Racial Ethnic Intolerance Cross National Criminology August 2010

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Racial-Ethnic Threat, Out-Group Intolerance,

and Support for Punishing Criminals: A Cross-
National Study
Article in Criminology · August 2012

DOI: 10.1111/j.1745-9125.2012.00275.x
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RACIAL–ETHNIC INTOLERANCE AND

SUPPORT FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:
A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON*
JAMES D. UNNEVER
Department of Criminology
University of South Florida-Sarasota
FRANCIS T. CULLEN
School of Criminal Justice
University of Cincinnati
KEYWORDS: capital punishment, public opinion, racial intolerance,

punitiveness, comparative criminology
This article tests cross-nationally the minority group threat thesis that
public sentiments toward repressive crime-control policies reflect con-
flicted racial and ethnic relations. Using multiple data sets representing
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, East and West Germany, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Denmark, Great Britain, Greece, Spain, Finland, Sweden,
Austria, Canada, Ireland, and Portugal, we examine whether racial and
ethnic intolerance—animus, resentments, or negative sentiments toward
minorities—predicts greater support for the death penalty. Our results
reveal that the respondents were significantly more likely to express
support for capital punishment if they were racially or ethnically intol-
erant while controlling for other covariates of public opinion. These
findings indicate that the link between support for capital punishment
and racial and ethnic animus may occur universally in countries with
conflicted racial and ethnic relations.
Defiantly, the United States stands apart from its Western European
peers in its use of the death penalty (Garland, 2002). In this context of
American exceptionalism (Steiker, 2002; Unnever, 2010), we examine
whether the factors that lead the American public to endorse the death
penalty explain support for capital punishment in other Western capitalist
* Direct correspondence to James D. Unnever, Department of Criminology,

University of South Florida-Sarasota, 8350 N. Tamiami Trail, Sarasota, FL 34243
(email: unnever@sar.usf.edu).
 2010 American Society of Criminology

CRIMINOLOGY VOLUME 48 NUMBER 3 2010 831
832 UNNEVER & CULLEN
democracies, including Canada, France, Great Britain, Spain, and other

European Union (EU) countries. More specifically, we focus on whether
one of the most salient sources of capital punishment attitudes in the
United States has similar effects cross-nationally—racial and ethnic intol-
erance (i.e., harboring animus, resentment, or negative sentiments toward
minority group members). If so—if this relationship transcends the many
differences in history, culture, and experience that occur among Western
capitalist democracies—then the connection between racial and ethnic
intolerance and punitiveness may be a cultural universal with important
theoretical and policy implications.
MINORITY GROUP THREAT AND SUPPORT FOR

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
In this section, we lay the foundation for the thesis that racial–ethnic
intolerance or animus will predict support for capital punishment cross-
nationally. This foundation is built on the following steps: a discussion of
minority group threat theory as it relates to public opinion; a review of the
relevant empirical research; and an analysis of the corresponding and
increasing tendency in Europe to identify minorities as the “criminal
other.”
THE MINORITY GROUP THREAT THESIS
Group-based conflict theories argue that public opinion is shaped by

intergroup competition over status, power, and material rewards. These
theories also posit that intergroup public opinion is fueled by perceived or
actual threats—the dominant group’s fear that its privileges are being
eroded by the demands of minority groups (and perceived advantages)
and the minority group’s belief that it can enhance its position by challeng-
ing the existing racial–ethnic order (Weitzer and Tuch, 2004, 2005).
Elaborating on the minority group threat thesis, Jackman and Muha
(1984) argue that associating criminality with those generally defined as
the “other” or “them”—that is, members of the out-group—becomes a
powerful tool in the maintenance of the in-group’s cultural hegemony.
This association simultaneously achieves two ends. First, it is a conduit for
solidifying racial–ethnic prejudices that emerge from both early child-rear-
ing experiences and group-based interests (Sears and Jessor, 1996). Mem-
bers of the privileged group can righteously voice their prejudices toward
the outsiders by claiming that these minorities are disrupting the norma-
tive order by being overly criminal. Under this veneer of legitimacy, domi-
nant group members can claim that they do not hold anything against
individual members of the out-group but that, as a group, minorities need
INTOLERANCE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 833
to be carefully policed. Second, associating “others” as being criminal rein-

forces the privileged group’s reluctance to endorse any policies that would
“level the playing field.” It is difficult to crystallize support among domi-
nant group members for minority-targeted policies, such as welfare or
affirmative action, if these policies are perceived to benefit disproportion-
ately those who flagrantly violate the law (Neubeck and Cazenave, 2001).
Scholars have noted for a long time the relationship among intolerance,
public opinion, and repressive policies (Gibson, 1989; Sullivan and Tran-
sue, 1999). In this context, we argue that associating criminality with well-
defined “others” brings into sharp focus why members of minority groups
are “legitimate” objects of harsh criminal justice policies (Fleury-Steiner,
Dunn, and Fleury-Steiner, 2009). This association thus provides a
“rational” justification among members of the dominant group to support
publicly punitive crime-control policies such as the death penalty (Chir-
icos, Welch, and Gertz, 2004; Jones and Newburn, 2005). It allows mem-
bers of the dominant group to believe that capital punishment, even when
it results in the disproportionate execution of “others,” is necessary
because members of these groups are more likely to murder innocent peo-
ple. Righteously, members of the dominant group can believe that minori-
ties are “getting nothing more than they deserve” because they are the
“threatening other” (Fleury-Steiner, Dunn, and Fleury-Steiner, 2009;
Hogan, Chiricos, and Gertz, 2005; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1997, 2005; Peffley
and Hurwitz, 2002). Researchers have documented that racial and ethnic
typifications of crime also serve a political purpose; political officials
exploit these typifications to solidify support among members of the domi-
nant group (Beckett and Sasson, 2003; Hogan, Chiricos, and Gertz, 2005;
Jones and Newburn, 2005; Mendelberg, 1997).
In sum, the “criminal other” is a polarizing force in public opinion about
capital punishment. Prejudiced members of the dominant group have their
animus reaffirmed when being “criminal” is attached to those who they
already do not like (Unnever and Cullen, 2009). And their animus is fur-
ther justified when opportunistic political officials “give them permission”
to dislike “others” because of their “superpredator” status (DiIulio, 1994).
As a result, researchers continue to find relatively high levels of support
for the death penalty among dominant groups, especially among those
who are racially and ethnically intolerant.
It is instructive that, by contrast, support for capital punishment remains
far lower among minority groups, who often perceive the death penalty as
a form of White domination (Bobo and Johnson, 2004; Ogletree and Sarat,
2006; Peffley and Hurwitz, 2007; Unnever and Cullen, 2007a, 2007b).
Unnever, Cullen, and Jonson (2008) report that despite three decades of
major changes in the political, civil, and economic lives of African Ameri-
cans, the gap between Blacks and Whites in their support for capital pun-
ishment has remained relatively constant—typically between 25 and 30
percentage points (see also Cochran and Chamlin, 2006). Indeed, in a 2006
Gallup Poll, most Whites supported, whereas most African Americans
opposed, executing “a person convicted of murder” (70 percent vs. 43 per-
cent) (Unnever, Cullen, and Jonson, 2008).
RACIAL–ETHNIC INTOLERANCE AND SUPPORT FOR

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Disturbingly, scholars have documented that a salient factor fueling this
divide is racial intolerance (Soss, Langbein, and Metelko, 2003; Unnever
and Cullen, 2007a). Soss, Langbein, and Metelko (2003) report that racial
intolerance is the most salient predictor of White support for capital pun-
ishment. Notably, Unnever and Cullen (2007a) constructed a measure of
White racism and found that it accounts for nearly a third of the racial
divide in support for the death penalty. Together, these findings indicate
that Americans who harbor racial resentments are significantly more
likely to support the death penalty.
Unnever, Cullen, and Fisher (2005) expand on these findings by show-
ing that it is not just racial animus but rather racial and ethnic intolerance
that underlie support for the death penalty. Analyzing the 2002 General
Social Survey (GSS), they included three “thermometers” in their analysis
that measured how “warm or cool” individuals felt toward African Ameri-
cans, Hispanics, and Asians. Initially, Unnever, Cullen, and Fisher (2005)
reported that a scale combining all three measures was a salient predictor
of support for capital punishment while controlling for other covariates.
They then disaggregated the intolerance scale and regressed support for
the death penalty and their empathy scale on the three individual mea-
sures of ethnic and racial intolerance. This analysis revealed that each
measure of intolerance predicted both support for capital punishment and
a lack of empathy. They concluded that Americans who are racially and
ethnically intolerant are more likely to associate minorities with crime
and, therefore, are less likely to empathize with those who are dispropor-
tionately executed—that is, minority group members on death row.
Unnever, Cullen, and Fisher’s (2005) conclusions are consistent with the
minority group threat thesis (Blalock, 1967). Scholars suggest that the
intervening process that explains why Americans with racial and ethnic
intolerance are more likely to support the death penalty is that they have
equated murderers with being a member of a disadvantaged minority
(Barlow, 1998; Gilliam and Iyengar, 2000; Soss, Langbein, and Metelko,
2003). That is, they have associated criminality with “others.” Therefore, it
is not surprising that Americans with racial and ethnic animus are more
likely to support capital punishment and are not troubled that it results in
the disproportionate execution of minorities. Prejudiced Americans do not
like minorities, and this animus is compounded when they believe that
racial and ethnic groups are more likely to murder innocent people.
Together, these findings suggest that within the United States, public sup-
port for the death penalty emerges from conflicted racial and ethnic
relations.
BEYOND AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: EUROPEAN

IMMIGRANTS AS THE “CRIMINAL OTHER”
Researchers have begun to draw parallels between the “typification of

crime” in the United States and the emerging association of crime with
“foreigners” or “immigrants” in other Western capitalist democracies
(Agozino, 2000). These parallels are centered on two simultaneously
occurring social forces: first, the defining of immigrants or foreigners as
“others”; and second, associating “others” with being criminal (Calavita,
2003). Both a plethora of anecdotal data (e.g., media reports) and an
emerging body of research reveal the tensions that exist between immi-
grants-foreigners and dominant groups throughout Western-styled capital-
ist democracies (Pager, 2008; Watts and Feldman, 2001). As Albrecht
(2002) shows, European nations have responded by enacting legislation
making it more difficult for foreigners to enter their countries.
Scholars have documented the pervasiveness of racial and ethnic animus
and the dominant group’s reaction to the relatively rapid expansion of
immigrant groups throughout Europe (Coenders and Scheepers, 1998,
2008; Pager, 2008; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky, 2006, 2007;
Semyonov et al., 2004).1 Melossi (2003) reports that a Eurobarometer poll
of citizens of the member-states of the EU found that nearly 33 percent of
the respondents described themselves as “quite racist” or “very racist.”
Scheepers, Schmeets, and Felling (1997) report that nearly 40 percent of
the Dutch electorate favored stopping immigration. Pettigrew (1998) adds
that European nations are not characterized by a “melting pot” ideology
but rather tend to resist granting immigrants full citizenship. He presents
data on out-group prejudice from seven European samples in four nations
polled in the Eurobarometer Survey 30 conducted in 1988. The nations
1. In general, this research examines the macrolevel factors (e.g., size of the foreign
population and the unemployment rate) and the individual-level factors (e.g., the
less educated) that predict anti-immigration attitudes and extreme right-wing
voting behavior. See also Gaasholt and Togeby (1995), Goldberg (2006), Golder
(2003), Ireland (1997), Knigge (1998), Lahav (2004), Quillian (1995), Scheepers,
Schmeets, and Felling (1997), Sole (2004), Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris (2007), and
Young (2003).
included Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and West Germany. Pet-
tigrew concludes that blatant and subtle prejudice is pervasive and that
minorities encounter discrimination across a wide spectrum, including
housing, employment, public accommodations, insurance, banking, and
even car rentals. Scholars further detail an escalating level of violence
against minorities, especially in those countries where the “race card” has
been played (Goldberg, 2006; Ireland, 1997; Pettigrew, 1998; Young, 2003).
They further argue that these conflicted ethnic and racial relations have
resulted in the disproportionate incarceration of minorities (Agozino,
2000; Holmberg and Kyvsgaard, 2003; Junger-Tas, 1997; Melossi, 2003;
Smith, 1997; Tonry, 2001; Wacquant, 1999, 2006).
However, because Western European countries have abolished capital
punishment, they are not confronted by the disquieting fact that, as in the
United States, minorities are disproportionately executed (Manacorda,
2003; Neapolitan, 2001; Ruddell, 2005; Ruddell and Urbina, 2004; van
Koppen, Hessing, and de Poot, 2002; Zimring, 2003).2 Indeed, nations
must abolish the death penalty to become a member-state of the EU (Hill,
2003). Even so, the data show that “racial disparities in America’s criminal
justice system are paralleled by comparable minority group disparities in
other countries” (Tonry, 1997: 11; see also Wacquant, 2006). For example,
Calavita (2003) found that although immigrants are only 2–3 percent of
Spain’s population, by 2001 they accounted for 20 percent of the prison
population.
Inextricably related to this disproportionate incarceration is the domi-
nant group’s typification of minority group members as “criminal”
(Agozino, 2000; Calavita, 2003; Eisenbach-Stangl, 2003; Friman, 2001,
2004; Melossi, 2003; Paoli and Reuter, 2008; Quassoli, 2004; Solé, 2004;
Solivetti, 2005; Van Der Burg, Fennema, and Tillie, 2000). Wacquant
(2006: 98) observes that immigrant–foreigner status “functions as a perma-
nent and indelible penal handicap much in the manner that convict status
(and blackness) does in the United States.” Agozino (2000: 361) adds that
dominant groups depict minority group immigrants as “the Other” who
are “inferior, dangerous, criminal and amoral.” Goldberg (2006: 339)
describes this process as “criminalization of the distinct, demonization of
2. Two issues are relevant here. First, in terms of the disproportionate application of
capital punishment to minorities, in 2004, 42 percent of the people on death row
were African Americans even though they are less than 13 percent of the U.S.
population. However, it must be noted that minorities, especially African Ameri-
cans, are disproportionately arrested for homicide. Second, researchers have ana-
lyzed cross-nationally macrolevel factors that predict the abolition of the death
penalty. This research suggests that population heterogeneity is negatively
related to the abolition of capital punishment (Neapolitan, 2001; Ruddell and
Urbina, 2004).
the damned.” In his discussion of the “Fortress Europe,” Albrecht (2002:

2) argues that “the dominant perspective on immigration and ethnic
minorities currently is characterized through crime, deviance and conflict.”
The social construction of the “immigrant-criminal” is also a salient
force altering the political landscape (Angel-Ajani, 2003; Calavita, 2003;
Medina-Ariza, 2006; Melossi, 2003; Zaslove, 2004). Lahav (2004) posits
that public opinion on immigration can be politicized by political officials
who use it to further their personal agenda. Albrecht (2002: 2) adds that
the “immigrant-criminal” facilitates polarization and “has become a rally-
ing point for authoritarian sentiments in European societies as well as for
new right wing political parties and extremist groups.” Scholars report that
right-wing parties, who have had a modicum of success (e.g., see
Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Goldberg, 2006), attempt to rally support
among members of the dominant group by heightening the perception that
criminal-immigrants threaten their economic, cultural, and social hegem-
ony (Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers, 2002; Van Der Burg, Fennema,
and Tillie, 2000; Zaslove, 2004). These sentiments are reflected in the fol-
lowing statement, made during his political campaign, by Nicolas Sarkozy,
now President of France: “There is an obvious link between thirty or forty
years of a policy of uncontrolled immigration and the social explosion in
French cities” (quoted in Schneider, 2008: 152).
Politicians playing the “race” or “immigrant” card facilitate a divide in
public opinion by allowing racial and ethnic animus to be expressed in a
socially acceptable way: Dominant group members are not against immi-
grants; rather they are against criminals (Eisenbach-Stangl, 2003; Knigge,
1998; Orlando, 2003; Schneider, 2008). Wacquant (2006: 95) draws two
conclusions regarding the political salience of the “immigrant-criminal”
and their mass incarceration. First, it conveys “the resurgent penal forti-
tude of the elites by staging their commitment to act in an openly retribu-
tive manner towards categories that conspicuously disrupt the
(supra)national symbolic order. Second, it offers an expressive vehicle for
the social amplification and cultural legitimation of collective feelings of
resentment towards these same categories.”
RESEARCH THESIS AND STRATEGY

In sum, the literature indicates that all dynamics specified by the minor-
ity threat group thesis are in place to expect a cross-national association
between public support for the death penalty and racial and ethnic intoler-
ance in countries with conflicted race relations. The research shows that
racial and ethnic animosities are pervasive throughout much of Western
Europe. It also reveals that individuals who hold these animosities tend to
perceive the “immigrant-other” as threatening their economic, cultural,
and social hegemony, especially as these subordinate groups challenge the
existing racial–ethnic order. Their animus and feelings of being threatened

are intensified as the “immigrant-other” is labeled with the master status
of “immigrant-criminal.” These attitudes are intensified even further when
politicians play the “race/immigrant card”—that is, associating “others”
with crime. Consequently, racist members of the dominant group can
openly support harsh correctional policies such as capital punishment by
claiming it is necessary to control the onslaught of immigrant-driven
crime. Thus, support for “get-tough” crime policies becomes an affective,
symbolic statement capturing the frustration acutely found among racist
members of the dominant group as they contemplate an uncertain future
(Costelloe, Chiricos, and Gertz, 2009; Garland, 2000, 2002, 2009; Hogan,
Chiricos, and Gertz, 2005; Johnson, 2009; Roberts et al., 2003; Vollum,
Longmire, and Buffington-Vollum, 2004). Together, these dynamic social
forces should result in public opinion about capital punishment being
cross-nationally driven by racial and ethnic intolerance.
We explore this research thesis in two ways and then with a supplemen-
tary analysis. First, we examine the relationship of racial–ethnic intoler-
ance to death penalty attitudes among separate adult samples in France,
Great Britain, Spain, and Canada. These distinct data sets were selected
because they allowed for the operationalization of racial–ethnic intoler-
ance and support for capital punishment and for salient control variables.3
It might be argued that the use of a different data set for each nation does
not allow for a truly comparative analysis because the same measures are
not used in each analysis. By contrast, we would contend that if the same
findings emerge across independent data sets, then this result would sug-
gest that the fundamental relationship is robust and not contingent on a
single method of measurement.
To address this possible concern, our second analysis examines data
from the 2001 Young European Eurobarometer, a European study that
disproportionately sampled youths aged 15–21 years across 16 nations.
Eurobarometers ask respondents standardized questions across nations.
Accordingly, using these data alleviate possible concerns that the results
we generate are related to differences in the ways in which our key mea-
sures are operationalized.
Third, we then provide a supplementary analysis of the 2006 European
Values and Society Issues Eurobarometer, an adult cross-national data set
that allows us to examine the impact of racial–ethnic intolerance on a
more general measure of punitiveness. If relationships are found, then
3. Race is not a routine question included in cross-national data sets. Except for
Great Britain, the surveys we analyzed did not include any questions that asked
respondents to identify their race or ethnicity (including Canada) (see, e.g.,
Orlando, 2003; Pager, 2008; Roberts and Doob, 1997).
they would suggest that animus toward minority groups inspires not only
support for the death penalty but also punitive attitudes toward crime con-
trol cross-nationally.
METHODS
DATA
We analyze the following surveys: the 1995 French Election Study
(Lewis-Beck et al., 1995), the 1997 British General Election Cross-Section
Survey (Heath et al., 1997), the Center for Research on Social Reality
Spain Survey, November 1992: Social Ethics (Centro de Investigaciones
Sobre la Realidad Social, 1992), the 2000 Canadian Election Survey (Blais
et al., 2000), the Eurobarometer 55.10VR: Young Europeans, April-May
2001 Survey (Christensen, 2002), and the 2006 Eurobarometer 66.1: Euro-
pean Values and Societal Issues, Mobile Phone Use, and Farm Animal
Welfare, September-October Survey (Papacostas, 2006). Appendix A
includes additional information on each survey.
To make the tables more parsimonious and readable, we used the same
variable names even though the measures to construct them might differ.
For example, regardless of how education was measured cross-nationally
(in years or categorical differences), its variable name is Education. We
code the variables in the same direction for each nation. To facilitate the
succinctness of our presentation, we do not report how the covariates were
coded for each data set, but this information can be obtained from the first
author. Subsequently, we describe the core of our analysis—the measures
of support for the death penalty, punitiveness, and racial and ethnic
intolerance.
CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF ADULTS

FRANCE
The last execution in France took place in 1977, and France completely
abolished capital punishment in 1981 (Hood, 2001, 2002). Therefore, the
respondents were asked whether “the death penalty should be reinstated.”
The responses ranged from (1) “strongly disagree” to (4) “strongly agree.”
Thirty-two percent strongly agreed, 25 percent agreed, 13 percent dis-
agreed, and 30 percent strongly disagreed that capital punishment should
be reinstated. Thus, over half of the French population, 57 percent, sup-
ported the reinstatement of the death penalty.
An index for Intolerance was created by summing across three items. 1)
“There are too many immigrants in France;” (1–4; 1 = strongly disagree; 4
= strongly agree). A clear majority of the French, 75 percent, stated that
they either agree or strongly agree that France has too many immigrants.
2) “Can you tell me for each of the following words if it evokes for you
something (1) very positive, (2) quite positive, (3) quite negative, or (4)
very negative?—attitude toward Islam.” 3) “It is only fair for Muslims liv-
ing in France to have mosques to practice their religion;” (1–4; 1 = strongly
agree; 4 = strongly disagree). Higher scores on the index indicate greater
racial and ethnic intolerance. A factor analysis indicated that the three
items loaded on one factor. The alpha coefficient for Intolerance was .68.
GREAT BRITAIN
The 1997 British General Election Cross-Section Survey included infor-
mation on the respondents’ race. Therefore, our analyses of these data
included only those respondents who were “White of any European ori-
gin” or “White of other origin.”
The survey included a question that asks whether “Britain should bring
back the death penalty?” The death penalty question included five
responses ranging from (1) “strongly disagree” to (5) “strongly agree.”
The data show that 22 percent strongly agreed, 26 percent agreed, 15 per-
cent were not sure either way, 19 percent disagreed, and 17 percent
strongly disagreed that the death penalty in Britain should be reinstated.
Thus, 48 percent of the respondents supported the reinstatement of capital
punishment.
An index for Intolerance was constructed by summing across the
responses to two recoded items. 1) “Immigration by Black people and
Asians has been” (1–5; 1 = very good for Britain, 2 = fairly good, 3 =
neither good nor bad, 4 = fairly bad, 5 = very bad for Britain). Thirty-six
percent responded that immigration was either “fairly bad” or “very bad
for Britain.” 2) “Has equal opportunities for Black people and Asians in
Britain gone too far or not gone far enough?” (1–5; 1 = not gone nearly far
enough, 2 = not gone far enough, 3 = about right, 4 = gone too far, 5 =
gone much too far). A factor analysis indicated that both items load on
one factor. The alpha coefficient for Intolerance was .59.
SPAIN
The survey, which is in Spanish, included six questions that assessed the
level of support for the death penalty. These questions asked respondents
whether they supported capital punishment for 1) murder in general, 2)
the murder of a public official, 3) the murder of a minor, 4) a terrorist act
that kills civilians, 5) the murder of someone who was kidnapped, and 6)
for drug traffickers. The responses to each of these queries ranged from
(1) “strongly disagree” to (5) “strongly agree.” The data showed that 13
percent strongly agreed, 34 percent agreed, 4 percent were indifferent, 31
percent disagreed, and 17 percent strongly disagreed with supporting the
execution of murderers in general. Thus, the distribution was essentially

bimodal, with 47 percent in agreement and 48 percent in disagreement.
We summed across these six measures to create an index measuring sup-
port for capital punishment. Its alpha coefficient was .97, and a factor anal-
ysis of these six items produced one factor.
Intolerance was measured with a single item. The translated version of
this question is as follows: “In many places in Europe, and even in Spain,
there seems to be problems with cohabitation between native populations
and immigrants. How do you think this problem could be solved?” 1)
“Allowing everyone to freely choose their place of residence” (68 per-
cent), 2) “Allowing into neighborhoods only those immigrants who are
good citizens” (25 percent), and 3) “Creating neighborhoods exclusively
for the immigrants” (7 percent).
CANADA
Support for the death penalty was measured with a binary variable (1 =
“favor,” 0 = “oppose” and “depends”). Individuals who responded “don’t
know” were deleted. Forty-five percent of Canadians supported capital
punishment.
We created an index, Intolerance, to measure the degree to which
Canadians were racially and ethnically intolerant. We summed across the
responses to the following five recoded items. 1) “We should look after
Canadians born in this country first and others second.” 2) “Immigrants
make an important contribution to this country.” 3) “Canadian unity is
weakened by Canadians of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds
sticking to their old ways.” 4) “Do you think Canada should admit more
immigrants, fewer immigrants, or about the same as now?” Thirty-seven
percent of the respondents reported that Canada should not admit any
more immigrants. 5) “Too many recent immigrants just don’t want to fit
into Canadian society.” Higher scores on the index indicate greater racial
and ethnic intolerance. A factor analysis of these five items produced one
factor. The alpha coefficient for Intolerance was .79.
EUROBAROMETER YOUNG EUROPEANS SURVEY

The Eurobarometer asked whether “young people of your age tend to
be in favour of or against” capital punishment (1 = “tend to be in favour,”
0 = “tend to be against”). Twenty-nine percent of the young Europeans
tended to be in favor of the death penalty. These data also include another
measure of support for punitive attitudes, which we analyze. We used the
following question to construct this measure: “Nowadays there is too
much tolerance. Criminals should be punished more severely.” Responses
ranged from (1) “totally disagree” to (4) “totally agree.”
We created an index, Intolerance, to measure the degree to which

Europeans, mostly those between the ages of 15 and 21 years old, were
racially and ethnically intolerant. Respondents were prompted with the
following question: “I am going to read out some opinions about people
who live in (Our Country), but who are not (Nationality). Which of the
following statements, if any, do you agree with?” We summed across the
responses to the following four binary coded items (1 = “agreed,” 0 = “dis-
agreed”). 1) “The presence of foreigners adds to the strength of (Our
Country).” 2) “I’m glad that foreigners live in (Our Country).” 3) “For-
eigners living in (Our Country) are full members of (Nationality) society.”
4) “Foreigners living in (Our Country) should have same rights as the
(Nationality).” The responses were recoded so that higher scores on the
index indicate greater racial and ethnic intolerance. A factor analysis of
these four items produced one factor, and the alpha coefficient for Intoler-
ance was .63.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The statistical procedure used to analyze the data depended on the met-
ric of the dependent variable. For example, if a binary variable was con-
structed to measure support for the death penalty, then we used binary
logistic regression. We used ordinary least squares if the dependent varia-
ble was ordinal ranked with more than two categories.4 We report stan-
dardized ordinary least-squares (OLS) and logistic regression coefficients.
Missing data were deleted using the listwise procedure. The sample sizes
are reported in the tables. We did not detect any substantive multicol-
linearity; no variance inflation factor exceeded 1.6. Max-rescaled R-
squares are reported when we used binary logistic regression. We analyzed
the weighted sample when the data set included a weight variable.
More substantively, we have attempted to conduct analyses that include
not only sociodemographic variables but also measures of factors that
might be hypothesized to render spurious the relationship between
racial–ethnic intolerance and support for capital punishment. In particular,
wherever possible, we have incorporated into the analyses controls for
political conservatism, authoritarianism, beliefs about equality, religious
beliefs and practices, and perceptions of crime rates.
4. We replicated the analysis presented in table 1 using ordinal regression for

France and Great Britain because these two countries had ordinal level measure-
ments of support for the death penalty. The results were substantively the same
as presented in table 1. In addition, we replicated the analyses presented in table
3 using ordinal regression, and again, the results were substantively identical.
Consequently, we present the standardized OLS coefficients because they are
more easily interpretable than the ordinal regression coefficients.
RESULTS
CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSES OF ADULTS
The results from table 1 support the minority group threat hypothesis
that cross-nationally public support for the death penalty is related to
racial and ethnic animus. The data show that individuals who expressed
greater racial and ethnic intolerance were more likely to support capital
punishment in France, Great Britain, Spain, and Canada. Individuals in
these countries who expressed racial and ethnic animus were more likely
to support the death penalty after controlling for an array of covariates,
including the respondents’ age, gender, income, education level, marital
status, Catholic affiliation, and employment status. In addition, other atti-
tudes related to intolerance and support for capital punishment were con-
trolled, including the respondents’ political orientation, the degree to
which they endorse egalitarian beliefs, the strength of their religious
beliefs, whether they expressed authoritarian views, and whether they
believed the crime rate was increasing. The standardized regression coeffi-
cients indicate that in each country studied, the measure of intolerance
was the most substantive predictor of support for the death penalty. These
results suggest that the link between support for capital punishment and
racial and ethnic animus may transcend the peculiarities of individual
Western capitalist democracies.
The data also show that other factors have a relatively consistent impact
on support for the death penalty cross-nationally, but none equals the
magnitude of the relationship between support for the death penalty and
racial–ethnic intolerance. The results from table 1 reveal that more edu-
cated individuals, those with higher incomes, and people who expressed
egalitarian beliefs tended toward less support for capital punishment.
However, males, those who were married, political conservatives, and
those who endorsed authoritarian attitudes were more supportive of the
death penalty (Tam, Leung, and Chiu, 2008).
EUROBAROMETER YOUNG EUROPEANS SURVEY
To assess further the reliability of these results, we turn to an analysis of

the Young European 2001 Eurobarometer. This data set has the advantage
of asking standardized questions across European nations. Using these
data also allows us to assess whether our results generalize across France,
Great Britain, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, West and East Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Greece, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, Austria,
and Ireland. The results from these analyses are presented in table 2.
The results presented in table 2 replicate those shown in table 1.
Racially and ethnically intolerant citizens of France, Great Britain, Spain,
Table 1. Cross-National Analysis of the Relationship

between Public Support for the Death Penalty
and Racial–Ethnic Intolerance
Variables France Great Britain Spain Canada
Intolerance .345*** .316*** .125*** .376***
Age –.008 –.075*** .023 –.030
Male –.000 .052** –.033 .233***
Education –.143*** –.170*** –.111*** –.017
Married .046** .047** .029 .086
Unemployed –.018 –.041* — –.097
Income –.085*** –.079*** –.005 –.010
Conservative .119*** .127*** — .035
Catholic .019 –.008 .083* –.123*
Religious salience — .050** .012 –.014
Egalitarianism −.096*** .012 — –.294***
Authoritarianism .089*** .059** .106* –.026
Crime rate — .078*** — .106
R2 .310*** .230*** .067*** .322***

N 3,134 2,241 775 507
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001 (two-tailed).
Belgium, the Netherlands, West and East Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,5

Denmark, Greece, Finland, Sweden, and Austria are more likely to sup-
port capital punishment if they are intolerant toward racial–ethnic minori-
ties. Two countries, Portugal and Ireland, are exceptions to this rule.
A SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS OF GENERAL PUNITIVE

ATTITUDES
Although the primary focus of this project is to explore death penalty

attitudes, the opportunity arose to explore whether racial–ethnic intoler-
ance was related not only to support for capital punishment but also to
more general punitive attitudes. To do so, we analyze the 2006
Eurobarometer 66.1: European Values and Societal Issues, Mobile Phone
Use, and Farm Animal Welfare, September-October Survey (Papacostas,
2006). This data set allows us to assess, using standardized questions,
whether punitive attitudes are related to racial–ethnic animus across the
countries analyzed (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, West and East Ger-
many, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Great Britain, Greece, Spain, Portu-
gal, Finland, Sweden, Austria, and Ireland).
5. The Luxembourg multivariate analysis included 118 respondents. At the bivari-

ate level, the relationship between support for the death penalty and
racial–ethnic intolerance is significant (r2 = .165, p = .035, one-tailed, N = 202).
Table 2. Cross-National Analysis of the Relationship between Public Support for the Death
Penalty and Racial–Ethnic Intolerance, 2001 Young European Eurobarometer
(Standardized Logistic Regression Coefficients)
\\server05\productn\C\CRY\48-3\CRY307.txt
All West East

Variables Countries France Belgium Netherlands Germany Italy Luxembourg Denmark Britain Greece Spain Portugal Germany Finland Sweden Austria Ireland
Intolerance .248*** .317*** .291*** .195** .223** .336*** .151 .365*** .323*** .188* .328*** –.023 .215*** .159* .250** .204* .133
Age –.040** .099 .092 –.010 .010 .041 –.127 –.094 –.011 .037 –.171* –.111 –.127* –.069 –.069 –.058 .102
Male .067*** .098 .093 .021 .015 .061 .096 .045 .019 .051 .182** .046 –.025 .146* .238 .058 .015
Married .052*** .116* .065 .178*** –.070 –.046 .006 –.018 .051 .078 .072 .021 .024 .015 –.654 .124* –.082
unknown
Unemployed –.004 .086 –.021 –.035 –.018 –.140* –1.481 .106 .031 .039 .037 –.048 –.001 –.063 .018 –.070 .026
Urban –.039** –.071 –.153** –.088 –.026 .074 –.044 –.161** –.024 –.080 –.135 .188 .064 –.227** –.109 –.107 .067
Crime .072*** .048 .163** –.002 .017 .060 .066 –.012 .068 .143* .124 –.115** –.012 .141* .132 .060 .056
Egalitarianism –.059*** .093 .009 –.093 –.082 –.121 .009 –.064 –.055 –.137* –.087 .002 –.118* –.125 –.046 –.164* .063
R2 .068*** .106*** .122*** .095*** .056* .105*** .092 .147*** .097*** .068* .140*** .060* .085*** .122*** .130*** .092** .031
N 6,197 384 427 553 394 381 118 438 458 376 399 332 413 406 377 392 349
Seq: 15
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed).

INTOLERANCE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
21-JUL-10
8:39
845
Prior research based on data collected in the United States suggests that
racial intolerance predicts not only pro–death-penalty attitudes but also
support for punitive crime-control measures (Barkan and Cohn, 1994,
2005; Unnever, Cullen, and Jones, 2008). Consequently, it is consistent
within a minority group threat thesis to anticipate that racial and ethnic
intolerance should predict not only greater support for capital punishment
but also punitive crime-control attitudes in Western capitalist democracies
that have conflicted racial and ethnic relations. If this relationship is pre-
sent, then it would suggest that the effects of racial–ethnic intolerance are
not specific to the particular sanction of the death penalty but potentially
underlie an orientation supportive of a more general “get-tough”
approach to crime control.
The results presented in table 3 support the minority group threat
hypothesis that public support for more generally expressed punitive atti-
tudes is cross-nationally related to racial and ethnic animus. The data show
that individuals who were more likely to support severely punishing
criminals expressed greater racial and ethnic intolerance. Similar to the
findings related to support for the death penalty, these findings generalize
to the populations of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, West and East
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Great Britain, Greece, Spain,
Finland, Sweden, and Austria.
In these nations, people who expressed racial and ethnic animus were
more likely to support harshly punishing criminals after controlling for the
covariates, including the respondents’ age, gender, education level, marital
status, Catholic affiliation, and employment status. In addition, other atti-
tudes were controlled, including the respondents’ political orientation, the
degree to which they endorse egalitarian beliefs, the strength of their relig-
ious beliefs, whether they expressed authoritarian views, and whether they
believed the crime rate was increasing. As with the death penalty, the stan-
dardized regression coefficients indicate that intolerance was one of the
most substantive predictors of punitiveness.
The data further show that two other factors have a relatively consistent
relationship with punitiveness, education, and political orientation. People
with more years of education were less likely and those who were conserv-
atives were more likely to embrace punitive sentiments.6 Similar to the
results from the death penalty analysis, punitiveness was not positively
related to racial–ethnic intolerance in Portugal and Ireland.
6. To further test the reliability of the results presented in table 3, we conducted two
more analyses on whether intolerance was related to more general punitive atti-
tudes (e.g., “Whether criminals stealing food in a shop should be punished more
severely” and “People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences”). 1)
We analyzed data included in the 1999 European Values Survey (European Val-
ues Study Group and World Values Survey Association, 2006). 2) We reanalyzed
Table 3. Cross-National Analysis of the Relationship between Public Support for Punitiveness
and Racial–Ethnic Intolerance, 2006 European Values and Societal Issues
Eurobarometer (Standardized OLS Regression Coefficients)
\\server05\productn\C\CRY\48-3\CRY307.txt
All West East

Variables Countries France Belgium Netherlands Germany Italy Luxembourg Denmark Britain Greece Spain Portugal Germany Finland Sweden Austria Ireland
Intolerance .172*** .306*** .190*** .176*** .181*** .238*** .180*** .341*** .213*** .127*** .237*** –.098** .264*** .222*** .258*** .154*** .033
Age .012 –.022 .031 –.071* –.125** –.046 –.140 –.044 –.117** .090* .008 .015 .129* .043 –.092** .005 .094*
Male –.028*** –.049 –.066* –.045 –.024 –.053 .002 –.013 –.031 –.076* –.003 –.042 –.015 –.025 –.086** .049 –.054
Education –.120*** –.148*** –.127*** –.180*** –.155*** .047 –.173** –.061* –.287*** –.088* –.109** –.036 –.154** –.152*** –.189*** –.188*** –.167***
unknown
Married .010 –.025 .045 –.046 .005 .028 .057 –.035 .004 .021 .121** –.020 –.021 .039 .003 –.064 –.085*
Unemployed .003 –.030 .009 .045 –.025 –.017 .019 –.016 .031 –.003 .026 –.041 .021 .014 .074** –.035 –.014
Conservative .070*** .218*** .071* .238*** .070* .069 –.087 .198*** .154*** .056 .005 .045 .022 .117*** .211*** .008 .028
Catholic .031*** .054 .044 .080** –.035 .008 .220*** –.000 –.005 .034 .084 .047 –.142** –.073* .045 .094** .123***
Church –.010 –.024 .037 .029 .026 –.030 –.107* –.036 –.029 –.042 –.059 –.013 .019 .020 –.046 –.024 –.054
Egalitarianism .005 .134*** .031 .053 –.000 .020 .019 .013 .021 –.073* .020 .092** –.001 –.027 .024 –.082** –.056
Authoritarianism .039*** –.002 .008 .027 .016 .118** .004 .007 .028 –.033 .042 –.038 .029 .066* –.031 .029 –.048
Seq: 17
R2 .063*** .252*** .100*** .160*** .078*** .090*** .146*** .193*** .163*** .084*** .139*** .032** .167*** .137*** .163*** .094*** .095***
N 20,646 782 842 896 807 639 369 918 770 760 560 715 438 837 939 808 692
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed).
INTOLERANCE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
21-JUL-10
8:39
847
DISCUSSION
The current research has demonstrated that in France, Belgium, the
Netherlands, East and West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark,
Great Britain, Greece, Spain, Finland, Sweden, Austria, and Canada, indi-
viduals who were racially and ethnically intolerant—expressing animus
toward immigrants—were significantly and substantively more likely to
support the death penalty. In two countries, Portugal and Ireland,
racial–ethnic intolerance did not positively predict support for either the
death penalty or more general punitive attitudes. We assert that these null
findings do not contradict the revealed general pattern that punitiveness—
however measured—is driven by racial and ethnic intolerance in Western
democratic countries with conflicted race relations. Rather, we suggest
that these findings indicate that these two countries have more benign race
relations.
Thus, scholars have found that Ireland seems to be an exception to per-
vasive anti-immigrant attitudes and the growth of right-wing parties. For
example, Garner (2007: 110) argues that: “Indeed, Ireland presents itself
as something of a counter-case in that increasing hostility towards Others
has been identified in the midst of rapid economic growth and political
stability, and that the parties manifestly opposed to immigration have
accumulated less than 1 percent of the vote whenever they have stood for
election.” Garner (2007) further speculates that market forces could alter
Ireland’s attitudes toward immigration. A contraction in the economy
could cause an increase in hostility as Irish citizens begin to perceive immi-
grants as economically superfluous. The issue of immigration in Portugal
also seems to be relatively benign. Peixoto (2002) reports that in 1999,
only 1.9 percent of its population was foreigners, with the plurality of them
originating from Europe or America and the remainder mostly emigrating
from countries with former Portuguese connections such as Brazil. Like
Ireland, Peixoto (2002) argues that a large percentage of the immigrants
had skills necessary to sustain, at that time, an expanding economy.
We further found that European youths with anti-immigration attitudes
were substantively more likely to support capital punishment. In addition,
our results reveal that individuals who harbor racial and ethnic animus
were more likely to express more generally held punitive attitudes in
Canada and nearly all Western European nations. Finally, racial–ethnic
the data sets from Canada, Great Britain, and Spain (France did not include gen-
eral measures of punitiveness). The results from these analyses show that individ-
uals who were more likely to support severely punishing criminals expressed
greater racial and ethnic intolerance while controlling for the other covariates.
This finding generalizes to the populations of Germany, Denmark, Austria,
Great Britain, Spain, and Canada.
intolerance remained one of the most robust predictors of support for

punitive crime-control policies even after controlling for a host of
covariates of public opinion. Recall that this same racial animus effect
exists in the United States. This consistent pattern of findings thus lends
credence to a salient conclusion: Racial–ethnic intolerance as a source of
punitiveness is a cultural universal in countries with conflicted minority
relations.
This cultural universal finding has three important conclusions. First,
racial threat theories have not fully captured the intricacies embedded
within public opinion about capital punishment. They explain why domi-
nant groups embrace harsh crime-control policies. They pay less attention,
however, to the extensive variation in punitive attitudes within the domi-
nant group (Unnever, 2008; Webster, 2008)—variation produced substan-
tially by differences in the extent to which majority group members harbor
racial animus. That is, minority group threat theorists have not fully incor-
porated into their thesis the reality that the base of support for punitive
crime-control policies principally resides among those with racial and eth-
nic intolerance.
There are limitations to advancing this argument. We could not show
that support for punitive policies specifically occurred among members of
the dominant group (i.e., Whites) who were intolerant toward minorities.
Except for Great Britain, the surveys did not ask respondents to identify
their race or ethnicity. This omission is not atypical. As Goldberg (2006:
339) argues, the aftereffects of the Holocaust have caused Europe to
render race as “unmentionable, unspeakable if not as reference to an anti-
Semitism of the past that cannot presently be allowed to revive” (the
Canadian survey also did not include a race measure). Still, given the fail-
ure of a control for race–ethnicity to substantively diminish the effects of
intolerance in the Great Britain analysis or in other analyses conducted on
U.S. data, the findings reported here cannot be dismissed as an empirical
artifact.7
7. We investigated whether our reported finding between racial–ethnic intolerance

and support for the death penalty would be substantially altered if we could con-
trol for the respondents’ race or limit our analysis to Whites. We conducted a
supplementary analysis of data collected in the United States (the GSS—a coun-
try that, of course, has a relatively large population of minorities when compared
with Western European nations) and a further analysis of the data from Great
Britain. Using the GSS from 2 years, 1990 and 2000, we first regressed support
for the death penalty on a standard measure of prejudice (attitudes toward inter-
racial marriage). As expected, the analysis shows that racial prejudice signifi-
cantly predicted support for capital punishment (standardized logistic regression
coefficient, .270, p = .000). These results indicate that people who are racially
intolerant are more likely to support the death penalty. Second, we regressed
support for capital punishment on the prejudice measure while controlling for
Second, current theories of punitiveness such as “penal populism” and

the “culture of control” have not fully taken into account the reality that
punitive attitudes are embedded within a racialized context (Roberts et al.,
2003). For example, Garland (1996) argues that institutionalization of the
“culture of control” depended on the demonization of the criminal. This
“criminology of the other” made the criminal into a “threatening outcast,
the fearsome stranger, the excluded and the embittered. . . . The other is
concerned to demonize the criminal, to excite popular fears and hostilities,
and to promote support for state punishment” (Garland, 1996: 461). How-
ever, what is omitted from Garland’s (1996) thesis is that the “criminology
of the other” is largely the “criminology of the racialized other” in socie-
ties with conflicted race relations. No explanation of punitiveness and the
policies these attitudes support will be complete unless the roles of race
and racial animus are accorded appropriate theoretical attention.
Third, in the time ahead, racial–ethnic intolerance may potentially
shape crime-control policy not only in the United States but also in
Europe. Given the EU’s constitutional ban on capital punishment, this
sanction is unlikely to reappear in Europe (Tonry, 2004). This reality does
the respondents’ race (1 = Black). Again, this setup allows us to assess whether
including a measure of the respondents’ race substantially alters the magnitude,
direction, and significance of the relationship between prejudice and support.
The results from this analysis show that support for the death penalty remains
substantially, positively, and significantly related to racial prejudice (.221, p =
.000) even after controlling for the respondents’ race (race was negatively related
to support, –.175, p = .000). We also reproduced the relationship between support
for the death penalty and racial prejudice separately for Whites and Blacks. The
racial prejudice regression coefficient for Whites was .229 (p = .000), and for
Blacks, it was .116 (p = .063).
In addition, there was one European data set that we analyzed that included
data on the respondents’ race–ethnicity—the 1997 British General Election Sur-
vey. We reproduced the previous analysis with these data. We first regressed sup-
port for the death penalty on our measure of racial–ethnic intolerance, and its
OLS standardized regression coefficient was .330 (p = .000) for all respondents.
We then regressed support for capital punishment on the intolerance index and
the respondents’ race (1 = Black), and the intolerance index coefficient was .325
(p = .000) (race was negatively related to support, –.020, p = .191). We also repro-
duced the relationship between support for the death penalty and racial–ethnic
intolerance separately for Blacks and non-Blacks. The intolerance index regres-
sion coefficient for Whites was .398 (p = .000), and for Blacks it was .057 (p =
.374). The bivariate correlations further illustrate that Whites are more intolerant
toward racial–ethnic minorities (.390, p = .000) than are Blacks (–.249, p = 000).
These analyses suggest that the inclusion of the respondents’ race would not
substantively alter the results we report if it were available in the other data sets
that we analyzed. These results also support the racial threat hypothesis that the
relationship between racial–ethnic animus and support for capital punishment is
positive and more prominent among members of the dominant group.
not mean, however, that public opinion about capital punishment is unim-
portant. Policies excluded by law—such as the death penalty in States or
countries where it is banned—can emerge as a symbolic issue in a more
general culture war over crime. In Europe, as Girling (2006) asserts, capi-
tal punishment has become enmeshed in a broader transnational identity
in which Europeans (or at least political officials) imagine themselves as
more civilized than those in nations that retain the death penalty, espe-
cially the United States. This penal cosmopolitanism, however, competes
with the far more punitive penal populism within nation-states. “The spec-
tre of a bloodthirsty European public,” observes Girling (2006: 77), “lurks
on the edges of abolitionist discussions.”
Our research indicates that this angst between penal cosmopolitanism
and penal populism is fueled by a relatively pervasive dislike of racial and
ethnic minorities. These results are echoed by commentators who argue
that the rise in European prison populations, which are increasingly filled
with members of minority groups, has been propelled by anti-immigrant
sentiments (Bosworth, 2008; Wacquant, 2006). As Downes (2007: 115, 130)
points out, there has been “the invocation of pathology” and “the tensions
stoked by large-scale migration are very real.” The increasing presence of
immigrants is being defined “in terms of social collapse” and that there “is
an apocalyptic tone to much of the political and media coverage” (2007:
115).
Capital punishment is thus potentially entangled in this web of racial
and ethnic animus and the embrace of more punitive criminal justice poli-
cies. As Downes (2007) contends, even left-leaning politicians in Europe
have moved to the right on crime control to maintain their legitimacy with
the public—so as to show that they are capable of responding to crime and
social disorder. Even though the death penalty will not be reinstituted in
the EU within the foreseeable future, within any given nation or in any
specific locale, opposition to capital punishment may render political offi-
cials vulnerable. Such officials could be attacked as being elitist and “soft
on crime” for not endorsing the use of the ultimate form of state legal
power in the community’s defense against an impending social collapse.
Should immigrants commit a string of terrorist acts or heinous crimes with
substantial casualties, right-wing politicians—with the ready support of an
electorate contaminated with racial and ethnic intolerance—may thus
have space to use the absence of the death penalty as a sign of progressive
politicians’ weakness in the face of serious threats. Ironically, the very
absence of the death penalty thus might prove a source of increased puni-
tiveness across the spectrum of available means of social control (see
Gottschalk, 2006).
In sum, if anti-immigrant sentiments in Western societies continue to
spread in breadth and in intensity, getting tough on crime—including calls
for imprisonment and the death penalty—will provide a conduit for politi-
cians to show their efficacy as leaders willing to protect innocent victims
from the heinous acts of “others” who have “no place in our society”
(Bosworth, 2008; Hagan, Levi, and Dinovitzer, 2008; Sayad, 2004). In the
end, the success of a movement in this punitive direction may hinge on the
extent to which progressive members of the dominant group—those who
do not have anti-immigrant attitudes—are capable of mounting a counter-
offensive. This resistance likely would need to deconstruct and show the
ineffectiveness of policies based on racial–ethnic intolerance and the cul-
ture of fear on which it depends (Simon, 2007).
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James D. Unnever is an associate professor of criminology at the Uni-

versity of South Florida - Sarasota. His most recent publication is Race,
Racism, and Crime: A Theory of African American Offending (2011).
Other current publications examine the “Obama effect,” global support
for the death penalty, whether racial and ethnic intolerance predicts puni-
tive attitudes cross-nationally, factors related to whether the public wants
to “get tough” on corporate crime, and a test of three competing models of
punitive attitudes. Furthermore, he has presented a theoretical model that
explains individual differences in support for penal crime-control policies.
He was the recipient of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences’ Donal
A. J. MacNamara Award.
Francis T. Cullen is Distinguished Research Professor of Criminal Jus-
tice and Sociology at the University of Cincinnati. His works include Reaf-
firming Rehabilitation, Combating Corporate Crime, Corporate Crime
Under Attack, Rethinking Crime and Deviance Theory, Unsafe in the Ivory
Tower: The Sexual Victimization of Women, Taking Stock: The Status of
Criminological Theory, Criminological Theory: Context and Consequences,
and Criminological Theory: Past to Present—Essential Readings. His cur-

rent research focuses on the impact of social support on crime, the mea-
surement of sexual victimization, public opinion about crime control, and
rehabilitation as a correctional policy. He is a past president of both the
American Society of Criminology and the Academy of Criminal Justice
Sciences.
APPENDIX A
CANADA
The Canadian survey included the following components: the Campaign-
Period Survey (CPS), the Post-Election Survey (PES), and the Mail-Back
Survey (MBS). Its universe was Canadian citizens aged 18 years and older,
who spoke one of Canada’s official languages (English or French) and
resided in private homes with a telephone in the ten Canadian provinces
and two territories. The description of the data shows that approximately
46 percent of the telephone numbers included in the CPS were completed
for a total of 3,651 interviews. Seventy-eight percent, or 2,860 of the CPS
respondents, completed the PES survey, and 1,517 of the PES respondents
completed the MBS. A two-stage probability selection process was used to
select survey respondents, and a weight was added to the sample by
province.
FRANCE
The 1995 French Election Study was a national random sample of quali-
fied registered voters in French electoral districts, and the data were col-
lected by personal interviews. Its universe was French citizens 18 years or
older registered on the electoral lists.
SPAIN
The Center for Research on Social Reality Spain Survey was a random
sample, stratified by autonomous regions and municipalities according to
their size and the data were collected by personal interviews. Its universe
was persons aged 18 years or older living in Spain.
GREAT BRITAIN
The 1997 British General Election Survey is a multistage stratified random
sample that interviewed respondents after the May 1, 1997 British General
Election. Its universe was a random sample of British adults with an over-
sampling of minorities. Of the 6,540 issued addresses, 5,814 contained a
person who was eligible for an interview, and 3,615 (62 percent) of these
individuals were successfully interviewed. A total of 882 of these respon-
dents were in Scotland. The interview length was 1 hour, conducted face to
face using computer-assisted interviewing, and all respondents were then
asked to complete a self-completion supplement taking around 15 min-
utes. Eighty-five percent completed the interview. There were also 705
ethnic minority respondents who are a subset of the survey. Eligible ethnic
minority respondents for this survey were those who considered them-
selves to be Black, Indian, Pakistani, or Bangladeshi, and they were identi-
fied by a random screening survey. The ethnic boost or the oversampling
of ethnic minorities included approximately 600 extra interviews and an
additional 10 minutes of questionnaire time for ethnic minority respon-
dents in England and Wales. There were 106 respondents from eligible
ethnic minority communities that were interviewed as part of the main
sample in England and Wales, and an additional 599 minorities were inter-
viewed as part of the booster sample in areas of high ethnic minority con-
centration (with a response rate of 45 percent). However, our analysis of
these data focused only on White support for the death penalty.
EUROBAROMETERS
The Eurobarometers we analyzed are part of the Eurobarometer survey

series of cross-national and cross-temporal comparative social-science
research. Beginning in the early 1970s, representative national samples in
all EU (formerly the European Community) member-states have been
simultaneously interviewed in the spring and autumn of each year. Both of
our surveys were conducted by various organizations operating in the EU.
The spatial units were countries, and the observation units were individu-
als. The universe for the young Europeans Eurobarometer survey was citi-
zens of the EU aged 15–24 years residing in the 15 EU member countries
of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom. The universe for the 2006 Eurobarometer was citi-
zens of the EU aged 15 years and older residing in the 25 EU member
countries of Austria, Belgium, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom plus the citi-
zens in the two EU acceding countries of Bulgaria and Romania, the citi-
zens in the two candidate countries of Croatia and Turkey, and the citizens
in the Turkish Cypriot Community. The individual country sampling
designs were either multistage national probability samples or national
stratified quota samples, and the data were collected during face-to-face
interviews.
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RACIAL–ETHNIC INTOLERANCE AND

KEYWORDS: capital punishment, public opinion, racial intolerance,

* Direct correspondence to James D. Unnever, Department of Criminology,

 2010 American Society of Criminology

832 UNNEVER & CULLEN

democracies, including Canada, France, Great Britain, Spain, and other

MINORITY GROUP THREAT AND SUPPORT FOR

THE MINORITY GROUP THREAT THESIS

Group-based conflict theories argue that public opinion is shaped by

INTOLERANCE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 833

to be carefully policed. Second, associating “others” as being criminal rein-

834 UNNEVER & CULLEN

RACIAL–ETHNIC INTOLERANCE AND SUPPORT FOR

INTOLERANCE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 835

BEYOND AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: EUROPEAN

Researchers have begun to draw parallels between the “typification of

836 UNNEVER & CULLEN

INTOLERANCE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 837

the damned.” In his discussion of the “Fortress Europe,” Albrecht (2002:

RESEARCH THESIS AND STRATEGY

838 UNNEVER & CULLEN

existing racial–ethnic order. Their animus and feelings of being threatened

INTOLERANCE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 839

CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF ADULTS

840 UNNEVER & CULLEN

INTOLERANCE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 841

execution of murderers in general. Thus, the distribution was essentially

EUROBAROMETER YOUNG EUROPEANS SURVEY

842 UNNEVER & CULLEN

We created an index, Intolerance, to measure the degree to which

4. We replicated the analysis presented in table 1 using ordinal regression for

INTOLERANCE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 843

EUROBAROMETER YOUNG EUROPEANS SURVEY

To assess further the reliability of these results, we turn to an analysis of

844 UNNEVER & CULLEN

Table 1. Cross-National Analysis of the Relationship

R2 .310*** .230*** .067*** .322***

Belgium, the Netherlands, West and East Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,5

A SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS OF GENERAL PUNITIVE

Although the primary focus of this project is to explore death penalty

5. The Luxembourg multivariate analysis included 118 respondents. At the bivari-

All West East

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed).

846 UNNEVER & CULLEN

All West East

848 UNNEVER & CULLEN

INTOLERANCE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 849

intolerance remained one of the most robust predictors of support for

7. We investigated whether our reported finding between racial–ethnic intolerance

850 UNNEVER & CULLEN

Second, current theories of punitiveness such as “penal populism” and

INTOLERANCE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 851

852 UNNEVER & CULLEN

INTOLERANCE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 853

854 UNNEVER & CULLEN

R2 .310* .230* .067* .322*

* p < .05; p < .01; * p < .001 (two-tailed).