ordered Ibrahim’s
disqualification even when no complaint or petition was filed against him yet. Let it be stressed that if filed
before the conduct of the elections, a petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy under
Section 78 of the OEC is the appropriate petition which should have been instituted against Ibrahim
considering that his allegedly being an unregistered voter of his municipality disqualified him from running as
Vice-Mayor. His supposed misrepresentation as an eligible candidate was an act falling within the purview of
Section 78 of the OEC. Moreover, even if we were to assume that a proper petition had been filed, the
COMELEC en banc still acted with grave abuse of discretion when it took cognizance of a matter, which by
both constitutional prescription and jurisprudential declaration, instead aptly pertains to one of its divisions.

 JALOSJOS VS. COMELEC - G.R. NO. 205033 , JUNE 18, 2013

D: Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution requiring a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc may take action is confined only to cases where the COMELEC exercises its quasi-
judicial power. It finds no application, however, in matters concerning the COMELEC’s exercise of
administrative functions. The distinction between the two is well-defined. As illumined in Villarosa v.
COMELEC, 319 SCRA 470 (1999): The term ‘administrative’ connotes, or pertains, to ‘administration,
especially management, as by managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution,

65
application, or conduct of persons or things. It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production
and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon. While a ‘quasi-judicial function’ is a term
which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to
investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a
basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.

Same; As petitioner’s disqualification to run for public office had already been settled in a previous case
and now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the COMELEC En Banc to cancel his Certificate of
Candidacy as a matter of course, else it be remiss in fulfilling its duty to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.

The Cancellation of COC may be done by the Comelec en banc motu propio in the exercise of its mandate to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election.

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

F: Jalosjos was convicted of 2 counts of statutory rape and 6 counts of acts of lasciviousness. He was sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification.
President Arroyo commuted his sentence and was eventually discharged from prison. He filed his certificate of
candidacy (COC) for mayor of Zambaonga City. Though there were 5 petitions asking for the cancellation of
his COC, the Comelec acted motu propio in cancelling said COC. COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio
Resolution No. 9613 resolving "to CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Romeo
G. Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections" due to his perpetual
absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter registration requirement

Jalosjos: COMELEC En Banc usurped the COMELEC Divisions’ jurisdiction by cancelling motu proprio
petitioner’s CoC through a Resolution

I: WON the Comelec en banc may motu propio cancel a COC?

H: YES

R: Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for
public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the
COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict
from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final
judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government agencies
tasked to implement the final judgment under the law. COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its quasi-
judicial functions when it issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any pending
petition or resolve any election case before it or any of its divisions. It merely performed its duty to enforce
and administer election laws in cancelling petitioner’s CoC on the basis of his perpetual absolute
disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by his final conviction.

In this regard, the COMELEC En Banc was exercising its administrative functions, dispensing with the need
for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same
being required only in quasi-judicial proceedings.

Art. IX-D

Section 1.

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 1. There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners,
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age, Certified Public Accountants with not less than ten years of
auditing experience, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. At no time shall all
Members of the Commission belong to the same profession.
2. The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of
those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one Commissioner for
five years, and the other Commissioner for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.

Section 2.
1. The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and
settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of
funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of
its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters, and on a post- audit basis:
a. constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal
autonomy under this Constitution;
b. autonomous state colleges and universities;
c. other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and
d. such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly,
from or through the Government, which are required by law or the granting
institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However,
where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the
Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as
are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general
accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law,
preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
2. The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to
define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods
required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including
those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant,
or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.

Section 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiaries in
any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission
on Audit.

Section 4. The Commission shall submit to the President and the Congress, within the time fixed
by law, an annual report covering the financial condition and operation of the Government, its
subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and non-governmental entities subject to its audit, and recommend measures
necessary to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. It shall submit such other reports as may
be required by law.
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 C. Commission on Audit ("COA")

Appointment and Term

 FUNA V. COA – G.R. NO. 192791, APRIL 24, 2012

D: Jurisprudence tells us that the word “reappointment” means a second appointment to one and the same
office. As Justice Arsenio Dizon (Justice Dizon) aptly observed in his dissent in Visarra v. Miraflor, 8 Phil.
1 (1963), the constitutional prohibition against the reappointment of a commissioner refers to his second
appointment to the same office after holding it for nine years. As Justice Dizon observed, “[T]he occupant
of an office obviously needs no such second appointment unless, for some valid cause, such as the
expiration of his term or resignation, he had ceased to be the legal occupant thereof.” The inevitable
implication of Justice Dizon’s cogent observation is that a promotion from commissioner to chairman,
albeit entailing a second appointment, involves a different office and, hence, not, in the strict legal
viewpoint, a reappointment. Stated a bit differently, “reappointment” refers to a movement to one and the
same office. Necessarily, a movement to a different position within the commission (from Commissioner to
Chairman) would constitute an appointment, or a second appointment, to be precise, but not
reappointment.

Where the Constitution or, for that matter, a statute, has fixed the term of office of a public official, the
appointing authority is without authority to specify in the appointment a term shorter or longer than what
the law provides—if the vacancy calls for a full seven-year appointment, the President is without discretion
to extend a promotional appointment for more or for less than seven (7) years.

The explicit command of the Constitution is that the “Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed
by the President x x x for a term of seven years [and] appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.” To repeat, the President has two and only two options on
term appointments. Either he extends an appointment for a full 7-year term when the vacancy results from
the expiration of term, or for a shorter period corresponding to the unexpired term of the predecessor when
the vacancy occurs by reason of death, physical disability, resignation or impeachment. If the vacancy calls
for a full seven-year appointment, the Chief Executive is barred from extending a promotional appointment
for less than seven years. Else, the President can trifle with terms of office fixed by the Constitution.

A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an
appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman.
Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the
length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed
seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death,
resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that “reappointment” found in Sec.
1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or
Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position
or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict
legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.

F: Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA
Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008.
Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly
thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment.

He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of
the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in this recourse,
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Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as
COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of seven (7) years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine,
that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008
when he was appointed to that position.

Meanwhile, Evelyn R. San Buenaventura (San Buenaventura) was appointed as COA Commissioner to serve
the unexpired term of Villar as Commissioner or up to February 2, 2011.

I: Whether Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after having served for four
(4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations imposed
under, and the circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution

H: The appointment of then Commissioner Reynaldo A. Villar to the position of Chairman of the Commission
on Audit to replace Guillermo N. Carague, whose term of office as such chairman has expired, is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violation of Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution.

Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, reads:

(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the
Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for
three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of
the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity. (Emphasis added.)

The Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the expiration of
the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven
(7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional.
i. The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of
the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system
prescribed by the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or
impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such
appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of
terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full term of
seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in the
Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are also
covered by the prohibition against reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an
appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing
chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate
period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor
will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman
resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that
“reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office
(Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment
involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a
new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the
Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Reappointment is prohibited for the obvious intent of the framers is to prevent the president from
“dominating” the Commission by allowing him to appoint an additional or two more commissioners. On the
69
other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional appointment from commissioner to
chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full term of seven years, further qualified by the third
sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that “the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired
portion of the term of the predecessor.” In addition, such promotional appointment to the position of
Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the commission membership such
that the aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be
appointed to the position of Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system
in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional appointment
from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the aforestated circumstances or conditions.

Powers and Functions

 DINGCONG V. GUINGONA, JR. - 162 SCRA 782

D: Not only is the Commission on Audit (COA) vested with the power and authority, but it is also charged
with the duty, to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to x x x the expenditures or uses of funds
x x x owned x x x by, or pertaining to, the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities (Article IX [D], Section 2 [1], 1987 Constitution). That authority extends to the accounts of
all persons respecting funds or properties received or held by them in an accountable capacity (Section 26,
P.D. No. 1445). In the exercise of its jurisdiction, it determines whether or not the fiscal responsibility that
rests directly with the head of the government agency has been properly and effectively discharged
(Section 25[1], ibid.), and whether or not there has been loss or wastage of government resources. It is also
empowered to review and evaluate contracts (Section 18 [4], ibid.). And, after an audit has been made, its
auditors issue a certificate of settlement to each officer whose account has been audited and settled in
whole or in part, stating the balances found due thereon and certified, and the charges or differences
arising from the settlement by reason of disallowances, charges or suspensions (Section 82, ibid.).

N: APPEAL by certiorari to review the decision of the Commission on Audit

F: An appeal on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the decision of respondent Commission on Audit
(COA) in its 7th Indorsement of 1 September 1986 disallowing petitioner's claim for reimbursement of
payments he had advanced for services rendered on "pakyao" basis in the renovation and improvement of the
office of the Bureau of Treasury, Iloilo City.

Petitioner, Atty. Praxedio P. Dingcong, was the former Acting Regional Director of Regional Office No. VI of
the Bureau of Treasury in Iloilo City, until his retirement on 17 January 1984.

On three occasions—June 1982, September 1982 and February 1983—petitioner, after public bidding,
contracted, admittedly on an "emergency labor basis," the services of one Rameses Layson, a private carpenter
and electrician on "pakyao" basis for the renovation and improvement of the Bureau of Treasury Office, Iloilo
City. Layson submitted the lowest bids so that the contracts were awarded to him.

Subsequently, Layson was hired as a casual employee in the Bureau of Treasury Office in order to do away
with the hiring of a private carpenter and electrician.

When petitioner retired on 17 January 1984, among the items disallowed by the Resident Auditor was the
amount of P6,574.00 from the labor contracts with Layson, by reducing the latter's daily rate from P40.00 per
day to P18.00 daily.

I: Whether the disallowance is invalid for being a usurpation of a management function and an impairment of
contract?

H: NO.

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R: Not only is the Commission on Audit (COA) vested with the power and authority, but it is also charged
with the duty, to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to ... the expenditures or uses of funds ...
owned ... by, or pertaining to, the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities (Article
IX [D], Section 2 [1],1987 Constitution). That authority extends to the accounts of all persons respecting funds
or properties received or held by them in an accountable capacity (Section 26, P. D. No. 1445). In the exercise of
its jurisdiction, it determines whether or not the fiscal responsibility that rests directly with the head of the
government agency has been properly and effectively discharged (Section 25[1], Ibid.), and whether or not
there has been loss or wastage of government resources. It is also empowered to review and evaluate contracts
(Section 18 [4], Ibid.). And, after an audit has been made, its auditors issue a certificate of settlement to each
officer whose account has been audited and settled in whole or in part, stating the balances found due thereon
and certified, and the charges or differences arising from the settlement by reason of disallowances, charges or
suspensions (Section 82, Ibid.).

Viewed in this light, the disallowance made by COA is neither illegal nor a usurpation of a management
function. The authority of the petitioner, as agency head, to enter into a contract is not being curtailed. What
COA maintains is that the "pakyao" contract has proved disadvantageous to the government.

 DANVILLE MARITIME, INC. V. COA - 175 SCRA 701

D: Under the Constitution, COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination,
establish the techniques and methods required therefore, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules
and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or use of government funds and properties. Thus,
interpretations by COA as the office charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of statutes
applicable to public biddings should be given controlling weight. In the absence of error or abuse of power or
lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion already conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a
legislative enactment creating or charging a governmental agency with the administration and enforcement
thereof, the action of the agency would not be disturbed by the judicial department. In this case, petitioner
alleged that the COA did not have the authority to declare the bidding in question as a failure due to lack of
competition. The Supreme Court disagreed and gave COA’s interpretation controlling weight.

N: PETITION for review from the decision of the Commission on Audit.

F: PNOC authorized the sale by public bidding of its turbine tanker named “T/T Andres Bonifacio” due to old
and high cost of maintenance. The sale was advertised and embassies were formally notified. However, only
during the sale, there was only one bidder, petitioner Daville Maritime, who was immediately declared the
winning bidder. Thereafter, PNOC and petitioner executed a Memorandum of Agreement for the sale. The
Commission on Audit issued a memorandum to the Chairman of the Disposal Committee in charge of the sale
advising the latter to submit the proposed contract to COA before it is signed, and that the public bidding
conducted suffered from the deficiency of lack of competition as there was only one bidder and that
negotiation with the lone bidder may not be resorted to as there were less than two public biddings held.
PNOC’s president requested for formal approval of the COA of the sale. A few days later, PNOC received a
telex from Fearnly Finans, a Norweigan company, offering to buy the vessel on negotiated sale for a price of at
least US$1 million higher than the bid given by Danville.

COA, through a letter, denied PNOC’s request for approval of sale in favor of Danville on the ground that the
initial bidding did not comply with the 1988 Amendments to the Implementing Rules and Regulations of PD
1594 (Prescribing Policies, Guidelines, Rules and Regulations for Government Infrastructure Contracts) which
states:
“At the time of opening of bids, there shall be at least two (2) competing bidders. In case there is only one
bidder, the bid shall be returned unopened and the project shall be advertised anew for bidding. Should after

71
rebiding, there be still only one bidder, the project, may be undertaken by administration or thru negotiated
contract giving preference to the lone bidder.

COA explained that while P.D. No. 1594 pertains only to infrastructure service contracts, its provisions
governing the evaluation of bids partake of a National Government policy in the matter of public biddings,
and hence are equally applicable to those conducted for assets disposition. COA directed a public rebidding of
the vessel. COA informed the PNOC that the award of the contract to a lone bidder suffers from the deficiency
of lack of competition, which is a condition sine qua non in public biddings and declared the bidding
conducted to be a failure.

Danville (petitioner) seeks to set aside a letter-directive of respondent Commission on Audit, which
disapproved the result of the public bidding held by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) for the sale
of its tanker-vessel “T/T Andres Bonifacio.” PNOC did not reply to the request of Danville to join the suit.

I: Whether or not COA had the authority to interpret the term “public bidding” and determine what
constitutes its “failure’?

H: YES

R: The Constitution grants COA exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish
the techniques and methods required therefore, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or use of government funds and properties.

The COA, realizing that the applicable law and rules and regulations as to the disposal of government assets
failed to provide for a clear definition of “failure of public bidding,” of government assets, properly considered
the definition under the implementing rules of P.D. 1594 which governs infrastructure projects to be applicable
in the disposition of government assets.

Well settled is the rule that the construction by the office charged with implementing and enforcing the
provisions of a statute should be given controlling weight. In the absence of error or abuse of power or lack
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion already conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a
legislative enactment creating or charging a governmental agency with the administration and enforcement
thereof, the action of the agency would not be disturbed by the judicial department.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion. COA has clearly
shown its position to the PNOC in its questioned letter-directive advising the latter of its misgivings as to why
the award was given to the lone bidder in spite of regulations previously made known to PNOC and to top it
all, why the PNOC perfunctorily rejected a much higher bid which appears to be more beneficial to the
corporation. Rather than condemn the COA as petitioner proposes, the COA should be commended for its zeal
and care in insuring that the disposition of the subject vessel would be in a manner most advantageous to the
government. A rebidding removes any suspicion that may arise out of the sale of the vessel to petitioner under
present circumstances.

 RAMOS V. AQUINO - 39 SCRA 256

D: The final approval by the Auditor-General under Section 2, Art. XI of the Constitution, in relation to Sec.
657 of the Revised Administrative Code, of certain accounts, even if no 'appeal therefrom has been made, is
no valid ground to prohibit the Provincial Fiscal from conducting an investigation for the purpose of
determining the criminal liability for malversation of public funds thru falsification of public documents
of petitioners, arising from disbursements of public funds already audited and approved by the Auditor-
General.

72
The reasons why final approval by Auditor-General under the Constitution and applicable statutes of
certain accounts, even if no appeal therefrom has been made is no bar to conducting an investigation for
purposes of determining the criminal liability of certain persons arising out of the accounts already
approved and audited by the Auditor-General are: (1) At most, such a duty of the Auditor-General goes no
further than requiring him to call the attention of the proper administrative officer of the existence of such
a situation (i.e., expenditures of public funds or property which, in his opinion, are irregular, excessive,
etc.) but does not even extend to the power "to refuse and disapprove payment of such expenditures, * * * "
(Guevara v. Gimenez, L-17115, Nov. 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 807 , 813) ; and (2) The conclusive effect of the finality
of the Auditor General's decision relates solely to the administrative aspect of the matter.

N: APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal

F: Petitioner are assailing jurisdiction of Benjamin Aquino, then Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to conduct
preliminary investigation of the alleged commission of malversation through falsification of public, official
and commercial documents imputed to them by the other respondent, then the Commanding General,
Philippine Army, Fort Bonifacio, Rizal, Romeo Espino.

The basis for such a motion was that under the Constitution, the Auditor General is not only vested with the
duty to examine or audit all expenditures of funds of the Government, but also to audit or investigate and
"bring to the attention of the proper administrative officer expenditures of funds or property which in his
opinion are irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant." It is their contention that under the above, it is
incumbent on the Auditor General to determine whether criminal responsibility for the anomaly discovered in
the courage of his audit or examination of the accounts lies. It was further contended that the decisions of the
Auditor-General on the correctness of the vouchers on which the alleged of cases were based having become
final and irrevocable, not even the courts could substitute its findings.

A Motion to Dismiss was then filed by the accused-petitioner, which was denied. Lower Court stated this view
would constitute encroachment of judicial functions by the Auditor General and it is a well-settled doctrine
that an injunction cannot restrain a fiscal of the rightful execution of his duty to prosecute.

I: Whether there is an encroachment on the constitutional prerogatives of the Auditor General if provincial
fiscal conducts a preliminary investigation for cases of malversation through falsification of public, official and
commercial documents.

H: NO, Constitutional. Fiscal can conduct PI.

R: The Auditor General, as noted, is vested with the power to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining
to the revenues and receipts from whatever source, and to audit expenditures of funds or property pertaining
to or held in trust by the government. HOWEVER, the ascertainment of whether a crime was committed and
by whom is definitely another.

Nowhere does it appear that such a statutory grant of authority of the Auditor General to open revised
accounts carries with it the power to determine who may be constituted in the event that in the preparation
thereof a crime has been committed. The conclusive effect of the finality of his decision on the execution of
branch of the government thus relates solely to the administrative aspect of the matter. His powers do not
include participation in the investigation of charges (otherwise it stretches his Constitutional power to
“unwarranted limits”).

Also, It is well-settled that, as a matter of general rule, the writ of prohibition will not issue to restrain criminal
prosecution."

 MAMARIL V. DOMINGO - 227 SCRA 206

73
D: The responsibility for state audit is vested by the Constitution on the Commission on Audit. State audit
is not limited to the auditing of the accountable officers and the settlement of accounts but includes
accounting functions and the adoption in the audited agencies of internal control, to see to it, among other
matters, that the correct fees and penalties due the government are collected.

The verification of the correctness of the evaluation and computation of the fees and penalties collectible
under the Land Transportation Law (R.A. No. 4136) are parts of the functions of the COA, which examines
and audits revenue accounts.

N: PETITION for certiorari to set aside the decision of the Commission on Audit.

F: Petitioner Mamaril was a former evaluator/computer at the LTO San Pablo Branch. In the course of the
performance of his duties, he committed errors in his evaluation and computation, resulting in the under
collection of registration, license, and other miscellaneous fees and penalties. Petitioner availed of the Early
retirement program under RA 6683. As a result of the decision of the COA, holding that the amount of
P44,515.90 be withheld from petitioner’s terminal leave pay other than his retirement gratuity, he has not
received in full the benefits due him from his retirement. Petitioner contended that he was not an accountable
officer under PD 1445 since: His work was purely clerical; He did not come into the possession of any money
or property for which he is now asked to pay; He did not acted in bad faith or with gross negligence

I: WON the COA has the power over non accountable officers.

H: YES.

R: The responsibility for state audit is vested by the Constitution on the Commission on Audit. Under the
Constitution, the COA "shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts,
pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in
trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, . . . .
However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt
such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the
deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by
law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto." (Art. IX-D, Sec. 2, par. 1)

Section 2(2) of the above article states that the COA is given the "exclusive authority, subject to the limitations
in this Article to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the technique and methods required
therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, . . ."

As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions of the Constitution, state audit is not limited to the auditing
of the accountable officers and the settlement of accounts, but includes accounting functions and the adoption
in the audited agencies of internal controls to see to it, among other matters, that the correct fees and penalties
due the government are collected.

When any person is indebted to any government agency, the COA may direct the proper officer to withhold
the payment of any money due such person or his estate to be applied in satisfaction of the indebtedness.

 OSMEÑA V. COA - 238 SCRA 463

D: COA has the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to revenue
and receipts of, and expenditures, and uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining
to the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters. In the exercise of its broad powers, particularly its
auditing functions, the COA is guided by certain principles and state policies to assure that “government
funds shall be managed, expended, utilized in accordance with law and regulations, and safeguarded

74
against loss or wastage x x x with a view to ensuring efficiency, economy and effectiveness in the
operations of government.”

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

F: The controversy had its origin in the stabbing by an unknown assailant of Reynaldo de la Cerna, the son of
the de la Cerna Spouses. He was rushed to the Cebu City Medical Center, but unfortunately died that night.
His parents claimed that Reynaldo would not have died were it not for the “ineptitude, gross negligence,
irresponsibility, stupidity and incompetence of the medical staff” of the Medical Center.

The de la Cerna Spouses accordingly instituted in the RTC of Cebu City a civil action, for recovery of damages,
based Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Named defendants were the city of Cebu, the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
and five physicians of the Cebu City Medical Center. The City of Cebu which, according to the complaint,
“operates, maintains, and manages the Cebu City Medical Center”, was impleaded as defendant on the theory
that as employer of the alleged negligent doctors, it was vicariously responsible for the latter’s negligence since
it failed to exercise due care and vigilance over the doctors while acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, to prevent them from causing the death of Reynaldo. The Civil Code provision relied upon by plaintiffs,
pertinently reads as follows:

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but
also for those persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

xxx xxx xxx

After the action had been pending for some time, negotiations for an amicable settlement were commenced,
which culminated in an agreement designed to put an end to the controversy in a manner acceptable to the
parties.

Since the compromise agreement included a provision for the payment of the sum of P30,000.00 to the
plaintiffs by defendant City of Cebu, the agreement was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City.
The sanggunian authorized “the City Budget Officer … to include in Supplemental Budget … of the
City . . .the amount of P30,000.00 for financial assistance to the parents of the late Reynaldo de la Cerna…

The agreement was also submitted to the RTC which rendered a judgment “(f)inding the same to be in
conformity with law, morals and public policy” and enjoining the parties “to comply strictly with the terms
and conditions thereof.”

About 11 months later, however respondent COA disallowed the “financial assistance” thus granted to the
spouses de la Cerna, saying that “no real or substantial relation to the public health, morals, or general welfare
of the community can be perceived from the act of giving such financial assistance.

The City of Cebu filed an MR, and the same “denied due course” by respondent Commission. Respondent
ruled that the motion was filed more than a year after receipt by the City government of notice of its Decision
and thereforethe decision had already become final and executory.

In behalf of the City of Cebu, Mayor Osmeña has come to this Court ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the
COA and its Members in so disallowing the city’s appropriation of P30,000.00 made conformably with the
compromise agreement in the civil suit against the City, embodied in due course in the Trial Court’s judgment.
Hence this petition for certiorari

75
I: WON COA commited grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the payment of P30,000.00 for the
compromise agreement between the parties herein involved.

H Yes. The assailed COA decisions are hereby nullified and set aside. Respondent COA is ORDERED to
approve and allow in audit the appropriation of P30,000.00 of Cebu City approved in connection with the
judicial compromise executed by it in the Civil before the RTC of Cebu City

R: There is to be sure no question that under the Constitution, respondent COA has the power, authority, and
duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to revenue and receipts of, and expenditures, and
uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters.
A compromise is a bilateral act or transaction that it expressly acknowledged as a juridical agreement by the
Civil Code and is therein dealt with in some detail. “A compromise,” declares Article 2208 of said Code, “is a
contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced.” The Civil Code not only defines and authorizes compromises, it in fact encourages them in civil
actions.

The participation by the City in negotiations for an amicable settlement of a pending litigation and its eventual
execution of a compromise relative thereto, are indubitably within its authority and capacity as a public
corporation; and a compromise of a civil suit in which it is involved as a party, is a perfectly legitimate
transaction, not only recognized but even encouraged by law.

That the City of Cebu complied with the relevant formalities contemplated by law can hardly be doubted. The
compromise agreement was submitted to its legislative council, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which approved
it conformably with its established rules and procedure, particularly the stipulation for the payment of
P30,000.00 to the de la Cerna family. Neither may it be disputed that since, as a municipal corporation, Cebu
City has the power to sue and be sued, it has the authority to settle or compromise suits, as well as the
obligation to pay just and valid claims against it.

Obviously, respondent refused to take account of the foregoing legal principles in relation to the antecedents
of the provision in the supplemental budget of the City for payment of P30,000.00. It failed to realize that
payment thereof was part of the consideration, not merely for the settlement of a claim, but for the settlement
of an actual controversy, and constituted one of the “reciprocal concessions” which the law considers “the very
heart and life of every compromise.”

By making reciprocal concessions, the parties in the civil case before the trial court put an end to the action in a
manner acceptable to all of them. The City thus eliminated the contingency of being made to assume heavier
liability in said suit for damages instituted against it in connection with its operation and management of the
Cebu City Medical Center, activities being undertaken by it in its proprietary (as distinguished from its
government) functions and in accordance with which it may be held liable ex contractu or ex delito, for the
negligent performance of its corporate, proprietary or business functions.

It is noteworthy that the compromise in question was approved by, and embodied in the judgment of, the
Court, which pronounced it “to be in conformity with law, morals and public policy” and enjoined the parties
“to comply strictly with the terms and conditions thereof.”

This judicial compromise is conclusive and binding on all the parties, including the City of Cebu. It is
enforceable by execution, as above stressed. There was no reason whatever to object to it, much less disallow
any disbursement therein stipulated. It should have been approved as a matter of course.

 BUSTAMANTE V. COA - 216 SCRA 134

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D: The Commission on Audit shall have the following powers and functions: “(1) Examine, audit, and
settle, in accordance with law and regulations, all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or
any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations; keep the gen-eral accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by
law, preserve the vouchers pertaining thereto; and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations including those for the prevention of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant
expenditures or uses of funds and property. x x x.” (Article XII-D, 1973 Constitution.)

If We will not sustain the Commission’s power and duty to examine, audit and settle accounts pertaining to
this particular expenditure or use of funds and property, owned or held in trust by this government-owned
and controlled corporation, the NPC, We will be rendering inutile this Constitutional Body which has been
tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government’s, and ultimately,
the people’s property.

N: PETITION for certiorari with preliminary injunction to review the decision of the Commission on Audit.

F: Benito Bustamante was a Regional Legal Counsel of the National Power Corporation (NPC) for the
Northern Luzon Regional Center. He was issued a government vehicle. Pursuant to NPC policy reflected in
Resolution 81-95, authorizing the monthly disbursement of transportation allowance, Bustamante claimed his
transportation allowance for the month of January 1989. This was in addition to the use of the government
vehicle. Regional Auditor Martha Roxana Canburian disallowed his claim. Bustamante’s appeal to the
Commission on Audit was denied. Hence, the present petition where Bustamante claims that: Under the
NPC Charter (RA 6395), the NPC has the power to formulate and adopt policies and measure for the its
management and operation. It is in pursuance to this, that Resolution 81-95, authorizing the monthly
reimbursement of representation and transportation allowance, was passed. Therefore, the Commission on
Audit usurped the statutory functions of the NPC to promulgate its own rules.

I: Whether or not the Commission on Audit usurped the NPC’s authority to promulgate its own rules?

H: No.

R: The Constitution provides that the Commission on Audit shall have the power and function to examine,
audit, and settle, in accordance with law and regulations, and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds
and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies,
or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations; keep the general accounts of the
Government and, for such period vouchers pertaining thereto; and promulgate accounting and auditing rules
and regulations including those for the prevention of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant
expenditures or uses of funds and property. (1973 Constitution)

In the exercise of such power it promulgated COA Circular No. 75-6 dated November 7, 1975, regulating the
use of government motor vehicles, aircrafts and watercrafts, which, among others, provides:

VI. Prohibition Against Use of Government Vehicles by Officials provided with transportation allowance ––

No official which has been furnished motor transportation allowance by any government corporations or other
office shall be allowed to use mother vehicle transportation operated and maintained from funds appropriated
in the abovecited Decree.

The use of government motor vehicle and the claim for transportation allowance are mutually exclusive.

Bustamante’s contention that the Commission, in the exercise of its power granted by the Constitution,
usurped the statutory functions of the NPC Board of Directors, cannot be sustained for its leads to the absurd
conclusion that a mere Board of Directors of a government-owned and controlled corporation, by issuing a
77
resolution, can put to naught a constitutional provision which has been ratified by the majority of the Filipino
people.

If the Commission's power and duty to examine, audit and settle accounts pertaining to this particular
expenditures or use of funds and property, owned or held in trust by this government-owned and controlled
corporation (NPC) is not sustained, this Constitutional Body, which has been tasked to be vigilant and
conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately, the people's property, will
be rendered inutile.

 OROCIO V. COA - 213 SCRA 109

D: Power of Commission on Audit to audit includes prevention of irregular, unnecessary, excessive or

extravagant expenditures or uses of funds or property by government-owned or controlled corporations.

The NPC, as a government-owned corporation, is under the COA’s audit power. Under the 1973
Constitution, which was the Constitution in force at the time the disallowance in question was made, the
COA had the power to, inter alia, examine, audit, and settle, in accordance with law and regulations, all
accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned
or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations; and promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations including those for the prevention of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or
extravagant expenditures or uses of funds or property.

Commission on Audit not bound by opinion of legal counsel of agency or instrumentality regarding
necessity of agency’s expenditures.

N: PETITION for review of the decision of the Commission on Audit.

F: An accident occurred at the Malaya Thermal Plant of the NPC. Several NPC employees casual employees of
OPLGS (janitorial contractor of NPC), suffered injuries (mostly 1st and 2nd degree burn). Total hospitalization
expenses reached P53k. The NPC initially advanced this amount by setting it up as an account receivable from
OPLGS deducted on a staggered basis from the latter's billings against NPC until the same was fully satisfied.
OPLGS requested for a refund of the total amount deducted from their billings representing payment of the
advances made by the NPC. Petitioner, recommended favorable action on OPLGS' request, thus the
hospitalization was refunded to OPLGS.

HOWEVER, Agustin (Unit Auditor of COA assigned to NPC) disallowed the refund on the ground that under
the contract of OPLGS causal employees, there is no employee-employer relationship. Hence, NPC is not
answerable for for such expenses. Instead employees, who were directly liable should answer for the expenses.
Petitioner (General Counsel of the NPC) asked for a reconsideration of the aforesaid disallowance, and in his
legal opinion claims that although no employer-employee relationship, the basis of the payment is quasi-delict
or negligence on the part of NPC personnel.

Agustin informed General Counsel that he is adopting his stand and maintain that while quasi-delicts could be
a source of obligation, the fault or negligence of the party from whom damages is being recovered must first be
proven. Absence of proof of negligence of NPC personnel and given there was proof, it does not make NPC
automatically and equally negligent.

COA's General Counsel, amended previous findings and issued debit memo in petitioner’s name debiting his
account with the NPC for the hospitalization expenses.

78
Petitioner filed an MR stresses that he is not personally liable for the amount disallowed as he was merely
performing his official functions. Also that questioned disbursement is not within the Scope of auditing power
of COA.

I: Whether the disbursement is within the scope of auditing power of COA? Does the legal opinion of
petitioner, preclude or bar the COA from disallowing in post-audit such disbursement? Whether petitioner is
liable?

H: Disbursement is within the scope of auditing power of COA. Legal opinion of petitioner does not
preclude or bar the COA from disallowing in post-audit such disbursement. Petitioner is not liable.

R: The Constitution grants the COA the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts
pertaining to the expenditures or uses of funds and property pertaining to the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

While it may be true the charter of the NPC provides that all legal matters shall be handled by the General
Counsel of the Corporation, it by no means follows that all legal opinions of the General Counsel are ex-
cathedra and binding upon all.

In determining whether an expenditure of a Government agency or instrumentality such as the NPC is

irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable, the COA should not be bound by the opinion
of the legal counsel of said agency or instrumentality which may have been the basis for the questioned
disbursement; otherwise, it would indeed become a toothless tiger and its auditing function would be a
meaningless and futile exercise. Its beacon lights then should be nothing more than the pertinent laws and its
rules and regulations.

COA auditor had every reason to believe that the disbursement by the NPC as a refund to the OPLGS for the
hospitalization expenses on the theory that the NPC was actually liable under the law on quasi-delict, as
determined by the petitions, was irregular, if not illegal because there is no competent evidence to show that
either the NPC or any of its employees were responsible for the accident

HOWEVER, even if the disallowance was proper, there would still be no basis for directly holding petitioner
liable therefor together with those earlier found to be responsible by Agustin BUT it does not necessarily
follow, however, that in no case may the petitioner be liable for his legal opinion. As the OIC of General
Counsel of NPC, he exercised quasi-judicial functions. He was empowered with discretion and authority to
render an opinion as to whether the claim for reimbursement was proper. Thus, If he rendered the opinion in
the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks, he would not be
personally liable for any injury that may result therefrom.

But whether petitioner acted with malice, bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction is a
matter respondent Agustin cannot dispose of unilaterally and summarily without infringing on the petitioner's
right to due process.

Petition GRANTED. The memorandum holding petitioner personally liable is hereby set aside.

 DBP V. COA- JANUARY 15, 2002

D: The mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the COA of its power
to examine and audit the same government agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even
with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and its findings nor
conclusions will still bind government agencies and their officials. A concurrent private audit poses no
danger whatsoever of public funds or assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit.

79
Section 26 defines the extent and scope of the powers of the COA. Considering the comprehensive
definition in Section 26, the COA’s jurisdiction covers all government agencies, offices, bureaus and units,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, and even non-government entities enjoying
subsidy from the government. However, there is nothing in Section 26 that states, expressly or impliedly,
that the COA’s power to examine and audit government banks is exclusive, thereby preventing private
audit of government agencies concurrently with the COA audit.

Clearly, under existing laws, the COA does not have the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit
government banks. The Central Bank has concurrent jurisdiction to examine and audit, or cause the
examination and audit, of government banks

N: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Commission on Audit.

F: The COA affirmed Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 93-2, which disallowed in audit the
dividends distributed under the Special Loan Program (SLP) to the members of the DBP Gratuity Plan.
Because certain funds or “income” of the Gratuity Plan Fund, is going to be distributed. COA disallowed such
distribution, on the ground that the distribution of income of the Gratuity Plan Fund (GPF) to future retirees of
DBP is irregular and constituted the use of public funds for private purposes which is specifically proscribed
under Section 4 of P.D. 1445.

I: The DBP reiterates that the income of the Fund should be treated and recorded as separate from the income
of DBP itself, and charges that COA committed grave abuse of discretion.

H: YES.

R: The Agreement indisputably transferred legal title over the income and properties of the Fund to the Funds
trustees. Thus, COAs directive to record the income of the Fund in DBPs books of account as the miscellaneous
income of DBP constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The income of the Fund does not form part of the
revenues or profits of DBP, and DBP may not use such income for its own benefit. The principal and income of
the Fund together constitute the res or subject matter of the trust. The Agreement established the Fund
precisely so that it would eventually be sufficient to pay for the retirement benefits of DBP employees under
RA 1616 without additional outlay from DBP. COA itself acknowledged the authority of DBP to set up the
Fund. However, COAs subsequent directive would divest the Fund of income, and defeat the purpose for the
Funds creation.

The funds being under trusteeship, is not part of DBP funds. Therefore, COA does not have the power to
require that DBP use the funds for its own benefit. its not public funds.

 BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT - G.R. NO.

177131. JUNE 7, 2011.

D: The Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the
Commission on Audit’s (COA’s) audit jurisdiction

There are three classes of juridical persons under Article 44 of the Civil Code and the BSP, as presently
constituted under Republic Act No. 7278,falls under the second classification. Article 44 reads: Art.  44. The
following are juridical persons: (1) The State and its political subdivisions; (2) Other corporations,
institutions and entities for public interest or purpose created by law; their personality begins as soon as
they have been constituted according to law; (3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private
interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member.

80
The Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) which was created by a special law to serve a public purpose in
pursuit of a constitutional mandate, comes within the class of “public corporations” defined by paragraph
2, Article 44 of the Civil Code.

The BSP is a public corporation or a government agency or instrumentality with juridical personality,
which does not fall within the constitutional prohibition in Article XII, Section 16, notwithstanding the
amendments to its charter. Not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso
facto to be considered private corporations as there exists another distinct class of corporations or chartered
institutions which are otherwise known as “public corporations.” These corporations are treated by law as
agencies or instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control
and economic viability but to different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional
policies and objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or any of its Departments
or Offices.

The relationship of the BSP, an attached agency, to the government, through the DECS, is defined in the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987. The BSP meets the minimum statutory requirement of an attached
government agency as the DECS Secretary sits at the BSP Board ex officio, thus facilitating the policy and
program coordination between the BSP and the DECS.

Since the BSP, under its amended charter, continues to be a public corporation or a government
instrumentality, we come to the inevitable conclusion that it is subject to the exercise by the COA of its
audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the provisions of the BSP Charter

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.

F: The COA issued a resolution to audit the Boy Scout of the Philppines (BSP) as it allege that it was created as
a public corporation under Commonwealth Act No. 111. COA also cited the case of that in Boy Scouts of the
Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission, were BSP was declared a "government-controlled
corporation within the meaning of Article IX(B)(2)(1) of the Constitution" and that "the BSP is appropriately
regarded as a government instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code."

I: Whether the COA has jurisdiction over the BSP

H: Yes

R: Jurisdiction of COA. After looking at the legislative history of its amended charter and carefully studying
the applicable laws and the arguments of both parties, we find that the BSP is a public corporation and its
funds are subject to the COAs audit jurisdiction.

The BSP Charter (Commonwealth Act No. 111, approved on October 31, 1936), entitled "An Act to Create a
Public Corporation to be Known as the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, and to Define its Powers and Purposes"
created the BSP as a "public corporation"

There are three classes of juridical persons under Article 44 of the Civil Code and the BSP, as presently
constituted under Republic Act No. 7278,falls under the second classification. Article 44 reads:

Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose created by law; their
personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants
a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.

81
The BSP, which is a corporation created for a public interest or purpose, is subject to the law creating it under
Article 45 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 45.Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article are governed by the laws creating
or recognizing them.

Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject.

Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the provisions of this Code
concerning partnerships.

The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it was created in order to implement a
State policy declared in Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution, which reads:

ARTICLE II -DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect
their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a public purpose in pursuit of a constitutional
mandate, comes within the class of "public corporations" defined by paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil Code
and governed by the law which creates it, pursuant to Article 45 of the same Code.

 DELA LLANA VS. COA – G.R. NO. 180989, FEBRUARY 7, 2012

D: Decisions and orders of the Commission on Audit (COA) rendered in its quasi-judicial capacity are
reviewable by the court via a petition for certiorari and not those promulgated under its quasi-legislative or
rule-making powers.

The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over
all accounts pertaining to government revenues and expenditures and the use of public funds and property,
including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination; to establish the
techniques and methods for the review; and to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations.
Its exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that give life to the check
and balance system inherent in our form of government.

The conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel the COA to perform. This
discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination. When the language of the law is clear and
explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only application. Neither can the scope of the provision be
unduly enlarged by this Court

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

F: On 26 October 1982, the COA issued Circular No. 82-195, lifting the system of pre-audit of government
financial transactions, albeit with certain exceptions. With the normalization of the political system and the
stabilization of government operations, the COA saw it fit to issue Circular No. 89-299, which again lifted the
pre-audit of government transactions of national government agencies (NGAs) and government-owned or -
controlled corporations (GOCCs).

The rationale for the circular was, first, to reaffirm the concept that fiscal responsibility resides in management
as embodied in the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines; and, second, to contribute to accelerating

82
the delivery of public services and improving government operations by curbing undue bureaucratic red tape
and ensuring facilitation of government transactions, while continuing to preserve and protect the integrity of
these transactions.

Concomitant to the lifting of the pre-audit of government transactions of NGAs and GOCCs, Circular No. 89-
299 mandated the installation, implementation and monitoring of an adequate internal control system, which
would be the direct responsibility of the government agency head.

Petitioner, as a taxpayer, filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. He alleges that the pre-audit duty on
the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that pre-audit is a constitutional mandate
enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution.[3] He further claims that, because of the lack of
pre-audit by COA, serious irregularities in government transactions have been committed.

I: W/N the COA may be compelled to conduct pre-audit duty.

H: NO.

The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all
accounts pertaining to government revenues and expenditures and the use of public funds and property,
including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination; to establish the techniques
and methods for the review; and to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations.[15] Its exercise
of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that give life to the check and balance
system inherent in our form of government..

The Supreme Court found that there is nothing in section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution that
requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government agencies. The
only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-
audit is mandated for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only when the
internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures,
including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies. Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not
a mandatory duty that the Supreme Court may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in
line with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its
audit and examination. When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation,
only application. Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly enlarged by the Court.

 PROVINCE OF AKLAN V. JODY KING CONSTRUCTION & DEVLOPMENT

CORP. - G.R. NOS. 197592 & 20262, NOVEMBER 27, 2013

D: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. All the proceedings of the court in violation of the doctrine and all orders and decisions
rendered thereby are null and void.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if the matter may well be within
their proper jurisdiction. . It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into
play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the
court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such
issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged,
dismiss the case without prejudice. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the
court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative

83
agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the
court.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, it is the
COA which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and
instrumentalities. Section26. General jurisdiction.—The authority and powers of the Commission shall
extend to and comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures, systems and controls, the keeping of
the general accounts of the Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten
years, the examination and inspection of the books, records, and papers relating to those accounts; and the
audit and settlement of the accounts of all persons respecting funds or property received or held by them in
an accountable capacity, as well as the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort
due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The said
jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, and
other self-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, and as herein prescribed,
including non-governmental entities subsidized by the government, those funded by donations through
the government, those required to pay levies or government share, and those for which the government has
put up a counterpart fund or those partly funded by the government.

Pursuant to its rule-making authority conferred by the 1987 Constitution and existing laws, the COA
promulgated the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit. Rule II, Section 1
specifically enumerated those matters falling under COA’s exclusive jurisdiction, which include “[m]oney
claims due from or owing to any government agency.” Rule VIII, Section 1 further provides: Section
1.Original Jurisdiction.—The Commission Proper shall have original jurisdiction over: a)money claim
against the Government; b) request for concurrence in the hiring of legal retainers by government agency;
c) write off of unliquidated cash advances and dormant accounts receivable in amounts exceeding one
million pesos (P1,000,000.00); d) request for relief from accountability for loses due to acts of man, i.e. theft,
robbery, arson, etc., in amounts in excess of Five Million pesos (P5,000,000.00).

There are established exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, such as:
(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant;
(d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts
of justice;
(f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
(g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage;
(h) where the controverted acts violate due process;
(i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;
(j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
(k) when strong public interest is involved; and,
(l) in quo warranto proceedings. However, none of the foregoing circumstances is applicable in the
present case.

N: PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decisions and resolutions of the Court of Appeals.

F: Province of Aklan (petitioner) and Jody King Construction and Development Corp. (respondent) entered
into a contract for the design and -construction of the Caticlan Jetty Port and Terminal (Phase I) in Malay,
Aklan. The total project cost is P38,900,000: P 18,700,000 for the design and construction of passenger terminal,
and P20,200,000 for the design and construction of the jetty port facility. In the course of construction,
petitioner issued variation/change orders for additional works. The scope of work under these change orders
were agreed upon by petitioner and respondent.

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On January 5, 2001, petitioner entered into a negotiated contract with respondent for the construction of
Passenger Terminal Building (Phase II) also at Caticlan Jetty Port in Malay, Aklan. The contract price for Phase
II is P2,475,345.54.

Respondent made a demand for the total amount of P22,419,112.96 covering the items which petitioner
allegedly failed to settle. Petitioner refused to pay. It asserted that the sums being claimed by respondent were
not indicated in Change Order No. 3 as approved by the Office of Provincial Governor.

Respondent sued petitioner in the RTC to collect the aforesaid amounts. Petitioner denied any unpaid balance
and interest due to respondent. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent and issued a writ for execution.

I: Whether the RTC of Marikina has jurisdiction over the case? Whether the issuance of the writ of execution is
proper?

H: No.

R: Jurisdiction. COA has primary jurisdiction over private respondent’s money claims Petitioner is not
estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if the matter may well be within
their proper jurisdiction.

The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it should
refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or
some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.

As can be gleaned, respondent seeks to enforce a claim for sums of money allegedly owed by petitioner, a local
government unit. Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No.
1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and
instrumentalities.

Pursuant to its rule-making authority conferred by the 1987 Constitution and existing laws, the COA
promulgated the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit. Rule II, Section 1 specifically
enumerated those matters falling under COA’s exclusive jurisdiction, which include "money claims due from
or owing to any government agency." Rule VIII, Section 1 further provides:

Section 1. Original Jurisdiction - The Commission Proper shall have original jurisdiction over:
a) money claim against the Government; b) request for concurrence in the hiring of legal retainers by
government agency; c) write off of unliquidated cash advances and dormant accounts receivable in amounts
exceeding one million pesos (P1,000,000.00); d) request for relief from accountability for loses due to acts of
man, i.e. theft, robbery, arson, etc, in amounts in excess of Five Million pesos (P5,000,000.00).

In Euro-Med Laboratories Phil., Inc. v. Province of Batangas, we ruled that it is the COA and not the RTC
which has primary jurisdiction to pass upon petitioner’s money claim against respondent local government
unit. Such jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties’ failure to argue the issue nor active participation in
the proceedings.

Respondent’s collection suit being directed against a local government unit, such money claim should have
been first brought to the COA. Hence, the RTC should have suspended the proceedings and refer the filing of
the claim before the COA. Moreover, petitioner is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction even after
the denial of its notice of appeal and before the CA.

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There are established exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on
the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the
rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause
great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings. However,
none of the foregoing circumstances is applicable in the present case.

Propriety of Writ of Execution

Writ of Execution issued in violation of COA’s primary jurisdiction is void. Since a judgment rendered by a
body or tribunal that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is no judgment at all, it cannot be
the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. All acts pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it
have no legal effect and the void judgment can never be final and any writ of execution based on it is likewise
void.

 FUNA V. MANILA ECONOMIC CULTURAL OFFICE - G.R. NO. 193462,

FEBRUARY 4, 2014

D: COA has the authority to audit non-governmental entities receiving equity or subsidy with respect to
those “funds xxx coming from or through the government. In this case, MECO was declared a sui generis
entity, which, although governed by the Corporation Code, was entrusted by the government to collect
verification fees and consular fees as its agent in Taiwan. Thus, with respect to those fees, MECO is subject
to the auditing authority of COA.

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Mandamus.

F: The Philippines formally ended its official diplomatic relations with the government in Taiwan on 9 June
1975, when the country and the PROC expressed mutual recognition thru the Joint Communiqué of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (Joint
Communiqué). Under the Joint Communiqué, the Philippines categorically stated its adherence to the One
China policy of the PROC. The Philippines’ commitment to the One China policy of the PROC, however, did
not preclude the country from keeping unofficial relations with Taiwan facilitated by the offices of the Taipei
Economic and Cultural Office, for the former, and the MECO, for the latter.
Petitioner sent a letter to COA requesting a copy of the latest financial and audit report of the MCO,
invoking his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, alleging that MECO is under the
“operational supervision” of DTI, is a GOCC, and thus subject to the audit jurisdiction of COA. COA replied
that MECO was not among the agencies audited by any of the three Clusters of the Corporate Government
Sector.
Petitioner thus filed this petition claiming that the accounts of the MECO ought to be audited by the COA
because the former is a GOCC or government instrumentality. Petitioner points out that the MECO is a non-
stock corporation “vested with governmental functions relating to public needs”; it is “controlled by the
government thru a board of directors appointed by the President of the Philippines”; and it operates “outside
of the departmental framework,” subject only to the “operational and policy supervision of the DTI.”
Petitioner also alleges that MECO is controlled by the government, that the President appoints the directors of
MECO albeit indirectly and by way of “desire letters” addressed to MECO’s Board. The MECO thus possesses,
petitioner argues, the essential characteristics of a bona fide GOCC and government instrumentality.
The MECO counters that the “desire letters” that the President transmits are merely recommendatory
and not binding on it. The MECO maintains that, as a corporation organized under the Corporation Code,
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matters relating to the election of its directors and officers, as well as its membership, are ultimately governed
by the appropriate provisions of the said code, its articles of incorporation and its by-laws.

I: Whether or not MECO is subject to the audit jurisdiction of COA?

H: It depends.

R: The MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. The fact of the incorporation of the MECO under
the Corporation Code is key. However, the MECO was “entrusted” by the government with the “delicate and
precarious” responsibility of pursuing “unofficial” relations with the people of a foreign land whose
government the Philippines is bound not to recognize. Thus, it is a sui generis private entity especially
entrusted by the government with the facilitation of unofficial relations with the people in Taiwan without
jeopardizing the country’s faithful commitment to the One China policy of the PROC. However, despite its
non-governmental character, the MECO handles government funds in the form of the “verification fees” it
collects on behalf of the DOLE and the “consular fees” it collects under Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001.
Hence, under existing laws, the accounts of the MECO pertaining to its collection of such “verification fees”
and “consular fees” should be audited by the COA.
Under Section 2(1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution, the COA was vested with the “power, authority and
duty” to “examine, audit and settle” the “accounts” of the following entities: 1. The government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities; 2. GOCCs with original charters; 3. GOCCs without original
charters; 4. Constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under the
Constitution; and 5. Non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or
through the government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to the COA for audit
as a condition of subsidy or equity.

Complementing the constitutional power of the COA to audit accounts of “non-governmental entities
receiving subsidy or equity xxx from or through the government” is Section 29(1) of the Audit Code, which
grants the COA visitorial authority over the following nongovernmental entities: 1. Non-governmental entities
“subsidized by the government”; 2. Non-governmental entities “required to pay levy or government share”; 3.
Non-governmental entities that have “received counterpart funds from the government”; and 4. Non-
governmental entities “partly funded by donations through the government.” Section 29(1) of the Audit Code,
however, limits the audit of the foregoing non-governmental entities only to “funds xxx coming from or
through the government.”

Since the Philippines does not maintain an official post in Taiwan, the DOLE entered into a “series” of
Memorandum of Agreements with the MECO, which made the latter the former’s collecting agent with respect
to the “verification fees” that may be due from Taiwanese employers of OFWs. Evidently, the entire
“verification fees” being collected by the MECO are receivables of the DOLE. Such receipts pertain to the
DOLE by virtue of Section 7 of EO No. 1022.

The “verification fees” mentioned here refers to the “service fee for the verification of overseas employment
contracts, recruitment agreement or special powers of attorney” that the DOLE was authorized to collect under
Section 7 of EO No. 1022, which was issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on 1 May 1985. These fees are
supposed to be collected by the DOLE from the foreign employers of OFWs and are intended to be used for
“the promotion of overseas employment and for welfare services to Filipino workers within the area of
jurisdiction of [concerned] foreign missions under the administration of the [DOLE].”

Aside from the DOLE “verification fees,” however, the MECO also collects “consular fees,” or fees it collects
from the exercise of its delegated consular functions. The authority behind “consular fees” is Section 2(6) of EO
No. 15, s. 2001. The said section authorizes the MECO to collect “reasonable fees” for its performance of the
following consular functions: 1. Issuance of temporary visitors’ visas and transit and crew list visas, and such
other visa services as may be authorized by the DFA; 2. Issuance, renewal, extension or amendment of
passports of Filipino citizens in accordance with existing regulations, and provision of such other passport
services as may be required under the circumstances; 3. Certification or affirmation of the authenticity of
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documents submitted for authentication; and 4. Providing translation services. Evidently, and just like the
peculiarity that attends the DOLE “verification fees,” there is no consular office for the collection of the
“consular fees.” Thus, the authority for the MECO to collect the “reasonable fees,” vested unto it by the
executive order.

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