POLICING IN INDIA: EXPLORING ORIGINS AND

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

“INTERPLAY OF CASTE IN POLICE”

Submitted By:-

Ritu Kumari

NLS ID: 2499

XIV Trimester, V Year

Date of Submission: 20.01.23

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................................3

LAYING THE GROUND.................................................................................................................4

STRUCTURAL FOUNDATION....................................................................................................4

STRUCTURAL COMPOSITION...................................................................................................5

ANALYSING THE LEGAL LOOPHOLES.........................................................................................6

GROUND-LEVEL REDRESSAL..................................................................................................6

LACK OF INTROSPECTED AUTONOMY, MORE OF UNINFORMED AUTONOMY........................8

CASE STUDIES..........................................................................................................................10

CASTEIST INVESTIGATION AND VIOLENCE...........................................................................11

CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................18

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 INTRODUCTION
The caste system in India has had a profound impact on many aspects of Indian society,
including the functioning of the police. The police force is still heavily populated by
members of upper-castes in many regions of India, particularly Brahmins and other regional
high-caste groups. This has caused a number of problems, including discrimination against
and lack of representation and knowledge of members of lower-caste communities,
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (“SC/STs”) within the police force.

Discrimination against them is one of the major problems caused by the dominance of upper-
caste members within the police. This has manifested in a variety of ways; bias in the
investigation and prosecution of crimes and a lack of consideration for the wants and needs of
people from lower social classes. This has resulted in a lack of trust on the part of these
communities in the police, which hampers their ability to effectively protect and serve them.

Lack of representation and understanding of lower-caste groups is a problem that results from
the predominance of upper-caste police officers. This can make it challenging for the police
to effectively interact with and serve these communities and can block the understanding of
the social and cultural issues that these groups face. It can also result in a lack of awareness
of the needs and worries of people from lower-castes. There have been calls for more
members of lower-castes to be represented in the police force in order to address these
problems, which involves initiatives to increase the number of people from lower castes
joining the police force as well as initiatives to give lower-caste officers training and support
so they can better serve and defend their own communities. However, its argued that this
apart from the difficulty for lower-communities to resume positions of decision-making and
power authority in the police force, even the development in their numbers in the force is
only the first step and will not guarantee caste sensitivity.

It is significant to remember that addressing caste-related problems solely by changing the

makeup of the police force does not suffice. This paper argues that the larger transformations
needs to happen in the police force’s policies, practices and mindsets to ensure accordance of
dignity and respect to individuals, regardless of their caste. It first lays contextualizes the
police structure in its background of a colonially structured way of working and then dives
into its practical manifestations of how over the years implicit caste biasness could have been
ingrained within such a system.

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 LAYING THE GROUND
STRUCTURAL FOUNDATION
The Indian police structure was originally laid by the Britishers at a time when social-
structures and hierarchies were penetrating colonial administration to devise a division of
labour and labourers that could favour colonists in ruling, regulating and controlling the
various congeries of communities. The Police Act of 1861 was enacted to establish a three-
tier structure of constabulary, supervisory and superior ranked officers. This structure still
functions with some modifications and expansion in senior levels.1

The relationship between the federal and provincial governments regarding policing is a
crucial factor to take into account when analysing the Indian police. The police, public order,
courts, and other related institutions fall under the purview of State or provincial authority
under Article 246 of the Indian Constitution, which divides legislative powers between the
Parliament and State legislative assemblies. So, the central government has control over
central policing organisations like the CBI but not the civil police, an institution governed at
the State level with local police Acts that complement the all-India structures and
procedures.2 The civil police is thus, in obvious ways, the face of the state. Plus there is dual
control at the district, with the District Superintendent subject to District Magistrate’s
directions. The complexities in the centre-state relationship is evident in the recruitment of
police officers and sharing of intelligence across states. While senior officers are recruited
through a national process, belonging to the Indian Police/Administrative Service, most other
are admitted at the state level holding positions of constables, sub-inspectors and deputy
superintendent.

This is based on Robert Peel’s model of Ireland’s Metropolitan Police. 3 In addition to leaving
behind attitudes, preconceived notions and predispositions toward the police for the general
public and policy-makers as well as a concept of ‘proper’ police duties that continues to
follow what was considered ‘proper’ under the British, the British police legacy to
independent India goes beyond its structure. With the rigid hierarchy and discipline being
important aspects of identity invoked with pride and prejudice, caste politics impliedly plays
a critical role in their contemporary understandings of civil police’s proper duties. Caste often
1
The Police Act 1861.
2
Arvind Verma, The Indian Police: A Critical Evaluation (New Delhi, Regency, 2005).
3
ibid.

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takes over the political functions of class in policing due to the intersectional multiple-layered
dimensions connecting caste with historically evolved notions of criminality, justice,
civilization and behavioural tendencies. Modern politics in modern capitalist or industrialist
economy is intensifying sectarian politics, and caste-identity is prey to it.

This paper cautiously separates SC/STs and the reservations accorded to them in the police
force from OBCs in light of the differential reasonings and causations behind ensuring
adequacy in their representation. This is not to delegitimise the discrimination and
subordination faced by OBCs.

STRUCTURAL COMPOSITION
Various studies, surveys and reports show how India’s police force underrepresents
disadvantaged communities as well as their women in proportion to their share of reserved
postings. Central Government has guidelines issued for recruitment and promotions of
SC/STs with reservations in direct recruitment at constable and sub-inspector level of 15%
and 7.5% respectively.4 So there is also state-wise police staff of different social groups in
terms of their strength, and positions, and reservation accorded differently in states mostly as
per their SC/ST population.5 The impact is seen more in Hindi-belts as Nagaland has
hundred-percent while Punjab has twenty-five-percent, Uttar Pradesh 2-percent of STs
reservations in their police force out of which majority have been vacant for long. According
to the Common Cause Report, only 11.5% and 11.6 % of SC and ST, hold the officer ranks
(assistant sub-inspector to deputy superintendent of police), despite the fact that officers
make up 13.4% of the entire police force.6

These statistics show a non-linear dimension of progress because sure there is a general
increase of SC/STs in the police force and it may seem like there is better presentation in
comparison to their share in national population. 7 Here any improvement aiding in balancing
the scales of community-based representation in institutions can be seen as a mark of
4
Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions, Compendium of Instructions on Reservation in
Appointments in Posts/Services in the Central Government, Department of Personnel and Training
Establishment Estt (Reservation) Division (14 October 2022)
https://documents.doptcirculars.nic.in/D2/D02est/Compendium%20of%20Instructions%20on%20Reservation
%20in%20AppointmentsSUBSi.pdf; This is a very recent development with mentions of establishing
equivalence.
5
Ministry of Home Affairs, Data on Police Organizations, Bureau of Police Research and Government (New
Delhi 2021) 53, 105; Status of Policing in India Report 2019 Police Adequacy and Working Conditions,
Common Cause (New Delhi 2019)
https://www.commoncause.in/uploadimage/page/Status_of_Policing_in_India_Report_2019_by_Common_Cau
se_and_CSDS.pdf .
6
ibid, 34.
7
12-percent against 8-percent of ST; ibid.

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assurance about the State's intentions regarding inclusion and affirmative action in a country
divided along lines of identity and gender. However a closer qualitative, over quantitative
lens shows a different picture. Given that marginalised groups make up the majority of the
under-trials in India, this has a foreboding ring to it. The country’s police-to-personnel ratio,
which dropped from 198 to 195 in 2019, is already below the minimum requirement of over
220 set by the United Nations. SC/ST representation in Central Armed and Police force,
Specialised Force, Central Investigation Agencies is less alongside decision-making ranks. A
stretched out force with severe gender and community representational imbalances is far from
ideal when it comes to its capacity to combat crime, which frequently results from social,
cultural, and economic inequalities.

ANALYSING THE LEGAL LOOPHOLES

I use the particular lens of theory of indeterminacy to approach this subject, in terms of law,
its language, interpretation and distortion in its purpose and outcomes, and show the flawed
approach in state’s intervention strategy against caste-related discrimination. This thesis was
devised by scholars opining that there is indeterminacy within the legal text and then further
within the rule when applied to a case. The expected results are compromised due to this
legal uncertainty occurring in both interpretation and conception of the law. 8 The loopholes,
contradictions, vagueness, overreaching and overlapping principles in laws on Police duties
and protection of lower-castes are often abusively interpreted and the materials of legal
analysis fall short of correcting it.

GROUND-LEVEL REDRESSAL
Henceforth I argue that increasing SC/ST police officers alone may not necessarily lead to a
reduction in caste bias within and by police officers because; i) it may not change the culture
and attitude as a whole; ii) SC/ST officers may not cause substantial affects without proper
training and education on caste-bias; iii) their initiative and efforts can be discouraged or
receive retaliation due to an inherent lack of proper support mechanisms in place to report
and address discrimination; iv) without equal opportunity and fair treatment, they will be
unable to perform their duty effectively and; v) they may not have the same degree of power
and influence as others even if they are sufficiently promoted failing to bring about change
within the force.

8
Servan Gurler, ‘The Problem of Legal Indeterminacy in Contemporary Legal Philosophy’ (2008) 57 AXL;
Mark Tushnet, ‘Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis’ (1997) 16 QLR 339.

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The liberal scope left in describing the laws on police duties and functioning allows too much
leeway for abuse without consequences.

The preamble of the 1861 Act reads “it is expedient to reorganise the police and to make it a
more efficient instrument for the prevention and detection of crime”9 narrows their spirit. In
the limited spirit of their obligations under the Act, which include obeying and executing all
orders and warrants lawfully issued by any competent authority, gathering and sharing
information affecting public-peace, preventing the commission of crimes, detecting and
bringing offenders to justice, and apprehending all individuals the officer is legally authorised
to apprehend, the police have frequently claimed that they have no other societal role to play.
The notion of legal justice is not completely realised through this.

State needs to view police training through a needs-based approach, reflective of a

democratic polity’s demands, the propagated knowledge, values, skills and attitudes must
catalyse social and technological changes. Development of many novel skills beyond those
taught in current institutions are necessary due to unprecedented changes taking place in
India’s cultural, political, economic, social domains. The organizational structure mentioned
in the previous chapter restricts individual autonomy, in discerning right and wrong. The
higher ranks receive the majority of the innovation and funding allocated toward their
training, with the lower ranks, particularly the constabulary, neglected.10 The lack of adequate
priority given to constable training in light of the development of the training resources and
efforts reflects a pertinent and persistently blatant disregard for the training of those
personnels who make up more than 80% of the police strength and have direct interactions
with public.

Caste sensitivity is inevitably to be instilled from the beginning. But the larger problem is the
kind of training received which does not pay attention to social-sensitivity, lens of substantive
equality while dealing with inequalities.11 Disciplinarian training models overtly demand
officers to develop personalities of apathy, rudeness, intimidating and violence. Various
Committee Reports discusses its nature as traditionalist, technical and procedurally stiff, less
amenable to adopting changes in their training content, pedagogy, philosophy. 12 The
9
The Police Act 1861, Preamble.
10
Navaz Kotwal, Sanjay Patil, Building Bridges: Experiments with Community Police in South-Asia, Human
Rights Initiative (2011) https://humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/police/Building-Bridges-2012-CHRI.pdf.
11
The All India Services (Conduct) Rules 1968; The Police Training Institutions & Training Centres Rule 2017,
Police Code of Conduct; The National Police University at Greater Noida, Raksha Shakti University are positive
step towards unanimity within police community.
12
Ministry of Home Affairs, The Gore Committee Report on Police Training (1971)
https://police.py.gov.in/Police%20Commission%20reports/THE%20GORE%20COMMITTEE%20REPORT

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development of a public-oriented police service should be considered when discussing the
infrastructure, hard skills, and soft skills required for effective and impact-oriented training,
subjective to the changing realities of the profession. Competencies of ethical decision-
making, constitutionalism and democratic values are not promoted for acquisition.

LACK OF INTROSPECTED AUTONOMY, MORE OF UNINFORMED AUTONOMY

The state government, as the political administration, is given direct control over police
supervision under the terms of the Police Act. The Head of Police, Director or Inspector
General enjoy their tenure at the pleasure of the Chief Minister, 13  where they can be fired at
any moment without any reasonable cause. The 1861 Act is however a central Act conferring
the state government the power to frame their own detailed Act. A situation like this has led
to a widespread politicisation of the police, whose allegiance is increasingly owed to the
ruling political elite rather than the law, despite it being against their code of conduct. 14 There
is less adherence to the law, chain of command, and procedures due to the widespread nature
of this influence over the rank and file as well as top police officers. This is aggravated when
higher-ranking members closer to political affiliations, forbidden from criticising the
government in any manner,15 are the ones authorized to sentence disciplinary and offence
penalties.

It worsens as modern-police is predominantly run by upper-castes, and not all instances of

police misbehaviour constitute prosecutable crimes. Filing criminal complaints against them
is a drawn-out process. Courts are not permitted to hear cases involving alleged offences
committed by various categories of police officers, while discharging their official duties
under Section 132 and 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CrPC”).16 Courts
infrequently sanction this consequence, that shows the heavy reliance laid on internal
disciplinary mechanisms which do not enjoy public confidence. Discretion in such power-
matrix is exercised in multiple ways and several provisions succumb to the open-endedness
on questions of police whimsical power.

National Police Commission of 1979 had stated that the 1861 Act was not designed to
specialize “police’s role as a servant of the law as such, but to totally subordinate the police,

%20ON.pdf & Malimath Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice System Vol.I (March 2003)
https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/criminal_justice_system.pdf.
13
TPA 1861, s 1,2,3,4,7,14,15.
14
TAIS Rules 1968, s 5.
15
ibid, s 7.
16
Code of Criminal Procedure 1908, s 132,197.

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in discharging their duties, to the Executive.”17 It referred to S.23 that deemed any order
coming from anyone above a officer in the hierarchy as lawful without engaging in checking
its legality under any enabling provision. Although exercise of unfettered discretion is
prohibited apart from committing acts sanctioned by law under S.20, instances of civilian and
political control over police is not discussed. The scope for police to invoke case on fanciful
allegations and suspicions are enlarged by such provisions. The 1861 Act itself has very
broad language.

Like S.5 of CrPC allows imposition of restrictions on suspicions under vague purpose of
“prevention of the commission of offences and public nuisances.”18 Many cases also
substantiate arbitrary invocation of serious sections disproportionately to cases of lesser
intensity, sections whose ingredients are not found in the FIR itself, like IPC S.308 attempt to
culpable homicide for non-cognizable scuffle, S.124A on sedition for permissible
sloganeering.19 It enhances their courage to implicate false cases of say, planting arms on to a
person themselves and charging him under Arms Act, charging accused who were absent at
the site of crime etc. with investigative power of S.14 and 1720 of CrPC.

In addition, there are also provisions empowering officers with unwarranted arrest, detention,
mobilized control for committing a breach of peace is distortedly interpreted and acted upon
targeting marginalized communities. Because disputable terms, like peace and sufficient
grounds to take action,21 are not explained. Similarly with powers to issue orders under CrPC
for apprehended danger in nuisance cases without definitions. This is also allowed under the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act on mere suspicion of involvement in terrorist or related
activities and Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act for probing attacks in certain regions for
public order maintenance. S.156(3) complicates it wherein Magistrate, empowered to order
the Police to register and investigate a case, do not apply judicial mind to the complaints.22

All these provisions allow justifications for arbitrary actions directed towards minorities,
political dissidents and marginalized groups. On one side, the gaps in otherwise simple
normative laws impound efforts for law enforcement, and on the other, allow for almost

Second Report National Police Commission (16 August 1979) https://police.py.gov.in/Police%20Commission

17

%20reports/2nd%20Police%20commission%20report.pdf.
18

19
Balwant Singh and Another v S/o Punjab (1995)
20
“Power to enter and search any place and break open any door and remove any obstruction in the exercise of
the powers conferred by this Act”; “Power to take such measures as may be necessary for the preservation of
the peace and the protection of life and property” ibid, s 14,17.
21
TPA 1861, s 17,23,30.
22
Priyanka Srivastava & Anr v S/o U.P (2015) ; Ajai Malviya v S/o U.P

9
unbridled use and abuse of discretion. Scholars like Ronald Dworkin suggest moderate
indeterminacies are of no harm since they do not avoid dialogue on the best interpretation of
legal practice thereby causing substantial breakdown in community. However, I believe this
is misplaced when judicial decisions get trapped within it. The tension within the underlying
norms and the greater vision, the origins of Police’s normative structure which is not
adequately insulated from competing objectives in implementation, provide the basis for
these rules, hence indeterminacy. And their application when informed by different
considerations of officers, leads to neither fairness, utility, stability or predictability.

CASE STUDIES
We have the SC/STs (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 for prevention of hate crimes and
atrocities against the SC/ST expected to be judiciously applied by the police for greater
reliefs. There are conducts and behaviours outlines as atrocities, format of institutional
expedited justice and relief measures under a compensatory mechanism. However it has
barely been effectively implemented. Here I attempt to study what inconsistencies and gaps
can be abused by the Police in light of the above highlighted nature of power.

Firstly, the act requires a high burden of proof for conviction and when combined with
Police’s act of erasing evidence in prejudice for the accused, it falls weak. Secondly, it only
covers acts of atrocities to have occurred in public and not private sphere23 which shows that
the larger objective is not for the society to transform. It separates upliftment and respect of
SC/STs solely as state responsibility. But then why is the Police, a state agent, to act in a
prejudiced manner?

Indeterminacy in the form of open-endedness in laws for facilitating transformative change in

order to keep up with the changing, modern times is certainly useful. For instance, not
describing and limiting outraging a woman’s modesty can benefit in addressing implicit
sexism of society, however, the absence of a definition for untouchability in the
Untouchability Prevention Act is bound to operate within the uneven power relations.

Its through direct violence or hegemonic imposition that caste operates as a coercive and
disciplining mechanism in the society. Caste-violence manifests itself in a variety of ways
throughout a broad range of human endeavours, all of which aim to maintain the social
stigma associated with belonging to a particular group. The 1989 Act provides penalisation of
overt and covert hegemonic practices of such caste stigmatisation, however, it does not
23
The SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989, s 3.

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include or rather a gives a comprehensive brief of all possible ways in which that case take
place. For instance, retaliatory violence or tension in economic relations like untouchability
during payment, non-payments, under-payments etc.

The Act alongside also provides for appointment of public prosecutors from the SC/ST
Communities as well as for the setting up of special courts for the trial of offences under the
Act24. But many times existing district session courts which have intimate local relations act
as special courts implying half-hearted procedural compliance. Despite barring of the CrPC
(including on anticipatory bail), bail is many times granted under the general criminal
procedure law, allowing evidence tampering, and pressurising complainant and witnesses. 25
Additionally no alternative mechanism is provided for an officer not of the mentioned cadre
could not affect an arrest. The investigating officer is due to be appointed by the Director
General/Superintendent/State Government only based on their past experiences, sense of
ability and justice to investigate it within least possible time by perceiving the case’
implications.26 But not conditions are described to judge the officer’s qualities and intentions,
very vulnerable to be politically manipulated. In reference, the Act also has no programme
for witness protection, awareness and sensitization, clarity on any special criminal procedure
unsuitable for expedited trial, and uncertainty on special courts positioning dilutes this
further.

CASTEIST INVESTIGATION AND VIOLENCE

Data on crimes against SC/ST by National Crime Reports Bureau show a 1.2% increase, 32.6
of total crime rate in 2021; six crimes every hour. 27 Its acknowledged that the high rate of
crime reporting shows slight progress in SC/ST’s accessibility to the police. Besides, the
cases on police’s handling of crimes against SC/ST are innumerable28 to describe and that is
not the point of this paper, to give a documented case list. Hence, I would like to focus on one
case in specific; the Ranvir Sen Massacre.

24
ibid, s 14.
25
ibid, s 15,18.
26
The SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules 1995, Rule 7, 18.
27
Nikhil Rampal, ‘Madhya Pradesh &Rajasthan have Highest Crime Rate Against Dalit: Here’s why’ The Print
(1 September 2022) https://theprint.in/india/madhya-pradesh-rajasthan-have-highest-crime-rate-against-dalits-
heres-why/1110399/.
28
National Dalit Movement for Justice, Criminal Justice in the Shadow of Caste, Study on Discrimination
Against Dalit and Adivasi Prisoners & Victims of Police Excesses (New Delhi 2018); All India Dalit Mahila
Adhikar Manch, Dalit Women Rise For Justice (2021)
https://gcap.global/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/AIDMAM-report-final-cutmarks.pdf; National Dalit Movement
Equity Watch:2015 Access to Justice for Dalits in India

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I would like to quote Punnaiah J Commission Report here: “it is surprising to note that the
same Sub-Inspectors or Inspectors of Police are showing over enthusiasm to arrest those SCs
and STs who were the complainants (even before the Deputy Superintendent of Police takes
up investigation), though the very same Police officers do not arrest the assailants of the SCs
and STs on their complaints.”29

RANVIR SENA KILLINGS:

To give context, Bhumihars, Rajputs, Kayasthas and Brahmins are the dominant upper-castes
in Bihar, and there are hundreds of backward-castes. SCs constitute most of the agricultural
labourers whose status have remained stagnant in Bihar where patterns of land-distribution
run alongside caste hierarchy. In the 1990s, this power dynamic in economic relations, and
failure of state land-reforms and minimum-wages in bridging the gap in wealth, motivated
gross atrocities against the SCs; sexual assaults, abuse of landless classes, bonded-labour.
This imbalanced economic exploitation gave birth to militant leftist groups in numbers,
weaponry and political influence, called Naxalites by the dominants. In counter, rose private
upper-caste militants, Ranvir Sena being one of them comprising of Bhumihars. Over 400
Dalits were slaughtered by them between 1995-97 for elections and economic causations,
with numerous Dalit women raped, but state treated both groups differently.

Notably, Rajpurs and Bhumihars dominated the police force at the time, often alleged of
discriminating against OBCs who were admitted under the Mandal recommendations. 30 There
were reports of former CRPF personnels training the Sena, plus possessions of thousands of
unlicensed guns. An intriguing justification was provided by SSP for not attempting to revoke
their firearms, that the state was unable to defend all Bhumihars in the current conditions of
agricultural violence of Bihar making weaponry a necessity for their self-protection. A lot of
times, police used to arrive much after the crime-commission or even be silent eye-witnesses
to killings inside Dalit homes. They were later penalized with mere temporary suspensions.
Police often dismissed to act upon the news of Sena’s meetings and attacks as ‘routine’

The Sena held extensive political patronage from the Janata Dal, Congress and BJP which
benefited from Bhumihar’s support in 1998 elections. Its demonstrated by the fact that, in
contrast to the vast number of Naxalites who were slain in encounters while not a single Sena

29
https://gramawardsachivalayam.ap.gov.in/GSWS/downloads/Revised%20-%20Social%20Justice.pdf
30
Rajesh Nayak, ‘Naxalism, Private Caste-Based Militias and Rural Violence in Central Bihar’ (2012) 73 PIHC
1303.

12
member met the same fate.31 There is wide-coverage of the pattern of extrajudicial executions
carried out in disturbed areas against Dalits often covered in the guise of ‘self-defence’ as
well as crowd firing on peasant protests for land-reforms. Post 1997 Laxmanpur Bathe
massacre,32 the police appeared more interested to conduct raids without female officers on
Dalit villages in the guise of combating extremism, under the pretext of seeking out Naxalites
and falsely arrested multiple people including women and children. This was when election
polls were being barged by the Sena. Many of these searches have ended up in infliction of
punitive measures like sexual abuse vulnerable sections.33

The exploitative use of police powers exhausts hope and trust-levels when it manifests into
unjust judicial decisions. The Sena had confessed to their acts stating that they were forced
“take up arms to save the honour, dignity, and life and property of the innocent farmers.” 34
How did this not account for breach of public-peace, order and nuisance? While some
‘Naxalites’ were sentenced to death, Sena members walked out on bail, 35 as a part of a
premediated, bribed investigation as the police remain subservient to those landlords for
luxury and donations. The Patna High Court, of an upper-caste Bench, acquitted all Sena
men, in three tried cases, some previously sentenced to life imprison and others to death on
the basis of no evidence without feeling any need to constitute any Special Investigation
Team. The accused ran arguments that; i) FIRs against them are invalid because they were
not recorded with District Superintendent’s written approval under S,20-A(1); ii) non-
examination of the informants; iii) non-conduct of identification test; iv) delay in recording
witness statements and omitting some witnesses too; v) absence of necessary orders from the
DG; vi) frequent changes in the investigating officers from varying police stations; vii) lack
of procedural and protocol knowledge in the officers especially of TADA; and viii)
inconsistent noting in FIR.36 All of these were deliberately done by the Police and
conveniently used by the defendants, to the extent of establishing that few men could not be
said to have belonged to Ranvir Sena. The political and police complicity was blatant to slash
judicial legitimacy too. The table below reflects how the judiciary is also trapped within

31
Dhirendra K. Jha, ‘The running feud’ The Pioneer (December 12 1997).
32
Arvind Sinha, ‘Ranveer Sena and Massacre Widows’ (2001) 36:43 EPW 4095.
33
Agrarian Conflict in Bihar and the Ranbi Sena, People’s Union for Democratic Rights (Delhi 1997)
https://pudr.org/sites/default/files/2019-02/1997%20Agrarian%20conflict%20in%20Bihar.pdf.
34
“Our fight will continue till the extremists as well as the government lift the illegal economic blockade and
release confiscated land, other properties, arms and ammunition, etc. of innocent farmers...” ibid.
35
PUDR (n 33).
36
Vyas Ram & Ors v S/o Bihar (2013) 12 SCC 349.

13
procedural gaps and its subsequent channelisation for vested-interest groups inviting conflict
of interest in administration of justice without bias.

14
DALIT SIKHS:

Now this deliberate haphazard discharge of police duties for the upper-castes can be
contrasted with the quick, expedite actions they remain excited to undertake against the
lower-castes. This case refers to the charging of Dalit Sikhs under the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act and Arms Act with around 50 FIRs filed on suspected involvement in
Khalistani activities and Pakistan-based extremist organisation and arrested immediately.
This false narrative was crafted under the Punjabi Ekta Party and a firm leadership of the
DGP.37 CrPC requires filing of chargesheet within 3-months after the FIR’s registration while
UAPA allows a judicial request to be made for a 180-day extension. There was however a
1.5months delay even after the expiry of 90-days by the Police here.

However, there was a major lack of substantiating evidence here when some accused were
detained for five months, not to forget, obviously subjected to brutal custodial violence.
Cyber crime department report on extracting data from phones, forensic science laboratory
report on pistols and catridges, Additionally, the Punjab Police was working within the
intersectional-dimensions of nationalism, socio-religious leads, and communalism. 38 There
were justifications based on the accused’s backgrounds of being Sikh-farmers but consuming
tobacco and alcohol, participation in social organizations on Sikh justice.

There are endless number of cases on biased arrests, investigations, prosecutions, detentions
and violence, custodial deaths, fake encounters, torture of minors etc. 39 Law is silent on
established external mechanisms to deal with disciplinary infractions and resorts to be taken
against police misconducts giving rise to the mentioned kinds of unaccountability. The extent
of malicious prosecutions, incarcerations, false cases are also ragingly high.40

37
Nikita Saxena, ‘Good Faith, Bad Faith’ The Caravan (15 May 2019)
https://caravanmagazine.in/religion/elections-2019-hindu-terror-islamic-sikh-terrorism-mac-narendra-modi.
38
Anonymous, ‘Punjab Police bust Pakistan-backed KLF terror module from Patiala; 3 Arrested’ Tribune India
(30 June 2020) https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/punjab/punjab-police-bust-pakistan-backed-klf-terror-
module-from-patiala-3-arrested-106653; Anonymous, ‘Punjab Police Busts Terror Module, Arrest Three KLF
Operatives’ Indian Express (Chandigarh, 1 July 2020)
https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/chandigarh/punjab-police-busts-terror-module-arrest-three-klf-
operatives-6484925/.
39
National Dalit Movement for Justice (n 28); Alia Allana, ‘The Police Rapes’ Fountain Ink (6 March 2017)
http://fountainink.in/reportage/the-police-rapes.
40
Ministry of Law & Justice, 277th Law Commission Report on ‘Wrongful Prosecution (Miscarriage of Justice):
Legal Reform) (30 August 2018) https://static.pib.gov.in/WriteReadData/userfiles/Report%20No.
%20277%20Wrongful%20Prosecution.pdf.

15
This list was prepared by the Naitonal Dalit Movement for Justice on the forms of torture
practiced on Dalits by conducting an empirical survey.

16
The Common Cause Report even reveals data on trust issues between the public and police;
fear of being physically assaulted, falsely arrested or implicated, sexually exploited, and
personal experiences of these.41 Herein the STs endorse lesser condonation of violence
against alleged criminals in police custody whereas majority support it as a part of quick,
retributive justice. The arrest of Dalit Sikhs was or encounter killings are also widely
supported in the spirit of nationalistic duties, police being a state body cannot be imbued with
any wrong ulterior motive. The disparity in opinions is visible in politically upper-caste
dominant states of Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Delhi, which are ironically more industrialised, and
modernized, expected to have a greater accordance for respect for human rights, against
Odisha and Himachal Pradesh with majority population of marginalized.

The majority of the populace trusts the police because they want to see a drop in crime rates.
However, they frequently disregard the rules and guidelines of the legal system that deal with
determining guilt and imposing punishment. The media and entertainment sector in India
frequently reinforce this mindset. This attitude disproportionately affects the most vulnerable
groups in society, like the Dalits and Tribals, who make up a higher percentage of those in

41
Common Cause (n 5) 140.

17
prison (55%) than their overall population representation (39%), as well as a higher
percentage of those who are waiting for trial.

18
 CONCLUSION
Police organisations must be receptive to community needs because their primary
responsibilities is to serve and protect the community. This entails actively engaging the
community and consulting with them. However, police in India has typically been conducted
in a one-sided manner, with communities having little influence over the plans and
techniques used to protect them. The notion that the community holds the police accountable
has not gained traction in the nation. The Police Code of Conduct mandates that officers
uphold the highest standards of integrity and respect for people' rights, but frequent reports of
police abuses cause a crisis in departmental discipline.

Because of a number of reasons, including a desire to preserve the department's reputation,

dubious police procedures, and political meddling in investigations, the public generally
distrusts the police. As a result, police personnel are inclined to thwart democratic processes
for personal benefit and political favouritism, which undermines the rule of law and limits the
police force's capacity to maintain the community's safety. Instead, crime, corruption, and
misuse of authority, the very systemic seductions they are meant to fight, have increased the
police force's vulnerability. This paper studied this aspect of the Indian police force in
specific reference to Caste, an omnipresent virtue of Indian economy.

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