The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts

Axel Honneth (2005)

Translator’s introduction - Joel Anderson

• Honneth: the struggle for the establishment of relations of mutual recognition as a precondition for self-real-
isation (x)
• Position: the very possibility of identity formation depends crucially on the development of self-confidence,
self-respect, and self-esteem (‘practical relation-to-self). These modes of relating to oneself can only be ac-
quired and maintained intersubjectively through being granted recognition by others whom one also recog-
nises. These relationships go beyond (a) love and friendship and include (b) institutionalised relations of
universal respect for the autonomy and dignity of persons and (c) networks of solidarity and shared values
within which the particular worth of individual members of a community can be acknowledged (xi-xii).
These relations must be established through social struggles and the ‘grammar’ of these struggles is
‘moral’ (because they imply normative judgements about the legitimacy of social arrangements).

Basic self-confidence

• The underlying capacity to express need and desires without fear of being abandoned as a result (xiii)

Self-respect

• To have a sense of oneself as a morally responsible agent - capable of participating in public deliberation
(xv)
• A person without rights can have self-respect but self-respect can only be fully achieved when agents are
recognised as ‘legal persons’
• Idea of rights has built into it the idea that every subject of the law must also be its author (xvi)

Self-esteem

• What makes one unique - this is about something valuable

• Situates esteem in the values of a particular culture
• Claims that a good society is one in which individuals have a real opportunity for full self-realisation - i.e. a
society in which the common values would match the concerns of individuals in such a way that no mem-
ber of the society would be denied the opportunity to earn his/her contribution to the common good
• ‘Solidarity’ - shared concern, interest of value for Honneth, carries a ‘communitarian’ sense of particularity -
which particular values are endorsed by society is a contingent matter
• Point of reference for esteeming individuals is the evaluative framework accepted by the entire community
not just one subculture (xviii)

• These intersubjective conditions provide the basis for ‘formal conception of ethical life’ - normative ideal of
society in which self-confidence, self-respect and self0esteem for the full development of their identities is
allowed

Summary

http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/honneth.htm

Part 1

• In summary, from Honneth’s reading of Hegel’s System of Ethical Life have learnt that: the struggle for
recognition is the direct (unmediated) confrontation between two self-consciousnesses; it’s movement be-
gins with a failure of recognition associated with the lack of mediation; in the course of the struggle which
results, each self-consciousness mediates the development of the other (philosophy of consciousness in
later works by Hegel occurs when Spirit replaces Nature, giving such greater scope for the development of
cognitive and moral distinctions but losing touch with the roots of civilisation in the natural life of human be-
ings)
• Hegel’s master-slave narrative is a story of mediated from beginning to end
• In summary, in the first stage, self-consciousness is undifferentiated and each mediates the relation of the
other to itself; in the second stage, when self-consciousness emerges in the absence of mediation the re-

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 sult is either destruction of one or other self-consciousness or their mutual repulsion; in the third stage, the
conflict is resolved by the incorporation of the dominated subject within the labour process of the dominant
subject and the appropriation of the surplus.
• It’s only in the third stage that recognition is completed - albeit one-sided and unequal. For the ‘indepen-
dent’ self-consciousness, its truth is the activity of the unfree consciousness. Through the last stage, have
the self-consciousness of an individual really distinguished that the community as a whole, the essential
basis for the development of civil society and rights
• Significance of Hegel: the issue in tracing the emergence of self-consciousness is to trace the specific
forms of mediation which can arise from the situation where there is no self-consciousness and no media-
tion, and create the pre-conditions for individualism and civil society.
• ‘Self-consciousness’ is capable of any number of conceivable materialisations. Arises for Hegel through
the master-slave dialectic
• While initially struggle for recognition appears to be the direct confrontation between two self-conscious-
nesses, it is really a complex process of reciprocal mediation
• Place for ‘solidarity’? Solidarity is the process of subject-formation in which a person voluntarily places
themselves outside of the dominant culture to identify with an emergent other, and conversely, where a
subject (willingly or not) in conflict with the dominant power experiences others “standing up to be counted”
alongside them. What is essential to the process of solidarity is that those giving solidarity risk their lives
under conditions when they could stay with the dominant power, and those receiving solidarity are already
fighting.
• Andy: my qualification though is that there is an essential mode of mediation involved in the process of soli-
darity, namely the struggle for survival of the first subject. It is by people voluntarily joining the struggle that
solidarity comes about. The individual who is fighting for their life does not know about solidarity so long as
they are joined only by others who likewise have no choice but to fight. Political consciousness arises when
aid comes from an ‘unexpected’ quarter.

Conclusion

The “struggle for recognition” as a conception of social development in terms of intersubjectivity has the po-
tential for application to the understanding of social and political development. The struggle for recognition,
as described by Hegel, is never a binary relationship however, it represents an approach to intersubjectivity
which explores how subjects mediate the relationships between each other and themselves.

An exploration of the struggle for recognition as an approach to political consciousness formation through
solidarity should be fruitful, provided use is made of the concepts of mediation we can learn from the mature
Hegel.

Part II

• Honneth aims to draw on work of the empirical sciences to reconstruct in modern terms concepts of the
‘struggle for recognition’ originally outlined in metaphysical terms by the young Hegel

• Question: how does self consciousness emerge?

• “I can become aware of what my gesture signifies for the other only by producing the other’s reply in
myself.” [p. 73]

So that:

• “In perceiving one’s own vocal gesture and reacting to myself as my counterpart does, I take on a
de-centred perspective, from which I can form an image of myself and thereby come to a conscious-
ness of my identity ... individuals can only become conscious of themselves in the object-position.”
[p. 74]
• Draws a distinction between ‘me’ and ‘I
• ‘Me’ - ’the “internalisation of norms of action that result from a generalisation of the expectations of
all members of society ... ‘the generalised other’,” substantiates the stage of development of subjects
of recognition of themselves and their partners to interaction as legal subjects possessing the same
rights, but does not yet substantiate the emergence of individuality, in which a subject recognises
themselves and others as having unique and differentiated value and identity.
• ‘I’ - characterised by the increasing but never-completed recognition of the ‘I’ which always lies be-
yond perception, but forever intervenes into and disturbs interactive activity with its impulses and de-
mands.

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 • Honneth sees the development of ‘I’ as a driving force for social change as new demands emerge
from within a subject, pressing social norms to be adapted to satisfy its unique demands. Satisfac-
tion of such demands is counterfactual, the subject must be able to “visualise” an ideal community in
which its demands are satisfied and in which it is able to coordinate its activity with other subjects

Chapter 5

• Honneth conceptualises the development of individual self-consciousness as the self-differentiation out of

a single system of life-activity of a subject which knows itself to be both dependent and independent partici-
pant in that activity. This is the central idea of Hegel’s explication of the dialectic of self-consciousness. For
Hegel, the point of interest is the emergence of self-consciousness out of a single system of activity rather
than the coming-into-relation of already-existing self-consciousnesses, a process of differentiation of self-
consciousness rather than intersubjectivity
• If Honneth wants to find empirical backing for a theory of recognition which can explain processes of social
change, then a clear distinction needs to be made between the historical construction and psychological
acquisition of such relationships.
• Rights enter the conciseness of individuals as already-existing forms of practice. But need to explain
the capacity of human beings to acquire the ability to act in accordance with a system of socially es-
tablished rights (psychology)
• Since Honneth is interested in social change, must note that the acquisition of consciousness of
rights doesn’t explain the creation of new rights
• What needs explaining is what forms of activity could give rise to the historical construction of a given sys-
tem of rights, and on the other hand, what are the conditions which could lead to a failure by an individual
or group of people to internalise a given socially established system of rights or to find the existing system
of social rights disrespectful and worthy of disrespect.
• Point to three kinds of right - civil, political and social. Each new right comes on to the agenda as a claim
for inclusion in full-fledged membership of the community with access to already existing rights e.g. to de-
fend civil rights need right to participate in political decision-making of the community and to do this, need
basic education etc etc
• What within a person is granted recognition in granting rights?
• Legal - to be an end-in-oneself/a moral agent with FW - no degree of being worthy of recognition
• Worth of a person - greater of lesses depending on the value of their activity or labour
• I.e. to be recognised as a person ‘like anyone else’ or the demand for recondition of the uniqueness
of one’s personality/group attributes
• From this Honneth can introduce two kinds of practical relation-to-self: self-respect and self-esteem
• Loving relationship is the basic condition for three kinds of practical relation-to-self.
• Honneth connects these three practice RTS to three kinds of recognition - self-confidence-> love,
self-respect -> rights and self-esteem -> solidarity (latter problematic? Can esteem enemy but ex-
tend to them no solidarity)
• Andy - common struggle, the potential for manifestation of comradeship, is the basis of the feeling of
solidarity, Can esteem an enemy and ally but solidarity only extends to ally
• Specific emotional responses correspond to failures of each type of recognition e.g. social integrity is
threatened
• In dealing with the problem that for the overwhelming majority of individuals, life is acquiring the culture of
our times and incrementally adding to it in our chosen line of work, there are a few individuals, “heroes”,
who somehow become conduits for the Zeitgeist, seem impervious to social pressure to conform, and bring
about change. The psychology of such people — Napoleon, Martin Luther, Christ — is exceptional.
• For the rest of us, the capacity for social criticism depends on the existence of real contradictions in the so-
cial environment, existing at the linguistic level thanks to those few who can give voice to what is not yet le-
gitimate. Thus the normal process of creatively acquiring the culture of our age may bring with it lived con-
tradiction. In this context participation in the Civil Rights Movement, for example, was as much to do with
joy, pride and exhilaration as it was to do with abuse, denigration and exclusion.
• The three practical relations to self are relevant to understanding social change:
• Self-confidence comes from actions successfully producing the intended result without sanction or
revenge from others; self-respect arises from positive reinforcement to one’s activity being provided
by others who confirm that your actions are not regarded as wrong by others; self-esteem is the pos-
itive feelings associated with confirmation that one’s activity is positively valued by others. People
who want nothing to do with you can respect you by not interfering with your activity; but only people
see you in some way as a collaborator can offer you esteem
• Stimulus for social change is supposed to come as a response to injury done to one of these
• People may not experience these injuries as such. A social movement is not just the self-conscious-
ness of many individuals added up, but objective self-consciousness. It seems reasonable to sup-

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 pose that, at least in very many of the cases just mentioned, even though lack of respect was felt, it
was not felt as something which ought not to be — as a deficit.
• Seems like Honneth is looking for how certain cognitive structures can generate the motivating forces for
social change - need scientific account

• In summary,
• Solidarity is specifically a relationship which may exist between people who have no actual ties, and
consequently can neither esteem nor respect one another. It is a relation which is summed up with
the maxim: “There but for the grace of God go I,” out of which one is moved to voluntarily risk one’s
life or well-being to protect another from a threat which one can see through their eyes. The relation
of solidarity is one mediated by an ideal; one goes to the aid of someone’s of one’s own class (I
count “class” as an ideal), even though you do not know them. Ideals which generate solidarity have
their basis in social cooperation, but solidarity is the positive relation which extend beyond need and
love or friendship

• This brings us to the issue of social change: how is it that a person who has been denied equal rights and
valued more lowly forever, comes to find this condition one of dis-respect and offensive and motivated to
put forward rights-claims?
• I have observed that a slave feels no disrespect in the eyes of the slave-owner just so long as the slave
knows themselves only through the eyes of slave-owners and other slaves. Still lacking in self-respect,
inasmuch as the slave regards themselves only as a slave and not a master, fear, anger and solidarity may
still motivate the slave, but there is no insult in being a slave. But as Hegel so eloquently described in the
Phenomenology, once the slave acquires the subjectivity of the free citizen (by reproducing with their
labour the objectification of the world of the free citizen), their subordination to the will of the slave-owner
becomes an affront. All sorts of mechanisms have been historically active in opening this kind of window.
Once a real struggle is under way, people can identify with that struggle, but it is usually something else
which creates the initial opening.

Part III

• Andy: “the struggle for recognition” is still an imperfect model to conceive the continuity of progressive
struggles underlying social progress, but the initiative Honneth has taken is very much worth pursuing. An
intersubjective approach to analysis of social struggle tends to take for granted the existence of social sub-
jects who only then enter into a struggle for recognition. However, the whole point of Hegel’s original idea
was that it is only in the process of struggle for recognition that subjectivity comes into being in the first
place. Thus “recognition” is not a concept which can completely capture this struggle.