As a learner of epistemology, and its impact on the search as well as conception of what is so

ideal it can be called, this class has been very instructive. The core readings have been instrumental in
identifying the thought processes involved in conceiving objective legal positions, as well as constructing
the functional relationships between facts and truths. 1 Over the course of seminar one, the nature of
legal epistemology within the realm of sociological theory became more and more important. In this
reflection of Seminar One entitled ‘The Problem of Epistemology’, the following theoretical constructs
informed the learning and discussion curves in class: rationalism, empiricism, and critical empiricism.
Based on those grounds, it is possible to acquire a more learned approach to ascertaining positions of
law, as they are ensconced in the realities of fact. The lenses through which the class viewed the
relationships between law and fact were essentialism, as well as the central role that hermeneutic
pragmatism plays in crafting truth within specific situations. 2 Overall, the acquisition of knowledge
depends on the attainment of common positions of fact, through which theoretical positions can find
common ground. As social scientists, the question before the class during the seminar was whether it is
possible to attain an ‘objective truth’ in social science. The literature, as well as discussions showed that
laws are an objective manifestation of truths that a society adopts. The route that society (through
legislation, executive actions, or even juridical positions) therefore takes to achieve these positions is
therefore what occupies social scientists like us legal minds. Rationalism and empiricism present the two
ends of the epistemological method, with critical empiricism being the halfway line. In effect, the
authors and literature elucidating these mechanisms of finding a truth represent the notions that
reason, experience (both exclusively), and a combination of both respectively.

1
Teubner G, ‘How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law” [1989] 23 (5) Law and Society
Review . 727-58
2
Huller L., ‘The Case of the Speluncean Explorers’ [1949] 62 (4)Harvard Law Review 616-45