(9781782545101 - Handbook On Political Trust) Immigration, Ethnic Diversity and Political Trust

20.
Immigration, ethnic diversity and political trust

Lauren McLaren
INTRODUCTION
Feelings of community and identity are central features of modern states. A great deal
of the seminal research on the creation of modern nation-states highlights the somewhat
artificial nature of nation-state construction around chosen vernaculars and myths of
common culture and history (e.g., Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1983, 1990; Anderson,
1991), but some scholars have also argued that the spreading of national identity would
not have been so successful if there were not already shared cultures and practices and
people did not have a fundamental need for such identities (e.g., Smith, 1991). Research
on the topic of national political systems contends that this affective, identity-based com-
ponent of system support is also important for the creation and maintenance of stable
democracy (Easton, 1957; Almond and Verba, 1989). Specifically, where state leaders
have been successful in their endeavour to develop a sense of national identity, a reser-
voir of goodwill was created that should carry over into support for political institutions
(Easton, 1957, 1965; Almond and Verba, 1989). Modern research also contends that
national identity is a key component of state legitimacy (e.g., Dalton, 2004; Norris, 2011;
see also Chapter 2 in this volume by Norris) and should help to increase trust in the insti-
tutions of the state (Miller, 1995). This research also implies that national identity requires
some sense of national community and more precisely, a relatively high level of in-group,
or generalized, trust for other members of the ‘imagined’ community.
This chapter discusses the effect that immigration and the diversity resulting from it
may be having on perceptions of national political systems. One of the key arguments of
the chapter is that ethnic diversity may be undermining political trust by weakening the
above-mentioned sense of connection amongst citizens and more importantly, between
citizens and political elites and institutions. The chapter also contends that in the modern
age of immigration, national identities are likely to be relevant to understanding differ-
ences in levels of political trust and that not all types of national identity help to maintain
positive perceptions of state institutions.
The first section of the chapter outlines the reasons that the diversity resulting from
immigration may be having negative effects on perceptions of national political systems,
arguing that perceptions of immigration are likely to be particularly relevant to percep-
tions of political systems, and especially political institutions and elites. This part of the
chapter also examines the potentially moderating effects of experience with immigration
and having a strong far-right party that may articulate the connection between immigra-
tion and political institutions and elites, thereby causing ordinary citizens to more clearly
draw these linkages. The second section of the chapter considers the role of differing
identity constructions in fostering or reducing trust in political institutions and elites in
an age of mass immigration, and contends that the way individuals perceive newcomers
to fit (or not) within their national identity constructions is relevant to political trust and
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Immigration, ethnic diversity and political trust 317
that official government policy regarding immigrant incorporation moderates the effect
of national identity on political trust. The final section of the chapter addresses the topic
of the political trust of immigrants themselves; immigrant-origin minorities comprise an
increasing percentage of state populations and it is important to consider whether such
individuals are themselves increasing or decreasing overall political trust. That is, are
their levels of political trust likely to be similar to non-minorities, or are they more or
less trusting of political institutions and elites than the latter? The chapter concludes by
summarizing the key arguments and implications of the findings presented here before
discussing potential avenues for future research on the topics discussed in the chapter.
IMMIGRATION AND TRUST
Immigration to Europe is not a new phenomenon. However, compared to earlier periods

of immigration it seems that the context of migration has changed. Periods of immigra-
tion before the twentieth century occurred prior to much real construction of national
identity and before the creation of fully representative European democracies. Now there
is a more clearly articulated community, identity and system of values that newcomers
may be perceived to be threatening. As noted above, one of the arguments of this chapter
is that immigration may have negative implications for the sense of connectedness people
in a democracy feel to one another and to their political institutions and elites. This
section of the chapter outlines why this might be the case; develops propositions about the
connection between immigration and political trust; and finally, tests these propositions
using multilevel modelling that combines individual-and country-level data.
Research on social identities has long pointed to the conclusion that identities – even
artificially constructed laboratory- based identities – are meaningful to individuals,
because they contribute positively to self-esteem and self-image and because they help to
provide clarity in a complex, confusing world (Tajfel, 1970; Turner, 1982, 1985; Turner
et al., 1987, 1994). Long-established identities like national identities are likely to be even
more relevant and powerful, no matter how artificial they may appear to the outside
observer. Despite large-scale changes that many predicted would spell the end of nation-
alism, such as modernization, social mobility and increases in educational attainment,
national identities are still relevant to European citizens in the modern day (Hooghe and
Marks, 2009).
Immigrants pose clear threats to these identities by bringing with them seemingly
different values and ways of life; they may also be perceived to threaten the economic
resources of citizens. Particularly in European countries, where the main myths of iden-
tity have not tended to include the myth of being accepting of migrants (compared to
the myths of identity in the United States, for instance), it may be unclear as to how to
reconstruct identity to incorporate newcomers. Newcomers who may be perceived as
holding extremely different values from those of natives – Muslim migrants with regard
to a predominantly secular Europe, for instance – may be particularly difficult to reconcile
with existing national identities.
The difficulty of coming to terms with new migrants, in turn, has potential implica-
tions for national political systems. Political systems are thought to be prone to failure if
individuals in the system are not ‘sufficiently oriented toward one another’ and willing to


318 Handbook on political trust
support the existence of a group of individuals who can negotiate and settle differences
(Easton, 1957, p. 391). Moreover, Tyler (1998) contends that general orientations to the
political system are partly based on ‘social trust’; that is, people’s orientations to the
individuals leading the political system are likely to have been traditionally connected to
a certain amount of goodwill stemming from identification with these individuals, and
institutions are more difficult to run if they are dependent upon instrumental rather than
social trust or feelings of connection. In Tyler’s view, identification with others in society
and with political elites and institutions is important for governance (ibid., p. 282).
Some research into social capital has come to the conclusion that immigration and
multiculturalism may create problems for the sense of orientation toward one another
required for the functioning of national political systems, although it must be noted that
the evidence is mixed (see Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000a, 2000b; Costa and Kahn, 2003;
Anderson and Paskeviciute, 2006; Putnam, 2007; Stolle et al., 2008; Letki, 2008; Hooghe
et al., 2009; Sturgis et al., 2011; Pendakur and Mata, 2012; Van der Meer and Tolsma,
2014). Specifically, Robert Putnam raised the possibility that ethnic diversity serves to
undermine social cohesion by causing people ‘to hunker down – that is, to pull in like
a turtle’ (Putnam, 2007, p. 149), an idea that is now identified as constrict theory. This
theory is usually applied to social trust rather than political trust, and there are currently
very few studies of the direct connection between diversity or immigration and political
trust (but see McLaren, 2012, 2015); however, constrict theory as applied in the social
capital literature may be applicable to understanding political trust.
As noted by Van der Meer and Tolsma (2014), constrict theory implies two pathways
by which diversity can reduce social cohesion. The first is related to conflict theory as dis-
cussed in research on intergroup relations; according to this pathway, diversity increases
the sense of ethnic group competition over scarce resources, producing a general sense of
distrust and a retreat from social life. From the perspective of this chapter’s focus, then,
it could be argued that this retreat from social life produces a sense of disconnect with
others in society, as well as with elites running the society’s political institutions, thereby
reducing the general sense of trust in these elites. Alternatively, according to constrict
theory, diversity may reduce social cohesion by affecting perceptions of shared societal
norms and moral values. As discussed above, this sense of shared norms is thought to be
crucial for the functioning of the nation-state, with political institutions built upon these
foundations. Without such foundations, the basis for trust in political institutions is thus
likely to collapse.
Investigations of constrict theory generally use indicators of diversity to try to predict
social capital or social cohesion. Most of the empirical support for the theory comes from
the United States, where long-term racial conflict may have created very different circum-
stances than is the case with the more recent immigrant-origin ethnic diversity in Europe
(see Hooghe et al., 2009). Following on from these approaches, though, this chapter also
includes a measure of diversity – the percentage of foreign born in the country (based on
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – OECD – estimates) – to
try to determine whether levels of diversity are affecting political cohesion, as measured
by indicators of political trust.
However, I also argue that the way immigration is perceived is likely to be more impor-
tant for understanding trust in politics than the actual numbers of foreign born. As
noted above, it is clear that immigration creates widespread concern about political and


social community and about social identities (Sniderman et al., 2004; Sides and Citrin,
2007; McLaren, 2013). Moreover, under conceptualizations of national identity before
mass immigration, the institutions through which elites governed the national polity
were designed to govern and adjudicate between members of the national community.
When individuals perceive that immigration has threatened that community the institu-
tions that govern them are likely to be called into question. That is, those most attuned to
the effects of immigration on the national community may question the extent to which
national political institutions exist to represent a national citizenry. Moreover, it is likely
that individuals specifically blame their political elites and institutions for allowing large-
scale migration in the first place and thus hold these elites and institutions in contempt as
a result (see McLaren, 2015 for further elaborations on this argument).
Concern About Immigration and Political Trust in Europe: Analysis and Initial Findings
I am not arguing that concern about immigration is necessarily currently affecting national
identity or general support for the principles of democracy; instead the argument devel-
oped in this chapter pertains to perceptions of regime performance, confidence in the
regime’s institutions, and perceptions of the elites running those institutions. Specifically,
those most concerned about the effects of immigration may perceive that the political
system as a whole no longer adequately represents a national community (which is still
valued by most individuals – see Dalton, 2004; Norris, 2011), and that the institutions
and elites in the democracy are implicated in the creation of large groups of immigrant-
origin ethnic minorities. If this is the case, I would expect concern about immigration to
be negatively related to trust in national institutions and elites.
Most observers would probably not contest that there is likely to be a relationship
between concern about immigration and perceptions of national political systems, but
critics may contend that this connection is spuriously driven by other factors, such as the
joint mobilization of these sentiments by powerful far-right parties, general pessimism,
economic pessimism, alienation, interpersonal (dis)trust, ideology, negative perceptions
of the outputs of governments, and the actual functioning of the economy and govern-
ment (e.g., corruption, weak rule of law, poor public service provision, inefficient bureau-
cracy and institutional instability). The analyses presented below account for as many of
these potential explanations for the relationship between concern about immigration and
perceptions of political systems as possible. The analysis also includes a test of constrict
theory as it is normally tested in literature on social capital/cohesion – that is, by investi-
gating the effect of diversity on political trust.
The individual-level data set used in this section of the chapter is the European
Social Survey (ESS), Rounds 1–4 (2002–08), including Western and Southern European
countries;1 aggregate-level data come from various sources, including the OECD,
Eurostat and the World Bank. Measures of all variables investigated are provided in the
Electronic Appendix to this chapter. I estimate a three-level model with the individual
at level 1, variables that are measured at the country level and that vary across the four
rounds of the ESS (country-round) at level 2 (this includes far-right popularity, level of
spending on social protection and percentage of foreign born) and variables measured at
the country level that do not vary across the four rounds at level 3 (long-term country of
migration, governance quality, GDP per capita and unemployment rate).


Table 20.1 provides individual-level results from a multilevel model of trust in institu-
tions and elites. These results confirm that even taking into account potential causes of
spuriousness at the individual-level, there is a relationship between concern about the cul-
tural and economic impacts of immigration and perceptions of national political systems.
Given that the results in Table 20.1 are similar for both indicators of concern about
immigration and for the multiple indicators of political trust, Table 20.2 combines each
of these sets of indicators and adds country-level indicators of the functioning of the
economy and political system – including social welfare provision – as well as far-right
popularity, percentage of foreign born and history with immigration (to be discussed
further below). As shown in Table 20.2, taking into account these additional potential
sources of spuriousness, concern about immigration continues to be related to political
trust, with those most concerned about immigration being less trusting.2 The results also
indicate that actual levels of diversity, as measured by the percentage of foreign born, are
not significantly related to political trust. This is not entirely surprising, given the wide
array of divergent findings from tests of constrict theory (Van der Meer and Tolsma,
2014) and that actual immigrant numbers also seem to be unrelated to perceptions of
immigration (e.g., Sides and Citrin, 2007). As noted by Hooghe and De Vroome (2015)
perceived size of immigrant groups has a stronger impact on anti-immigrant sentiments,
for instance, than the actual presence of ethnic minority groups. Similarly, this chapter
argues that it is perceptions of immigration that are affecting political trust rather than
variation in actual numbers.3
National Contexts: The Far-right and History of Immigration
There are two country-level contexts that are likely to moderate the relationship between
concern about immigration and perceptions of national political systems: (1) far-right
mobilization and (2) history of experience with immigration. Far-right parties have been
on the rise in Europe since the 1980s in great part because of anti-immigration sentiment.
Ivarsflaten (2008), for instance, finds that the key factor uniting successful right-wing
parties in Europe is mobilization against immigration. Many of these same parties also
attempt to mobilize hostility to ‘the political class’. Thus, it is possible that the relation-
ship between concern about immigration and distrust in politics may be moderated by the
mobilizing ability of far-right parties.
Some may contend that the argument outlined here implies that levels of immigration
should also be relevant. As discussed above, I argue that the phenomenon being discussed
here is not necessarily connected to the actual numbers of immigrants but instead is
about perceptions of the threat (or lack of threat) presented by immigration. All of the
countries included in the analysis here have received millions of migrants since the end of
World War II, and we know that perceptions of actual numbers are often incorrect (e.g.,
Taylor-Gooby and Hastie, 2002, p. 88; Sides and Citrin, 2007; Hooghe and De Vroome,
2015; on other recent perceptions gap research, see Laycock, 2009) and change very little
in response to increased restrictions on immigration (Ford and Goodwin, 2010). History
with immigration may, however, be relevant to understanding the relationship between
concern about immigration and perceptions of national political systems.
Historically, experience with immigration has been extremely varied, with Southern
Europe and Ireland initially not being prime destinations for migrants. This began to


Table 20.1 Three-level model of perceptions of national political systems, individual-level

variables only
Parliament Politicians Legal System

b SE b SE b SE
Individual level
Concern about cultural −0.07 0.00*** −0.04 0.00*** −0.06 0.00***
impact of immigration
Concern about economic −0.08 0.00*** −0.06 0.00*** −0.06 0.00***
impact of immigration
Happy −0.02 0.00*** −0.02 0.00*** −0.00 0.00
Satisfied with life 0.01 0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00**
Meet friends often 0.00 0.00 −0.01 0.00 −0.01 0.00
Interpersonal trust 0.19 0.00*** 0.22 0.00*** 0.20 0.00***
Satisfied with country’s 0.24 0.00*** 0.23 0.00*** 0.16 0.00***
economy
Dissatisfied with personal −0.07 0.01*** −0.07 0.01*** −0.05 0.01***
income
Satisfied with health system 0.12 0.00*** 0.11 0.00*** 0.13 0.00***
Satisfied with education 0.11 0.00*** 0.12 0.00*** 0.15 0.00***
system
Loser effect −0.39 0.01*** −0.31 0.01*** −0.10 0.01***
Voted for far-right party −0.40 0.04*** −0.33 0.03*** −0.49 0.04***
in last general election
Left–right scale 0.04 0.00*** 0.04 0.00*** 0.03 0.00***
HH income 0.01 0.00*** 0.01 0.00* 0.02 0.00***
Age −0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00***
Education 0.10 0.00*** 0.02 0.00*** 0.11 0.00***
Female −0.05 0.01*** 0.10 0.01*** 0.00 0.01
Constant 2.15 0.11*** 1.03 0.11*** 2.38 0.16***
Variance components: no independent variables in model
Level 1 4.98 4.48 5.29
Level 2 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05***
Level 3 0.43*** 0.62*** 0.69***
Variance components: with independent variables in model
Level 1 3.78 3.42 4.26
Level 2 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04***
Level 3 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.31***
Notes:
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
N (level 1): 109 732.
N (level 2): 59.
N (level 3): 16.
Statistics were computed using HLM software.
Source: European Social Survey, Rounds 1–4 (2002–08).


Table 20.2 Three-level model of trust in politics, with country-level variables
b SE
Individual level
Concern about immigration −0.15 0.00***
Happy −0.01 0.00***
Satisfied with life 0.01 0.00***
Meet friends often −0.00 0.00
Interpersonal trust 0.20 0.00***
Satisfied with country’s economy 0.21 0.00***
Dissatisfied with personal income −0.06 0.01***
Satisfied with health system 0.12 0.00***
Satisfied with education system 0.13 0.00***
Loser effect −0.27 0.01***
Voted for far-right party in last general election −0.39 0.03***
Left–right scale 0.04 0.00***
HH income 0.01 0.00***
Age −0.00 0.00***
Education 0.07 0.00***
Female 0.02 0.01
Country*wave level
Far-right party popularity −0.01 0.01
Social protection expenditure 0.00 0.00
Percentage of foreign born −0.02 0.02
Round 2 −0.30 0.06***
Round 3 −0.42 0.06***
Round 4 −0.27 0.06***
Country level
Long-term country of immigration, post-World War II (dummy) −0.22 0.33
World Bank Governance Indicators −0.54 0.46
GDP/capita −0.00 0.01
Unemployment −0.02 0.06
Constant 3.20 1.16*
Variance components
Level 1 2.39
Level 2 0.04
Level 3 0.10
Notes:
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
N (level 1): 109 732.
N (level 2): 59.
N (level 3): 16.
Variance components with no independent variables in the model are as follows: level 1: 3.48; level 2: 0.04;
level 3: 0.52.


change only in the 1980s and 1990s, with Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece receiving large
numbers of migrants from North Africa and, in the case of Greece, also from Central/
Eastern Europe. In recent decades, Ireland, too, has become a key destination for immi-
grants (Geddes, 2003; Castles and Miller, 2009). Thus, ultimately, all the Western and
Southern European nation-states now share the experience of large-scale mass immigra-
tion from outside of these regions, and all therefore confront the same difficulty of having
to incorporate newcomers into the polity. This also means that all citizens of these coun-
tries are likely to have impressions about whether newcomers are detrimental or helpful
to their national political and socioeconomic systems.
It is possible that the history of migration to the country will affect the relationship
between concern about immigration and political trust. Why might this be? That there is
an expected connection between concern about immigration and political trust reflects a
process by which citizens are becoming disconnected from their state institutions, because
of their growing belief that non-nationals are sharing in the state’s spoils and will eventu-
ally have a voice in its political decisions – or already have a voice in these decisions. This
is not likely to be a sudden transformation of perceptions, as, for instance, when individu-
als respond relatively rapidly to economic downturns. It is instead likely to be a gradual
process, as generations of citizens come to terms with the implications of immigration
for their states. In addition, in longer-term immigration countries, several generations
of citizens have now had the opportunity to reflect on their perceptions of the impact
of newcomers on their societies. This, in turn, is likely to reflect lengthier public debates
about the effects of immigration in these countries, with citizens developing firmer views
about whether immigrants are a plus or a minus for the country and about the implica-
tions of immigration for the political system as a whole (see McLaren, 2012 for further
discussion).
Table 20.3 provides the coefficients for the models of political trust that include the
interactions discussed in this section, and Figures 20.1 and 20.2 illustrate these interac-
tions. The interactive hypotheses appear to be supported by the evidence displayed in
Figures 20.1 and 20.2. Namely, the impact of concern about immigration on political trust
(Figure 20.2) is stronger in the countries that have longer experiences with immigration in
the post-war era. The effect of concern about immigration on political trust is also some-
what stronger in countries in which there is a stronger far-right presence (Figure 20.1),
though there is still a relationship between concern about immigration and perceptions
of national political systems even where the far-right is weak. That is, anti-immigration
and anti-system sentiments are present without a strong far-right party stoking these
sentiments.
NATIONAL IDENTITY CONSTRUCTIONS AND POLITICAL

TRUST IN AN AGE OF MIGRATION
As noted in the chapter’s introduction, system affect, or national identity for our pur-
poses, is thought to be important in bolstering support for political institutions and elites,
in that institutions are more difficult to run if they are dependent on instrumental support
(e.g., Tyler, 1998). However, this chapter contends that migration is an important factor in
understanding the connection between national identity and political trust. Specifically,


Table 20.3 Three-level model of trust in politics: far-right and long-term country of

immigration interactions
Far-right Interaction Long-term Country of

Immigration Interaction
b SE b SE
Individual level
Concern about immigration −0.13 0.00*** −0.08 0.00***
Happy −0.01 0.00*** −0.01 0.00***
Satisfied with life 0.01 0.00** 0.01 0.00**
Meet friends often −0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00
Interpersonal trust 0.20 0.00*** 0.20 0.00***
Satisfied with country’s economy 0.21 0.00*** 0.21 0.00***
Dissatisfied with personal income −0.06 0.01*** −0.07 0.01***
Satisfied with health system 0.12 0.00*** 0.12 0.00***
Satisfied with education system 0.13 0.00*** 0.13 0.00***
Loser effect −0.27 0.01*** −0.26 0.01***
Voted for far-right party in last −0.37 0.03*** −0.37 0.03***
general election
Left–right scale 0.04 0.00*** 0.04 0.00***
HH income 0.01 0.00*** 0.01 0.00***
Age −0.00 0.00*** −0.00 0.00***
Education 0.07 0.00*** 0.07 0.00***
Female 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Country*wave level
Far-right party popularity −0.01 0.01 −0.02 0.01*
Far-right party popularity*Concern −0.00 0.00***
about immigration
Social protection expenditure 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00***
Round 2 −0.30 0.05*** −0.30 0.05***
Round 3 −0.42 0.06*** −0.42 0.06***
Round 4 −0.27 0.06*** −0.27 0.06***
Country level
Long-term country of immigration, −0.26 0.25 0.15 0.23
post-World War II (dummy)
Long-term country of immigration, −0.09 0.01***
post-World War II*Concern
about immigration
World Bank Governance Indicators −0.54 0.34 −0.52 0.32
GDP/capita −0.01 0.01* −0.01 0.01*
Unemployment −0.01 0.04 −0.01 0.04
Constant 3.72 0.85** 3.44 0.79**
Variance components
Level 1 2.39 2.38
Level 2 0.02 0.02
Level 3 0.05 0.04


Table 20.3 (continued)
Notes:
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
N (level 1): 109 732.
N (level 2): 59.
N (level 3): 16.
Variance components with no independent variables in the model are as follows: level 1: 3.48; level 2: 0.04;
level 3: 0.52.
6.0
Vote share far-right parties: 22%
Vote share far-right parties: 0%
5.5
5.0
Political trust
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Concern about immigration
Figure 20.1 Far-right popularity, concern about immigration and political trust
this second section of the chapter examines the possibility that in the modern context of
large-scale immigration, the way individuals see their national identities may ultimately
impact on their perceptions of their political institutions and elites.
Some individuals perceive that shared ancestry, being born in a country and having
long-term connections to the country are what ties fellow co-nationals together. Others
see national identity in terms of shared language or culture. Still others see national iden-
tity in more voluntary terms, for instance that participation in a shared political system
and community life or simply feeling like a country-national is what is important. These
distinctions have been categorized and labelled in different ways by scholars of citizenship
policy and national identity. For instance, the distinction made in early seminal work by
Hans Kohn (1944) was between ethnic and civic national identities; others have added
culture as another component of national identity that some individuals emphasize more
than others (e.g., Shulman, 2002). Other researchers simply distinguish between ascriptive
and non-ascriptive characteristics, for example, characteristics over which the individual
has no control (place of birth, parentage, lengthy connections to the country, etc.) and


6.0
Long-term country of immigration

5.5
Not a long-term country of immigration
5.0
Political trust
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Concern about immigration
Figure 20.2 Long-term country of immigration, concern about immigration and political

trust
those over which the individual does have control (participating in the political system
and voluntary organizations, feeling like a country-national, obeying the country’s laws,
etc.) (see Tilley et al., 2004; Heath and Tilley, 2005).
These varying understandings of national identity are likely to have consequences
for how individuals perceive their national political systems in the modern day of mass
immigration. Specifically, individuals who see their national identities in non-ascriptive
terms are likely to be more positive about their political systems than those who see
national identity in ascriptive terms. Because of large-scale post-World War II migration
to Western and then Southern Europe, the reality of many European nation-states is that
they consist of some individuals who were born or raised in the country and share in
the country’s customs and traditions and a significant portion of individuals who were
not born or raised in the country and do not necessarily share in these same traditions.
As argued above, in the modern day all of Western and Southern Europe have received
substantial numbers of immigrants and asylum seekers, and it is unlikely to be the actual
numbers that matter anymore for public perceptions of immigration. Instead, the large
presence of immigrants and the subsequent creation of minority populations that are
often seen as culturally very different from the majority (Sniderman et al., 2004; Sides
and Citrin, 2007) in all of Western and Southern Europe has presented substantial and
variable challenges to these countries in terms of determining where newcomers and
immigrant-origin minorities fit within the predominant national identity construction
in the country. In the context of large-scale immigration and the resulting creation of
minority populations, an emphasis on ethnicity, culture or non-ascriptive/civic char-
acteristics takes on new meaning with regard to perceptions of the national political
system. This is because the constructions of national identity differ in terms of their
level of inclusiveness (Shulman, 2002): it is generally very difficult (or impossible) for
outsiders or newcomers to meet the ethnic criteria in order to become country-nationals,


while learning the language and traditions are perhaps difficult but possible, and in some
countries, the civic criterion of political participation is relatively easier for newcomers
to adopt. Even this tripartite distinction can further be considered in terms of how easy
it is to acquire various characteristics. For instance, learning the language and feeling
like a country-national may be seen as more easily acquired than long-term sharing of
customs and traditions (see Tilley et al., 2004; Heath and Tilley, 2005; Wright, 2011;
Wright et al., 2012).
In the modern context, those who see their national identities in terms of factors that
can be acquired – voting, participation and feeling national – are likely to be more positive
about their national political systems than those who do not emphasize these character-
istics. This is because these individuals are more likely to perceive the political system as
capable of coping with newcomers, as these newcomers and their children can eventually
acquire these key aspects of nationality. This construction of national identity does not
imply that the national political system is exclusively for ethnic co-nationals, those who
have lived in the country for a long time or those who share the country’s traditions.
Instead, newcomers can become nationals through, for instance, active participation in
democratic institutions. Amongst those who see their national identities in civic/non-
ascriptive terms, there should be more openness to the idea of the political system includ-
ing non-co-ethnics and newcomers.
Immigration is more of a problem for individuals who emphasize ethnicity, being born
in the country or having parents who are country-nationals. Outsiders cannot easily meet
these constructions of national identity (or meet them at all). Indeed, it is likely that in
the minds of many people who see national identity in this way, newcomers may never
become country-nationals. However, the reality of Western and Southern Europe is that
because of large-scale immigration by those who are perceived not to share heritage
and traditions with country-nationals, newcomers and their descendants are eventually
incorporated into these European political systems. For those who emphasize ethnicity,
birthplace, lengthy ties to the country and cultural connections, this fails to meet the
individual’s expectations about the construction of the national political community. In
turn, this may mean that those who emphasize these characteristics may not be very happy
with their political systems precisely because these no longer exist exclusively for ethnic
or cultural co-nationals.
Table 20.4 investigates these propositions using Eurobarometer 71.3 from June–July
2009 and a two-level model (see the Electronic Appendix to this chapter for the measure-
ment of variables included in the model); the results indicate that those who emphasize
more civic characteristics are more positive about their political systems while those who
emphasize more ascriptive characteristics are more negative about their political systems.4
The effects of emphasis on language or culture are not statistically significant. The effects
of emphasizing differing characteristics are likely to vary by context, however.
National Identity Constructions and Political Trust in an Age of Migration: The Effect of
Multiculturalism Policies
Some governments design policies that make it relatively easy for immigrants and their
descendants to live in the country, maintain connections to others from the same back-
ground and maintain their own cultures. Countries that adopt these sorts of policies are


Table 20.4 National identity and political trust
b SE
Important to:
Have civic characteristicsa 0.08 0.00***
Have ascriptive characteristicsb −0.04 0.02*
Share cultural traditions 0.02 0.12
Master the country’s language −0.01 0.03
Control variables
Life satisfaction 0.11 0.01***
Perception of national economic situation 0.20 0.01***
Perception of personal job situation −0.01 0.01
Perception of household financial situation 0.07 0.01***
Perception of country’s employment situation 0.13 0.01***
Perception of environmental situation in country 0.14 0.01***
Expectations for life in general −0.02 0.03
Expectations for the economic situation in the country 0.16 0.02***
Expectations for the financial situation of your household 0.03 0.03
Expectations for the employment situation in the country 0.08 0.02***
Expectations for personal job situation −0.02 0.03
Left–right self-placement 0.03 0.01***
Education 0.01 0.00***
Age 0.00 0.00***
Female −0.07 0.02**
Rural −0.11 0.03**
Small town −0.02 0.02
Social self-placement 0.05 0.01***
Constant −0.35 0.12*
Level 1 variance 1.783
Level 2 variance 0.074
Level 1 variance explained (%) 13.9
Level 2 variance explained (%) 74.5
Notes:
a. Exercise citizens’ rights, participation, feel national.
b. Have national parents or be born or raised in country.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
N (level 1): 12 858. Statistics were computed using HLM software.
Variance components with no variables in the models are as follows: level 1: 2.005; level 2: 0.325.
Source: Eurobarometer 71.3.
also generally the same ones that adopt other policies that make it easier for immigrants to
become fully functioning members of society, such as short-term waiting periods before
being eligible for naturalization. Other countries have not tended to adopt such policies,
in many cases because the diversity of immigrant-minority culture is not something that
is welcome (see Banting and Kymlicka, 2006). This may be because policy-makers’ under-
standings of what it means to be a country-national emphasize the indigenous ethnicity or
culture (e.g., Germany, Austria or Denmark), or because the image of what it means to be


a country-national is based on assimilationist understandings of the nation (e.g., France).

While government policy may reflect the predominant understanding of what it means
to be a country-national (see Weldon, 2006), there are likely to be substantial numbers
of citizens who perceive national identity in very different ways from this predominant
national identity construction.
When the individual perceives that what is important for being a country-national
includes factors like being born in the country, lengthy residence and attachment to the
country and long-term sharing of cultural traditions but government policy fails to reflect
these preferences and instead privileges immigrants and immigrant-minority cultures (see
note 5 for examples of these privileges) that individual is likely to be less positive about
the political system as a whole because the latter fails to reflect his or her preferences
regarding the treatment of immigrant-origin minorities. On the other hand, those who
emphasize civic approaches to national identity are likely to buy into the notion that new-
comers can become a part of the nation by participating in society and in politics, and by
getting involved in their communities, and these individuals should be more positive about
a political system that makes this possible than those who do not emphasize civic identity.
Table 20.5 provides the coefficients from an analysis that includes interactions between
individual understanding of national identity and the privileging of immigrant-minority
cultures, measured by Banting and Kymlicka’s Multiculturalism Policy Index (MPI).5 The
results indicate that the effect of emphasis on differing components of national identity
Table 20.5 Multiculturalism policy, national identity and political trust
MPI*Civic Characteristics MPI*Ascriptive

Interaction Characteristics Interaction
b SE b SE
Important to:
Have civic characteristicsa −0.05 0.03 0.08 0.02***
Have ascriptive characteristicsb −0.04 0.02* 0.04 0.03
Share cultural traditions 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
Master the country’s language −0.01 0.03 −0.01 0.03
Multiculturalism Policy Index (MPI) −0.11 0.05* −0.04 0.05
MPI*Civic characteristics 0.05 0.01***
MPI*Ascriptive characteristics −0.03 0.01***
Constant −0.08 0.16 −0.24 0.16
Level 1 variance 1.724 1.726
Level 2 variance 0.072 0.073
Notes:
a. Exercise citizens’ rights, participation, feel national.
b. Have national parents or be born or raised in country.
The control variables from Table 20.4 were also included in these models. Their coefficients, standard errors
and p-values were only marginally affected by the interaction terms.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
N (level 1): 12 858.
Source: Eurobarometer 71.3.


2.5
MPI: Number of multicultural policies in country (5.5)
2.0
Political trust
1.5
1.0
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Ascriptive national identity
Figure 20.3 Interaction between emphasis on ascriptive characteristics and Multicultura-

lism Policy Index (MPI)
is indeed moderated by government policy regarding immigrant- origin minorities.

(The interactions between emphasis on culture and language were not statistically
significant and so these have been omitted.) Figures 20.3 and 20.4 illustrate these effects.
Figure 20.3 shows that when the individual emphasizes more ascriptive characteristics –
birthplace, parentage, where one is raised – and government policy privileges immigrant-
minority cultures, political trust is indeed lower than when the individual lives in a
similar context but does not emphasize these characteristics. Interestingly, the figure also
illustrates that trust is higher in countries where there are very limited multiculturalism
policies. Figure 20.4 illustrates that when the individual emphasizes more civic character-
istics and government policy provides for greater multiculturalism policies, the level of
trust is higher than when the individual does not emphasize these characteristics, and is
even slightly higher than the case of individuals living in countries where there are limited
multiculturalism policies. I discuss the implications of these findings in the concluding
section of the chapter.
POLITICAL TRUST OF IMMIGRANTS
Thus far, this chapter’s focus has been on the impact of immigration on the perceptions
of political systems of natives (that is, non-immigrant-minority portions of national
populations). However, given that immigrants and immigrant-origin minorities have
come to constitute a significant portion of the electorate in Western democracies,
they may themselves be having an impact on levels of political trust by bringing with
them perspectives on political institutions that are very different to those of natives.
This raises questions about what sorts of perspectives of political systems immigrants
bring with them, and whether they are ultimately having a positive, negative or neutral


2.5

2.0
Political trust
1.5
1.0
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Civic national identity
Figure 20.4 Interaction between emphasis on civic characteristics and Multiculturalism

Policy Index (MPI)
effect on levels of political trust in the host country. It also raises questions about per-
ceived legitimacy of the adoptive homeland’s institutions. The evidence from existing
research on levels of political trust amongst immigrant-origin minorities indicates that
with a few notable exceptions there is perhaps little to worry about in this regard, in
that immigrants tend to converge toward the levels of trust of those of native origin.
This third and final section of the chapter reviews the key findings in this area of
research.
Research in the specific area of the political trust of immigrant-origin minorities is
still relatively new. However, the evidence from this body of work thus far indicates that
there are higher levels of trust amongst immigrants than natives, and immigrants from
authoritarian regimes tend to have more positive perceptions of the political systems and
specifically higher levels of trust in their adoptive regimes in their adoptive homelands
because these function in a more open manner than their home country institutions
(see Maxwell, 2010; Strömblad and Adman, 2010; Röder and Mühlau, 2012; Heath et al.,
2014; see also Michelson, 2003; Weaver, 2003; Wenzel, 2006; but see Bilodeau et al., 2010;
Bilodeau, 2014; Adman and Strömblad, 2015). However, there also appears to be strong
evidence of convergence between immigrants and natives in terms of political trust (Heath
et al., 2014), particularly when socioeconomic status is taken into account (De Vroome
et al., 2013; see also Adman and Strömblad, 2015). In particular, political trust appears
to decline with length of residence in the host country and declines significantly between
first-and second-generation immigrants (Maxwell, 2010; Strömblad and Adman, 2010;
Röder and Mühlau, 2012), with second-generation migrants often converging toward the
average level of trust amongst natives (Heath et al., 2014). Some contend that this is a
result of ‘acculturation’, in which immigrants gradually develop attitudes and behaviours
similar to those of natives (Adman and Strömblad, 2015). Others claim that it is a matter
of ‘altering expectations’ – that the hopes of immigrants are initially high but when these


individuals actually experience how institutions work, they become more critical and less
trusting (see Reese, 2001; Menjívar and Bejarano, 2004).
Another possible explanation is that immigrant-origin minorities experience higher
levels of discrimination in jobs and housing, for instance, and this may produce a sense
of general dissatisfaction with the political systems in their new homelands (the so-called
‘barriers to integration’ approach – see Adman and Strömblad, 2015). Moreover, it is
likely to be the second generation that is more aware of the discrimination and inequality
in the host country and therefore more disaffected with the political system (Heath et al.,
2014). According to Heath et al. (2014), for instance, British citizens of black Caribbean
background and those of mixed white/black background are significantly more distrust-
ing of British political institutions than are white British, and this appears to be connected
to their perceptions of having been discriminated against. Evidence from Sweden also
indicates that immigrants who report experiencing discriminatory behaviour tend to be
less politically trusting (Adman and Strömblad, 2015).
CONCLUSION
This chapter examined three elements of the potential effects of immigration and the
resulting ethnic diversity on political trust: the impact of concern about immigration,
the impact of different national identity constructions in an age of mass immigration
and the impact of the values of immigrants themselves on overall levels of political
trust. Some of the findings presented here are rather worrying since they indicate that
public concern about immigration appears to be reducing trust in politics, particularly in
longer-term countries of immigration, and even where the far-right is not very powerful.
Moreover, they indicate that political trust is higher where there are fewer multicultur-
alism policies and trust is relatively low when there are many multiculturalism policies
but the individual sees her national identity in an ascriptive way – that is, lengthy ties
to the country, birthplace and so on. The reason these findings are worrying is that the
ethnic diversity that has resulted from post-war immigration is now a fact of life in these
countries. The possibility that perceptions of this diversity and of immigration are not
only simply negative in and of themselves but may also have implications for perceptions
of national political systems appears to produce somewhat apocalyptic predictions for the
future of European democracies, which will now continue to remain ethnically diverse.
Also potentially worrisome is that immigrant-origin minorities tend to become more
distrusting over time, with some minority groups showing lower levels of trust than
natives. Thus, immigration-related diversity may be reducing overall levels of political
trust by contributing to a sense of weakened connection between natives and state elites
and institutions and due to a reduced level of political trust amongst some immigrant-
origin groups, which is presumably a result of their treatment by political authorities.
However, on the positive side, at least amongst natives, it appears that the combina-
tion of a national identity that emphasizes shared commitment to active participation in
politics and voluntary organizations – and emphasizes simply voluntarily coming to feel
oneself to be a country-national – combined with government policies that help minori-
ties to maintain their distinct cultural connections, produces more positive perceptions of
national political systems. I tentatively take this to mean that identity constructions that


are adapted to the reality of a modern Europe that is ethnically diverse and government
policies that also accept and acknowledge this fact may help to generate more positive
feelings about national political systems in the long term. One of the challenges in modern
politics is likely to be to convince political elites that emphasizing such identity construc-
tions may ultimately be good for them and for their political systems.
The ideas and findings presented in this chapter leave open a wide range of questions
and avenues for future research. For instance, the relationship between concern about
immigration and perceptions of national political systems was shown to be stronger in
the longer-term countries of immigration and weaker, on average, in newer countries of
immigration like Spain, Portugal and Ireland. Given that the latter have caught up to the
older immigration countries and have received very large numbers of immigrants in the
past two to three decades, it is possible that the process outlined here will increasingly
apply to Southern Europe and Ireland. Thus, one potential research question is whether
concern about immigration is likely to be undermining trust in institutions and elites as
immigration becomes more prominent in these newer countries of immigration.
The findings also imply that government policies toward immigrants or immigrant-
origin minorities are important for understanding how national identity constructions
are related to political trust in the modern age of immigration. This raises the question
of whether policy changes in this area have any effect on perceptions of national politi-
cal systems. A follow-up research question could thus be: does political trust respond to
changes in government policy regarding immigrant-origin minorities, or is this unlikely
to affect such perceptions? Another follow-up question from this part of the chapter is:
is it possible for political elites to successfully frame national identity in civic terms, and
if so, which elites can do this?
The findings presented here further raise the question of whether generational change
might have some bearing on the conclusions. Research by other scholars indicates that
at least in some European countries, younger generations perceive immigrants and their
descendants in very different ways than older generations (Ford, 2011). One question
that could be asked therefore is: were previous youths equally positive about immigration
(on average), and if so what are their attitudes to immigration now? In addition, do the
attitudes of younger generations who have grown up with the existence of ethnic diversity
in their countries change over time? Do they become like their parents and grandparents
and thus start to worry about the impact of immigration on their societies and their politi-
cal systems? Or is there evidence of a substantial value change, with younger generations
being accustomed to a permanent immigrant-origin minority population, and with no
sense that this population poses a threat to them or their societies?
Also of relevance is that there is research to indicate that older groups of immigrants
come to be seen more positively over time (Simon, 1993). So, for instance, Afro-Caribbeans
are seen in more positive terms than Asian immigrants in Britain (Ford, 2011), which may
simply be because the former arrived earlier than the latter. What is not known, however,
is whether migrants from countries that may be perceived to have fundamentally different
values such as Muslims from Asian or Middle Eastern countries will also come to be seen
more positively. Thus, follow-up research questions could be: how have perceptions of
migrants from Muslim countries and the Middle East changed? Also, is it concern about
particular migrant groups that is leading to distrust in political institutions and elites?
Another potentially confounding factor here is government social welfare policy and


income equality. Stronger social protection measures tend to be associated with more
positive perceptions of government institutions and elites (e.g., Table 20.2 in this chapter).
Different types of welfare provision are also related to perceptions of immigrants (Crepaz
and Damron, 2009), with strong social welfare being connected to more positive per-
ceptions of the latter. This implies that such measures may help to reduce the sense of
threat and the feelings of competition posed by immigrants. It is possible that the income
inequality–threat dynamic may feed back into perceptions of the political system in ways
that are currently unknown and unexplored. A specific question that could be answered
therefore is: how do income inequality and social welfare provision moderate the effect of
concern about immigration on political trust?
In addition, Eric Uslaner’s recent research (2012) serves as a reminder that segregation
of and lack of personal contact with minorities presents a major challenge to social cohe-
sion. The same difficulties are likely to apply to the arguments and findings presented in
this chapter. Thus, a key question to be answered is: does segregation have any effect on
perceptions of political institutions; either directly, or indirectly through factors like inter-
personal trust and sense of community? Thus, there are still many important questions to
be answered within the topic of ethnic diversity and political trust.
NOTES
1. The arguments of this chapter are limited to European countries that have been large-scale immigrant-
receiving countries since the end of World War II. The countries that we generally consider to be within
Western and Southern Europe are the ones that have received relatively large numbers of immigrants in
the past 70 years. Thus, the analysis excludes the newer democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
because I do not necessarily expect the relationships discussed in this chapter to hold for these countries,
which are much newer countries of immigration and thus far have not received immigrants in the large
numbers experienced by the rest of Europe. These countries are also not included because it is likely that the
survey questions about immigration used in this book capture a very different phenomenon in these coun-
tries than in Western Europe, particularly attitudes to co-nationals coming from neighbouring countries as
a result of historical border changes. That is, the immigration dynamic in this region is very different than
that in Western and Southern Europe and so I limit my analysis to this latter set of countries (see Wallace,
2002, pp. 607–9). Finally, it is unclear as to whether the arguments outlined here should apply to traditional
immigrant-receiving countries (the USA, Canada, Australia), and investigating this possibility is compli-
cated due to lack of data that are strictly comparable to the data used here.
2. I have also used an instrumental variables approach on Round 1 of the ESS and used panel data from the
UK to further investigate whether concern about immigration is likely to be a cause of distrust in politics
and the results confirm that this is indeed the case (see McLaren, 2015).
3. Note that I have investigated this relationship with percentage of foreign born as the only variable in the
model and the relationship between the latter and political trust is insignificant. I have also examined the
relationship between percentage of foreign born and concern about immigration and this relationship was
not statistically significant. Because of its collinearity with other country-level indicators, percentage of
foreign born will not be included in the remaining models below.
4. Note that I have also investigated these relationships using the European Values Study of 2008, where the
indicators of ascriptive and non-ascriptive identity are quite different from those used here and the results
are similar to those presented here.
5. See http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/immigrant.html, accessed 17 July 2014; measures from 2000 were used
since these came before the individual-level data used here. The MPI uses the following indicators of mul-
ticulturalism policy: (1) constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism; (2) the
adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum; (3) the inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in
the mandate of public media or media licensing; (4) exemptions from dress codes, Sunday-closing legisla-
tion etc.; (5) allowing dual citizenship; (6) the funding of ethnic group organizations to support cultural
activities; (7) the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction; (8) affirmative action for
disadvantaged immigrant groups. Each country is given a score ranging from 0 to 1 for each dimension,


and these scores are summated to form an overall Multiculturalism Policy Index; all items are thus weighted
equally. Note that I have also investigated the interactions shown here using the EU’s Migrant Integration
Policy Index (MIPEX) and the results are virtually identical to those shown here.
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20.

Immigration, ethnic diversity and political trust

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IMMIGRATION AND TRUST

Immigration to Europe is not a new phenomenon. However, compared to earlier periods

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National Contexts: The Far-­right and History of Immigration

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Table 20.1 Three-­level model of perceptions of national political systems, individual-­level

Parliament Politicians Legal System

Source: European Social Survey, Rounds 1–4 (2002–08).

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Table 20.2 Three-­level model of trust in politics, with country-­level variables

Source: European Social Survey, Rounds 1–4 (2002–08).

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NATIONAL IDENTITY CONSTRUCTIONS AND POLITICAL

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Table 20.3 Three-­level model of trust in politics: far-­right and long-­term country of

Far-­right Interaction Long-­term Country of

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Table 20.3 (continued)

Source: European Social Survey, Rounds 1–4 (2002–08).

Figure 20.1 Far-­right popularity, concern about immigration and political trust

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Long-term country of immigration

Figure 20.2 Long-­term country of immigration, concern about immigration and political

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Table 20.4 National identity and political trust

Source: Eurobarometer 71.3.

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a country-­national is based on assimilationist understandings of the nation (e.g., France).

Table 20.5 Multiculturalism policy, national identity and political trust

MPI*Civic Characteristics MPI*Ascriptive

Source: Eurobarometer 71.3.

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Figure 20.3 Interaction between emphasis on ascriptive characteristics and Multicultura-

is indeed moderated by government policy regarding immigrant-­ origin ­minorities.

POLITICAL TRUST OF IMMIGRANTS

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MPI: Number of multicultural policies in country (5.5)

National Contexts: The Far-right and History of Immigration

Table 20.1 Three-level model of perceptions of national political systems, individual-level

Table 20.2 Three-level model of trust in politics, with country-level variables

Table 20.3 Three-level model of trust in politics: far-right and long-term country of

Far-right Interaction Long-term Country of

Figure 20.1 Far-right popularity, concern about immigration and political trust

Figure 20.2 Long-term country of immigration, concern about immigration and political

a country-national is based on assimilationist understandings of the nation (e.g., France).

MPICivic Characteristics MPIAscriptive

Figure 20.3 Interaction between emphasis on ascriptive characteristics and Multicultura-

is indeed moderated by government policy regarding immigrant- origin minorities.

Figure 20.4 Interaction between emphasis on civic characteristics and Multiculturalism