1.) Ganuelas v. Cawed 7.
The defendants-herein petitioners alleged in their Answer 6 that the donation
G.R. No. 123968, 24 April 2003 (cf. Arts. 748-749)
FACTS:
1. On April 11, 1958, Celestina Ganuelas Vda. de Valin (Celestina) executed a
Deed of Donation of Real Property 2 covering seven parcels of land in favor
of her niece Ursulina Ganuelas (Ursulina), one of herein petitioners.
2. The pertinent provision of the deed of donation reads, quoted verbatim:
a. xxx           xxx           xxx That, for and in consideration of the love and affection
which the DONOR has for the DONEE, and of the faithful services the latter has
rendered in the past to the former, the said DONOR does by these presents transfer
and convey, by way of DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above,
described, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; but in the event that
the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed
rescinded and of no further force and effect. xxx           xxx           xxx.3
3. On June 10, 1967, Celestina executed a document denominated as
Revocation of Donation4 purporting to set aside the deed of donation. More
than a month later or on August 18, 1967, Celestina died without issue and
any surviving ascendants and siblings.
4. After Celestina's death, Ursulina had been sharing the produce of the
donated properties with private respondents Leocadia G. Flores, et al.,
nieces of Celestina.
5. In 1982, or twenty-four years after the execution of the Deed of Donation,
Ursulina secured the corresponding tax declarations, in her name, over the
donated properties, to wit: Tax Declarations Nos. 18108, 18109, 18110,
18111, 18112, 18113 and 18114, and since then, she refused to give private
respondents any share in the produce of the properties despite repeated
demands.
6. Private respondents were thus prompted to file on May 26, 1986 with the
RTC of San Fernando, La Union a complaint 5 against Ursulina, along with
Metodio Ganuelas and Antonio Ganuelas who were alleged to be unwilling
plaintiffs. The complaint alleged that the Deed of Donation executed by
Celestina in favor of Ursulina was void for lack of acknowledgment by the
attesting witnesses thereto before notary public Atty. Henry Valmonte, and
the donation was a disposition mortis causa which failed to comply with the
provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments,
hence, it was void. The plaintiffs-herein private respondents thus prayed
that judgment be rendered ordering Ursulina to return to them as intestate
heirs the possession and ownership of the properties. They likewise prayed
for the cancellation of the tax declarations secured in the name of Ursulina,
the partition of the properties among the intestate heirs of Celestina, and the
rendering by Ursulina of an accounting of all the fruits of the properties
since 1982 and for her to return or pay the value of their shares.
in favor of Ursulina was inter vivos as contemplated under Article 729 of
the Civil Code,7 hence, the deed did not have to comply with the
requirements for the execution of a valid will; the Revocation of Donation is
null and void as the ground mentioned therein is not among those provided
by law to be the basis thereof; and at any rate, the revocation could only be
legally enforced upon filing of the appropriate complaint in court within the
prescriptive period provided by law, which period had, at the time the
complaint was filed, already lapsed.
8. By Decision of February 22, 1996, the trial court, holding that the provision in the Deed of
Donation that in the event that the DONEE should predecease the DONOR, the "donation shall
be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect" is an explicit indication that the deed is
a donation mortis causa,8 found for the plaintiffs-herein private respondents, thus:
a. WHEREFORE the Court renders judgment declaring null and void the Deed of
Donation of Real Property executed by Celestina Ganuelas, and orders the partition
of the estate of Celestina among the intestate heirs.
9. The trial court also held that the absence of a reservation clause in the deed implied that
Celestina retained complete dominion over her properties, thus supporting the conclusion that
the donation is mortis causa,10 and that while the deed contained an attestation clause and an
acknowledgment showing the intent of the donor to effect a postmortem disposition, the
acknowledgment was defective as only the donor and donee appear to have acknowledged the
deed before the notary public, thereby rendering the entire document void.11
10. Lastly, the trial court held that the subsequent execution by Celestina of the Revocation of
Donation showed that the donor intended the revocability of the donation ad nutum, thus
sustaining its finding that the conveyance was mortis causa.12
11. On herein petitioners' argument that the Revocation of Donation was void as the ground
mentioned therein is not one of those allowed by law to be a basis for revocation, the trial court
held that the legal grounds for such revocation as provided under the Civil Code arise only in
cases of donations inter vivos, but not in donations mortis causa which are revocable at will
during the lifetime of the donor. The trial court held, in any event, that given the nullity of the
disposition mortis causa in view of a failure to comply with the formalities required therefor,
the Deed of Revocation was a superfluity.13
12. Hence, the instant petition for review.
13. Petitioners argue that the donation contained in the deed is inter vivos as the main
consideration for its execution was the donor's affection for the donee rather than the donor's
death;15 that the provision on the effectivity of the donation — after the donor's death — simply
meant that absolute ownership would pertain to the donee on the donor's death; 16 and that since
the donation is inter vivos, it may be revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles
760,17 76418 and 76519 of the Civil Code.
14. In a letter of March 16, 1998, 20 private respondent Corazon Sipalay, reacting to this Court's January 28, 1998 Resolution
requiring private respondents "to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt" for
failure to submit the name and address of their new counsel, explains that they are no longer interested in pursuing the case and
are "willing and ready to waive whatever rights" they have over the properties subject of the donation. Petitioners, who were
required to comment on the letter, by Comment of October 28, 1998, 21 welcome private respondents' gesture but pray that "for
the sake of enriching jurisprudence, their [p]etition be given due course and resolved."
ISSUES:
1. W/N The issue is thus whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa.
RATIO:
1. T Crucial in the resolution of the issue is the determination of whether the
donor intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon the
execution of the deed.22
2. Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the
former, the act is immediately operative even if the actual execution may be
deferred until the death of the donor, while in the latter, nothing is conveyed
to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-testator. 23 The
following ruling of this Court in Alejandro v. Geraldez is illuminating:24
a. If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning that the full
or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of
the donor's death, then it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a
donation mortis causa which should be embodied in a last will and testament.
b. But if the donation takes effect during the donor's lifetime or independently of the
donor's death, meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the
donated properties passes to the donee during the donor's lifetime, not by reason of
his death but because of the deed of donation, then the donation is inter vivos.
3. The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important
as the validity or revocation of the donation depends upon its nature. If the
donation is inter vivos, it must be executed and accepted with the
formalities prescribed by Articles 74825 and 74926 of the Civil Code, except
when it is onerous in which case the rules on contracts will apply. If it
is mortis causa, the donation must be in the form of a will, with all the
formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise it is void and cannot transfer
ownership.27
4. The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the
following:
a. 1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the
ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
b. 2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at
will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
c. 3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.28
5. In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which
indicates that any right, title or interest in the donated properties was to be
transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina.
6. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR"
admits of no other interpretation but that Celestina intended to
transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death, not
during her lifetime.29
7. More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should
die before the donor, the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no
further force and effect shows that the donation is a postmortem disposition.
8. As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characteristics of a
donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the
donor should survive the donee.30
9. More. The deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the
donation as mortis causa:
a. SIGNED by the above-named donor, Celestina Ganuelas, at the foot of this deed of
donation mortis causa, consisting of two (2) pages and on the left margin of each
and every page thereof in the joint presence of all of us who at her request and in
her presence and that of each other have in like manner subscribed our names as
witnesses.31 (Emphasis supplied)
10. To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is founded on
considerations of love and affection is erroneous. That the donation was
prompted by the affection of the donor for the donee and the services
rendered by the latter is of no particular significance in determining
whether the deed constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not, because a
legacy may have an identical motivation.32 In other words, love and
affection may also underline transfers mortis causa.33
11. In Maglasang v. Heirs of Cabatingan,34 the deeds of donation contained
provisions almost identical to those found in the deed subject of the present
case:
a. That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the
DONEE, x x x. the DONOR does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by
way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-described property, together with the
buildings and all improvements existing thereon, to become effective upon the death
of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE
should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically
rescinded and of no further force and effect. (Emphasis supplied)
12. In that case, this Court held that the donations were mortis causa, for the
above-quoted provision conclusively establishes the donor's intention to
transfer the ownership and possession of the donated property to the donee
only after the former's death. Like in the present case, the deeds therein did
not contain any clear provision that purports to pass proprietary rights to the
donee prior to the donor's death.
13. As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the
formalities of a will under Article 728 of the Civil Code should have been
complied with, failing which the donation is void and produces no effect.35
14. As noted by the trial court, the attesting witnesses failed to acknowledge the
deed before the notary public, thus violating Article 806 of the Civil Code
which provides. Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will,
or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
15. The trial court did not thus commit any reversible error in declaring the
Deed of Donation to be mortis causa.
16. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

2.) Spouses Gestopa v. CA & Danlag-Pilapi
G.R. No. 111904, 5 October 2000 (cf. Arts. 748-749)
FACTS:
1. Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of six parcels of
unregistered lands. They executed three deeds of donation mortis
causa, two of which are dated March 4, 1965 and another dated October 13,
1966, in favor of private respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil.4 The first
deed pertained to parcels 1 & 2 with Tax Declaration Nos. 11345 and
11347, respectively. The second deed pertained to parcel 3, with TD No.
018613. The last deed pertained to parcel 4 with TD No. 016821.
2. All deeds contained the reservation of the rights of the donors (1) to amend,
cancel or revoke the donation during their lifetime, and (2) to sell,
mortgage, or encumber the properties donated during the donors'
lifetime, if deemed necessary.
3. On January 16, 1973, Diego Danlag, with the consent of his wife, Catalina
Danlag, executed a deed of donation inter vivos5 covering the
aforementioned parcels of land plus two other parcels with TD Nos. 11351
and 11343, respectively, again in favor of private respondent Mercedes.
This contained two conditions, that (1) the Danlag spouses shall continue to
enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime, and that (2) the donee can
not sell or dispose of the land during the lifetime of the said spouses,
without their prior consent and approval. Mercedes caused the transfer of
the parcels' tax declaration to her name and paid the taxes on them.
4. On June 28, 1979 and August 21, 1979, Diego and Catalina Danlag sold
parcels 3 and 4 to herein petitioners, Mr. and Mrs. Agripino Gestopa. On
September 29, 1979, the Danlags executed a deed of revocation 6 recovering
the six parcels of land subject of the aforecited deed of donation inter vivos.
5. On March 1, 1983, Mercedes Pilapil (herein private respondent) filed with
the RTC a petition against the Gestopas and the Danlags, for quieting of
title7 over the above parcels of land. She alleged that she was an illegitimate
daughter of Diego Danlag; that she lived and rendered incalculable
beneficial services to Diego and his mother, Maura Danlag, when the latter
was still alive. In recognition of the services she rendered, Diego executed a
Deed of Donation on March 20, 1973, conveying to her the six (6) parcels
of land. She accepted the donation in the same instrument, openly and
publicly exercised rights of ownership over the donated properties, and
caused the transfer of the tax declarations to her name. Through
machination, intimidation and undue influence, Diego persuaded the
husband of Mercedes, Eulalio Pilapil, to buy two of the six parcels covered
by the deed of donation. Said donation inter vivos was coupled with
conditions and, according to Mercedes, since its perfection, she had
complied with all of them; that she had not been guilty of any act of
ingratitude; and that respondent Diego had no legal basis in revoking the
subject donation and then in selling the two parcels of land to the Gestopas.
6. In their opposition, the Gestopas and the Danlags averred that the deed of
donation dated January 16, 1973 was null and void because it was obtained
by Mercedes through machinations and undue influence. Even assuming it
was validly executed, the intention was for the donation to take effect upon
the death of the donor. Further, the donation was void for it left the donor,
Diego Danlag, without any property at all.
7. On December 27, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:
a. "WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Court hereby renders judgment in
favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff:
b. 1. Declaring the Donations Mortis Causa and Inter Vivos as revoked, and, therefore,
has (sic) no legal effect and force of law.
c. 2. Declaring Diego Danlag the absolute and exclusive owner of the six (6) parcels
of land mentioned in the Deed of revocation (Exh. P-plaintiff, Exh. 6-defendant
Diego Danlag).
d. 3. Declaring the Deeds of Sale executed by Diego Danlag in favor of spouses
Agripino Gestopa and Isabel Gestopa dated June 28, 1979 (Exh. S-plaintiff; Exh.
18-defendant); Deed of Sale dated December 18, 1979 (Exh. T plaintiff; Exh. 9-
defendant); Deed of Sale dated September 14, 1979 (Exh. 8); Deed of Sale dated
June 30, 1975 (Exh. U); Deed of Sale dated March 13, 1978 (Exh. X) as valid and
enforceable duly executed in accordance with the formalities required by law.
e. 4. Ordering all tax declaration issued in the name of Mercedes Danlag Y Pilapil
covering the parcel of land donated cancelled and further restoring all the tax
declarations previously cancelled, except parcels nos. 1 and 5 described, in the
Deed of Donation Inter Vivos (Exh. "1") and Deed of Sale (Exh. "2") executed by
defendant in favor of plaintiff and her husband.
f. [5.] With respect to the contract of sale of abovestated parcels of land, vendor Diego
Danlag and spouse or their estate have the alternative remedies of demanding the
balance of the agreed price with legal interest, or rescission of the contract of sale.
8. In rendering the above decision, the trial court found that the reservation clause in all the deeds
of donation indicated that Diego Danlag did not make any donation; that the purchase by
Mercedes of the two parcels of land covered by the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos bolstered this
conclusion; that Mercedes failed to rebut the allegations of ingratitude she committed against
Diego Danlag; and that Mercedes committed fraud and machination in preparing all the deeds
of donation without explaining to Diego Danlag their contents.
9. Mercedes appealed to the Court of Appeals and argued that the trial court erred in (1) declaring
the donation dated January 16, 1973 as mortis causa and that the same was already revoked on
the ground of ingratitude; (2) finding that Mercedes purchased from Diego Danlag the two
parcels of land already covered by the above donation and that she was only able to pay three
thousand pesos, out of the total amount of twenty thousand pesos; (3) failing to declare that
Mercedes was an acknowledged natural child of Diego Danlag.
10. On August 31, 1993, the appellate court reversed the trial court. It ruled:
a. "PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and a new
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
b. 1. Declaring the deed of donation inter vivos dated January 16, 1973 as not having
been revoked and consequently the same remains in full force and effect;
 c. 2. Declaring the Revocation of Donation dated June 4, 1979 to be null and void and
therefore of no force and effect;
d. 3. Declaring Mercedes Danlag Pilapil as the absolute and exclusive owner of the six
(6) parcels of land specified in the above-cited deed of donation inter vivos;
e. 4. Declaring the Deed of Sale executed by Diego Danlag in favor of spouses
Agripino and Isabel Gestopa dated June 28, 1979 (Exhibits S and 18), Deed of Sale
dated December 18, 1979 (Exhibits T and 19), Deed of Sale dated September 14,
1979 (Exhibit 8), Deed of Sale dated June 30, 1975 (Exhibit U), Deed of Sale dated
March 13, 1978 (Exhibit X) as well as the Deed of Sale in favor of Eulalio Danlag
dated December 27, 1978 (Exhibit 2) not to have been validly executed;
f. 5. Declaring the above-mentioned deeds of sale to be null and void and therefore of
no force and effect;
g. 6. Ordering spouses Agripino Gestopa and Isabel Silerio Gestopa to reconvey
within thirty (30) days from the finality of the instant judgment to Mercedes Danlag
Pilapil the parcels of land above-specified, regarding which titles have been
subsequently fraudulently secured, namely those covered by O.C.T. T-17836 and
O.C.T. No. 17523.
h. 7. Failing to do so, ordering the Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court
(Branch V) at Cebu City to effect such reconveyance of the parcels of land covered
by O.C.T. T-17836 and 17523.
11. The Court of Appeals held that the reservation by the donor of lifetime usufruct indicated that
he transferred to Mercedes the ownership over the donated properties; that the right to sell
belonged to the donee, and the donor's right referred to that of merely giving consent; that the
donor changed his intention by donating inter vivos  properties already donated mortis causa;
that the transfer to Mercedes' name of the tax declarations pertaining to the donated properties
implied that the donation was inter vivos; and that Mercedes did not purchase two of the six
parcels of land donated to her.
12. Hence, this instant petition for review filed by the Gestopa spouses.
13. Before us, petitioners allege that the appellate court overlooked the fact that
the donor did not only reserve the right to enjoy the fruits of the properties,
but also prohibited the donee from selling or disposing the land without the
consent and approval of the Danlag spouses. This implied that the donor
still had control and ownership over the donated properties. Hence, the
donation was post mortem.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Crucial in resolving whether the donation was inter vivos or mortis
causa is the determination of whether the donor intended to transfer the
ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed.11  donations mortis causa. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the
RATIO:
1. In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the deed's provisions must
be read together.12 The deed of donation dated January 16, 1973, in favor of
Mercedes contained the following:
a. "That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the Donor inspires in
the Donee and as an act of liberality and generosity, the Donor hereby gives,
donates, transfer and conveys by way of donation unto the herein Donee, her heirs,
assigns and successors, the above-described parcels of land;
b. That it is the condition of this donation that the Donor shall continue to enjoy all the
fruits of the land during his lifetime and that of his spouse and that the donee
cannot sell or otherwise, dispose of the lands without the prior consent and
approval by the Donor and her spouse during their lifetime.
c. xxx
d. That for the same purpose as hereinbefore stated, the Donor further states that he
has reserved for himself sufficient properties in full ownership or in usufruct
enough for his maintenance of a decent livelihood in consonance with his standing
in society.
e. That the Donee hereby accepts the donation and expresses her thanks and gratitude
for the kindness and generosity of the Donor."13 
2. Note first that the granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties
out of love and affection for the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter
vivos.14 Second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor
intended to transfer the naked ownership over the properties. As correctly
posed by the Court of Appeals, what was the need for such reservation
if the donor and his spouse remained the owners of the properties?
Third, the donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in
accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the donor intended
to part with the six parcels of land.15 
3. Lastly, the donee accepted the donation. In the case of Alejandro vs.
Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245 (1977), we said that an acceptance clause is a mark
that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for
donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will,
are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime.
4. Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the right
to dispose of the properties belonged to the donee. The donor's right to give
consent was merely intended to protect his usufructuary interests.
In Alejandro, we ruled that a limitation on the right to sell during the
donors' lifetime implied that ownership had passed to the donees and
donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime.
5. The attending circumstances in the execution of the subject donation also
demonstrated the real intent of the donor to transfer the ownership over the
subject properties upon its execution. 16 Prior to the execution of
donation inter vivos, the Danlag spouses already executed three
Danlag spouses were aware of the difference between the two donations. If
they did not intend to donate inter vivos, they would not again donate the
four lots already donated mortis causa. Petitioners' counter argument that
this proposition was erroneous because six years after, the spouses changed
their intention with the deed of revocation, is not only disingenious but also
fallacious. Petitioners cannot use the deed of revocation to show the
spouses' intent because its validity is one of the issues in this case.
6. Petitioners aver that Mercedes' tax declarations in her name can not be a
 basis in determining the donor's intent. They claim that it is easy to get tax
declarations from the government offices such that tax declarations are not
considered proofs of ownership. However, unless proven otherwise, there is
a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. 17 We find
that petitioners did not overcome this presumption of regularity in the
issuance of the tax declarations. We also note that the Court of Appeals did
not refer to the tax declarations as proofs of ownership but only as evidence
of the intent by the donor to transfer ownership.
7. Petitioners assert that since private respondent purchased two of the six
parcels of land from the donor, she herself did not believe the donation
was inter vivos. As aptly noted by the Court of Appeals, however, it was
private respondent's husband who purchased the two parcels of land.
8. As a rule, a finding of fact by the appellate court, especially when it is
supported by evidence on record, is binding on us.18 On the alleged purchase
by her husband of two parcels, it is reasonable to infer that the purchase was
without private respondent's consent. Purchase by her husband would make
the properties conjugal to her own disadvantage. That the purchase is
against her self-interest, weighs strongly in her favor and gives credence to
her claim that her husband was manipulated and unduly influenced to make
the purchase, in the first place.1âwphi1
9. Was the revocation valid? A valid donation, once accepted, becomes
irrevocable, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to
comply with the charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. 19 The
donor-spouses did not invoke any of these reasons in the deed of revocation.
The deed merely stated:
a. "WHEREAS, while the said donation was a donation Inter Vivos, our intention
thereof is that of Mortis Causa so as we could be sure that in case of our death, the
above-described properties will be inherited and/or succeeded by Mercedes Danlag
de Pilapil; and that said intention is clearly shown in paragraph 3 of said donation to
the effect that the Donee cannot dispose and/or sell the properties donated during
our life-time, and that we are the one enjoying all the fruits thereof."20 
10. Petitioners cited Mercedes' vehemence in prohibiting the donor to gather
coconut trees and her filing of instant petition for quieting of title. There is
nothing on record, however, showing that private respondent prohibited the
donors from gathering coconuts. Even assuming that Mercedes prevented
the donor from gathering coconuts, this could hardly be considered an act
covered by Article 765 of the Civil Code. 21 Nor does this Article cover
respondent's filing of the petition for quieting of title, where she merely
asserted what she believed was her right under the law.
11. Finally, the records do not show that the donor-spouses instituted any action
to revoke the donation in accordance with Article 769 of the Civil
Code.22 Consequently, the supposed revocation on September 29, 1979, had
no legal effect.
12. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1993, is AFFIRMED.
3.) Alejandro v. Geraldez,
G.R. No. L-33849, 18 August 1977 (cf. Arts. 728-732)
FACTS:
1. On
ISSUES:
1. W/N
RATIO:
1. T
4.) Republic v. Silim
G.R. No. 140487, 2 April 2001 (cf. Arts. 728-732)
FACTS:
1. On Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 43840, entitled Leon Silim, et al. vs. Wilfredo Palma,
et al., which declared null and void the donation made by respondents of a parcel of land in
favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur.
2. On 17 December 1971, respondents, the Spouses Leon Silim and Ildefonsa
Mangubat, donated a 5,600 square meter parcel of land in favor of the
Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur
(BPS). In the Deed of Donation, respondents imposed the condition that the
said property should "be used exclusively and forever for school purposes
only."1 This donation was accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the District
Supervisor of BPS, through an Affidavit of Acceptance and/or Confirmation
of Donation.
3. Through a fund raising campaign spearheaded by the Parent-Teachers
Association of Barangay Kauswagan, a school building was constructed on
the donated land. However, the Bagong Lipunan school building that was
supposed to be allocated for the donated parcel of land in Barangay
Kauswagan could not be released since the government required that it be
built upon a one (1) hectare parcel of land. To remedy this predicament,
Assistant School Division Superintendent of the Province of Zamboanga del
Sur, Sabdani Hadjirol, authorized District Supervisor Buendia to officially
transact for the exchange of the one-half (1/2) hectare old school site of
Kauswagan Elementary School to a new and suitable location which would
fit the specifications of the government. Pursuant to this, District Supervisor
Buendia and Teresita Palma entered into a Deed of Exchange whereby the
donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot owned by the latter.
Consequently, the Bagong Lipunan school buildings were constructed on
 the new school site and the school building previously erected on the
donated lot was dismantled and transferred to the new location.
RATIO:
4. When respondent Leon Silim saw, to his surprise, that Vice-Mayor
Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated land, he asked the
latter why he was building a house on the property he donated to BPS. Vice
Mayor Wilfredo Palma replied that he is already the owner of the said
property. Respondent Leon Silim endeavored to stop the construction of the
house on the donated property but Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma advised him
to just file a case in court.
5. On February 10, 1982, respondents filed a Complaint for Revocation and
Cancellation of Conditional Donation, Annulment of Deed of Exchange and
Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real Property with damages
against Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma, Teresita Palma, District Supervisor
Buendia and the BPS before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City,
Branch 21.
6. In its Decision dated 20 August 1993, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit.2 The pertinent portion of the decision reads:
a. Thus, it is the considered view of this Court that there was no breach or violation of
the condition imposed in the subject Deed of Donation by the donee. The exchange
is proper since it is still for the exclusive use for school purposes and for the
expansion and improvement of the school facilities within the community. The
Deed of Exchange is but a continuity of the desired purpose of the donation made
by plaintiff Leon Silim.
b. In sum, it may be safely stated that the aforesaid transaction of exchange is a (sic)
exception to the law invoked by the plaintiffs (Art. 764, Civil Code). The donee,
being the State had the greater reciprocity of interest in the gratuitous and onerous
contract of donation. It would be illogical and selfish for the donor to technically
preclude the donee from expanding its school site and improvement of its school
facilities, a paramount objective of the donee in promoting the general welfare and
interests of the people of Barangay Kauswagan. But it is a well-settled rule that if
the contract is onerous, such as the Deed of Donation in question, the doubt shall be
settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of interests, which in the instant case, is
the donee.
c. x     x     x
d. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgement is hereby rendered:
e. 1. Dismissing the complaint for lack of merit;
f. 2. Dismissing the counterclaim for the sake of harmony and reconciliation between
the parties;
g. 3. With costs against plaintiffs.
7. Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, respondents elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals. In its Decision dated 22 October 1999, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the trial court and declared the donation null and void on the grounds that the donation was not
properly accepted and the condition imposed on the donation was violated.4  thereof in an authentic form, and his step shall be noted in both instruments.
8. Hence, the present case where petitioner raises the following issues:
ISSUES:
1. W/N
1. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the donation
null and void for the reason that the acceptance was not allegedly done in
accordance with Articles 7456 and 7497 of the New Civil Code.
2. We agree.
3. Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as: (1)
pure or simple; (2) remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal;
and (4) onerous. A pure or simple donation is one where the underlying
cause is plain gratuity.8 This is donation in its truest form. On the other
hand, a remuneratory or compensatory donation is one made for the purpose
of rewarding the donee for past services, which services do not amount to a
demandable debt.9 
4. A conditional or modal donation is one where the donation is made in
consideration of future services or where the donor imposes certain
conditions, limitations or charges upon the donee, the value of which is
inferior than that of the donation given.10 Finally, an onerous donation is that
which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be more
precise, this is the kind of donation made for a valuable consideration, the
cost of which is equal to or more than the thing donated.11 
5. Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the onerous type are the
most distinct. This is because, unlike the other forms of donation, the
validity of and the rights and obligations of the parties involved in an
onerous donation is completely governed not by the law on donations but by
the law on contracts. In this regard, Article 733 of the New Civil Code
provides:
a. Art. 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on
contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as
regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed.
6. The donation involved in the present controversy is one which is onerous
since there is a burden imposed upon the donee to build a school on the
donated property.12 
7. The Court of Appeals held that there was no valid acceptance of the
donation because:
a. x     x     x
b. Under the law the donation is void if there is no acceptance. The acceptance may
either be in the same document as the deed of donation or in a separate public
instrument. If the acceptance is in a separate instrument, "the donor shall be notified
c. "Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of
a deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and
the donor duly noticed thereof. (Abellera vs. Balanag, 37 Phils. 85; Alejandro vs.
 Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245). If the acceptance does not appear in the same document, it
must be made in another. Solemn words are not necessary; it is sufficient if it shows
the intention to accept, But in this case, it is necessary that formal notice thereof be
given to the donor and the fact that due notice has been given it must be noted in
both instruments (that containing the offer to donate and that showing acceptance).
Then and only then is the donation perfected. (11 Manresa 155-11, cited in Vol. II,
Civil Code of the Philippines by Tolentino.)."
d. This Court perused carefully the Deed of Donation marked as exhibit "A" and "1"
to determine whether there was acceptance of the donation. This Court found none.
We further examined the record if there is another document which embodies the
acceptance, we found one. Although the Court found that in the offer of exhibits of
the defendants, a supposed affidavit of acceptance and/or confirmation of the
donation, marked as exhibit "8" appears to have been offered.
e. However, there is nothing in the record that the exhibits offered by the defendants
have been admitted nor such exhibits appear on record.
f. Assuming that there was such an exhibit, the said supposed acceptance was not
noted in the Deed of Donation as required under Art. 749 of the Civil Code. And
according to Manresa, supra, a noted civilist, the notation is one of the requirements
of perfecting a donation. In other words, without such a notation, the contract is not
perfected contract. Since the donation is not perfected, the contract is therefore not
valid.13 
g. x     x     x
h. We hold that there was a valid acceptance of the donation.
i. Sections 745 and 749 of the New Civil Code provide:
j. ART. 745. The donee must accept the donation personally, or through an authorized
person with a special power for the purpose, or with a general and sufficient power;
otherwise the donation shall be void.
k. ART. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be laid, it must be made
in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the
charge which the donee must satisfy.
l. The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public
document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the
donor.
m. If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified
thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments
8. Private respondents, as shown above, admit that in the offer of exhibits by
the defendants in the trial court, an affidavit of acceptance and/or
confirmation of the donation, marked as Exhibit "8," was offered in
evidence. However, private respondents now question this exhibit because,
according to them "there is nothing in the record that the exhibits offered by
the defendants have been admitted nor such exhibit appear on record."
9. Respondents' stance does not persuade. The written acceptance of the
donation having been considered by the trial court in arriving at its decision,
there is the presumption that this exhibit was properly offered and admitted
by the court.
10. Moreover, this issue was never raised in the Court of Appeals. Nowhere in
their brief did respondents question the validity of the donation on the basis
of the alleged defect in the acceptance thereof. If there was such a defect,
why did it take respondents more than ten (10) years from the date of the
donation to question its validity? In the very least, they are guilty of
estoppel.14 
11. Respondents further argue that assuming there was a valid acceptance of the
donation, the acceptance was not noted in the Deed of Donation as required
in Article 749 of the Civil Code, hence, the donation is void.
12. The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to
ensure that such acceptance is duly communicated to the donor. Thus,
in Pajarillo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,15 the Court held:
a. There is no question that the donation was accepted in a separate public instrument
and that it was duly communicated to the donors. Even the petitioners cannot deny
this. But what they do contend is that such acceptance was not "noted in both
instruments," meaning the extrajudicial partition itself and the instrument of
acceptance, as required by the Civil Code.
b. That is perfectly true. There is nothing in either of the two instruments showing that
"authentic notice" of the acceptance was made by Salud to Juana and Felipe. And
while the first instrument contains the statement that "the donee does hereby accept
this donation and does hereby express her gratitude for the kindness and liberality
of the donor," the only signatories thereof were Felipe Balane and Juana Balane de
Suterio. That was in fact the reason for the separate instrument of acceptance signed
by Salud a month later.
c. A strict interpretation of Article 633 can lead to no other conclusion that the
annulment of the donation for being defective in form as urged by the petitioners.
This would be in keeping with the unmistakable language of the above-quoted
provision. However, we find that under the circumstances of the present case, a
literal adherence to the requirement of the law might result not in justice to the
parties but conversely a distortion of their intentions. It is also a policy of the Court
to avoid such as interpretation.
d. The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the acceptance of the
donation is duly communicated to the donor. In the case at bar, it is not even
suggested that Juana was unaware of the acceptance for she in fact confirmed it
later and requested that the donated land be not registered during her lifetime by
Salud. Given this significant evidence, the Court cannot in conscience declare the
donation ineffective because there is no notation in the extrajudicial settlement of
the donee's acceptance. That would be placing too much stress on mere form over
substance. It would also disregard the clear reality of the acceptance of the donation
as manifested in the separate instrument dated June 20, 1946, and as later
acknowledged by Juan.
13. In the case at bar, a school building was immediately constructed after the
donation was executed. Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the
school building put up on the donated lot through the efforts of the Parents-
Teachers Association of Barangay Kauswagan. It was when the school
building was being dismantled and transferred to the new site and when
Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated
property that respondents came to know of the Deed of Exchange. The
actual knowledge by respondents of the construction and existence of
 the school building fulfilled the legal requirement that the acceptance of
the donation by the donee be communicated to the donor. 
14. On respondents' claim, which was upheld by the Court of Appeals, that the
acceptance by BPS District Supervisor Gregorio Buendia of the donation
was ineffective because of the absence of a special power of attorney from
the Republic of the Philippines, it is undisputed that the donation was made
in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools. Such being the case, his
acceptance was authorized under Section 47 of the 1987 Administrative
Code which states:
a. SEC. 47.  Contracts and Conveyances. - Contracts or conveyances may be executed
for and in behalf of the Government or of any of its branches, subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, whenever demanded by the exigency or exigencies of
the service and as long as the same are not prohibited by law.

15. Finally, it is respondents' submission that the donee, in exchanging the

donated lot with a bigger lot, violated the condition in the donation that
the lot be exclusively used for school purposes only.
16. What does the phrase "exclusively used for school purposes" convey?
"School" is simply an institution or place of education. 16 "Purpose" is
defined as "that which one sets before him to accomplish or attain; an end,
intention, or aim, object, plan, project. Term is synonymous with the ends
sought, an object to be attained, an intention, etc." 17 "Exclusive" means
"excluding or having power to exclude (as by preventing entrance or
debarring from possession, participation, or use); limiting or limited to
possession, control or use.18 
17. Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the donation was not in
any way violated when the lot donated was exchanged with another
one. The purpose for the donation remains the same, which is for the
establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered
or affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in
furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The
acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the
construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be
accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.
18. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is
REINSTATED.
 naked ownership of the donated properties passes to the donee during the donor's
lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of the deed of donation, then the
donation is inter vivos.

T003 Alejandro v. Geraldez (CELAJE)

FACTS:
G.R. No. L-33849 | 18 August 1977 | Aquino, J. | Mortis Causa v. Inter Vivos
G.R. No. L-33849 August 18, 1977
TEODORICO ALEJANDRO, et al., petitioners, 
vs.
HON. AMBROSIO M. GERALDEZ, ANDREA DIAZ and ANGEL
DIAZ, respondents.
G.R. No. L-33968 August 18, 1977
ANDREA DIAZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AMBROSIO M. GERALDEZ, , TEODORICO ALEJANDRO, et al.,
respondents.
SUMMARY: The bone of contention is Lot No. 2502. On January 20, 1949 the
spouses Gabino (Gavino) Diaz and Severa Mendoza, their daughter-in-law
Regina Fernando and their three children, Olimpia Diaz, Angel Diaz and Andrea
Diaz, executed a deed of donation covering eight lots of the Lolomboy Friar
Lands Estate, owned by the Diaz spouses, located at Barrio Parada, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan. ½ went to Angel Diaz and the other half went to Andrea Diaz.
Eventually, respondent Teodorico Alejandro, the surviving spouse of Olimpia
Diaz (the child who did get a share in the donation), and their children
intervened in the said case, claiming one-third of Lot No. 2502. The intervenors
claimed that the 1949 donation was a void mortis causa disposition. Issue: W/N
the donation to Andrea and Angel Diaz was a donation inter vivos or donation
mortis causa. Inter vivos because it took effect during the lifetime of the donors.
It was already effective during the donors' lifetime, or immediately after the
execution of the deed.  void mortis causa disposition.
DOCTRINE: If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death,
meaning that the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to
the donee only because of the donor's death, then it is at that time that the
donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should be
embodied in a last will and testament. But if the donation takes effect during the
donor's lifetime or independently of the donor's death, meaning that the full or
15. This is a case about donations inter vivos and mortis causa . The bone of
contention is Lot No. 2502 of the Lolomboy Friar Lands Estate with an area
of 5,678 square meters, situated in Sta. Maria, Bulacan and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7336.
16. ****Note: Only Lot 2502 is material to the case.
17. On January 20, 1949 the spouses Gabino (Gavino) Diaz and Severa
Mendoza, their daughter-in-law Regina Fernando and their three children,
Olimpia Diaz, Angel Diaz and Andrea Diaz, executed a deed of donation
covering eight lots of the Lolomboy Friar Lands Estate, owned by the Diaz
spouses, located at Barrio Parada, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
18. Gabino Diaz died in 1962. On October 20, 1964 Severa Mendoza and her two children, Andrea
Diaz and Angel Diaz, executed a deed of donation denominated as "Kasulatan ng Pagbibigay
na Magkakabisa Pagkamatay (Donation Mortis causa )" over one-half of Lot No. 2377-A,
which is a portion of Lot No. 2377 of the Lolomboy Friar Lands Estate.
19. In that deed of donation, Severa Mendoza donated to Andrea Diaz her one-half share in Lot
2377-A, which one-half share is Identified as Lot 2377-A-1, on condition that Andrea Diaz
would bear the funeral expenses to be incurred after the donor's death. She died in 1964.
20. It should be noted that the other one-half share in Lot 2377-A or Lot No. 2377-A-2 was
previously adjudicated to Angel Diaz because he defrayed the funeral expenses on the occasion
of the death of Gabino Diaz.
21. On May 12, 1970 Andrea Diaz sued her brother, Angel Diaz, in the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, Sta. Maria Branch V for the partition of Lots Nos.
2377-A and 2502 (Civil Case No. SM-357).
22. Teodorico Alejandro, the surviving spouse of Olimpia Diaz (the child who
did get a share in the donation), and their children intervened in the said
case. They claimed one-third of Lot No. 2502. Angel Diaz alleged in his
answer that he had been occupying his share of Lot No. 2502 "for more than
twenty years". The intervenors claimed that the 1949 donation was a
 
23. On March 15, 1971 the lower court rendered a partial decision with respect
to Lot No. 2377-A. The case was continued with respect to Lot No. 2502 in
the 1949 deed of donation.
24. RTC: The trial court in its decision of June 30, 1971 held that the said deed of donation was a
donation mortis causa because the ownership of the properties donated did not pass to the
donees during the donors' lifetime but was transmitted to the donees only "upon the death of
the donors".  However, it sustained the division of Lot No. 2502 into two equal parts between
Angel Diaz and Andrea Diaz on the theory that the said deed of donation was effective "as an
 extra-judicial partition among the parents and their children. Consequently, the Alejandro
intervenors were not given any share in Lot No. 2502. Alejandro MR denied.
25. Andrea Diaz and the Alejandro intervenors filed separate appeals to this
Court. Andrea Diaz contends that the 1949 deed of donation is a valid
donation inter vivos and that the trial court erred in deleting the award for
attorney's fees. The Alejandro intervenors contend that the said donation
is mortis causa; that they are entitled to a one-third share in Lot No, 2502,
and that the trial court erred in characterizing the deed as a valid partition.
ISSUES:
2. W/N the donation to Andrea and Angel Diaz was a donation inter vivos or
donation mortis causa. Inter vivos because it took effect during the lifetime
of the donors. It was already effective during the donors' lifetime, or
immediately after the execution of the deed.  23. But if the donation takes effect during the donor's lifetime or independently
RULING: WHEREFORE, the trial court's amended decision is reversed insofar as it
pronounces that the deed of donation is void. That donation is declared valid as a
donation inter vivos. The disputed lot should be partitioned in accordance with that
deed between Andrea Diaz and Angel Diaz.
RATIO:
17. To resolve that issue, it is necessary to determine whether the deed of
donation is inter vivos or mortis causa.
18. Nature of donations inter vivos and mortis causa transfers. —An inter vivos
donation of real property must be evidenced by a public document and
should be accepted by the donee in the same deed of donation or in a
separate instrument. In the latter case, the donor should be notified of the
acceptance in an authentic form and that step should be noted in both
instruments.
19. On the other hand, a transfer mortis causa should be embodied in a last will
and testament (Art. 728, supra). It should not be called donation mortis
causa . It is in reality a legacy (5 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 6th Ed., p. 107). If
not embodied in a valid will, the donation is void.
20. This Court advised notaries to apprise donors of the necessity of clearly
specifying whether, notwithstanding the donation, they wish to retain the
right to control and dispose at will of the property before their death,
without the consent or intervention of the beneficiary, since the reservation
of such right would be a conclusive indication that the transfer' would be
effective only at the donor's death, and, therefore, the formalities of
testaments should be observed; while, a converso, the express waiver of the
right of free disposition would place the inter vivos character of the
donation beyond dispute.
21. From the aforequoted articles 728 to 732, it is evident that it is the time of
effectivity (aside from the form) which distinguishes a donation inter
vivos from a donation mortis causa. And the effectivity is determined by the
time when the full or naked ownership (dominum plenum or dominium
directum) of the donated properties is transmitted to the donees. The
execution of a public instrument is a mode of delivery or tradition.
22. If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning that
the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee
only because of the donor's death, then it is at that time that the donation
takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should be embodied in
a last will and testament.
of the donor's death, meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda
proprietas) of the donated properties passes to the donee during the donor's
lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of the deed of donation, then
the donation is inter vivos.
24. The effectivity of the donation should be ascertained from the deed of
donation and the circumstances surrounding its execution. Where, for
example, it is apparent from the document of trust that the donee's
acquisition of the property or right accrued immediately upon the effectivity
of the instrument and not upon the donor's death, the donation is inter vivos.
25. What are the distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa?
Justice Reyes in the Bonsato case says that in a disposition post mortem (1)
the transfer conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death
of the transferor, or the transferor (meaning testator) retains the ownership,
full or naked; (2) the transfer is revocable before the transferor's death and
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed, and (3) the transfer would
be void if the transferor survived the transferee.
26. In other words, in a donation mortis causa it is the donor's death that
determines that acquisition of, or the right to, the property donated, and the
donation is revocable at the donor's will,
27. Where the donation took effect immediately upon the donee's acceptance
thereof and it was subject to the resolutory condition that the donation
would be revoked if the donee did not give the donor a certain quantity of
rice or a sum of money, the donation is inter vivos.
28. It may be added that the fact that the donation is given in consideration of
love and affection or past or future services is not a characteristic of
donations inter vivos because transfers mortis causa may be made also
for those reasons.
29. There is difficulty in applying the distinctions to controversial cases because
it is not easy sometimes to ascertain when the donation takes effect or when
the full or naked title passes to the transferee.
30. The existence in the deed of donation of conflicting stipulations as to its
effectivity may generate doubt as to the donor's intention and as to the
nature of the donation.
31. Where the donor declared in the deed that the conveyance was mortis
causa and forbade the registration of the deed before her death, the clear
inference is that the conveyance was not intended to produce any definitive
effect nor to pass any interest to the grantee except after her death. In such a
case, the grantor's reservation of the right to dispose of the property during
her lifetime means that the transfer is not binding on her until she dies. It
does not mean that the title passed to the grantee during her lifetime.
32. Examples of mortis causa transfer:
a. (a) Where it was stated in the deed of donation that the donor wanted to give the
donee something "to take effect after his death" and that "this donation shall
produce effect only by and because of the death of the donor, the property herein
donated to pass title after the donor's death" (Howard vs. Padilla, 96 Phil. 983). In
the Padilla case the donation was regarded as mortis causa  although the donated
property was delivered to the donee upon the execution of the deed and although the
donation was accepted in the same deed.  vivos. Donations mortis causa , being in the form of a will, are never
b. (b) Where it was provided that the donated properties would be given to the donees
after the expiration of thirty days from the donor's death, the grant was made in the
future tense, and the word "inherit" was used (Carino vs. Abaya, 70 Phil. 182). 
c. (c) Where the donor has the right to dispose of all the donated properties and the
products thereof. Such reservation is tantamount to a reservation of the right to
revoke the donation (Bautista vs. Sabiniano 92 Phil. 244).  acknowledge and give importance to the generosity and solicitude shown by
d. (d) Where the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of donation
reveal that the donation could not have taken effect before the donor's death and the
rights to dispose of the donated properties and to enjoy the fruits remained with the
donor during her lifetime (David vs. Sison, 76 Phil. 418).  the funeral of the donors and that the donees cannot sell to a third person the
33. But if the deed of donation makes an actual conveyance of the property to
the donee, subject to a life estate in the donors, the donation is inter vivos.
34. A clear instance where the donor made an inter vivos donation is found in
De Guzman vs. Ibea 67 Phil. 633. In that case, it was provided in the deed
that the donor donated to the donee certain properties so that the donee
"may hold the same as her own and always" and that the donee would
administer the lands donated and deliver the fruits thereof to the donor, as
long as the donor was alive, but upon the donor's death the said fruits would
belong to the donee. It was held that the naked ownership was conveyed to
the donee upon the execution of the deed of donation and, therefore, the
donation became effective during the donor's lifetime.
35. Resolution of the instant case. — The donation in the instant case is inter
vivos because it took effect during the lifetime of the donors. It was already
effective during the donors' lifetime, or immediately after the execution of
the deed. 
36. In that clause it is stated that, in consideration of the affection and esteem of
the donors for the donees and the valuable services rendered by the donees
to the donors, the latter, by means of the deed of donation, wholeheartedly
transfer and unconditionally give to the donees the lots mentioned and
described in the early part of the deed, free from any kind of liens and
debts: 
a. Na dahil at alang-alang sa pagmamahal at masuyong pagtingin na taglay ng
NAGKAKALOOB (DONORS) sa Pinagkakalooban (DONEES) gayun din sa tapat
at mahalagang paglilingkod noong mga lumipas na panahon na ginawa ng huli sa
una ang nabanggit na nagkakaloob sa pamagitan ng kasulatang ito ng pagkakaloob
(Donation) ay buong pusong inililipat at lubos na ibinibigay sa nasabing
pinagkakalooban ang lupang binabanggit at makikilala sa unahan nito, laya sa ano
mang sagutin at pagkakautang, katulad nito: 
37. Following the above-ousted granting, habendum and warranty clause is the
donors' declaration that they donate (ipinagkakaloob) Lot No. 2502, the
property in litigation, in equal shares to their children Angel Diaz and
Andrea Diaz, the western part to Angel and the eastern part to Andrea. 
38. The acceptance clause is another indication that the donation is inter
accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime. Acceptance is a
requirement for donations inter vivos.
39. In the acceptance clause herein, the donees declare that they accept the
donation to their entire satisfaction and, by means of the deed, they
the donors and sincerely thank them.
40. In the reddendum or reservation clause of the deed of donation, it is
stipulated that the donees would shoulder the expenses for the illness and
donated properties during the donors' lifetime but if the sale is necessary to
defray the expenses and support of the donors, then the sale is valid. 
41. The limited right to dispose of the donated lots, which the deed gives to
the donees, implies that ownership had passed to them by means of' the
donation and that, therefore, the donation was already effective during
the donors' lifetime. That is a characteristic of a donation inter vivos. 
42. However, paragraph 3 of the reddendum in or reservation clause provides
that "also, while we, the spouses Gabino Diaz and Severa Mendoza, are
alive, our administration, right, and ownership of the lots mentioned earlier
as our properties shall continue but, upon our death, the right and ownership
of the donees to each of the properties allocated to each of them shall be
fully effective." The foregoing is the translation of the last paragraph of the
deed of donation which reads: 
 a. (3) Gayun din samantalang kaming mag-asawang Gabino Diaz at Severa Mendoza lifetime.
ay buhay, patuloy and aming pamamahala, karapatan, at pagkamayari sa mga
nasabing pagaari na sinasaysay sa unahan nito na pagaari namin; ngunit sakaling 52. It may he noted that in that deed Lot No. 2377 was divided into three equal
kami ay bawian ng buhay ng Panginoong Dios at mamatay na, ang mga karapatan parts: one-third was donated to Andrea Diaz and one-third to Angel Diaz.
at pagkamayari ng bawa't pinagkalooban (Donatorios) sa bawa't pagaari nauukol sa
bawa't isa ay may lubos na kapangyarihan.  The remaining one-third was reserved and retained by the donors, the
spouses Gabino Diaz and Severo Mendoza, for their support. That reserved
43. Evidently, the draftsman of the deed did not realize the discordant and one-third portion came to be known as Lot No. 2377-A.
ambivalent provisions thereof. The habendum clause indicates the transfer
of the ownership over the donated properties to the donees upon the 53. In 1964 or after the death of Gabino Diaz, his surviving spouse Severa
execution of the deed. But the reddendum clause seems to imply that the Mendoza executed a donation mortis causa wherein she conveyed to her
ownership was retained by the donors and would be transferred to the daughter, Andrea Diaz (plaintiff-appellant herein), her one-half share in Lot
donees only after their death.  No. 2377-A, which one-half share is known as Lot No. 2377-A-1, the other
half or Lot No. 2377-A-2 having been already conveyed to Angel Diaz. 
44. We have reflected on the meaning of the said contradictory clauses. All the
provisions of the deed, like those of a statute and testament, should be 54. That disposition of Lot No. 2377-A-2 clearly implies that the conveyance in
construed together in order to ascertain the intention of the parties. the 1949 deed of donation as to Lot No. 2377 took effect during the lifetime
of the donors, Gabino Diaz and Severa Mendoza, and proves that the 1949
45. Our conclusion is that the aforequoted paragraph 3 of the reddendum or donation was inter vivos. 
reservation clause refers to the beneficial ownership (dominium utile) and
not to the naked title and that what the donors reserved to themselves, by
means of that clause, was the management of the donated lots and the 1.
fruits thereof.
46. But, notwithstanding that reservation, the donation, as shown in
the habendum clause, was already effective during their lifetime and was 5.) Metropol v. Sambok
not made in contemplation of their death because the deed transferred to the
donees the naked ownership of the donated properties. G.R. No. L-39641 | February 28, 1983 | Castro, J.

47. That conclusion is further supported by the fact that in the deed of donation, FACTS:
out of the eight lots owned by the donors, only five were donated. Three 1. On
lots, Lots Nos. 4168, 2522 and 2521 were superfluously reserved for the
spouses or donors in addition to one- third of Lot No. 2377. ISSUES:

48. If the deed of donation in question was intended to be a mortis 1. W/N

causa disposition, then all the eight lots would have been donated or RATIO:
devised to the three children and daughter-in-law of the donors.
2. T
49. The trial court's conclusion that the said deed of donation, although void as
a donation inter vivos is valid "as an extrajudicial partition among the
parents and their children" is not well-taken. Article 1080 of the Civil Code
provides that should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter
vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." 
50. We have already observed that the said donation was not a partition of the
entire estate of the Diaz spouses since, actually, only five of the eight lots,
constituting their estate, were partitioned. Hence, that partition is not the
one contemplated in article 1080. 
51. There is another circumstance which strengthens' the view that
the 1949 deed of donation in question took effect during the donors'