1.) Magbaleta v.
Gonong petition is dismissed and the restraining order issued on November 3, 1976
(G.R. No. L-44903, 22 April 1977)
FACTS/ISSUE/RATIO:
1. Petition for certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus, with preliminary
FACTS:
injunction, against the orders of respondent judge in (Civil Case No. 633-IV
of the CFI of Ilocos Norte dated August 31, 1916 and October 8, 1976
denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint filed against them
notwithstanding that private respondent is the brother of petitioner Rufino
Magbaleta, the husband of the other petitioner Romana B. Magbaleta, and
the suit is to have a parcel of land, covered by a Free Patent Title in the
name of Rufino, declared to be the property of private respondent, who
claims in said complaint that the third petitioner Susana G. Baldovi is trying
to take possession of said land from his representative, contending she had
bought the same from the spouses Rufino and Romana, said orders having
been issued allegedly in violation of Article 222 of the Civil Code and
Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, there being no allegation in
respondent's complaint that his suit, being between members of the same
family, earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made before the
same was filed.
2. Respondent judge premised his refusal to dismiss the complaint upon the
sole ground that one of the defendants, petitioner Susana G. Baldovi, the
alleged buyer of the land in dispute, is a stranger, hence the legal provisions
abovementioned do not apply.
3. The Court holds that this ruling of respondent judge is correct. While
indeed, as pointed out by the Code Commission "it is difficult to imagine a sadder
and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family" hence, "it is
necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed
to breed hate and passion in the family" and "it is known that a lawsuit between close relatives
generates deeper bitterness than between strangers" (Report of the Code Commission, p. 18),
these considerations do not, however, weigh enough to make it imperative
that such efforts to compromise should be a jurisdictional pre-requisite
for the maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the family is a
party thereto, whether as a necessary or indispensable one.
4. It is not always that one who is alien to the family would be willing to
suffer the inconvenience of, much less relish, the delay and the
complications that wranglings between or among relatives more often
than not entail. Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that the
determination of the rights of a stranger to the family Who just happened to
have innocently acquired some kind of interest in any right or property
disputed among its members should be made to depend on the way the latter
would settle their differences among themselves. We find no cause in the
reason for being of the provisions relied upon by petitioners to give it
broader scope than the literal import thereof warrants. WHEREFORE, the
is hereby lifted.
2.) Sps. Fortaleza v. Sps. Lapitan
(G.R. No. 178288, 15 August 2012)
1. Unless a case falls under recognized exceptions provided by law and jurisprudence, courts
should maintain the ex parte, non-adversarial, summary and ministerial nature of the issuance
of a writ of possession.
2. Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza (spouses Fortaleza) obtained a loan
from spouses Rolando and Amparo Lapitan (creditors) in the amount of
P1.2 million subject to 34% interest per annum. As security, spouses
Fortaleza executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage6 over their residential house and lot situated in Barrio Anos,
Municipality of Los Baños, Laguna (subject property) registered under
(TCT) No. T-412512.7 
3. When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness including the
interests and penalties, the creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of
the Real Estate Mortgage before the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-
Officio Sheriff of Calamba City. The public auction sale was set on May 9,
2001.
4. At the sale, the creditors’ son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona (spouses
Lapitan) emerged as the highest bidders with the bid amount of P2.5
million. Then, they were issued a Certificate of Sale 8 which was registered
with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba City and annotated at the back of
TCT No. T-412512 under Entry No. 615683 on November 15, 2002.9 
5. The one-year redemption period expired without the spouses Fortaleza
redeeming the mortgage. Thus, spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit of
consolidation of ownership on November 20, 2003 and caused the
cancellation of TCT No. T-412512 and the registration of the subject
property in their names under TCT No. T-53594510 on February 4, 2004.
Despite the foregoing, the spouses Fortaleza refused spouses Lapitan’s
formal demand11 to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property.
6. Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court: On August 27, 2004, spouses Lapitan filed an ex parte
petition for the issuance of writ of possession with Branch 35 of the RTC of Calamba City docketed as
SLRC Case No. 2528-2004-C. 12 As new registered owners of the subject property, spouses Lapitan claimed
that they were entitled to its possession pursuant to Section 7 of Act No. 3135, 13 as amended by Act No.
4118.
7. In their opposition,14 spouses Fortaleza questioned the validity of the real estate mortgage and the foreclosure
sale. They argued that the mortgage was void because the creditors bloated the principal amount by the
imposition of exorbitant interest. Spouses Fortaleza added that the foreclosure proceeding was invalid for
non-compliance with the posting requirement.
8. Later, for repeated failure of spouses Fortaleza to appear at the scheduled hearings, the RTC allowed spouses
Lapitan to present evidence ex parte.
9. Eventually, on September 16, 2005, the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of possession explaining that it is
 a ministerial duty of the court especially since the redemption period had expired and a new title had already
been issued in the name of the spouses Lapitan, thus: Accordingly, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby
ordered to issue a Writ of Possession directing the provincial sheriff of Laguna to place the petitioner in
possession of the above described property free from any adverse occupants thereof.
10. Spouses Fortaleza moved for reconsideration, 16 claiming that the subject property is their family home and is
exempt from foreclosure sale. On October 11, 2005, however, the RTC issued an Order 17 denying their
motion. Accordingly, the branch clerk of court issued the Writ of Possession 18 and the sheriff served the
corresponding Notice to Vacate19 against spouses Fortaleza.
11. Proceedings before the Court of Appeals: Dissatisfied, spouses Fortaleza elevated the case to the CA via
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 86287. With the perfection of an appeal, the
RTC held in abeyance the implementation of the writ. 20 After the parties submitted their respective briefs, the
CA rendered the assailed Decision21 dated January 10, 2007 dismissing the appeal: Affirmed. The court a quo
is DIRECTED to enforce the Writ of Possession it issued on October 24, 2005.
12. In affirming the ruling of the RTC, the CA stressed that any question regarding the regularity and validity of
the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of the writ of
possession since the proceedings is ex parte and non-litigious. Moreover, until the foreclosure sale is
annulled, the issuance of the writ of possession is ministerial.
13. Spouses Fortaleza filed this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. W/N
RATIO:
1. Second, citing Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court26 and Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,27 and reiterating the irregularities that allegedly attended the foreclosure sale, the
spouses Fortaleza insist that the issuance of writ of possession is not always ministerial and the
trial court should have accorded them opportunity to present contrary evidence.
2. Last, spouses Fortaleza maintain that the subject property is a family home
exempt from forced sale. Hence, in the spirit of equity and following the
rulings in Tolentino v. Court of Appeals,28  and De los Reyes v. Intermediate
Appellate Court,29 the Court should allow them to exercise the right of
redemption even after the expiration of the one-year period.
3. Our Ruling
4. On the Issuance of Writ of Possession
5. Spouses Fortaleza claim that the RTC grievously erred in ignoring the apparent nullity of the
mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure sale. For them, the RTC should have heard and
considered these matters in deciding the case on its merits. They relied on the cases of
Barican38  and Cometa39 in taking exception to the ministerial duty of the trial court to grant a
writ of possession.
6. But the cited authorities are not on all fours with this case. In Barican, we held that the
obligation of a court to issue a writ of possession ceases to be ministerial if there is a third
party holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor. Where such third party exists, the
trial court should conduct a hearing to determine the nature of his adverse possession. And in
Cometa, there was a pending action where the validity of the levy and sale of the properties in
question were directly put in issue which this Court found pre-emptive of resolution. For if the
applicant for a writ of possession acquired no interest in the property by virtue of the levy and
sale, then, he is not entitled to its possession. Moreover, it is undisputed that the properties
subject of said case were sold at an unusually lower price than their true value. Thus, equitable
considerations motivated this Court to withhold the issuance of the writ of possession to
prevent injustice on the other party.
7. Here, there are no third parties holding the subject property adversely to the judgment debtor. It
was spouses Fortaleza themselves as debtors-mortgagors who are occupying the subject
property. They are not even strangers to the foreclosure proceedings in which the ex parte writ
of possession was applied for. Significantly, spouses Fortaleza did not file any direct action for
annulment of the foreclosure sale of the subject property. Also, the peculiar circumstance of
gross inadequacy of the purchase price is absent.
8. Accordingly, unless a case falls under recognized exceptions provided by law and
jurisprudence, we maintain the ex parte, non-adversarial, summary and ministerial nature of the
issuance of a writ of possession as outlined in Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act
No. 4118.
9. Under the provision cited above, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of
possession during the redemption period. Notably, in this case, the one-year period for the
spouses Fortaleza to redeem the mortgaged property had already lapsed. Furthermore,
ownership of the subject property had already been consolidated and a new certificate of title
had been issued under the name of the spouses Lapitan. Hence, as the new registered owners of
the subject property, they are even more entitled to its possession and have the unmistakable
right to file an ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. As aptly explained in
Edralin v. Philippine Veterans Bank, the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession in
such instances is ministerial, and the court may not exercise discretion or judgment, thus:
a. Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession after the expiration of
the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no
redemption is made. x x x The purchaser can demand possession at any time
following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a
new TCT. After consolidation of title in the purchaser’s name for failure of the
mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens into the
absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of
possession, upon proper application and proof of title becomes merely a ministerial
function. Effectively, the court cannot exercise its discretion.
10. In this case, spouses Lapitan sufficiently established their right to the writ of possession. More
specifically, they presented the following documentary exhibits: (1) the Certificate of Sale and
its annotation at the back of spouses Fortaleza’s TCT No. T-412512; (2) the Affidavit of
Consolidation proving that spouses Fortaleza failed to redeem the property within the one-year
redemption period; (3) TCT No. T-535945 issued in their names; and, (4) the formal demand
on spouses Fortaleza to vacate the subject property.
11. Lastly, we agree with the CA that any question regarding the regularity and validity of the
mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be raised as a justification for opposing the petition for the
issuance of the writ of possession.43 The said issues may be raised and determined only after the
issuance of the writ of possession.44 Indeed, "[t]he judge with whom an application for writ of
possession is filed need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its
foreclosure."45 The writ issues as a matter of course. "The rationale for the rule is to allow the
purchaser to have possession of the foreclosed property without delay, such possession being
founded on the right of ownership." 46 To underscore this mandate, Section 8 47 of Act No. 3135
gives the debtor-mortgagor the right to file a petition for the setting aside of the foreclosure
sale and for the cancellation of a writ of possession in the same proceedings where the writ was
issued within 30 days after the purchaser-mortgagee was given possession. The court’s
decision thereon may be appealed by either party, but the order of possession shall continue in
effect during the pendency of the appeal.
12. "Clearly then, until the foreclosure sale of the property in question is annulled by a court of
competent jurisdiction, the issuance of a writ of possession remains the ministerial duty of the
trial court. The same is true with its implementation; otherwise, the writ will be a useless paper
judgment – a result inimical to the mandate of Act No. 3135 to vest possession in the purchaser
immediately."48 
13. On exemption of the subject property  and the exercise of right of
redemption
14. Spouses Fortaleza’s argument that the subject property is exempt from
forced sale because it is a family home deserves scant consideration. As a
rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment.49  accommodate the spouses Forteza due to their negligence or omission to
15. However, Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced
sale of a family home "for debts secured by mortgages on the premises
before or after such constitution." In this case, there is no doubt that spouses
Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of Real
Estate Mortgage over the subject property which was even notarized by
their original counsel of record. And assuming that the property is exempt
from forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff
such exemption from forced sale before it was sold at the public auction.
16. As elucidated in Honrado v. Court of Appeals: 50 
a. While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time
it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale
under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up
and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction.
Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption.
b. As this Court ruled in Gomez v. Gealone:
i. Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which
to claim the exemption, the rule is, nevertheless, well-settled that the
right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor
and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor
himself at the time of the levy or within a reasonable period
thereafter.
17. Certainly, reasonable time for purposes of the law on exemption does not
mean a time after the expiration of the one-year period for a judgment
debtor to redeem the property.52  failed to heed Claudio’s subsequent demand for payment.
18. Equally without merit is spouses Fortaleza’s reliance on the cases
of Tolentino53 and De Los Reyes54 in praying for the exercise of the right of
redemption even after the expiration of the one-year period. In Tolentino,
we held that an action to redeem filed within the period of redemption, with
a simultaneous deposit of the redemption money tendered to the sheriff, is
equivalent to an offer to redeem and has the effect of preserving the right to
redemption for future enforcement even beyond the one-year period. 55 And
in De Los Reyes, we allowed the mortgagor to redeem the disputed property
after finding that the tender of the redemption price to the sheriff was made
within the one-year period and for a sufficient amount.
19. The circumstances in the present case are far different. The spouses
Fortaleza neither filed an action nor made a formal offer to redeem the
subject property accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of
payment. It is also undisputed that they allowed the one-year period to lapse
from the registration of the certificate of sale without redeeming the
mortgage. For all intents and purposes, spouses Fortaleza have waived or
abandoned their right of redemption.
20. Although the rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in favor of the
original owner of the property, we cannot apply the privilege of liberality to
exercise the right of redemption within the prescribed period without
justifiable cause.
21. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The CA
Decision are AFFIRMED.
3.) De Mesa v. Acero
(G.R. No. 185064, 16 January 2012)
FACTS:
1. This involves a parcel of land situated at No. 3 Forbes Street, Mount Carmel
Homes Subdivision, Iba, Meycauayan, Bulacan, which was formerly
covered by (TCT) No. T-76.725 (M) issued by the Register of Deeds of
Meycauayan, Bulacan and registered under Araceli’s name. The petitioners
jointly purchased the subject property on April 17, 1984 while they were
still merely cohabiting before their marriage. A house was later constructed
on the subject property, which the petitioners thereafter occupied as their
family home after they got married sometime in January 1987.
2. Sometime in September 1988, Araceli obtained a loan from Claudio D.
Acero, Jr. (Claudio) in the amount of ₱100,000.00, which was secured by a
mortgage over the subject property. As payment, Araceli issued a check
drawn against China Banking Corporation payable to Claudio.
3. When the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored as the
account from which it was drawn had already been closed. The petitioners
4. Thus, on April 26, 1990, Claudio filed with the Prosecutor's Office of
Malolos, Bulacan a complaint for violation of (B.P. 22) against the
petitioners. After preliminary investigation, an information for violation of
B.P. 22 was filed against the petitioners with the (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan.
5. On October 21, 1992, the RTC rendered a Decision 3 acquitting the
petitioners but ordering them to pay Claudio the amount of ₱100,000.00
with legal interest from date of demand until fully paid.
6. On March 15, 1993, a writ of execution was issued and Sheriff Felixberto L.
Samonte (Sheriff Samonte) levied upon the subject property. On March 9,
1994, the subject property was sold on public auction; Claudio was the
highest bidder and the corresponding certificate of sale was issued to him.
7. Sometime in February 1995, Claudio leased the subject property to the
petitioners and a certain Juanito Oliva (Juanito) for a monthly rent of
₱5,500.00. However, the petitioners and Juanito defaulted in the payment of
the rent and as of October 3, 1998, their total accountabilities to Claudio
 amounted to ₱170,500.00.
8. Meanwhile, on March 24, 1995, a Final Deed of Sale 4 over the subject
property was issued to Claudio and on April 4, 1995, the Register of Deeds
of Meycauayan, Bulacan cancelled TCT No. T-76.725 (M) and issued TCT
No. T-221755 (M)5 in his favor.
9. Unable to collect the aforementioned rentals due, Claudio and his wife Ma.
Rufina Acero (Rufina) (collectively referred to as Spouses Acero) filed a
complaint for ejectment with the (MTC) of Meycauayan, Bulacan against
the petitioners and Juanito. In their defense, the petitioners claimed that
Spouses Acero have no right over the subject property. The petitioners deny
that they are mere lessors; on the contrary, they are the lawful owners of the
subject property and, thus cannot be evicted therefrom.
10. On July 22, 1999, the MTC rendered a Decision,6 giving due course to Spouses Acero’s
complaint and ordering the petitioners and Juanito to vacate the subject property. Finding
merit in Spouses Acero’s claims, the MTC dismissed the petitioners' claim of ownership over
the subject property. According to the MTC, title to the subject property belongs to Claudio as
shown by TCT No. T-221755 (M).
11. The MTC also stated that from the time a Torrens title over the subject property was issued in
Claudio’s name up to the time the complaint for ejectment was filed, the petitioners never
assailed the validity of the levy made by Sheriff Samonte, the regularity of the public sale that
was conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of Claudio’s Torrens title that was resultantly
issued.
12. The petitioners appealed the MTC’s July 22, 1999 Decision to the RTC. This appeal was,
however, dismissed. Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for review 7 with the CA
assailing the RTC’s November 22, 1999 Decision. In a December 21, 2006 Decision, 8 the CA
denied the petitioner’s petition for review. This became final on July 25, 2007.9  Code. Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified
13. In the interregnum, on October 29, 1999, the petitioners filed against the
respondents a complaint10 to nullify TCT No. T-221755 (M) and other
documents with damages with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. Therein, the
petitioners asserted that the subject property is a family home, which is
exempt from execution under the Family Code and, thus, could not have
been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the March 15, 1993 writ
of execution.
14. On September 3, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision, 11 which dismissed the petitioners’
complaint. Citing Article 155(3) of the Family Code, the RTC ruled that even assuming that
the subject property is a family home, the exemption from execution does not apply. A
mortgage was constituted over the subject property to secure the loan Araceli obtained from
Claudio and it was levied upon as payment therefor.
15. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s disposition in its Decision 13 dated June 6, 2008. The CA
ratiocinated that the exemption of a family home from execution, attachment or forced sale
under Article 153 of the Family Code is not automatic and should accordingly be raised and
proved to the Sheriff prior to the execution, forced sale or attachment. The appellate court
noted that at no time did the petitioners raise the supposed exemption of the subject property
from execution on account of the same being a family home.
16. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the instant petition for review, praying for the cancellation of
TCT No. T-221755 (M). They insist that the execution sale that was conducted is a nullity
considering that the subject property is a family home. The petitioners assert that, contrary to
the disposition of the CA, a prior demonstration that the subject property is a family home is
not required before it can be exempted from execution.
ISSUES:
1. whether the lower courts erred in refusing to cancel Claudio’s Torrens title
TCT No. T-221755 (M) over the subject property.
RATIO:
1. Second Issue: Nullification of TCT No. T-221755 (M)
2. Anent the second issue, this Court finds that the CA did not err in
dismissing the petitioners’ complaint for nullification of TCT No. T-221755
(M).
3. The subject property is a family home.
4. The petitioners maintain that the subject property is a family home and,
accordingly, the sale thereof on execution was a nullity. In Ramos v.
Pangilinan,20 this Court laid down the rules relative to exemption of family
homes from execution:
a. For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to
what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be
complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege.
Hence, two sets of rules are applicable.
b. If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or
before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or
extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil
petition before the courts and the registration of the court’s order with the Registry
of Deeds of the area where the property is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial
constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the
execution of a public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of
Property. Failure to comply with either one of these two modes of constitution will
bar a judgment debtor from availing of the privilege.
c. On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or
judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts
as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein. Moreover,
the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership,
or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the
other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where
it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as
provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have
been incurred after August 3, 1988.21 (citations omitted)
5. In the earlier case of Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc.,22 we stressed that:
a. Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family
Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing
family residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the
Family Code.23 
6. The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of
exemption from execution, could be summarized as follows:
7. First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family
Code or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either
judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code in order to be exempt from execution;
8. Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and
thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as
long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
9. Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially
constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but
were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law
and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code.
10. Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in
January 1987. There was no showing, however, that the same was
judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code.
11. Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject
property became a family home by operation of law and was thus
prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in
asserting that the subject property was a family home.
12. The family home’s exemption from execution must be set up and
proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction.
13. Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should
have been exempt from execution, we nevertheless rule that the CA did not
err in dismissing the petitioners’ complaint for nullification of TCT No. T-
221755 (M). We agree with the CA that the petitioners should have
asserted the subject property being a family home and its being
exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a
reasonable time thereafter. As the CA aptly pointed out:
a. In the light of the facts above summarized, it is evident that appellants did not assert
their claim of exemption within a reasonable time. Certainly, reasonable time, for
purposes of the law on exemption, does not mean a time after the expiration of the
one-year period provided for in Section 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for
judgment debtors to redeem the property sold on execution, otherwise it would
render nugatory final bills of sale on execution and defeat the very purpose of
execution – to put an end to litigation. x x x.24  is generally exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. 30  The family
14. The foregoing disposition is in accord with the Court’s November 25, 2005
Decision in Honrado v. Court of Appeals,25 where it was categorically stated
that at no other time can the status of a residential house as a family home
can be set up and proved and its exemption from execution be claimed but
before the sale thereof at public auction:
a. While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time
it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale
under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up
and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to
do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption.
b. As this Court ruled in Gomez v. Gealone:
i. Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which
to claim the exemption, the rule is, nevertheless, well-settled that the
right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor
and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor
himself at the time of the levy or within a reasonable period thereafter;
1. "In the absence of express provision it has variously held that
claim (for exemption) must be made at the time of the levy if
the debtor is present, that it must be made within a reasonable
time, or promptly, or before the creditor has taken any step
involving further costs, or before advertisement of sale, or at
any time before sale, or within a reasonable time before the
sale, or before the sale has commenced, but as to the last
there is contrary authority."
c. In the light of the facts above summarized, it is self-evident that appellants did not
assert their claim of exemption within a reasonable time. Certainly, reasonable time,
for purposes of the law on exemption, does not mean a time after the expiration of
the one-year period. We now rule that claims for exemption from execution of
properties under Section 12 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court must be presented
before its sale on execution by the sheriff.26 (citations omitted)
15. Reiterating the foregoing in Spouses Versola v. Court of Appeals, 27 this
Court stated that:
a. The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153
of the Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and
as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before
the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person
claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim
for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff. x x x.
16. Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed exemption of
the subject property before the sale thereof at public auction, the petitioners
now are barred from raising the same. Failure to do so estop them from later
claiming the said exemption.
17. Indeed, the family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the
repository of cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime. 29 It is
likewise without dispute that the family home, from the time of its
constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein,
home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases. 31 
18. However, this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure
to set up and prove the status of the property as a family home at the
 time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter.
19. In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioners allowed a considerable time
to lapse before claiming that the subject property is a family home and its
exemption from execution and forced sale under the Family Code. The
petitioners allowed the subject property to be levied upon and the public
sale to proceed. One (1) year lapsed from the time the subject property was
sold until a Final Deed of Sale was issued to Claudio and, later, Araceli’s
Torrens title was cancelled and a new one issued under Claudio’s name,
still, the petitioner remained silent. In fact, it was only after the
respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, or approximately
four (4) years from the time of the auction sale, that the petitioners
claimed that the subject property is a family home, thus, exempt from
execution.
20. For all intents and purposes, the petitioners’ negligence or omission to
assert their right within a reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that
they have abandoned, waived or declined to assert it. Since the exemption
under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right, it is incumbent
upon the petitioners to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed
period and it is not the sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the status of the
subject property as a family home.
21. The petitioners’ negligence or omission renders their present assertion
doubtful; it appears that it is a mere afterthought and artifice that cannot be
countenanced without doing the respondents injustice and depriving the
fruits of the judgment award in their favor. Simple justice and fairness and
equitable considerations demand that Claudio’s title to the property be
respected. Equity dictates that the petitioners are made to suffer the
consequences of their unexplained negligence.
22. WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition
is DENIED. The CA Decision affirming the RTC which dismissed the
complaint for declaration of nullity of TCT No. 221755 (M) and other
documents are AFFIRMED.
4.) Eulogio v. Bell
(G.R. NO. 186322, 8 July 2015)
FACTS:
1. Respondents Paterno William Bell, Jr., Florence Felicia Victoria Bell,
Paterno Ferdinand Bell III, and Paterno Benerano IV (the Bell siblings) are
the unmarried children of respondent Spouses Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia
Calingasan-Bell (Spouses Bell). In 1995, the Bell sibling lodged a
Complaint for annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and
damages against petitioner Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio (the
Eulogios). It was docketed as Civil Case No. 4581 at the (RTC) of Batangas
City. The complaint sought the annulment of the contract of sale executed
by Spouses Bell over their 329-square-meter residential house and lot, as
well the as the cancellation of the title obtained by petitioners by virtue of
the Deed.
2. The RTC granted respondents’ prayers, but declared Spouses Bell liable to
petitioners in the amount of 1 million plus 12% interest per annum. The
dispositive portion of the Decision dated 15 July 1998 reads as follows:
a. WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the Court hereby declares:
b. 1. That the sale of the subject house and lot under Deed of Sale marked as Exhibit
"F" is only an equitable mortgage in favor of the defendants Enrico Eulogio and
Natividad Eulogio. However, the mortgage cannot bind the property in question for
being violative of Chapter 2, Title 4 of the Family Code, its encumbrance not
having been consented to in writing by a majority of the beneficiaries who are the
plaintiffs herein;
c. 2. The said equitable mortgage is deemed to be an unsecured mortgage [sic] for
which the Spouses Paterno C. Bell, Sr. and Rogelia Calingasan Bell as mortgagors
are liable to the defendants-spouses Enrico Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio in the
amount of 1,000,000 plus interest of 12% per annum. However, under the Fourth
Party Complaint Sps. Paterno C. Bell, Sr. and Rogelia Calingasan Bell have the
right of reimbursement from fourth party defendants Nicolas Morana and Julieta
Morana for whom their loan of 1,000,000 was secured by Sps. Paterno C. Bell, Sr.
and Rogelia Calingasan Bell. Accordingly, the fourth party defendants Nicolas
Morana and Julieta Morana are hereby ordered to reimburse Paterno C. Bell, Sr. and
Rogelia Calingasan Bell the loan of 1,000,00 plus interest of 12% per annum to be
paid by the latter to defendants Enrico and Natividad Eulogio;
d. 3. The house and lot in question free from any and all encumbrances by virtue of
said equitable mortgage or the purported sale; and
e. 4. The Deed of Sale (Exhibit "F") is null and void for being contrary to law and
public policy.
f. Accordingly, (1) the Register of Deeds of Batangas City is hereby ordered to cancel
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-131472 in the name of defendants Enrico S.
Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio and to re-constitute (sic) Transfer Certificate of
Title No. RT-680-(5997) as "family home" of the plaintiffs Florence Felicia
Victoria C. Bell, Paterno William C. Bell Jr., Paterno Ferdinand C. Bell III, Paterno
Benerano C. Bell IV and fourth party plaintiffs Paterno C. Bell Sr. and Rogelia
Calingasan Bell; or in the alternative to issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title
under the same tenor;
g. 2. The City Assessor of Batangas City is hereby directed to issue a tax declaration
covering the said subject property as family home for the said plaintiffs and fourth
party plaintiffs Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia Calingasan Bell; and
3. Both petitioners and respondent appealed to the CA, but the trial court’s
Decision was affirmed en too. Spouses Bell later brought the case to this
Court to question their liability to petitioners in the amount of 1 million plus
interest. The Court, however, dismissed their Petition for failure to show
any reversible error committed by the CA. 4 Thereafter, entry of judgment
was made.5
4. On 9 June 2004 the RTC issued a Writ of Execution as a result of which
respondents’ property covered by the newly reconstituted (TCT) No. 54208
 [formerly RT-680 (5997)] was levied on execution. Upon motion by
respondents, trial court, on 31 August 2004, ordered the lifting of the writ of
the execution on the ground that the property was a family home.6
5. Petitioners filed a MR of the lifting of the writ of execution. Invoking
Article 160 of the Family Code, they posited that the current market value
of the property exceeded the statutory limit of 300,000 considering that it
was located in a commercial area, and that Spouses Bell had even sold it to
them for 1million.7
6. The RTC, on 13 October 2004, set the case for hearing to determine the
present value of the family home of respondents. It also appointed a Board
of Appraisers to conduct a study on the prevailing market value of their
house and lot.8
7. Respondents sought reconsideration of the above directives and asked the
RTC to cite petitioners for contempt because of forum-shopping. 9 they
argued that petitioners’ bid to determine the present value of the subject
property was just a ploy to re-litigate an issue that had long been settled
with finality.
8. The RTC, however, denied the MR of respondents and directed the
commissioners to canvass prospective buyers of their house and lot.11
9. On 23 November 2004, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Injunction before the CA.12 where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No.
87531.
10. Subsequently, the RTC issued on 25 November 2004 an Order 13 dispensing
with the valuation report of the commissioners and directing the issuance of
a writ of execution.
11. Consequently, respondents filed before the CA a Supplemental Petition with an urgent prayer
for a temporary restraining order.14 The CA eventually enjoined.15 the execution sale set on 22
December 200416 by the RTC.
12. On 31 July 2008, the CA rendered it Decision granting respondent’s Petition for Certiorari, but
it rejected their theory that res judicata had already set in. The appellate court ruled that the
RTC Decision, which had become final and executory, only declared respondents’ house and
lot as a family home. Since the issue of whether it may be sold in execution was incidental to
the execution of the aforesaid Decision, there was as yet no res judicata.
13. Still, the CA found that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
execution sale of the subject family home after finding its present value exceeded the statutory
limit. The basis for the valuation of a family home under Article 160, according to the appellate
court, is its actual value at the time of its constitution and not the market/present value;
therefore, the trial court’s order was contrary to law.17
ISSUES:
1. (1) whether petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping; (2) whether a hearing to determine the
value of respondents’ family home for purposes of execution under Article 160 of the Family
Code is barred under the principle of res judicata; and (3) whether respondents’ family
home may be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.
RATIO:
1. The Court denies the Petition for lack of merit.
2. Petitioners are not guilty of forum-shopping.
3. Respondents contend that the Decision in Civil Case No. 4581, which declared that property in dispute was a
family home, had long attained finality. Accordingly, respondents maintain that petitioners’ bid to re-litigate
the present value of the property in the course of the execution proceedings is barred by res judicata, and that
petitioners should be cited for contempt of court because of forum-shopping.22
4. Recall that although the trial court had nullified the Deed of Sale over respondents’ family home in Civil
Case No. 4581 for lack of a written consent from its beneficiaries as required under Article 158 of the
Family Code,23 the court still recognized the validity of the transaction as an unsecured loan. Hence, it
declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in the amount of 1 million plus 12% interest per annum.
5. Petitioners’ bid to satisfy the above judgment cannot be considered an act of forum shopping. Simply, the
execution of a decision is just the fruit and end of a suit and is very aptly called the life of the law. 24 It is not
separate from the main case. Similarly, the filing of the instant Petitions as a continuation of the execution
proceedings does not constitute forum shopping. Seeking a reversal of an adverse judgment or order by
appeal or certiorari does not constitute forum shopping. Such remedies are sanctioned and provided for the
rules.25
6. Indeed, as will be presently discussed, the causes of action in the main proceedings in Civil Case No. 4581
and the consequent execution proceedings are identical. Suffice it to say, however, that the danger of a
multiplicity of suits upon one and the same cause of action, which the judicial policy against forum shopping
seeks to prevent, does not exist in this case.
7. Re-litigating the issue of the value of respondents’ family home is barred by res judicata.
8. In this case, the trial court’s final decision in Civil Case No. 4581 bars petitioners’ move to have the property
in dispute levied on execution.
9. There is no question that the main proceedings in Civil Case No. 4581 and the subsequent execution
proceedings in Civil Case No. 4581 and the subsequent execution proceedings involved the same
parties31 and subject matter.32 for these reasons, respondents argue that the execution sale of the property in
dispute under Article 170 of the Family Code is barred by res judicata, since the trial court has already
determined that the value of the property fell within the statutory limit.
10. The CA held that the trial court’s Decision which is indisputably final, only settled the issue of whether the
property in dispute was a family home. The CA ruled thus:
a. We rule that there is no res judicata.
b. At the outset, let it be emphasized that the decision of the trial court dated July 15, 1998, which
has become final and executor, only declared the subject property as a family home. As a matter
of fact, private respondents never questioned that such property is a family home, and
consequently, the issue as to whether or not the property is family home is settled and res
judicata lies only with respect to this issue.
c. But the issue as to whether or not a family home could be the subject of an execution sale was
not resolved by the trial court. This issue[was] raised only when the writ of execution was
issued and hence, [was not] resolved with finality. Thus, the issue before this Court is whether
or not the [f]amily [h]ome of petitioners under the facts and circumstances of the case could be
the subject of a writ execution sold at public auction.33
11. The Court disagrees with the CA.
12. "Cause of action" is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. 34 It may be argued that
the cause of action the main proceedings was the sale of the property in dispute, while in the execution
proceedings it was the indebtedness of Spouses Bell to petitioners.
13. The settled rule, however, is that identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity. Otherwise, a
party could easily escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action or the relief
sought.35 The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same
evidence will sustain both actions, or whether is an identity of the facts essential to the maintenance of the
two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions considered the same, and a
judgment in the first case would be a bar to the subsequent action. Hence, party cannot, by varying the form
of action or adopting a different method of presenting the case, escape the operation of the principle that one
and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or their privies. 36
14. Among several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of
action are: (1) whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and the second causes of
action and (2) whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other. Also
fundamental is the test for determining whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of
the filing of the first complaint.37
15. Applying the above guidelines, the Court finds that the entirety of Civil Case No. 4581 – including the bid of
petitioners to execute the money judgment awarded to them by the trial court – is founded on a common
cause of action. Records show that the sole evidence submitted by petitioners during the execution
proceedings was the Deed of Sale, which the trial court had nullified in the main proceedings.
Concomitantly, the very sane defense raised by petitioners in the main proceedings, i.e., that they had bought
the property from Spouses Bell for 1 million – was utilized to substantiate the claim that the current value of
respondents’ family home was actually 1 million. In fact, the trial court’s order for respondent’s family home
to be levied on execution was solely based on the price stated in the nullified Deed of Sale.
16. Res judicata applies, considering that the parties are litigating over the same property. Moreover, the same
contentions and evidence advanced by the petitioners to substantiate their claim over respondents’ family
home have already been used to support their arguments in the main proceedings.
17. Any lingering doubt on the application of res judicata to this case should be
put to rest by the trial court’s discussion of the nature and alienability of the
property in dispute, to wit;
a. The second issue is about the allegation of the plaintiffs that the family home which has been
constituted on the house and lot in question is exempt from alienation and that its value does not
exceed 300,000. Paterno Bell, Sr. testified that the two-storey house was built in 1947 and was
made of wood and hollow blocks. He inherited it in 1976 from his parents and has been living
there with his family. In 1976, when an extra- judicial settlement was made of the estate of his
parents, the fair market value of the house was 70,000.
b. City Assessor Rodezinda Pargas testified and presented Tax Declaration and others, (Exhibit
"J", Tax Declaration No. 005-047) beginning 1985 showing that the subject lot with an area of
329 sq. m. had a fair market value of 76,000.00 and the residential house located thereon of
50,000.00, for a total value of 126,000.00. She testified that during the prior years the assessed
values were lower. This shows that the limit of the value of 300,000.00 under Article 157, Title
5 of the Family Code has not been exceeded. The testimonies of the plaintiffs who are children
of Sps. Paterno Bell, Sr. and Rogela Calingasan Bell show that they had lived in that house
together with their said parents. The Court therefore concludes that the said house is a family
home under Chapter 2, Title 5 of the Family Code. Its alienation by the said Spouses without
the written consent of the majority of the children/plaintiffs is null and void for being contrary
to law and public policy as enunciated in Art. 158 of the Family Code.38 [underscoring supplied]
18. The foregoing points plainly show that the issue of whether the property in
dispute exceeded the statutory limit of 300,000 has already been determined
with finality by the trial court. Its finding necessarily meant that the
property is exempt from execution. Assuming for the sake of argument that
causes of action in the main proceedings and in the execution proceedings
are different, the parties are still barred from litigating the issue of whether
respondents’ family home may be sold on execution sale under the principle
of conclusiveness of judgment.
19. Respondents’ family home cannot be sold on execution under Article
160 of Family Code.
20. Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as expressly
provided for in Article 153 of the Family Code.39
21. It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous,
inalienable and free from attachment.40 The great controlling purpose and
policy of the Constitution is the protection or the preservation of the
homestead - the dwelling place. A houseless, homeless population is a
burden upon the energy, industry, and morals of the community to which it
belongs. No greater calamity, not tainted with crime, can befall a family
than to be expelled from the roof under which it has been gathered and
sheltered.41 The family home cannot be seized by creditors except in special
cases.42
22. The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to be
exempt, however, are determined by the exemption statute. The exemption
is limited to the particular kind of property of the specific articles prescribed
by the statute; the exemption cannot exceed the statutory limit.43
23. Articles 155 and 160 of the Family Code specify the exceptions mentioned
in Article 153. Related to the foregoing is Article 157 of the Family Code.
24. The minutes of the deliberation by the drafters of Family Code on Article
160 are enlightening, to wit:
a. In reply, Judge Diy opined that the above Article is intended to cover a situation
where the family home is already worth 500,000 or IM.
b. Justice Reyes stated that it is possible that a family home, originally valued at
300,000, later appreciated to almost IM because of improvements made, like roads
and plazas. Justice Caguioa, however, made a distinction between voluntary and
involuntary improvements in the sense that if the value of the family home
exceeded the maximum amount because of voluntary improvements by the one
establishing the family home, the Article will apply; but if it is through an
involuntary improvement, like conversion into a residential area or the
establishment of roads and other facilities, the one establishing the family home
should not be punished by making his home liable to creditors. He suggested that
the matter be clarified in the provision.
c. Prof. Bautista objected to the phrase "is worth" since if they will specify that the
family home is worth more than the maximum amount at the time it was
constituted, they will avoid the suit because the creditor will be given proper
warning. Justice Caguioa added that, under the second sentence, there will be a
preliminary determination as to whether the family home exceeds the maximum
amount allowed by the law.
i. Justice Caguia accordingly modified the last sentence as follows:
ii. If the excess in actual value over that allowed in Article 157 is due to
subsequent voluntary improvements by the person or persons
constituting the family home or by the owner or owners of the property,
the same rules and procedure shall apply.
d. Prof. Bautista objected to the above provision, because it will in effect penalize the
owner for improving the family home. On the other hand, Justice Puno opined that
the provision covers only the excess in actual value over that allowed by law. Judge
Diy added that the owner may improve the family home up to 300,000. Justice
Caguioa stated that without the above provision, one can borrow money, put it all
on improvement of the family home even beyond the maximum value of a family
home and, thereby, exempt it from levy on the part of the creditor. He added that
anyway, if one voluntarily improves his family home out of his money, nobody can
complain because there are no creditors.
e. Justice Puno posed the question: what is "due to the subsequent improvement?" is it
the "excess" or is it the "increase", or is it the "increase", which constitutes the
"excess"? in reply, Justice Reyes opined that it is the "increase" which constituted
 the "excess". Justice Puno, Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa modified the last
sentence as follows:
i. If the increase in actual value exceeds that maximum allowed in Article
157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by
the person or persons constituting the family home or by the owner or
owners of the property, the same rule and procedure shall apply.
f. Prof. Bautista commented that the phrase "increase in actual value" does not include
the original value. Justice Puno suggested that they just say "increased actual
value", which the Committee approved.44
25. To summarize, the exemption of the family home from execution, forced
sale or attachment is limited to 300,000 in urban areas and 200,000 in rural
areas, unless those maximum values are adjusted by law. If it is shown,
though, that those amounts do not match the present value of the peso
because of currency fluctuations, the amount of exemption shall be based on
the value that is most favorable to the constitution of a family home. Any
amount in excess of those limits can be applied to the payment of any of the
obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160.
26. Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the
persons constituting it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment provided the following
conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the property at the time of its
constitution has been determined to fall below the statutory limit; and
(b) the improvement or enlargement does not result in an increase in its
value exceeding the statutory limit.45 Otherwise, the family home can be
the subject of a forced sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is
applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160.
27. Certainly, the humane considerations for which the law surrounds the
family home with immunities from levy do not include the intent to enable
debtors to thwart the just claims of their creditors.46
28. Petitioners maintain that this case falls under the exceptions to the
exemption of the family home from execution or forced sale. They claim
that the actual value of respondents’ family home exceeds the 300,000 limit
in urban areas. This fact is supposedly shown by the Deed of Sale whereby
private respondents agreed to sell the property for 1 million way back in
1995. Therefore, the RTC only properly ordered the execution sale of the
property under Article 160 to satisfy the money judgment awarded to them
in Civil Case No. 4581.47
FACTS:
29. As earlier discussed, it has been judicially determined with finality that the
property in dispute is a family home, and that its value at the time of its
constitution was within the statutory limit. Moreover, respondents have
timely claimed the exemption of the property from execution. 48 On the other
hand, there is no question that the money judgment awarded to petitioners
falls under the ambit of Article 160.
30. Notwithstanding petitioners’ right to enforce the trial court’s money
judgment, however, they cannot obtain its satisfaction at the expense of
respondents’ rights over their family home. It is axiomatic that those
asserting the protection of an exception from an exemption must bring
themselves clearly within the terms of the exception and satisfy any
statutory requirement for its enforcement.49
31. To warrant the execution sale of respondents’ family home under Article
160, petitioners needed to establish these facts: (1) there was an increase in
its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on
the property introduced by the persons constituting the family home, its
owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value
exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157.
32. During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was alleged – much
less proven – by petitioners.1 The sole evidence presented was the Deed of
Sale, but the trial court had already determined with finality that the contract
was null, and that the actual transaction was an equitable mortgage.
Evidently, when petitioners and Spouses Bells executed the Deed of Sale in
1990, the price stated therein was not the actual value of the property in
dispute.
33. The court thus agrees with the CA’s conclusion that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the sale on execution of the
property in dispute under Article 160. The trial court had already
determined with finality that the property was a family home, and there
was no proof that is value had increased beyond the statutory limit due
to voluntary improvements by respondents. Yet, it ordered the execution
sale of the property. There is grave abuse of discretion when one acts in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of one’s
judgment, as in this case in which the assailed order is bereft of any factual
or legal justification.50
34. WHEREFORE, the Petitioner for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
enjoining the trial court from proceeding with the sale of the family home of
respondents, is AFFIRMED.
5.) Narciso Salas v. Annabelle Matusalem
(G.R. No. 180284, 10 April 2013)
1. On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint 3 for
Support/Damages against Narciso Salas (petitioner) in the (RTC) of
Cabanatuan City (Civil Case No. 2124-AF). Respondent claimed that
petitioner is. the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas who was born on
December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her
as she was then only 24 years old, making her believe that he is a widower.
 Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed and shouldered all
expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of caesarian
operation and hospital confinement.
2. However, when respondent refused the offer of petitioner’s family to take
the child from her, petitioner abandoned respondent and her child and left
them to the mercy of relatives and friends. Respondent further alleged that
she attempted suicide due to depression but still petitioner refused to
support her and their child.
3. Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support in
the amount of ₱20,000.00, as well as actual, moral and exemplary damages,
and attorney’s fees.
4. Petitioner filed his answer4 with special and affirmative defenses and
counterclaims. He described respondent as a woman of loose morals, having
borne her first child also out of wedlock when she went to work in Italy.
Jobless upon her return to the country, respondent spent time riding on
petitioner’s jeepney which was then being utilized by a female real estate
agent named Felicisima de Guzman.
5. Respondent had seduced a senior police officer in San Isidro and her charge
of sexual abuse against said police officer was later withdrawn in exchange
for the quashing of drug charges against respondent’s brother-in-law who
was then detained at the municipal jail. It was at that time respondent
introduced herself to petitioner whom she pleaded for charity as she was
pregnant with another child. Petitioner denied paternity of the child
Christian Paulo; he was motivated by no other reason except genuine
altruism when he agreed to shoulder the expenses for the delivery of said
child, unaware of respondent’s chicanery and deceit designed to
"scandalize" him in exchange for financial favor.
6. At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified. Petitioner
was declared to have waived his right to present evidence and the case was
considered submitted for decision based on respondent’s evidence.
7. Respondent testified that she first met petitioner at the house of his
"kumadre" Felicisima de Guzman at Bgy. Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija.
During their subsequent meeting, petitioner told her he is already a widower
and he has no more companion in life because his children are all grown-up.
She also learned that petitioner owns a rice mill, a construction business and
a housing subdivision (petitioner offered her a job at their family-owned
Ma. Cristina Village). Petitioner at the time already knows that she is a
single mother as she had a child by her former boyfriend in Italy. He then
brought her to a motel, promising that he will take care of her and marry
her. She believed him and yielded to his advances, with the thought that she
and her child will have a better life. Thereafter, they saw each other weekly
and petitioner gave her money for her child. When she became pregnant
with petitioner’s child, it was only then she learned that he is in fact not a
widower. She wanted to abort the baby but petitioner opposed it because he
wanted to have another child.5
8. On the fourth month of her pregnancy, petitioner rented an apartment where
she stayed with a housemaid; he also provided for all their expenses. She
gave birth to their child on December 28, 1994 at the Good Samaritan
Hospital in Cabanatuan City. Before delivery, petitioner even walked her at
the hospital room and massaged her stomach, saying he had not done this to
his wife. She filled out the form for the child’s birth certificate and wrote all
the information supplied by petitioner himself. It was also petitioner who
paid the hospital bills and drove her baby home. He was excited and happy
to have a son at his advanced age who is his "look-alike," and this was
witnessed by other boarders, visitors and Grace Murillo, the owner of the
apartment unit petitioner rented. However, on the 18th day after the baby’s
birth, petitioner went to Baguio City for a medical check-up. He confessed
to her daughter and eventually his wife was also informed about his having
sired an illegitimate child. His family then decided to adopt the baby and
just give respondent money so she can go abroad. When she refused this
offer, petitioner stopped seeing her and sending money to her. She and her
baby survived through the help of relatives and friends. Depressed, she tried
to commit suicide by drug overdose and was brought to the hospital by
Murillo who paid the bill. Murillo sought the help of the Cabanatuan City
Police Station which set their meeting with petitioner. However, it was only
petitioner’s wife who showed up and she was very mad, uttering unsavory
words against respondent.6
9. Murillo corroborated respondent’s testimony as to the payment by petitioner
of apartment rental, his weekly visits to respondent and financial support to
her, his presence during and after delivery of respondent’s baby,
respondent’s attempted suicide through sleeping pills overdose and
hospitalization for which she paid the bill, her complaint before the police
authorities and meeting with petitioner’s wife at the headquarters. 7
10. On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision 8 in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
a. WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant as follows:
b. 1. Ordering the defendant to give as monthly support of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00)
PESOS for the child Christian Paulo through the mother; 2. Directing the defendant to pay the
plaintiff the sum of ₱20,000.00 by way of litigation expenses; and
11. Petitioner appealed to the CA arguing that: (1) the trial court decided the case without affording him the right
to introduce evidence on his defense; and (2) the trial court erred in finding that petitioner is the putative
father of Christian Paulo and ordering him to give monthly support.
12. By Decision dated July 18, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal. The appellate court found no reason
to disturb the trial court’s exercise of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for postponement on April 17,
1998, the scheduled hearing for the initial presentation of defendant’s evidence.
13. On the paternity issue, the CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling that respondent satisfactorily established the
illegitimate filiation of her son Christian Paulo, and consequently no error was committed by the trial court
in granting respondent’s prayer for support. The appellate court thus:
a. Christian Paulo, in instant case, does not enjoy the benefit of a record of birth in the civil
 registry which bears acknowledgment signed by Narciso Salas. He cannot claim open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
b. It had been established by plaintiff’s evidence, however, that during her pregnancy, Annabelle
was provided by Narciso Salas with an apartment at a rental of ₱1,500.00 which he paid for.
Narciso provided her with a household help with a salary of ₱1,500.00 a month (TSN, October
6, 1995, ibid). He also provided her a monthly food allowance of ₱1,500.00 (Ibid, p. 18).
Narciso was with Annabelle at the hospital while the latter was in labor, "walking" her around
and massaging her belly (Ibid, p. 11). Narciso brought home Christian Paulo to the rented
apartment after Annabelle’s discharge from the hospital. People living in the same apartment
units were witnesses to Narciso’s delight to father a son at his age which was his "look alike". It
was only after the 18th day when Annabelle refused to give him Christian Paulo that Narciso
withdrew his support to him and his mother.
c. Said testimony of Annabelle aside from having been corroborated by Grace Murillo, the owner
of the apartment which Narciso rented, was never rebutted on record. Narciso did not present
any evidence, verbal or documentary, to repudiate plaintiff’s evidence.
d. In the cases of Lim vs. CA (270 SCRA 1) and Rodriguez vs. CA (245 SCRA 150), the Supreme
Court made it clear that Article 172 of the Family Code is an adaptation of Article 283 of the
Civil Code. Said legal provision provides that the father is obliged to recognize the child as his
natural child x x "3) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is
his father".
e. In fact, in Ilano vs. CA (230 SCRA 242, 258-259), it was held that–
i. "The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically
covers all the other cases in the preceding paragraphs. ‘Any other evidence or
proof’ that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the
other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for
compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet [the] requirements of the first
three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph. This paragraph
permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with
respect to illegitimate filiation."
f. As a necessary consequence of the finding that Christian Paulo is the son of defendant Narciso
Salas, he is entitled to support from the latter (Ilano vs. CA, supra).
g. It "shall be demandable from the time the person who has the right to recover the same needs it
for maintenance x x." (Art. 203, Family Code of the Philippines). 10
14. Petitioner MR denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. W/N
RATIO:
1. We grant the petition.
2. It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the convenience of the
plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle that choosing the venue of an action
is not left to a plaintiff’s caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. 12 In personal actions such as
the instant case, the Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his complaint. He can file it
in the place (1) where he himself or any of them resides, or (2) where the defendant or any of the defendants
resides or may be found. 13 The plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of the place where the action has
been instituted at the time the action is commenced. 14
3. However, petitioner raised the issue of improper venue for the first time in the Answer itself and no prior
motion to dismiss based on such ground was filed. Under the Rules of Court before the 1997 amendments,
an objection to an improper venue must be made before a responsive pleading is filed. Otherwise, it will be
deemed waived.15 Not having been timely raised, petitioner’s objection on venue is therefore deemed
waived.
4. As to the denial of the motion for postponement filed by his counsel for the resetting of the initial
presentation of defense evidence on April 17, 1998, we find that it was not the first time petitioner’s motion
for postponement was denied by the trial court.
5. Records disclosed that after the termination of the testimony of respondent’s last witness on November 29,
1996, the trial court as prayed for by the parties, set the continuation of hearing for the reception of evidence
for the defendant (petitioner) on January 27, February 3, and February 10, 1997. In the Order dated
December 17, 1996, petitioner was advised to be ready with his evidence at those hearing dates earlier
scheduled. At the hearing on January 27, 1997, petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Rolando S. Bala, requested
for the cancellation of the February 3 and 10, 1997 hearings in order to give him time to prepare for his
defense, which request was granted by the trial court which thus reset the hearing dates to March 3, 14 and
17, 1997. On March 3, 1997, upon oral manifestation by Atty. Bala and without objection from respondent’s
counsel, Atty. Feliciano Wycoco, the trial court again reset the hearing to March 14 and 17, 1997. With the
nonappearance of both petitioner and Atty. Bala on March 14, 1997, the trial court upon oral manifestation
by Atty. Wycoco declared their absence as a waiver of their right to present evidence and accordingly
deemed the case submitted for decision.16
6. On July 4, 1997, Atty. Bala withdrew as counsel for petitioner and Atty. Rafael E. Villarosa filed his
appearance as his new counsel on July 21, 1997. On the same date he filed entry of appearance, Atty.
Villarosa filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 14, 1997 Order pleading for liberality and
magnanimity of the trial court, without offering any explanation for Atty. Bala’s failure to appear for the
initial presentation of their evidence. The trial court thereupon reconsidered its March 14, 1997 Order,
finding it better to give petitioner a chance to present his evidence. On August 26, 1997, Atty. Villarosa
received a notice of hearing for the presentation of their evidence scheduled on September 22, 1997. On
August 29, 1997, the trial court received his motion requesting that the said hearing be re-set to October 10,
1997 for the reason that he had requested the postponement of a hearing in another case which was
incidentally scheduled on September 22, 23 and 24, 1997. As prayed for, the trial court reset the hearing to
October 10, 1997. On said date, however, the hearing was again moved to December 15, 1997. On February
16, 1998, the trial court itself reset the hearing to April 17, 1998 since it was unclear whether Atty. Wycoco
received a copy of the motion.17
7. On April 17, 1998, petitioner and his counsel failed to appear but the trial court received on April 16, 1998
an urgent motion to cancel hearing filed by Atty. Villarosa. The reason given by the latter was the scheduled
hearing on the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction in another case under the April 8, 1998 Order
issued by the RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 36 in Civil Case No. 1946. But as clearly stated in the
said order, it was the plaintiffs therein who requested the postponement of the hearing and it behoved Atty.
Villarosa to inform the RTC of Gapan that he had a previous commitment considering that the April 17,
1998 hearing was scheduled as early as February 16, 1998. Acting on the motion for postponement, the trial
court denied for the second time petitioner’s motion for postponement.
8. Even at the hearing of their motion for reconsideration of the April 17, 1998 Order on September 21, 1998,
Atty. Villarosa failed to appear and instead filed another motion for postponement. The trial court thus
ordered that the case be submitted for decision stressing that the case had long been pending and that
petitioner and his counsel have been given opportunities to present their evidence. It likewise denied a
second motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Villarosa, who arrived late during the hearing thereof on
December 4, 1998.18
9. A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right, but a request addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. Parties asking for postponement have absolutely no right to assume that their motions
would be granted. Thus, they must be prepared on the day of the hearing. 19 Indeed, an order declaring a party
to have waived the right to present evidence for performing dilatory actions upholds the trial court’s duty to
ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on the part of one party.20
10. Atty. Villarosa’s plea for liberality was correctly rejected by the trial court in view of his own negligence in
failing to ensure there will be no conflict in his trial schedules. As we held in Tiomico v. Court of Appeals21
a. Motions for postponement are generally frowned upon by Courts if there is evidence of bad
faith, malice or inexcusable negligence on the part of the movant. The inadvertence of the
defense counsel in failing to take note of the trial dates and in belatedly informing the trial court
of any conflict in his schedules of trial or court appearances, constitutes inexcusable negligence.
It should be borne in mind that a client is bound by his counsel’s conduct, negligence and
mistakes in handling the case.22
11. With our finding that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the motion for
postponement filed by petitioner’s counsel, petitioner’s contention that he was deprived of his day in court
must likewise fail. The essence of due process is that a party is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. Where a party was afforded an
opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due
process. If the opportunity is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the
constitutional guarantee.23
12. We now proceed to the main issue of whether the trial and appellate courts
 erred in ruling that respondent’s evidence sufficiently proved that her son
Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of petitioner.
13. Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate
filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children. Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:
14. Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth 24 (Exhibit "A-1") of
Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner appears as his father
but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it was only respondent who
filled up the entries and signed the said document though she claims it
was petitioner who supplied the information she wrote therein.
15. We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the
putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no
showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the
certificate.25 Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the
placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is
incompetent evidence of paternity.26 Neither can such birth certificate be
taken as a recognition in a public instrument 27 and it has no probative value
to establish filiation to the alleged father.28
16. As to the Baptismal Certificate 29 (Exhibit "B") of Christian Paulo Salas also
indicating petitioner as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal
certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so
specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of
entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity.30
17. The rest of respondent’s documentary evidence consists of handwritten
notes and letters, hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and
respondent inside their rented apartment unit.
18. Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged
father are inconclusive evidence to prove paternity.31 Exhibits "E" and
"F"32 showing petitioner and respondent inside the rented apartment unit
thus have scant evidentiary value. The Statement of Account33 (Exhibit
"C") from the Good Samaritan General Hospital where respondent herself
was indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent to prove that petitioner is
the father of her child notwithstanding petitioner’s admission in his answer
that he shouldered the expenses in the delivery of respondent’s child as an
act of charity.
19. As to the handwritten notes34 (Exhibits "D" to "D-13") of petitioner and
respondent showing their exchange of affectionate words and romantic
trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to
petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement
of admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if
these notes were authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-à-
vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of
illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned.35
20. Petitioner’s reliance on our ruling in Lim v. Court of Appeals36 is
misplaced.1 In the said case, the handwritten letters of petitioner contained
a clear admission that he is the father of private respondent’s daughter and
were signed by him. The Court therein considered the totality of evidence
which established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was indeed the
father of private respondent’s daughter.
21. On the other hand, in Ilano v. Court of Appeals,37 the Court sustained the
appellate court’s finding that private respondent’s evidence to establish her
filiation with and paternity of petitioner was overwhelming, particularly the
latter’s public acknowledgment of his amorous relationship with private
respondent’s mother, and private respondent as his own child through acts
and words, her testimonial evidence to that effect was fully supported by
documentary evidence. The Court thus ruled that respondent had adduced
sufficient proof of continuous possession of status of a spurious child.
22. Here, while the CA held that Christian Paulo Salas could not claim open
and continuous possession of status of an illegitimate child, it nevertheless
considered the testimonial evidence sufficient proof to establish his filiation
to petitioner.
23. An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation
by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," like
his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his
name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.38 
24. Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondent’s evidence
insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.
25. The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the
birth of Christian Paulo, petitioner’s financial support while respondent
lived in Murillo’s apartment and his regular visits to her at the said
apartment, though replete with details, do not approximate the
"overwhelming evidence, documentary and testimonial" presented in
Ilano. In that case, we sustained the appellate court’s ruling anchored on the
following factual findings by the appellate court which was quoted at length
in the ponencia:
a. It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of Merceditas (sic) at the
Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal
examination accompanied by Artemio (TSN, p. 33, 5/17/74). After delivery, they
went home to their residence at EDSA in a car owned and driven by Artemio
himself
b. Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of "Ilano" since birth without any objection
on the part of Artemio, the fact that since Merceditas (sic) had her discernment
she had always known and called Artemio as her "Daddy" (TSN, pp. 28-29,
 10/18/74); the fact that each time Artemio was at home, he would play with
Merceditas (sic), take her for a ride or restaurants to eat, and sometimes sleeping
with Merceditas (sic) (id. p. 34) and does all what a father should do for his child —
bringing home goodies, candies, toys and whatever he can bring her which a child
enjoys which Artemio gives to Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp. 38-39, 5/17/74) are
positive evidence that Merceditas (sic) is the child of Artemio and recognized by
Artemio as such. Special attention is called to Exh. "E-7" where Artemio was telling
Leoncia the need for a "frog test" to know the status of Leoncia.
c. Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and Merceditas (sic)
was sometimes in the form of cash personally delivered to her by Artemio, thru
Melencio, thru Elynia (Exhs. "E-2" and "E-3", and "D-6"), or thru Merceditas (sic)
herself (TSN, p. 40, 5/17/74) and sometimes in the form of a check as the Manila
Banking Corporation Check No. 81532 (Exh. "G") and the signature appearing
therein which was identified by Leoncia as that of Artemio because Artemio often
gives her checks and Artemio would write the check at home and saw Artemio sign
the check (TSN, p. 49, 7/18/73). Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that the check
and signature were those of Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77; TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).
d. During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband and wife,
Artemio has shown concern as the father of Merceditas (sic). When Merceditas (sic)
was in Grade 1 at the St. Joseph Parochial School, Artemio signed the Report Card
of Merceditas (sic) (Exh. "H") for the fourth and fifth grading period(s) (Exh. "H-1"
and "H-2") as the parent of Merceditas (sic). Those signatures of Artemio [were]
both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) because Artemio signed Exh. "H-1"
and "H-2" at their residence in the presence of Leoncia, Merceditas (sic) and of
Elynia (TSN, p. 57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). x x x.
e. x x x           x x x          x x x When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial
Board of Cavite[,] Artemio gave Leoncia his picture with the following dedication:
"To Nene, with best regards, Temiong". (Exh. "I").
f. The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality
of the evidence indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The
entry in the Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated
therein as married does not mean that Leoncia is not appellee’s daughter. This
particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself in order to avoid
embarrassment.39
26. In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by
themselves are not competent proof of paternity and the totality of
respondent’s evidence failed to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to
petitioner.
27. Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is
required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and
support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the
family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or
filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.40
28. Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion41 filed by petitioner’s
counsel informing this Court that petitioner had died on May 6, 2010. The
action for support having been filed in the trial court when petitioner was
still alive, it is not barred under Article 175 (2)42 of the Family Code.
29. We have also held that the death of the putative father is not a bar to the
action commenced during his lifetime by one claiming to be his illegitimate
child.43 The rule on substitution of parties provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, thus applies.
a. SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. – Whenever a party to a pending action
dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to
inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to
give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of
counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
b. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may
appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
c. The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear
and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
d. If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceas~d party, or if the
one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order
the opposing party, within a specified time to procure the appointment of an
executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in
procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs .
30. WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
CA Decision are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No.
2124-AF of the RTC of Cabanatuan City, Branch 26 is DISMISSED.
6.) Rodolfo S. Aguilar v. Edna G. Siasat
(G.R. 200169, 28 January 2015)
FACTS:
1. Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar
spouses) died, intestate and without debts, on August 26, 1983 and February
8, 1994, respectively. Included in their estate are two parcels of land (herein
subject properties) covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896
and T-(15462) 1070 of the Registries of Deeds of Bago and Bacolod (the
subject titles).6
2. In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC of Bacolod
City (Bacolod RTC) a civil case for mandatory injunction with damages
against respondent Edna G. Siasat. Docketed as Civil Case No. 96-9591 and
assigned to Branch 49 of the Bacolod RTC, the Complaint 7 alleged that
petitioner is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that
he (petitioner) discovered that the subject titles were missing, and thus he
suspected that someone from the Siasat clan could have stolen the same;
that he executed affidavits of loss of the subject titles and filed the same
with the Registries of Deeds of Bacolod and Bago; that on June 22, 1996, he
filed before the Bacolod RTC a Petition for the issuance of second owner’s
copy of Certificate of Title No. T-25896,which respondent opposed; and
that during the hearing of the said Petition, respondent presented the two
 missing owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles. Petitioner thus prayed
for mandatory injunctive relief, in that respondent be ordered to surrender to
him the owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles in her possession; and
that damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit be awarded to him.
3. In her Answer,8 respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole
surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised
by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness of heart; that
petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses; that since
Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter
inherited the conjugal share of the former; that upon the death of Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar, her brothers and sisters inherited her estate as she had no
issue; and that the subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted to her for
safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt. By way of
counterclaim, respondent prayed for an award of moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees.
4. During trial, petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the Aguilar
spouses as their son. To prove filiation, he presented the following
documents, among others:
a. 1. His school records at the Don J.A. Araneta Elementary School, Purok No. 2,
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company (BMMC), Bacolod City (Exhibit "C" and
submarkings), wherein it is stated that Alfredo Aguilar is petitioner’s parent;
b. 2. His Individual Income Tax Return (Exhibit "F"), which indicated that Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar is his mother;
c. 3. Alfredo Aguilar’s Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1 dated October 10,
1957 (Exhibit "G"), a public instrument subscribed and made under oath by Alfredo
Aguilar during his employment with BMMC, which bears his signature and thumb
marks and indicates that petitioner, who was born on March 5, 1945, is his son and
dependent;
d. 4. Alfredo Aguilar’s Information Sheet of Employment with BMMC dated October
29, 1954 (Exhibit "L"), indicating that petitioner is his son;
e. 5. Petitioner’s Certificate of Marriage to Luz Abendan (Exhibit "M"), where it is
declared that the Aguilar spouses are his parents; and
f. 6. Letter of the BMMC Secretary (Exhibit "O") addressed to a BMMC supervisor
introducing petitioner as Alfredo Aguilar’s son and recommending him for
employment.
g. 7. Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City Civil Registry to
the effect that the record of births during the period 1945 to 1946 were "all
destroyed by nature," hence no true copies of the Certificate of Live Birth of
petitioner could be issued as requested (Exhibit "Q").9
5. Petitioner also offered the testimonies of his wife, Luz Marie Abendan-
Aguilar (Abendan-Aguilar), and Ester Aguilar-Pailano (Aguilar-Pailano),
his aunt and sister of Alfredo Aguilar. Abendan-Aguilar confirmed
petitioner’s identity, and she testified that petitioner is the son of the Aguilar
spouses and that during her marriage to petitioner, she lived with the latter
in the Aguilar spouses’ conjugal home built on one of the subject properties.
On the other hand, 81-year old Aguilar-Pailano testified that she is the sister
of Alfredo Aguilar; that the Aguilar spouses have only one son – herein
petitioner – who was born at BMMC; that after the death of the Aguilar
spouses, she and her siblings did not claim ownership of the subject
properties because they recognized petitioner as the Aguilar spouses’ sole
child and heir; that petitioner was charged with murder, convicted,
imprisoned, and later on paroled; and that after he was discharged on parole,
petitioner continued to live with his mother Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar in
one of the subject properties, and continues to live there with his family.10
6. For her evidence, respondent testified among others that she is a retired
teacher; that she does not know petitioner very well, but only heard his
name from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she is not related by
consanguinity or affinity to petitioner; that she attended to Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar while the latter was under medication in a hospital until her
death; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar’s hospital and funeral expenses were
paid for by Nancy Vingno; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar executed an
affidavit to the effect that she had no issue and that she is the sole heir to her
husband Alfredo Aguilar’s estate; that she did not steal the subject titles, but
that the same were entrusted to her by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that a
prior planned sale of the subject properties did not push through because
when petitioner’s opinion thereto was solicited, he expressed disagreement
as to the agreed price.11
7. Respondent likewise offered the testimony of Aurea Siasat-Nicavera
(Siasat-Nicavera), 74 years old, who stated that the Aguilar spouses were
married on June 22, 1933 in Miag-ao, Iloilo; that she is the sister of
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she does not know petitioner, although she
admitted that she knew a certain "Rodolfo" whose nickname was "Mait";
that petitioner is not the son of the Aguilar spouses; and that Alfredo
Aguilar has a sister named Ester Aguilar-Pailano.12
8. Respondent also offered an Affidavit previously executed by Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar (Exhibit "2")announcing among others that she and Alfredo
have no issue, and that she is the sole heir to Alfredo’s estate.
9. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
10. On August 17, 1999, the Bacolod RTC issued its Decision, decreeing as follows:
a. From the evidence thus adduced before this Court, no solid evidence attesting to the fact that
plaintiff herein is either a biological son or a legally adopted one was ever presented. Neither
was a certificate of live birth of plaintiff ever introduced confirming his biological relationship
as a son to the deceased spouses Alfredo and Candelaria S. Aguilar. As a matter of fact, in the
affidavit of Candelaria S. Aguilar (Exhibit 2) she expressly announced under oath that Alfredo
and she have no issue and that she is the sole heir to the estate of Alfredo is (sic) concrete proof
that plaintiff herein was never a son by consanguinity nor a legally adopted one of the deceased
spouses Alfredo and Candelaria Aguilar.
b. This being the case, Petitioner is not deemed vested with sufficient interest in this action to be
considered qualified or entitled to the issuance of the writ of mandatory injunction and damages
prayed for.
c. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with cost.
11. Ruling of the Court of Appeals: Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA. 14 Docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-CV No.
64229, the appeal essentially argued that petitioner is indeed the Aguilar spouses’ son; that under Article 172
of the Family Code,15 an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned constitutes proof of filiation; that through the documentary
evidence presented, petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate biological son of the Aguilar spouses and
the sole heir to their estate. He argued that he cannot present his Certificate of Live Birth as all the records
covering the period 1945-194616 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed as shown by
Exhibits "Q" to "Q-3"; for this reason, he presented the foregoing documentary evidence to prove his
relationship to the Aguilar spouses. Petitioner made particular reference to, among others, Alfredo Aguilar’s
SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit "G"), arguing that the same was made under oath and thus sufficient under Article
172 of the Family Code to establish that he is a child and heir of the Aguilar spouses. Finally, petitioner
questioned the trial court’s reliance upon Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar’s affidavit (Exhibit "2") attesting that she
and Alfredo have no children and that she is the sole heir to the estate of Alfredo, when such piece of
evidence has been discarded by the trial court in a previous Order dated April 1, 1998, stating thus:
a. Except for defendant’s Exhibit "2", all other Exhibits, Exhibits "1", "3", "4" and "5", together
with their submarkings, are all admitted in evidence. 17
12. On August 30, 2006, the CA issued the assailed Decision affirming the trial court’s August 17, 1999
Decision, pronouncing thus:
a. The exhibits relied upon by plaintiff-appellant to establish his filiation with the deceased
spouses Aguilar deserve scant consideration by this Court. The Elementary School Permanent
Record of plaintiff-appellant cannot be considered as proof of filiation. As enunciated by the
Supreme Court in the case of Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439:
i. "Student record or other writing not signed by alleged father do not constitute
evidence of filiation."
b. As regards the Income Tax Return of plaintiff-appellant filed with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, WE hold that it cannot be considered as evidence of filiation. As stated by the
Supreme Court in the case of Labagala vs. Santiago, 371 SCRA 360:
i. "A baptismal certificate, a private document is not conclusive proof of filiation.
More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that
income tax has been paid and the amount thereof."
c. With respect to the Certificate of Marriage x x x wherein it is shown that the parents of the
former are Alfredo and Candelaria Siasat Aguilar does not prove filiation. The Highest Tribunal
declared that a marriage contract not signed by the alleged father of bride is not competent
evidence of filiation nor is a marriage contract recognition in a public instrument.
d. The rest of the exhibits offered x x x, except the Social Security Form E-1 (Exhibit "G") and the
Information Sheet of Employment of Alfredo Aguilar (Exhibit "L"), allegedly tend to establish
that plaintiff-appellant has been and is presently known as Rodolfo Siasat Aguilar and he has
been bearing the surname of his alleged parents.
e. WE cannot sustain plaintiff-appellant’s argument. Use of a family surname certainly does not
establish pedigree.
f. Insofar as the SSS Form E-1 and Information Sheet of Employment of Alfredo Aguilar
are concerned, WE cannot accept them as sufficient proof to establish and prove the
filiation of plaintiff-appellant to the deceased Aguilar spouses. While the former is a public
instrument and the latter bears the signature of Alfredo Aguilar, they do not constitute
clear and convincing evidence to show filiation based on open and continuous possession
of the status of a legitimate child. Filiation is a serious matter that must be resolved
according to the requirements of the law. All told, plaintiff-appellant’s evidence failed to
hurdle the "high standard of proof" required for the success of an action to establish one’s
legitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding open and continuous
possession or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
g. Having resolved that plaintiff-appellant is not an heir of the deceased spouses Aguilar, thereby
negating his right to demand the delivery of the subject TCTs in his favor, this Court cannot
grant the writ of mandatory injunction being prayed for.
h. xxxx
i. In the present case, plaintiff-appellant failed to show that he has a clear and unmistakable right
that has been violated. Neither had he shown permanent and urgent necessity for the issuance of
the writ.
j. With respect to the damages prayed for, WE sustain the trial court in denying the same. Aside
from the fact that plaintiff-appellant failed to show his clear right over the subject parcels of
land so that he has not sustained any damage by reason of the withholding of the TCTs from
him, there is no clear testimony on the anguish or anxiety he allegedly suffered as a result
thereof. Well entrenched in law and jurisprudence is the principle that the grant of moral
damages is expressly allowed by law in instances where proofs of the mental anguish, serious
anxiety and moral shock were shown.
k. ACCORDINGLY, in line with the foregoing disquisition, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The
impugned Decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
13. Petitioner MR denied. Hence, the present Petition.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error [in] not
taking into consideration petitioner’s Exhibit "G" (SSS E-1 acknowledged
and notarized before a notary public, executed by Alfredo Aguilar,
recognizing the petitioner as his son) as public document that satisfies the
requirement of Article 172 of the [Family] Code in the establishment of the
legitimate filiation of the petitioner with his father, Alfredo Aguilar.
2. The herein [P]etition raises the issue of pure question of law with respect to
the application of Article 172 of the Family Code particularly [paragraph] 3
thereof in conjunction with Section 19 and Section 23, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court relating to public document which is substantial enough to
merit consideration of this Honorable Court as it will enrich jurisprudence
and forestall future litigation.21
RATIO:
1. Petitioner’s Arguments
2. In his Petition and Reply22 seeking to reverse and set aside the assailed CA dispositions and
praying that judgment be rendered ordering respondent to surrender the owner’s duplicates of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070, petitioner argues that Alfredo
Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit "G") satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and
relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code. Petitioner contends
that said SSS Form E-1 is a declaration under oath by his father, Alfredo Aguilar, of his status
as the latter’s son; this recognition should be accorded more weight than the presumption of
legitimacy, since Article 172 itself declares that said evidence establishes legitimate filiation
without need of court action. He adds that in contemplation of law, recognition in a public
instrument such as the SSS Form E-1 is the "highest form of recognition which partake (sic) of
the nature of a complete act of recognition bestowed upon" him as the son of the late Alfredo
Aguilar; that respondent has no personality to impugn his legitimacy and cannot collaterally
attack his legitimacy; that the action to impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed pursuant
to Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code; 23 and that having proved his filiation, mandatory
injunction should issue, and an award of damages is in order.
3. Respondent’s Arguments
4. In her Comment24 and Memorandum,25 respondent simply echoes the pronouncements of the
CA, adding that the Petition is a mere rehash of the CA appeal which has been passed upon
succinctly by the appellate court.
5. Our Ruling
6. The Court grants the Petition.
7. This Court, speaking in De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon,26 has held that –
a. The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1)
the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall
be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The
due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act
of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any
authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in
itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence
merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the
applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s
acknowledgment.
b. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage
of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as
being their father. There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of
access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and
wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.
Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in
proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August
1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally
feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and
unassailable.27
c. Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it must be
concluded that petitioner – who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the marriage
of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar 28 and before their respective
deaths29 – has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar
spouses. As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit
"G") satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar
spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes
an "admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned."
8. Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth
since all the records covering the period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil
Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed, which necessitated the
introduction of other documentary evidence – particularly Alfredo
Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit "G") – to prove filiation. It was
erroneous for the CA to treat said document as mere proof of open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under the second
paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation
under the first paragraph thereof, the same being an express recognition in a
public instrument.
9. To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be proved by an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and such
due recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act
of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. And, relative to said form of acknowledgment, the Court has
further held that:
a. In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the
following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission
of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
b. 1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted
to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the
same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
c. 2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have
been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence. Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child
shall be the "paramount consideration" in resolving questions affecting him. Article
3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the
Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
i. Article 3
ii. 1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration.
d. It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation
of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x x."
Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development."30 
10. This case should not have been so difficult for petitioner if only he obtained
a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth from the National Statistics Office
(NSO), since the Bacolod City Civil Registry copy thereof was destroyed.
He would not have had to go through the trouble of presenting other
documentary evidence; the NSO copy would have sufficed. This fact is
not lost on petitioner; the Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the
Bacolod City Civil Registry (Exhibit "Q") contained just such an advice for
petitioner to proceed to the Office of the Civil Registrar General at the NSO
in Manila to secure a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth, since for every
registered birth in the country, a copy of the Certificate of Live Birth is
submitted to said office.
11. As to petitioner's argument that respondent has no personality to impugn his
legitimacy and cannot collaterally attack his legitimacy, and that the action
to impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed pursuant to Articles 170
and 171 of the Family Code, the Court has held before that -Article
26331 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and
prove that a person is not a man's child by his wife. However, the present
 case is not one impugning petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents are
asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but
that she is not a child of Jose at all.32
12. Finally, if petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar
spouses, then he is as well heir to the latter's estate. Respondent is then left
with no right to inherit from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar's. estate,
since succession pertains, in the first place, to the descending direct line. 33
13. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The CA and RTC Decision are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Edna G. Siasat is hereby
ordered to SURRENDER to the petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar the owner's
duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462)
1070.
7.) Eugenio San Juan Geronimo V. Karen Santos
(G.R. No. 197099, 28 September 2015)
FACTS:
1. At bar is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 and
Resolution2 of the (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88650 promulgated on January
17, 2011 and May 24, 2011, respectively, which affirmed the Decision 3 of
the (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 8. Both courts a quo ruled that
the subject document titled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman is null and
void, and ordered herein petitioner Eugenio San Juan Geronimo (Eugenio),
who was previously joined by his brother Emiliano San Juan Geronimo
(Emiliano) as codefendant, to vacate the one-half portion of the subject
6,542-square meter property and surrender its possession to respondent
Karen Santos. In a Resolution4 dated November 28, 2011, this Court
ordered the deletion of the name of Emiliano from the title of the instant
petition_ as co-petitioner, viz.:
a. x x x The Court resolves:
b. (2) to AMEND the title of this petition to read "Eugenio San Juan Geronimo,
petitioner vs. Karen Santos, respondent," considering the sworn statement of
Eugenio San Juan Geronimo that he does not know whether his brother is still alive
and that his brother did not verify the instant petition; x x x5
2. The following facts were found by the trial court and adopted by the
appellate court in its assailed Decision, viz.:
3. On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of
deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of
document and recovery of possession against the defendants Eugenio and
Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of her father. She alleged that with
the death of her parents, the property consisting of one half of the parcel of
land located at San Jose, Paombong, Bulacan with Tax Declaration No. 99-
02017-00219 and belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law
on intestacy; that lately, she discovered that defendants executed a
document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman declaring themselves
as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad and adjudicating to
themselves the property in question; and that consequently[,] they took
possession and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject
property to their names. She prayed that the document Exhibit C be
annulled and the tax declaration of the land transferred to her, and that the
defendants vacate the property and pay her damages.
4. In an amended answer, the defendants denied the allegation that plaintiff
was the only child and sole heir of their brother. They disclosed that the
deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and took in as their
ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the child of Caridad’s sister. They
claimed that the birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document.
It was allegedly impossible for Rufino and Caridad to have registered the
plaintiff in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur because they had never lived or sojourned
in the place and Caridad, who was an elementary teacher in Bulacan never
filed any maternity leave during the period of her service from August 1963
until October 1984.
5. The plaintiff took the stand and testified that her parents were Rufino and
Caridad Geronimo. The defendants Eugenio and Emiliano were the half-
brothers of her father Rufino, being the children of Rufino’s father
Marciano Geronimo with another woman Carmen San Juan. Rufino co-
owned Lot 1716 with the defendants’ mother Carmen, and upon his death in
1980, when the plaintiff was only 8 years old, his share in the property
devolved on his heirs. In 1998, some 18 years later, Caridad and she
executed an extra-judicial settlement of Rufino’s estate
entitled Pagmamanahan Sa Labas ng Hukuman Na May Pagtalikod
Sa Karapatan, whereby the plaintiff’s mother Caridad waived all her rights
to Rufino’s share and in the land in question to her daughter the plaintiff. Be
that as it may, in 1985, guardianship proceedings appeared to have been
instituted with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos by Caridad in which it
was established that the plaintiff was the minor child of Caridad with her
late husband Rufino. Caridad was thus appointed guardian of the person and
estate of the plaintiff.
6. The plaintiff further declared that she and her mother had been paying the
real estate taxes on the property, but in 2000, the defendants took possession
of the land and had the tax declaration transferred to them. This compelled
her to file the present case.
7. Eugenio Geronimo, the defendant, disputes the allegation that the plaintiff is
the only child and legal heir of his brother Rufino. He disclosed that when
Rufino’s wife could not bear a child, the couple decided to adopt the
plaintiff who was Caridad’s niece from Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur. It was in
1972, 13 years after the marriage, when Karen joined her adoptive parents’
household. Believing that in the absence of a direct heir, his brother
 Emiliano and he should succeed to the estate of their brother, they executed
in 2000 an extra-judicial settlement called Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman.
8. Eugenio was able to obtain a copy of the plaintiff’s alleged birth certificate.
It had irregular features, such as that it was written in pentel pen, the entry
in the box date of birth was erased and the word and figure April 6,
1972 written and the name Emma Daño was superimposed on the entry in
the box intended for the informant’s signature.
9. Two more witnesses were adduced. Atty. Elmer Lopez, a legal consultant of
the DECS in Bulacan brought the plaintiff's service record as an elementary
school teacher at Paombong[,] Bulacan to show that she did not have any
maternity leave during the period of her service from March 11, 1963 to
October 24, 1984, and a certification from the Schools Division
Superintendent that the plaintiff did not file any maternity leave during her
service. He declared that as far as the service record is concerned, it reflects
the entry and exit from the service as well as the leaves that she availed of.
Upon inquiry by the court, he clarified that the leaves were reflected but
the absences were not. Testifying on the plaintiff’s birth certificate, Exhibit
14, Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, confirmed that there was an
alteration in the date of birth and signature of the informant. In view of the
alterations, he considered the document questionable.6
10. On October 27, 2006, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, viz.:
a. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
b. 1. Declaring the document Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman dated March 9, 2000
executed in favor of Eugenio San Juan-Geronimo and Emilio San Juan-Geronimo
as null and void;
c. 2. Annulling Tax Declaration No. 99-02017-01453 of the subject property in the
names of Eugenio San Juan-Geronimo and Emiliano San Juan-Geronimo;
d. 3. Ordering defendants Eugenio San Juan-Geronimo and Emiliano San Juan-
Geronimo to vacate the ½ portion of the subject property and to surrender the
possession to the plaintiff;
11. The trial court ruled that respondent is the legal heir – being the legitimate child – of the
deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad Geronimo (spouses Rufino and Caridad). It found that
respondent’s filiation was duly established by the certificate of live birth which was presented
in evidence. The RTC dismissed the claim of petitioner that the birth certificate appeared to
have been tampered, specifically on the entries pertaining to the date of birth of respondent and
the name of the informant. The trial court held that petitioner failed to adduce evidence to
explain how the erasures were done. Petitioner also failed to prove that the alterations were due
to the fault of respondent or another person who was responsible for the act. In the absence of
such contrary evidence, the RTC relied on the prima faciepresumption of the veracity and
regularity of the birth certificate as a public document.
12. The trial court further stated that even granting arguendo  that the birth certificate is
questionable, the filiation of respondent has already been sufficiently proven by evidence of
her open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under Article 172 of
the Family Code of the Philippines. The RTC considered the following overt acts of the
deceased spouses as acts of recognition that respondent is their legitimate child: they sent her
to school and paid for her tuition fees; Caridad made respondent a beneficiary of her burial
benefits from the Government Service Insurance System; and, Caridad filed a petition for
guardianship of respondent after the death of her husband Rufino. Lastly, the trial court held
that to be allowed to impugn the filiation and status of respondent, petitioner should have
brought an action for the purpose under Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code. Since
petitioner failed to file such action, the trial court ruled that respondent alone is entitled to the
ownership and possession of the subject land owned by Rufino. The extrajudicial settlement
executed by petitioner and his brother was therefore declared not valid and binding as
respondent is Rufino’s only compulsory heir.
13. On appeal, petitioner raised the issue on the alterations in the birth certificate of respondent and
the offered evidence of a mere certification from the Office of the Civil Registry instead of the
birth certificate itself.
14. According to petitioner, respondent’s open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child is only secondary evidence to the birth certificate itself. Respondent questioned
if it was legally permissible for petitioner to question her filiation as a legitimate child of the
spouses Rufino and Caridad in the same action for annulment of document and recovery of
possession that she herself filed against petitioner and his then co-defendant.
15. Respondent argued that the conditions enumerated under Articles 170 and 171 of the Family
Code, giving the putative father and his heirs the right to bring an action to impugn the
legitimacy of the child, are not present in the instant case. She further asserted that the Family
Code contemplates a direct action, thus her civil status may not be assailed indirectly or
collaterally in this suit.
16. In the assailed Decision dated January 17, 2011, the appellate court held that under Article 170,
the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child must be reckoned from either of these two
dates: the date the child was born to the mother during the marriage, or the date when the birth
of such child was recorded in the civil registry. The CA found no evidence or admission that
Caridad indeed gave birth to respondent on a specific date. It further resolved that the birth
certificate presented in this case, Exhibit 14, does not qualify as the valid registration of birth in
the civil register as envisioned by the law, viz.:
a. x x x The reason is that under the statute establishing the civil register, Act No.
3753, the declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or in
default thereof, that declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be
sufficient for the registration of birth in the civil register. The document in question
was signed by one Emma Daño who was not identified as either the parent of the
plaintiff or the physician or midwife who attended to her birth. Exhibit 14, legally,
cannot be the birth certificate envisioned by the law; otherwise, with an informant
as shadowy as Emma Daño, the floodgates to spurious filiations will be opened.
Neither may the order of the court Exhibit E be treated as the final
judgment mentioned in Article 172 as another proof of filiation.
17. The final judgment mentioned refers to a decision of a competent court finding the child
legitimate. Exhibit G is merely an order granting letters of guardianship to the parent Caridad
based on her representations that she is the mother of the plaintiff.8
18. Noting the absence of such record of birth, final judgment or admission in a public or private
document that respondent is the legitimate child of the spouses Rufino and Caridad, the
appellate court – similar to the trial court – relied on Article 172 of the Family Code which
allows the introduction and admission of secondary evidence to prove one’s legitimate
filiation via open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. The CA agreed
with the trial court that respondent has proven her legitimate filiation, viz.:
a. We agree with the lower court that the plaintiff has proven her filiation by open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. The evidence consists of
the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her putative parents to bear their
family name Geronimo; (2) they supported her and sent her to school paying for her
tuition fees and other school expenses; (3) she was the beneficiary of the burial
benefits of Caridad before the GSIS; (4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied
 for and was appointed legal guardian of the person and property of the plaintiff
from the estate left by Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the plaintiff executed an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino on the basis of the fact that they are
both the legal heirs of the deceased.
b. It is clear that the status enjoyed by the plaintiff as the legitimate child of Rufino
and Caridad has been open and continuous. x x x The conclusion follows that the
plaintiff is entitled to the property left by Rufino to the exclusion of his brothers, the
defendants, which consists of a one-half share in Lot 1716.9
19. Petitioners moved for reconsideration10 but the motion was denied in the assailed Resolution
dated May 24, 2011. Hence, this petition raising the following assignment of errors:
ISSUES:
1. W/N
RATIO:
1. On the first issue, petitioner argues that secondary evidence to prove one’s
filiation is admissible only if there is no primary evidence, i.e, a record of
birth or an authentic admission in writing. 12 Petitioner asserts that herein
respondent’s birth certificate, Exhibit 14, constitutes the primary evidence
enumerated under Article 172 of the Family Code and the ruling of both
courts a quo that the document is not the one "envisioned by law" should
have barred the introduction of secondary evidence. Petitioner expounds
this proposition, viz.:
a. The findings of the courts a quo  that the birth certificate [Exhibit 14] is not [the]
one envisioned by law finds support in numerous cases decided by the Honorable
Supreme Court. Thus, a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no
showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates,
and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child upon the information of a third person. Where the birth certificate
and the baptismal certificate are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of
filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the
same. x x x
b. x x x The birth certificate Exhibit 14 contains erasures. The date of birth originally
written in ball pen was erased and the date April 6, 1972 was superimposed using a
pentel pen; the entry on the informant also originally written in ball pen was erased
and the name E. Dano was superimposed using also a pentel pen; there is no
signature as to who received it from the office of the registry. Worst, respondent
Karen confirms the existence of her birth certificate when she introduced in
evidence [Exhibit A] a mere Certification from the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, which highlighted more suspicions of its
existence, thus leading to conclusion and presumption that if such evidence is
presented, it would be adverse to her claim. True to the suspicion, when Exhibit 14
was introduced by the petitioner and testified on by no less than the NSO
representative, Mr. Arturo Reyes, and confirmed that there were alterations which
renders the birth certificate questionable.
c. Argued differently, with the declaration that the birth certificate is a nullity or
falsity, the courts a quo  should have stopped there, ruled that respondent Karen is
not the child of Rufino, and therefore not entitled to inherit from the estate.13
2. On the second issue, petitioner alleges that the CA gravely erred and abused
its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he does not
have personality to impugn respondent’s legitimate filiation.14
3. While petitioner admits that the CA "did not directly rule on this particular
issue,"15 he nonetheless raises the said issue as an error since the appellate
court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner argues that in so
affirming, the CA also adopted the ruling of the trial court that the filiation
of respondent is strictly personal to respondent’s alleged father and his heirs
under Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, 16 thereby denying petitioner
the "right to impugn or question the filiation and status of the
plaintiff."17 Petitioner argues, viz.:
a. x x x [T]he lower court’s reliance on Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code is
totally misplaced, with due respect. It should be read in conjunction with the other
articles in the same chapter on paternity and filiation of the Family Code. A careful
reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt
exists that a child is indeed a man’s child, and the father [or, in proper cases, his
heirs] denies the child’s filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is
alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple. Petitioners are asserting not
merely that respondent Karen is not a legitimate child of, but that she is not a child
of Rufino Geronimo at all. x x x18
4. We grant the petition.
5. Despite its finding that the birth certificate which respondent offered in
evidence is questionable, the trial court ruled that respondent is a legitimate
child and the sole heir of deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad. The RTC
based this conclusion on secondary evidence that is similar to proof
admissible under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code to
prove the filiation of legitimate children, viz.:
6. Petitioner argues that such secondary evidence may be admitted only in a
direct action under Article 172 because the said provision of law is meant to
be instituted as a separate action, and proof of filiation cannot be raised as a
collateral issue as in the instant case which is an action for annulment of
document and recovery of possession.
7. Petitioner is correct that proof of legitimacy under Article 172, or
illegitimacy under Article 175, should only be raised in a direct and separate
action instituted to prove the filiation of a child. The rationale behind this
procedural prescription is stated in the case of Tison v. Court of
Appeals,19 viz.:
a. x x x [W]ell settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked
collaterally.
b. The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:
c. "The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code x x x actually fixes a civil
status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked
collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action
brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
d. The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an
 independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in
the Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: ‘The contest of the legitimacy of a
child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the
competent court; any contest made in any other way is void.’ This principle applies
under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view,
because they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy."
e. This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods
fixed in the present articles.
f. Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child can no longer be brought. The status conferred by the
presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be
questioned.1âwphi1 The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a
child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also
aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that
the evidence material to the matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring
during the period of the conception of the child, may still be easily available.
g. xxxx
h. Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the
one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife
produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in
view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases
that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none –
even his heirs – can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his
memory."20
8. What petitioner failed to recognize, however, is that this procedural rule is
applicable only to actions where the legitimacy – or illegitimacy – of a child
is at issue. This situation does not obtain in the case at bar.
9. In the instant case, the filiation of a child – herein respondent – is not at
issue. Petitioner does not claim that respondent is not the legitimate child of
his deceased brother Rufino and his wife Caridad. What petitioner alleges
is that respondent is not the child of the deceased spouses Rufino and
Caridad at all. He proffers this allegation in his Amended Answer before
the trial court by way of defense that respondent is not an heir to his brother
Rufino.
10. When petitioner alleged that respondent is not a child of the deceased
spouses Rufino and Caridad in the proceedings below, jurisprudence shows
that the trial court was correct in admitting and ruling on the secondary
evidence of respondent – even if such proof is similar to the evidence
admissible under the second paragraph of Article 172 and despite the instant
case not being a direct action to prove one’s filiation. In the following cases,
the courts a quo and this Court did not bar the introduction of secondary
evidence in actions which involve allegations that the opposing party is not
the child of a particular couple – even if such evidence is similar to the kind
of proof admissible under the second paragraph of Article 172.
11. In the 1994 case of Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals,21 therein deceased spouses Vicente Benitez (Vicente)
and Isabel Chipongian (Isabel) owned various properties while they were still living. Isabel departed in 1982,
while Vicente died intestate in 1989. In 1990, Vicente’s sister (Victoria Benitez-Lirio) and nephew (Feodor
Benitez Aguilar) instituted an action before the trial court for the issuance of letters of administration of his
estate in favor of Feodor. In the said proceedings, they alleged that Vicente was "survived by no other heirs
or relatives be they ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted x x
x."22 They further argued that one "Marissa Benitez[-]Badua who was raised and cared for by them since
childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir [of
Vicente]."23 Marissa opposed the petition and proffered evidence to prove that she is an heir of Vicente.
Marissa submitted the following evidence, viz.:
a. 1. her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3);
b. 2. Baptismal Certificate (Exh. 4);
c. 3. Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente
naming her as his daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and
d. 4. School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6).
e. She also testified that the said spouses reared and continuously treated her as their legitimate
daughter.24
12. Feodor and his mother Victoria offered mostly testimonial evidence to show that the spouses Vicente and
Isabel failed to beget a child during their marriage. They testified that the late Isabel, when she was 36 years
old, was even referred to an obstetrician-gynecologist for treatment. Victoria, who was 77 years old at the
time of her testimony, also categorically stated that Marissa was not the biological child of the said spouses
who were unable to physically procreate.25
13. The trial court, relying on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code, declared Marissa as the legitimate
daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente and Isabel. The appellate court reversed the RTC’s ruling
holding that the trial court erred in applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code. On appeal to this
Court, we affirmed the reversal made by the appellate court, viz.:
a. A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like
in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of
a certain couple.
b. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child
of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said
child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his
wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the
child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child;
(3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization
or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or
undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive
period within which the husband or any of hisheirs should file the action impugning the
legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused
to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs
of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their
clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in
Cabatbat- Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned
decision is apropos, viz:
i. "Petitioners’ recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the
Family Code] is not welltaken.
ii. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to
this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an
action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their
childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat
Lim is an illegitimatechild of the deceased, but that she is not the
decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged
natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a
legal heir of the deceased."26
14. Similarly, the 2001 case of Labagala v. Santiago 27 originated from a complaint for recovery of title,
ownership and possession before the trial court. Respondents therein contended that petitioner is not the
daughter of the decedent Jose and sought to recover from her the 1/3 portion of the subject property
pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioner’s sole possession upon Jose’s death. Respondents sought to
prove that petitioner is not the daughter of the decedent as evidenced by her birth certificate which did not
itself indicate the name of Jose as her father. Citing the case of  Sayson v. Court of Appeals and Article 263
of the Civil Code (now Article 170 of the Family Code), 28petitioner argued that respondents cannot impugn
her filiation collaterally since the case was not an action impugning a child’s legitimacy but one for recovery
 of title, ownership and possession of property. We ruled in this case that petitioner’s reliance on Article 263
of the Civil Code is misplaced and respondents may impugn the petitioner’s filiation in an action for
recovery of title and possession. Thus, we affirmed the ruling of the appellate court that the birth certificate
of petitioner Labagala proved that she "was born of different parents, not Jose and his wife." 29 Citing the
aforecited cases of Benitez-Badua and Lim v. Intermediate Appellate Court,30 we stated, viz.:
a. This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on paternity
and filiation in the Civil Code. A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it
contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man’s child by his wife, and
the husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies the child’s filiation. It does not refer to
situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple.31
b. Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a
person is not a man’s child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning
petitioner’s legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a
legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all.
15. Be that as it may, even if both courts a quo were correct in admitting
secondary evidence similar to the proof admissible under Article 172 of the
Family Code in this action for annulment of document and recovery of
possession, we are constrained to rule after a meticulous examination of the
evidence on record that all proof points to the conclusion that herein
respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad.
16. While we ascribe to the general principle that this Court is not a trier of
facts,33 this rule admits of the following exceptions where findings of fact
may be passed upon and reviewed by this Court, viz.: It is clear in the case
at bar that the ruling of both courts a quo declaring respondent as a
legitimate child and sole heir of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad is
one based on a misapprehension of facts.
17. A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of respondent would
show that it was tampered specifically on the entries pertaining to the
date of birth of respondent and the name of the informant. Using pentel
ink, the date of birth of respondent – April 6, 1972 – and the name of the
informant – Emma Daño – were both superimposed on the document.
Despite these glaring erasures, the trial court still relied on the prima
facie presumption of the veracity and regularity of the birth certificate for
failure of petitioner to explain how the erasures were done and if the
alterations were due to the fault of respondent. It thus ruled that
respondent’s filiation was duly established by the birth certificate. The
appellate court did not agree with this finding and instead ruled that the
birth certificate presented does not qualify as the valid registration of birth
in the civil register as envisioned by the law. We reiterate the relevant
pronouncement of the CA, viz.:
a. x x x The document in question was signed by one Emma Daño who was not
identified as either the parent of the plaintiff or the physician or midwife who
attended to her birth. Exhibit 14, legally, cannot be the birth certificate envisioned
by the law; otherwise, with an informant as shadowy as Emma Daño, the floodgates
to spurious filiations will be opened. Neither may the order of the court Exhibit E be
treated as the final judgment  mentioned in Article 172 as another proof of filiation.
The final judgment mentioned refers to a decision of a competent court finding the
child legitimate. Exhibit G is merely an order granting letters of guardianship to the
parent Caridad based on her representations that she is the mother of the plaintiff.35
18. Nonetheless, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that respondent
has proven her filiation by showing that she has enjoyed that open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child of the deceased
spouses Rufino and Caridad, viz.:
a. x x x The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her
putative parents to bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they supported her and
sent her to school paying for her tuition fees and other school expenses; (3) she was
the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad before the GSIS; (4) after the death
of Rufino, Caridad applied for and was appointed legal guardian of the person and
property of the plaintiff from the estate left by Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the
plaintiff executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino on the basis of
the fact that they are both the legal heirs of the deceased.36
19. We do not agree with the conclusion of both courts a quo. The appellate
court itself ruled that the irregularities consisting of the superimposed
entries on the date of birth and the name of the informant made the
document questionable. The corroborating testimony of Arturo Reyes, a
representative of the NSO, further confirmed that the entries on the date of
birth and the signature of the informant are alterations on the birth
certificate which rendered the document questionable. To be sure, even the
respondent herself did not offer any evidence to explain such irregularities
on her own birth certificate. These irregularities and the totality of the
following circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are
sufficient to overthrow the presumption of regularity attached to
respondent’s birth certificate, viz.:
a. 1. The identity of one Emma Daño, whose name was superimposed as the informant
regarding the birth of respondent, remains unknown.
b. 2. The testimony of Atty. Elmer De Dios Lopez, a legal consultant of the
Department of Education in Bulacan, proved that the deceased Caridad did not have
any maternity leave during the period of her service from March 11, 1963 to
October 24, 1984 as shown by her Service Record as an elementary school teacher
at Paombong, Bulacan. This was corroborated by a certification from Dr. Teofila R.
Villanueva, Schools Division Superintendent, that she did not file any maternity
leave during her service. No testimonial or documentary evidence was also offered
to prove that the deceased Caridad ever had a pregnancy.
c. 3. Based on the birth certificate, respondent was born in 1972 or 13 years into the
marriage of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad. When respondent was born,
Caridad was already 40 years old. There are no hospital records of Caridad’s
delivery, and while it may have been possible for her to have given birth at her own
home, this could have been proven by medical or non-medical records or testimony
if they do, in fact, exist.
d. 4. It is worthy to note that respondent was the sole witness for herself in the instant
case.
20. Finally, we also find that the concurrence of the secondary evidence relied
upon by both courts a quo does not sufficiently establish the one crucial fact
in this case: that respondent is indeed a child of the deceased spouses. Both
the RTC and the CA ruled that respondent is a legitimate child of her
putative parents because she was allowed to bear their family name
"Geronimo", they supported her and her education, she was the beneficiary
 of the burial benefits of Caridad in her GSIS policy, Caridad applied for and
was appointed as her legal guardian in relation to the estate left by Rufino,
and she and Caridad executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
Rufino as his legal heirs.
21. In the case of Rivera v. Heirs of Romualdo Villanueva 37 which incisively
discussed its parallelisms and contrasts with the case of Benitez- Badua v.
Court of Appeals,38 we ruled that the presence of a similar set of
circumstances – which were relied upon as secondary proof by both
courts a quo in the case at bar – does not establish that one is a child of the
putative parents. Our discussion in the Rivera case is instructive, viz.:
a. In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, Marissa Benitez-Badua, in attempting to
prove that she was the sole heir of the late Vicente Benitez, submitted a certificate
of live birth, a baptismal certificate, income tax returns and an information sheet for
membership in the Government Service Insurance System of the decedent naming
her as his daughter, and her school records. She also testified that she had been
reared and continuously treated as Vicente’s daughter.
b. By testimonial evidence alone, to the effect that Benitez-Badua’s alleged parents
had been unable to beget children, the siblings of Benitez- Badua’s supposed father
were able to rebut all of the documentary evidence indicating her filiation. One fact
that was counted against Benitez-Badua was that her supposed mother Isabel
Chipongian, unable to bear any children even after ten years of marriage, all of a
sudden conceived and gave birth to her at the age of 36.
c. Of great significance to this controversy was the following pronouncement:
i. But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth
certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid
adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted
child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to
simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth
certificate, which is a public document.(emphasis ours)
d. Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie  evidence
of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the
statements made there by the interested parties. Following the logic of Benitez,
respondent Angelina and her codefendants in SD-857 should have adduced
evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her birth certificate. The
records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.
e. There are several parallels between this case and Benitez- Badua that are simply too
compelling to ignore. First, both Benitez-Badua and respondent Angelina submitted
birth certificates as evidence of filiation. Second, both claimed to be children of
parents relatively advanced in age. Third, both claimed to have been born after their
alleged parents had lived together childless for several years.
f. There are, however, also crucial differences between Benitez Badua  and this case
which ineluctably support the conclusion that respondent Angelina was not
Gonzales' daughter, whether illegitimate or adopted. Gonzales, unlike Benitez-
Badua's alleged mother Chipongian, was not only 36 years old but 44 years old, and
on the verge of menopause at the time of the alleged birth. Unlike Chipongian who
had been married to Vicente Benitez for only 10 years, Gonzales had been living
childless with Villanueva for 20 years. Under the circumstances, we hold that it was
not sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' biological
daughter, nor even her adopted daughter. Thus, she cannot inherit from Gonzales.
Since she could not have validly participated in Gonzales' estate, the extrajudicial
partition which she executed with Villanueva on August 8, 1980 was invalid. 39
22. In view of these premises, we are constrained to disagree with both courts a
quo and rule that the confluence of the circumstances and the proof
presented in this case do not lead to the conclusion that respondent is a child
of the deceased spouses.
23. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88650 dated
January 17, 2011 and May 24, 2011, respectively,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint in Civil Case No. 268-
M-2001 for Annulment of Document and Recovery of Possession is hereby
ordered DISMISSED.
8.) Jesse U. Lucas v. Jesus S. Lucas
(G.R. No. 190710, 6 June 2011)
FACTS:
1. On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish
Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA
Testing)2 before the (RTC), Branch 72, Valenzuela City. Petitioner narrated
that, sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie), migrated to Manila
from Davao and stayed with a certain "Ate Belen (Belen)" who worked in a
prominent nightspot in Manila. Elsie would oftentimes accompany Belen to
work. On one occasion, Elsie got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S.
Lucas, at Belen’s workplace, and an intimate relationship developed
between the two. Elsie eventually got pregnant and, on March 11, 1969, she
gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioner’s father was
not stated in petitioner’s certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on
told petitioner that his father is respondent. On August 1, 1969, petitioner
was baptized at San Isidro Parish, Taft Avenue, Pasay City. Respondent
allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and petitioner for a period of
about two years. When the relationship of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie
refused to accept respondent’s offer of support and decided to raise
petitioner on her own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several
attempts to introduce petitioner to respondent, but all attempts were in vain.
2. Attached to the petition were the following: (a) petitioner’s certificate of
live birth; (b) petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college
diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio
City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from the
same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the
Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from
different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
3. Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless,
respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. His counsel
 therefore went to the trial court on August 29, 2007 and obtained a copy of
the petition.
4. Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, on September 3, 2007,
the RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued the Order 3 setting the case for
hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to the petition to file his opposition. The court also
directed that the Order be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in any newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, and that the Solicitor General be furnished with copies of the Order and the
petition in order that he may appear and represent the State in the case.
5. On September 4, 2007, unaware of the issuance of the September 3, 2007
Order, respondent filed a Special Appearance and Comment. He manifested
inter alia that: (1) he did not receive the summons and a copy of the petition;
(2) the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be
served on him as respondent; (3) should the court agree that summons was
required, he was waiving service of summons and making a voluntary
appearance; and (4) notice by publication of the petition and the hearing
was improper because of the confidentiality of the subject matter.4
6. On September 14, 2007, respondent also filed a Manifestation and
Comment on Petitioner’s Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case.
Respondent reiterated that the petition for recognition is adversarial in
nature; hence, he should be served with summons.
7. After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration.5 Respondent averred that the petition was not in due
form and substance because petitioner could not have personally known the
matters that were alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be had
on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioner’s
father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of
DNA evidence.
8. On July 30, 2008, the RTC, acting on respondent’s motion for reconsideration, issued an
Order6 dismissing the case. The court remarked that, based on the case of Herrera v.
Alba,7 there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which the
parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and the child. The court opined that petitioner
must first establish these four procedural aspects before he can present evidence of paternity
and filiation, which may include incriminating acts or scientific evidence like blood group test
and DNA test results. The court observed that the petition did not show that these procedural
aspects were present. Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case considering that (a) his
mother did not personally declare that she had sexual relations with respondent, and
petitioner’s statement as to what his mother told him about his father was clearly hearsay; (b)
the certificate of live birth was not signed by respondent; and (c) although petitioner used the
surname of respondent, there was no allegation that he was treated as the child of respondent
by the latter or his family. The court opined that, having failed to establish a prima facie case,
respondent had no obligation to present any affirmative defenses. The dispositive portion of the
said Order therefore reads:
a. WHEREFORE, for failure of the petitioner to establish compliance with the four
procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action in his petition, his motion for the
submission of parties to DNA testing to establish paternity and filiation is hereby
denied. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
9. Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration to the Order dated July 30, 2008,
which the RTC resolved in his favor. Thus, on October 20, 2008, it issued the Order 9 setting
aside the court’s previous order, thus:
a. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated July 30, 2008 is hereby
reconsidered and set aside.
b. Let the Petition (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) be set
for hearing on January 22, 2009 at 8:30 in the morning.
10. This time, the RTC held that the ruling on the grounds relied upon by petitioner for filing the
petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. The court
stressed that the petition was sufficient in form and substance. It was verified, it included a
certification against forum shopping, and it contained a plain, concise, and direct statement of
the ultimate facts on which petitioner relies on for his claim, in accordance with Section 1,
Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. The court remarked that the allegation that the statements in the
petition were not of petitioner’s personal knowledge is a matter of evidence. The court also
dismissed respondent’s arguments that there is no basis for the taking of DNA test, and that
jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence. It noted that the new Rule
on DNA Evidence11 allows the conduct of DNA testing, whether at the court’s instance or upon
application of any person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation.
11. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order dated October 20, 2008 and for
Dismissal of Petition,12reiterating that (a) the petition was not in due form and substance as no
defendant was named in the title, and all the basic allegations were hearsay; and (b) there was
no prima facie case, which made the petition susceptible to dismissal.
12. The RTC denied the motion in the Order dated January 19, 2009, and rescheduled the
hearing.13
13. Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, questioning the Orders dated
October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009.
14. On September 25, 2009, the CA decided the petition for certiorari in favor of respondent, thus:
a. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED for being
meritorious. The assailed Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009 both
issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172 of Valenzuela City in SP.
Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
case docketed as SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 is DISMISSED.14
15. The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent, as no
summons had been served on him. Respondent’s special appearance could not be considered as
voluntary appearance because it was filed only for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction
of the court over respondent. Although respondent likewise questioned the court’s jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the petition, the same is not equivalent to a waiver of his right to
object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.
16. The CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to establish illegitimate filiation, specifically
seeking a DNA testing order to abbreviate the proceedings. It noted that petitioner failed to
show that the four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met.
The CA further held that a DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to
establish a prima facie case, thus:
a. While the tenor [of Section 4, Rule on DNA Evidence] appears to be absolute, the
rule could not really have been intended to trample on the substantive rights of the
parties. It could have not meant to be an instrument to promote disorder,
harassment, or extortion. It could have not been intended to legalize unwarranted
expedition to fish for evidence. Such will be the situation in this particular case if a
court may at any time order the taking of a DNA test. If the DNA test in
compulsory recognition cases is immediately available to the petitioner/complainant
without requiring first the presentation of corroborative proof, then a dire and
absurd rule would result. Such will encourage and promote harassment and
extortion.
 b. xxxx
c. At the risk of being repetitious, the Court would like to stress that it sees the danger
of allowing an absolute DNA testing to a compulsory recognition test even if the
plaintiff/petitioner failed to establish prima facie proof. x x x If at anytime, motu
proprio and without pre-conditions, the court can indeed order the taking of DNA
test in compulsory recognition cases, then the prominent and well-to-do members of
our society will be easy prey for opportunists and extortionists. For no cause at all,
or even for [sic] casual sexual indiscretions in their younger years could be used as
a means to harass them. Unscrupulous women, unsure of the paternity of their
children may just be taking the chances-just in case-by pointing to a sexual partner
in a long past one-time encounter. Indeed an absolute and unconditional taking of
DNA test for compulsory recognition case opens wide the opportunities for
extortionist to prey on victims who have no stomach for scandal.15
17. Petitioner MR denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
2. W/N Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court can issue a DNA
testing order?
RATIO:
1. Petitioner contends that respondent never raised as issue in his petition for certiorari the court’s
lack of jurisdiction over his person. Hence, the CA had no legal basis to discuss the same,
because issues not raised are deemed waived or abandoned. At any rate, respondent had
already voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court by his filing of several
motions asking for affirmative relief, such as the (a) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated September 3, 2007; (b) Ex Parte Motion to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order dated November 6, 2007; and (c) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated October
20, 2008 and for Dismissal of Petition. Petitioner points out that respondent even expressly
admitted that he has waived his right to summons in his Manifestation and Comment on
Petitioner’s Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, the issue is already moot
and academic.
2. Petitioner argues that the case was adversarial in nature. Although the caption of the petition
does not state respondent’s name, the body of the petition clearly indicates his name and his
known address. He maintains that the body of the petition is controlling and not the caption.
3. Finally, petitioner asserts that the motion for DNA testing should not be a reason for the
dismissal of the petition since it is not a legal ground for the dismissal of cases. If the CA
entertained any doubt as to the propriety of DNA testing, it should have simply denied the
motion.18 Petitioner points out that Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence does not require
that there must be a prior proof of filiation before DNA testing can be ordered. He adds that the
CA erroneously relied on the four significant procedural aspects of a paternity case, as
enunciated in Herrera v. Alba.19Petitioner avers that these procedural aspects are not applicable
at this point of the proceedings because they are matters of evidence that should be taken up
during the trial.20
4. In his Comment, respondent supports the CA’s ruling on most issues raised in the petition for
certiorari and merely reiterates his previous arguments. However, on the issue of lack of
jurisdiction, respondent counters that, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, he raised the issue
before the CA in relation to his claim that the petition was not in due form and substance.
Respondent denies that he waived his right to the service of summons. He insists that the
alleged waiver and voluntary appearance was conditional upon a finding by the court that
summons is indeed required. He avers that the assertion of affirmative defenses, aside from
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, cannot be considered as waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over such person.
5. The petition is meritorious.
6. The grounds for dismissal relied upon by respondent were (a) the court’s
lack of jurisdiction over his person due to the absence of summons, and (b)
defect in the form and substance of the petition to establish illegitimate
filiation, which is equivalent to failure to state a cause of action.
7. We need not belabor the issues on whether lack of jurisdiction was raised
before the CA, whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent, or whether respondent waived his right to the service of
summons. We find that the primordial issue here is actually whether it was
necessary, in the first place, to serve summons on respondent for the court
to acquire jurisdiction over the case. In other words, was the service of
summons jurisdictional? The answer to this question depends on the nature
of petitioner’s action, that is, whether it is an action in personam, in
rem, or quasi in rem.
8. An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal
liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the
person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its
object is to subject that person's interest in a property to a corresponding
lien or obligation. A petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res,
which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption,
annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an
action in rem.22
9. The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By
the simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the
RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is
notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort to the
right sought to be established.24 Through publication, all interested parties
are deemed notified of the petition.
10. If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for
the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying
the due process requirements.25 This is but proper in order to afford the
person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so
chooses.26 Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the court of its
jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case, the lack of summons
may be excused where it is determined that the adverse party had, in fact,
the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this case. We find that the due
process requirement with respect to respondent has been satisfied,
considering that he has participated in the proceedings in this case and he
has the opportunity to file his opposition to the petition to establish filiation.
11. To address respondent’s contention that the petition should have been
 adversarial in form, we further hold that the herein petition to establish
filiation was sufficient in form. It was indeed adversarial in nature despite
its caption which lacked the name of a defendant, the failure to implead
respondent as defendant, and the non-service of summons upon respondent.
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest
it.27 In this petition—classified as an action in rem—the notice requirement
for an adversarial proceeding was likewise satisfied by the publication of
the petition and the giving of notice to the Solicitor General, as directed by
the trial court.
12. The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance. It satisfies
Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which requires the complaint to
contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts upon
which the plaintiff bases his claim. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken
out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. 28 A
complaint states a cause of action when it contains the following elements:
(1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant,
and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.29
13. The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied upon by petitioner to
establish his filiation to respondent. Respondent, however, contends that the
allegations in the petition were hearsay as they were not of petitioner’s
personal knowledge. Such matter is clearly a matter of evidence that cannot
be determined at this point but only during the trial when petitioner presents
his evidence.
14. In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the
question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the
allegations made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action and not
whether those allegations of fact are true, for said motion must
hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.30
15. The inquiry is confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no
other.31 The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is
whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid
judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.32
16. If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form and substance but
their veracity and correctness are assailed, it is incumbent upon the court to
deny the motion to dismiss and require the defendant to answer and go to
trial to prove his defense. The veracity of the assertions of the parties can be
ascertained at the trial of the case on the merits.33
17. The statement in Herrera v. Alba34 that there are four significant procedural
aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been
widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted
by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties
have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence
that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only
the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that
petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case—the first procedural aspect
in a paternity case—is therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a
party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
18. Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a
prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence
has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to
discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted
considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact,
the latter has just set the said case for hearing.
19. At any rate, the CA’s view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA
testing without corroborative proof is well taken and deserves the
Court’s attention. In light of this observation, we find that there is a
need to supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in
resolving motions for DNA testing order, particularly in paternity and
other filiation cases. We, thus, address the question of whether a prima
facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order.
20. The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for
the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides
the "prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and
validity (i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports,
etc.), the possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission
of DNA test results as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA
evidence." It seeks "to ensure that the evidence gathered, using various
methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, [and] shall
not be misused and/or abused and, more importantly, shall continue to
ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice
the public."35
21. Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides
for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the
DNA testing. Section 4 states:
a. SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The appropriate court may, at any
time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due
hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:
b. (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
c. (b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA
testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the
results may require confirmation for good reasons;
d. (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
e. (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is
relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
f. (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as
 potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
g. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at
the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or
proceeding is commenced.
22. This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a
matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
23. In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must
be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of
paternity or "good cause" for the holding of the test. 36 In these states, a
court order for blood testing is considered a "search," which, under their
Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause
in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or
reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a
finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently
explained —
a. Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing
of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must
be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various
jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but
those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must
be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in
paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court
may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that
there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in
which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo
a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants
issuance of a court order for blood testing.37
24. The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to
protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the
hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima
facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
25. Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA
testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for
example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing.
If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the
DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its
discretion, disallow a DNA testing.
26. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The CA
Decision are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 20,
2008 and January 19, 2009 of the RTC of Valenzuela City are AFFIRMED.
9.) BBB (husband) v. AAA (wife)
(G.R. No. 193225, 9 February 2015)
FACTS:
1. The CA aptly summarized as follows the facts of the case until the RTC’s
issuance of the PPO against BBB:
2. Both [BBB] and [AAA] allege that they first met in 1991 but started to date
seriously only in 1996. [AAA] was then a medical student and was raising
her first child borne from a previous relationship, a boy named [CCC], with
the help of her parents.
3. During the relationship with [BBB], [AAA] bore two more children namely,
[DDD] (born on December 11, 1997) and [EEE] (born on October 19,
2000).
4. To legalize their relationship, [BBB] and [AAA] married in civil rights on
October 10, 2002 and thereafter, the birth certificates of the children,
including [CCC’s], was amended to change their civil status to legitimated
by virtue of the said marriage.
5. The relationship, both admit, was far from ideal and has had its share of
happy moments and heated arguments. The two however have contradicting
statements as to the cause of their present situation.
6. [BBB] alleges that [AAA’s] irrational jealousy has caused their frequent
arguments. According to [BBB], [AAA] has been suspicious of [BBB] and
his relationship with his female co-workers, which [BBB] alleges, contrary
to [AAA’s] suspicion, are purely professional. According to [BBB], because
of their repeated fights, he was forced to leave the family home to prevent
the brewing animosity between him and his wife. Soon after [BBB] left,
[AAA] herself decided to leave the family home and brought the children
with her, which made it difficult for [BBB] to see their kids regularly. This
has also caused the family expense to double, making it even more difficult
for [BBB] to fulfill his financial obligations.
7. [AAA], on the other hand, alleges that their heated arguments were often
due to [BBB’s] incessant womanizing. When confronted about it, [BBB],
instead of denying the same, would even curse [AAA].
8. The breaking point for [AAA] came when, [BBB’s] alleged mistress, a
woman by the name of [FFF], insulted and humiliated [AAA] in public, in
the presence of [BBB] himself, who, according to [AAA], did nothing to
stop the same. Extremely hurt, [AAA] decided to leave the conjugal home
with the children and lived temporarily at a friend’s house. She however
went back to the conjugal home with [DDD] and [EEE] after some time,
leaving her son [CCC] at her friend’s house.
9. What made matters worse, according to [AAA], was the apparent biases of
 [BBB] in favor of [DDD] and [EEE]. That despite his promise to treat
[CCC] as his own, [BBB] would still treat the latter differently from the two
kids, putting [CCC] at a disadvantage. [AAA], cites as example the
instances when, [BBB] would buy food and toys for [DDD] and [EEE]
only, buying nothing for [CCC].
10. While living separately from [BBB], [AAA] discovered that [BBB] was not
paying the rentals due on the condominium unit they were occupying,
forcing [AAA] to move out. [AAA] was likewise compelled to find work to
support the family, after [BBB] has started to be remiss in his financial
obligations to the family. According to [AAA], the amounts given by
[BBB] were not sufficient to cover the family expenses, forcing her to
request for loans from friends.
11. [AAA] likewise feels threatened after discovering [that BBB] was stalking
her and/or their children. [AAA] alleges that she found out that [BBB] has
sought the help of one [GGG], a friend of [BBB] who lives within the same
compound where [AAA] lives, to go through the guard’s logbook to
monitor their every move, i.e., who visits them, what time [AAA] leaves
and returns back home, etc.
12. Citing the foregoing as constituting economic and psychological abuse,
[AAA] filed an application for the issuance of a Temporary Protection
Order with a request to make the same permanent after due hearing, before
the RTC of Pasig City.
13. Finding good ground in [AAA’s] application, the court a quo issued a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO). The TPO was thereafter, made permanent by virtue of a Decision of the RTC
dated August [14, 2007], the dispositive portion of which orders:
a. "x x x x a. Prohibiting [BBB], directly and indirectly, from stalking, harassing,
annoying, or otherwise verbally abusing [AAA], directly or indirectly, to refrain
from insulting her, cursing her and shouting invectives at her;
b. b. Prohibiting [BBB] from committing or threatening to commit any act that may
cause mental and emotional anguish to [AAA], i.e. publicly displaying her
extramarital relations with his mistress [FFF] and anyone else for that matter;
c. c. Prohibiting [BBB] from exposing the minor children to immoral and illicit
environment, specifically prohibiting him to allow her (sic) mistress[FFF] and
anyone else to be with them in instances where he would be allowed by this Court
to see their children;
d. d. Allowing [BBB] ALONE to see and visit his children once a month (for a total of
12 visits per year) at the latter’s residence for a maximum period of 2 years
[sic]each visit, subject to further orders from this Court. For this purpose, [BBB’s
every visit] shall be accompanied by the Court Sheriff, who shall coordinate with
[AAA] as to the availability of time and date of children for such visit, at the
expense of [BBB]. For every visit, the Court Sheriff is directed to submit his report
within 5 days from the date [BBB] visited the children;
e. e. Directing [BBB] to allow [AAA] to continue to have lawful use and possession of
the motor vehicle more particularly described as follows:
f. One (1) Hyundai Starex Van, 1997 Model, Plate Number: WJP 902, Chassis
Number: Serial Number KMJWH7HPXU158443
g. f. Granting [AAA] permanent sole custody over their common children until further
orders from this Court;
h. g. Ordering [BBB] to provide support in the amount of Php 62,918.97 per month
(not Php 81,650.00 being prayed by [AAA]) to [AAA] as monthly support, inclusive
of educational expenses, groceries, medicines, medical bills, and insurance
premiums, starting from the month of January 2007 to be given within the first five
(5) days of the month through the Court Sheriff, who shall coordinate with [AAA]
in receiving such support;
i. h. Requiring [BBB] to stay away from the offended party and any designated family
or household member at a distance of 100 meters;
j. i. Requiring [BBB] to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment or
any specified place frequented regularly by the offended party and children and any
designated family or household member;
k. j. Ordering [BBB] to post bond of Php 300,000.00 to keep peace pursuant to
Section 23 of RA 9262 with the undertaking that [BBB] will not commit the violence
sought to be prevented and that in case such violence is committed[,] he will pay
the amount determined by the Court in its judgment;
14. Ruling of the CA: BBB filed before the CA an appeal6 to challenge the RTC Decision dated
August 14, 2007. BBB alleged that the RTC’s (a) issuance of the PPO against him, (b) award
to AAA of the sole custody over their children, and (d) declaration that he had an abusive
character lack factual bases.
15. On November 6, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the factual findings and
dispositions of the RTC, but ordering the remand of the case for the latter to determine in
the proper proceedings who shall be awarded custody of the children. Like the RTC, the
CA found that under the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, 7 BBB had subjected
AAA and their children to psychological, emotional and economic abuses. BBB displayed acts
of marital infidelity which exposed AAA to public ridicule causing her emotional and
psychological distress. While BBB alleged that FFF was only a professional colleague, he
continued to have public appearances with her which did not help to dispel AAA’s accusation
that the two had an extra-marital relation. Further, BBB verbally abused AAA either in person
or through text messages. The CA likewise did not favorably consider BBB’s claim that he
cannot provide financial support to AAA and the children in the amount required by the RTC
as his income merely depended on contractual hosting and events management assignments.
The CA emphasized that AAA was in the position to know the sources of BBB’s income.
Citing Section 288 of R.A. No. 9262 and Article 2139 of the Family Code, the CA, however,
ordered the RTC to determine who shall be entitled to exercise custody over the children, who
at that time were already older than seven years of age.
ISSUES:
1. W/N
RATIO:
1. In support of the instant petition, BBB merely reiterates his factual claims in the proceedings
below relative to his financial position and AAA’s supposedly baseless accusations and
demands from him. In addition, he posits that the text messages offered by AAA as evidence
were unauthenticated; hence, doubt exists as to their admissibility. Further, he points out that
due to the current whereabouts and circumstances of the parties, the PPO issued against him is
rendered moot. He now has actual care and custody of DDD and EEE, while CCC, who is not
his biological son, resides in a college dormitory. BBB and AAA barely get in touch with each
other except when the latter initiates the same.
2. In her Comment15 to the petition, AAA counters that BBB erroneously raises factual issues
which are subjects beyond the contemplation of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
 Civil Procedure. Further, BBB continuously violates the PPO, which under the provisions of
R.A. No. 9262, is supposed to be immediately executory upon its issuance by the RTC. AAA
claims that BBB still verbally abuses her. BBB has not posted the 300,000.00 bond required
from him. He likewise has not paid the attorney’s fees and costs of litigation awarded to AAA.
He does not provide support for CCC, who, in the eyes of the law, is also among his
legitimated children. AAA further alleges that in2010, she left DDD and EEE under the care of
BBB only because the circumstances then obtaining forced her to do so. Three years had then
lapsed from the time she filed an application for a protection order and still, no execution of the
PPO ensued. She could not depend for financial support from BBB. She was thus left with no
choice but to yield custody over DDD and EEE even if the set-up exposed the children to
BBB’s illicit affairs. AAA points out that since their children are all older than seven years of
age, they are already capable of choosing for themselves whom they want to exercise custody
over them.
3. Pending the Court’s deliberation of the instant case, BBB filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Render Judgment Based on a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). 16 BBB alleges that on July
29, 2013, he and AAA had entered into a compromise anent the custody, exercise of parental
authority over, and support of DDD and EEE.17
4. AAA’s counsel, Atty. Shielah Elbinias-Uyboco (Atty. Uyboco), filed a Comment to the
MOA18 pointing out that AAA signed the MOA while emotionally distressed and sans the
former’s advice and guidance. Atty. Uyboco likewise emphasizes that BBB’s illicit
relationship with FFF continues in violation of the PPO issued by the RTC.
5. In BBB’s Reply,19 he counters that AAA should be presumed to have acted with due care and
full knowledge of the contents of the MOA which she signed. Further, BBB’s alleged
involvement with FFF is an issue which need not be resolved in a judgment based on
compromise.
6. Disquisition of the Court
7. The instant petition is not a proper subject of a compromise agreement.
8. The Court cannot take the simplest course of finally writing finis to the instant petition by
rendering a judgment merely based on compromise as prayed for by BBB due to reasons
discussed below.
9. Alleging psychological violence and economic abuse, AAA anchored her application for the
issuance of a TPO and a PPO on the basis of the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. In the instant
petition, what is essentially being assailed is the PPO issued by the RTC and which was
affirmed by the CA. The rules, however, intend that cases filed under the provisions of R.A.
No. 9262 be not subjects of compromise agreements.
10. It bears stressing that Section 23(d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC20 explicitly prohibits
compromise on any act constituting the crime of violence against women. Thus, in Garcia v.
Drilon,21 the Court declared that:
a. Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves
parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. x
x x.
11. AM No. 10-4-16-SC,23 on the other hand, directs the referral to mediation of all issues under
the Family Code and other laws in relation to support, custody, visitation, property relations
and guardianship of minor children, excepting therefrom those covered by R.A. No. 9262.
12. While AAA filed her application for a TPO and a PPO as an independent action and not as an
incidental relief prayed for in a criminal suit, the instant petition cannot be taken outside the
ambit of cases falling under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. Perforce, the prohibition against
subjecting the instant petition to compromise applies.
13. The courts a quo committed no error in issuing a PPO against BBB.
14. Anent the main issues raised in the instant petition, the Court finds no error
in the CA’s ruling that the RTC properly issued a PPO against BBB and that
a remanding of the case to the trial court is necessary to determine who shall
exercise custody over CCC, DDD and EEE.
15. However, the choices of the children as with whom they would prefer to
stay would alter the effects of the PPO. Hence, this Court affirms the herein
assailed PPO except items (d), (f), (g), (h) and (i) 24 thereof relative to who
shall be granted custody over the three children, how the spouses shall
exercise visitation rights, and the amount and manner of providing financial
support, which are matters the RTC is now directed to determine with
dispatch.
16. The Court notes BBB’s manifestation that he and AAA had arrived at an
amicable settlement as regards the issues of custody, exercise of parental
authority over, and support of DDD and EEE.
17. While these matters can be lawful subjects of compromise, AAA’s
vacillation, as expressed by her counsel, compels the Court to exercise
prudence by directing the RTC to resolve with finality the aforesaid issues.
The parties are, however, not precluded from entering into a compromise as
regards the aforesaid issues, but the Court now requires the RTC’s direct
supervision lest the parties muddle the issues anew and fail to put an end to
their bickering.
18. No grounds exist which compel this Court to resolve the first three issues raised by BBB
since they are merely factual in character.
19. In BBB’s case, he avers that the RTC and the CA’s (a) issuance of the PPO, (b) award of
attorney’s fees and costs of litigation in AAA’s favor, and (c) directive for him to post a bond
in the amount of 300,000.00 all lack factual bases. The first three issues presented
unmistakably call for a re-calibration of evidence. While the general rule that only legal issues
can be resolved in a petition filed under Rule 45 recognizes exceptions, 27 BBB’s case does not
fall in the latter category. The RTC and the CA are in accord with each other as to their factual
findings, which are supported by substantial evidence, thus, binding upon this Court.
20. The doubt raised by BBB anent the admissibility of the text messages as evidence is not genuinely a legal
issue.
21. In the case of Justice Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud, 28 it is stated that any question as to the admissibility of text
messages as evidence is rendered moot and academic if the party raising such issue admits authorship of the
subject messages.29
22. BBB argues that the RTC and the CA erred in admitting as evidence the text messages which were sent by
him and FFF to AAA since they were unauthenticated. However, BBB himself effectively admitted in the
pleadings filed with this Court and the CA that he indeed sent the text messages attributed to him by AAA.
The Appellant’s Brief30 filed before the CA stated in part that:
a. [AAA] conveniently chose to leave out the initiatory messages to which [BBB] replied to. It is
totally obvious that the alleged messages from [BBB] are only messages that are in response to
an ongoing verbal or virtual tussle and the adamant refusal of [AAA] to bring the children home
despite the entreaties of [BBB]. Be it noted that [BBB], for the past several months leading up
to their separation, and up to the time that the instant case has been filed, continuously endured
the extreme mood swings, malicious accusations, haranguing, curses, insults, and even violence
from [AAA].31 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original and italics ours)
23. Further, in the instant petition, BBB repleads that:
a. [I]t is utterly apparent that the alleged messages from [BBB] are only messages that are in
 response to an ongoing verbal or virtual tussle between the parties. 32
24. In the above-quoted portions of the pleadings, BBB attempted to justify why he sent the messages to AAA.
However, in doing so, he, in effect, admitted authorship of the messages which AAA adduced as evidence. It
is likewise noted that BBB did not deny ownership of the cellphone number from which the text messages
were sent.
25. Hence, while at first glance, it would seem that the issue of admissibility of the text messages requires an
interpretation of the rules of evidence, this Court does not find the same to be necessary. While BBB had
admitted authorship of the text messages, he pleads for this Court to consider those messages as inadmissible
for allegedly being unauthenticated. BBB’s arguments are unbearably self-contradictory and he cannot be
allowed to take refuge under technical rules of procedure to assail what is already apparent.
26. The deletion from the PPO of the directive of the RTC and the CA
relative to the award of support is not warranted. While CCC is not
BBB’s biological son, he was legitimated under the latter’s name. Like
DDD and EEE, CCC is entitled to receive support from BBB.
27. BBB claims that DDD and EEE are now under his sole care and custody,
which allegedly renders moot the provision in the PPO relative to support.
BBB points out that CCC is not his biological son. Impliedly then, BBB
justifies why CCC is not entitled to receive support from him.
28. This Court is not persuaded.
29. Article 177 of the Family Code provides that "[o]nly children conceived and
born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may
be legitimated." Article 178 states that "[l]egitimation shall take place by a
subsequent valid marriage between parents."
30. In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact that BBB is not CCC’s
biological father. Such being the case, it was improper to have CCC
legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAA’s marriage. Clearly
then, the legal process of legitimation was trifled with. BBB voluntarily
but falsely acknowledged CCC as his son. Article 1431 of the New Civil
Code pertinently provides:
a. Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive
upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying thereon.
31. At least for the purpose of resolving the instant petition, the principle of
estoppel finds application and it now bars BBB from making an assertion
contrary to his previous representations. He should not be allowed to
evade a responsibility arising from his own misrepresentations. He is
bound by the effects of the legitimation process. CCC remains to be
BBB’s son, and pursuant to Article 179 of the Family Code, the former
is entitled to the same rights as those of a legitimate child, including the
receipt of his father’s support.
32. Notwithstanding the above, there is no absolute preclusion for BBB from
raising before the proper court the issue of CCC’s status and filiation.
However, BBB cannot do the same in the instant petition before this Court
now. In Tison v. CA,33 the Court held that "the civil status [of a child]
cannot be attacked collaterally." The child’s legitimacy "cannot be
contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a
different purpose."34 The instant petition sprang out of AAA’s application
for a PPO before the RTC. Hence, BBB’s claim that CCC is not his
biological son is a collateral issue, which this Court has no authority to
resolve now.
33. All told, the Court finds no merit in BBB’s petition, but there exists a
necessity to remand the case for the RTC to resolve matters relative to who
shall be granted custody over the three children, how the spouses shall
exercise visitation rights, and the amount and manner of providing financial
support.
34. The RTC and the CA found substantial evidence and did not commit
reversible errors when they issued the PPO against BBB. Events, which
took place after the issuance of the PPO, do not erase the fact that
psychological, emotional and economic abuses were committed by BBB
against AAA. Hence, BBB’s claim that he now has actual sole care of DDD
and EEE does not necessarily call for this Court’s revocation of the PPO
and the award to him of custody over the children.
35. This Court, thus, affirms the CA’s order to remand the case for the RTC to
resolve the question of custody. Since the children are now all older than
seven years of age, they can choose for themselves whom they want to stay
with. If all the three children would manifest to the RTC their choice to stay
with AAA, then the PPO issued by RTC shall continue to be executed in its
entirety.
36. However, if any of the three children would choose to be under BBB’s care,
necessarily, the PPO issued against BBB relative to them is to be modified.
The PPO, in its entirety, would remain effective only as to AAA and any of
the children who opt to stay with her. Consequently, the RTC may
accordingly alter the manner and amount of financial support BBB should
give depending on who shall finally be awarded custody over the children.
Pursuant to Articles 201 and 202 of the Family Code, BBB’s resources and
means and the necessities of AAA and the children are the essential factors
in determining the amount of support, and the same can be reduced or
increased proportionately. The RTC is reminded to be circumspect in
resolving the matter of support, which is a mutual responsibility of the
spouses. The parties do not dispute that AAA is now employed as well,
thus, the RTC should consider the same with the end in mind of promoting
the best interests of the children.
37. A final note on the effectivity and violation of a PPO
38. The Court reminds the parties that the application for the issuance of a PPO is not a process to
be trifled with. It is only granted after notice and hearing. Once issued, violation of its
provisions shall be punishable with a fine ranging from Five Thousand Pesos (5,000.00) to
Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) and/or imprisonment of six (6) months.35
39. Section 16 of R.A. No. 9262, on the other hand, provides that "[a] PPO shall be effective until
revoked by a court upon application of the person in whose favor the order was issued."
Pending the resolution of the instant petition, BBB claims that he and AAA had executed a
MOA, upon which basis a judgment by compromise is sought to be rendered. Atty. Uyboco, on
her part, pointed out AAA’s vacillation anent the MOA’s execution. With the foregoing
circumstances, the parties, wittingly or unwittingly, have imposed upon this Court the undue
burden of speculating whether or not AAA’s half-hearted acquiescence to the MOA is
tantamount to an application for the revocation of the PPO. The Court, however, refuses to
indulge the whims of either parties. The questions raised in the instant petition for the Court to
dispose of revolve around the propriety of the PPO’s issuance. The Court resolves that
principal query in the affirmative. The PPO thus stands unless AAA, categorically and without
any equivocation, files an application for its revocation.

40. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The CA

Decision AFFIRMED. The Permanent Protection Order, dated August 14,
2007, issued against BBB by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
162STANDS except items (d), (f), (g), (h) and (i) 36 thereof. The case is
hereby remanded to the trial court for it to accordingly modify the
aforecited items after determining with dispatch the following:
41. (1) who between BBB and AAA shall exercise custody over the three
children;
42. (2) how the parties shall exercise their respective visitation rights; and
43. (3) the amount and manner of providing financial support.